In June 2015, will the Six-Party Talks process be only nominally alive? Initiated in 2003 following the North Korean regime’s sudden withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), this collective forum comprised of representatives from China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia, and the United States has languished in a semi-vegetative state for the past six years. Yet again, the fault for this lies with Pyongyang, with its abrupt decision to quit the Six-Party Talks (SPT) in April 2009 in the aftermath of a United Nations resolution sanctioning the country for carrying out a new (illegal) ballistics testing. So far, the sixth round of this ambitious collective initiative aimed at finding a peaceful and balanced solution regarding the North Korean nuclear weapons program was the last. But a seventh could quite possibly be called for in the coming months…
The permanent unpredictability of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime, its renewed propensity to explore the limits of (verbal) provocation (towards both the South Korean and American administrations), and the understandable reservations of several participants to the process (Washington, Seoul) regarding the seriousness and « sincerity » of the DPRK to comply with past agreements, might prolong the current paralysis, at least until the end of this year. And this despite Beijing’s constant and worthy efforts over the last few years to revive this complicated initiative.
So, in summer 2015, should we consider this collective mechanism as dormant or simply dead in the water? Or, to the contrary, as a still-relevant initiative ready to be revived?
Trying to answer this tricky question requires adopting a three-point methodology, as much to hedge our bets as to adapt to the genuine unpredictability of the North Korean stance on this specific matter. Hence, three working hypotheses have been selected to approach the « truth, » a highly volatile concept in the context of the DPRK regime.
Working hypothesis n°1 deliberately adopts a pessimistic approach with the following premise: Pyongyang has no serious intention of complying with the rules of the SPT, to honor its past commitments, or to adopt the appropriate behavior requested to restart the process. Here, the DPRK regime mainly sees the SPT framework as a tool, a leverage, or a delaying tactic in an attempt to appear “engaged” – more or less – on the international community’s radar without compromising any of its assets. In this hypothesis the North Korean regime does not want to take any steps forward to create the appropriate environment necessary for productive talks or fulfill the preconditions demanded by the other SPT participants.
Working hypothesis n°2 is more optimistic, based on the premise that for specific reasons known only to the North Korean leadership, Pyongyang is committed to readjusting its position and policies and to create a favorable environment with the five other members of the SPT. This would allow for a seventh round to take place in the short term, with Seoul and Washington responding favorably to this more constructive – and relatively unexpected – approach, with the backing of Beijing and Moscow.
Positioned somewhere in between the two above options, working hypothesis n°3 adopts a more realistic and pragmatic perspective. According to its premise, the North Korean government would eventually be interested in resurrecting – step by step – the dormant SPT process; not for the sake of pleasing Seoul, Washington, Moscow, Tokyo, or Beijing, or to present a more favorable face to the international community, but rather to keep alive a channel of communication with Washington. In this scenario, Pyongyang is attempting to portray itself – for as long and as shrewdly as possible – as the « good guy » wishing to repent. This allows the regime to extract benefits (security guaranties; humanitarian, financial, and economic assistance; energy; etc.) while buying its time to achieve a larger goal (e.g. to complete its ballistic and nuclear programs) by reducing external pressure. With this pragmatic approach, neither Washington (with presidential elections looming in November 2016) nor Seoul would feel compelled to fall into the trap by allowing the resurrection of the collective mechanism.
With Pyongyang’s habit of favoring hard-to-defend defiant posturing, one can certainly not take for granted the veracity any of these three possible premises; the DPRK may currently be working on a set of different options, be it a more radical approach (e.g. a more aggressive posture to put pressure on Washington and Seoul) or a less expectable by welcome conciliatory approach (e.g. set of confidence-building measures with Seoul, Washington, and Beijing). Time will tell.
Let us come back to our three-tier methodology and dedicate some more time to each of them to assess the merit of our approach in view of recent events in and around North Korea.
Working hypothesis N°1, the pessimistic assessment: the DPRK is not serious about creating the necessary conditions for a rebirth of the Six-Party talks and is not motivated to do so.
Looking back over information coming out of North Korea over the past few months, even if an open-minded approach is adopted, it is difficult to distinguish any significant decisions, postures, or declarations indicating a desire by Pyongyang to prepare the field for serious participation in dialogue or the negotiation process.
