European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Naja Bentzen.

New digital technologies are a mixed blessing for women’s rights and representation in the information sphere in general, and in the democratic debate in particular. Innovative digital tools often promise to make public debates more inclusive, for women too. In practice, recent AI-enabled technology – including deepfake tools – appears to facilitate an increasingly hostile information environment for women, with repercussions for their democratic participation both online and offline. 

At the same time, the ongoing global wave of autocratisation goes hand in hand with a backlash against women’s rights and gender equality. Authoritarian regimes have strategic reasons for suppressing women, and often use gendered disinformation to undermine women opposition leaders, as well as to erode confidence in democratic values and rights.

In the European Union, equality between men and women is a fundamental right and a founding value enshrined in the Treaties. Over the past decades, the EU has worked to increase gender equality at home, and used its global influence to support women’s rights abroad. At the same time, its evolving digital regulatory framework aims to make the digital space safe for all, including by protecting the rights of women online.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in the age of AI-enabled disinformation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alina Dobreva.

CONTEXT

On 16 July 2025, the European Commission adopted its proposal for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), which was completed on 3 September with the adoption of a second package. The own resources part of the proposal is intended to equip the EU with a diversified revenue stream and sufficient means for delivering on EU priorities, as well as for the repayment of the debt created by Next Generation EU.

Legislative proposal

2025/0574 (CNS) – Proposal for a Council decision on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 – COM(2025) 574, 16.7.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0574 (CNS)

Read the complete briefing on ‘System of own resources: Multiannual financial framework 2028-2034‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir

Despite strong political commitments to gender equality at EU and national level, women still remain politically under-represented at all levels of political power. In the European Parliament, as well as in national parliaments, governments and local assemblies, their share most often is under the symbolic 40 % mark. Moreover, after successive electoral cycles in which women’s share in representative assemblies had increased, this trend has slowed down or come to a halt. Progress has also been uneven among Member States, with women remaining markedly under-represented in some Member States.

Gender-balanced political representation is not only important for women and female politicians but also for political parties themselves and the rest of society. It increases trust in the political system and strengthens economic and political governance.

The EU has committed to achieving gender balance in political representation and participation in the EU; however, except for the European elections, its powers in the area remain limited mainly to soft action. It can support the specific actions to be taken by the EU institutions, national governments, political parties, civil society and the media, by issuing recommendations, facilitating the exchange of good practice or funding projects.

There is substantial evidence of the obstacles to women’s political participation and the means to overcome it. This picture is nevertheless not static, as new challenges emerge, particularly from mounting opposition to gender equality, as well as from digital technologies, most recently artificial intelligence, which can both empower women and discourage them.

This updates a March 2024 briefing by Ionel Zamfir.

Source: European Institute for Gender Equality (2025)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in politics in the EU: State of play in 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Food contact materials (FCMs) include all materials that come into physical contact with food during its production, processing, packaging and storage. They contain thousands of chemicals, some of which can migrate into food, especially at high temperatures, during long contact times or with certain food types.

Scientific evidence shows that such migration is common and may contribute to human exposure to hazardous substances, including endocrine disruptors, carcinogens and reproductive toxicants. Well-known examples include phthalates, bisphenols and PFAS, which remain authorised in some applications despite links to adverse health effects. Current risk assessments often consider substances individually and may underestimate combined or cumulative exposure.

The EU’s core legislation is Regulation (EC) 1935/2004, which sets out general safety and labelling rules, supported by the Good Manufacturing Practice Regulation (EC) 2023/2006. However, only four material types – plastics, ceramics, regenerated cellulose film and active/intelligent materials – are subject to fully harmonised EU rules. The remaining materials (paper, inks, coatings, rubber, metal, etc.) rely mostly on national rules, leading to regulatory fragmentation, uneven safety standards and unclear requirements for industry. In addition, existing rules focus largely on known intentionally added substances, while non‑intentionally added substances (NIAS), impurities and degradation products remain insufficiently addressed.

A 2022 Commission evaluation found the framework only partially effective, with gaps in enforcement, control of NIAS and harmonisation. The Commission has recently reiterated its commitment to further harmonising EU legislation on FCMs.

The European Parliament has pushed for stronger rules, contributing to recent EU‑wide bans on BPA and PFAS in food packaging.

Citizens and stakeholders broadly support a comprehensive revision establishing clearer standards, harmonised testing and stronger consumer protection.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Food contact materials in the EU: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Liselotte Jensen.

CONTEXT

The carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is being implemented to create a level playing field on carbon pricing of specific goods within the EU single market. For CBAM-covered goods, free allowances under the EU′s emissions trading system (ETS) will be progressively phased out by 2034.

With the phase-out of free allowances in CBAM-covered goods, EU operators producing goods for export will be at a disadvantage in markets without similar carbon pricing.

The European Commission is proposing a temporary decarbonisation fund to support certain goods in the aluminium, fertilisers, iron and steel sectors. Other energy-intensive industries at continued risk of carbon leakage could also benefit. The fund would provide short-term support as a temporary bridge solution, pending a review in the context of the forthcoming revision of the EU ETS due in 2026.

Legislative proposal

2025/0418(COD) – Proposal for a regulation establishing the temporary decarbonisation fund – COM(2025) 990, 17 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0418(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Temporary decarbonisation fund‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

Background

Since his return to the White House in January 2025 until 20 February 2026, President Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on US trading partners after declaring several national emergencies under IEEPA on the grounds of the ‘influx of illegal aliens and illicit drugs‘ into the US and the persistent annual US trade in goods deficit. Trump declared Brazil’s actions against former Brazilian president Bolsonaro a national emergency under IEEPA to impose tariffs on Brazil. He also invoked IEEPA, on the grounds of Russian threats to the US, to impose tariffs against US imports from India because of India’s purchases of Russian oil.

The US Supreme Court tariff ruling

On 20 February 2026, a six to three majority of the nine US Supreme Court judges, including two Republican judges nominated during President Trump’s first term – in Learning Resources, Inc., versus Trump, President of the United States – ruled that, although IEEPA provides the US president with far-reaching powers, these do not include the authority to impose tariffs. They therefore ruled that President Trump’s use of IEEPA as an authority to levy tariffs on US trading partners is inconsistent with the US Constitution. The latter grants the power to impose tariffs solely to the US Congress, which, whenever it decided in the past to delegate tariff authority to the US president, stipulated that expressly in the respective legal act.

The Supreme Court ruling does not order the refunding of import tariffs already paid to the US government and thus does not impose an obligation on the US government to refund automatically the tariff revenue it has already collected. To be refunded, US importers will likely be compelled to take legal action individually against the US government at the US Court of International Trade. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Ranking Member of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, stated that there is ‘no legal mechanism for consumers and many small businesses to recoup the money they have already paid’.

