Agrégateur de flux

In diesem Artikel werden wir Ihnen einen umfassenden Überblick über die verschiedenen europäischen Flaggen geben und dabei Ihre einzigartigen Designs und historischen Hintergründe hervorheben. Jedes Land in Europa hat seine eigene nationale Flagge, die einzigartige Elemente und Farbkombinationen enthält, die oft mit der Geschichte und Kultur des Landes verbunden sind.

Von der klassischen Schwarz-Rot-Gold-Kombination der deutschen Flagge bis hin zu den markanten Blau-Weiß-Streifen Griechenlands – die Vielfalt europäischer Flaggen ist ein faszinierendes Thema. Lassen Sie uns gemeinsam diese farbenfrohe Reise durch Europa unternehmen und mehr über die Bedeutung und das Aussehen jeder dieser bemerkenswerten Nationalflaggen erfahren.

Das Wichtigste in Kürze

• Europäische Flaggen haben einzigartige Designs und Farbkompositionen, die oft mit nationaler Geschichte und Kultur verbunden sind.
• Deutschlands Flagge: Horizontale Streifen in Schwarz, Rot und Gold seit dem 19. Jahrhundert.
• Frankreichs Flagge: Vertikale Streifen in Blau, Weiß und Rot, repräsentiert nationale Ideale.
• Schwedens Flagge: Gelbes Kreuz auf blauem Hintergrund symbolisiert Landschaft und Christentum.
• Griechenlands Flagge: Blau-weiße Streifen mit Kreuz, repräsentiert Unabhängigkeit und nationale Identität.

Flagge von Deutschland: Schwarz-Rot-Gold, einfaches Streifendesign

Die Flagge von Deutschland besteht aus drei horizontalen Streifen in den Farben schwarz, rot und gold. Diese Kombination repräsentiert das Land seit dem 19. Jahrhundert.

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Flagge von Frankreich: Blau-Weiß-Rot, senkrechte Streifen

Europäische Flaggen mit Namen: Ein ÜberblickDie Flagge von Frankreich ist ein bekanntes Symbol Europas. Sie besteht aus drei senkrechten Streifen in den Farben Blau, Weiß und Rot.

Flaggen sind Symbole von Einheit und Stolz, Sie erzählen die Geschichten der Nationen, die Sie vertreten. – Kofi Annan

Italiens Flagge: Grün-Weiß-Rot, ins Auge fallend

Italiens Flagge: Die Farbkombination Grün, Weiß und Rot ist unverkennbar bekannt. Der schlichte Streifendesign macht die Flagge prägnant und unverwechselbar.

Englands Flagge: Rotes Kreuz, weißer Hintergrund

Englands Flagge ist durch ein rotes Kreuz auf einem weißen Hintergrund gekennzeichnet. Sie ist Teil des Union Jacks, der Nationalflagge des Vereinigten Königreichs.

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.table-responsiv {width: 100%;padding: 0px;margin-bottom: 0px;overflow-y: hidden;border: 1px solid #DDD;overflow-x: auto;min-height: 0.01%;} Land Design Farbkombination Deutschland Horizontale Streifen Schwarz-Rot-Gold Frankreich Vertikale Streifen Blau-Weiß-Rot Italien Vertikale Streifen Grün-Weiß-Rot England Kreuz Rot-Weiß Schweden Kreuz Gelb-Blau Spanien Horizontale Streifen mit Wappen Rot-Gelb Griechenland Streifen und Kreuz Blau-Weiß Norwegen Kreuz Blau-Rot Schwedens Flagge: Gelbes Kreuz, blauer Hintergrund

Schwedens Flagge: Gelbes Kreuz, blauer Hintergrund – Europäische Flaggen mit Namen: Ein ÜberblickDie Flagge Schwedens zeigt ein markantes Design mit einem gelben Kreuz auf einem blauen Hintergrund. Dieses Farbschema symbolisiert oft den Kontrast zwischen Himmel und Sonne und ist seit Jahrhunderten ein stolzes nationales Symbol für das skandinavische Land.

Siehe auch: Beliebte Urlaubsziele in Europa

Spaniens Flagge: Rot-Gelb, markantes Wappen

Spaniens Flagge besteht aus zwei roten und einem gelben Streifen, wobei das markante Wappen auf dem gelben Streifen prominent hervorsticht.

Griechenlands Flagge: Blau-Weiß, Streifen und Kreuz

Die Flagge Griechenlands ist in den Farben Blau und Weiß gehalten. Sie besteht aus neun horizontalen Streifen, wobei die Streifen abwechselnd blau und weiß gefärbt sind. In der oberen linken Ecke befindet sich ein quadratisches Feld mit einem weißen Kreuz auf blauem Grund.

Norwegens Flagge: Blaues Kreuz, roter Hintergrund

Die Flagge von Norwegen zeichnet sich durch ein blaues Kreuz auf einem roten Hintergrund aus. Das Design symbolisiert die Verbindung des Landes mit dem Christentum und stellt eine visuelle Verwandtschaft zu den anderen skandinavischen Ländern dar.

FAQ: Antworten auf häufig gestellte Fragen Welche Bedeutung haben die Farben der deutschen Flagge? Die Farben Schwarz, Rot und Gold der deutschen Flagge haben historische Wurzeln und stehen symbolisch für Einheit und Freiheit. Sie wurden erstmals zu Zeiten der Revolution von 1848 verwendet und repräsentieren die Einigkeit der deutschen Länder und den Freiheitsdrang gegen Unterdrückung. Warum hat die schwedische Flagge ein gelbes Kreuz auf blauem Hintergrund? Das gelbe Kreuz auf blauem Hintergrund der schwedischen Flagge repräsentiert die schwedische Landschaft und das Christentum. Das Blau stellt den Himmel und das Wasser dar, während das Gelb oft als Symbol für die Sonne und das Licht betrachtet wird. Seit wann wird die griechische Flagge offiziell verwendet? Die aktuelle griechische Flagge wird seit dem 22. Dezember 1978 offiziell verwendet. Ihr Design hat jedoch seine Wurzeln in der griechischen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts. Was symbolisiert das Wappen auf der spanischen Flagge? Das Wappen auf der spanischen Flagge symbolisiert die verschiedenen Königreiche, die die historische Grundlage der modernen Nation Spanien bilden. Es enthält Symbole für Kastilien, León, Aragón und Navarra sowie das Granatapfel-Symbol, das für das eroberte Königreich Granada steht. Hat die Union Jack (Flagge des Vereinigten Königreichs) Bestandteile anderer nationaler Flaggen? Ja, die Union Jack kombiniert Elemente der St. George’s Cross (Englands Flagge), der St. Andrew’s Cross (Schottlands Flagge) und der St. Patrick’s Cross (Symbol für Irland). Diese Kombination repräsentiert die Vereinigung dieser Länder im Vereinigten Königreich. Wie sieht die Nationalflagge Norwegens aus und welche Bedeutung hat sie? Die Flagge Norwegens besteht aus einem blauen Kreuz mit weißen Rändern auf rotem Hintergrund. Das Design stellt Norwegens Verbindung zum Christentum dar, wobei das Kreuzmotiv auch kennzeichnend für andere nordische Länder ist. Die Farben Rot, Blau und Weiß symbolisieren Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit.