– The North Korean leadership remains as provocative as ever: North Korean Diplomats disrupted a UN human rights panel in New York in early May; Pyongyang threatened the United States with a nuclear attack on April 26; the North Korean regime slammed South Korean President Park’s speech on the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in late March; North Korean media called the attack on the American ambassador in Seoul a « deserved punishment » in early March; Pyongyang said there would no longer be any chance for inter-Korean dialogue in early March; « North Korea threaten missile attack on anti-Pyongyang leaflets » (Yonhap news agency, March 2); « N. Korea says it won’t talk with ‘gangster-like’ U.S » (Yonhap, February 4); « N. Korea ridicules former S. Korean president over memoir » (Yonhap, February 4); « North Korea Tests Five Missiles » (New York Times, February 8); etc. This list – telling, but not exhaustive (!) – speaks for itself.
– Invitations and suggestions to adopt a more constructive policy remain largely if not totally unheard: « U.S. urges N. Korea to show denuclearization commitment » (Yonhap, April 17); « DPRK rules out dialogue with Japan » (Xinhua, April 2); « UN presses North Korea to Account for Abductions » (New York Times, March 9); « North Korea negative about six-way nuclear talks » (Yonhap, March 2); « U.S. urges N. Korea to cease threats after missile launches » (Yonhap, February 2). Here again, there are no obvious signs of any desire by Pyongyang to extract itself from diplomatic isolation.
– Recent positive examples in international diplomacy (e.g. West-Iran and Southeast Asia-Burma talks) seem to be disregarded: « N.K. fails to learn lesson from Iran nuclear deal » (Yonhap, April 22). In June 2012, Robert King, then-US envoy on North Korean human rights issues, suggested to Pyongyang to take similar steps (political and economic reforms) to those recently taken by Burma, arguing that the benefits for the Burmese regime (e.g. sanctions eased then lifted; investors flocking the country; return to the global stage) were self-evident. Three (long and agitated) years later, this sage advice has manifestly not been espoused by Pyongyang.
Working hypothesis N°2, the optimistic projection: Pyongyang is committed to readjusting its policy to create a favorable environment with the five other members of the SPT, allowing for a seventh round to take place before the end of 2015.
Consider here that despite Kim Jong-un’s rather poor, if not terrible, record since coming into power in December 2011 (and now that the three-year long period of mourning is over), Pyongyang and its current leadership feel more compelled – under parallel pressure from Beijing and Moscow – to partly give up its brinkmanship policy and try to reintegrate (after a long absence) into the club of responsible nations. In this scenario, going forward would start by convincing Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo of a genuine political will to leave the current deadlock and embark upon a more cooperative chapter.
That said, we have so far not witnessed any tangible signs from Pyongyang giving credit to this bold thesis, to say the least. We cannot not interpret the polite refusal of Kim Jong-un to attend World War II celebrations in Moscow on May 9 – despite the personal invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin – as supportive of this theory. Nor can we consider that the recent civilian inter-Korean representatives meeting in Shenyang (China, May 5) – dedicated to preparatory talks on plans to jointly celebrate the 15th anniversary of the historic inter-Korean Summit (June 13-15, 2000, in Pyongyang) – necessarily indicates a change of strategy by the North Korean regime.
However, after eight years of permanent defiance, of verbal/frontal opposition with both the Blue House and the White House, the North Korean leadership under young Kim Jong-un may finally recognize that its hard-line posturing has not achieved as much as expected (despite two nuclear tests and a long series of ballistic missile tests, not to mention the torpedoing of the South Korean Cheonan corvette in the Yellow Sea) and that it may be time to reassess the benefits of this strategy.
This reassessment comes during a period of uncertainty regarding the identity of the next US president, his/her political party, and stance on non-proliferation issues. In the meantime, the North Korean regime could finally consider that the current Blue House policy vis-à-vis Pyongyang – no more free gifts [1] to the North but the door always open for discussion, negotiation, and reconciliation – may be worth giving a try; a position that probably finds some supporters in Beijing still working hard to keep the idea of a possible and desirable resurrection of the talks alive.
Working hypothesis N°3, the pragmatic vision: the « talks only to talk, » to buy some time until…
Based on past experience, numerous disappointments, and various unpleasant surprises when dealing with Pyongyang and its highly sophisticated nuclear policy, one cannot escape the need to consider the likelihood of a less glamorous and more realistic assessment of its probable short-term commitment vis-à-vis the sleepy SPT. The assumption here is that the least open and least democratic regime in Asia may pretend to be interested in the rebirth of this dormant, and may even go as far as to start responding favorably to the demands of the five other participants, but remains fundamentally much more motivated by the project of buying time (while extracting assistance and various benefits from the international community, a tactic Pyongyang has proven itself comfortable with) for a ‘higher’ purpose…
Excluding this scenario may present some risks. True, many governments (including major ones like Beijing, Moscow, Seoul, and possibly Tokyo) may be eager to reopen a « dialogue » with Pyongyang after such a long deadlock and its many highly tense phases. But there is a significant difference between (misguided?) eagerness and reality on the ground. Keeping the door open for genuine negotiations while excluding any step towards this action in absence of tangible commitments from Pyongyang – a policy consistently observed by the Obama administration since 2008 and President Park Geun-hye since 2012 – does not at all imply gullibly reading into any conciliations from the DPRK as a radical shift of policy or the promise of happier, easier, and rosier tomorrows.