Implications of the US Supreme Court ruling for US tariff policy

As a result of the ruling, President Trump can no longer use IEEPA’s emergency authority to levy tariffs and is thus deprived of using the swiftest and most flexible tool in his tariff policy toolbox. IEEPA tariffs levied in 2025 are estimated at US$142 billion, with most of the tariff cost borne by US businesses and consumers.

However, the US Congress delegated the power to levy tariffs to the US president under alternative US legal bases, some of which President Trump has used during his first and second terms. The country-specific tariffs levied against China under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act and the national security-based sector-specific tariffs imposed on imports of aluminium, steel and other items under Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act have not been challenged by the Court and will remain in place.

Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act authorises the US president to take ‘all appropriate action’, including tariffs, against trading partners engaging in unfair trade practices that cause harm to US trade. While the imposition of Section 301 tariffs and new investigations have focused on China, in July 2025 the US initiated investigations against Brazil and the first Trump Administration used Section 301 to investigate the use of digital services taxes by a number of countries, including EU Member States.

Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act authorises the President to impose tariffs or other restrictions on imports if they are considered a threat to national security. President Trump imposed steel and aluminium tariffs under Section 232 during his first term. In 2025, this legal basis was used for probes into items including cars, pharmaceuticals, trucks, robotics, drones, aircraft, medical equipment and chips.

The US strategy is to shift to the use of another untested legal basis under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act that allows the President to move fast to impose a blanket tariff of 15 % for a maximum of 150 days, unless Congress extends it or President Trump restarts the clock, to tackle a ‘large and serious’ US balance-of-payments deficit, that, experts argue, does not exist, and to a greater use of the tested legal bases above.

The Section 122 tariff of 15 %, effective from 24 February 2026, will allow the US government to bridge the time needed for more tariffs to be activated under legal bases that require several months of investigations. According to a Global Trade Alert estimate, the Section 122 tariff would lower the tariff burden on Brazil, China and India, but would increase it on the EU by 0.8 % to 12.5 % (US trade-weighted average: 13.2 %).

Table 1 – The shift in legal bases for US tariff policy in President Trump’s second term

2025 2026US legal basisIEEPASection 301Section 232Section 122Section 301Section 232Source: EPRS.

Another alternative legal basis, as untested as Section 122, is Section 338 of the 1930 Tariff Act (Smoot-Hawley Act) that allows the President to levy tariffs up to 50 % for discrimination against US commerce.

The change of the US legal basis is unlikely to alleviate the economic impact of the tariffs on businesses and consumers. US tariffs, uncertainty and unpredictability in trade with the US are here to stay.

Early reactions to the Supreme Court ruling

The Court ruling had been expected for a long time and the oral argument of 5 November 2025 already suggested scepticism among both Democratic and Republican Supreme Court judges as to whether President Trump’s use of IEEPA was consistent with the US Constitution. The Court decision was welcomed by Democrats, with California Governor Newsom, Illinois Governor Pritzker and Senator Cantwell calling for refunds, and by several Republicans who praised free trade or the separation of powers and had voted for bills to repeal tariffs. By contrast, it drew criticism from the US government and many other Republicans.

EU leaders have cautiously welcomed the ruling. A Commission spokesperson stated that the US Supreme Court ruling is being carefully analysed and that the EU remains in close contact with the US administration: ‘We therefore continue to advocate for low tariffs and to work towards reducing them.’ A later Commission statement called on the US to provide clarity on the next steps.

European businesses have reacted in a muted way, remaining clear-eyed that the ruling will merely lead to different US tools being applied and that it is unlikely to reduce the level of US import tariffs. It is seen as a new source of unpredictability, after European exporters had started to adjust to the US tariff policy before the judgment.

Several governments have signalled their interest in renegotiating past tariff arrangements with the Trump Administration, while the US has stated that the tariff deals negotiated under IEEPA remain in force.

Impact on the tariff provisions of the 2025 EU-US framework agreement

On 24 February 2026, Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) was set to adopt two legislative reports, drafted by the standing rapporteur for the US and INTA chair, Bernd Lange (S&D, Germany). These reports would feed into Parliament’s first reading position, which was originally due to be adopted during the March 2026 plenary, on two Commission proposals for implementing the EU’s tariff commitments under the 2025 EU-US framework agreement. Following the Supreme Court ruling, on 23 February 2026 Bernd Lange stated – after a meeting with the INTA shadow rapporteurs – that, given the new circumstances, a majority of political group representatives has agreed that the two legislative files ‘should be put on hold until clarity, stability and legal certainty in EU-US trade relations are re-established.’

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What to expect after the landmark United States Supreme Court tariff ruling?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Juan Fernando López Hernández

CONTEXT

The Commission is proposing to revise CO2 emission performance standards for new cars and vans. The amendments aim to introduce flexibilities and enhance technology neutrality to achieve the related targets. The proposal also establishes a new labelling system based on CO2 emission performance classes, with the aim of facilitating the purchase of electric vehicles and harmonising labelling across the EU. The proposal builds on feedback from the 2025 strategic dialogue on the future of the automotive industry, which sought to address challenges in the sector. It forms part of the automotive package for a clean and competitive European automotive sector.

Legislative proposal

2025/0420(COD) – Proposal for a Regulation of the of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards CO2 emission performance standards for new light duty vehicles and vehicle labelling and repealing Directive 1999/94/EC – COM(2025)995 final, 16.12.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The latest developments in the legislative procedure can be followed via the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0420 (COD).

Read the complete briefing on ‘Revision of CO2 emission performance standards for new light-duty vehicles and vehicle labelling‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French and English):

English EU-Mercosur agreements

In December 2025, the European Union (EU) and the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) finished negotiating a partnership agreement. The agreement covers trade and also political dialogue and cooperation in matters such as the environment and human rights.

On 9 January 2026, the Council of the European Union (the governments of EU countries) authorised the European Commission to sign the agreement. The agreement was signed on 17 January.

For the agreement to enter into force, the European Parliament must vote on it. Parliament must either approve or reject the deal, but it cannot change it. All EU countries will also have to approve it.

The EU and Mercosur also signed an interim agreement. This will allow the trade aspects of the deal to be implemented before the partnership agreement as a whole enters into force, which could take several years. Since trade policy is exclusively an EU competence, the interim agreement does not need approval from individual EU countries. It only needs approval from the European Parliament.

Parliament’s position on the EU-Mercosur agreement

On 21 January 2026, Parliament decided to ask the EU Court of Justice to review the agreements’ compatibility with EU Treaties. Parliament will have to wait for the Court of Justice’s decision before taking a final vote on the agreements. The Court of Justice could take over a year to deliver an opinion.

In an October 2025 resolution, the European Parliament highlighted that the agreement would strengthen EU-Mercosur cooperation on common challenges, while counteracting the growing influence of authoritarian actors in the region. Parliament also considered that the agreement would help the EU diversify its supply of critical raw materials.