Der Beitrag Europäische Flaggen mit Namen: Ein Überblick erschien zuerst auf Neurope.eu - News aus Europa.

Credit: Connie France/AFP

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

Right-wing candidate Keiko Fujimori has won Peru’s presidential runoff, narrowly defeating leftist Roberto Sánchez to become the country’s ninth president in a decade. She inherits a system so engineered for dysfunction that rather than making compromises, she may decide the concentration of power is her only means of survival. The constitution that created this trap was written by her father.

A system built to fail

Keiko, daughter of authoritarian former president Alberto Fujimori, has finally succeeded in her fourth consecutive runoff, having lost in 2011, 2016 and 2021. She won with a margin of roughly a quarter of a percentage point over a candidate who is a close ally of jailed former president Pedro Castillo. Both sides alleged fraud, filed claims and sent their supporters onto the streets.

Peru is often described as a democracy without parties. The party system disintegrated in the 1990s and was never rebuilt. In its place came a sequence of improvised candidacies and personal electoral vehicles that rise and fall with their founders. For the first-round vote on 12 April, the largest ballot paper in Peru’s history listed 35 candidates. Fujimori came first with just 17.19 per cent. Ultimately, most Peruvians didn’t vote for either candidate who made the runoff. A president elected on that basis has a mandate so weak that rivals can dispute it from day one, and they do.

Congressional seats scatter across dozens of parties, none of which dominates. But parties can combine to reach the two-thirds threshold needed to invoke a constitutional clause to impeach and remove a president on the grounds of ‘permanent moral incapacity’, a mechanism Peru’s constitution leaves deliberately vague. The Congress elected in 2021 removed three presidents in one term.

Authoritarian incentives

The constitutional mechanism that enables political instability is the reason Fujimori’s presidency could be dangerous. As she enters office with a razor-thin margin and no congressional majority, she faces an immediate strategic choice. She can seek compromise with her opponents, but this might signal that the threat of impeachment works, inviting it. Or she can move to concentrate power and weaken the institutions that constrain the executive, denying her opponents the tools they could use to remove her.

Everything points towards the second option. Most presidents recently removed by Congress were, at the time of their removal, attempting to govern within the rules, and the rules were weaponised against them. Pedro Castillo tried a different approach, dissolving Congress pre-emptively to forestall his impeachment. He was immediately arrested and removed. A politician who has watched this dynamic consume eight predecessors might conclude that the only way to survive is to change the game.

Keiko’s father ruled Peru from 1990 to 2000 as an elected president who progressively dismantled the institutions that constrained him. Two years into his first term, citing the simultaneous crises of hyperinflation and insurgency, he dissolved Congress and suspended the constitution. The emergency was real, but it was also an opportunity. Fujimori rewrote the constitution to entrench executive power, won re-election in 1995 and then won a fraud-tainted third term before being forced from office within months. His government became synonymous with grand corruption and human rights atrocities, including the forced sterilisation of over 272,000 mostly Indigenous women. After he was forced out in 2000, he was convicted of homicide and kidnapping, and imprisoned.

The constitution Alberto Fujimori wrote to entrench his power is still in force. The moral incapacity clause that the 1993 constitution retained – useful to Fujimori when he controlled Congress – has become the primary weapon congressional majorities have used to remove president after president. The most significant recent constitutional change, the reinstatement of a two-chamber Congress, may end up increasing congressional power. This is the system Keiko now has to deal with.

The costs of dysfunction

Peru’s dysfunction has long been sustained by a comforting fiction: that while politics is chaotic, the economy runs itself. Macro fundamentals have remained relatively stable. Inflation in 2025 ran at around 1.5 per cent, and the economy grew 3.4 per cent in 2024. But economic growth has roughly halved over a decade of turmoil. Poverty, at 27.6 per cent in 2024, remains above pre-pandemic levels. Homicides stand at 10.7 per 100,000 people, alongside an epidemic of extortion.

Freedoms are deteriorating and those who protest pay the highest price. In 2025, attempts to change the pension system triggered Gen Z-led protests that quickly expressed broader anger at corruption, insecurity and political dysfunction. Security forces responded with violence. In December 2024, the CIVICUS Monitor, which tracks civic space conditions globally, downgraded Peru to repressed status, its second-worst rating, citing years of escalating state violence and the systematic harassment of human rights defenders and journalists, who political figures routinely smear as terrorists and traitors.

In March 2025, Congress passed a law giving the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation extensive powers to control, censor and persecute civil society organisations that receive foreign funding, threatening fines of up to US$720,000 and criminalising any use of foreign funds to support legal action against the Peruvian state. It is, in effect, a law against accountability.

Danger ahead

Keiko Fujimori ran a law-and-order campaign under the slogan ‘Fujimori returns, order returns’, casting the fight against organised crime as a sequel to her father’s 1990s war against insurgency and promising mass deployments of police and military forces. Her party championed a 2025 amnesty law shielding security forces and civilian armed groups from prosecution for disappearances, killings and torture during that conflict, in direct defiance of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Keiko has been evasive about her father’s atrocities and has recast human rights as a matter of access to basic services rather than accountability for past abuses. Her record offers no grounds for optimism about civic space or democratic norms.

Keiko’s father justified breaking the rules that constrained him by pointing to insurgency and economic collapse. Keiko faces no insurgency and no hyperinflation, so if she moves to concentrate power, she will have to find her own justification, perhaps in a crime wave, a security emergency or a conspiracy of her enemies. The Fujimorist playbook could come back with a vengeance.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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Une autre raison qui empêche les femmes d'atteindre l'orgasme avec leur partenaire est la difficulté à parler ouvertement de ce qu'elles apprécient pendant les rapports sexuels.

Six fans of the Black Stars are living proof of how football can drive supporters to extreme lengths to follow their team.

Whether it is the middle or working classes, or even the well-to-do, life can start to shrink in the face of extreme weather. Credit: Shutterstock

By Philippe Benoit
PARIS, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

If you pay close attention to the rhetoric regarding climate change (at least in those forums still allowed to use the term), there has been a disturbing emerging trend among some climate-concerned thought leaders, as epitomized by Bill Gates’s letter to COP30 last fall.

In it, Mr. Gates argues that climate change is principally a problem facing poorer countries: “Although climate change will have serious consequences – particularly for the people in the poorest countries – it will not lead to humanity’s demise. People will be able to live and thrive in most places on Earth for the foreseeable future.”

In many ways, Mr. Gates is correct: the people living in the poorest countries are particularly vulnerable to climate change, and the Earth will continue to be able to support humanity for decades and more. But what the recent record heat wave across Europe has served to remind those of us in more affluent countries is that there are different ways of living — and that living under a heat dome of near-40-degrees Celsius (over 100 degrees Fahrenheit) can stop us from thriving.