Having achieved an Asian foreign policy (partial) success in Burma – with President Thein Sein adopting a reformist agenda – the White House under its current tenant is not willing, a year and a half before the end of his final term (-January 2017), to take the politically suicidal risk of being fooled by a regime more willing to nominally engage the powerful nation than to heed its words; a dictatorial regime that, incidentally, regularly threatens to use nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles to strike targets on US soil. Along with the relative « Burmese success, » President Obama’s foreign policy achievements include the significant betterment of bilateral relations with Tehran and Havana, an undeniably remarkable legacy that the 44th president of the United States will not want to sacrifice on the altar of the unpredictable Pyongyang.
At the same time, several members of the SPT, including Seoul and Beijing, were remarkably active in the early days of May 2015. On May 5, the South Korean Special representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs (Hwang Joon-kook), shortly after a meeting in Washington with his American counterpart (Ambassador Sung Kim, special representative for North Korea policy), declared: « As a result of close consultations among the five parties, there is a degree of consensus formed on conditions for the resumption of six-party talks. Based on this, we are pushing for unconditional exploratory talks [2]. » A bold and encouraging statement that did not go unnoticed in East Asia and beyond; the following day (May 6) this headline appeared in the Indian press: « S. Korea Seeks ‘New Momentum’ with China to revive N. Korea Nuclear Talks [3]. »
And if, against all odds, the SPT were in fact on the verge of an unexpected resurrection?
In light of the latest information to trickle out of the secretive corridors of power in Washington, Seoul, Beijing, or Moscow, these three opposing scenarios – and the many others not included here for reasons of brevity – lead us now to envisage a series of four short questions/answers to extend the thinking on the sometimes elusive Six-Party Talks matter. A set of provocative interrogations to get us started:
Is the resumption of the talks truly desirable?
First of all, in the event the North Korean regime follows up on the idea to join the recently much-discussed « exploratory talks » (without any preconditions), reviving this sleepy forum would entail: meeting and talking to Pyongyang, being ready to listen to (some of) its demands, and – eventually, after some (positive) steps, time, and (eventual) progress – to consider the possibility of delivering something to this reclusive state. This could be anything that could be celebrated as a great victory by the regime, and its hyperactive propaganda apparatus, to bolster domestic legitimacy; nothing that would in fine pressure the North Korean leadership to modify its policies or consider even low-level reforms.
The « exploratory talks, » if confirmed and meaningful enough to survive the year, will in any case not count on the indispensable strong American engagement. At the moment, the current US administration has not the time, the authority, nor any desire to assume the entailed risks (even with the likely prospect of another Democrat victory in the November 2016 elections) to engage in a serious deal with the North Korean regime.
Seoul: beneficiary or hostage of the SPT?
Obviously, and even if Pyongyang keeps on thinking that its first and foremost interlocutor on the nuclear and disarmament issues remains Washington, there is no state more concerned by any move – positive or dramatic – engaged by the defiant North Korean regime than Seoul. This premise remains valid under the current administration of President Park Geun-hye, whose consistently bold, balanced, and open-minded policy vis-à-vis her difficult and often abrasive northern neighbor should be commended.
Since her very first day in office in February 2013, the first female head of state in the Korean Peninsula has consistently repeated that the end of this exhausting and costly state of crisis with the North lies in dialogue, reconciliation, and a common future. In January of this year she confirmed again that she was willing to hold a summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un without any pre-conditions. « My position is that to ease the pain of division and to accomplish peaceful unification, I am willing to meet with anyone, » President Park said. « If it is helpful, I am up for a summit meeting with the North. There is no pre-condition [4]. » A month later, she instructed her staff to prepare a « roadmap for Korean unification »; such a reunification could bring an « economic bonanza [5] » to neighboring countries as well as the two Koreas. Politically speaking, this policy is indisputably courageous, considering the very low return on investment so far and the total absence of the most elementary respect shown to her [6] by the North since she took office two years ago.
Can the international community (excluding the SPT participants) put some ‘real pressure’ on the eventual revival of the Talks?