In a previous resolution in April 2025, the European Parliament expressed concern over the agreement’s potentially negative impact on EU sustainability and safety standards, as well as on the EU agricultural and food sector’s competitiveness.

Provisional application of the partnership and interim agreements

Under the EU Treaties, the Council can decide on the provisional application of international treaties before Parliament approves them.

Before now, Parliament has regretted the Council’s decision to allow the provisional application of international agreements in areas which are subject to Parliament’s consent, such as trade.

Safeguard clause

The European Parliament and the Council have agreed on rules for applying the safeguard clause included in the partnership agreement. This clause allows the EU to suspend trade preferences on imports of agricultural products from Mercosur countries if such imports harm EU producers.

French Accords UE-Mercosur

En décembre 2025, l’UE et les pays du Mercosur (Argentine, Brésil, Paraguay et Uruguay) ont achevé la négociation d’un accord de partenariat. L’accord couvre non seulement le commerce, mais aussi le dialogue politique et la coopération dans des domaines tels que l’environnement et les droits de l’homme.

Le 9 janvier 2026, le Conseil de l’UE (les gouvernements des pays de l’UE) a autorisé la Commission européenne à signer l’accord. La signature a eu lieu le 17 janvier.

Cependant, pour que l’accord entre en vigueur, le Parlement européen doit se prononcer par un vote. Il doit soit approuver soit rejeter l’accord, mais il ne peut pas le modifier. Tous les pays de l’UE devront également l’approuver.

L’UE et le Mercosur ont signé également un accord intérimaire. Celui-ci permettra de mettre en œuvre les aspects commerciaux de l’accord avant l’entrée en vigueur de l’accord de partenariat dans son ensemble, ce qui pourrait prendre plusieurs années. Étant donné que la politique commerciale relève exclusivement de la compétence de l’UE, l’accord intérimaire n’a pas besoin de l’approbation de chaque pays membre. Il requiert seulement l’approbation du Parlement européen.

Position du Parlement sur les accords UE-Mercosur

Le 21 janvier 2026, le Parlement a décidé de demander à la Cour de justice de l’UE d’examiner la compatibilité des accords UE-Mercosur avec les traités de l’Union. Le Parlement doit maintenant attendre la décision de la Cour de justice avant de procéder au vote final sur les accords. La procédure devant la Cour de Justice pourrait durer plus d’un an.

Dans une résolution d’octobre 2025, le Parlement européen a souligné qu’un accord renforcerait la coopération UE-Mercosur face aux défis communs, tout en contrant l’influence croissante des acteurs autoritaires dans la région. Le Parlement a également estimé qu’un accord aiderait l’Union à diversifier ses sources d’approvisionnement en matières premières critiques.

Dans une résolution précédente d’avril 2025, le Parlement européen s’est dit préoccupé par les conséquences potentiellement négatives de cet accord sur les normes de durabilité et de sécurité de l’UE et sur la compétitivité du secteur agricole et alimentaire de l’UE.

Application provisoire des accords de partenariat et intérimaire

En vertu des traités de l’UE, le Conseil peut décider d’appliquer provisoirement des traités internationaux avant que le Parlement ne les approuve.

Par le passé, le Parlement a regretté la décision du Conseil d’autoriser l’application provisoire d’accords internationaux dans des domaines qui sont soumis à l’approbation du Parlement, tels que le commerce.

Clause de sauvegarde

Le Parlement européen et le Conseil se sont mis d’accord sur les règles d’application de la clause de sauvegarde figurant dans l’accord de partenariat. Cette clause permet à l’UE de suspendre les préférences commerciales sur les importations de produits agricoles en provenance des pays du Mercosur si ces importations nuisent aux producteurs de l’UE.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by António Vale with Paul Anton Albrecht.

Lasers have a wide range of current applications, in manufacturing, medicine or communications. Their characteristics vary across different fields and they remain under continuous development, with the academic sector pushing the limits of the technology. One field of interest is laser pulse time acontrol and questions about the shortest processes in nature. These ultrashort processes govern our lives and happen all around us: biological processes are driven by protein folding and enzymatic reactions, the movements of molecules and bond breaking create chemical reactions, and the interaction with light leads to different radiation processes. Most of these can be observed in the ‘femtosecond’ regime. One femtosecond is 10‑15 seconds – if a second was as long as the distance from earth to the sun, we would measure at the scale of a hairs’ width – which would be a single femtosecond.

Huge progress has been made in observing this timescale with ultrashort pulses of light, creating snapshots, or even movies of hitherto unseen processes. The light sources behind such discoveries are often particle accelerators such as synchrotrons or newer XFELs. The latter are very long accelerators that are used to bring free electrons close to the speed of light; these then undulate as they go through an array of magnets, causing them to emit, high-energy light pulses in the form of X-rays. Some of these state-of-the-art facilities are European, such as the European XFEL (EuXFEL, which opened at the Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY) in Hamburg in 2017). XFEL is 3.4 km long and incorporates superconducting accelerator technology. This is a key example of European cooperation hosting a world-leading science centre and connecting scientists across nationalities and disciplines.

Future development could lead to interesting possibilities: chemical reactions and the movement of molecules are still much slower than the electronic processes underlying them – their natural timescale is in the attosecond range (a thousandth of a femtosecond – 10-18s). If we return to our metaphor of a second being equal to the distance of the earth to the sun, we are now considering an entity the size of a microscopic virus. This timescale can be reached with methods such as high-harmonic generation (HHG), which led to Agostini, Krausz and L’Huillier’s award of the 2023 Nobel prize for physics for their work on methods to resolve electron dynamics. However, these are limited to lower intensity pulses, achieving this timescale only at ‘small scale’ (tabletop) and under technical compromises. Theoretical studies on these timescales continue, but experimental limits make a direct comparison quite difficult.

Potential impacts and developments

The idea behind investigating any dynamic is most often to make a video of the action. For extremely fast processes, this becomes very difficult, as it is like repeated stop-motion photography using a long-exposure camera and imperfect timing. An investigation is therefore significantly easier with improved camera timing.

To reach the attosecond scale, with high-intensity, high-quality light pulses, several new technological ideas exist, which promise to improve XFELs. These include wakefield acceleration, which accelerates the electrons initially with an additional laser or plasma, reaching high speeds at short length, and technologies that improve the properties and intensity of the resulting laser, such as self-/laser-seeding or enhanced self-amplified spontaneous emission (ESASE). These are already partially implemented in existing and new facilities, such as the Chinese SHINE facility (expected to open in 2026), or the Compact XFEL being built in the United States. Europe relies on existing facilities and established strengths, with plans to improve and upgrade them including an improved electron beam at DESY.