This recent European heat wave points to how climate change is also a menace to wealthier countries … today and more so tomorrow when rising CO2 emissions drive even more frequent and severe weather events

Whether it is the middle or working classes, or even the well-to-do, life can start to shrink in the face of extreme weather. It was ironic (perhaps the better word is sad) to see a number of events during London’s Climate Action Week cancelled because of soaring temperatures.

Staying home often becomes the best option, but it only really works as a refuge if you can afford air conditioning.

Those without need to hope to find the rare air-conditioned mall or other commercial space to escape to.

Probably the only ones who remain impervious to surging temperatures are the very rich who can jump on a plane at a moment’s notice to flee to another part of the globe that isn’t facing a heat wave. And all the while, the high temperatures and resulting surge in air-conditioning demand are putting a severe strain on Europe’s electricity grids, raising the possibility of even more disruptive blackouts.

Some analysts have argued that this record heat wave is being driven by the accumulation of high levels of CO2 in the atmosphere generated by the burning of fossil fuels. The analysis linking this particular heat wave to fossil fuel use is complex and beyond my competence (I am an energy expert, not an atmospheric specialist).

However, what is clear from scientists is that we can expect more of these types of extreme weather events as we continue to pour massive amounts of additional CO2 into our atmosphere from the combustion of fossil fuels (currently, over 35 gigatons each year).

Distressingly, climate change will mess with our lives in many ways beyond extreme heat. From wildfires that burn businesses and homes (including of the wealthy as last year’s fires in Hollywood showed), to higher winds that knock down electricity poles and trees, to reoccurring flooding that ravage towns (as Germany has experienced), to an uptick in heat-related deaths and other climate-related health risks, all the while simultaneously slowing economic activity as nature wreaks havoc on the normal ordering of our lives, jobs and economies. It may not add up to a climate apocalypse, but it is far from a minor inconvenience simply to be ignored.

And importantly, as the old Bachman-Turner Overdrive song says, when it comes to the destructive power of climate change, “You Ain’t Seen Nothing Yet.” Indeed, we can expect worse in the future if we don’t curtail greenhouse gas emissions.

Yes, climate change will have a particularly severe impact on the world’s poorest countries. In that regard, Mr. Gates is totally correct. But this recent European heat wave points to how climate change is also a menace to wealthier countries … today and more so tomorrow when rising CO2 emissions drive even more frequent and severe weather events.

So, when politicians and pundits try to limit the impact of climate change to the world’s poorest, or worse, try to wipe it out of our political and policy discourse, let us remember these past weeks and that, aside from the uber rich, climate change is a threat to all.

Philippe Benoit is managing director for Global Infrastructure Advisory Services 2050, specializing in international energy and climate issues.

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Des dizaines de milliers de Héréros et de Namas ont été tués entre 1904 et 1908 par les troupes impériales allemandes dans la colonie du Sud-Ouest africain, actuelle Namibie. Leurs descendants, traumatisés, privés de leurs terres ancestrales et marginalisés par le pouvoir central, s'estiment (…) / Namibie, Allemagne, Colonisation, Génocide

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Le 14 octobre 2023, une nette majorité d'Australiens se prononçait par référendum contre une réforme constitutionnelle qui aurait dû créer un comité consultatif permettant aux peuples autochtones de donner leur avis sur les politiques les concernant. Au cœur de l'« outback », la population (…) / Australie, Aborigènes, Frontières, Droits des minorités, Autodétermination des peuples

A Nyan One Way Effector (OWE) was launched from the experimental testbed vessel XV Patrick Blackett while the ship was underway off the south coast of England.

The trial, which according to image data took place in early June 2026, is billed as the next step towards the operational integration of one way effector (OWE) drones into the British military. The Nyan OWE, designed by BAE Systems subsidiary Callen-Lenz, was previously tested from land by British Army personnel in Estonia.

The Royal Navy has successfully launched a strike-capable drone from a ship at sea, marking a significant step forward in the UK’s drive to create a hybrid naval force to defend against evolving threats. | Source: Crown Copyright 2026

Organised under Operation Neptune Reach, the launch brought together personnel from the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and the British Army. Launching an OWE drone from a Royal Navy vessel has been listed as the first goal of Project VANTAGE, with latter stages focused on spreading OWE launch capability to vessels across the fleet, up to and including the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. This is a key part of the Ministry of Defence’s aim to transform the Royal Navy into a ‘hybrid navy’, leveraging a tailored blend of crewed and uncrewed systems with the mantra ‘crewed where necessary, uncrewed wherever possible‘.

.@BAESystems @callenlenz Nyan One-Way Effector launched from @XVPTBK https://t.co/KR68KfHm3I pic.twitter.com/VA8vH69274

— Navy Lookout (@NavyLookout) July 3, 2026

Lieutenant Commander David Burton, Maritime OWE capability sponsor, Royal Navy, said: “This trial makes a significant step forward in delivering Maritime One-Way Effectors at pace.

“Under Project Vantage we are planning to integrate these capabilities into the Hybrid Navy, combining crewed platforms with uncrewed systems to expand reach, increase tempo and enhance lethality. Working closely with our army colleagues, this activity demonstrates how we are accelerating Atlantic Strike concepts into practical, deployable capabilities of the Fleet,” he added.

Luke Pollard MP, Minister of State for Defence Readiness and Industry, said: “Britain is serious about the transition to a Hybrid Navy with new, powerful drones at the heart of the Royal Navy. By bringing together Army and Navy expertise to field strike drones from a ship at sea, we are accelerating the capabilities our forces need to stay ahead of our adversaries.”

 

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A post shared by 26th Regiment Royal Artillery (@26royalartillery)

The Nyan OWE, designed for precision strike missions, is powered by a small ‘microturbine’ jet engine, and has a wingspan of 2.9 metres. In a February 2026 direct award contract notice, the MoD noted it as the only off-the-shelf product of its type registered with the UK Military Aircraft Register, stating: “it is the only feasible option to bring into service in the near term on the grounds of safety and legality”.

British Army crews in Estonia move a Nyan OWE on the ground. | Source: via BAE Systems

Matt Foster, CEO of BAE Systems’ Callen-Lenz, says over 1,000 Nyan units have been produced so far, and it has proven itself during land-based trials. “Now it has successfully demonstrated its ability to add real value in a maritime environment too. These trials reflect strong collaboration across the services and industry, highlighting the pace at which we can deliver innovation to advance the UK’s integrated, multi-domain defence capability.”

The drone was launched from a rail installed on the Patrick Blackett’s rear deck, and then directed towards a pre-designated target. Data from the test is now being analysed by a specialist Royal Navy team as well as the Royal Air Force’s Air and Space Warfare Centre (ASWC).

The Royal Navy has successfully launched a strike-capable drone from a ship at sea, marking a significant step forward in the UK’s drive to create a hybrid naval force to defend against evolving threats. | Source: Crown Copyright 2026 XV Patrick Blackett 

The futuristic all-black trials vessel XV Patrick Blackett was acquired by the Royal Navy in 2022, and officially began acceptance trials in February 2023. Although not a commissioned Royal Navy vessel, it is crewed by Royal Navy personnel and is wholly owned by the UK Government. 

Its primary role is supporting trials of uncrewed surface and sub-surface vessels, which are in line to become a major part of the Royal Navy’s overall fleet structure in the coming years. 

Confimation of the new RN construction plan, as radical as Fisher’s new navy. These were revealed in the recent Frazer-Nash NDP renders (below).

Type ?? Common Combat Vessel, smaller crewed command hub (possibly AH140 based?) to be in-service by early 2030s.
Type 91 – uncrewed… https://t.co/NJcFFPFeE3 pic.twitter.com/l2mpWVInfI

— JamesFennell MBE (@FennellJW) June 29, 2026

The ship’s large, open rear deck area is ideal for frequent configuration changes to support different programs. In this case, it provides ample room for the rail launcher. In one previous exercise, the deck area has even been used as a target area for dummy bombs dropped from a drone. 

UAV Roton conducts a successful artificial bomb drop on XV Patrick Blackett as part of a training exercise in Portugal during exercise REPMUS24. | Source: LPhot Daniel Bladen/Crown Copyright 2024

A lesser seen but vitally important additional part of XV Patrick Blackett’s duties is pioneering the use of quantum navigation equipment at sea. These systems use atom interferometry to provide inertial navigation, meaning that it could provide the answer to the problems posed by the vulnerability of GPS. Additionally, quantum navigation would work in places where GPS simply can’t – under the sea, underground, or in some of the few locations in the world where access to reliable global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) cannot be guaranteed.

The first UK test of airborne quantum navigation systems took place from MoD Boscombe Down in 2024, backed by BAE Systems and Qinetiq. 

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Roland Marchal, chercheur au Centre de recherches internationales de Sciences Po et spécialiste de l’Afrique, était l’invité de France 24 pour évoquer la situation des civils au Soudan, en particulier à El-Obeid, ville assiégée qui retient l’attention de l’ONU. Alors que les Forces de soutien rapide poursuivent leur progression vers l’est dans une guerre qui dure depuis trois ans et disposent notamment de drones dans les combats autour de la ville, le chercheur estime toutefois peu crédible un scénario de prise d’El-Obeid par les paramilitaires.

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Several French business heavyweights will join the French delegation heading to Damascus with French President Emmanuel Macron next week. Those [...]

Le Conseil des droits de l’homme de l’ONU s’est réuni en urgence pour évoquer le risque d’une attaque imminente des Forces de soutien rapide contre la ville assiégée d’El-Obeid, au Soudan. Dans un pays ravagé par plus de trois ans de guerre entre l’armée et les FSR, les combats ont déjà fait des dizaines de milliers de morts et déplacé près de 12 millions de personnes, et les ONG alertent sur des exactions et des accusations de crimes graves.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Áine Feeney.

As Members gather for the last plenary session before the summer recess, their agenda covers enlargement, foreign affairs, competitiveness, the EU budget, agriculture, social security and the environment. On Tuesday morning, a debate will follow a presentation of the programme of activities of the Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which began on 1 July. On Wednesday morning, Members will hear Council and European Commission statements on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 18‑19 June 2026.

EU-Mexico relations

Bilateral relations between the EU and Mexico have been bolstered by the current framework since 2000. On Tuesday, Parliament is due to decide whether to give its consent to the conclusion of two instruments to update this framework, the EU-Mexico Political, Economic and Cooperation Strategic Partnership Agreement (Modernised Global Agreement, MGA) and an interim Trade Agreement (iTA), both of which were signed by the EU and Mexico in May 2026. Parliament remains in favour of modernising the MGA, with a joint report by the International Trade (INTA) and AFET committees welcoming it as a step towards further economic expansion that could benefit EU companies and farmers. The INTA committee is due to vote on a draft recommendation on the conclusion of the iTA before the plenary vote.

Passenger rights

Lower ticket prices and a wider choice of routes are not the only results of air transport liberalisation. On Monday, Members are expected to discuss an agreement to revise the air passenger rights framework to better protect passengers during increasingly common travel disruption. Delayed in the Council for over a decade, Parliament has shown consistent support for measures to protect air passengers and their rights. Parliament negotiators reached a political agreement in conciliation with the Council in June 2026. The agreement maintains the three-hour threshold for compensation for flight delays and strengthens passenger rights including on rerouting options, protection for missed connections and reimbursement for unused vouchers.

Social security when working abroad

A reform of EU social security rules aims to help citizens living or working in another EU country and better distribute responsibilities between EU countries. Members are set to vote on a provisional agreement on the move to modernise the rules on Monday. Parliament’s negotiators maintained mandatory prior notifications for the construction sector in the agreed text, meaning that authorities of the home Member State would be notified if someone works in another Member State. Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) confirmed the agreement in April 2026 and Parliament and the Council now need to formally adopt the new social security rules.

East Asia relations

The geopolitical situation in East Asia has grown more volatile as the region experiences increased security challenges triggered by authoritarian regimes. On Monday evening, Members are expected to vote on an AFET committee recommendation, which affirms the need to deepen cooperation with partners in the region, including Japan, Korea, ASEAN and Taiwan. Parliament also recommends establishing a comprehensive EU-Taiwan cooperation framework, in addition to strengthening EU engagement with regional security initiatives and diplomatic efforts to prevent further escalation in East Asia. 

Fertiliser prices

The crisis in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has caused an increase in fertiliser prices, placing a significant financial burden on farmers. On Tuesday, Members are set to vote on a proposal for a regulation to provide temporary common agricultural policy (CAP) support, which would offer exceptional support to farmers most affected by the soaring prices, including the possibility of increased advances on direct payments through existing CAP envelopes. Given the urgency, Parliament decided to consider the proposal without preparing a report, to enable farmers to make prompt decisions on buying fertilisers for the year ahead.

28th tax regime

The EU’s plans to allow companies to register as an ‘EU Inc.’, recognised across all Member States, under a ’28th regime’, are central to its competitiveness agenda, aimed at simplifying rules for companies to scale up in the single market. Complementing the legislative proposal already on the table, Members are expected to vote on an own-initiative report from the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), on Thursday, on the feasibility of a 28th tax regime and its potential to support competitiveness by simplifying and harmonising corporate taxation.

Environmental crime

Environmental crimes can have a devastating impact, yet they are difficult to detect and prosecute. Parliament has repeatedly called for measures to combat such crimes. On Wednesday, Parliament is scheduled to vote on endorsement of the EU’s ratification of the Council of Europe’s new Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law. A report from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee recommends ratification, concluding that the convention is consistent with the EU directive. The new convention establishes minimum requirements for the criminalisation of environmental offences related to activities such as pollution, destruction of biodiversity and improper handling of hazardous waste.

EU Budget

To enter a 2025 budget surplus of €2.1 billion as revenue in the 2026 budget, on Tuesday Parliament is set to consider the Council’s position on draft amending budget No 1/2026 (DAB 1/2026). While endorsing the proposal, a report adopted by the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) welcomes that higher own resources are driving the surplus rather than underspending, but reiterates its long-standing view that revenue from fines and fees should strengthen the EU budget instead of lowering national contributions, and calls for more sustainable EU own resources in the next multiannual financial framework.

Annual enlargement reports

Enlargement remains a prominent topic at this plenary session. On Tuesday, Members are expected to debate separately three reports prepared by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), on Ukraine, Moldova and Serbia. The report on Ukraine stresses the need for a ‘sustainable’ ceasefire and a peace agreement reached with the participation of the EU, while also recognising Ukraine’s European integration as a strategic priority for the Union.

AFET’s report on Moldova commends the country’s commitment to EU accession, condemning attempts by Russian efforts to destabilise Moldova’s path to accession through interference campaigns.

As a result of political instability in the country, Serbia’s EU accession process remains at an impasse. The AFET report recalls that accession is conditional on respect for EU values and democracy, reiterating the need for Serbia to affirm its geopolitical orientation towards the EU, particularly in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Further reading

• Agenda
• Priority dossiers under the Irish EU Council Presidency
• 2025 Commission report on Ukraine
• 2025 Commission report on Moldova
• 2025 Commission report on Serbia
• EU-Mexico agreements
• The changing geopolitical situation in East Asia
• Temporary CAP support to help farmers cope with high fertiliser prices
• Feasibility of a 28th tax regime and its potential to support EU competitiveness
• Air passenger rights
• Developments in social security coordination
• EU accession to the Council of Europe Convention on Environmental Crime
• Draft amending budget No 1/2026: 2025 surplus

This Policy Paper examines the renewed debate on completing the EU Single Market. It argues that the challenge is not simply to adopt more EU legislation or to choose between regulations and directives, but to turn formal market access into operational market integration. Focusing on capital markets, services and governance, the paper shows that fragmentation persists when legal convergence is not matched by implementation capacity, supervisory alignment and political incentives for compliance. Completing the Single Market means making Europe the natural scale for firms, capital and innovation.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Dr Apostolos Samaras, Research Fellow, European Programme ‘Ariane Condellis’, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).

Introduction: From Single Market Completion to European Scale

“All those who, in trying to meet the economic challenges set out by the treaty of Rome, neglected the political dimension have failed. As long as [those] challenges will be addressed exclusively in an economic perspective, disregarding their political angle, we will run – I am afraid – into repeated failures” 

Paul-Henri Spaak, Discours à la Chambre des Représentants, 14 June 1961.

To date the Single Market is the EU’s most significant economic achievement. However, its relevance depends on its ability to support European competitiveness under rapidly changing global conditions. In January 2025, the European Commission unveiled the so-called “competitiveness compass”, a fresh strategy aimed at revitalising EU’s dynamism (European Commission, 2025a). The Commission views competitiveness as a multifaceted concept, structured around several crucial elements including the functioning of the Single Market, access to capital, innovation, skills and infrastructure (European Commission, 2024). Within this framework, a well-functioning internal market is presented as a central condition for enabling businesses to scale, facilitating investment and supporting productivity growth across the EU.

The European Commission has consistently identified hurdles affecting the functioning of the Single Market, particularly in services and areas requiring administrative coordination (European Commission, 2020a). The aforementioned barriers increase costs for businesses, reduce legal certainty and discourage cross-border activity. Moreover, recent policy reports place these issues in a broader economic context. Draghi (2024) links Europe’s investment gap to structural inefficiencies, including fragmentation within the Single Market. Letta (2024) similarly argues that the Single Market must evolve to support scale, speed and strategic resilience. Institutional policy analysis reinforces this assessment, e.g. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that Europe’s growth potential is restrained by weak productivity and limited scale (IMF, 2024).

The European Council has endorsed a renewed focus on the Single Market as a key driver of competitiveness, emphasising the need to remove barriers and improve its functioning.

These findings are indicated in current EU political priorities. The European Council has endorsed a renewed focus on the Single Market as a key driver of competitiveness, emphasising the need to remove barriers and improve its functioning (European Council, 2026). Market fragmentation is affecting investment decisions, innovation, productivity growth and the global position of European businesses, also having broader strategic implications. As recent policy analysis emphasises, the absence of an integrated internal market limits businesses’ ability to scale and raises capital costs, weakening Europe’s position in an increasingly bloc-based global economy, where size and coordination determine competitiveness (Jacques Delors Institute, 2026).

This paper argues that the next phase of Single Market reform should not be framed simply as a choice between more or less EU legislation. The central question is whether EU legal instruments, enforcement mechanisms and supervisory structures can convert formal market access into operational market integration. Capital markets and services show that fragmentation persists where legal convergence is not matched by administrative capacity, supervisory alignment and political incentives for compliance.

The Problem: What Kind of Fragmentation?

 Α precise understanding of fragmentation requires distinguishing between its main sources. Two factors are particularly relevant. The first is incomplete regulatory convergence. […] The second is implementation failure. Even where appropriate EU legislation exists, its application may still be uneven. 

A precise understanding of fragmentation requires distinguishing between its main sources. Two factors are particularly relevant. The first is incomplete regulatory convergence. In certain areas, EU legislation does not fully eliminate cross-border burdens. Capital markets provide a clear example, where differences in insolvency law, taxation in cross-border investing and market infrastructure continue to create barriers to integration. The second is implementation failure. Even where appropriate EU legislation exists, its application may still be uneven. Although not confined to Single Market law, the persistence of infringement litigation before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirms that uneven application remains a structural problem in EU law enforcement, with 200 infringement actions brought between 2021 and 2025 (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2026). Enforcement mechanisms are often slow and reactive. The Commission has acknowledged the need to strengthen enforcement as part of its broader strategy (European Commission, 2022).

At a deeper level, fragmentation signifies a structural trade-off. Greater market integration entails constraints on national regulatory autonomy, especially in areas such as finance, taxation or supervision. 

Moreover, Member States apply EU law within national systems shaped by domestic institutional structures and policy priorities. This can create incentives to preserve regulatory discretion or to delay reforms, particularly in politically sensitive areas, even where legal obligations are clear. At a deeper level, fragmentation signifies a structural trade-off. Greater market integration entails constraints on national regulatory autonomy, especially in areas such as finance, taxation or supervision. The extent to which this trade-off is genuinely accepted varies across Member States and over time, shaping the pace and the depth of integration.

These factors can be interlinked in practice. Regulatory divergence may endure because implementation is weak, whilst domestic political incentives sometimes discourage convergence. The European Commission’s May 2025 Single Market Strategy identifies the “Terrible Ten” barriers disrupting the market, such as restrictive national services rules, long delays in standard-setting and overly complex EU rules (European Commission, 2025b). Evidence from the services sector exemplifies this dynamic. Despite existing EU legislation, barriers remain widespread, reflecting both regulatory and implementation challenges (European Commission, 2020a).

The Digital Single Market provides a useful illustration of this broader pattern. Recent analysis identifies mutually reinforcing bottlenecks: uneven regulatory implementation, nationally siloed infrastructure, barriers to data flows and skills mobility, and insufficient growth-stage finance. This confirms that Single Market reform cannot rely on legal harmonisation alone. Uniform rules must be connected to enforcement capacity, digital infrastructure, public procurement, capital market depth and practical compliance tools if firms are to scale across borders (Aarnio et al., 2026).

IMF staff estimates suggest that persisting internal barriers within Europe may be equivalent to an indicative 110% tariff on services and 44% for manufactured goods […] recent audit evidence finds that only around 20% of services in the EU are provided cross-border, while approximately 60% of barriers identified more than two decades ago remain in place.

IMF staff estimates suggest that persisting internal barriers within Europe may be equivalent to an indicative 110% tariff on services and 44% for manufactured goods (Kammer, 2025). This shows the economic scale of fragmentation. European consumers and businesses face these costs through reduced competition, increased prices and lower productivity. Moreover, recent audit evidence finds that only around 20% of services in the EU are provided cross-border, while approximately 60% of barriers identified more than two decades ago remain in place (European Court of Auditors, 2026). At the same time, weaknesses in prioritisation, enforcement and monitoring suggest that fragmentation persists due to regulatory inconsistencies across the bloc and limited EU strategic capacity to remove the most significant obstacles (European Court of Auditors, 2026).

A competitiveness agenda that creates startups but fails to support scaleups would leave Europe’s structural scale problem unresolved.

Kyriakos Pierrakakis, the President of the Eurogroup, has stressed that Europe faces a pivotal decision: it must swiftly advance toward greater financial integration or face the risk of falling behind in a world that is rapidly changing (ANA-MPA, 2026a). More specifically, Europe’s startup problem is increasingly a scaleup problem. Eurobarometer evidence supports the view that the Single Market should be judged not only by market access, but by its capacity to help firms grow across borders. A competitiveness agenda that creates startups but fails to support scaleups would leave Europe’s structural scale problem unresolved (European Commission, 2025c). EU innovative startups and scaleups continue to face fragmented regulatory regimes, high compliance costs, limited access to late-stage capital, skills shortages and difficulties in using cross-border procurement and institutional markets (Thomadakis & Marcus, 2025).

…EU stock markets have a combined capitalisation of roughly 60% of EU GDP, while the two largest US exchanges alone exceed 200% of US GDP

A credible SIU should therefore be judged by whether it enables firms to scale inside the EU, with institutions such as the European Investment Bank helping to mobilise capital (ANA-MPA, 2026b). It is noteworthy that EU stock markets have a combined capitalisation of roughly 60% of EU GDP, while the two largest US exchanges alone exceed 200% of US GDP (Jacques Delors Institute, 2026). This disparity highlights the structural difficulty of mobilising capital at scale within a fragmented Single Market. The SIU framing places greater emphasis on the role of households and institutional investors, as well as on the integration of savings products and capital markets. Nonetheless, mobilising savings depends on trust in financial systems, consistent regulatory frameworks and efficient cross-border infrastructure.

FIGURE 1: Market barriers and the rationale for the SIU

 

Legal Integration and its Limits

The EU’s legislation governing the Single Market is prima facie comprehensive. It encompasses primary law provisions, specified and complemented by extensive secondary law. This common binding framework establishes directly enforceable rights for economic actors and prohibits a wide array of restrictions on cross-border activities. In that respect, EU law is sound and unavoidable.

Even though it has been established that EU legislation prohibits unjustified restrictions on the free movement of capital, services, goods, and persons, it certainly does not eliminate the conditions under which those restrictions arise. 

However, the strength of EU law should not obscure its limits. Even though it has been established that EU legislation prohibits unjustified restrictions on the free movement of capital, services, goods, and persons, it certainly does not eliminate the conditions under which those restrictions arise. Nor does it ensure convergence in administrative practices, regulatory approaches or institutional capacity. These are structural limitations, since the implementation of EU law depends on national authorities that operate within different legal traditions, administrative systems and policy priorities. This leads to the familiar paradox that the same EU legal rule may produce different outcomes across Member States.

…there is increasing support for regulations (Wax & Ionta, 2026), which are binding and directly applicable, reducing the scope for divergence. 

Policy debates have focused on this issue, which is also intrinsically correlated to national sovereignty concerns. Directives, as binding legal acts that allow flexibility in national transposition, granting Member States some national discretion to decide how to achieve the set objectives, have often resulted in divergent implementation. In response, there is increasing support for regulations (Wax & Ionta, 2026), which are binding and directly applicable, reducing the scope for divergence. The shift towards regulations is already visible in EU legislative practice: in recent years regulations have become the dominant instrument among legislative acts adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure (Publications Office of the European Union, n.d.). This approach aims to address possible legal confusion among Member States, without being a panacea for every problem, since ultimately all EU rules depend on national enforcement. Legal uniformity, in that sense, mitigates one aspect of market fragmentation, whilst not addressing other disparities in administrative capacity or supervisory practices.

Recent OECD evidence links regulatory compliance costs to weaker productivity and lower business dynamism.

Recent OECD evidence links regulatory compliance costs to weaker productivity and lower business dynamism (Andrews et al., 2026). This matters for the Single Market because firms experience EU law also as compliance tasks, administrative procedures and enforcement practices. Regulations can reduce one important source of fragmentation by limiting divergent national transposition, but they do not remove the practical costs of compliance. Evidence on cumulative compliance costs for SMEs shows that burdens often arise from national interpretation, monitoring and enforcement practices, as well as from the accumulation of obligations over time (European Commission, 2015). These costs may affect firms’ decisions to innovate, enter new markets or expand across borders. The implication is that the choice of legal instrument matters, but it must be accompanied by clear implementation planning, proportionate enforcement and attention to administrative capacity. Otherwise, directly applicable rules may still produce uneven market effects across Member States (European Commission, 2015; Capuano, 2025).

The increasing reliance on regulations should be treated as a governance choice, not as a shortcut to integration.

Even where EU rules are directly binding, Member States remain central to how their effects materialise for businesses and citizens (OECD, 2025). The increasing reliance on regulations should be treated as a governance choice, not as a shortcut to integration. Regulations can limit national divergence, but where they postpone application, rely heavily on implementing acts, or require substantial national administrative adjustment, they may reproduce some of the same practical problems usually associated with directives (Capuano, 2025). The question is therefore not whether regulations are preferable in abstract terms, but under what conditions they can produce uniform market effects without increasing legal complexity or weakening accountability.

Policy discussions have also explored the use of optional EU-wide legal regimes, such as the so-called “28th regime” corporate legal framework, as a means of reducing fragmentation without requiring full harmonization.

Policy discussions have also explored the use of optional EU-wide legal regimes, such as the so-called “28th regime” corporate legal framework, as a means of reducing fragmentation without requiring full harmonization (Hallak, 2026). It would allow businesses to operate under a single set of EU rules across Member States, bypassing divergent national frameworks. This approach is clearly manifesting an attempt to reconcile regulatory uniformity with political limitations on deeper harmonisation. It aims to be a transition towards a legal framework specifically designed to more effectively facilitate cross-border activities in Europe. It goes hand in hand with the argument that before venturing into the global market, European companies should prioritise strengthening their presence within Europe.

Capital Markets as a Stress Test: From Free Movement to SIU

Regarding the freedom of capital, primary EU law is particularly liberal. Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits all restrictions on capital movements within the EU and between Member States and third countries. The CJEU has even interpreted EU law on capital and payments in a dynamic way that reinforces its role as a central pillar of market integration (Samaras, 2022). Even so, further provisions in the TFEU stipulate a number of exceptions to the principle of free movement of capital. Article 65 TFEU stipulates derogations related to taxation, prudential supervision of financial institutions, public policy and public security.

The free movement of capital is enshrined in primary EU law, but in practice it relies largely on trust in banks, institutions, and the country’s economic performance.

Sometimes the implementation of the free movement of capital lacks certainty. As an example, one might cite the experience of “capital controls” in Cyprus (2013-2015) and in Greece (2015-2019) over the past decade, as it provides a picture of the realistic limits of legal integration within the Single Market under conditions of economic turmoil and financial crisis. The free movement of capital is enshrined in primary EU law, but in practice it relies largely on trust in banks, institutions, and the country’s economic performance. When that trust is broken, exceptions become the norm.

Today, although no comparable emergency capital controls are in place in the Member States, the free movement of capital within the EU is still not fully utilised. Capital markets provide a clear test of the limits of the current integration model.

The gradual process of further liberalising the Single Market is not always linear. Naturally, the banking and financial sector’s stability has been prioritised during periods of severe crisis. Exceptional measures have been adopted in the past, in line with EU law. Consequently, the EU’s economic freedoms are not absolutely guaranteed in perpetuity, regardless of the state of the Member States’ domestic economies and the solutions offered by the EU at the time. Even the most liberal Treaty freedom operates within institutional, financial and crisis-management constraints. Today, although no comparable emergency capital controls are in place in the Member States, the free movement of capital within the EU is still not fully utilised.

Capital markets provide a clear test of the limits of the current integration model. Successive CMU initiatives have addressed several layers of capital-market integration, including prospectus rules, securitisation, long-term investment funds, company disclosure through the European Single Access Point (ESAP), trading transparency, listing rules and withholding tax procedures.[1] Yet these measures have not removed deeper structural fragmentation in supervision, insolvency law, taxation, market infrastructure and growth-stage finance.

This means that companies and investors face higher transaction costs and legal uncertainty when operating across borders. The European Commission has identified these frictions as key impediments to the effective functioning of capital markets and to the broader objective of financing growth within the EU (European Commission, 2020b). Recent analysis indicates that the main obstacle to deeper capital market integration lies in the limited centralisation of supervisory powers at EU level, with the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) still lacking the authority required to ensure consistent application of rules across Member States (Gortsos, 2026).

More integrated capital markets support private risk sharing across Member States, improve the allocation of capital and enhance the resilience of the euro area to asymmetric shocks.

The European Central Bank (ECB) has also noted the macroeconomic importance of capital market integration. More integrated capital markets support private risk sharing across Member States, improve the allocation of capital and enhance the resilience of the euro area to asymmetric shocks (European Central Bank, 2024). Fragmentation reduces these benefits, it reinforces reliance on bank-based financing and constrains access to risk capital, particularly for innovative and high-growth businesses. The CMU agenda has addressed some of these issues through targeted legislative initiatives, facilitating cross-border investment and promoting supervisory convergence. Nevertheless, structural differences in national frameworks are still problematic in a cross-border context.

The initiative for a SIU, presented by the European Commission in March 2025, suggests a recalibration into a holistic approach that incorporates the entire EU financial system, attempting to mobilise European savings more effectively and to channel them into productive investment within the EU.

The initiative for a SIU, presented by the European Commission in March 2025, suggests a recalibration into a holistic approach that incorporates the entire EU financial system, attempting to mobilise European savings more effectively and to channel them into productive investment within the EU (European Commission, 2025d). It is designed to transform the foundational work of the two main CMU Action Plans (i.e. the pioneering 2015 CMU Action Plan and the 2020 CMU Action Plan), along with the parallel efforts to develop the Banking Union, into a high-impact, more inclusive and citizen-focused, financial engine. This is closely linked to concerns about the EU’s investment gap and the need to finance large-scale transitions, including digitalisation and decarbonisation (Draghi, 2024).

Towards a results-oriented EU governance approach

The governance of the Single Market is based largely on decentralised implementation.

The governance of the Single Market is based largely on decentralised implementation. Member States are responsible for applying EU law, while the European Commission -acting as the “guardian of the Treaties”- monitors compliance and initiates enforcement when required. It is unavoidable that structural challenges and disputes rise from time to time, since the application of EU law varies in practice across the 27 EU Member States. The infringement procedure against a Member State that fails to implement EU legislation remains a crucial enforcement tool. However, despite its usefulness, it addresses specific Member State breaches of EU law, not systemic patterns of violations. The Commission has framed enforcement as a strategic and preventive function, rather than merely a reactive infringement mechanism, with particular emphasis on own-initiative investigations, incorrect transposition of directives, and infringements that obstruct fundamental freedoms or the effective functioning of the Single Market (European Commission, 2022).

…the main challenge for the EU continues to be ineffective governance.

The completion of the Single Market also requires a credible delivery framework that combines, other than political commitment, a coherent legislative package and clear timelines (Jacques Delors Institute, 2026). Recent EU initiatives point towards a more targeted and measurable enforcement strategy. The “2026 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness” report introduces the first annual “Single Market Enforcement Agenda”, focused on priority barriers such as late payments and obstacles in construction and installation services linked to the green transition, while simplification packages seek to reduce administrative burdens and make Single Market rules easier to apply in practice (European Commission, 2026). Nonetheless, institutional limits hinder enforcement. Coordination mechanisms rely on cooperation and do not always generate strong incentives for compliance. Consequently, the main challenge for the EU continues to be ineffective governance.

A turning point appears to be marked by more recent developments towards a results-oriented EU governance approach. The joint “One Europe, One Market” roadmap, agreed in late April 2026 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, seeks to introduce a structured implementation framework through priority legislative deliverables and clear timelines, as well as regular monitoring through quarterly stocktaking. Europe’s fragmentation was translated into a structured work programme built around five priorities: simplifying rules, deepening Single Market integration, strengthening trade, reducing energy prices while advancing decarbonisation, and driving the digital and AI transformation, supported by more than forty legislative and policy deliverables.

The roadmap shows the political commitment of the EU institutions for setting out concrete steps towards a more operational Single Market governance (Council of the European Union, 2026). It converts a broad competitiveness agenda into a delivery test: capital markets, energy, digital infrastructure and industrial policy are placed within one political framework, with timelines that make delays more visible and politically costly (Letta, 2026a).

FIGURE 2: “One Europe, One Market” roadmap (April 2026), from political commitment to measurable delivery

The roadmap’s “market integration and supervision package” is particularly relevant in this respect, since the Commission’s December 2025 proposals seek to address capital-market fragmentation through changes to trading, post-trading, asset management and ESMA supervision, confirming that the SIU depends not only on new rules but on a more integrated supervisory architecture (European Commission, 2025e).

Policy Recommendations

Completing the Single Market requires targeted action. The adoption of these strategic priorities is strongly encouraged:

• Target harmonisation and implementation where fragmentation is structural: EU legislative action should focus on areas such as insolvency, taxation procedures and other market obstacles, where national discrepancies create permanent barriers. Where the Treaty basis allows it, regulations may be more effective than directives, since they reduce transposition delays and limit divergent national implementation. Moreover, the Commission should track the implementation of major Single Market initiatives early, using detailed guidance and reporting to prevent new fragmentation from emerging. Attention should be paid to reducing “gold-plating” (adding extra layers of rules at the national level), which often increases compliance costs without clear policy justification.
• Reinforce supervisory convergence in capital markets: As has been pointed out in the Draghi Report (2024), the EU lacks a single securities market regulator. The ESMA ought to be transformed to serve as the sole common regulator for all securities markets within the EU. The EU should strengthen convergence through the ESMA, reinforcing transparency and technical standards, attaining a more unified supervision of capital markets.
• Constitutional discipline for restrictions on capital movements: Past episodes of capital controls show that EU law can accommodate emergency restrictions on capital movements where they are justified, proportionate and temporary. The unresolved issue is institutional. These safeguards have operated mainly through ad hoc assessment and monitoring, rather than through a permanent framework designed to protect capital-market integration. The EU should therefore develop, first through secondary legislation and eventually through Treaty reform, a stricter constitutional discipline for the use of Article 65 TFEU. Its provisions should not be abolished, since taxation, prudential supervision and public policy/security remain legitimate public interests. Its invocation, however, should be tied to clearer EU-level conditions: notification, time limitation, strict periodic review and consistency with the objective of capital-market integration. The aim would not be to invent new legality criteria, but to make their application more predictable, reviewable and aligned with the completion of the SIU.

Conclusion

Eliminating internal obstacles across the EU is essential for enabling market dynamics to operate effectively on a large scale.

In 2024, the findings and recommendations of the Letta and Draghi reports had been met with widespread enthusiasm (Kritikos, 2024). Eliminating internal obstacles across the EU is essential for enabling market dynamics to operate effectively on a large scale. A true unified market is needed, ensuring that conducting business between Vilnius and Madrid is as seamless as it is between Athens and Thessaloniki. The competitiveness debate is therefore also a debate about scale. The EU’s difficulty is that companies, banks and capital markets are primarily organised around national markets. In a global economy shaped by continental-scale competitors from the United States and China, the relevant benchmark is whether businesses in the EU can achieve sufficient growth to establish themselves as truly European entities, rather than remaining confined to national prominence. This does not alter the fact that slow convergence may be insufficient in sectors where technological cycles and global competition move faster than EU implementation.

A more integrated Single Market needs rules that are clear and sufficiently uniform to support cross-border growth, while avoiding unnecessary procedural burdens that make compliance easier for incumbents than for new entrants.

A more integrated Single Market needs rules that are clear and sufficiently uniform to support cross-border growth, while avoiding unnecessary procedural burdens that make compliance easier for incumbents than for new entrants. National regulatory discretion may protect domestic dominant players and, possibly, reduce unwanted competitive pressure from other Member States. This might explain why many barriers still exist even when their aggregate cost to the EU economy is widely recognised. Completing the Single Market requires confronting the domestic interests that benefit from partial integration.

A functioning SIU should be assessed by whether it enables European firms to grow within Europe, rather than pushing them towards capital markets elsewhere.

Greater scale should not be understood as a goal only for large Member States or large firms. Smaller Member States and SMEs may benefit most from a genuinely integrated Single Market, because domestic scale is structurally limited. Deeper integration can expand their addressable market and create more credible paths from local innovation to European growth. Besides, Europe does not lack startups or entrepreneurial talent, but many firms face a financing and market-size ceiling once they move from creation to scaleup. A functioning SIU should be assessed by whether it enables European firms to grow within Europe, rather than pushing them towards capital markets elsewhere.

Recent EU policy developments set out the way forward regarding greater regulatory uniformity and less economic overreliance on third countries. This direction addresses important aspects of the problem. However, legal convergence does not automatically produce effective integration. The central challenge is mostly operational, since the EU has demonstrated its ability to identify barriers and design policy responses. Ensuring consistent implementation across Member States is more difficult. The long-term political sustainability of the Single Market depends also on ensuring that mobility remains a choice rather than an obligation. As emphasised in recent policy debates, deeper integration must be accompanied by economic and social cohesion in order to remain politically viable (Letta, 2026b).

Completing the Single Market should be understood not only as an economic reform, but as a condition for European resilience and sovereignty.

The link between competitiveness and European security is also central to the Single Market debate. In a global economy, fragmentation weakens the EU’s capacity to invest, innovate and act strategically. Completing the Single Market should be understood not only as an economic reform, but as a condition for European resilience and sovereignty (Letta & Lamy, 2026). It is time for the EU to compete with the dominant players, benefitting from a higher degree of autonomy by boosting its economy. For the EU this requires a decisive shift from agenda-setting to delivery. It implies departing from mediocrity, with stronger enforcement, greater administrative capacity and sustained political commitment.

Completing the Single Market means making Europe the natural scale of economic activity, rather than leaving firms, capital and innovation trapped in national markets.

From the early stages of the internal market, European policymakers recognised that incomplete integration risks reducing the market to a form of managed openness instead of a fully functioning economic space (European Commission, 1985). The struggle over the same strategic choice is still relevant today. The key question is whether Europe can transition from a culture of national protectionism to a European-scale mindset. Completing the Single Market means making Europe the natural scale of economic activity, rather than leaving firms, capital and innovation trapped in national markets.

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[1] See, indicatively, Regulation (EU) 2017/1129; Regulation (EU) 2017/2402; Regulation (EU) 2023/606; Regulation (EU) 2023/2859; Directive (EU) 2024/790; Regulation (EU) 2024/791; Regulation (EU) 2024/2809; Directive (EU) 2024/2811; Council Directive (EU) 2025/50.

Press conference with Federal Chancellor Merz and the B3 heads of state and government