The plain truth is that in 2015, the international community at large remains extremely weak when it comes to dealing with North Korea, the most isolated country on the planet in the 21st century. The most powerful international institutions (United Nations, IMF, World Bank) do have a certain capacity – but no real authority – to intervene in the volatile and complicated North Korean equation. Likewise, the inter-Korean dispute remains out of reach for the European Union – an otherwise influential regional institution – due to reasons of distance and geography. The fact that Pyongyang disregards the authority of such supranational entities and is much more interested in dealing face to face with Washington does not facilitate the task.
Incidentally, and to be frank, this situation is not considered a tragedy by influential capitals, in Europe as well as in the Middle East or Asia. Being involved in far-away and quasi-intractable issues usually does not bring much in the way of dividends to bold candidates.
Should we welcome the recent reconciliation between Pyongyang and Moscow?
Despite being personally invited to Moscow by President Putin to attend World War II celebrations (May 9), and after a long silence, Kim Jong-un finally declined the invitation [7]; Kim Yong-nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK (the ceremonial North Korean head of state), will travel to Russia to attend the ceremony on behalf of his boss. Whatever the reasons behind this not-so-unexpected volte-face by the North Korean leader, they will probably not harm the diplomatic rapport [8] Moscow and Pyongyang have managed to (re)build over the last few years (during which time relations between Pyongyang and Beijing were suffering a spectacular cooling [9]). However, the attractiveness of Russia on the world stage has been considerably reduced in the wake of its dangerous maneuvering in Crimea and in the context of the current Ukrainian crisis. For the moment, the « benefits » of this new honeymoon between North Korea and Russia – two (relatively) isolated actors – remain to be seen as far as the SPT are concerned, even if some signs suggest possible advantages [10].
*****
Despite a recent surge of track one and track two diplomacy activities mechanically generating some level of hope, no one – even in secretive Pyongyang – can take for granted the eventual resuscitation of the Six-Party Talks in the short-to-medium term. The obvious and respectable goodwill towards this dormant forum displayed by several main players (Seoul, Beijing) will inevitably be confronted by the unpredictable, pathologically-defiant, and risk-prone Pyongyang under the still partly obscure and little documented leadership of the young Kim Jong-un. Political and domestic issues impacting others (presidential elections in the USA in November 2016) will play a major role as well in the still uncertain future of this crucial initiative, while the « rest » of the international community, largely out of the picture in this « small Great game, » will patiently and powerlessly hope for a positive evolution in the strategic and volatile Northeast Asia region.
References:
[1] « Seoul spurns Pyongyang’s call for lifting sanctions, » Yonhap news agency, May 7, 2015.
[2] Yonhap, May 5.
[3] Indiaeveryday, May 6.
[4] Reuters, January 11, 2015.
[5] Korea Times, February 16, 2015.
[6] The Diplomat, April 29, 2014.
[7] New York Times, April 30, 2015.
[8] ‘’DPRK, Russia ink protocol after inter-governmental meeting’’, Xinhua, April 27, 2015. ‘’ Western Relations Frosty, Russia Warms to North Korea’’, New York Times, March 11, 2015.
[9] An easing is however observed between Pyongyang and Beijing in May 2015, as noted in the following article: ’’N. Korean official calls ties with China ‘precious treasure’’, Yonhap, May 7, 2015.
[10] ‘’Xi’s visit to deepen, celebrate China-Russia relations’’, Xinhua, May 6, 2015. One can assume that a closer Moscow-Pyongyang connection associated with a strengthening Moscow-Beijing axis (two partners of the SPT) may be in a position to deliver some positive benefits vis-à-vis North Korea.
Analyze presented by Olivier Guillard during the World Korean Forum organized in Paris in June 2015.
On Tuesday May 27th, the second GreenEcoNet Annual Conferece with the title: ‘Growing a sustainable EU economy through SMEs: Boosting jobs, growth and entrepreneurship’ was hold at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. As job creation and economic growth are two of the top priorities of the European Commission under President Juncker, the conference aimed at discussing the impact of SMEs to growing a sustainable EU economy, addressing issues such as the contribution of SMEs to developing green jobs as well as the growth and job opportunities arising from a more efficient use of resources.
After a short introductory part, hold by Vasileios Rizos, Researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Kurt Vandenberghe, Director DG Research & Innovation, European Commission, was asked to make the point about SMEs and ‘green-growth’ in Europe.
Kurt Vandenberghe:
Greening is happening even in spite of policy-making. Europe is already a leader in green know-how technologies but further efforts are needed in order to boost economic growth and well being through eco-sustainable or eco-efficient measures.