Combining several of these next-generation technologies may allow science to attain the ambitious goal of achieving a reliable resolution of significantly below 100 attoseconds, which could compete with HHG. This would be enough, for example, to precisely track the steps of an electron within a molecule, giving us insight into electronic movements and transitions. This could allow scientists to observe the key steps in light absorption and conversion, charge migration, or chemical reactions. Better understanding of these processes could unlock a range of scientific applications, such as tracing the light-driven path of electrons in photosynthesis, or establishing a new conceptual basis for chemistry by naturally linking structure and dynamics. It could also help drive innovation by, for example, allowing the development of more powerful and energy efficient optoelectronic components, helping overcome production barriers to unlock the potential of quantum device technologies, or a deeper understanding of the charge transfer mechanisms in batteries.

This positions XFELs as a classic example of a research infrastructure which, even if not geared towards immediate innovation outcomes, can be leveraged to progress a wide range of research, which could have a significant potential economic impact. Furthermore, new developments in compact XFELs, which may ultimately allow them to be shrunk to tabletop size, may open the door to direct commercial application in chip manufacturing. Such development would be particularly relevant for EU competitiveness, given the current European monopoly on high-end chip lithography machines through ASML.

Anticipatory policymaking

X-ray free electron lasers demonstrate the challenges involved in closely tracking the shortest processes in nature: it is difficult, but possible. Better control of the attosecond regime is in reach with existing technology but requires upgrading existing facilities (affecting operation) or creating new ones. The high investment required for such projects makes XFELs a poster case for the need for a European strategy on research and technology infrastructures, as recently launched by the European Commission. Cutting-edge infrastructures like this are attractive sites for research: congregating skills and talent, offering unique opportunities, making such centres the first address for EU scientific cooperation, and not only help promote European researcher mobility, but also attract researchers currently based elsewhere.

Given a renewed European focus on competitiveness, it makes sense to design such projects as cross-cutting initiatives, and to seek opportunities to involve the private sector. An ambitious effort to attain high attosecond precision could develop the EU high-tech supply chain (in fields such as electron sources, superconductor technology, or detectors), helping to secure a leading role for Europe in these sectors, as in the case of projects such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Combining both attractive centres of excellence and scientific fields and more investment in high-tech industry could also be a potential idea for a moonshot project under the next Horizon Europe programme. This could advance research in a plethora of scientific fields, from quantum science over chemistry to biology. In addition, the potential direct commercial viability of this technology, such as in semiconductor manufacturing, could attract innovative funding. This would perpetuate the tradition of European excellence in this field and enable development of a next-generation technology industry in Europe.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘What if we could track an electron’s every step?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vasco Guedes Ferreira with Oona Lagercrantz.

Quantum technologies have transformative potential and are already exerting a significant impact on global economies and society. The European Union (EU) supports the development of these technologies through initiatives such as the Quantum Flagship and Horizon Europe, as well as through national initiatives and programmes. However, the specific role of quantum technologies in supporting the EU’s energy and climate goals has so far received limited and fragmented policy attention. This briefing explores how the emerging quantum ecosystem could help accelerate decarbonisation and address the existing innovation gap that must be bridged to achieve climate neutrality (i.e. net-zero emissions) by 2050. Achieving this goal requires technological breakthroughs in sectors that are currently difficult to decarbonise.

Quantum computing has the potential to transform these areas by, for example, simulating complex molecular interactions that classical computers cannot handle efficiently. Such capabilities could fast-track the development of more efficient batteries, green hydrogen catalysts and carbon capture materials. Quantum sensing is already providing precise tools for monitoring greenhouse gas emissions, and quantum communication has the potential to secure the critical digital infrastructure of future electricity grids. Available evidence indicates that, while the EU is investing seriously in quantum research, it currently lacks a coordinated strategy linking these technologies explicitly to decarbonisation. With the European Commission expected to adopt a quantum act in 2026, policymakers have a unique window of opportunity to address this gap. By integrating long-term decarbonisation objectives into the research and innovation framework, the EU can leverage its scientific leadership to drive the next generation of clean technologies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Quantum technologies: Can they boost Europe’s decarbonisation?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

We replied to those who took the time to write to the President.

Main elements of our reply Violence in north‑east Syria may amount to war crimes

In its resolution of 12 February 2026 on the situation in north‑east Syria, the European Parliament expresses concern over credible reports of human rights violations, particularly against the Kurdish population – which may constitute war crimes.

Parliament calls for swift investigations into crimes against civilians by government forces and militias, and urges the Syrian authorities to grant full access to UN bodies.

The European Parliament welcomes the agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government, calling on all parties to respect the ceasefire. It denounces Turkey’s continued military intervention in north‑east Syria.

Parliament recalls the decisive contribution of Kurdish forces against Daesh and expresses grave concern over Daesh fighters who have escaped from detention.

It calls on Syrian authorities to protect all ethnic and religious communities, ensuring full recognition, participation and rights for Kurds.

A press release about this resolution is available on the European Parliament’s website. Parliament also adopted resolutions on Syria and the Kurdish community in May 2025, July 2025 and January 2026, during its current mandate.

European Union foreign policy

Although the European Parliament takes political positions on world developments, it is the governments of EU countries that decide the EU’s common foreign and security policy in both the European Council (heads of government) and the Council of the EU (government ministers). The European External Action Service, led by High Representative Kaja Kallas, implements the EU’s foreign and security policy.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Anna Caprile, Eric Pichon.

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has been President of the Russian Federation since 31 December 1999, except for a brief four-year interlude from 2008 to 2012 during which he held the office of prime minister but effectively maintained his political authority.

During Putin’s 26-year rule, Russia has been at war, overtly or covertly, for 21 years. Putin’s first term coincided with the launching of the Second Chechen War, intended to be brief but which lasted for 10 violent years. In 2014, during Putin’s third term, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, and the initially covert support to the separatist forces in eastern Ukraine gradually became overt, leading up to the full-scale invasion of February 2022. Overlapping with these two armed conflicts, the Russo-Georgian War took place in 2008, and since 2015 Russia has deployed military forces in Syria. Russian paramilitary groups have also expanded operations in Africa.

The transformation of Russia over these 26 years has been fundamental. A series of indicators can help measure its economic evolution, the surge in military expenditure, its demographic decline, the worsening of various freedom and governance rankings, and growing inequality. In a shift towards the east, China has become, by far, Russia’s main trading partner, providing it with a crucial economic and diplomatic lifeline since 2022.

Putin, now 73 years old, was proclaimed President of the Russian Federation for his fifth term in 2024, after obtaining over 88 % of the votes in what was broadly seen as yet another ritual electoral performance. In line with the constitutional reforms introduced in 2020, he can remain in power until 2036.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia under Vladimir Putin: His 26-year rule in facts and figures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak.

