France

By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Felice Noelle Rodriguez
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, May 12 2026 (IPS)

Transnational agribusinesses increasingly shape food policies worldwide. Claiming to best address recent food security concerns, they seek to profit more from innovations in food production, processing, and distribution.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Post-war food security
Food policies in the Global South have evolved significantly since World War Two (WWII), especially after nations in Asia and Africa gained independence, often after experiencing wartime food deprivations.

The early post-WWII and post-colonial eras saw new emphases on food security, especially following severe food shortages before, during, and after the war.

Many starved as millions experienced acute malnutrition. The wartime Bengal famine in India claimed over three million lives as Churchill prioritised British imperial interests and military priorities.

After WWII, colonial powers weaponised food supplies for counterinsurgency and population control purposes, especially to overcome popular anti-imperialist resistance.

Many who died were not military casualties but victims of deliberate counter-insurgency food deprivation. Unsurprisingly, food security efforts became a popular policy priority after WWII.

Western-controlled research organisations, including the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), became highly influential, shaping and even developing post-colonial food security policies.

Felice Noelle Rodriguez

Green Revolution
Public research institutions were established in developing countries, many of which are affiliated with the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).

The Green Revolution initially focused on increasing yields of wheat, maize, and rice. These efforts increased cereal production unevenly during the 1960s and 1970s.

Malthusian logic held that rising life expectancies meant population growth outstripped the increase in food supply, constrained by limited agricultural land.

As government funding from wealthy nations declined, powerful corporate interests and philanthropies became even more influential. They often promoted their own interests at the expense of farmers, consumers, and the environment.

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) was established in the 1970s, channelling a small share of windfall petroleum incomes into food and agricultural development.

Soon after, the US transformed its Public Law (PL) 480 program into the World Food Programme (WFP). Thus, some FAO functions were ceded to donor-controlled UN funds and programmes also set up in Rome.

Embarrassingly, an FAO report found WFP food supplies were withheld from Somalia to avoid being taken by the ‘Islamist’ As-Shabaab militia. Chatham House also estimated two to three hundred thousand deaths as a consequence.

Neoliberalism
The counter-revolution against national development efforts in the 1980s undermined government fiscal capacities, import-substituting industrialisation, and food security efforts.

Neoliberal structural adjustment policies involving economic liberalisation were imposed on heavily indebted developing countries, mainly in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Global North promoted trade liberalisation, undermining earlier protection of and support for food and industrial production.

Powerful food conglomerates sponsored and promoted import-friendly food security indicators, undermining FAO and other civil society research and advocacy efforts.

Countries hardly producing any food were highly ranked, as civil society organisations tried to counter with their own indicators, mainly focused on food sovereignty.

Trump 2.0
A new phase has begun with Donald Trump’s re-election as US president.

Trump 2.0’s weaponisation of economic policies and agreements, including food supplies, has ominous implications for countries trying to assert some independence.

Economic and military threats have been used for diverse ends, including economic, political, and other ‘strategic’ goals. Tariffs and sanctions are now part of a diverse arsenal of such weapons deployed for various purposes.

Governments have even been threatened with tariffs and sanctions for personal reasons. Trump has demanded Brazilian ex-President Jair Bolsonaro’s freedom following his failed coup after losing the last presidential election.

Deploying such economic weapons has worsened the deepening worldwide economic stagflation, as various Trump economic and military policy threats exacerbate contractionary and inflationary pressures.

The US-controlled WFP was long used to provide food aid selectively. But there is little sympathy left in Washington for other nations’ food security concerns.

To cut federal government spending, Trump has ended official development and humanitarian assistance, including food aid, while the US remains the world’s leading food exporter.

Nevertheless, Trump may take unexpected new steps to boost farmers’ earnings to recover electoral support before the November mid-term election.

Weaponisation of food aid took an ominous turn during the Israeli siege of Gaza, by calibrating food access to enable selective ethnic cleansing.

The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation attracted hungry residents to its food centres, causing hungry families desperately seeking food to be shot while seeking food.

Poverty is primarily defined by inadequate access to food, while the FAO considers income the main determinant of food insecurity.

Although World Bank poverty measures have generally continued to decline, FAO indicators suggest a reversal of earlier progress in food security over the last decade.

These contradictory trends not only reflect problems in estimating and understanding poverty and food security but also suggest that resulting policies are poorly informed, if not worse.

Professor Felice Noelle Rodriguez is Director of the Centre for Local History and Culture, Universidad de Zamboanga, Philippines.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

De l'idée d'une pandémie planifiée à celle d'une "conspiration vaccinale"... Des théories complotistes, identiques à celles qui ont circulé lors de la Covid-19, circulent sur les réseaux sociaux.

Un Tunisien de 27 ans a été interpellé le 7 mai dans le cadre d'une enquête préliminaire initiée la veille "du chef d'association de malfaiteurs terroriste en vue de crimes contre les personnes", selon le Parquet national antiterroriste (Pnat).

L'accusation a requis lundi la confirmation de la condamnation en première instance de l'ancien président français pour association de malfaiteurs, dans le cadre de son procès en appel pour le financement libyen de sa campagne de 2007.

By CIVICUS
May 11 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses Gen Z-led protests in the Philippines with Charles Zander, a 17-year-old climate justice activist from Bohol and youth campaigner for Greenpeace Philippines.

Charles Zander

The Philippines is particularly exposed to climate change, hit by increasingly destructive annual typhoons. In 2025, a major scandal over corruption in flood control funds brought young people onto the streets alongside climate and social justice activists who had long been organising. The protests led to some accountability, but activists argue that structural problems remain unresolved.