The question for policy-making regulators these days is not how to promote green growth but how do we accelerate ‘green-growth’ in Europe?
We need a transformative agenda, we’re currently making progress but we could do much more. Indeed what we need to do is to give a reasonable perspective of a return in investment. This is our objective in Horizon 2020 and should also be a message to public authorities.
We will pay a lot of attention to the future of SMEs not just because prescribed in the horizon 2020 procedure but because we are convinced that SMEs are the drivers of innovation.
Greening and growing go together and will even go more together in the future
What do SMEs need, to create more jobs?
Patrice Liauzu, Adviser, European Investment bank:
First of all our macroeconomic environment is still slowly recovering from the
Economical crisis and there are still some issues concerning bank leverage.
Moreover, what we also witness is that there is still a high level of market
fragmentation in Europe. Indeed in a few countries, as Germany and Austria for
example the conditions for SMEs are better if compared to the southern part of
Europe. Last but not least, the supply chain is a bit weak therefore we do need to
propose a solution on the policy side. In order to create more jobs, we need to promote investments and liquidity flows into the market.
The problems we are facing in this context, is that the big banks institutes often do not foster SMEs investment projects because they are judged as too small.
Banks should start considering the proposed projects not just in terms of financial return but also in social and environmental terms.
My message today is the following one: we need to try to provide tools and instruments in order to incentive banks to finance also small projects. Equity is also something we need to promote further, and in order to reach these objectives we will closely cooperate with the European Commission.
How can research and innovation boost growth and green jobs for SMEs in Europe?
Peter Czaga, Policy Officer, DG Environment, European Commission:
The progress made concerning the promotion of green economy initiatives in the last period was good but we need to continue our work in this direction. In order to boost economical growth and employment rates we need to step our efforts for concrete policy measures, with a specific focus on SME’s.
Our intention is to develop a circular economy package in the near future focusing on environment, access to raw materials, societal pressures, innovation and growth potential. Just considering waste, there are and would be lots of opportunities for SMEs to go greener.
The areas of intervention will be, and need to be the following ones:
– Extraction and production processes, rendering them ‘greener’;
– Product design, enhancing consumer awareness;
– Distribution and consumption;
– Waste, some countries are doing very well, others are lacking behind.
– More and better harmonization.
How can SMEs contribute to a sustainable EU economy?
Franz Brudl, Advisor, Austrian economic chamber, presented the Austrian perspective:
A green business is: a business that develops, produces and sells environmental technology to become “greener” in a wider sense.
In Austria most of our companies are SMEs. To be precise 99,6% of the Austrian companies are SME’s, employing 1,7 million people and training other 65.000 a year. This green sector took off in Austria about the 1990, and was strong even during the years of the crisis (turnover increased by 8% every year).
Concerning the European green companies sector, Germany is in the lead, closely followed by Sweden and Austria.
In terms of contribution to a sustainable economy, ‘green’ SMEs in Austria contributed to a reduction in terms of gas emissions and waste volume for 953.000 MWh last year, comparable to 38 million Euros. Moreover investing in SME’s contributes to upgrade your brand image allowing you to sell your products to a higher price.
What kind of impacts do green business models and practices have on growth and job creation?
Daniel Coulon, Managing Director, Techniwood International, presents the point of view for the SMEs:
Higher efficient products warrant performance. In order to develop these products investments in research and development are needed which often require a huge amount of money.
The problem SME’s are facing nowadays is quite simple: the time amount needed from the development of a new market product, to its market implementation takes too much time resulting in an increase of expenditures. With the amount of current regulations, if a company decides to change and innovate also just a minimum aspect in the creation of a product, the path to undertake in order to obtain a patent is extremely long, varying from country to country. Moreover standards also vary from country to country. A higher level of harmonization of the internal market is needed; in fact there is no Single Market yet.