CONTEXT

The European Union’s competitiveness and prosperity depends on an optimal allocation of resources, particularly savings, within the single market, yet EU capital markets remain fragmented. EU rules are mostly set out through directives, leaving Member States’ supervisory authorities latitude in their interpretation and application of the rules. Therefore, although rules are enacted at EU level, the resulting uneven supervisory environment is considered a major cause of fragmentation of EU capital markets. EU-level supervision and regulation thus constitute instruments to ‘de-fragment’ – i.e. ‘integrate’ – the EU’s capital markets.

On 4 December 2025, the European Commission issued a package of three proposals to address this situation (the ‘Market integration package’), as part of its savings and investments union strategy. The proposal to amend 14 regulations – entitled the ‘Master regulation’ by the Commission – would primarily transfer supervisory powers to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in some specific markets and areas, strengthen its coordination instruments, and modify its governance. This proposal also aims at removing barriers to cross-border activities and trading.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0383 (COD) – Proposal for amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, No 648/2012, No 600/2014, No 909/2014, 2015/2365, 2019/1156, 2021/23, 2022/858, 2023/1114, No 1060/2009, 2016/1011, 2017/2402, 2023/2631 and 2024/3005 as regards the further development of capital market integration and supervision within the Union – COM(2025) 943, 4 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0383 (COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Capital markets integration and supervision: Master regulation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Members debated several Commission and Council statements, including on the European response to extreme weather events, particularly in Portugal, southern Italy, Malta and Greece; building a stronger European defence in an increasingly volatile international environment; as well as urgent action to revive EU competitiveness, deepen the single market and reduce the cost of living, following up on the Draghi report. Debates also covered the rule of law, fundamental rights and the misuse of EU funds in Slovakia, and Spain’s large-scale regularisation policy and its impact on the Schengen Area and EU migration policy. Further debates concerned the presentation of the action plan against cyberbullying, the International Day of Education and the fight against inequalities in access to education, as well as the need to tackle economic inequalities within the EU and globally. Members also adopted a Parliament statement to mark World Cancer Day.

Parliament held several debates on external relations, in particular on the European response to the attacks on the Ukrainian energy system and the resulting humanitarian crisis; the situation in north-east Syria, including violence against civilians and the need to maintain a sustainable ceasefire; the urgent need to address the humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan and achieve lasting peace; and the violence in the Great Lakes Region, particularly in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Finally, Members heard a formal address by Annalena Baerbock, President of the United Nations General Assembly.

EU-Mercosur Agreement: Bilateral safeguard clause

Members adopted a provisional agreement on a regulation implementing the bilateral safeguard clause for agricultural products incorporated into the trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement. The safeguard clause allows the EU to temporarily suspend Mercosur agreement tariff preferences and reinstate most-favoured nation duties under stricter and faster procedures should imports undercut EU prices or represent a danger to EU producers. In the provisional text, Parliament succeeded in lowering the thresholds for triggering a safeguard investigation from 10 % to 5 % and extending the reference period to three years. The Commission may also, upon a request from EU industry, extend monitoring to products or sectors not listed in the regulation.

European Climate Law

Parliament adopted a provisional agreement reached between Parliament and the Council on proposals to amend the European Climate Law, introducing an intermediate climate target for 2040. The amendment would include a binding 90 % net emissions reduction target for 2040, compared to 1990, and a capped potential contribution of international carbon credits towards meeting this target.

Cross-border enforcement of rules on unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain

Late payment, last-minute order cancellations, and unilateral contract changes on the part of large buyers in a different country can considerably harm EU farmers’ businesses. While the Unfair Trading Practices (UTP) Directive seeks to protect farmers from such activities, Parliament proposed extending the rules to operators based outside the EU whose commercial activities target the EU internal market. It also suggested establishing alerts on cross-border UTPs. Members adopted a provisional agreement on strengthening the directive. National authorities will be required to act on their own initiative to stop cross-border UTPs, even in the absence of a formal complaint.

Wine sector package

The EU wine sector is facing change, both in growing conditions and drinking habits, leading to a risk of surplus production. Parliament calls for a higher EU co-financing rate for vineyard restructuring. Members adopted a provisional agreement reached with the Council on amending several EU rules governing the sector. The provisional agreement will harmonise labelling, particularly regarding alcohol content and increase EU and national support to promote high-quality European wines outside the EU.

New EU anti-poverty strategy

With a Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) report calling for stronger EU coordination, Members debated the development of the EU’s first-ever anti-poverty strategy, calling for greater effort to eradicate poverty, particularly for children. The report highlights the multidimensional nature of poverty, particularly among children, people with disabilities, older people and those in precarious employment. It also stresses the need to improve minimum income schemes, and the importance of quality jobs, effective social protection and access to public services. Finally, the report calls for adequate funding, including through the 2028–2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), to support implementation of the strategy, improve coherence across existing initiatives and contribute to the goal of eradicating poverty by 2035.

Protecting workers’ rights

Workplace incidents remain a significant challenge in the EU, particularly in the construction, transport, and manufacturing sectors. Parliament has urged action, particularly on contractor and subcontractor liability, and Members debated and adopted an EMPL committee own-initiative report reiterating this call. The report calls for a comprehensive strategy against labour exploitation, including tackling illegal work, organised crime and abusive business practices such as some subcontracting activities. It highlights the need for effective enforcement through closer cooperation between the European Labour Authority, Europol, national authorities and social partners.

Action plan against cyberbullying

Members held a debate on the cyberbullying action plan, following a Commission statement. Parliament has consistently highlighted the need to protect children online, addressing issues such as cyberbullying, hate speech, child sexual abuse and mental health risks. The Commission’s EU action plan against cyberbullying aims at protecting children, young adults and others at particular risk online. The plan addresses the lack of a common definition of cyberbullying along with proposals for prevention and awareness-raising measures.

EU priorities for the 70th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women

The 70th session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW) in March is expected to focus on access to justice for women and girls. Parliament adopted recommendations to the Council on the EU’s priorities for the 70th session. An own-initiative report from the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) urges the Council to lead efforts against the global backlash on gender rights and calls on the EU to defend diversity, equality and inclusion, safeguard the UNCSW‘s mandate, and address funding shortfalls.

Accession of third countries to Hague conventions

Members debated the accession of third countries (in this case Albania and Montenegro) to the Hague conventions (specifically the Hague Judgments Convention). There are various procedures for handling the effects of ratification of an acceding state on existing parties in Hague Conventions. In one scenario, if existing parties do not oppose the accession by submitting a declaration within a set time limit, their agreement to the accession is tacit. However, when the Commission raises no objection to a third country’s accession and does not submit a declaration of opposition, the Council and Parliament cannot give their consent. Parliament’s position is therefore that the Commission must present a proposal for acceptance in such cases, even where not required by the convention itself. Members adopted two resolutions on the matter.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from Parliament’s International Trade (INTA) Committee on the negative trade-related effects of global overcapacity on the Union steel market was approved without vote.

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – February 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French and English):

English Current EU legislation

A 2023 European Union (EU) law ensures that products containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are clearly labelled.

Agreement on new genomic techniques

On 4 December 2025, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU reached an agreement on the European law governing products derived from new genomic techniques (NGTs).

The agreement stipulates that products derived from plants considered comparable to natural or conventional plants (known as NGT1) will be exempt from the GMO labelling requirements for consumers. However, labelling will remain mandatory for seeds, allowing farmers to make an informed choice.

Plants with more complex modifications (referred to as NGT2) will remain subject to the existing GMO legislation requirements, including mandatory labelling for all derived products.

Plants that have been modified to tolerate herbicides or produce an insecticidal substance will be classified as NGT2. No NGTs will be allowed in organic production.

The agreement allows NGTs to be patented, except for traits or sequences that already occur in nature or are produced organically. Safeguards will be put in place to prevent the market from being dominated by a few firms and keep seeds affordable and accessible to farmers.

Next steps

The law will enter into force after formal approval by the Parliament and the Council (representing the governments of EU countries).

French Législation européenne en vigueur

Une loi de l’Union européenne (UE) de 2003 assure que les produits contenant des organismes génétiquement modifiés (OGM) soient clairement étiquetés.

Accord sur les nouvelles techniques génomiques

Le 4 décembre 2025, le Parlement européen et le Conseil de l’UE sont parvenus à un accord sur la loi européenne qui régira les produits dérivés des nouvelles techniques génomiques (NTG).

L’accord prévoit que les produits dérivés des plantes considérées comparables à des plantes naturelles ou conventionnelles (dénommées NTG 1) seront exemptés de l’obligation d’étiquetage des OGM pour les consommateurs. Cependant, l’étiquetage restera obligatoire pour les semences, afin de permettre aux agriculteurs de faire un choix éclairé.

Les plantes dont les modifications sont plus complexes (dénommées NTG 2) resteront régies par les règles actuelles applicables aux OGM, ce qui implique un étiquetage obligatoire pour tous les produits dérivés.

Les plantes modifiées pour tolérer les herbicides ou produire une substance insecticide seront considérées NTG 2. Aucune NTG ne sera autorisée dans la production biologique.

L’accord autorise les brevets pour les NTG, à l’exception des caractères ou séquences présents dans la nature ou produits par des moyens biologiques. Des garanties sont prévues pour empêcher la concentration du marché et pour garantir que les semences restent abordables et accessibles aux agriculteurs.

Prochaines étapes

La loi entrera en vigueur après l’approbation formel du Parlement et du Conseil (représentant les gouvernements des pays de l’UE).

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Maria Niestadt.

CONTEXT

On 19 November 2025, the Commission published a proposal for a Digital Omnibus on AI: a set of amendments to the Artificial Intelligence Act (in force since 1 August 2024) and to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 on common rules for civil aviation (in force since 11 September 2018). These amendments seek to address specific implementation issues and to reduce the regulatory burden arising from the AI Act; the timely application of the AI Act has faced some delays, particularly regarding the designation of national competent authorities and the publication of harmonised standards and compliance tools for high-risk AI requirements. The minor amendments to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 aim to ensure the consistent application of the AI Act’s high-risk requirements in civil aviation.

The Digital Omnibus on AI is part of a broader digital package published on 19 November 2025, which includes two digital omnibus proposals (henceforth referred to as ‘the digital omnibus’: one amending personal and non-personal data and cybersecurity rules, and another – the Digital Omnibus on AI – amending AI rules), the European data union strategy and a proposed regulation on European business wallets. The digital package aims to simplify and enhance the effectiveness of the EU’s digital laws, and help EU businesses to innovate, scale, and save on administrative costs. While the digital package has been welcomed by most stakeholders, the digital omnibus has raised concerns about achieving simplification while ensuring fundamental rights. It also entails a risk that simplification could upset the fragile equilibrium achieved during the initial trilogue negotiations.

Legislative proposal

2025/0359(COD) – Proposal for a regulation amending Regulations (EU) 2024/1689 and (EU) 2018/1139 as regards the simplification of the implementation of harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Digital Omnibus on AI) – COM(2025) 836 final, 19.11.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments regarding this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Digital Omnibus on AI‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Annastiina Papunen.

Enhancing the EU’s competitiveness is a key priority for the European Council in the current legislative cycle. In a complex geopolitical environment, in which the international rules-based order is increasingly undermined and core alliances are questioned, it is essential for Europe to be able to stand firmly on its own feet. Strengthening the single market and the EU economic base is ‘an urgent strategic imperative’ in the words of European Council President António Costa, to improve the EU’s competitiveness and develop its strategic autonomy.

On 12 February 2026, EU leaders will meet for an informal leaders’ retreat – ‘a strategic brainstorming session’, according to President Costa – in Alden Biesen, Belgium, to discuss EU competitiveness. This meeting, which 19 EU leaders requested in a letter in October 2025, builds on previous discussions on the topic, notably 1) the informal meeting of 22 January 2026 on transatlantic relations and trade, 2) the strategic discussion on geoeconomy and competitiveness at the December 2025 European Council meeting, and 3) the October 2025 regular meeting on simplification and twin transition. Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta have been invited to join the retreat to share their visions and highlight developments since their groundbreaking reports. European Parliament President Roberta Metsola will also address the meeting; President Costa has met Parliament’s Conference of Presidents ahead of the retreat. No formal conclusions are expected from the strategic debate, but the reflections are likely to feed into the March 2026 European Council conclusions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outlook for the 12 February 2026 retreat: Work on competitiveness in the European Council‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tim Peters and Jakub Przetacznik with Silke Maes.

On 18 December 2025, the European Council agreed to a €90 billion loan to Ukraine to cover the country’s financial needs in the years 2026 and 2027. The European Commission has subsequently presented three legislative proposals to implement the European Council’s decision: (i) a proposal for a €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan financed by the EU except for Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia; (ii) a proposal to amend the Ukraine Facility to use it for the disbursement of the new loan; and (iii) a proposal to amend the EU’s multiannual financial framework to use it as a guarantee for the loan, and to finance the grants used for the borrowing cost subsidy.

The loan will be financed through EU borrowing on the capital markets backed by the EU budget’s headroom. The EU budget will pay for the interest rates and other associated costs for Ukraine.

While €30 billion of the loan are meant to support the Ukrainian budget, €60 billion will be used to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities. The Commission proposal stipulates that defence products financed from the loan should, in principle, originate from the EU, European Economic Area, European Free Trade Area and Ukraine. Only if products are not available there, or cannot be delivered fast enough, can products from other third countries be bought.

In the past, Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union had been seen as an obstacle to financing weapons and military equipment from the EU budget. However, as the proposed Ukraine Support Loan is based on Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the rules on the EU’s common foreign and security policy do not apply.

