European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Eszter Balázs.

INTRODUCTION

The country takes over from Denmark and will hand the baton on to Ireland. Cyprus is the last member of the presidency trio with Poland and Denmark.

State and government

The Republic of Cyprus is a presidential democracy. The president is the head of state and the head of government; there is no prime minister. This full presidential system is unique among the EU Member States.

According to the Constitution, executive power is exercised jointly by a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of the Republic, through a Council of Ministers appointed by them (seven and three ministers, respectively).

In 1963, the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and the three Turkish Cypriot ministers withdrew from government, and since then the government has been functioning by necessity only with Greek Cypriots in all ministries, the number of which was subsequently raised to 11. Moreover, the President of the Republic, according to the provisions of the relevant national legislation, has appointed five Deputy Ministers. The post of Vice-President remains vacant.

The post of Deputy Minister for European Affairs has been created especially for the Presidency. It will cease after Cyprus’s term concludes.

The President convenes and sets the agenda of the Council of Ministers. In foreign affairs, defence and security, the President has veto powers over both the legislative branch and the Council of Ministers.

The current President of the Republic is Nikos Christodoulides, in office since 1 March 2023, following presidential elections in February 2023. His term of office, as is also that of the Council of Ministers, is five years, with the next presidential elections scheduled for February 2028. President Christodoulides is independent, supported by the nationalist-centrist Democratic Party (DIKO – S&D), the social-democratic Movement for Social Democracy – Citizes’ Alliance (EDEK – S&D), and the centrist Democratic Alignment (DIPA – Renew).

Read the complete briefing on ‘Priority dossiers under the Cyprus EU Council Presidency‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sarah Sheil.

What are the challenges and issues that the European Union will have to take on in 2026? For ten years now, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) has asked its policy analysts to identify ten issues to watch in the year to come. While not exhaustive, the annual outlook produced by the Members’ Research Service seeks to explore some major political debates as well as put the spotlight on issues that are not so well known. Over a challenging and defining decade, the series has tackled themes across the European Parliament’s various fields of competence, from citizens’ policies and structural policies to the economy, digital and climate issues, to budget and international affairs.

Such periodic analysis enables us to better understand today’s opportunities and challenges. When reflecting on issues that have affected the European Union in the past decade, dramatic changes immediately come to mind: the COVID-19 pandemic, the war on Ukraine, and the shift in global power balances. But this annual exercise has also covered long-standing, recurrent issues: addressing climate change, shaping the long-term budget for Europe, monitoring the Union’s weight in global trade, and analysing the changing dynamics of the transatlantic relationship.

This tenth edition comes at a highly turbulent time in geopolitics. The balance of power in the world is shifting, and the rules-based international order now faces greater and more frequent challenges than ever before. The selection of issues for 2026 reflects this heightened focus on external policies. The publication addresses three directly affecting the EU: Ukraine’s integration into the EU, European defence capability gaps, and EU-China relations. These issues interact with other trends and developments with geopolitical consequences, such as the impact on the web of artificial intelligence (AI), the potential of Europe’s startup companies, the tougher stances on irregular migration being taken around the world, including in Europe, and challenges on climate policy and ocean protection – all covered below. All these issues, as well as the ‘normal business’ that is not highlighted in this paper but is the European Union’s daily work in delivering for its citizens, require financial means and governance. So this paper also covers the discussions on shaping Europe’s long-term budget, or multiannual financial framework, for the coming years, as well as lessons drawn from implementing the post-COVID-19 Recovery and Resilience Facility.

EPRS provides independent, objective and authoritative information to Members of the European Parliament. As with all EPRS publications, this paper is based on research, robust facts and figures, and informed analysis, with the aim of providing Members with the elements they need to do their work. Readers will find links to the previous editions of this publication listed under the ‘Further reading’ section. Analysis on countless other topics and issues requiring closer, more regular monitoring can be found in the thousands of publications that EPRS has issued over the years, enriching Parliament’s knowledge environment. We hope that this tenth edition of ‘Ten issues to watch’ will provide you with material for reflection as we enter 2026.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

© EPRS 2026

Written by Anna Flynn.

The European Parliament is fully committed to ensuring an ambitious European Union budget that meets the Union’s many challenges in the years to come. The European Commission presented its proposals for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF) on 16 July 2025. The Commission proposes a budget amounting to a total of almost €1.8 trillion in commitments over seven years (in constant 2025 prices). The MFF constitutes the EU’s long-term budgetary plan, setting a maximum level of spending (‘ceilings’) for each major category of expenditure (‘heading’) in accordance with Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

The proposed 2028-2034 budget corresponds to 1.26 % of the EU’s GNI. This includes 0.11 % of EU gross national income (GNI) for the repayment of the debt created by Next Generation EU (NGEU) grants. Excluding the NGEU repayment, the proposed post-2027 MFF reflects, in nominal terms, an increase of €367.2 billion (+29 %). However, in real terms, the increase is only 0.02 percentage points of GNI.

The national and regional partnership plans (NRPPs) proposed by the European Commission have proven particularly controversial throughout the European Parliament. They are seen as a risk of ‘renationalising’ the EU budget, as each Member State would agree their own plan with the Commission, within the constraints of allocated funding that is conditional on meeting EU priorities This raises questions about Parliament’s capacity for oversight and scrutiny. Moreover, the NRPPs merge many funds that were previously separate, such as the common agricultural policy, cohesion policy, and the common fisheries policy. Parliament’s four pro-European groups (S&D, Greens/EFA, Renew Europe, and the EPP) threatened to reject the Commission’s draft regulation on the NRPPs if it does not substantially amend its proposal.

On 9 November 2025, the Commission proposed some possible reforms to the NRPPs, such as the introduction of a 10 % spending target for agriculture, and a strengthened role for regional authorities in decision-making. However, these revisions do not address all of Parliament’s concerns. Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) continues its work on the interim report on the MFF proposals, with opinions awaited from many of the standing committees before the BUDG report goes to plenary in May 2026.

An overview of the main components of the proposed 2028-2034 MFF and an initial comparison with the 2021-2027 budget framework illustrates the Commission’s proposed division of €1.763 trillion in commitments, which Parliament’s BUDG committee finds lacks ambition.

Academia, think tanks, other EU institutions and bodies, and a variety of stakeholders are publishing a wealth of analysis and commentary on the proposed 2028-2034 MFF as it proceeds through negotiations (see our monthly digest).

Links to EPRS publications:

• ERDF – Cohesion Fund and conditions for EU support to regional policy
• Background information on the post-2027 MFF – December 2025
• Regulation on the common agricultural policy for the period 2028 to 2034
• EU budget 2028-2034: Overview of the Commission’s proposal

Other links

• The European Parliament rejects the National and Regional Partnership Plans proposal as it stands and demands an amended proposal to start negotiations (30 October 2025)
• MEPS brand von der Leyen’s EU budget ‘re-nationalisation’ (9 September 2025)

Written by Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer.

Introduction to Cyprus’s parliamentary system

Cyprus is a presidential democracy with a President directly elected by universal suffrage in a secret ballot. The President is both Head of State and Head of Government as he or she appoints the ministers and exercises executive power together with them. The President is formally invested by the Parliament, but the executive, legislative, and judicial powers are strictly separated.

The President and ministers are scrutinised by the Parliament, but they are not accountable to it. Reciprocally, the executive cannot dissolve the Parliament; only an absolute majority of the Parliament can decide to do so (Article 67 of the Constitution). The President and ministers cannot be members of the Parliament.

Legislative power is exercised by the House of Representatives, the unicameral parliament of the Republic of Cyprus. It is elected by universal and secret suffrage every five years through a system of simple proportional representation in six electoral districts. Both the President and the members of parliament are elected for five-year terms but in different years. The President does not necessarily have the support of a parliamentary majority and can govern without it.

The Constitution sets the number of members of the House of Representatives at 50 (two thirds Greek Cypriots, and one third Turkish Cypriots), but this number may be altered by the House of Representatives. Since 1985, the number of seats has been set at 80, keeping the same proportions between the two communities (Law 124/85): 56 Members come from the Greek Cypriot community, and 24 seats are reserved for Members coming from the Turkish Cypriot community – currently vacant due to the de facto division of the island. In addition, the minority religious groups of Armenians, Maronites and Latins each elect a representative who can express views but not vote.

The main role of the House of Representatives is to examine and adopt legislation, including on the state’s budget. Both the executive and the Parliament can make legislative proposals, but in practice, most are proposed by the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, this right is constrained for the Parliament, as bills it proposes should not result in any increase in budgetary expenditure.

The House of Representatives has the right to amend the Constitution, with the exception of the articles determining its form of government, the separation of powers and the bicommunal character of the state.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Parliament of Cyprus and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Flynn.

The EU and China account for nearly 30 % of global trade. The EU has defined China as a ‘partner, competitor, and systemic rival.’

One of the key, current challenges is that, following the announcement of United States’ tariffs, China announced new export controls on their rare earth elements in April and October 2025. A second package was suspended until November 2026.

At the 25th EU-China Summit in Beijing, marking 50 years of diplomatic relations, the partners discussed trade, climate change, and Russia, against an ongoing backdrop of huge geopolitical shifts.

During the July 2025 summit, the EU urged China to lift its restrictions. China’s rare earth elements are difficult to source elsewhere, and simultaneously play an imperative role in the EU’s digital, defence, and green industries. According to the European Central Bank, 80 % of European firms are three intermediaries away from rare earth element producers; highlighting the value of these materials to the EU economy.

The EU’s plan to address this vulnerable, yet vital supply, is the Critical Raw Materials Act. The aim of this regulation (among other things) is to diversify the EU’s imports, support strategic projects, and strengthen EU monitoring of supply risks.

In July 2025, Parliament adopted a resolution urging the Commission to speed up the process of implementing the Critical Raw Materials Act, condemning China’s actions as unjustified and coercive.

Moreover, The EU’s trade deficit with China (€308.4 billion in 2024), is expected to rise.

Meanwhile, China’s relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is growing, in direct competition with the EU’s objective to diversify critical raw material sources. Latin America produces large amounts of lithium and copper. By 2030, the EU’s demand for lithium is expected to increase 12-fold. Chinese companies have purchased half of the world’s largest lithium mines, and China is Latin America’s second largest trading partner today.

Nevertheless, in a joint statement following the EU-China summit, both parties reiterated that major economies should bolster climate efforts. They agreed to cooperate and lead a green transition.  

A couple of months afterwards, ahead of COP30, China submitted its nationally determined contribution (NDC), or climate targets, for 2035. China’s share of global emissions increased from 9 % in 1990 to 17 % in 2024, and this is the first time that it has agreed to an absolute greenhouse gas emissions reduction.

An additional source of contention is China’s involvement with Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. At the summit, the EU stressed China’s responsibility to uphold world order and to refrain from supporting Russia’s military agenda. At the end of October 2025, the EU’s 19th package of sanctions was adopted against Russia, including sanctions on 12 entities located in China that are supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex.

This bilateral relationship will continue to carry far-reaching importance.

Links to EPRS publications

• China’s rare-earth export restrictions
• China’s 2035 climate pledge
• Economic Outlook Quarterly Final year of implementation for the recovery plans
• The third generation of national climate plans Analysis of major economies’ nationally determined contributions ahead of COP30
• China’s increasing presence in Latin America: Implications for the European Union
• EU-China relations

Housing is becoming an urgent issue in many European Union (EU) countries, as rents and property prices are currently increasing faster than inflation.

While housing is generally the responsibility of EU countries, the EU supports national and local authorities through partnerships and social housing funding programmes. At the same time, the European Parliament is urging broader EU action to promote decent and affordable housing for all.

Housing as a European Union priority

Ahead of her re-election, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promised to make housing an EU priority, with a new Commissioner responsible for housing and a European affordable housing plan.

In its 2024-2029 political guidelines, the European Commission pledged to enable EU countries to double the investments in affordable housing planned under the EU’s cohesion policy, which aims to reduce differences between EU regions.

The EU funds housing projects in several ways, including by providing over €100 billion for energy-efficiency renovations up to 2030. EU financing comes from many sources, and is designed to complement other public funding at national or regional level.

The Commission is also collaborating with the European Investment Bank (EIB) to provide the financing and expertise needed to build more innovative, energy-efficient and affordable homes.

Additionally, the Commission and the EIB are working with the EU’s national promotional banks and international financial institutions to develop new financing opportunities for affordable and sustainable housing across Europe.

The European Parliament’s position

In two March 2025 resolutions on employment and social priorities and on the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), Parliament stressed that the EU’s budget must align with social priorities like affordable housing, and called for more resources to support people in vulnerable situations.

Parliament called on the Commission and EU Member States to make it easier to build, convert and renovate accessible and energy-efficient housing that is affordable for people at risk of poverty and those wanting to buy a property.

It underlined that the ESF+ can be instrumental in this, and called for a stronger ESF+ in the next EU seven‑year budget (beyond 2027) to focus on homelessness and access to housing, including social housing and affordable rental schemes.

In September 2025, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on using cohesion funds to resolve the housing crisis. It asked the authorities managing EU funds to address housing challenges in all regions, especially remote areas and islands, by using the mid-term review of cohesion policy programmes as an opportunity to increase housing-related investments.

The Parliament’s resolution also suggested broadening the scope of several EU funds to include innovative approaches for affordable housing. It asked EU countries and regions to develop strategies on affordable and sustainable housing for middle and low-income households in urban and rural areas.

Special Parliamentary committee on housing in the EU

In December 2024, Parliament set up a special committee to propose practical ways for the EU to tackle housing issues.

The Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU is investigating the root causes of the housing crisis through a series of hearings, and will report its findings at the end of its mandate in early 2026.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We will reply in the EU language in which you write to us.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of China compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2024, China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate was recorded at 5%, while the EU experienced a growth rate of 1.1%. Chinese inflation rates remain stable at 0.2%. The exchange rate of the renminbi-yuan continues to rise, reaching 7.8 units per euro in 2024. Trade in goods and services between the EU and China has remained relatively stable, with a slight increase from the previous year. The EU is China’s largest trade partner in goods, accounting for 12.7% of China’s total imports and exports. Conversely, China is the EU’s second-largest trade partner, representing 14.6% of the EU’s trade, while the United States ranks first at 17.3%.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘China: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU imports of services from China (2024)

Written by Polona Car.

The Cybersecurity Act (CSA) came into force in 2019 as part of the EU’s efforts to build strong cybersecurity. Since its introduction, the EU cybersecurity regulatory framework has become more complex in response to the rise in cyber-attacks. New EU rules, as well as changes in the geopolitical context, have impacted the CSA, and the regulation is currently under review. Although stakeholders are aligned on most issues, significant differences remain, notably in addressing non-technical risks relating to the security of the information and communications technology (ICT) supply chain.

The Cybersecurity Act in short

Regulation (EU) 2019/881 (the CSA) formalised the role of the European Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA), giving it a permanent mandate, resources and tasks, including operational ones. It also established a voluntary EU cybersecurity certification framework (ECCF) for ICT products, services and processes. The ECCF aims to set up and maintain specific certification schemes, allowing companies operating in the EU to use the certificates recognised across all Member States. In January 2025, a targeted amendment to the CSA was adopted, to enable the future adoption of European certification schemes for ‘managed security services’ covering areas such as incident response, penetration testing, security audits and consultancy. The CSA requires an evaluation and review every five years. Postponed several times, this is now expected on 14 January 2026.

Evolving context

Since the CSA entered into force, cyber-attacks have been on the rise. This has prompted new EU cybersecurity laws to address the growing number and complexity of cyber threats. As a result, ENISA’s roles and responsibilities have expanded. For example, ENISA supports implementation of the Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2) by providing technical guidelines, facilitating information sharing, and enhancing coordination between Member States. Similarly, ENISA supports implementation and enforcement of the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) by providing technical expertise, developing a single reporting platform for vulnerability and incident reporting, and supporting cybersecurity certification schemes.

As regards certification, implementation of the ECCF has been challenging. So far, only one EU certification scheme has been adopted – the European cybersecurity scheme on common criteria (EUCC), dedicated to certifying ICT products. All other schemes (cloud services – EUCS, 5G, digital identity wallets and managed security services) are still under development. Additionally, there are concerns whether the ECCF effectively addresses non-technical supply-chain cybersecurity risks such as geopolitical dependencies. Questions have also been raised about how voluntary certification frameworks will align with the CRA, which establishes a presumption of conformity (in Article 27) for products certified under a recognised European scheme such as the EUCC.

The proposal for a revised CSA therefore aims to address both ENISA’s growing responsibilities and ECCF implementation. During the consultation, the Commission also gathered views on ICT supply chain security challenges and the simplification of cybersecurity rules, such as how to streamline reporting obligations.

CSA review: Points of convergence among stakeholders

The replies to the call for evidence for the CSA review have shown broad agreement that the CSA should be revised on the following issues: (i) streamline cybersecurity measures; (ii) enhance cyber resilience; and (iii) simplify the EU regulatory landscape. The review is seen as an opportunity to reduce administrative burden and compliance costs. A significant convergence point is the need to harmonise definitions and reporting requirements across major EU acts – such as NIS2, CRA and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) – and establish a single EU incident notification platform. Such a platform has now been put forward in the proposal for a ‘digital omnibus’ regulation.

There is consensus that ENISA’s mandate should be clarified and strengthened to reflect the agency’s growing operational responsibilities under new EU rules such as NIS2 and CRA. Stakeholders note that this expansion should be matched by adequate financial resources and staffing in order to ensure the agency’s effectiveness. The view is that ENISA should serve as a central technical coordinator, to promote consistency and harmonise implementation of EU cybersecurity laws across the Member States, thereby reducing regulatory divergence. This echoes the Council conclusions of December 2024 on a stronger EU Agency for Cybersecurity. Poland went as far as calling for a separate law for ENISA, to separate this item from potential controversy around the EUCS discussions.

Stakeholders widely acknowledge that the process for developing and adopting certification schemes is too slow and opaque. They highlight that a more agile, transparent and inclusive process with clearer timelines is urgently needed. Furthermore, stakeholders underline that certification schemes should be based on and align with international standards in order to ensure global interoperability, maximise acceptance, and reduce compliance costs for companies operating internationally. The prevailing view is that certification schemes should also be leveraged as a recognised means of demonstrating conformity or compliance with security requirements stemming from other major EU legislative acts, including NIS2, CRA and the AI Act.

Potential challenges

Disagreements revolve around the specific content and scope of certification schemes, particularly regarding sovereignty and the legal limits of ENISA’s influence. The most contentious point is the inclusion of sovereignty requirements in certification schemes such as the EUCS. This issue divides stakeholders into those advocating measures to protect European digital autonomy (e.g. both data localisation and corporate headquarters based in the EU) and those prioritising open markets and technical neutrality. Pro‑sovereignty advocates, and stakeholders supporting ‘cloud by Europe‘ models (i.e. entirely EU-based cloud service providers, not controlled by non-EU stakeholders), argue that these measures are crucial to protecting sensitive data and reinforcing EU strategic autonomy. By contrast, major tech companies, such as Microsoft, Amazon and Google, argue that non-technical criteria are subjective and do not improve cybersecurity outcomes, potentially restricting market access and innovation. At Member State level, too, positions are divided, with some countries expressing concern over sovereignty requirements, and others advocating in their favour.

On the nature of certification, the majority view is that it should remain mostly voluntary, to maintain flexibility and innovation. However, mandatory certification in critical sectors where high-security assurance is essential was also proposed. In addition, ENISA’s regulatory power has sparked debate. Some stakeholders, including Amazon, oppose granting ENISA the authority to issue binding opinions or regulatory guidance, arguing that its role should remain technical and advisory.

It remains to be seen to what extent the Commission will consider stakeholders’ views. The CSA review will also need to fit into the simplification of cybersecurity-related incident reporting obligations, which are part of the ‘digital omnibus’ proposal published on 19 November 2025.

Read this ‘At a Glance note’ on ‘Cybersecurity Act review: What to expect‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Flynn.

Start-ups are important in boosting competitiveness, which is a key priority during the EU’s 2024-2029 legislative term.

So, the EU is taking steps to foster its strategic innovation agenda, both financially and through policy measures. Evidence shows that the EU is falling behind competitors here (especially the US and China) – notably in the sectors of AI, biotech, clean tech, and defence tech.

The need for reform was highlighted by two 2024 papers – the Letta and Draghi reports, which set out recommendations to strengthen the EU’s single market and competitiveness, respectively.

Building on these reports, in January 2025, the Commission adopted the competitiveness compass. The compass is an economic framework that outlines three ‘imperatives’ – closing the innovation gap, decarbonising the economy, and reducing foreign dependencies.

Following this, the Commission launched the start-up and scale-up strategy (SSS) in May 2025. The aim is to make Europe an attractive place to set up and grow innovative companies. The SSS is linked to other initiatives such as the savings and investments union, the single market strategy, and the union of skills. In addition, the SSS will also encompass a 28th regime, with a focus on supporting startups.

The 28th regime is a long-standing concept. It would be a separate initiative that creates a single set of rules for businesses in the EU. The objective is to simplify laws and mitigate the fact that there are varying national regulations that create barriers for companies. The Letta report states that this ‘would be a transformative step towards a more unified single market’. The 28th regime would replace national law where the EU has exclusive competence, and it would supplement national legislation in other cases. It would also address relevant laws such as insolvency, labour, and tax rules. The Commission has indicated that the legislative proposal for this is scheduled for the first quarter of 2026.

ERPS has identified four challenges relevant to the 28th regime; to help the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) prepare a legislative-initiative report supporting the proposal’s development. The four issues are that:

• the European financing ecosystem has a low appetite for risk and cross-border investment;
• Member States and innovative European companies struggle to attract skilled, entrepreneurial workers;
• the high cost of failure and restructuring for innovative European companies;
• high geographical variation in legal frameworks and innovation across the EU.

EPRS studies have corroborated that a transnational, pro-innovation perspective would bring economic benefit to the EU: a coordinated approach at EU level, instead of Member States acting alone, could add 0.9 % (or, with a more ambitious integrated approach, 2.6 %) to GDP by 2035.

Amid Parliament’s preparatory work, during a plenary debate on 7 October 2025, some MEPs noted that the 28th regime could consolidate the single market, while others expressed reservations about the potential impact on national laws.

JURI’s legislative-initiative report is expected to be voted in plenary during the January 2026 session.

Links

• The 28th regime
• Savings and investments union: Overview and state of play
• Scaling up European innovation – What is the potential European added value of a 28th regime?
• Single market strategy
• Union of skills
• A competitive compass for the EU
• Cost of non-Europe in strategic innovation
• Deepening the single market in the light of the Letta and Draghi reports

Written by Anna Flynn.

Years later, we are all still experiencing the consequences of COVID‑19, with EU countries yet to fully recover from the severe economic downturn that followed the 2020 coronavirus outbreak. As a response, the Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument was established. It has a strong focus on the green and digital transitions – key priorities backed by the European Parliament. The total budget is €806.9 billion, financed through EU borrowing, the Emissions Trading System (ETS), and the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR). 

While the Council established the NGEU, Parliament co-legislated the rules for its implementation, adopting the regulation on the NGEU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) in February 2021. The RRF distributes 90 % of the NGEU funds to Member States, financing reforms and investments specified in separate national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs). Parliament has called for ensuring that the RRF is managed transparently, that it stimulates progress in the green, digital and energy sectors, and supports children, young people and women. Parliament demands that respect for the rule of law is among the key prerequisites for receiving funding.

Implementation of the RRF enters its final year in 2026, with the deadline for payment execution in December 2026. In June 2025, the Commission underlined that Member States should streamline the NRRPs (for example, through removing targets that won’t be met) and subsequently redirecting the funds.

The European Commission is required to update Parliament on the state of play of the RRF and present regular reports. In the latest annual report (for 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025), the Commission outlined that, although the application of RRF projects needs to accelerate; significant progress was made during this period. The Commission noted that 37 % of the 6 985 milestones and targets agreed in the NRRPs had been met (at the time of the report).

To ensure it receives timely and detailed information, and to enable an exchange of views with other institutions, Parliament insisted on a bi-monthly meeting between Members of its Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and on Budgets, and appropriate Commission representatives. In addition, Parliament set up a special RRF working group, to discuss the quality of NRRP measures and maintain oversight of overall progress.

Since 2022, Members have looked very closely at RRF expenditure through the annual budgetary discharge procedure. RRF-related issues (which are generally prominent in the work of Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT)) were included in the report granting budgetary discharge to the European Commission in May 2025. In the adopted report, the CONT committee outlined its concern about outstanding debt from borrowing. This was only projected to increase through continued borrowing – some of which would be for the RRF. Notably, the discharge procedure applies only to RRF grants, as the RRF loans do not come under the jurisdiction of parliamentary scrutiny.

In July 2025, the Commission unveiled its proposal for the EU’s long-term budget for the 2028-2034 period. Within this, there is €149.3  billion (0.11 % of the EU’s GNI) set aside to repay the debt from NGEU grants.

Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting.

Links

• Recovery and Resilience Facility: Annual Report 2025
• Economic Outlook Quarterly: final year for the implementation for the recovery plans
• EU Budget 2028-2034: Overview of the Commission’s proposal
• The European Parliament’s oversight powers: Tools to scrutinise the European Commission
• Discharge for 2023 budget: European Commission
• RRF under way: Cybersecurity measures

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

Extreme heat, flooding and drought are no longer distant warnings of climate change. They are becoming part of everyday life. Across Europe, measures to cut emissions, from electric vehicles to renewable energy, are already visible on our streets and in our homes. Many of these initiatives are driven and funded by the European Union, but they represent only part of a much broader effort. The European Parliament is helping shape EU climate action for the benefit of citizens, the economy and the environment.

Parliament is focused on ensuring that EU climate objectives are translated into effective action. A central element of this work has been Parliament’s role in negotiations to amend the European Climate Law to include a binding intermediate greenhouse gas emissions reduction target for 2040. By shaping this amendment, Parliament has sought to strengthen the legal pathway between the 2030 target and climate neutrality by 2050, while ensuring that the target remains grounded in scientific evidence and accompanied by clear monitoring and review mechanisms.

Parliament has also called for the energy union to be aligned with developments in EU climate and energy policy, underlining the need to boost energy infrastructure, particularly cross-border interconnections.

Since 2022, Russia’s war on Ukraine has had a massive impact on the EU energy landscape. Parliament approved the REPowerEU plan, seeking to improve EU energy security, end the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels and make further advances in tackling the climate emergency. This initiative raised key ‘fit for 55’ targets set in the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) and the Renewable Energy Directive (RED).

The ‘fit for 55‘ package is a set of laws aligning existing climate rules with the European Climate Law objectives. In its role as co-legislator, Parliament has played an important role in shaping these laws. It supported vulnerable citizens and companies through the Social Climate Fund while approving an update to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) reducing the amount of emission allowances. Parliament has also played a role in strengthening and simplifying the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) Regulation and addressing CO2 emission standards for cars and vans. Mindful of the need to provide alternatives to traditional transport fuels, Members successfully pushed for an earlier roll-out of electric charging and hydrogen refuelling infrastructure on EU roads. Parliament also negotiated more ambitious targets on renewables, carbon sinks and deforestation and land use.

The European Green Deal, approved by Parliament in 2020, seeks to tackle the challenges of climate change and environmental degradation by cutting emissions and achieving climate neutrality by 2050.

Only a year after the approval of the Green Deal, it became clear that the existing policy framework was not sufficient to reach its goals. As co-legislator, Parliament therefore contributed to raising the 2030 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction target from 40 % to a net 55 % compared with 1990 levels. Although this increase was not as high as Parliament wanted, Parliament succeeded in including the ambition of delivering negative emissions after 2050 and establishing an independent, inter-disciplinary scientific advisory panel. The Parliament and Council reached an agreement on the European Climate Law at the end of June 2021.

These actions illustrate how the European Parliament continues to shape and strengthen EU climate legislation, moving from setting targets to ensuring their effective implementation for the benefit of citizens, the economy and the environment.

Further reading:

• Amending the European Climate Law: Setting an emissions reduction target for 2040
• Future of the energy union
• EU energy infrastructure: Boosting energy security
• Revised Energy Efficiency Directive
• Renewable Energy Directive
• Fit for 55 package
• Review of the EU ETS: ‘Fit for 55’ package
• Social climate fund: ‘Fit for 55’ package
• Simplifying and strengthening CBAM
• CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans: ‘Fit for 55’ package
• Revision of the LULUCF Regulation: Strengthening the role of the land use, land-use change and forestry sector in climate action
• The European Parliament declares climate emergency
• European climate law

Written by Mar Negreiro.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is changing the way we look for information online. Search engines increasingly offer AI-generated answers that keep users on their platforms instead of redirecting them to external websites, and many are now using generative AI tools as search engines. This convergence has intensified competition between traditional search engines and generative AI platforms. At the same time, experts warn that such reliance may lead to informational dependency and a decline in users’ cognitive skills.

AI is shifting online search results

The transformation from traditional web search to an AI-driven model is becoming mainstream. Google, which accounts for about 90 % of the online search engines market, has added an ‘AI Overviews’ feature – an automated search-summary tool – to its search engine. The overview uses Google’s Gemini AI models to answer users’ queries based on sources selected by Google. According to a market analysis, about 60 % of informational search queries in Google now trigger the overview as the top search result. Google’s AI Overview competes against AI platforms like ChatGPT and Perplexity, as users increasingly use AI chatbots to search for information. Similarly, Microsoft has introduced its Copilot generative AI to its search engine, Bing. However, Microsoft Bing accounts for just around 4 % of the online search engine market.

According to experts, users are less likely to click on links when Google’s AI summary is provided. They also believe that users are now structuring search queries differently and are increasingly using natural language in voice commands. AI answers are the latest feature of search engines, after voice and image queries.

Main emerging challenges Lower traffic and less revenues to publishers

Trade associations representing publishers’ interests claim that AI overviews cause a drop of up to 25 % in publishers’ traffic, or even up to 50 % according to a digital marketing company. A network of digital marketing companies reports that 58 % of Google searches now end without the user visiting a single link. Reduced traffic translates into fewer ad impressions and a subsequent loss of revenue for content creators. In response, a coalition of publishers has filed a formal antitrust complaint with the European Commission against Google, accusing its ‘AI Overviews’ of diverting traffic and revenue from them. An alliance of German media and digital industry NGOs, associations and organisations has filed a formal complaint in Germany. A third case launched in the UK confirms Google has strategic market status in search services, including AI overviews and AI mode, the latter being its AI chatbot launched to compete against other chatbots.

The plaintiffs believe AI overviews are increasingly monetised through integrated advertisements, while Google extracts content from third-party websites without offering direct compensation or opt-out options, and without obtaining prior consent. They claim this has implications for media diversity, freedom of opinion and democratic discourse. Representatives of publishers’ interests claim they cannot opt out from appearing in the overviews without also being suppressed from the regular search listing.

Difficulties in the training of AI models

Tools like Google’s AI Overviews rely on two components: a large-language model (LLM) and a system able to retrieve information. Both need data, the first to learn to use human language and the second to retrieve documented information to answer users’ requests. Users and businesses may have grown accustomed to their data being collected and used for search results or targeted advertising, but the same may not be true for AI training. Complaints in the United States (US) point to an update of Google’s privacy policy, adding that the company may use publicly accessible information to train its AI tools. In fact, training LLMs with data publicly available on the web may raise copyright issues. Similarly, there is a case against Meta for not respecting the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) when collecting data to train their model, as users were not asked for prior consent to their data being collected for this purpose. However, recently proposed amendments to the GDPR might clarify that processing personal data for AI training may be permissible. Stakeholders are challenging Google. For instance, Cloudfare, a global platform and network of data centres that maintain websites and applications, is supporting a consortium of publishers to collectively block AI crawlers from collecting content for training unless companies pay for the content.

Threat to the open web

Until recently, Google drove online traffic in the open web, the public, interconnected network of websites and online services used for browsing, shopping and consuming news. Thus, Google has helped users find information by crawling and indexing web pages and ranking them based on a number of criteria. This is changing now, as users are offered generative AI-based responses and conversations and increasingly stop clicking and driving online traffic. Google has admitted that the open web is in rapid decline, referring to open-web display advertising. However, many believe this decline is much broader, as AI-driven search poses an unprecedented threat to the open web. In addition, users are increasingly using chatbots to conduct online searches, further reducing the number of users who access websites from search engines.

Risks for information quality, critical thinking and digital inclusion

AI-generated searches may include incorrect or biased information. Research suggests that AI could produce ‘chat chambers‘ that reinforce the misinformation it hallucinates. Thus, 27 % of US adults do not trust AI-generated search results. Concerns around AI-generated misinformation are high, with the likelihood of chatbots repeating false information nearly doubling from 18 % in August 2024 to 35 % in August 2025. In addition, higher confidence in generative AI is associated with less critical thinking, according to research. It could also widen the digital divide, as young users are more AI-literate than older ones, but young students are increasingly dependent on AI use in classwork, risking lower creative thinking.

Next steps

Google’s AI Overviews are already available in over 200 countries worldwide. However, within the EU, rollout has been slower. In early 2025, the feature launched in only a few Member States; by October 2025 it was available in all except France. The delay was due to regulatory reasons. It is to be seen if Google is fully complying with key EU level legislation, including the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), EU copyright rules and the AI Act. The Commission is currently assessing Google’s use of AI summaries at the top of its search results, given their potential to significantly disrupt the relationship between Google and the open web by reducing traffic to external websites. Moreover, AI integration now goes far beyond overviews and chatbots. AI tools are increasingly embedded in operating systems, core apps and hardware ecosystems. As a result, AI has become a driving force for digital services, with further automation expected through the integration of Agentic AI or virtual assistants – systems designed to make decisions with minimal human oversight. Google, alongside other big tech companies, such as OpenAI, Microsoft and NVIDIA, is developing such systems as the next step towards automated online search, without any human involvement and replacing online search engines like Google Search. There is also a risk that AI agents could themselves become ‘gatekeepers’, as defined by the DMA, acting independently and creating new questions around oversight and accountability.

Read the complete ‘At a Glance note’ on ‘Search engines in times of Artificial Intelligence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Flynn.

On 18 December 2025, International Migrants Day was marked, honouring the contribution and value of migrants.

This commemoration follows a year of notable reforms.

For example, in November 2025, the Commission adopted the EU’s first annual Asylum and Migration Report. The report outlined that there has been a 35 % reduction in illegal border crossings between July 2024 and June 2025 – but challenges remain.

In parallel, the Council agreed on the proposed Annual Solidarity Pool for migration. The pool ensures that Member States that are under migratory pressure may be assisted by other Member States, for example, through financial aid and facilitating relocation. This will be evaluated based on population size and GDP. Parliament has no formal role in its implementation, but has nevertheless supported the scheme.

In the same month, Parliament voted in favour of a law establishing the European Centre Against Migrant Smuggling within the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). This will protect victims by increasing information sharing and providing a range of support to Member States.

Underpinning all of this is the new pact for migration and asylum – this became law at the end of 2024, and will apply in full from June 2026. The pact has 10 separate but interconnected legislative acts.

Some of the Commission’s proposals that complement the pact have been criticised.

In April 2025, the first, formal EU list outlining safe countries of origin was announced. This means that asylum applicants from countries that are deemed safe (according to this list) will generally not be considered eligible for international protection. It is mandatory for Member States to abide by this list, but they are also permitted to keep or create their own national lists.

Various human rights organisations, civil society, and other stakeholders condemn this. There are questions about the transparency of how these lists are compiled, as well as the repercussions for individuals who are migrating from a safe country of origin but do need protection. However, Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee endorsed this list on 3 December 2025 as a way to better manage migration.

In March 2025, to further build upon the migration and asylum pact, the Commission proposed a common approach to returns for citizens illegally residing in a Member State. Part of this is the creation of return hubs – centres in safe non-EU countries that people may be sent to if they cannot legally reside in the EU. A mutual recognition of returns is also proposed, allowing Member States to recognise and apply return decisions made by another Member State.

The Council’s position on the regulation was finalised on 8 December 2025, so this will now be negotiated with Parliament.

Looking ahead, 2025 marked the start of decisions on how the pact will be financed over the coming years. In July, the Commission’s unveiled its proposal for the EU’s long-term budget for 2028-2034. This included information on how migration policies are to be financed during this period.

A proposed €12 billion (in 2025 prices) is to be allocated for migration policy. This is similar to the current budget for 2021-2027, where around €12.6 billion in 2025 prices has been dedicated to this.

One aspect that differs, however, is that this money will be allocated through national plans crafted by each Member State. Members of the European Parliament have highlighted their concern about how this will impact their capacity for oversight and scrutiny in this area.

Overall, the current and future budgets reflect the increasing importance of migration as a political issue.

Links to EPRS publications

• International Migrants Day: 18 December 2025
• Union support for asylum, migration and integration
• Stronger role for Europol to fight migrant smuggling and human trafficking
• European Parliament Plenary Session November I 2025
• The first annual Asylum and Migration Report and the Annual Solidarity Pool
• ‘Safe country of origin’ concept in EU asylum law
• Planned revision of the EU Return Directive
• Implementation of the EU pact on migration and asylum

Written by Anna Flynn.

Parliament has, on many occasions, supported the EU’s active role in ocean governance. the Commission adopted the European Ocean Pact in June 2025. It serves as a non-legislative framework for all ocean-related policies, covering a wide range of issues such as research, maritime security, ocean health, coastal communities, and more.

A proposal for an EU ocean act is expected by 2027.

Notably, throughout 2025, Parliament gave its consent to a number of fisheries agreements with third countries. An important example is the protocol with Greenland. Moreover, the approved EU-Côte d’Ivoire agreement is significant for the EU’s tuna fleet.

Since July 2025, citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament to call for higher standards and stronger regulation of EU fishing practices outside the Union. In response, EPRS highlighted that the EU’s agreements with third countries promote local sustainability, conservation and development.

For instance, in the agreement with Guinea-Bissau, €4.5 million is allocated to the country’s fishing sector – namely towards control and surveillance capacities, as well as for communities in the region. Moreover, the agreement with Cabo Verde is viewed by the Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries as balanced; due to the fact that the EU’s financial contributions are higher than the cost of the access rights.

In July 2025, Parliament adopted a text agreed with the Council on improving the EU’s measures tackling third countries’ unsustainable practices concerning shared fish stocks. These are stocks that are not limited to the waters of a single country. This means that there is now clarity on exactly what actions are subject to EU penalties.

Beyond fisheries, in 2025, the Parliament also adopted its position on the Commission’s proposed directive on the high seas.

This directive integrates the UN’s High Seas Treaty into EU legislation. The treaty protects marine biodiversity beyond country’s borders. No nation has jurisdiction over nearly two thirds of the ocean, and the high seas make up a large part of this.

Parliament’s report amends the proposal by suggesting that Member States need to publish their actions in the high seas (related to biodiversity). The objective of this is to improve transparency. However, MEPs also called for greater flexibility in reporting.

In the same week, Parliament also adopted a provisional agreement on expanding the European Maritime Safety Agency’s (EMSA) mandate. The aim of the proposed regulation is to strengthen EMSA’s ability to tackle security risks by broadening its remit. For example. the agreement introduces a flexibility mechanism so that the agency can undertake additional tasks for the Commission and Member States.

Post-2027, there is no separate fund outlined for the common fisheries policy (CFP). Currently, there is a European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) for the 2021-2027 period – but in July 2025, the Commission proposed merging this with other policies, such as agriculture. This means that there would be no specific, allocated sum of money for this sector. The CFP encompasses ‘conservation of marine biological resources’ – one of only five areas in which the EU has exclusive competence.

Links to EPRS publications

• Plenary round-up – November I 2025
• Protecting marine biodiversity in the high seas
• Revision of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) founding regulation
• Conditions for EU support to the CFP (2028-2034 programming period)
• Sustainable fishing outside the European Union – answering citizens’ concerns
• EU-Côte d’Ivoire fisheries agreement
• EU fisheries agreement with Greenland: Conclusion of a new protocol (2025-2030)
• Measures against countries that do not cooperate on shared fish stocks
• The European ocean pact
• EU fisheries agreement with Guinea-Bissau
• EU fisheries agreement with Cabo Verde: Conclusion of a new protocol (2024-2029)

Written by Anna Flynn.

The EU strongly condemned Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022. By July 2025, the civilian death toll in Ukraine had exceeded 13 800, according to the UN. Now, nearly four years later, the EU has provided €187.3 billion in support for Ukraine, and this response marks the Union’s largest civil protection operation to date.

EPRS notes that ‘the ongoing attack has reverberated beyond Ukraine’s borders, affecting food security, energy prices and inflation both in the EU and beyond’. The European Parliament labelled Russia’s war ‘the most outrageous act of aggression conducted by the political leadership of a given country in Europe since 1945.’ The  EU’s response  has been structured along three axes: political, economic and military support for Ukraine; isolation and containment of Russia; and enhancement of EU and EU neighbours’ resilience.

Parliament’s extraordinary meeting of 1 March 2022, at which it adopted a resolution unequivocally condemning Russia’s aggression and setting the direction for EU action, was one of the first international gatherings that Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, attended. Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, was the first EU leader to visit Kyiv, on 1 April 2022. In September 2025, Metsola officially opened a permanent European Parliament liaison office in Kyiv. 

Since the start of the war, Parliament has dealt with multiple legislative files of paramount importance for Ukraine and adopted numerous non-legislative resolutions on aspects of EU support for the country; including several rounds of macro-financial assistance, the Act in support of ammunition production (ASAP); and the Ukraine Facility, which earmarks €50 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction from 2024 to 2027.

Parliament has also unwaveringly supported Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations, advocating successfully in June 2022 for Ukraine to be granted candidate country status, and in December 2023 for Member States to start accession negotiations. During EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee meetings, Members and their Ukrainian counterparts have discussed parliamentary follow-up of Ukraine’s official accession request. Accession negotiations have not properly started due to lack of required unanimity in the Council. However, in April 2025, Parliament called for the acceleration of the screening process that would allow these discussions to begin.

Moreover, Parliament has used its powers to advocate a tougher policy of containment towards Russia. A huge discussion has centred around the possibility of the EU using immobilised Russian assets (of the Central Bank of Russia) to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction. This money has been frozen since the war began. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for the assets (amounting to around €300 billion) to be used. However, it is a divisive issue due to potential economic, legal, and reputational consequences. On 12 December 2025, the Council adopted a regulation indefinitely prohibiting the transfer of any of the assets.

On 19 December 2025, the European Council approved a €90 billion loan to support Ukraine in 2026 and 2027. Without this, Ukraine was expected to run out of funds in early 2026. Instead of using Russian assets, this loan is financed through EU borrowing secured on the ‘headroom’ in the EU’s budget.

Parliament also supports the EU’s sanctions against Russia. The Council recently adopted its 19th comprehensive package of sanctions, containing 69 additional listings. This constitutes companies now subject to asset freezes (that will also be ineligible for further disbursement of funds), as well as individuals who now face travel bans.

Parliament is therefore employing its budgetary, agenda-setting, external action and law-making powers to mobilise solid EU support for Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s aggression, and to ensure that the EU honours its pledges.

Links

• Financing Ukraine in 2026 and 2027
• State of play: EU support to Ukraine
• Ukraine’s future in the EU
• Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024
• Act in support of ammunition production

Written by Maria Niestadt.

Influencer marketing has become a significant part of the digital economy. Influencers allow brands to reach highly targeted audiences, and their endorsements are often perceived as more authentic than direct advertising. Some consumer groups – such as younger consumers and those with lower financial literacy, lower income, or consumers who follow trends closely – are particularly receptive to this type of marketing.

The fast growth of this sector has exposed several problematic practices and regulatory challenges in the EU. Many influencers do not clearly disclose the commercial intent behind their posts, while others manipulate visibility by buying fake followers, likes or plays to inflate their perceived influence and to make more profit. Additional concerns include reinforcing unrealistic beauty standards, promoting harmful or illegal products, accelerating the spread of false and misleading claims, and exploiting kidfluencers for financial gain.

At EU level, laws relevant to influencer marketing exist but are fragmented across consumer protection, digital and audiovisual media regulation. Hidden advertising and misleading commercial practices are already prohibited, yet the responsibilities of different actors in the influencer marketing value chain are not always clear. Some EU Member States, such as France and Spain, have complemented these EU laws with national legislation, and many have issued guidance to help influencers and companies understand their legal obligations.

The European Commission has signalled its intention to address misleading influencer marketing practices in the forthcoming digital fairness act. The European Parliament and Council will play a central role in shaping this legislation once the proposal is published.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Regulating influencer marketing in the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The key debate of the last plenary session of 2025 was on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 18-19 December 2025, particularly the need to support Ukraine, the EU’s strategic autonomy, and transatlantic relations. Members condemned the terrorist attack on the Hanukkah celebrations in Sydney and expressed solidarity with the victims and their families. Several debates were held following Commission presentations of its political and legislative initiatives, such as the European affordable housing plan, EU cardiovascular health plan, the 2030 consumer agenda, the automotive and power grids packages, and plans to tackle rising energy prices through robust infrastructure. Further debates on external policy covered recent developments in Palestine and Lebanon, the deepening democratic crisis in Georgia, and the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Dayton–Paris Peace Agreement.

Members also debated Commission statements on: the need to tackle drug trafficking; breeders’ protests following a lumpy-skin-disease outbreak in France; the geopolitical situation’s impact on access to medicines; preventing sexual harassment in public institutions; Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania; pro-Russian espionage in the European Parliament; and the global rise in violence against humanitarian workers and journalists.

Sakharov Prize

President Roberta Metsola awarded the 2025 Sakharov prize to representatives of Andrzej Poczobut, of Belarus, and Mzia Amaglobeli, of Georgia, journalists fighting for democracy in their home countries. Both journalists were jailed for defending freedom of expression and democracy, and Parliament called for their immediate release. The Sakharov Prize is the EU’s highest tribute to human rights work, recognising those that have made an outstanding contribution to protecting freedom of thought.

EU defence investment

Amid rising geopolitical pressure, the EU aims to redirect budget resources to defence through the ReArm Europe plan/Readiness 2030 initiative. Members debated and approved a provisional agreement amending five programmes’ regulations to facilitate defence funding. The amendments concern the scope of the Digital Europe programme, European Defence Fund, Connecting Europe Facility, strategic technologies for Europe platform (STEP) and Horizon Europe. They also cover funding for dual-use defence technologies and infrastructure across these programmes. The amendments also aim at supporting defence research and development and strengthening European value chains. The agreement extends the EDF to Ukraine, allowing Ukrainian entities to participate in collaborative defence research and development.

Military mobility

Military mobility – the ability to move troops, weapons and equipment quickly and efficiently across the EU – is essential for European security and defence and for EU support to Ukraine. Parliament debated and adopted a joint own-initiative report from the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) and Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), calling for a significantly increased budget for military mobility. The report recognises the urgent need to improve military mobility in the EU, including for fast deployment of troops and military equipment to the EU’s eastern flank.

Common agricultural policy simplification agreement

Members considered and adopted a provisional agreement on amendments to the common agricultural policy (CAP). The agreement aims to simplify CAP requirements for farmers, including on ‘good agricultural and environmental conditions of land’ (GAECs), by exempting farms partially certified as organic from certain GAECs and providing farmers with additional support for compliance with some GAEC requirements. It increases the maximum payment amount for small farmers and includes new support for small-farm business development. The agreement advises Member States to avoid conducting more than one on-the-spot check per year on the same farm.

Compulsory licensing of patents for crisis management

Innovation is a top EU priority, and Members adopted at second reading a provisional agreement on a compulsory patent licensing scheme. The scheme aims at facilitating rapid use of patents during crises while preserving innovation incentives through patent protection. Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in excluding crises relating to semiconductors, gas supply security and defence-related products from the scope, as well as maintaining the confidentiality of protected knowledge, and lowering maximum fines and penalties.

Implementation of the rule of law conditionality regime

The Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation allows the EU to suspend or reduce funds to Member States that violate the rule of law in a way that directly threatens the Union’s financial interests. Members are concerned that the mechanism has only been triggered once to date, against Hungary in December 2022. Parliament debated and adopted an own-initiative report assessing the regulation’s implementation. The joint report from the Committees on Budget (BUDG) and Budgetary Control (CONT) calls for improvements to increase transparency through a public portal tracking breaches, a simpler complaint procedure, and a stronger role for parliamentary scrutiny.

Citizens’ Initiative – ‘My voice, my choice: For safe and accessible abortion’

Parliament debated and adopted a resolution drafted by the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) regarding the EU’s plans to follow up on the European Citizens’ Initiative, ‘My voice, my choice: for safe and accessible abortion’. The initiative proposes creating an EU-funded, voluntary opt-in system to support EU countries that offer safe and legal abortion services to people from EU countries where access is limited. Members condemned anti-gender movements that seek to undermine equality and human rights, and called on Member States to reform their abortion laws and policies in line with international human rights standards.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Two decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations – from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF): support to workers affected by imminent job displacement in enterprises undergoing restructuring; and from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), on the application for the electronic submission of travel data (‘EU Digital Travel application’), use of digital travel credentials – were approved. Two other decisions, from the LIBE committee on the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept and the establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level, were approved by vote.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – December II 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Steven Blaakman.

Drawing attention to migrants’ human rights and highlighting their contribution to society, International Migrants’ Day is observed every year on 18 December. The day was designated by the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 2000 in response to growing migration numbers around the world.

Context

Migration has been a constant throughout history, with people moving in search of new opportunities or protection. On 1 January 2024, 29.0 million people (6.4 %) of the 449.3 million people living in the EU were non-EU citizens. In 2023, 4.4 million migrants from non-EU ountries arrived in the EU. In 2024, most first-residence permits were given for reasons of employment (32 %), family (27 %) and
education (16 %). Some also arrive looking for international protection: in 2024, 911 960 first-time asylum applicants arrived in the EU.

Migration management in the EU

The EU and EU countries share competence in migration policy. In recent years, the priority accorded to migration management has been eflected in the EU budget, with €22.7 billion allocated to migration and border policy from 2021 to 2027. Acknowledging that the EU needed to move away from ad hoc solutions and put in place a predictable and reliable migration management system, the European Commission put forward a new pact on migration and asylum in 2020. The pact combines key EU policies on migration, asylum and border management and was adopted in spring 2024. In addition, the Commission has initiated reforms to the EU’s legal migration policy by proposing a skills and talent package, intended to attract and retain highly skilled third-country nationals, and by creating the EU Talent Pool, which will match employers in the EU with jobseekers from non-EU countries. The objective is to help address critical labour shortages across Europe and to offer a response to the demographic situation in the EU of an ageing population. Research confirms that legal migration channels are a viable way to mitigate the problem of a declining EU workforce.

Honouring the contributions of migrants and respecting their rights

International Migrants Day is about honouring the contributions of migrants and highlighting the increasingly complex environment in which migration occurs. The European Commission asserts that legal migration and resettlement benefit migrants as well as EU countries.

The EU action plan on integration and inclusion addresses barriers to migrants’ education, access to the labour market and housing. Progress on practical action to support integration in areas such as health, housing and employment can be checked in the Commission’s progress tracker

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has for years advocated a humane, solidarity-based and common approach to migration. In its resolution of 25 November 2021, taking into consideration that total labour supply in the euro area was projected to fall by 13 % (20 million people) between 2019 and 2070, Parliament encouraged the development of adequate legal economic migration channels.

Parliament’s adoption of the new pact on migration and asylum, to be applied from mid-2026, confirmed its willingness to take ‘an important step, to a common European asylum and migration policy that is well functioning and long-term’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘International Migrants’ Day: 18 December 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

One of the European Parliament’s most important priorities is to ensure all EU policy promotes respect for people’s fundamental freedoms and human rights. Parliament has therefore awarded its Sakharov Prize to individuals and organisations making a remarkable effort to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms since 1988. Previous laureates include Nelson Mandela, Alexei Navalny and Malala Yousafzai.

This year, the Parliament awards its Sakharov Prize to individuals who show great personal courage in defending these freedoms and rights: Andrzej Poczobut of Belarus and Mzia Amaglobeli of Georgia, journalists who have fought for democracy in their respective countries. Both have been imprisoned for standing up for freedom of expression and democratic values. The Sakharov Prize award ceremony takes place during Parliament’s December plenary session.

The award is named in honour of Andrei Sakharov, the eminent Soviet nuclear physicist, dissident, human rights advocate and recipient of the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize. Indeed, several of the laureates have gone on to win the Nobel Peace Prize –including María Corina Machado, Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad.

Parliament’s political groups and individual Members (at least 40) nominate the candidates at a joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Development Committee and the Human Rights Subcommittee each September. The Parliament publishes a shortlist of three candidates in October and the Conference of Presidents selects the winner. Parliament then awards the prize at a plenary session at the end of the year. The prize confers an endowment of €50 000 on the winner, and the Sakharov network supports laureates in their efforts to defend their cause. When awarding the Prize, Parliament, through the voice of its President, usually calls for jailed laureates’ release from prison. Parliament also uses all the means in its parliamentary diplomacy toolbox to protect laureates from state repression and to keep human rights defenders’ struggle in the spotlight.

The Sakharov Prize therefore has a long history, featuring many distinguished names in the struggle to protect human rights and freedoms for all. Since 2014, the European Parliamentary Research Service produces a paper on the laureates of each prize, the human rights situation and the Parliament’s position. These papers are available in several EU languages:

A concerning deterioration in the human rights situation In Venezuela and election irregularities under the Maduro regime led to María Corina Machado, leader of Venezuela’s democratic forces, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia winning the 2024 Sakharov Prize. The second time the prize has been awarded to Venezuela’s democratic opposition activists (the first time was in 2017), they represent all Venezuelans both inside and outside the country who are fighting to restore freedom and democracy.

In 2023, following the murder of Jina Mahsa Amini’s by Iran’s security forces for her refusal to wear a hijab, and repression of women’s rights protesters in Iran, Parliament awarded the 2023 Sakharov Prize to Jina Mahsa Amini and the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement in Iran in support of the protesters’ aspirations for a free, stable, inclusive and democratic country.

The brave people of Ukraine have fought hard and sacrificed a great deal to protect their country from Russia’s aggression. A number of individuals and organisations were awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize in recognition of their resistance to Russian attack.

Political repression was already intensifying in Russia in 2021. To honour his courageous defence of human rights and democratic freedoms despite severe personal risk and his imprisonment for his anti‑corruption activism and criticism of the Kremlin, Parliament awarded the 2021 Sakharov Prize to opposition leader Alexey Navalny. Parliament strongly condemned Navalny’s murder in 2024 and underlined that the Russian Government and Vladimir Putin should personally bear criminal and political responsibility for the death of their most prominent opponent.

Following contested presidential election in Belarus and a severe crackdown on peaceful protests, Parliament awarded the 2020 Sakharov Prize to the democratic opposition in Belarus, represented by the Coordination Council, in tribute to their courage and determination to resist repression and advance democratic freedoms.

In 2019, in response to escalating repression against Uyghur minorities and civil society activists in China, the Parliament awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize to Uyghur economics professor Ilham Tohti, in recognition of his advocacy for ethnic minority rights and peaceful dialogue. Tohti remains in prison in China, serving a life sentence.

Parliament awarded the 2018 Sakharov Prize to Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, imprisoned on politically motivated charges against the backdrop of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Parliament aimed to spotlight Sentsov’s plight and underscore broader concerns about political prisoners and human‑rights abuses in Russian‑controlled territories.

Amid a severe erosion of democratic institutions and repression of political freedoms in Venezuela, the European Parliament awarded the 2017 Sakharov Prize to the Democratic Opposition in Venezuela, notably the National Assembly and political prisoners, in support of their struggle for democratic transition, human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms.

The 2016 Sakharov Prize was awarded to Nadia Murad Basee Taha and Lamiya Aji Bashar to highlight the fate of their people, the Yazidis, one of the communities most affected, in proportion to their total population, by the violence committed by ISIL/Da’esh (or ‘Islamic State’), particularly during the conflict in Syria.

Saudi Arabian blogger, Raif Badawi was awarded the 2015 Sakharov Prize following his arrest and sentence to 10 years in prison, 1 000 lashes and a hefty fine for insulting Islam (his site hosted material criticising senior religious figures and a Saudi university). In his writings, Badawi advocates liberal Islam, freedom of thought and expression, and separation of state and religion.

Europe’s top human rights prize was awarded in 2014 to Dr Denis Mukwege, a gynaecologist from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in recognition for his perseverance and courage in his efforts to help rape survivors. A fervent advocate of women’s rights, Dr Mukwege has received many international awards, but has also been the target of death threats, and even a 2012 assassination attempt.

Any AI-generated content in this text has been reviewed by the author.

More information on the Sakharov Prize and the laureates:

• 30 Years of the Sakharov Prize: The European Parliament upholding freedom of thought
• Sakharov’s legacy on the centenary of his birth
• Laureates of the 2025 Sakharov Prize: Andrzej Poczobut and Mzia Amaglobeli, journalists fighting for democracy in Belarus and Georgia
• Sakharov Prize laureates in difficulty: Facing repression for defending human rights
• Laureates of the 2024 Sakharov Prize: María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, fighting for democracy in Venezuela
• 2023 Sakharov Prize laureate: Jina Mahsa Amini and the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement in Iran
• 2022 Sakharov Prize laureate: The brave people of Ukraine
• 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate: Alexey Navalny
• 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate: The democratic opposition in Belarus
• 2019 Sakharov Prize laureate: Ilham Tohti
• Oleg Sentsov: The 2018 Sakharov Prize laureate
• The 2017 Sakharov Prize
• The Yazidis: An ongoing genocide
• The 2015 Sakharov Prize
• Sakharov Prize 2014: Tending the scars of sexual violence in DRCEuropean Parliament Sakharov Prize

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

Members gather on 15 December for the final plenary session of 2025. The agenda reflects ongoing geopolitical tensions, and addresses issues of defence, human rights, trade, energy and the environment. Parliament will also debate the preparation of the European Council meeting of 18‑19 December 2025.

The Sakharov Prize is the EU’s highest tribute to human rights work, recognising those that have made an outstanding contribution to protecting freedom of thought. On Tuesday, President Roberta Metsola is to award the prize to Andrzej Poczobut of Belarus and Mzia Amaglobeli of Georgia, journalists fighting for democracy in their home countries. Both journalists were jailed for defending freedom of expression and democracy.

Amid rising geopolitical pressures, the EU aims to redirect budget resources to defending the EU through the ReArm Europe plan/Readiness 2030 initiative. On Monday, Members are due to consider formal adoption of a provisional agreement amending five regulations on defence funding programmes. The amendments would expand the scope of the Digital Europe Programme (DEP), European Defence Fund (EDF), Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) and Horizon Europe. The amendments increase funding for dual-use defence technologies and infrastructure across these programmes, and aim at supporting defence research and development and strengthening European value chains. The agreement extends the EDF to Ukraine, allowing Ukrainian entities to participate in EU collaborative defence research and development.

Military mobility – the ability to quickly and efficiently move troops, weapons and equipment across the EU – is essential for European security and defence and for EU support to Ukraine. On Tuesday, Parliament is scheduled to consider a joint report from the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) and Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) calling for a significantly increased budget for military mobility. The report recognises the urgent need to improve military mobility in the EU, including for fast deployment of troops and military equipment to the EU’s eastern flank.

The rule of law conditionality regulation allows the EU to suspend or reduce funds to Member States that violate the rule of law in a way that directly threatens the Union’s financial interests. Members are concerned that the mechanism has only been triggered once to date, against Hungary in December 2022. On Wednesday, Parliament is due to debate a report assessing the regulation’s implementation. The joint report from the Committees on Budget (BUDG) and Budgetary Control (CONT) calls for improvements to increase transparency through a public portal tracking breaches, a simpler complaint procedure, and a stronger role for parliamentary scrutiny.

Innovation is a top EU priority, and Members are expected to consider a provisional agreement on a compulsory patent licensing scheme on Tuesday. The scheme aims at facilitating rapid use of patents during crises while preserving innovation incentives through patent protection. Parliament’s negotiators have succeeded in excluding crises relating to semiconductors, gas supply security and defence-related products from the scope, as well as maintaining confidentiality of protected knowledge and lowering maximum fines and penalties.

On Monday, Parliament is scheduled to consider a provisional agreement on amendments to the common agricultural policy (CAP). The agreement aims to simplify CAP requirements for farmers, including good agricultural and environmental conditions of land (GAECs), by exempting farms partially certified as organic from certain GAECs and providing farmers with additional support for compliance with some GAECs. It would increase the maximum payment amount for small farmers and include new support for small farm business development. Under the agreement, Member States are advised to avoid conducting more than one on-the-spot check per year on the same farm.

Parliament is due to debate a motion for a resolution from the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) on Tuesday, regarding how the EU intends to follow up on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘My voice, my choice: for safe and accessible abortion’. The initiative proposes creating an EU-funded, voluntary opt-in system to support EU countries that offer safe and legal abortion services to people from EU countries where access is limited. The FEMM motion for a resolution urges Member States to align their laws with international human rights standards, and highlights the EU’s responsibility to promote sexual and reproductive health and rights more broadly.

Quick links to all our publications for this plenary session:

• Laureates of the 2025 Sakharov Prize: Andrzej Poczobut and Mzia Amaglobeli, journalists fighting for democracy in Belarus and Georgia
• Enhancing EU defence investments
• Implementation of the rule of law conditionality regime
• CAP simplification agreement
• Military mobility
• European Citizens’ Initiative – ‘My voice, my choice: For safe and accessible abortion’
• EU compulsory licensing of patents for crisis management