Patrick Zingerle
En dépit des nombreuses critiques formulées aux niveaux national, européen ou international, par différentes associations spécialisées dans la protection des libertés fondamentales, ONG, personnalités politiques ainsi que des réserves exprimées par la Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL) et le Défenseur des droits en France, Jacques Toubon, le projet de loi définitif relatif au renseignement a été voté massivement les 23 et 24 juin par les parlementaires français. Ce texte controversé vise à fournir un cadre légal aux activités des services de renseignement français. (Pour plus d’informations, lire un précédent article dédié au projet de loi)
Au niveau européen, cinq eurodéputés membres du groupe ALDE (Alliance des Libéraux et Démocrates Européens) ont interpellé la Commission européenne au sujet du projet de loi français. Nathalie Griesbeck (France), Sophie in’t Veld (Pays-Bas), Cecilia Wikström (Suède), Filiz Hyusmenova (Bulgarie) et Louis Michel (Belgique) avaient adressé dès le 14 avril 2015, une question avec demande de réponse écrite à la Commission. En substance, les élus s’interrogeaient sur la conformité du projet de loi français au droit mais aussi aux valeurs et droits de l’Union européenne. Si la Commission européenne dans une lettre du 23 juin, co-signée par Frans Timmermans, premier Vice-Président de la Commission, et les Commissaires Dimitris Avramopoulos et Věra Jourová, ne s’estimait « pas compétente pour commenter la législation nationale d’un Etat membre tant que la procédure intérieure n’est pas achevée », celle-ci considérait que le projet de loi pouvait « soulever d’importantes questions de droit ».
La dernière critique en date émane du Comité des droits de l’Homme de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) qui considère que le projet de loi accorde des « pouvoirs excessivement larges de surveillance » aux services de renseignement. Le Comité, composé de 18 experts indépendants, dénonce, dans son rapport remis le 10 juillet, les objectifs « vastes et peu définis » qui sont attribués au texte.
Dès le 25 juin, trois saisines avaient été déposées devant le Conseil constitutionnel français, Cour Suprême garante de la conformité de la loi à la Constitution française notamment. Le premier recours avait été formé par 106 députés, à l’initiative de Laure de La Raudière et Pierre Lellouche, tous deux députés Les Républicains. Les élus s’interrogeaient sur « la définition large et peu précise des missions pouvant donner lieu à des enquêtes administratives » ainsi que sur « les moyens techniques considérables de collectes massives de données ». De même, la question de « la proportionnalité, par rapport aux objectifs recherchés, de la mise en œuvre de ces techniques intrusives et attentatoires au respect de la vie privée » avait motivé leur saisine. Parallèlement, le Président du Sénat, Gérard Larcher, également membre du groupe Les Républicains, avait fait le choix d’une saisine blanche du Conseil constitutionnel. Cela signifie que Monsieur Larcher ne formulait aucun grief et saisissait les Sages sur l’ensemble du texte. Habituellement, le Conseil constitutionnel examine uniquement les dispositions dont la conformité à la Constitution est contestée. Enfin, pour la première fois, le Président de la République, François Hollande (Parti socialiste), avait saisi le Conseil constitutionnel « pour savoir si l’ensemble des dispositions prévues assuraient un équilibre suffisant entre la sauvegarde des intérêts fondamentaux de la Nation et la protection des droits constitutionnellement garantis, en particulier le respect de la vie privée ».
Les associations French Data Network et la Quadrature du Net, ainsi que la Fédération des Fournisseurs d’accès à internet associatifs, qui avaient déjà exprimé leurs inquiétudes au cours de l’examen du projet de loi, ont transmis au Conseil constitutionnel, le 25 juin également, un mémoire visant à appuyer les saisines. Il en a été de même pour GenerationLibre et les acteurs des nouvelles technologies le 1er juillet.
Par sa décision n° 2015-713 DC du 23 juillet 2015, le Conseil constitutionnel a validé l’essentiel du projet de loi et censuré trois dispositions. Le premier article concerné devait permettre aux services de renseignement de déroger à l’autorité politique, c’est-à-dire à l’autorisation du Premier ministre et à l’avis de la Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement, en cas « d’urgence opérationnelle ». Les Sages ont considéré qu’il s’agissait là d’une « atteinte manifestement disproportionnée au droit au respect de la vie privée et au secret des correspondances ». L’article relatif à la surveillance internationale a également été censuré, le Conseil constitutionnel considérant que « le législateur n’a pas déterminé les règles concernant les garanties fondamentales accordées au citoyen pour l’exercice des libertés publiques ». Les contours de cette surveillance internationale ont donc été jugés trop flous en l’absence de fixation des modalités d’exploitation, de conservation et de destruction des renseignements collectés ainsi que des conditions du contrôle par la Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement. La troisième disposition censurée relevait, pour le Conseil constitutionnel, « du domaine réservé des lois de finances ». Celle-ci n’avait donc pas lieu de figurer dans le projet de loi sur le renseignement.
Les techniques de renseignement prévues par le projet de loi ont donc été validées, sous réserve qu’un strict contrôle de proportionnalité soit effectué. Il en est ainsi des interceptions administratives de correspondances, des techniques de sonorisation, de la captation d’images et de données informatiques ou encore de la géolocalisation. Les durées de conservation des données collectées ont également été jugées conformes.