What brought you to activism?

I grew up in Bohol, an island province in the Philippines where the climate crisis knocks on our doors every week. When I was younger, politics felt distant, but that changed in 2021, when Typhoon Odette hit our province. My home was severely damaged, but others suffered a lot more. I knew people who lost everything. Coastal communities were flattened and some villages were so cut off that it took weeks for supplies to reach them. In my case, it took two years before we had electricity again, and a year before we had water or I could access education.

My two childhood best friends died in the aftermath, and losing them changed me. At first, I didn’t think I was doing activism. It started with relief work: distributing food, organising community support, listening to people who had lost everything. I realised people needed to be heard. But the more you listen, the more questions appear. Why were some communities still waiting for aid?

Eventually, I realised if you grow up in a place where disasters are routine, silence feels like complicity. I joined local groups working on climate justice, community education and disaster response. And I saw protest as the moment when patience runs out.

What are young Filipinos demanding?

For many young Filipinos, the climate crisis is not a policy issue; it is the story of our lives. Climate injustice is therefore at the core of our struggle, but it connects to many other struggles. We live in a country hit by stronger typhoons every year, yet coal plants still get approved. We have coastal communities losing their homes to storm surges, yet development decisions rarely involve them. We have severe flooding everywhere in the country, and our government is pocketing climate adaptation funds.

When disaster hits, wealthy neighbourhoods rebuild quickly and sometimes are not damaged at all, while remote island communities wait for assistance for months, if not years. Disasters expose inequality, so climate protests are about fairness, about whose lives are considered worth protecting.

How were recent protests organised, and what role did social media play?

There are many active organisations, youth groups and community leaders, and when a major event such as a typhoon or a scandal creates urgency, conversations spread through networks and messaging groups. At some point someone proposes a date, which we often tie to a symbolic moment, such as the day of a national hero. The most recent one, in February, was on the 40th anniversary of the 1986 People Power Revolution. This has practical implications: on holidays, people don’t have school or work, so they can participate without worrying about their livelihoods. And because they’re home, people are paying more attention to social media, which increases our reach.

In this sense, nobody owns the protests. Movements grow because many people decide the moment has come. But organising involves logistics, including permits, safety planning, communication, outreach and coordination among groups with different priorities and strategies. That process can be messy, but it also reflects the democratic nature of grassroots movements. Eventually we all come together and get onto the streets.

Social media platforms, particularly Facebook and Instagram, allow young people to organise quickly across islands, cities and movements. Calls for protests can reach people within hours. Organisers can document events, share live updates and counter disinformation.

We use memes a lot. Older generations might respond to more technical explanations, but Gen Z and Gen Alpha are more reachable through humour and jokes. We also link issues to people’s actual lives so they feel compelled to act. But there needs to be more work on making sure people really know what they are fighting for when they join, not joining because it looks cool on social media.

Ultimately, technology is just a tool. A hashtag cannot replace a community. The underlying work is slower and happens when no one is watching. Protests are the visible tip of the iceberg, but below the surface there are community workshops, policy research meetings with local leaders, training of young volunteers and network-building across the country. A protest is just one day, but organising is the thousands of conversations that make that day possible. Without that groundwork, protests would fade quickly.

What risks have you faced?

For me personally, one of the most tangible dangers has been surveillance, online and offline. After participating in a major climate and social justice march, I noticed my online activity and messages being monitored more closely. It’s a subtle kind of pressure, but it makes you think twice about who you trust, how you communicate, what you post.

There’s also intimidation. At one protest, for instance, local authorities questioned volunteers about their involvement, contacts and affiliations. This is meant to create fear.

This has emotional and practical impacts. It can be exhausting and sometimes isolating. But it also shapes how you organise. You become strategic, deliberate, more protective of your peers. The fact that there are risks shows that those in power recognise the potential of youth movements to challenge the status quo. It is a reminder that our struggle matters.

What have the protests achieved, and where have they fallen short of ambition?

Change rarely arrives all at once. Sometimes protests produce policy progress, stronger commitments and greater attention to issues. Sometimes the impact is cultural. A protest can shift what people believe is possible, what people believe is right.

In the Philippines, the most visible achievement concerned the corruption around flood control projects. Although change is slow, we have seen some politicians arrested. A sitting senator is in hiding right now because of an arrest warrant. If we hadn’t spoken up, we would have lost so much more money from climate adaptation projects while our communities continued to suffer.

But movements also face setbacks. Governments delay action, hiding behind procedural issues, and public attention moves on quickly. This is discouraging. What failure teaches, though, is that we should communicate more effectively, build stronger alliances and sustain momentum beyond a single protest. A movement is not defined by the moment it wins, but by whether it continues after losing.

Is it right to call these Gen Z protests?

I have mixed feelings about it. I understand why the label appears. Many of the visible faces in recent movements are young people. The label captures something real: many young people feel the future they are inheriting was shaped by decisions made long before they had any political voice. The climate crisis is the clearest example. Policies that created the crisis were implemented decades ago, yet the consequences will unfold across the lifetimes of today’s young people. That creates a sense of urgency, and calling these protests Gen Z protests signals that a new generation is politically active and unwilling to remain passive.

But movements are rarely that simple. In almost every movement, people from many generations stand together, students marching alongside workers, community elders joining demonstrations, parents bringing their children, veteran organisers who have been fighting for decades showing up alongside people attending their first protest.

When protests are framed only as Gen Z movements, something important gets lost. It can unintentionally erase the contributions of older generations who built the foundation for these struggles. Every movement stands on ground that someone else cleared. Civil rights campaigns, climate movements and labour struggles didn’t start with Gen Z. These are long historical arcs that young people are entering and pushing forward.

The most powerful movements are intergenerational. Older organisers bring experience, historical memory and institutional knowledge. Younger generations bring new energy, new tools and new ways of communicating. One generation can ignite a movement, but lasting change requires many generations moving together.

It is also wrong to call us leaderless. We are not leaderless; we are leaderful. We just refuse to adopt some of the hierarchical ways of organising of previous generations, because sometimes leading collectively works much better than having someone dictate everything.

What keeps you going?

People, particularly young people, keep going because the problems are immediate and impossible to ignore. Protesting means refusing to accept the future we are being handed and making our voices matter.

Hope is not a passive feeling. It’s found in action, not in waiting. I see hope in the movement, because when young people, elders, students and communities stand together, there’s a shared strength, and the possibility of a world that values dignity, justice and sustainability becomes real. We keep moving because we are not alone. I also find hope in history, because it shows that while change is messy, people have always managed to push the boundaries of what is possible.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
Gen Z protests: new resistance rises CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
Bulgaria: ‘We protested against a whole system of corrupt governance and state capture’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Aleksandar Tanev 21.Apr.2026
Philippines: ‘We refuse to stay silent while those in power treat public office like private property’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Raoul Manuel 25.Nov.2025

 

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Despite the newfound discovery of sexual harassment and the taxpayer-funded settlements, the United States Congress has failed to implement any lasting policy reforms to protect staff from sexual misconduct. Credit: Shutterstock

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, May 11 2026 (IPS)

After more than two centuries of independence, it appears that the United States Congress, or at least certain parts of it, has finally discovered the existence of sexual harassment within the institution.

This discovery by Congress is noteworthy in a country where sexual harassment is widespread. Nationally, 81% of women have reported experiencing some form of sexual harassment and/or assault in their lifetime. Moreover, as of early 2026, reports indicate that 25% of individuals have witnessed or experienced sexual harassment in the workplace within the past 12 months.

Sexual harassment in Congress is believed to be driven by a combination of interrelated factors. These include extreme power disparities within a hierarchical framework, a decentralized workplace structure, the abuse of position to coerce or manipulate, burdensome reporting processes, the use of taxpayer funds for settlements, fear of retaliation, staff members’ career dependency, gender imbalance, lack of oversight, and a perceived culture of tolerance with a historical lack of accountability.

Despite Congress passing reforms to require sexual harassment training and streamline reporting, the underlying factors and cultural issues continue to pose challenges for ensuring a safe workplace free of sexual misconduct.

Throughout much of its recent history, there have been reported claims and personal accounts of sexual harassment and misconduct in Congress. For example, in the 2010s, there were 16 instances of sexual harassment reported (Figure 1).

Source: GovTrack.US.

 

In addition to the alleged claims and personal accounts, Congress has conducted investigations and awarded settlements for sexual misconduct within the institution. For example, since 2017, the U.S. House Ethics Committee has undertaken 20 investigations into allegations of sexual misconduct by members of the House.

However, approximately 80% of the individuals who have reported sexual misconduct to their respective offices about sexual misconduct choose not to report it to the Office of Compliance due to fears of retaliation and negative consequences on their employment and careers.

Many of the settlements involve non-disclosure agreements, which have been criticized for protecting the identities of the perpetrators. Between 1996 and 2018, 349 settlements and awards were made involving 80 House and Senate offices (Table 1).

Source: GovTrack.US.

Despite numerous alleged claims, personal accounts, settlements, and awards, Congress has been hesitant to openly acknowledge the prevalence of sexual harassment within its branch of government.

However, with the recent surge in allegations, high-profile resignations, and investigations into taxpayer-funded settlements, leaders of both parties in the House and Senate are under increasing pressure to address and prevent sexual misconduct. As a result, the U.S. Congress seems to have finally discovered the existence of sexual harassment within its ranks.

With the recent surge in allegations, high-profile resignations, and investigations into taxpayer-funded settlements, leaders of both parties in the House and Senate are under increasing pressure to address and prevent sexual misconduct

Additionally, three Republican women in Congress have recently launched a campaign against sexual harassment. Their main goal is to uncover and hold accountable predators in Congress from all parties. Besides advocating for transparency, they are demanding that members of Congress face consequences for their sexual misconduct.

Furthermore, these women are urging Congressional lawmakers to acknowledge the pervasive culture of sexual harassment and misconduct on Capitol Hill. They are also calling for lawmakers to take action to change the environment where such behavior has been accepted as an unfortunate but unchangeable reality.

One of these Republican lawmakers has claimed that the sexual misconduct in Congress goes much deeper than the public realizes.

Additionally, these Congressional lawmakers are committed to dismantling the unwritten rules of political expediency and tribal loyalty that have historically kept sexual harassment concealed.

One of the lawmakers introduced a resolution (H.Res.1100) directing the committee to preserve and publicly release records and reports on all investigations into Congressional members for sexual harassment. Additionally. these Republican lawmakers are demanding the release of documents detailing any settlements related to sexual harassment involving members of Congress.

However, the party’s male leaders, including the president and top Republican congressional leaders, have chosen to support the accused men whose votes are necessary to maintain their majority in the House of Representatives.

Furthermore, numerous women in the United States have publicly accused the country’s current president of various acts of sexual misconduct, including rape.

In 2023, a New York jury found the U.S. president civilly liable for sexually abusing advice columnist E. Jean Carroll and awarded her $5 million in damages. Currently, no other person serving in the U.S. federal government has as many credible accusations and a jury conviction for sexual misconduct as the president.

Additionally, in a rare statement, the Congressional House Ethics Committee defended its handling of sexual harassment charges following the resignations of two lawmakers facing sexual misconduct. The committee operates in secrecy and typically takes years to complete its inquiries.

While acknowledging flaws in the reporting process, the committee cited the challenges it faces and urged employees with sexual harassment claims to come forward. However, Congressional staffers are understandably reluctant and afraid to make accusations of sexual harassment against lawmakers to a panel controlled by their peers.

Congressional lawmakers are predominantly men. In 2026, men make up 71% of the House of Representatives and 74% of the Senate (Figure 2).

 

Source. U.S. Congress. Gov.

In addition to the women in Congress who are objecting to the sexual harassment taking place within Congress, advocacy groups across the country are demanding more transparency and easier reporting processes. They maintain that sexual harassment typically goes undisclosed because of the power dynamics within Congress, with many incidents going unreported because of fear of retaliation.

For example, the National Women’s Defense League reported that there have been fifty-three allegations of workplace sexual harassment made against at least 30 lawmakers in the House and Senate over the past two decades. Nearly all of these documented cases involve men harassing women, with 77% of the allegations involving members of the legislative staff.

Furthermore, the issue of sexual harassment in Congress is bipartisan. Of all the allegations, 60% are made against Republicans and 40% against Democrats. The recent cases of sexual harassment in 2026 have prompted calls for accountability, stricter ethics investigations, and public disclosure of misconduct records.

In April and May 2026, prominent lawmakers, including Rep. Eric Swalwell and Rep. Tony Gonzales, resigned due to allegations of sexual misconduct and ethics violations. In addition, the Ethics Committee is currently investigating Rep. Chuck Edwards for reportedly having an improper relationship with a subordinate and sexually harassing staff.

Moreover, documents released since 2004 reveal that over $338,000 in taxpayer funds have been used to settle confidential sexual harassment claims involving 13 claims against members of Congress. The process of filing complaints in Congress has been criticized for being opaque and largely unknown.

The recent resignations of lawmakers along with the use of taxpayer funds to settle harassment claims have contributed to Congress’s discovery of sexual harassment committed by its members.

It appears that Congress is now beginning to address some of the immediate issues of sexual misconduct taking place within the institution. However, despite the newfound discovery of sexual harassment and the taxpayer-funded settlements, the United States Congress has failed to implement any lasting policy reforms to protect staff from sexual misconduct.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of many publications on population issues.

The French president stood up during a conference in Kenya to tell the audience to quieten down, saying it was “impossible” for speakers to be heard.

Les terres rares sont au cœur des rivalités économiques et géopolitiques mondiales. Utilisées dans les technologies médicales, les véhicules électriques, les éoliennes offshore ou encore les équipements de défense, elles constituent aujourd’hui un enjeu stratégique majeur pour les États. Face à la domination chinoise sur l’extraction, le raffinage et la fabrication d’aimants permanents, la France et l’Union européenne tentent de développer leur stratégie minière afin de réduire leur dépendance. Mais le retard accumulé reste considérable et les capacités industrielles européennes demeurent limitées. Le « plan national sur les terres rares » français marque-t-il un véritable tournant ? Pourquoi les terres rares sont-elles au cœur des enjeux géopolitiques mondiaux ? L’Union européenne peut-elle réellement rattraper son retard face à la Chine ? Et comment la Chine utilise-t-elle les terres rares comme un instrument de puissance et de pression diplomatique ? Le point avec Guillaume Pitron, chercheur associé à l’IRIS, spécialiste des matières premières critiques.

Pourquoi les terres rares font-elles aujourd’hui l’objet d’une attention particulière ?

Les terres rares constituent une famille de quinze métaux présents dans un grand nombre de technologies. Elles sont utilisées dans l’électronique, les moteurs de véhicules électriques, les éoliennes offshore, les technologies médicales ou encore les équipements d’imagerie. Elles sont aussi stratégiques pour l’industrie de défense. Le samarium, par exemple, permet de fabriquer des aimants résistants à de très hautes températures, indispensables dans certains équipements militaires. Aujourd’hui, le secteur de la défense fait face à une dépendance extrêmement forte aux terres rares.

La Chine extrait environ 60 % des terres rares mondiales, raffine près de 85 % de la production et fabrique environ 94 % des aimants permanents à base de terres rares. Depuis plusieurs années, Pékin restreint progressivement ses exportations de terres rares et d’aimants permanents. Ces restrictions touchent directement les secteurs utilisateurs, notamment l’industrie médicale, les véhicules électriques et surtout la défense.

Les industriels français de la base industrielle et technologique de défense se retrouvent aujourd’hui dans une situation de forte vulnérabilité, en particulier concernant les aimants samarium-cobalt, dont la Chine assure pratiquement 100 % de la production. Les industriels cherchent donc activement des fournisseurs alternatifs, principalement aux États-Unis ou en Europe. Mais les États-Unis s’inscrivent désormais dans une logique « America First », ce qui limite également les garanties d’approvisionnement pour les Européens. Cette situation explique l’urgence actuelle autour des terres rares et la nécessité d’accélérer le développement d’une production alternative sur le continent européen.

Le « plan national sur les terres rares » présenté par Roland Lescure, ministre de l’Économie, et Sébastien Martin, ministre délégué chargé de l’Industrie, constitue-t-il une avancée majeure pour réduire la dépendance de la France aux importations de terres rares ?

Une avancée majeure, peut-être pas. La France, l’Europe et le monde occidental en général accusent environ trente ans de retard sur la Chine dans le développement de leur industrie des terres rares. Le retard est immense. Le terme « majeur » paraît donc ambitieux, même s’il s’agit bien d’une avancée.

Le plan rappelle d’abord ce qui a déjà été engagé en France concernant le redéploiement d’une filière de production de terres rares et d’éléments de terres rares. Cette industrie existait déjà en France avant de s’éteindre progressivement. Il s’agit désormais de la relancer. Le plan met en avant plusieurs sociétés déjà actives, dont la production devrait démarrer à moyen terme. En ce sens, il ne constitue pas une nouveauté totale puisqu’il reprend largement des initiatives industrielles déjà engagées depuis plusieurs années, notamment par des entreprises comme Carester ou MagREEsource.

Il y a donc une part de communication dans l’annonce de ce plan. Des actions industrielles déjà lancées sont présentées sous un angle nouveau, avec des objectifs à relativement court terme qui restent très ambitieux, notamment en matière de séparation des terres rares et de production d’aimants permanents. Le plan confirme surtout le maintien de dispositifs gouvernementaux déjà existants : crédits d’impôt, simplifications réglementaires et prêt garanti par l’État (PGE) destinés à accompagner les entreprises du secteur. Ces mécanismes visent notamment à sécuriser les achats de terres rares par les entreprises situées à l’aval de la chaîne de valeur, en garantissant certains achats futurs auprès de producteurs français ou étrangers. Cette garantie sécurise à la fois l’acheteur et le producteur. En parallèle, l’État demande également aux industriels de mieux cartographier leurs chaînes d’approvisionnement et l’origine de leurs approvisionnements en terres rares. Cette connaissance plus précise de la chaîne de valeur est présentée comme une étape indispensable pour mettre en œuvre une véritable stratégie de souveraineté minérale. Le plan impose donc aux industriels d’investir davantage dans la connaissance et le suivi de leurs propres chaînes d’approvisionnement.

Le plan reconnaît aussi implicitement que la France ne sera pas capable de reconstruire seule l’ensemble d’une chaîne intégrée allant de la mine à l’aimant permanent. Plusieurs accords bilatéraux ont déjà été signés avec des pays producteurs de métaux critiques et de terres rares, notamment le Brésil, la Malaisie, l’Afrique du Sud ou encore la Suède. La France devra donc aller chercher à l’étranger une partie des terres rares nécessaires à sa filière. On voit donc les limites de ce plan, qui sont avant tout géologiques. La France ne dispose pas des ressources suffisantes sur son propre territoire. L’objectif consiste ainsi à intégrer des ressources extraites dans des pays partenaires au sein d’une filière française ou européenne, avec une spécialisation davantage orientée vers la séparation, la production d’aimants permanents et le recyclage.

L’aspect réellement nouveau réside surtout dans le fait qu’il existe désormais un plan national spécifiquement consacré aux terres rares. Jusqu’à présent, la France disposait d’une politique générale sur les métaux critiques, mais jamais d’un plan ciblant une famille particulière de matières premières. C’est la première fois qu’un traitement spécifique est appliqué aux terres rares, ce qui pourrait annoncer d’autres plans nationaux consacrés à des métaux critiques particuliers selon les urgences industrielles.

Le plan européen sur les matières premières critiques permet-il réellement à l’Union européenne de répondre aux enjeux actuels ? Quels sont les principaux freins à une relocalisation de la production et du raffinage en Europe ?

Le plan européen porte officiellement le nom de Critical Raw Materials Act. Adopté en 2024, il fixe des objectifs de souveraineté minérale à l’horizon 2030 pour l’ensemble des métaux critiques, dont les terres rares. Ce plan constitue une étape indispensable. Il marque une prise de conscience européenne et établit une stratégie commune. Toutefois, il souffre d’un manque important de financements et sa mise en œuvre reste complexe. Pour certains métaux, comme le lithium, une relative souveraineté européenne paraît atteignable à l’horizon 2030. En revanche, pour d’autres métaux critiques, notamment certaines terres rares, les objectifs du plan seront beaucoup plus difficiles à atteindre faute de capacités industrielles suffisantes. La Commission européenne a également lancé un programme de 47 projets stratégiques industriels portant sur l’extraction, le raffinage, la fabrication d’aimants et le recyclage des métaux critiques. Ces projets bénéficient d’un soutien européen afin d’accélérer la relance industrielle du secteur.

Globalement, les décisions prises vont dans le bon sens, mais elles arrivent tardivement. Elles auraient dû être engagées il y a dix, quinze ou vingt ans. Les effets ne seront donc visibles qu’à moyen ou long terme. Par ailleurs, les États-Unis accélèrent eux aussi massivement leurs investissements dans les métaux critiques. À titre d’exemple, pour un euro investi par les Européens dans cette filière, les Américains investissent dix dollars. Face à l’avance chinoise, il sera impossible d’assurer rapidement une souveraineté complète, même partielle, d’ici 2030.

Comment expliquer la domination de la Chine dans la production et le raffinage des terres rares ? Dans quelle mesure utilise-t-elle ces ressources comme un levier de puissance et de pression diplomatique ?

La Chine a compris dès les années 1980 l’importance stratégique des terres rares et, plus largement, des métaux critiques pour les industries du futur. L’État chinois dispose d’une capacité de planification industrielle à très long terme. Il peut accepter des sacrifices économiques immédiats afin de garantir des bénéfices stratégiques à l’échelle de plusieurs décennies. Pékin a ainsi sécurisé très tôt l’accès aux terres rares tout en absorbant progressivement les capacités alternatives de production occidentales. Cette stratégie a permis à la Chine d’acquérir une position dominante qui lui donne aujourd’hui un véritable levier de pression sur les pays occidentaux. Les terres rares sont devenues un outil de puissance.

La Chine peut resserrer ou rouvrir le robinet des exportations en fonction de ses intérêts économiques ou diplomatiques. Cette logique est apparue très clairement lors de la reprise de la guerre commerciale entre les États-Unis et la Chine après le retour de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche. Pékin a réduit ses exportations de terres rares, obligeant Washington à modérer certaines positions commerciales. Les terres rares constituent aujourd’hui un véritable talon d’Achille pour les États-Unis comme pour l’Europe.

Cette dépendance devrait perdurer encore plusieurs années. Les pays occidentaux accélèrent désormais leurs stratégies de souveraineté minérale, notamment sur l’extraction minière. Mais la Chine conserve une avance considérable dans le raffinage et la fabrication d’aimants permanents. Il faut donc s’attendre à ce que le pays devrait continuer à dominer pendant encore dix à quinze ans sur une partie importante de la chaîne de valeur des terres rares, en particulier sur certaines très stratégiques comme le samarium, dont il contrôle pratiquement l’intégralité de la production mondiale.

L’article « Plan national sur les terres rares » : la France et l’UE peuvent-elles endiguer leur retard face à la Chine ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

As the global target to eliminate hunger by 2030 fast slips out of reach, investing in how the world feeds itself is the only way to avert a crisis. Investing in agrifood systems—from production and processing to distribution and consumption—is crucial to making the global agriculture sector more resilient to food security threats, said Mohamed […]

Deux ans après les émeutes qui avaient enflammé la Nouvelle-Calédonie, le débat sur la composition du corps électoral n'est toujours pas tranché, à quelques semaines des élections provinciales du 28 juin.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

La coopération sanitaire internationale n’a jamais dissocié, dans sa pratique et son financement, l’impératif humanitaire des considérations géopolitiques qui le sous-tendent. La tension entre solidarité internationale et intérêt national est constitutive de l’histoire de la coopération sanitaire mondiale. Ce qui change avec la stratégie américaine de l’America First Global Health Strategy (AfGHS), publiée en septembre 2025, c’est la rhétorique souverainiste qui s’est radicalement accentuée. Une des plus grandes puissances assume sans détour que son aide sanitaire est un instrument stratégique.

Washington entend signer des accords bilatéraux pluriannuels assortis d’objectifs précis en matière de santé, de délais stricts et de conséquences en cas de non-respect. Cette logique intervient dans un contexte de refonte de la stratégie sanitaire états-unienne, à la suite du retrait des États-Unis de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) en janvier 2025, et du démantèlement de l’Agence des États-Unis pour le développement international (USAID) au premier semestre 2025.

Les États-Unis ont ainsi mis en place des Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), un format bilatéral d’accords avec les pays bénéficiaires qui s’articulent autour de plans quinquennaux (2026-2030). Au 6 mai 2026, 32 accords bilatéraux ont été potentiellement signés, dont 22 accords documentés en Afrique subsaharienne jusqu’à présent, mais le processus de négociation est encore en cours. Les accords bilatéraux conclus dans le cadre de l’America First Global Health Strategy représentent un volume d’au moins 20 milliards de dollars sur la période 2026–2030, dont environ 63 % financés par les États-Unis et 37 % par les pays partenaires.

Ces accords de co-financement, avec un engagement états-unien généralement dégressif, impliquent pour les États concernés de réévaluer la part de leur budget national consacré à la santé. Ces accords semblent par ailleurs recouper un certain nombre d’intérêts stratégiques états-uniens dans les pays concernés.

Analyse en carte et infographie de cette refonte de la stratégie sanitaire états-unienne à l’œuvre.

L’article America First Global Health Strategy : une santé mondiale dépendante des financements états-uniens ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Vladimir Poutine a déclaré ce week-end que la guerre en Ukraine touchait « à sa fin ». Son calcul initial reposait sur un retrait massif du soutien à l’Ukraine avec l’arrivée de Donald Trump, ce qui n’a pas eu lieu. Les États-Unis ont maintenu leur soutien en renseignement, tandis que l’Europe a financé massivement l’Ukraine via un prêt de 90 milliards d’euros.

Dans le même temps, Kiev a considérablement renforcé sa capacité de production militaire, notamment dans le domaine des drones, freinant l’avancée russe et stabilisant plusieurs fronts.

En mobilisant l’essentiel de ses ressources en Ukraine, Vladimir Poutine n’a pas été capable de soutenir ses alliés ailleurs : chute du régime de Bachar el-Assad en Syrie, revers de l’Africa Corps au Mali face au JNIM et au FLA, recul de l’influence russe en Asie centrale… La Russie apparaît aujourd’hui affaiblie sur plusieurs terrains stratégiques.

Malgré la hausse des revenus énergétiques liée aux tensions internationales dans le Golfe, le coût humain, économique et politique de la guerre devient de plus en plus lourd pour le Kremlin. La société russe s’épuise, la répression s’intensifie et la popularité de Vladimir Poutine montre des signes d’érosion.

Bien que la Russie ait étendu son territoire sur la Crimée et une partie du Donbass, le bilan global est négatif : affaiblissement géopolitique, isolement international et épuisement des forces. Vladimir Poutine n’a pas saisi l’opportunité de négocier avec Donald Trump, qui proposait de lever les sanctions en échange d’un statu quo territorial.

Mon analyse dans cette vidéo.

L’article Ukraine – Poutine : gains territoriaux, guerre perdue est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

OPINION on the proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive (EU) 2015/637 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and Directive (EU) 2019/997 establishing an EU Emergency Travel Document
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Nacho Sánchez Amor

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

OPINION on the proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive (EU) 2015/637 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and Directive (EU) 2019/997 establishing an EU Emergency Travel Document
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Nacho Sánchez Amor

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

MISSION REPORT following the mission to the Republic of Korea and Japan from 30 March to 2 April 2026
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

MISSION REPORT following the mission to the Republic of Korea and Japan from 30 March to 2 April 2026
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of security policy education over the past four decades (1984–2024). It traces the transition from the „Simplicity of Destruction”—defined by Cold War nuclear deterrence and Realist state-centric models—to the „Complexity of Resilience,” necessitated by hybrid threats, climate change, and algorithmic warfare. The article identifies four distinct eras: the Strategic Calculus of the Cold War, the Post-1991 Broadening of the security agenda, the Post-9/11 Asymmetric Turn, and the current era of Hybridity and Technological Supremacy. This report places special emphasis on the technological pulse of security, mapping the shift from nuclear physics to artificial intelligence and quantum vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the study examines pedagogical shifts from theoretical lecturing to immersive wargaming and „Red Teaming.” Finally, it provides a case study of the Hungarian educational landscape, documenting the transition from the Marxist-Leninist military doctrines of the 1980s to the „Comprehensive Approach” of the National University of Public Service (NKE).

I. 1984–1991: The Era of Strategic Calculus

In 1984, security policy education was a disciplined, almost clinical exercise in strategic mathematics. Dominated by the Neorealist paradigm—exemplified by Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (1979)—the curriculum was built on the assumption that the international system is anarchic and states are rational, unitary actors. Students of the era focused on „Hard Power”: the measurable capability of a state to coerce others through military or economic might.

The pedagogical cornerstone was Nuclear Strategy. Concepts like Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the dynamics of the „Nuclear Triad,” and the intricacies of the SALT and START treaties formed the core of the syllabus. Security was synonymous with defense, and defense was synonymous with the state. The educational objective was to train analysts who could calculate second-strike capabilities and interpret the movement of tank divisions across the North German Plain. It was a world of high stakes but clear ontological boundaries.

II. 1991–2001: The Great Widening

The collapse of the Soviet Union acted as an ontological shock to the field. Security policy education underwent what scholars call „The Widening.” The Copenhagen School, led by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, introduced Securitization Theory, arguing that „security” is not an objective condition but a social construct—a „speech act.”

In 1994, the UNDP Human Security Report fundamentally shifted the referent object of security from the „State” to the „Individual.” Education began to include economic, food, health, and environmental security. Students were no longer just studying throw-weights of ICBMs; they were analyzing the security implications of the Balkan wars, ethnic conflict, and the collapse of „failed states.” This decade introduced the idea that security is multidisciplinary, requiring insights from sociology, economics, and environmental science.

III. 2001–2014: The Asymmetric Turn

The attacks of September 11, 2001, forced a pivot toward asymmetry. The pedagogical focus shifted from state-on-state conflict to Counter-Insurgency (COIN) and non-state actors. Mary Kaldor’s concept of „New Wars”—where the distinction between soldier and civilian, and between war and organized crime, blurs—became essential reading.

The 2006 publication of the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) influenced civilian curricula worldwide, emphasizing „winning hearts and minds” and the „Comprehensive Approach.” This era also marked the rise of Critical Migration Studies. Scholars like Jef Huysmans (2006) highlighted how the „securitization of migration” transformed border management into a primary security concern. Education now required an understanding of cultural anthropology and the psychology of radicalization.

**IV. 2014–2024: Hybridity and Global Resilience**
Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, security education has grappled with „Hybrid Warfare.” Frank Hoffman’s theories on the blending of conventional, irregular, and cyber tactics redefined the curriculum. The focus has moved toward „Total Defense” and Societal Resilience—the ability of a nation’s infrastructure and population to withstand and recover from systemic shocks.

Climate Security (Parenti, 2011) has moved from the periphery to the centre. Students today analyse resource scarcity, water wars, and climate-induced migration not as „soft” issues, but as „threat multipliers” that can destabilise entire regions. The 2024 curriculum is characterised by „Grand Strategy” in an era of Great Power Competition (GPC), where the Arctic, the Indo-Pacific, and Outer Space are the new frontiers of confrontation.

**V. The Technological Pulse: From Nuclear Physics to Algorithmic Warfare**
Technological innovation has always been the „silent engine” of security policy. In the 1980s, security technology was largely about nuclear physics and ballistic engineering. The 1990s introduced the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), focusing on precision-guided munitions and the „system of systems” (Owens, 2000).

The 2000s saw the „Unmanned Revolution,” as drones (Singer, 2009) changed the ethics and practice of targeted killing. Today, the focus is on AI, Algorithmic Warfare, and Quantum Security. Security programs must now teach „Digital Forensics” and prepare for „Q-Day” (the point when quantum computers can break current encryption). The speed of the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) is now determined by machine learning, forcing students to contemplate a future where „meaningful human control” over lethal force is the primary ethical and strategic challenge (Scharre, 2018).

III. 2001–2014: The Asymmetric Turn

The attacks of September 11, 2001, forced a pivot toward asymmetry. The pedagogical focus shifted from state-on-state conflict to Counter-Insurgency (COIN) and non-state actors. Mary Kaldor’s concept of „New Wars”—where the distinction between soldier and civilian, and between war and organised crime, blurs—became essential reading.

The 2006 publication of the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) influenced civilian curricula worldwide, emphasising „winning hearts and minds” and the „Comprehensive Approach.” This era also marked the rise of Critical Migration Studies. Scholars such as Jef Huysmans (2006) have highlighted how the „securitization of migration” transformed border management into a primary security concern. Education now required an understanding of cultural anthropology and the psychology of radicalization.

IV. 2014–2024: Hybridity and Global Resilience

Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, security education has grappled with „Hybrid Warfare.” Frank Hoffman’s theories on the blending of conventional, irregular, and cyber tactics redefined the curriculum. The focus has moved toward „Total Defense” and Societal Resilience—the ability of a nation’s infrastructure and population to withstand and recover from systemic shocks.

Climate Security (Parenti, 2011) has moved from the periphery to the center. Students today analyze resource scarcity, water wars, and climate-induced migration not as „soft” issues, but as „threat multipliers” that can destabilize entire regions. The curriculum of 2024 is characterized by „Grand Strategy” in an era of Great Power Competition (GPC), where the Arctic, the Indo-Pacific, and Outer Space are the new frontiers of confrontation.

V. The Technological Pulse: From Nuclear Physics to Algorithmic Warfare

Technological innovation has always been the „silent engine” of security policy. In the 1980s, security technology was largely about nuclear physics and ballistic engineering. The 1990s introduced the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), focusing on precision-guided munitions and the „system of systems” (Owens, 2000).

The 2000s saw the „Unmanned Revolution,” as drones (Singer, 2009) changed the ethics and practice of targeted killing. Today, the focus is on AI, Algorithmic Warfare, and Quantum Security. Security programs must now teach „Digital Forensics” and prepare for „Q-Day” (the point when quantum computers can break current encryption). The speed of the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) is now determined by machine learning, forcing students to contemplate a future where „meaningful human control” over lethal force is the primary ethical and strategic challenge (Scharre, 2018).

VI. From Lecturing to Wargaming: Pedagogical Evolution

The way we teach security has changed as much as the content. Traditional lectures are increasingly supplemented by active, immersive methods. Wargaming (Perla, 1990) has seen a massive resurgence, allowing students to simulate complex crisis management scenarios in a low-risk environment.

„Red Teaming”—the practice of viewing a problem from an adversary’s perspective (Heuer, 1999)—is now a standard skill taught in intelligence and policy tracks. Furthermore, the rise of Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) has democratized research. In 1984, satellite imagery was the exclusive domain of superpowers; today, students are trained to geolocate conflict zones and verify human rights abuses using commercial satellite data and social media, turning the classroom into a real-time intelligence hub.

VII. The Hungarian Experience: From Zrínyi to NKE

In Hungary, the evolution of security education followed a unique historical trajectory. In 1984, the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy was the center of education, operating within the strict ideological framework of Marxist-Leninist military doctrine and Warsaw Pact requirements. The focus was on conventional land warfare and „Socialist Patriotism.”

The 1990s brought a period of rapid „NATO-ization.” Curriculum reform focused on civilian oversight of the military, democratic accountability, and interoperability with Western allies. The 2012 establishment of the National University of Public Service (NKE) marked a turning point, integrating military, law enforcement, and diplomatic education. This „Comprehensive Approach” reflects the Hungarian reality: security is no longer just a military matter but involves disaster management, cyber defense, and public administration. Today, Hungarian students study within a framework that balances European integration with the specific challenges of the Carpathian Basin.

Conclusion

 
The evolution from 1984 to 2024 represents a fundamental shift from the „Simplicity of Destruction” to the „Complexity of Resilience.” Security policy education is no longer just about counting tanks or calculating megatons; it is about understanding the fragile, interconnected nodes of a globalized world. As we look toward the next forty years, the challenge for educators will be to foster „Security Literacy”—the ability to navigate a world where a computer virus can be as deadly as a kinetic missile, and where the most important battlefield is often the cognitive resilience of the population.

References

* Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
* Hoffman, F. G. (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
* Heuer, R. J. (1999). *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. Center for the Study of Intelligence.
* Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Harvard University Press.
* Huysmans, J. (2006). *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. Routledge.
* Kaldor, M. (1999). *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Stanford University Press.
* Lowenthal, M. M. (2022). *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (9th ed.). CQ Press.
* Nye, J. S. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. PublicAffairs.
* Owens, W. A. (2000). *Lifting the Fog of War*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
* Parenti, C. (2011). *Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence*. Nation Books.
* Perla, P. P. (1990). *The Art of Wargaming*. Naval Institute Press.
* Rid, T. (2013). *Cyber War Will Not Take Place*. Oxford University Press.
* Scharre, P. (2018). *Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War*. W. W. Norton & Company.
* Singer, P. W. (2009). *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-first Century*. Penguin Press.
* UNDP. (1994). *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security*. Oxford University Press.
* U.S. Army. (2006). *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*. Headquarters, Department of the Army.
* Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Addison-Wesley.
* Zenko, M. (2015). *Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy*. Basic Books.

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