Legislative Proposals

• COM(2026) 20 – Proposal for a regulation implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027
• COM(2026) 22 – Proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2024/792 establishing the Ukraine Facility
• COM(2026) 21 – Amended proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027

Read the complete study on ‘EU support for Ukraine for 2026-2027‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp

Facts and figures

The EU’s defence industry is at a pivotal moment, shaped by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States’ shifting priorities, and a renewed drive for strategic autonomy. After years of underinvestment and persistent fragmentation, the EU is now seeking to rebuild military capability and strengthen its defence industrial base. The European defence industry comprises a number of large prime contractors, mid-caps and a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). According to Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) data, and the author’s calculations for the EU-27, the EU-based defence industry’s turnover is estimated at around €148 billion in 2024, an increase of more than 60 % since 2021 in nominal terms. Exports amounted to roughly €48 billion in 2024 and direct employment in the EU defence industry amounted to around 500 000 people.

Table 1 – Top EU defence companies by revenue

CompanyCountryRevenue*Global rankingThalesFrance15 900#10LeonardoItaly13 822#13AirbusEuropean12 705#14RheinmetallGerman8 245#18SaabSweden5 542#26MBDAEuropean5 305#27SafranFrance5 198#29Naval GroupFrance4 716#33

Source: DefenseNews, 2024. *Revenue from defence in US$ million (2024).

Table 2 – EU defence industry revenue, 2021-2024

Source: ASD data, 2025 and author’s calculations.

The EU’s defence industry remains largely concentrated in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. However, a report shows that prime producers of the 46 most critical defence items are located across 23 Member States. Thales of France ranked as the largest defence company in the EU by defence revenue in 2024, followed by Italy’s Leonardo. That year, 20 companies headquartered in the EU featured among the world’s top 100 defence firms, including five based in France and four in Germany, together generating defence revenues of approximately US$112 billion, or about €104 billion. By contrast, 48 of the top 100 defence companies were based in the United States, accounting for roughly US$334 billion in defence revenue. Lockheed Martin alone, the leading global defence firm, reported defence revenues of US$68.39 billion. Five of the top 100 were based in China, together accounting for US$355 billion in revenue. The ownership structure of Europe’s leading defence firms underscores the strategic character of the sector.
In many instances, national authorities maintain blocking or controlling shares, which helps safeguard alignment with national priorities and allows for direct public oversight. Across continental Europe, ownership is commonly concentrated either within the state or among family-controlled enterprises. Prominent examples include Dassault (almost 70 % of shares held by the Dassault family’s Groupe Industriel Marcel Dassault), Naval Group (over 60 % of shares are held by the French state), Fincantieri (70 % of shares held by the state-owned Italian sovereign wealth fund, CDP Equity S.p.A.), and Liebherr Group (entirely owned by the Liebherr family). State participation can narrow the scope for cross-border cooperation and industrial consolidation. While mergers between defence firms may deliver economic benefits through economies of scale, they are often treated as strategically sensitive due to their implications for national security and sovereignty. Family-owned firms similarly pursue nationally anchored corporate strategies, reducing their openness to deeper EU-level integration. Golden power rules and the veto capacity of dominant family shareholders further reinforce this structural rigidity. Researchers found that the combined effect is a European defence industrial base that remains fragmented and less competitive than more consolidated markets.

What does the European defence industry produce?

The European defence industry produces a broad range of military equipment and technologies and therefore provides an extensive industrial offering. Its production spans: military aeronautics, including combat, transport and mission aircraft, and helicopters; land capabilities, such as main battle tanks, armoured vehicles across multiple classes, logistics and tactical transport assets, artillery and ammunition of different calibres, alongside individual combat equipment; naval platforms from submarines to surface combatants; space-related defence capabilities; missile systems at both tactical and strategic levels; and defence-specific electronics, information and communication technologies, cyber capabilities and autonomous systems – notably drones, which have experienced a particular boom in production. Despite this breadth, the EU industry does not currently provide domestic solutions in several critical segments, including medium altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, tactical ballistic missiles and long-range artillery rockets. These gaps reflect long-term underinvestment and sustained dependence on the United States security guarantee.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the rapid availability of military equipment became a key priority for EU governments and armed forces. Firms based outside Europe – benefiting either from larger domestic markets as in the United States or from higher baseline levels of defence readiness as in South Korea – were better positioned to maintain higher production capacity and to deliver or pledge substantial quantities of equipment at speed. By contrast, many European manufacturers were limited by long periods of industrial contraction and underinvestment. This context has evolved markedly since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. EU ammunition production capacity, for example, rose from around 300 000 rounds per year in 2022 to an estimated 2 million by the end of 2025, reflecting a pace of industrial expansion that, according to the Financial Times, exceeds peacetime growth rates by a factor of three.

EU and Member States’ support for the defence industry

EU Member States’ defence expenditure has risen sharply since 2021, reflecting a sustained shift towards higher investment in defence. Defence spending reached an estimated €381 billion in 2025, representing a rise of almost 63 % compared to 2020. Expenditure grew from 1.6 % of GDP in 2023 to 1.9 % in 2024 and is expected to reach approximately 2.1 % in 2025. Growth has been driven primarily by investment, which approached €130 billion in 2025. Investment accounted for 31 % of total defence expenditure in 2024, with equipment procurement dominating and exceeding €88 billion. Defence research and development spending also expanded significantly, reaching €13 billion in 2024 and a projected €17 billion in 2025. The EU has introduced several measures to complement and amplify national efforts. These include financial support instruments such as the SAFE loan facility, budgetary flexibility via the national escape clause, and cooperation through the European Peace Facility. In parallel, EU budget instruments such as the European Defence Fund, military mobility funding, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) and the European defence industry programme (EDIP) aim to reduce fragmentation and strengthen the competitiveness of Europe’s defence industrial base.

European Parliament position

Parliament has consistently called for an increase in defence spending and for boosting the EU defence industry. Members welcome rising national defence spending but urge deeper European cooperation to prevent market fragmentation and call for expanded industrial output and greater interoperability.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘European defence industry‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

Main elements of our reply EN:

At the European Parliament’s sitting on 19 January 2026, President Roberta Metsola voiced the EU’s support for Denmark and the people of Greenland. She stressed that Greenland is not for sale and that sovereignty and territorial integrity need to be respected.

In two resolutions adopted by Parliament on 21 January on the EU’s common foreign and security policy and common security and defence policy, Parliament confirmed its full and unwavering solidarity with Greenland.

The European Parliament denounces the use of unilateral trade threats and economic intimidation against Denmark and other EU countries as a form of coercion that does not respect international law and the core principles of cooperation between NATO allies. It warns against attempts to instrumentalise security concerns in the Arctic to exert territorial or political pressure. Parliament stresses that Greenland must not be used as a tool to divide the EU. The European Parliament calls on the EU to respond firmly, collectively and decisively.

Parliament also notes, with grave concern, that the US unilateral military action, conducted outside lawful multilateral frameworks in relation to Venezuela, raises significant questions under international law.

On 14 January 2026 President Metsola, together with leaders of the European Parliament’s political groups, issued a statement expressing unequivocal support for Greenland and Denmark.

DE:

In der Sitzung des Europäischen Parlaments am 19. Januar 2026 bekundete Präsidentin Metsola ihre Unterstützung für Dänemark und für die Menschen in Grönland. Sie betonte, dass Grönland nicht zum Verkauf steht und dass Souveränität und territoriale Unversehrtheit respektiert werden müssen.

In zwei Entschließungen des Parlaments zur Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und zur Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU, die am 21. Januar 2026 angenommen wurden, bekräftigte das Parlament seine uneingeschränkte und unerschütterliche Solidarität mit Grönland.

Das Europäische Parlament verurteilt den Einsatz einseitiger Handelsdrohungen und wirtschaftlicher Einschüchterung gegen Dänemark und andere Mitgliedstaaten als eine Form von Zwang, die mit dem Völkerrecht und den Grundprinzipien der Zusammenarbeit zwischen NATO-Verbündeten unvereinbar ist. Es warnt vor Versuchen, Sicherheitsbedenken in der Arktis zu instrumentalisieren, um territorialen oder politischen Druck auszuüben. Es betont, dass Grönland nicht als Instrument zur Spaltung der EU eingesetzt werden darf. Das Europäische Parlament fordert die EU auf, gemeinsam und entschlossen zu reagieren.

Zudem stellt das Parlament mit großer Besorgnis fest, dass das unilaterale militärische Vorgehen der USA in Venezuela außerhalb rechtmäßiger multilateraler Rahmen entscheidende Fragen im Hinblick auf das Völkerrecht aufwirft.

Am 14. Januar 2026 gab Präsidentin Metsola zusammen mit den Vorsitzenden der Fraktionen des Europäischen Parlaments eine Erklärung zur eindeutigen Unterstützung Grönlands und Dänemarks ab.

FR:

Lors de la séance plénière du Parlement européen du 19 janvier 2026, la Présidente Roberta Metsola a exprimé le soutien de l’UE au Danemark et à la population du Groenland. Elle a souligné que le Groenland n’était pas à vendre et que la souveraineté et l’intégrité territoriale devaient être respectées.

Dans deux résolutions adoptées le 21 janvier sur la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune et sur la politique de sécurité et de défense commune, le Parlement a réaffirmé sa solidarité totale et indéfectible avec le Groenland.

Le Parlement européen dénonce le recours à des menaces commerciales unilatérales et à l’intimidation économique à l’encontre du Danemark et d’autres États membres, qui constituent une forme de coercition incompatible avec le droit international et aux principes fondamentaux de coopération entre les alliés de l’OTAN. Il met en garde contre les tentatives visant à instrumentaliser les préoccupations en matière de sécurité dans l’Arctique afin d’exercer des pressions territoriales ou politiques. Le Parlement souligne que le Groenland ne doit pas être utilisé comme un outil pour diviser l’UE. Il invite l’Union à réagir avec fermeté, collectivement et de manière décisive.

Le Parlement relève également, avec une profonde préoccupation, que l’action militaire unilatérale menée par les États-Unis  hors des cadres multilatéraux légaux en lien avec le Venezuela soulève des questions importantes en matière de droit international.

Le 14 janvier 2026, la Présidente Metsola, accompagnée des présidents des groupes politiques du Parlement européen, a publié une déclaration (en anglais) exprimant leur soutien sans équivoque à l’égard du Groenland et au Danemark.

IT:

Nella seduta del Parlamento europeo del 19 gennaio 2026, la Presidente Roberta Metsola ha espresso il sostegno dell’UE alla Danimarca e al popolo groenlandese. Ella ha sottolineato che la Groenlandia non è in vendita e che occorre rispettare la sovranità e l’integrità territoriale.

In due risoluzioni approvate dal Parlamento il 21 gennaio sulla politica estera e di sicurezza comune e sulla politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune dell’UE, il Parlamento ha confermato la sua piena e ferma solidarietà alla Groenlandia.

Il Parlamento europeo denuncia il ricorso a minacce commerciali unilaterali e all’intimidazione economica contro la Danimarca e altri paesi dell’UE quale forma di coercizione che non rispetta il diritto internazionale e i principi fondamentali della cooperazione tra gli alleati della NATO. Esso mette in guardia contro i tentativi di strumentalizzazione delle preoccupazioni in materia di sicurezza nell’Artico per esercitare pressioni territoriali o politiche. Il Parlamento sottolinea che la Groenlandia non deve essere utilizzata come strumento per dividere l’UE. Il Parlamento europeo invita l’UE a rispondere in modo fermo, collettivo e deciso.

Il Parlamento rileva inoltre, con profonda preoccupazione, che l’azione militare unilaterale degli Stati Uniti, condotta al di fuori di quadri multilaterali legali per quanto attiene al Venezuela, solleva questioni significative ai sensi del diritto internazionale.

Il 14 gennaio 2026 la Presidente Metsola, insieme ai leader dei gruppi politici del Parlamento europeo, ha rilasciato una dichiarazione in cui si esprime un sostegno inequivocabile alla Groenlandia e alla Danimarca.

ES:

En la sesión del Parlamento Europeo del 19 de enero de 2026, la presidenta Roberta Metsola expresó el apoyo de la UE a Dinamarca y al pueblo de Groenlandia. Subrayó que Groenlandia no está a la venta y que deben respetarse su soberanía e integridad territorial.

En dos resoluciones aprobadas por el Parlamento el 21 de enero sobre la política exterior y de seguridad común de la UE y la política común de seguridad y defensa, el Parlamento confirmó su solidaridad plena e inquebrantable con Groenlandia.

El Parlamento Europeo denuncia el uso de amenazas comerciales unilaterales y la intimidación económica contra Dinamarca y otros países de la UE como una forma de coerción incompatible con el derecho internacional y los principios fundamentales de la cooperación entre los aliados de la OTAN. Advierte de los intentos de instrumentalizar los problemas de seguridad en el Ártico para ejercer presión territorial o política. El Parlamento subraya que Groenlandia no debe utilizarse como herramienta para dividir a la UE. El Parlamento Europeo pide a la UE que responda con firmeza, colectiva y decisivamente.

El Parlamento también observa con gran preocupación que la acción militar unilateral de los Estados Unidos en relación con Venezuela, llevada a cabo al margen de los marcos jurídicos multilaterales, plantea serias dudas a la luz del derecho internacional.

El 14 de enero de 2026, la presidenta Metsola, junto con los dirigentes de los grupos políticos del Parlamento Europeo, emitió una declaración (en inglés) en la que expresaban su apoyo inequívoco a Groenlandia y Dinamarca.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.