Le Président de la République a réagi le jour même et pris acte des articles censurés. Son communiqué de presse insiste sur le fait que les articles en question « ne modifient en aucune façon l’équilibre de la loi et ne privent pas les services de renseignement de leurs moyens d’agir ». Le Premier ministre, Manuel Valls, s’est quant à lui félicité sur Twitter de la création d’un « cadre sécurisé contre le terrorisme et respectueux des libertés » qu’il considère être un « progrès décisif ». Sans surprise, La Quadrature du Net ne partage pas cet avis. Pour cette association de défense des droits et libertés numériques « le Conseil constitutionnel légalise la surveillance de masse et avalise un recul historique des droits fondamentaux ». Une décision, « extrêmement décevante » qui conduira à la promulgation d’une « loi scélérate » contre laquelle l’association entend continuer de se battre.
Les regards sont à présent tournés vers la Commission européenne qui va pouvoir donner son avis sur la conformité de la loi française avec le droit, les valeurs et les droits de l’Union européenne, et ainsi répondre aux députés européens qui s’inquiètent de la mise en place d’une surveillance organisée. Questionné sur ce sujet de la surveillance, Edward Snowden a répondu de manière cinglante : « Prétendre ne pas s’inquiéter pour sa vie privée parce qu’on n’a rien à cacher revient à dire qu’on se moque de la liberté d’expression parce qu’on n’a rien à dire ». Affaire à suivre donc…
Charline Quillérou
Pour en savoir plus
-. EU-LOGOS, « Projet de loi français relatif au renseignement : On n’est pas sorti de l’auberge ! Pense-t-on à Bruxelles »
-. Rapport du comité consultatif des droits de l’Homme de l’ONU
https://cdn.nextinpact.com/medias/ccpr_c_fra_co_5_21191_f.docx (FR)
-. Communiqué de presse du Conseil constitutionnel sur la décision n°2015-713
-. Décision n° 2015-713 DC du 23 juillet 2015 du Conseil constitutionnel sur la loi renseignement
-. Communiqué de presse du Président de la République française
http://www.elysee.fr/communiques-de-presse/article/conseil-constitutionnel/ (FR)
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in collaboration with TechUK and the Coalition for the Digital Economy (COADEC), invited Wednesday May 13th for a Digital Forum seminar entitled: “The General Data Protection Regulation- Issues for the Trilogue”. The seminar, divided in two parts, discussed the main issues related to the upcoming trilogue on the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) from the point of view of start-ups and entrepreneurs on the one side and policy experts on the other.
Panel 1: Challenges of data protection for start-ups and SMEs
The first panel discussion aimed at providing the policy experts present at the discussion, with an insider perspective. A team of entrepreneurs urged regulators to provide them with legal clarity and questioned the extent to which explicit consent should be balanced with legitimate interests for companies that want to develop useful solutions and personalised services to their costumers.
Nathan Salter (COO, OMG):
My company provides performance marketing and advertisement services using anonymous data. In our business we’re paid only if the advert generates SEO, therefore we use cookies and other anonymous tricks to know if we are working successful. IP addresses are collected and used to count and evaluate the number of generated sales, not to identify end-users.
It seems that with the new data protection proposal, the scope of personal data is getting broader and broader. Types of data we never considered personal are becoming it. Data’s are becoming very sensitive involved in the new regulation.
The risk of a too restrictive regulation, that could hamper the development of the Internet advertising and marketing industry, a source of exponential growth in the EU, needs to be taken into account. We need to adopt rules on a case-by-case basis, distinguishing between innovative data analytics from aggressive profiling, unfair tracking and price discrimination practice.
Raphael Van Assche (Managing Consultant, Tunstall Healthcare):
My company provides technology enabled services, basically social alarm services, e-medicine or health management services to elderly people in Europe.
We collect data but we don’t use them for profiling activities, we just get the right information in order to support the people in the best way.
In order to enhance trust and confidence we really need to adopt an efficient data protection regulation, ensuring better perspectives for e-business development in Europe. A better harmonisation of the data rules around Europe would help to create a communitarian health database.
Andrey Dokuchaev (COO, Clausematch):
I’m representing a utility platform for contract negotiations. The adoption of the new GDPR would provide joint liability between data controllers and data processers. Additional requirements would potentially raise the costs and add burdensome procedures, becoming a major problem for start-ups.
Aneesh Varma (Founder, Aire):
My company provides access to financial products, therefore to warrant a financial service our profiling activities need to be accurate. Mobility for work is increasing; this raises the need for data to move with workers. Data should be used to drive financial inclusion.
Panel 2: Issues for the Trilogue
During the first panel we had the opportunity to hear and better get to know the point of view of a team of entrepreneurs giving us an insider perspective. The second panel discussion, focus on the other half of the medal: policy experts. Indeed, the Council and the European Parliament have conflicting positions on many provisions, including the sensitive “informed consent” issue, set out as a cornerstone by the EP. This principle foresees that users must be informed and explicitly express their consent about any activity aiming at collecting or processing their data.
Michal Boni MEP:
We have been working on GDPR for a long time. I think that now we should say thank u very much to the Latvian presidency, as they open the possibility to start the trilogue discussions, hoping on a good institutional cooperation!
Indeed we are open for discussions, but remembering our work done until now. Combined with the review of the privacy directive, the adoption of the GDPR would shape a concrete continental privacy package, striking the right balance between business interests and user’s protection.
Moreover we should understand that there is no possibility to discuss on possible solutions, concerning the 16 initiatives presented in the DSM strategy without starting the implementation of the GDPR. I would also like to strengthen the point, that one of the 16 initiatives is focused on a privacy directive, underlining the need for Europe to have a privacy regulation. We need to prepare the conditions and framework for it’s implementation, and we need to consider if all the presented solutions will be implementable.
Speaking about data protection and data privacy we should think on a better balance between all the stakeholders and the possibility for business to implement it.
A new question should be put on the table: Who is actually the owner of Data?
Are we the owners as individuals, as public authorities, as businesses?
The answer is: everyone, not just businesses! It’s not all about business, there is indeed no possibility for our digital economy to further develop without a data regulation.
Let me conclude mentioning that during the trilogue it will be particularly important to focus on the following controversial points: Explicit and Non-explicit content, the right to be forgotten, profiling activities, One Stop Shop.
When talking about data protection regulation, we need to stress the importance of more harmonisation and better cooperation including all the stakeholders.
In some areas we need regulations in others we need conduct codes.
Kevin O’Connel (Member of Commissioner Vĕra Jourová’s Cabinet, European Commission) gave his own view on the evolution of the legislative process starting from the first Commission’s proposal in 2012. Indeed if the initial reform proposed focused more on empowering EU citizens, giving them better and clearer data protection laws, the new agenda, adopted by this College of Commissioners, includes also EU rules to improve regulations for SMEs and entrepreneurs. The regulation, currently under intense discussion, can be defined as a key building block for the launch of the DSM, and the GDPR as the most important variable of the whole DSM strategy.
In order to be successful, we need to be careful when adapting the directive, not inventing something new but enforcing and updating the existing things. As we are dealing with fundamental rights, we need to be very carefully.
Baiba Jugane (Justice Consellor, Permanent Representation of the Republic of Latvia), basically pointed out the achievements made under the Latvian presidency. The biggest effort, she said, was the agreement on the one stop shop mechanism for data protection.
Concerning the most debated horizontal issues, Chapter II relating on the principles of data processing, was the most crucial point. Indeed this chapter and its principles are still an issue on the table. Our intention is also to find a compromise on Chapter III.
Finally I would like to thank the other member States and Institutions for the trust expressed towards the Latvian presidency and wish good luck and a good work to the representatives of Luxembourg, which will take over the presidency.
Laure Wagener (Counsellor, Permanent Representation of Luxembourg to the Eu) congratulated her Latvian colleagues for the excellent work done during their presidency. Now it’s up to us to continue with the good work done until yet.
Concerning our presidency we will focus on two imperatives concerning the GDPR:
Time is another crucial factor, because we need to update the legal framework as soon as possible, otherwise it will be out-dated as soon as implemented. Technological progress moves on very fast. Getting the reform in place by 2015 is and will be our common goal.
Anthony Walker:
When regulating and thinking about the potential text of the DSM, it’s important to think about all the stakeholders, including them all. The European companies need a clear legal framework in order to do their business and to do it the best way possible.
We have to deliver both of the things: Jobs and privacy.
The digital innovation can do great things for Europe, for the world, but needs the right legal framework to be able to express its whole potential.
The idea of proportionality is important, as there are many scenarios where this right is highly needed.
The other big question is the issue of consent, how do we avoid the situation of bothering people with the issues of consent? And how can we be sure, that people really pay attention to the legal terms?
Simplicity and clarity that’s what we need speaking about digital markets.
Patrick Zingerle
To know more:
EU-LOGOS ATHENA “INSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLES CONCERNING THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION »:
PROPOSAL ON THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf