Ideas on Europe Blog

A guest contribution by Başak Alpan,
from the Middle East Technical University, Ankara.

Here’s one of the few good things about being a political science professor in Turkey: elections are never only boring econometrical calculations that no one is interested in, but each election gives you an ample amount of shock, perplexity, and challenge to cope with.

The parliamentary elections of 1st November are no exception to this rule. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), as a surprise to even its own cadres, increased its vote from 40 % to 49% compared to the previous elections on 7 June, which had been repeated due to the stalemate in coalition negotiations. For the opponents of the government, it was one more occasion of shock, perplexity and challenge.

Some 70 000 of them – mainly middle-class, educated, urban political activists – had decided to be more than just voters and bystanders. They had volunteered for the civic oversight of elections under the umbrella of the civic movement named ‘Vote and Beyond’.

‘Vote and beyond’ – the civic movement’s emblem.

‘Vote and Beyond’, which started as a movement in Istanbul in December 2013 (in the aftermath of Gezi Protests) became an association in April 2014. They have since become organised in half of the 81 provinces and were active in observing ballot boxes in the March 2014 local elections, August 2014 presidential elections and June 2015 parliamentary elections, aiming to make sure that the elections are realised impartially and without any rig.

The variety of volunteers that make up this movement gives evidence to the ‘shock-perplexity-challenge’ theorem mentioned above: there are social democrats, unwavering seculars sick of the conservative regime, anti-capitalist Muslims, liberals who have more recently been disenchanted with the AKP, socialists who struggle for peace and democracy, and more. According to a widely shared, self-ironical tweet, the political context in Turkey has become so surreal that it even turned previously poststructuralist anarchists into staunch guardians of elections.

As a member of this movement, I was an election observer in Ulubey yesterday, one of the relatively poor districts in Ankara. As I was travelling there along the misty hills of Ankara, I was aware of the fact that I would be meeting with a pre-dominantly conservative AKP electorate. The polling commission welcomed me, and during the nine hours I spent in the primary school classroom used as a polling station, we chatted, laughed, argued and exchanged views.

The inhabitants of Ulubey, however, had a different life agenda: they were concerned with the recent urban regeneration projects that would have a direct impact on their dwellings, and very upset about the influx of Syrian refugees to the district due to affordable rents and living conditions. ‘We were not even locking our doors here before the migrants arrived’, one of the voters said. Note that all these highly political issues were however extremely personalised and bore no immediate connection to any political party or governmental policy. It simply was about their lives and their neighbourhood.

Still, at the end of the day, it became apparent that 68 per cent of the electorate of our classroom had voted for the AKP. The Guardian was right when it claimed after the Ankara bombings and their 102 victims on 10 October that even pain cannot bridge the current polarisation in Turkish society between conservatives and progressives. But that does not change the fact that any political dissident living in Turkey today has to pass that bridge every single day. Before wrapping yourself up into your daily self-induced, anti-government, dissident utopia, you buy your bread from a pro-AKP bakery, you take a cab with a pro-Erdoğan radio channel blasting; you live your life surrounded by them. They are normal people with normal lives, dreams, desires, feelings and experiences. It is just that they have different priorities and abstraction levels.

This is what we need to theorise and address if we really want to claim that another world is possible for Turkey.

Başak Alpan is Assistant Professor
in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration
at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara.

The French version of this post can be found in the ‘Mails from Europe’ series,
on the homepage of the EU-Asia Institute at ESSCA School of Management.

The post The Vote and Beyond : Lessons from the Turkish Repeat Elections appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

For decades, the global human rights community has seen human rights as a matter of law, mostly international law. Economic, social and cultural rights, however, are meant to be progressively realized making use of all available resources. The violations approach and the work on their justiciability do not address the structural factors that constrain the enjoyment of these rights. Human rights are about policy and politics as much as about law. There is room for human rights advocacy outside and beyond the limits of the law.

Abstract of a chapter by Koldo Casla in Can human rights bring social justice?, book edited by Amnesty International Netherlands in the Changing Perspectives on Human Rights collection.

 

The post Dear fellow jurists, human rights are about politics, and that’s perfectly fine appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The summer holiday season is over and everyone are back at work. Many people have taken a plane to somewhere nice, sunny and warm or driven to a faraway destination or been on a road trip. Yet this leisure travel, which we take for granted has a negative impact the environment. I’m not saying that we shouldn’t go on holiday, but how many stop up and consider the environmental impact of our leisure travel! Although, airlines will ask us if we want to offset our carbon emission, it does not prevent us from flying, indeed paying a few euros to offset our emission has the same feel good effect as buying dark organic fair trade chocolate. This clearly begs the question of how to adopt more sustainable transport behavior.

From a sustainable mobility perspective it is important to make a distinction between transport needs and wants. Basic transport needs are defined as transport to work, education, health facilities and food shopping[i], by comparison transport wants are defined as leisure travel, which include going to the gym/sport, socialising and visiting family. Crucially holidays and weekend breaks, where people might choose to fly, are clearly a transport want not a transport need. The distinction between transport needs and wants is tied into the principle of free movement, which most of us take for granted, and which is central to any democratic state. Indeed free movement (goods, persons, services and capital) is integral to the EU.

Our daily transport pattern is determined by the distance between home and work/education, our working hours, the opening hours and location of children’s daycare/school and availability of public transport or road network. Here the structure of our lives influence our mobility patterns, as such we have limited agency over our daily mobility compared to our leisure travel, where we have more agency to choice how we would like to spend our time. The choices we make in terms of our leisure travel, i.e. transport wants, is just as important as our choice of how to meet our transport needs as leisure travel contribute negatively towards the environment.

During the summer, there are queues on the German autobahn and on the motorways in France as people choose their car as the main mode of transport for their summer holiday, this not only puts pressure on the infrastructure but also impact the environment negatively. During the summer charter flights take people to their holiday destinations although, some people choose a staycation to explore their own country.

Crucially, we decide how we want to spend our leisure time this agency is not available in our daily lives. Yet how many make decisions about where to go on holiday based on how much their holiday will impact the environment? Most holiday decisions are made based on affordability and personal interests e.g. beach versus active, city versus country versus sea holidays.

In August I took the train to Munich from Roskilde (town near Copenhagen). My decision to take the train for this leisure travel was influenced by three factors. Firstly, it was a question of which transport mode pollutes the least here the train had clear benefits[ii] (see figure below). Second it was a question of avoiding taking 2 days off work for travelling, although the train journey is 11 hours compared to 1 hour and 40 minutes by plane, there is no security checks and waste time in the airport instead you get on the train in the morning and start working. I chose comfort over speed. Third, the economic cost of travelling by train and plane were the same.  The option of driving was not part of my decision-making, and as the figure shows cars, and road vehicles in general, are the most polluting modes of transport. Significantly, road transport account for around 83 percent of all passenger transport in EU28. Thus, how can we change our travel behaviour and what are the politicians doing to encourage more environmental conscious transport behaviour?

 

One idea would be to introduce an individual carbon footprint, similar to the existing EU Emission Trading System. Whilst the introduction of individual carbon footprint would be an effective method to help people quantify their emission[iii], it is not an idea supported at the political level on the contrary restricting personal mobility contradicts the EU principles of free movements. Significantly, the past 30 years of liberalization of transport modes have encouraged more travel, especially cheap air travel, which has increased our personal agency in terms of leisure travel. Several EU member states are currently planning to invest in new high speed railways and new road networks to facilitate the increased demand for travel. Importantly, new infrastructure investment will give us more choice and encourage more travel. Yes, some national policies attempts to regulate transport behaviour through pricing, e.g. making public transport cheap. The theme for the annual EU mobility week (18-22 September 2015) is multimodality, which encourages people to think about their patterns of mobility and explore new means of travelling but does not integrate the environmental dimension.

Overall, policies seem to encourage and support increased level of mobility due to demand, these policies do not solve the environmental crisis. Thus, there is a need for alternative ideas about a future more sustainable transport paradigm to emerge and challenge the current paradigm, here personal agency is important not only for changing transport behaviour but also for making sure alternative ideas are put to the fore of the political debate.

[i] Holden, E., K. Linnderud and D. Banister (2013) ”Sustainable Passenger Transport: Back to Brundtland” Transportation Research Part A  volume 54, pp. 67-77

[ii] http://reiseauskunft.bahn.de/bin/query.exe/en?application=ECOLOGYINFO&start=1&dbkanal_007=L01_S01_D001_KIN0001_qf-umwelt_LZ003&S=M%FCnchen+Hbf&REQ0JourneyStopsSID=&Z=Hoeje+Taastrup+st&REQ0JourneyStopsZID=A%3D1%40O%3DHoeje+Taastrup+st%40X%3D12268801%40Y%3D55648621%40U%3D80%40L%3D008601031%40B%3D1%40p%3D1438767591%40&date=Mo%2C+10.08.15&time=09%3A00&timesel=depart&returnTimesel=depart&qf.mobil.button.umweltmobilcheck=1

[iii] For a discussion of individualisation of carbon offsetting see Paterson, M & j. Stripple (2010) “My Space: governing individuals’ carbon emissions” Environmental & Planning D: Society and Space vol 28, no 2 pp 341-362

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According to information provided by the Polish development aid programme Polish Aid, Moldova is the country with a low level of GDP growth and of the other development indicators. “It is one of the most impoverished countries in Europe, largely dependent on foreign aid. Despite good reforms, the economy is based on monoculture, which makes it prone to economic fluctuations and export limitations. A serious problem for the Moldovan economy is its dependence on Russian supplies of raw materials and the existence of the internationally unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic/Transnistria[1].” Nevertheless, despite economic problems, Moldova has built its position among the Eastern Partnership (the EaP) countries as the country, which wants to follow EU’s good governance objectives and applies reforms within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. However, situation in Moldova within its government and corruption scandal, where, according to the national Central Bank, three Moldovan financial institutions granted unknown loans for a total of around €1 billion, just before the parliamentary elections in November 2014, significantly have undermined the EU relation with Moldova.

The importance of Moldova’s current situation cannot be neglected by the EU because of several reasons, which do not only include economic and security issues, but point the stability and success of the Eastern Partnership policy. EU’s activity in Eastern region has been undermined in almost all countries belonging to the EaP and consequently, make this region a crucial area of its foreign policy. Whereas conducting policy coordination in Ukraine is strongly determined by the current political situation with Russia, in Armenia and Azerbaijan the situation mainly derived from their current political attitude. Armenia actively demonstrated willingness to cooperate with Brussels until September 2013 when President Serzh Sargsyan announced that closer ties with the EU was no longer on his agenda. In October 2014, Armenia became a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, thereby joining Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan negotiated an Association Agreement with the EU but then resigned from the idea and proposed an alternative strategic modernisation partnership[2]. In Belarus, almost no EU’s technical assistance projects are provided (except of TAIEX) due to the political situation of the country and a little desire in developing democracy rules. Thus, only Georgia remains still the partner country which cooperates with the EU without any major disruptions and follows to implement bilateral institution-building programmes designed to improve supporting internal institutional and economic reforms.

Moldova still is, along with Georgia and Ukraine, the country which integrates most of EU’s technical assistance programmes provided within the EaP policy, although it has proved that once established pro-EU approach may not last forever. After last parliamentary elections in November 2014, the most pro-European parties, the Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party, established a minority government, which surprisingly supported the pro-Russia Communist Party. In return, the Democrats limited their reform plans. Clearly, no one wants to deny democratically selected representatives, but the new political landscape somehow has indicates changes which in the long-term perspective may be significant in terms of Moldovan society’s approach towards the EU. Elections constitute the most visible opinion about a political shape of state and should be treated as a relevant reflection of future possible social-political scenarios. Thus, despite the still existing majority of pro-European parties in the government, the strongest party in the parliament after last elections in 2014 became the pro-Russian Socialist Party (PSRM), which increased support among voters demonstrates some important shift in citizens’ thinking- rapprochement to the Eurasian Economic Union instead of the EU. This has to be a signal for EU officials to upgrade and reform its attitude towards Moldova and in particular, to its society. While the government’s pro-EU support is definitely a crucial thing to implement desired internal reforms, it is even more important first to express those interests to people and make them aware of common norms and values promoted through the EaP bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Refreshed two-sided approach towards Moldova, namely towards its high government officials and citizens should have the same high priority within the EU agenda as other initiatives within the framework of the Eastern Partnership policy. Although, the financial aspect constitutes a difficult part to re-negotiate in any of agreed EU policies, the additional activities within the society should be strongly encouraged in Moldovan government by the EU. “For many in Moldova, the Russian civilizational model is the only one they are accustomed to; relatively few appreciate and take advantage of visa-free travel to Europe. The EU needs to address its failure in communicating with populations in the Eastern neighborhood, and more effectively promote its intentions and values[3]”. Thus, as Moldova still represents pro-EU attitude in its parliament, the joint cooperation should first of all improves country’s bottom-up approach. Every single technical assistance project promoted by the EU in Eastern countries has its crucial implementation phase at the subordinate levels, which includes individuals responsible for managing accepted reforms and requires their active role in applying new norms and rules. Their attitude may prevail over the policy outcome.

According to Aline Robert (2015), “the official differentiation between the two groups (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus) is a logical step in the evolution of relations since the Vilnius summit. During this period, the EU has provided massive financial support to Ukraine, and to a lesser extent to Moldova and Georgia. The three other countries do not have access to the same levels of financial aid, which is mainly used to support the education and judicial systems, as well as for economic development”[4]. Thus, the alternative solution proposed by Russia in the form of the Eurasian Union, established in January 2015, should be seen as a sign for the EU to strengthen its relations with Eastern partners through more individualistic approach which responds to the actual political position of each country. Although, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia have been offered by the Eurasian Economic Union a membership, all three countries opted for the European Union[5]. Hopefully, this will remain Moldova’s the most important goal in its foreign policy.

Some parts of this post come from my master thesis on: “Technical Assistance” in EU foreign policy: to support good governance in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Polish aid in the preparation and implementation of the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy.

[1] https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Moldova,187.html

[2] Azerbaijan is not a member of Eurasian Custom Union, but it is possible that it may happen despite the cooperation with the EU, which currently is rather limited. The economic situation of this partner country to the EU situates its position between those two integration organisations.

[3] Inayeh, A. and Panainte, S. 2015. “The EU and Moldova: How to Liberate a Captured State”, http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2015/06/16/eu-and-moldova-how-liberate-captured-state#sthash.X2z4LGjQ.dpuf

[4] Robert, A. 2015. “Two tier Eastern Partnership on the table at Riga summit.” EurActiv.com, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/two-tier-eastern-partnership-table-riga-summit-314726

[5] However, break-away regions, so-called “frozen conflicts” with Russia, of Moldova (Transnistria), Ukraine (Donetsk and Lugansk) and Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) have expressed a desire to join the Eurasian Customs Union and integrate into the Eurasian Economic Union.

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The real European Games have only just begun: Finding the right approach on Azerbaijani prisoners of conscience. By Eske van Gils

Last June, Baku hosted the first European Games with much grandeur. Azerbaijan spent great amounts on the Games (dubbed by locals as ‘the Games for Europeans’) and wanted to put the country positively on the map. Yet, it seems that the real European Games have only just begun. On 11 September the European Parliament submitted a motion for a resolution condemning the deterioration of the human rights situation in Azerbaijan. The motion has already caused much uproar in bilateral relations, with Azerbaijan threatening to re-consider its participation in the Eastern Partnership; and once again brings the EU’s value promotion policy into the spotlights. However, Brussels and Baku appear to be playing different games. While the EU believes they are involved in a round of disciplinary hide and seek, Baku smiles and runs away in a game of catch me if you can.

 

The motion was submitted following a number of new convictions of journalists and activists who were critical of the Azerbaijani government; many more preceded them. The resolution calls on the Azerbaijani government to respect human rights (regarding a range of issues), and on other EU institutions to take a more active stance on the matter, including imposing sanctions on the regime. The vote on the motion has not yet been scheduled at the time of writing. At this point, I would like to join the debate. The EU seems to find itself caught between a rock and a hard place, and I hope to shed some light on the context of the issue.

 

Tax evasion, heroin and treason

The recent convictions should be seen in light of the urge of the Azerbaijani government to maintain stability in the country. Azerbaijan is a state in the South Caucasus that gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. President Ilham Aliyev succeeded his father, the late Heydar Aliyev, in 2003, after the latter had been president of Azerbaijan for ten years. In the past two decades, the country has undergone a major economic transformation – although poverty is still widespread and the country’s oil wealth is distributed very unevenly. It is exactly the concentration of wealth at the top, along with the regime’s corruption, which one of the convicted journalists, Khadija Ismayilova, tried to expose. This, naturally, would pose a threat to the regime.

 

Commentators as well as international organisations have assessed that the state of democracy and human rights has worsened under Ilham Aliyev’s rule. Currently, there are approximately 100 political prisoners in jail in the country. What is important to note is that these journalists and activists have not been persecuted on grounds of their actual critical activities. Instead, people have been arrested on accusations of among others tax evasion, drug possession, or cooperation with the enemy (working in civil society projects in cooperation with Armenia). According to several international organisations these charges have been trumped up.

 

The regime’s reasons for concealing its real motives are probably firstly Baku’s desire for a positive recognition by the international community. Baku has invested heavily in its diplomatic capacity as well as PR. Also grand events such as the Eurovision Song Festival in 2012, and the European Games in the spring of 2015, can be seen in this light. Perhaps ironically, and definitely fruitlessly, the regime tries to keep up a discourse of democratisation and the government even denies the existence of any prisoners of conscience, with the argument that the definition of ‘political prisoner’ is still contested within the Council of Europe.

 

A second probable reason for covering up the nature of the convictions is that the government wants to prevent domestic unrest, to secure its internal legitimacy – which at the same time is the very reason for these prosecutions in the first place. Moreover, by basing the persecutions on ‘legitimate’ grounds, the idea can be upheld that the justice system has operated fairly and merely according to the law.

 

Criticism on the EU: Oil versus values (but is this really so?)

Back to the current situation: the motion for a resolution by the EP. This is quite a big step by the Parliament, considering that the EU’s overall policy towards Azerbaijan is generally not that outspoken regarding issues of human rights. The EU therefore often receives criticism: it would not be doing enough to address the worrisome situation in Azerbaijan, and would even hold double standards compared to other countries, such as Belarus, where the situation is also concerning but (however wrong this may sound) still better in some regards than in Azerbaijan. It’s often suggested that the EU’s moderate stance is because of its reliance on Azerbaijani oil and gas.

 

It is very likely that the EU indeed limits its criticism on the Azerbaijani regime because of the trade deals between these two actors (note, however, that this concerns mostly individual EU member states, rather than ‘the EU’ as such). But it would be too simplistic to state that the EU doesn’t do a thing because they need the oil. Firstly, energy does not take up such a dominant position as is sometimes suggested: bilateral relations do consist of much more than that. Secondly, the EU does voice criticism, and does make considerable efforts to promote its norms on democracy and human rights in Azerbaijan, despite the fact that this does lead to frictions with the regime.

 

The European Parliament has always been relatively vocal and critical of the situation in Azerbaijan; Embassies of several member states were present at the trials of the people convicted; and the EU Delegation in Baku closely follows the situation, and is in almost daily contact with the Azerbaijani government on these issues. As soon as the motion was submitted, the Head of the Delegation was summoned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fact that these actions are taken nonetheless, show that the EU is not afraid to confront Aliyev’s government. Even though, indeed, the damage to relations remained limited so far; and while, indeed, the EU could potentially do more.

 

Sharpening the knives for a gunfight?

The problem of all this, however, is that open and public criticism does not seem to work in the case of Azerbaijan. Experts on the ground have argued that it even works counter-productive. Despite – or possibly even in reaction to – the motion for a resolution, several new arrests of journalists have taken place in the past week since the motion was submitted.

 

Exactly because Azerbaijan is so much concerned with its image in the international community, it will not accept such accusations and any criticism coming from international political actors or media is consistently followed by counter-moves from the government and defensive public statements in the media. Despite many years of EU democracy and human rights promotion in Azerbaijan, there are more prisoners of conscience now than ever before.

 

It seems that the ‘silent approach’, which is simultaneously applied by the EU and EU member states, may be more effective in reaching the goals of norm-promotion in Azerbaijan. This approach consists of consultations and discussions behind closed doors, as well as (less visible) support to civil society organisations in the country. Such approach fits much better with the notion of ‘Othering’, the process of acknowledging one another’s national interests, problems, and priorities in bilateral relations. Othering would be a necessary step if the EU wants to achieve a genuine partnership with Azerbaijan, because the current approach of bluntly promoting its own norms and values in another state is not only in conflict with the whole idea of partnership; but it also has not lead to any results. And it probably never will be effective, because Azerbaijan is becoming an increasingly strong actor in international politics who demands a more equal position in the relations.

 

Between the devil and the Caspian Sea

As a consequence, it seems that the EU currently finds itself in between two problematic options and that it will need to choose the lesser of two evils. Either it can hold on to its model of being a value promotor in the world, thereby risking relations with Baku but also the chance to end up with a deadlock. In that case it cannot have any positive effect on the situation in Azerbaijan anyway, since the government will respond to any EU condemnations only more fiercely.

 

The second option would be to follow a pragmatic course whereby the two actors build on the principles of partnership and find a compromise, e.g. implementing democracy and human rights promotion but only behind closed doors using the ‘silent approach’. This could potentially be more effective in terms of outcome in the long run, but the EU will appear to be giving up one of its core principles and let down those who are in prison – is remaining silent also being guilty of the crime?

 

This is a question I don’t know the answer to. One the one hand, the only possibility I see for the release of Khadija Ismayilova, Leila and Arif Yunus, Rasul Jafarov, Intigam Aliyev, Anar Mammadli, and many others who are sitting in a cell while you are reading this, is through pressure coming from the international community, notably the EU.  Naturally, the EU cannot let this go unnoticed. The question is however how public this pressure should be, as it risks working counterproductively, no matter how well we mean.

 

At the same time, I believe that partnership would be the only way in the long run. The current situation, in which the EU unilaterally keeps pushing for its own norms in Azerbaijan – and Azerbaijan not being very impressed by this at all – has so far only led to a deadlock with no results. Perhaps it is therefore time that Brussels and Baku start playing the same game, and search for common rules and shared norms.

 

Eske van Gils is a doctoral student at the University of Kent.

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This summer Europe witnessed unprecedented events as thousands of migrants embarked on dangerous journeys from the Middle East and further afield to reach the shores of Europe. The growing instability in the Middle East, most of all in Syria which has descended into a state of permanent internal civil war, has resulted in an unprecedented flow of migration towards Europe. As with the other major recent crises the EU is ill prepared to respond swiftly and collectively. The response – or the lack of it- towards the escalating migrant crisis resembles how the EU reacted to the sovereign debt crisis which followed the global financial crisis and externally to the standoff with Russia over Ukraine. All these events illustrate that the EU profoundly lacks a spirit of collective responsibility. It is most noticeable in the failure of the big six (Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain and Poland) to lead the EU towards effective supranational institutions and policies which are fit to address the various internal and external challenges. For too long national governments in the EU have retreated towards the minimum consensus on policy cooperation. Keen to ensure that they maintain a substantial degree of autonomy on sovereign political decision-making, EU leaders have neglected to determine binding common solutions to crucial areas such as economic and fiscal policy, defence and security as well as justice and home affairs.

The eurozone crisis resulted predominantly from systemic weaknesses in the original design of the stability and growth pact. Before the crisis the SGP operated like a gentleman’s agreement between member state governments and the European Commission. Greece and Italy were permitted to join the eurozone in spite of running a permanent and growing structural deficit of more than 100 per cent of their GDP. France and Germany started breaking the annual borrowing limit of maximum three per cent in relation to the GDP in 2002, the year the euro had come into operation as a hard currency. Both countries also started exceed the 60 per cent structural deficit limit[1]. After a period of political disarray and indecision, eurozone governments were ultimately driven to take action by events. When major credit rating agencies started to downgrade individual eurozone economies there was the risk that this would eventually spill over into a substantial loss of financial market confidence in the euro. As Germany and France became increasingly concerned about the risk of a total collapse of the single European currency, Merkel and Sarkozy embarked on a frantic spree of implementing new coordinative policy mechanisms. These policy mechanisms have blurred the distinction between national and EU-level decision-making even more than had already been the case under the existing arrangements. Moreover, as they are predominantly orientated towards elite-level consultations and decision-making, they have worsened the lack of democratic accountability in the EU. Since the onset of the economic crisis the level of public disillusionment with the ability to influence political decisions in the EU consequently has steadily grown. The lowest point of public confidence in the EU occurred in the autumn of 2014 when only 31 per cent of citizens across the EU-28 expressed trust in the Union’s institutions. At the same time the number of those who disagreed with the notion that their voice would count in the EU had also increased substantially, from 53 per cent in 2003 to 66 per cent in the autumn of 2013. In the first half of 2015 the public levels of trust in the EU’s institutions improved slightly towards 40 per cent.

A smaller percentage of people also expressed the opinion that their voice would not count in the EU (50 per cent)[2]. This can be explained by the new Spitzenkandidaten system for the position of European Commission president which was introduced during the campaign for the May 2014 European parliament elections. The nomination of leading candidates for the post by parliamentary groups in the EP gave the impression that citizens would have a direct influence on the appointment of the new Commission president, although the final decision on the appointment still rests with EU leaders in the Council. Although it was obvious that the EU had emerged from the financial crisis with a legitimacy crisis, there were signs that the public was nevertheless willing to give the EU the benefit of the doubt. The latest Eurobarometer research conducted in May this year actually shows that in spite of widespread reservations about the EU’s democratic accountability, the European public nevertheless expressed support for the deepening of political cooperation on the EU level: 69 per cent of citizens were in favour of directly electing the president of the European Commission and 58 per cent favoured the creation of an EU justice ministry. A majority of citizens also expressed support for transferring the decision-making on major policy areas towards the EU level: Environmental issues (72 per cent), combating unemployment (62 per cent), immigration (59 per cent), health and social security (50 per cent)[3].

The public trust in the joint problem-solving capacity of the EU has however not been matched by the reality of the EU’s response to the migrant crisis. The crisis has made it brutally obvious that EU leaders have for too long concentrated on the internal management of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. External affairs have consequently been neglected the management. This was already shown during the Ukraine crisis during the past two years, where the EU’s institutional level played practically no role. The EU High Representative and the External Action Service, which the Lisbon Treaty created to support the EU’s external activities, were almost completely sidelined by a joint intergovernmental diplomatic leadership initiative of France, Germany and Poland. The three countries intervened early to try to negotiate the peaceful handover of powers from disgraced president Yanukovych. When the situation escalated into a quasi civil war between the Ukrainian government and pro-Russian rebels over the control of the Eastern provinces of the country, Germany and France once again became active in trying to negotiate a ceasefire. The resulting Minsk agreement between Ukraine and Russia, which came into effect in February this year has so far managed to prevent further major violent clashes within Ukraine. This can nevertheless not conceal the fact that the EU once again repeated the pattern of behaviour it had previously shown over Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Member states remained divided on each of these external challenges member states and failed to uniformly support a common position. In spite of the gradual institutionalisation of the EU external relations since the newly created EU had created a dedicated Common Foreign and Security Pillar in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, foreign, defence and security policy remains firmly in the hands of national governments.

The same applies to asylum and migration policy, where the EU has practically failed to achieve any substantial institutionalisation. The consensus in the EU in this area has for decades centred on maintaining national regulations. This occurred in spite of the fact that migration has over the years become an increasing burden for the countries who form the Southern borders of the EU. Italy, Greece and Spain have for many years called for greater collective EU support in their struggle to manage the mounting levels of migration from the African continent through the Mediterranean. As in so many other policy areas EU member states were unable to move beyond a lowest denominator consensus which in effect leaves asylum and migration firmly in the hands of national governments. The EU has been working on developing a common asylum system since the late 1990s, which has since developed into a Commission asylum policy plan that member states have now adopted. The plan essentially determines common asylum standards and the need for enhanced cooperation between national authorities on handling asylum applications[4]. In practice the centrepiece of the plan remains the Dublin regulation, which the EU adopted in 1990 in response to an increase in asylum applications. It has been revised twice since with the latest Dublin III regulation having taken effect in January 2013. The core of Dublin is the principle that the member state where an asylum application is first registered remains responsible for administering the case[5]. This provision has shifted the burden of responsibility for dealing with refugees and migrants to the member states at the external borders of the EU. This has been in the interest of the larger member states Germany, France and the UK who were the drivers behind the original directive. The principle of responsibility in the country of first registration has helped to substantially lower the number of asylum applications in the rest of the EU, while the countries at the external Southern border of the EU have had to deal with a flood of new applications. The EU’s policy plan on asylum aspired to put in place as system of ‘well supported and practical cooperation’[6]. In reality the Southern European countries Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Cyprus have expressed their dismay at the lack of collective EU support for dealing with the constant and more recently escalating influx of migrants who started arriving by boat from Libya via the Mediterranean. Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi warned the EU in June this year that it was facing a ‘Mediterranean migrant emergency’. Renzi put the finger in the wound of the EU’s lack of collective solidarity under the Dublin regulation:

“Whoever has the right to asylum must be welcome in Europe, not just in Italy,  despite the EU’s Dublin regime. But it is inconceivable that one country should  tackle the entirety of this problem on its own. Responsibility and solidarity are concepts that go hand in hand (…) We are at a crossroads and we need to decide if events in the Mediterranean are everyone’s problem, or only that of the countries in the region[7].”

 Renzi’s appeal reflected the obvious failure of the Dublin regime to instil a spirit of collective responsibility for asylum and migration matters amongst EU member states. Even more importantly his intervention pointed towards the EU suffering from a profound leadership problem which has been evident for some considerable time. It is the result of increasingly diverging national interests between the former leadership duo France and Germany, combined with the failure of the other larger member states to offer alternatives. Italy and Spain continue to be preoccupied by their internal economic and political problems. Poland has been active in pushing towards progress in a number of policy areas, such as the Eastern partnership under the European neighbourhood policy, as well as on defence and security issues. Polish influence nevertheless remains limited due to the fact that the country is still considered as a transition country, who has yet to master the crucial hurdle of eurozone entry.  The United Kingdom under the leadership of Conservative prime minister David Cameron has increasingly retreated to the sidelines. Since he came to power in 2010, Cameron has chosen not to engage in any substantial EU policy debate except on those issues where he would like to see the renegotiation of the UK’s membership terms. These include the possibility to permanently opt out from the freedom of movement and from a federal political union which may eventually emerge in the eurozone in the future.

France has been reluctantly following what is essentially German unilateral part-time leadership or ‘reluctant hegemony’[8] under chancellor Angela Merkel’s reign. This semi-leadership is characterised by hesitation, short-term and last minute policy decisions and more recently by a lack of willingness to engage in multilateral consultations. Merkel’s leadership style in essence stems from her professional background as a natural scientist. She has shown a tendency to avoid seeking visionary and long-term strategies for the future of the EU. Instead her leadership style has been markedly passive and mechanical and she frequently micro manages EU affairs like a clinical trial in a laboratory. During the eurozone crisis Merkel was clearly driven by events and struggled to take an active role in shaping them. After months of inaction and hesitation she only became active on the EU level late in 2009 when it had become obvious that the loss of market confidence in the future of the euro had become substantial.  What followed was a political approach which presented the focus on budgetary and macroeconomic supervision and rigidity as being ‘without alternative’. The implementation of multiple layers of binding policy coordination under the ‘Six Pack’ mechanisms have substantially strengthened unelected supranational bodies at expense of the policy autonomy of national governments and parliaments. This raises serious questions about the EU’s democratic accountability and ultimately its legitimacy. The approach is most evident in the way the troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and IMF), including the newly created European Stability Mechanism (ESM), conducts itself as an illegitimate semi-government in eurozone sovereign debt countries, most of all in Greece. Concerns about the impact of these mechanisms on national sovereignty and the possibility that they could be extended further by transforming the European Commission into an executive government for the EU were voiced by a number of countries, most prominently by the UK, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Concerns about the federalisation of the EU were the main reason for the decision of the British government to demand the renegotiation of the UK’s membership terms and to let the British public decide on the future of the membership in a referendum. David Cameron hence demanded safeguards against what he called a ‘one size fits all approach which implies that all countries want the same level of integration’[9].

Merkel has also persistently ignored the wider political and social context of the crisis and rejected the repeated Greek calls for a more comprehensive long-term strategy to ensure that the budgetary consolidation process in the crisis countries would not have lasting detrimental social and political effects. The drama surrounding the deepening sovereign debt crisis in Greece has hence turned into a seemingly endless standoff between Germany as the leading creditor and an Greece as increasingly dependent debtor country. This has inflicted serious damage to the EU’s internal political cohesion. Merkel nevertheless shows little concern for the perception that the eurozone and the wider EU has increasingly fallen under a German dictate.

This pattern is replicated in the current migrant crisis, where Merkel surprised the rest of the EU when she reacted to the sudden vast influx of migrants into Greece with the announcement that Germany’s borders would be open to all refugees. On August 19th the German government had announced that it expected around 800,000 refugees to come to Germany in 2015. On August 31st chancellor Merkel publicly stated that German would manage this (‘Wir schaffen das’)[10]. On September 10th Merkel followed this up during a visit to an asylum camp in Berlin where she announced that Germany would not determine an upper limit when considering asylum applications amongst the current migrant wave[11]. Already on September 8th Merkel’s Social Democratic vice chancellor Sigmar Gabriel expressed the view that Germany could accept around 500,000 refugees per year in an interview with the German public TV station ZDF[12]. None of these announcements were previously discussed with Germany’s EU partners, not even with those who are most affected by the increasing influx of migrants via the Balkan route.  After thousands of migrants started to make their way towards Germany via Hungary and Austria on a daily basis the German government again acted unilaterally and announced the temporary suspension of the Schengen agreement by reinstating border controls on September 14th, only a week after Merkel’s and Gabriel’s original statements. At the same time the German government asked the European Commission to develop concrete proposals for the introduction of a refugee distribution quota amongst the EU-28.

The demand for quota are opposed by a number of EU countries, most of all by the United Kingdom and the Central and Eastern European countries. Since their accession to the EU the CEE countries have mostly been compliant policy-takers who did not try to fundamentally challenge the EU’s policy status quo. Many of the CEEs also have close partnerships with Germany which date back to the Cold War era. They have therefore tended to defend Germany’s leadership during the euro crisis against criticism from other member states. The former Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski publicly supported Germany’s leading role in 2011 when he stated that he feared German inaction in the EU more than its leadership[13]. Slovak foreign minister Lajcak supported this sentiment when he spoke of his country being relaxed about being part of a ‘greater Germany’[14]. The German government is in danger of destroying this good will towards their leadership because of the patronising way it tries to force the rest of the EU to follow its response to the migrant crisis.  Berlin would probably not have to worry too much if it was only the subject of criticism on the part of the Hungarian government led by populist prime minister Viktor Orban. The fact is however that governments across Central and Eastern Europe are alienated by what they perceive as an uncoordinated and patronising approach to the crisis. The Visegrad 4 countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) have collectively rejected the plans for an EU refugee quota. The V4 are especially affronted by the suggestions which emerged from the German government that countries within the EU who oppose the compulsory quotas may face financial penalties. Slovak prime minister Robert Fico publicly declared his intention to vigorously oppose the plan, even if this may mean blocking progress at the upcoming EU leaders’ summit:

“Never before in the EU did it happen that somebody was punished for their  own opinion. We are a sovereign country, we have the right to name things and have different view to tackle the crisis with migrants.”[15]

The Financial Times reports that CEE diplomats have expressed their anger and astonishment at what they perceive as being shut out of the EU’s diplomacy by Berlin as part of an approach of ‘ “passive aggressive bullying” ‘[16]. Berlin’s conduct is all the more astonishing as the German government should be well aware of the fact that the CEE member states in the EU are still in the process of economic transformation. In most cases they have made substantial progress since the fall of the iron curtain but they nevertheless remain between 20 and 40 per cent below the EU-28′s average GDP per capita[17]. The CEE region remains a low-income region with substantially higher levels of material poverty than the EU average. This explains why public and elite level opposition towards an increase in inward migration from outside the EU remains substantial. Germany’s demands for the acceptance of a refugee distribution quota therefore risk overstretching the CEE region and to feed an already underlying potential for a surge in political support for populist and extremist anti-EU and anti-immigration political parties. The same applies to the EU’s Southern European members, where economically and financially weak countries start to feel overstretched under the double burden of sustained austerity and the resource impact of the migrant crisis[18]. The migrant crisis has already played a substantial role in the campaign for upcoming Greek national election, where the neofascist Golden Dawn party currently polls in third place[19].

The at least temporary collapse of the EU’s Schengen system and the now almost daily blame game between member states on their handling of the migration flow shows that EU is dazed and confused by the speed and severity of events. Without swift and determined collective action the EU risks being slowly sucked into the downward spiral of a credibility crisis, which could eventually turn into an irreversible maelstrom that destroys the European project. The crisis has managed to damage intergovernmental relations between member states and the EU’s external reputation quite significantly. As Germany is clearly incapable of leading the EU out of this crisis it is therefore high time for other members and the Commission to step in to ensure that a lasting collective agreement on migration and asylum policies can be established. Especially the Commission has to tread carefully with this and avoid become the advocate of one country’s (i.e. Germany’s) interests.

A refugee quota system may be part of the immediate solution to events but it is definitely not the answer to resolving the crisis. Instead the EU needs to determine an unambiguous joint system of registering and processing asylum applications. This can only be done effectively if the countries at the EU’s external borders receive substantial financial and logistic support from the EU budget.  Collective budgetary resources will be needed to establish collective fast track asylum registration centres in Greece, Italy, Spain, Cyprus and possibly also in Hungary to ensure that asylum applications are processed quickly and a clear disctinction can be made between genuine refugees and economic migrants. The latter may still be able to obtain permanent residence in an EU member state if national governments unambiguously determine the rules of their domestic immigration policies. Here especially Germany will need to move towards the introduction of a immigration law to ease the burden on its already overstretched asylum system. The EU also needs to make sustained efforts to secure its external borders and to combat human trafficking.  In addition to the planned military missions which are aimed at detaining human traffickers in the Mediterranean, the EU’s border management agency FRONTEXT needs to take a more active role in supporting Southern European countries in the policing of the EU’s external borders.

If the EU fails in this momentous task the current practice of reverting to exclusive national solutions will eventually result in the demise of Schengen, which is a cornerstone of the EU’s internal market. Just as with the euro the collapse of a major integration project like Schengen could be the beginning of the end of what the EU has achieved in its more than sixty years long history. The German weekly DER SPIEGEL correctly pointed this out in this week’s leading editorial: ‘Schengen is not any law in the EU’s dense network of regulations. Whoever touches Schengen, the dream of a borderless Europe, touches the Union’s core.’[20] Merkel, Cameron, Hollande and the rest of the EU-28 leaders need to keep this in mind. They must stop dithering and realise what is at stake.

[1] Eurostat, Government Deficit and Debt, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/data/main-tables

[2] European Commission (2015) Standard Eurobarometer 83, available at http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/66896

[3] Standard Eurobarometer 83.

[4] European Commission (2008) Policy Plan on Asylum: An integrated approach to protection across the EU, COM(2008) 360 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0360:FIN:EN:PDF

[5] European Union (2013) Regulation No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 26 June, chapter III, article 3, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604&from=EN

[6] European Union, Common European Asylum System, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm

[7] Matteo Renzi (2015), ‘The Mediterranean migrant emergency is not Italy’s. It is Europe’s', The Guardian, 23 June, available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/23/mediterranean-migrant-crisis-not-italy-but-europe

[8] William E. Paterson (2013) ‘The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany moves centre stage in the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 49 (Annual Review): 57-75.

[9] Prime minister David Cameron’s EU speech at Bloomberg, 23 January 2013, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg.

[10] Chancellor Angela Merkel summer press conference, 31 August 2015, available at http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2015-08-31-pk-merkel.html

[11] Süddeutsche Zeitung, ‘Das Grundrecht auf Asyl kennt keine Obergrenze’, 10 September 2015, available at http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/bundeskanzlerin-merkel-das-grundrecht-auf-asyl-kennt-keine-obergrenze-1.2643260

[12] Der Spiegel (2015) ‘Gabriel hät 500.000 Flüchtlinge pro Jahr für verkraftbar’, 8 September 2015, available at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-gabriel-haelt-500-000-pro-jahr-fuer-verkraftbar-a-1051862.html

[13] Sikorski, Radoslaw (2011) ‘Poland and the future of the European Union’, Address at the German Council of Foreign Relations, Berlin, 28 November. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.pl/resource/33ce6061-ec12-4da1-a145-01e2995c6302:JCR. Accessed 14 January 2014.

[14] Kristina Mikulova (2013) ‘Central Europe’s Pivot to Germany: What does the U.S. stand to gain’,Huffington Post 1 May, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kristina-mikulova/central-   europes-pivot-to-_b_3194342.html

[15] Slovakian prime minister Robert Fico statement on official Facebook page, 15 September 2015.

[16] Duncan Robinson and Henry Foy (2015) ‘Migrant crisis sets Germany at odds with neighbours to the east’, Financial Times, 17 September, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/09ffbc28-5d46-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html?ftcamp=published_links%2Frss%2Fbrussels%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz3m0s05AvV

[17] High Level Reflection Group (2014), Central Europe fit for the future: Visegrad Group ten years after EU accession,  p. 12.

[18] Ekatimerine (2015) ‘Migrant crisis overwhelms Greek government’, 7 August 2015, available at http://www.ekathimerini.com/200333/article/ekathimerini/news/migrant-crisis-overwhelms-greek-government;

[19] Henry Foy (2015) ‘Greek far right party rides wave of xenophobia’, 17 September 2015, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d88eab00-5d30-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz3mCPbbckp

[20] Peter Müller (2015) ‘Der alte Kontinent: In der Flüchtlingskrise ist die EU in Gefahr. Um sie zu bewahren, braucht es Druck und Verständnis’, Der Spiegel 39, 19 September p. 8.

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This post presents my research paper submitted within the framework of the Russian Politics course at KU Leuven (January 2015). Scenario thinking is based on the assumption of a possible political situation in year 2020.

Scenarios presented were created through the SWOT analysis which constitutes one of the most popular heuristic method of analysis, helping to sort the collected information. It allows to examine the internal and external factors affecting studied phenomenon. In my analysis, I have examined the possible scenarios for Russia and Eastern Partnership countries relations, which are part of EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (the ENP). The SWOT analysis has been examined and performed from the Russian perspective.

Both sides, the EU and Russia have a strong commitment and strategic interest in the Eastern region, which strongly influence their mutual contacts. Nevertheless, the future situation of this region is currently one of the most important issue on the foreign affairs agenda on both sides. Therefore, it is important to address the greatest importance of Russian future strategic scenarios towards Eastern Partnership countries- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine, with the relation to EU’s Eastern policy.

The ENP was launched in 2004 with an aim to support partner countries in their political, economic and institutional reforms; to strengthen democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights along with economic modernization and liberalization. The main goal of the ENP is to establish a closer relation with non-EU countries and integrate them more with European market and EU sectoral programmes and policies[1]. Within the framework of the ENP, The Eastern Partnership project (the EaP) was launched in 2009 towards six post-Soviet countries, thus it is not hard to imagine that Russia do not support and agree with EU’s actions in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. These countries, countries of “strategic importance”, are part of Russian increasing assertive foreign policy, with Russian leaders and a Russian public opinion that wanted and strived to stop the Western influence and regain control over its “Near Abroad”[2].

Factors taken into account in the SWOT analysis for Russia were given the weight from - 3, which are the biggest threat and the weakest side, to 3 being the greatest opportunity and the strongest side of the Russian situation. I have removed 0 from the scale, because as a neutral result of studied phenomena, it has no effect on the assessment of the examined situation. Taking into consideration a page limit, the below table presents only part of the key internal and external factors, which were considered as the most relevant for Russia- Eastern Partnership countries relations.

Strengths

Weaknesses

1)      Large country (1)

2)      Common historical and cultural heritage in the Eastern region (2)

3)      Geographical proximity (3)

4)      Energy dependency of Eastern and EU countries from Russia (3)

1)      Authoritarian government (-1)

2)      High rates of unemployment and poverty in many areas (-2)

3)      Crisis on the Russian financial market (-3)

4)      No influence on the EaP policy on the EU level (-1)

Opportunities

Threats

1)      Annexation of Crimea  (3)

2)      Russian minorities in Eastern countries (2)

3)      Economic instability of the EU and Eurozone (1)

4)      Eurasian Economic Union (3)

5)      Armenia and Ukraine did not initial association agreements with the EU (2)

1)      Dependence on oil and gas (-3)

2)      EU’s sanctions (-3)

3)      International conflict with West (-2)

4)      Organized crime and terrorism towards Russians from Eastern countries (-1)

5)      Georgia and Moldova had successfully negotiated Association agreements with the EU (-2)

 Table 1  SWOT analysis of Russia- Eastern Partnership countries relations

Total result of included factors is positive (20-18=2), which means that there is more strengths and opportunities for Russia to develop its policy towards Eastern Partnership countries. It may also be a reason why Russia still intensively develop different incentives for Eastern countries.

The internal factors can be seen as strengths and weaknesses of the current situation and factors coming from outside the country are defining threats and opportunities. Hence we can create four strategies derived from four SWOT quadrants.

 

  Opportunities Threats Strengths Aggressive strategy Conservative strategy Weaknesses Competitive strategy Defensive strategy

Table 2 Four SWOT strategies. Source: http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analiza_SWOT

 

Because of the positive result of SWOT analysis, it seems that Russia would most probably use aggressive strategy towards Eastern Partnership countries and undermine EU’s policy towards this region. Aggressive strategy is a strategy of strong expansion and development of both factors, strengths and opportunities. It is not without significance that Crimea issue is the strongest factor of Russian external factors within opportunities quadrant. The success in the Ukraine conflict and Russia’s annexation reinforced belief that countries of the “strategic importance” would not be easily given up by Putin. Moreover, Russian previous conflicts with Chechnya, Georgia and now with Ukraine can be counted among Russian successes. Putin tries to soothe the loss of Empire and this strategy seems to work at this moment. Hard power versus EU’s soft power in the long-term is the insufficient protection for Georgia’s and Moldova’s frozen conflicts with Russia. According to Raik, “the Eastern Partnership reflects the general tendency of the EU to play down issues of hard security and geopolitics and pursue economic integration as an instrument for enhancing stability and peace[3].” Russia will do not stop with its efforts to attract Eastern countries with the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia’s project is based on common legislation and supranational institutions, in which it resembles European integration. Russia will offer member countries various benefits, mainly of an economic nature, including easier access to the Russian market, financial support and preferential prices for energy resources[4]. The Eastern countries depend on Russian energy, their governments currently more and more decide on some subservience toward Russia: Azerbaijan’s recent article[5], Moldova’s last parliamentary election, Georgian authorities’ new policy and recent events within the government[6], Armenia’s threat of its energy security and joined the Eurasian Economic Union, Belarus pro-Russian approach. Hence, Russia will not be threaten by EU’s policy and will continue with an invasion in Eastern countries. Frozen conflicts, unsolved problems with Georgia, Moldova and Armenia, will be used to achieve Russian interests and gain necessary support from pro-Russian population. The necessary support would be given also for domestic governments- Russia will propose deeper and more comprehensive Eurasian Union’s economic agreements, than the free trade agreements that the EU has already negotiated. The Eastern Partnership countries will not confront themselves with the Russian army and risk their energy and human security. The Ukraine crisis show them that Western countries were not able to hold back Putin, and it is better to join Kremlin, than reject closer integration.

Russia still continues to define the post-Soviet area as its sphere of influence. The main objectives of this policy is to maintain the status of the Kremlin’s power confronted with the growing power of China and a stable position of the US as a world leader. The confrontation with the EU on the disputed East area is inevitable, but on the other hand, Russia cannot afford EU’s sanctions and to back out from the economic and modernization cooperation with the EU. Through well-defined economic incentives Putin will go toward Eastern countries and undermine the EU’s policy using state-controlled media not only to deliver messages, but rather to spread rumours and create confusion.

Conservative strategy- the studied subject is not able to develop intensively in the existing external environment, because the strengths factors do not correspond with the opportunities of the external environment, thus it is necessary to wait for the improvement in external conditions. This strategy was true before Putin’s first presidential elections. Currently, Russia does not want to wait for the improvement of external affairs, but to create them.

Competitive strategy in case of Russia is not a perfect solution. This strategy comes up when there is an advantage of weaknesses over strengths, but the studied subject acts in a friendly environment, which allows him to maintain his position. Competitive strategy should in that case focus on the elimination of internal weaknesses and use opportunities from the external environment. But Putin does not see any weaknesses in Russia. Russian identity and civilization are the greatest value in the society, and Russia is exceptional because it is not coming from the West. Vladimir Putin wrote in 2012 in a government newspaper, that Russia is not just an ordinary country but a unique “state civilization”, bound together by the ethnic Russians who form its “cultural nucleus”[7]. He will not cooperate with the external West environment which do not understand and tolerate Russian identity. In Putin’s view, it is the West’s intention to interfere with Russia’s historic mission and to thwart the rightful “integration of the Eurasian space”[8].

Defensive strategy: weaknesses are strongly linked to external threats, there is a high risk of state’s collapse. This strategy is focused on the internally and externally survival. Russia is not a state which would collapse, so this strategy can be rejected. Although, if economic and demographic problems will prevail, Russia as a result of the increasing difficulty of administering such a large territory and a lack of adequate resources for investment, slowly begins to give up its colonial heritage in the east of the Urals and the Caucasus.

In 2020 we cannot excluded that the Eastern Partnership Policy may change its current shape and Armenia, Belarus and Azerbaijan would withdraw from the cooperation with the EaP. The EU is not able to forbidden Eastern countries to resign from this policy. Moscow, without strong pressure from the West, strengthens the cooperation with China in Central Asia. Also puts bigger effort on the cooperation in the BRIC group. In fulfilling this scenario, I assume that Moscow will seek to restore its sphere of the influence in the Eastern Europe (Caucasus, Belarus, Moldova), and even head to recover some impact on countries in the Central Europe. Even because of economic problems, Putin will not change his course in the Eastern region and the EU’s widespread condemnation would not change his mind. Instead of military actions, which constitute the last possible option of Russian influence, the economic incentives will gradually undermined the strategic planning in Eastern countries.

[1] Delreux, T. and Keukeleire, S. (2014). “The Foreign Policy of the European Union.” Palgrave Macmillan, p. 251.

[2] Delreux, T. and Keukeleire, S. (2014). “The Foreign Policy of the European Union.” Palgrave Macmillan, p. 260.

[3] Raik, Kristi (2013). “Eastern Partnership as Differentiated Integration: The challenges of EaP Association Agreements.” The Post-Vilnius Challenges of the Eastern Partnership in The Eastern Partnership Review No. 15.

[4] Sadowski, Rafał (2013). “Partnership in Times of Crisis. Challenges for the Eastern European countries’ integration with Europe.” Point of view No. 36. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies. pp. 44-45.

[5] On 3 December the Azerbaijani media published an article, by Ramiz Mekhtiyev, the head of the presidential administration and de facto the second most important person in the state. Among other statements, Mekhtiyev blamed the USA and the EU for trying to create a fifth column in Azerbaijan and stoking a desire to cause a ‘colour revolution’, and also specifically named individuals and organisations supported by the West. The article promotes the idea of a multipolar world consistent with the Russian vision, and emphasises the right of sovereign Azerbaijan to conduct a foreign policy which focuses on the development of bilateral relations. Source: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-12-10/azerbaijan-closer-to-russia-further-west

[6] Some Georgian politicians stress that Prime Minister Irakly Garibashvili is dismissing some ministers due to politically motivated reasons and is trying to undermine supporters for better relations with the West.

[7] Aron, Leon (2014). “Why Putin Says Russia Is Exceptional.” The Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-putin-says-russia-is-exceptional-1401473667.

[8] Ibidem.

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Autre temps…

It’s not been often that I’ve had cause to write about Labour and the EU in the past four or five years: apart from Ed Miliband’s semi-drift into referendum commitments last year, there hasn’t really been much of a policy. A general sense that it’s A Good Thing, but largely a continuation of the positional policy-making that has characterised British EU policy more generally – we like it because the other lot don’t.

However, Labout has always had a more complicated relationship with European integration than the popular memory often admits. Recall that until the 1980s, it was Labour that was more instinctively anti-membership of the EEC/EC, with the Tories pushing forward because of the trading opportunities it offered, while Labour worried about workers’ rights. Labour triggered the 1975 referendum, with Wilson only side-stepping internal opposition to his renegotiation by offering a free vote. With the possible exception of Tony Blair, there has been a certain sense that Labour leaders have always found the EU more useful as a stick to beat the Tories over the head with (more accurately, to let the Tories beat themselves with the stick) than as a central or fundamental plank of their programme.

And so we end up with Jeremy Corbyn, the great white hope of the Left.

Corbyn represents that long-standing part of the party that never really found an accommodation with European integration. While the leadership and most members turned in the 1980s under Kinnock and Smith, as workers’ rights came to the fore, the old Left (including many parts of the Trade Unions) merely skulked in the corner, biting lips, rather than expressing any enthusiasm. From the 1990s onwards, there were repeated formations of campaigning groups from this constituency, against the Euro, against the Constitutional Treaty, and now against membership.

That Corbyn secured as large a majority as he did last week points both to the relative lack of importance that the party attaches to European matters and to the latent constituency of sceptics that he has been able to mobilise: witness the TUC setting out their stall this week.

Corbyn himself has been very ambivalent about his position. From an initial refusal to give unconditional support to membership – which cost him some potential members of his shadow cabinet – we now have a statement that he couldn’t see himself campaigning to leave.

At one level, this is all just very Corbyn-esque: unspun, truthful and, in its way, reasonable. One would struggle to find anyone who would say that whatever it did they would support the EU (or anything else, for that matter). It’s bad politics and a bad way to live your live saying that your mind is made up and will never be changed, even if that’s often how things go. Of course, the EU is somewhat particular in that it’s a highly bargained system, with checks, balances and internal inconsistencies: from Corbyn’s perspective, Cameron doesn’t look like a man to be renegotiating more social or environmental protection, or to be stepping back from trade liberalisation, internally or externally.

But this reasonable position has its limits: as I’ve noted elsewhere, if Corbyn chooses not to be part of the ‘Remain’ campaign, then it becomes much harder to create the impression of a broad church of support. Certainly, his actions of the past weeks have already made it harder to take the whole Labour movement with him on this: it’s difficult to see him going down the road of a Damascene conversion in six month’s time. He’s Jeremy Corbyn, not Tony Blair.

The basic dilemma here is that the political life of the country is more than just EU membership, and Corbyn is entirely right to look at the big picture – a man who crowd-sources his interventions for PMQs is a man who wants to represent the people and their concerns. However, most people – including most politicians – don’t appreciate the extent to which the EU shapes, supports and constrains other areas. While the costs to the Left seem apparent – TTIP, austerity and the rest – the benefits are less clear, even more so the costs of non-membership.

The historic split of the Left came between those who decided to break the system and those who decided to shape it. The latter group, the socialists, might usefully recall that moment when they look at the EU: it is neither intrinsically good or bad, but rather a mechanism to be operated. The best way to get the EU they want, is to get stuck in, not to turn their back.

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Last year, India held it’s general elections and as usual there was a smattering of political parties, all with something different to offer approximately 700mn adults registered or eligible to vote at least. The newly chosen (by public) members of the national parliament have had some time to spend on the budgets and they should feel proud of having been elected by a bigger democracy than most in the West. Elections in the country are a regular thing, despite insurgencies in Kashmir, and numerous piecemeal episodes of border struggles. India is a gigantic country in South Asia – both demographically and politically, and the picture of rule here is one of reasonable stability because unlike in neighbouring Bangladesh, there has been no issues of autocratic rule, and a break with civilian government. Regionally, this is not an unnatural occurence: in Nepal, autocratic rule with a constitutional monarch was supposed to be the order of the day, as it has been since 1990. In 2008, however, Nepal became a republic, as a party convinced of ways of the armed revolution based on the Maoist model became the single-most dominant force in parliament. In retrospect, India did plenty of things with its newfound freedom from the British Empire, such as introduce the rights to vote for both men and women, all together. Democracy is an experiment sometimes in this region, even though the thought process is aligned with the creation of effective democratic governance. Right after independence, democracy was tried to be made into a popular political choice for a nation of mostly illiterates and poverty-stricken people. It has been tough to forge national unity in a land divided by language and religion, which is why even though a population diaspora might dictate the dominating language of the land, it cannot ascertain the sense of belonging that one single language is supposed to give one land. Democracy exists to provide citizens with the right to choose and replace their leaders, the right to speak up against misgovernance or be openly supportive about government decisions. In order for a government to function democratically there needs to be multiple political parties, and a constant presence of free, fair elections, the press needs to have freedom to conduct matters nationally. Democracy in India has often been viewed with sceptism, particularly where Kashmir is concerned. The people of Kashmir have often voiced their anger at the constant injustices they have had to face because of repeated accounts of corruption in a localised rule. Violence sometimes escalated and because of these numerous political disagreements the region has constantly been subjected to conflict. Although, from time to time Kashmiris have toyed with the idea of abiding by the local government’s customs and traditions, the response to the whole situation hasn’t always been positive. Regional development has almost always been forsaken but what has been astonishing to learn off is how the violence has often forced people to resort to military struggle. The scenario has been present both in Kashmir and in those Nepal locales where armed guerrillas are also equipping themselves with a greater awareness and learning about Maoist traditions and battling to remove the sophisticated manner of doing things. They want to do this by spreading the seeds of revolution and striving for independence from Nepal. It is difficult to imagine that Kashmiris should arm themselves to demand basic necessetities. But on certain days, that is the tallest order of the day because the region cannot afford to live relatively peacefully, when you compare it to it’s neighbouring Bhutan. In Bhutan, the most politically eventful episode to have occured in recent times was the dethroning of a king by choice in favour of his son ruling. In Kashmir, citizens must arm themselves to protect and to practice the kind of politics they would like to see in government, because the state is being far too harsh on them. When you step out of Kashmir, and into the rest of India, the picture of democracy is fully intact and functional because the national assemblies, the state assemblies all conduct themselves with freedom and fairness. Capital, labour, and goods can move about the country unperturbed, but there is no denying that the nation is still a weak democracy. There are illiberal idealogies spreading through political corridors, and there is also a lack of thoroughness in governance. A peaceful solution to Kashmir is possible, which would contribute to a better notion of democracy in India than the one present. Both the state and it’s citizens with demands need to co-operate on democratic matters, conduct more open dialogue about regional security, have more regular and fair elections, nurture the language and culture of minority groups and there needs to be a greater understanding of how more more power needs to be given to the people of Kashmir to shape their politics.

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September 2015: Border controls between Germany and France.

It is difficult not to be impressed by the remarkable breadth and multidisciplinary outreach of contemporary European Studies that was exposed at the UACES conference in Bilbao. Paper and panels were fed and underpinned by the political sciences, but also by economics, law, sociology and anthropology.

Yet the newspapers read during the return flight from Bilbao were a good reminder that in twenty years’ time (or less) European Studies might have become a preserve of historians. The latter will then analyse the reasons for the collapse of what will have been, all in all, a rather short parenthesis in our continent’s long history. Perhaps they will identify the summer of 2015 as the tipping point, from which on everything went surprisingly quickly.

Those who find this overly pessimistic should remind themselves that as late as spring 1989 not a single voice believed the Berlin Wall would come down any time soon. Let alone the reunification of Germany would occur. Let alone the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

I cannot remember any moment in my life as European citizen where the EEC, then EC, then the EU (not to mention the Eurozone) were not reported to be in a serious crisis. I have even repeatedly amused audiences with a very nostalgic and pessimistic quote from Le Monde about how European integration had completely lost its appeal, which actually did not refer to the present situation, but was written in 1958!

But I cannot remember either any moment over the last decades where as many indicators for a possible disintegration of the European community were converging like they seem to be doing in the second half of 2015. The concomitance of the Greek drama, the Ukrainian tragedy, the refugee crisis and the ongoing noise about a looming Brexit may well be too much for to handle for both our political leaders and their voters.

Especially the refugee question acts like a litmus test for the oft-invoked community of values. A test that is likely to reveal, in a rather painful manner, the absence of such a community. And from this observation it is only a small step to put into question the basic assumption of solidarity within what Churchill called ‘the European family’ in his famous speech of 1946.

It is no longer far-fetched to speculate on the funeral of the Schengen Agreement. Today I heard about the reintroduction of border controls between Germany and France, which I was (half) joking about only a few weeks earlier. I take the (small) risk of predicting that full sovereignty over the state’s border will be a major, hysterically discussed, issue in each national election campaign of the two years to come, including France and Germany.

It is no longer taboo to openly threaten others with financial consequences for their lack of solidarity. In other words, to play around with the idea of putting an end to redistributive policies. ‘Who needs structural funds?’ might become a recurrent question. ‘Just look at how they were used in Greece over decades!’, a convenient answer. And who needs a Common Agricultural Policy that even French farmers hate?

It is no longer implausible to see in David Cameron a sorcerer’s apprentice that will be completely overpowered by a wave of Europhobic discontent which he unleashed without need in the first place. And who can exclude today that a Brexit, however messy and unsatisfactory, would produce a domino effect? Not only in traditionally Eurosceptic places. Let’s face it: is it so absurd to anticipate that even German public opinion may turn massively Euro-sour, forcing whatever government it will elect in 2017 to commit to the repatriation of a maximum of competences (and money)?

Maybe still add a question mark?

As they say in France: history does not pass around the dishes twice. It is perfectly possible that the EU historians of 2040 will have warm words for their object of study: ‘Was absolutely worth a try’, they might tell us, ‘it’s just that the times were not ripe yet for a supranational community of interests, let alone values’.

 

Albrecht Sonntag, EU-Asia Institute, ESSCA School of Management.

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Last Wednesday, Jean-Claude Juncker delivered his first State of the European Union (SOTEU) address. This speech – the longest since Barroso started yearly SOTEU back in 2010 – is a key agenda-setting moment for the Commission President, providing the opportunity to set out a personal vision on the major issues facing the European Union today. While most media coverage focused on how Juncker grappled with the refugee and economic crises, this post sheds light on whether and how EU environmental and climate policies figured in the address.

Looking at the environmental side of the speech is key for two reasons: first, since the very start of his Commission, Juncker has been criticised as side-lining environmental issues[1] (in his Commission’s architecture, through his continuation of REFIT, etc.). Second, with the Paris Climate Summit (COP21) only three months away, the European Union (and the Commission in particular) will have to swiftly decide whether it wishes to remain a leader on climate change – or whether it is unwilling to bear the costs associated with leadership (e.g. maintaining credibility through well-functioning internal policies, well-funded external support for developing economies etc.).

A speech exists in two forms – the planned, written words, and the actual spoken words delivered on the day. Difference between the two is common, but the delivered version trumps the written one. The two versions are widely different when it comes to Juncker’s treatment of environmental issues. Hence, Jeremy Wates (EEB) drew attention to how the strong environmental rhetoric on how “the planet we share (…) cannot cope with the use mankind is making of it”, present in the written version of the speech was not delivered. Similarly, mentions of ‘sustainability’ were left out of the spoken version. This, Wates argued, shows that the environment is simply not high enough on the Commission’s agenda – when pressed for time, Juncker had no calms remaining silent on the topic – in 9929 words, he never mentioned ‘environment’.

Yet, looking in details at what Juncker said on the Paris negotiation reveals a more complex picture. Hence, while Juncker remained silent on general environmental issues (biodiversity, sustainability, pollution etc.) he chose to speak about climate change – highlighting a narrowing down of what environmental issues are considered relevant, or highly salient by the Commission. Furthermore, Juncker did again depart from his written speech when talking about Paris, but far from toning down his environmental rhetoric, he was more frank, and crucially, more critical of EU action.

The two versions show significant overlap – links between climate change and the on-going refugee crisis, need for a binding deal in Paris – but Juncker’s written speech is much more positive on the EU’s ability to lead on climate change. Instead, the actual, delivered speech, draws attention to remaining tensions within the EU, and the need to drum up support not only outside of the EU’s borders but within them. Recognising that the EU’s contribution is “probably not enough” is also a major departure from conventional EU rhetoric of climate leadership. But what does it mean? Should we read much into it? Does it indicate a split within the Commission, which would see Juncker as the (unlikely) proponent of greater ambition – or a simple slip of the tongue?

Timing is key – Juncker said he wanted “the European Union and the Member States to be as ambitious as possible on the way to Paris”: now is the time to put these words into action. Finance ministers were asked to consider their level of climate finance on Tuesday and Environment ministers are meeting this Friday to discuss the EU’s negotiation position – we will soon find out whether Juncker and his team are serious about further ambition and tackling internal divisions.

 

 

[1] Čavoški, A. (2015) A post-austerity European Commission: no role for environmental policy? Environmental Politics, 24(3), pp. 501-505

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Dorota Dakowska and Robert Harmsen

Why are Central and Eastern European countries said to be particularly exposed to European and international organizations? How did the Bologna Process become a central reference in many domestic reform projects in the region?  This special issue of the European Journal of Higher Education (Volume 5, Issue 1, 2015) aims to refine our understanding of higher education (HE) transformations in a post-authoritarian context. It further contributes to debates on Europeanization and policy transfer in the field.

 

This special issue brings together an international and interdisciplinary team of contributors.  Particular attention is focused on the different actors, who appropriate international norms in the cause of domestic reform, or conversely develop strategies of resistance.  The range of national and thematic case studies included, spanning both EU member states and the wider post-Soviet area, allows for the drawing of a comparatively broad-based portrait of both the ‘uses’ and the ‘users’ of international norms in domestic debates. 

 

Central and Eastern European countries may adopt different positions facing European HE policies. Some of them eagerly adopt European policy prescriptions, while others prefer a more selective approach. In any case, the Bologna Process and the European Higher Education Area are noticed, debated or even integrated in domestic political games. This being said, Europe is neither the only nor necessarily the main external reference in these countries. The interplay between the different external factors and actors is also highlighted in this issue.

 

Background

The special issue derives from an international research collaboration, launched with a conference organised at the University of Luxembourg in November 2010 and continued with a two-year research and training project funded by the Interdisciplinary Centre for Studies and Research on Germany (CIERA): ‘Rebuilding Academia: The Transformations of Central-East European Universities since 1989’ (2011-2013). The current issue derives from a workshop held in Strasbourg in 2013 (‘Bologna and Beyond: Experts, Entrepreneurs, Users and the Internationalisation of Higher Education Institutions’). Further collaborative work was made possible owing to the funding secured through the Strasbourg School of European Studies ‘Excellence project’ and the University of Luxembourg’s ‘Global-Uni’ project (2013-16).

 

Inside the Central European Academic Laboratory

In the introductory article Dorota Dakowska and Robert Harmsen deal with higher education (HE) transformations in Central and Eastern Europe in the context of democratization and globalization. The authors briefly survey the wider canvas of reform since 1989, probing the extent to which the countries of the region may be treated as a distinctive or a cohesive group. Diverging experiences with communism, international organizations and the European Union are highlighted, while attention is also focused on the differing degrees of marketization exhibited by academic systems across the countries of region. Notwithstanding their differences, the latter emerge as distinctive ‘laboratories of reform’, privileged sites for understanding the interplay of external and domestic influences in the reshaping of the HE sector. The introduction then turns to understanding the domestic mediation of the processes of Europeanization and internationalization, identifying a series of key factors broadly discussed in terms of structures, norms and actors.

 

In the first article that follows, Michael Dobbins analyses developments in Polish public higher education (HE) based on historical institutionalism and organizational isomorphism. The author argues that Polish public HE has been characterized by fragmentary state-driven attempts to inject more competition into the system and altogether relative policy inertia, despite an internal and external environment which is highly conducive to policy change and in particular marketization.

 

The second contribution, by Ligia Deca, focuses on the uses of international norms in the Romanian higher education reforms. By focusing on three phases of policy change, the author observes when, why and by whom the international influences were strategically used in Romanian public discourse on higher education reform. She draws a balance sheet across the two decades of higher education reforms in Romania to provide insights into wider problematics of reform, Europeanization and internationalization in a context of transition and peripherality.

 

In the third article, Liudvika Leisyte, Rimantas Zelvys and Lina Zenkieneexplore the implementation of selected Bologna action lines in Lithuanian higher education institutions (HEIs) from an organizational perspective. Although the Bologna process is likely to be normatively accepted by institutions in the context of high uncertainty, a phenomenon of national re-contextualization can be observed depending on the type of HEIs and the competitive horizons of academic disciplines.

 

In the fourth contribution Renáta Králiková sheds light on the domestic translation of international models basing on the Romanian and Lithuanian case of university governing boards. First, she stresses the importance of path dependent logics that go back to the transition period in the early 1990s. Second, she confirms that actors’ perceptions of institutions influence policy translation.

 

The fifth article written by Olga Gille-Belova, deals with the case of Belarus, which challenges the limits of the European Higher Education Area as the country is the only one that had at the time of writing not been accepted to join the Bologna Process. The contribution examines the strategic uses of the Bologna Process. The initial refusal of the Belarusian application reveals a complex interplay between the increasing importance of ‘technical’ criteria inside the EHEA and EU external policy considerations.

 

In her concluding comments Martina Vukasovic identifies a number of transversal themes and highlights the interplay between international, European and domestic influences on national policy changes. She then sketches a research agenda, outlines a theoretical framework and suggests topics for further research.

 

 

Dorota Dakowska is Professor of Political Science at the University of Lyon 2. She has published on EU Eastern Enlargement, German and European political foundations and the Europeanization of Polish Higher Education. Her current research project deals with the international dimension of academic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe.

 

Robert Harmsen is Professor of Political Science at the University of Luxembourg, where he directs the Master in European Governance. He has published extensively in the areas of European Politics and Public Policy, and is an editor of the Brill/Rodopi European Studies series.  His publications include Debating Europe (Nomos, 2011; co-edited with Joachim Schild).

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What a difference a summer makes. Only last June the Evening Standard’s front page lauded that Britain’s support for continued membership of the European Union was the highest ever. Yesterday, the Mail on Sunday’s front page turned that around, with a poll showing that for the first time most British people want to quit the EU.

The Mail cited the ‘migrant crisis engulfing the continent’ as a major reason for Britain’s change of direction on the contentious EU in/out issue. According to this latest poll, if a referendum was to be held tomorrow on whether Britain should remain a member of the EU, 51% of people would vote, ‘No’.

It means that the nation is pretty much split down the middle. Not ‘one nation’ as the new Conservative government promised the country, but clearly two nations almost exactly evenly divided on whether Britain’s future should be in the European Union or not.

In last June’s poll by Ipso Mori, 75% of British people were in favour of Britain’s continued membership of the EU, with only 25% wanting to leave. The poll meant that support for the EU was at its highest at the beginning of the summer since the European Community was renamed the European Union in 1993.

The Independent newspaper commentated then, “The latest poll will alarm Eurosceptic campaigners as the Government raises the prospect of an early EU referendum.”

Now, as the summer draws to a close, it’s the turn of pro-EU campaigners to feel alarmed. In the latest poll, by pollsters Survation, the gap between those who want to stay in the EU and those who want to leave has dramatically narrowed from 75/25 in favour to 51/49 against. The poll also revealed that if the “current migration crisis gets worse”, 22% in the ‘Yes’ to European camp might switch sides.

Commented today’s Mail on the latest poll, “Significantly, it is the first measure of public opinion since the Government changed the wording of the referendum question, lending weight to the claims that the new phrasing boosts the chances of victory for the Out campaign.”

Last May the new Conservative government announced that the referendum question would be, “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union?”

But following advice from the UK’s Electoral Commission, the referendum question is now going to be amended to, “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?” It means that instead of a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer, voters will be asked to answer ‘remain’ or ‘leave’.

The Survation poll was the first one which gauged the public’s opinion in response to the new referendum question.

It’s thought likely that the referendum will be held this time next year, and since the mood of the nation has changed so dramatically over the summer, it might yet change again in the space of twelve months. So both the ‘remain’ and ‘leave’ campaigners have all to play for. It’s likely to be one of the most hotly contested political campaigns in living memory.

Leaving the European Union is a right of every member; no country was forced to join the European Union and all members are free to leave. The rules of leaving are set out in the Treaty of European Union Article 50.

If Britain does decide to leave the European Union, it will be the first time that a member state will have left, although in 1975 Greenland left by default when it won independence from Community member Denmark. In a subsequent referendum, Greenland voted against membership.

Britain’s departure wouldn’t happen overnight as there would be a period of ‘exit’ negotiations which could take up to two years, although commentators believe that there would be many more years of uncertainty on a wide range of issues.

For example, what would be the status of EU migrants living in Britain and British migrants living across the EU? There have been plenty of suggestions, but nobody yet can know for sure because negotiations to leave haven’t taken place.

Also, Britain’s trade agreements that are currently ‘legislated through the European Union would have to be individually re-negotiated with each of the world’s countries. Regarding ‘free trade’ that Britain currently enjoys with the rest of the EU, in theory that would be lost upon leaving the EU and we may be back to customs duties and import/export tariffs.

UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, is currently negotiating with other EU heads of states to agree changes to Britain’s membership of the EU, including a proposal to curtail ‘free movement of people’, a core tenet of the EU that gives all EU citizens the right to live, work, study or retire in any other EU or EEA state.

Today the Mail reported that relations between Mr Cameron and Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, were not exactly getting closer. According to a new book being serialised by the paper, ‘Cameron at 10’ by Anthony Seldon and Peter Snowdon, Merkel accused Cameron at a private dinner at 10 Downing Street of being ‘too forceful’ in demanding concessions from the rest of the EU.

She is reported to have told the Prime Minister that was why, “we all hate you and isolate you”. Mr Cameron was reported to have responded, “I could walk away from the EU.”

With probably a year to go before the referendum, both the ‘remain’ and ‘leave’ campaigns are limbering up for a blistering, all-out fight. The referendum is likely to be the defining moment for all those allowed to vote – which will not include most citizens here from the rest of the EU, but will include citizens with leave-to-remain in the UK from Britain’s ex colonies. The outcome of the referendum will affect the country’s future for decades or maybe hundreds of years to come.

Unless something dramatically occurs to change my mind by the day of the referendum, I will be voting for Britain to ‘remain’ in the European Union.

But I do think it’s important that both sides of the argument are carefully listened to. The issue is too important for anybody to answer the question, “should we stay or should we go?” without careful consideration of all the implications.

Other articles by Jon Danzig:

• The value of being citizens of Europe
• The referendum – who can and can’t vote?
• We should stay in the EU says Virgin boss

To receive regular updates on this and other ongoing stories, please click the ‘Like’ button on my new Facebook page: Jon Danzig Writes

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Following the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and initial attempts to stimulate the economy through increased government spending, austerity has become a dominant narrative in many developed nations. Government spending has been significantly reduced in a number of European countries, as part of efforts to reduce both public deficits and debts. After several years of such austerity measures, what has been the impact of this policy approach on the environment.

In the short-term, the financial crisis has resulted in a reduction in the production of pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. However, the development of austerity policies which tend to favour the economy at the cost of the environment, combined with a reduction in the ambition of policies designed to protect the environment, are likely to result in significant environmental damage over the medium-to-long-term. Attempts to understand the impacts of austerity on the environment have barely scratched the surface so far. Vital questions remain unanswered: What measures are most useful for measuring the existence of austerity? How has austerity altered environmental policy? Have the environmental policy approaches of different European states differed in response to austerity? A forthcoming panel at the UACES (University Association for Contemporary European Studies) Annual Conference seeks preliminary answers to these very questions.

Taking place on the 7th of September 2015 and hosted in the stunning city of Bilbao, Spain, this panel will develop conceptual debates and examine recent empirical studies on European cases to assess the lasting legacy of austerity on the planet. The panel is chaired by Dr. Charlotte Burns of the University of York, who recently secured funding for three years to examine the impact of austerity on European environmental policy.

The panel begins with a paper by Viviane Gravey, investigating 20 years of attempts to dismantle EU environmental policies. Building on policy dismantling studies, her paper asks what could drive European actors to target the EU’s “green acquis”, and analyses the strategies EU actors deploy in order to cut policies in a highly consensual political system. It provides an historical background to the panel discussions, highlighting how calls to cut policies and remove policy proposals predate austerity. The paper argues that these repeated calls for dismantling have had broad effects – affecting existing policies, how proposals are produced and the culture of the Commission as a whole – paving the way for austerity at EU level.

From here, Paul Tobin and Charlotte Burns seek to answer the question, ‘how do we measure the impact of austerity on the environment?’ Their paper assesses whether budgetary amendments, institutional alterations, and both qualitative and quantitative changes to legislation can be possible impact indicators, finding that a triangulated approach which encompasses a variety of methods would enable the best assessment of austerity’s influence. From here, the co-authors provide the latest findings from three months of elite interviews in Brussels, identifying a change of narrative that has occurred with the selection of the new, pro-austerity EU Commission led by Jean-Claude Juncker. This new narrative of ‘jobs and growth’ has given the EU a new niche with which to build credibility amongst European citizens, but appears to have developed to the detriment of the EU’s former identity as an environmental pioneer.

Having assessed changes at the EU level, John Karamichas’s paper examines the impact of austerity at the nation-state level, focussing on the case studies of Greece and the UK. Greece has been at the centre of austerity politics in Europe since the financial crisis, acting as the clearest example of ‘austerity by imposition’ by an external actor, in this case, the troika of the IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank. The UK, on the other hand, has pursued austerity economics for ideological purposes as a result of its centre-right government.  The paper argues that regardless of the two states’ differences prior to the adoption of austerity measures, they have both entered a downward spiral where economic growth has become completely disengaged from environmental parameters.

Finally, the paper by Duncan Russel and David Benson focuses further on the UK situation. Their paper examines how green budgeting can be used as a means of stimulating sluggish economies. Here, competing discourses within environmental politics seek to minimise the impact of austerity politics by rival political institutions. By using veto player perspectives, the authors show how rival environmental policy discourses are used in bargaining games to minimize the impact of austerity politics by rival political institutions pursing their wider policy goals.

By demonstrating the development of austerity politics in Europe, establishing a methodology with which to understand the phenomenon and exploring two case studies, this panel promises to shine a spotlight on an otherwise neglected – but hugely important – contemporary issue in European politics.

 

 

 

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(Photo: L’Equipe)

Over the last twenty years ‘Europeanisation’ has become a key concept in European Studies, almost a research field of its own. The current meaning of the term must have been introduced around 1994 in a seminal JCMS article by Robert Ladrech (possible that there are some earlier occurrences that I am unaware of). Prior to this rather recent semantic shift, ‘Europeanisation’, both in its English and French version, was a term used mainly in the 19th century, in contexts of cultural hegemony. The Oxford English Dictionary of 1989, for instance, defines it at ‘to make European in appearance, form, habit, or mode of life’ and cites some literary quotes concerning the ‘Europeanisation’ of India, Egypt or Japan.

I was therefore quite surprised to bump into it in a newspaper article dated 5 September 1955. The text in question is the report on the first football match of a pan-European club competition, known then as ‘The European Champions Clubs Cup’ and today as ‘The Champions League’. At the end of his match analysis in L’Equipe, the French sports daily who was behind the whole idea of this competition, Gabriel Hanot expressed his fear that ‘national competitions might be sacrificed to the Europeanisation of football’.

Funny enough, the ‘Europeanisation of football’ has now become a serious object of study. And the fear that the Champions League might one day eclipse all other competitions and become a closed league of ‘super-clubs’ is still regularly voiced today. In 1955, the match between Sporting Portugal and Partizan Belgrade (final score: 3-3) was of interest to insiders only. Major media did not care at all. In comparison, the space devoted last week across all media in France, Germany, Britain or Spain, to an event as secondary as the simple draw for the first round group stage gives testimony to the degree this Europeanisation of the football horizon has reached.

One aspect of the match in question deserves to be mentioned in particular: the fact that in its very first official game the European Cup was able to cross Cold War borders and bring together a team from the Western edge of the Continent with one from behind the Iron Curtain. Salazar’s Portugal and Tito’s Yugoslavia did not even have diplomatic relations, which complicated the travelling (the Partizan players had to insert a stop-over in Paris) but by no means prevented the match from taking place. For the Cup’s organisers, it went without saying that Central and Eastern Europe needed to be present in this new competition, and besides Partizan, teams from Budapest and Warsaw also competed (Dynamo Moscow had declined the invitation, apparently for meteorological reasons).

Today we’re in a miniature Cold War again, with Russia and the EU imposing sanctions on each other. France will have to reimburse around a billion Euros to Russia for not delivering the two Mistral war ships it had already built on command of the Russian marine. But that will not keep Paris Saint-Germain from travelling to Donezk (of all places) this autumn to play their Champions League game against Chaktior, while Olympique Lyon will play Zenith Saint Petersburg.

But as in 1955, football somehow manages to ignore the political circumstances. It pursues its own Europeanisation agenda, kicked off in Lisbon exactly sixty years ago.

Albrecht Sonntag,
The EU-Asia Centre at ESSCA School of Management, Angers

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Let’s now turn to some efforts to, and ways to categorize or describe a taxonomy of organizations. One way is to look at their geographic scope. Some organizations are global in scope. Of course, the United Nations is global in scope. How many member states do we have in the United Nations today? If you said 193, you would be correct. From Afghanistan to Zimbabwe there are presently 193 member states of the United Nations. Of course, other organizations are global in scope. The specialized agencies, like the World Health Organization, or the Food and Agriculture Organization, or the World Food Program, or the World Trade Organization. International organizations like International Committee for the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, are also global in scope.

Other organizations are regional. We think of ASEAN, or the European Union or the African Union, for example. There are even subregional international organizations. Such as ECOWAS, the political subregional organization covering west and parts of central Africa. Or the Mekong Group, or the Southern African Development Community. The annual yearbook of international organizations lists more than 200 international organizations, ranging in size from three, like the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, to organizations with hundreds of members.

What then do we consider to be a definition of international organization? You may wish to develop a view of your own on what you think is an appropriate view, because it’s not black and white, and there are options for interpretation. In fact, there as many definitions of international organizations, almost, as there are such organizations. The OECD, the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, itself an international organization, puts forth really, a very narrow definition of international organizations. And I quote, international organizations are entities established by formal political agreements between their members, that have the status of international treaties. Their existence is recognized by the law in their member countries and they are not treated as resident, institutional units of the countries in which they are located, end quote. Let’s look at another definition, one that considers international organizations to be those whose members have at least three states, that have activities in several states, and whose members are held together by a formal intergovernmental agreement. Many commentators consider such an inter-governmental agreement to be an essential quality, an essential characteristic of an international organization. A sine qua non, if you will, of being in the category of international organizations.

International organizations are recognized subjects of international law, and have a separate legal standing from their member states or other members. Why do I say member states or other members? Because, over time, international organizations have evolved and some have become more inclusive.

So, the governance of international organizations has evolved over time and we’ll look at that in a little bit. A simple, broader, more inclusive definition of international organization would be something like an organization with an international membership, an international scope, or an international presence. And we can think of two main types or categories of international organization.

The first, inter-governmental organizations. Most closely associated with the term international organization, and these are those that are made up primarily of sovereign states. And examples, as I said, include the United Nations, the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the European Union, as I mentioned earlier, the African Union, other regional bodies.

The second major type of international organization is, of course, international non governmental organizations. Those that are usually non-profit. And examples include so many around the world and here in Geneva. The International Scouting Movement, the International Committee of the Red Cross.  We should note also, that intergovernmental organizations are usually considered public in nature. While NGOs fall into the category of private organizations. We of course, are not today addressing or including in our discussion, other kinds of entities that have an international presence. Coca Cola, Toyota, other multinational corporations are certainly present in villages, towns and cities all around the world, in more than what we think of as international organizations.Let me also note that a number of governments codify the definition of international organizations in their own domestic law, in their own domestic statutes. But let’s turn back again to the methodologies for thinking about or classifying international organizations.

We spoke already about geographic scope. Another basis for classifying, in our taxonomy of international organizations, is the purpose of the organization. Is the purpose general, like the United Nations or the Organization of American States? Is it specific, like specialized agencies of the United Nations? The founders of the UN envisaged that functional agencies would play key roles and carry out key activities, for example, in economic and social development. Indeed, the Charter, Articles 57 and 63 call for affiliations of the UN, with various organizations that are established by separate international agreements to deal with particular issues. Such as health, the World Health Organization. Or food, the World Food Program. Or science, education and culture, UNESCO. Or refugees, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Or economic and social development, such as the UN Development Program, or the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund. It’s very interesting how the purposes of these organizations have evolved over time since their creation.

What are the functions of international organizations? Informational, gathering, analyzing, disseminating data. Providing a forum for exchange of views and decision making. Normative functions, defining standards of conduct or of service. Rule creating, such as drafting legally binding treaties. Operational functions, allocating resources, providing technical assistance and relief, deploying forces. And dispute resolution, settling criminal or civil claims. Of course, some organizations can have many, or all of these functions.

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Beverly Barrett

Last week we convened in Montreal, Canada for the 9th general conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), which took place from 26-29 August at University of Montreal.  This was the first general conference of the ECPR to take place outside of Europe, and the francophone region of Quebec welcomed participants from around the world. The conference program included 59 sections, 372 panels and 1430 papers.

 

Panel on Ideas in the Global Governance of Knowledge (Photo credit: Mari Elken)

The Global Governance of Knowledge Policies: Europe of Knowledge in Context was the title of the Section 54. This section was organized by the UACES’s European Research Area – Collaborative Research Network (ERA-CRN) and co-chaired by Meng-Hsuan Chou (Nanyang Technological University in Singapore) and Mitchell Young (Charles University in Prague) who facilitated the nine panels among research and higher education policy scholars.

 

Mitchel Young and Meng-Hsuan Chou (Photo credit: Mari Elken)

An overview of some of the panel topics includes Regionalism and multi-level governance of higher education and research.  This panel made comparisons between the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) of the Bologna Process and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) higher education policies on degree compatibility, quality assurance, and recognition of degrees.  Global collaboration and competition in science, technology and innovation addressed international initiatives for research policy across countries in Europe and beyond.

 

The panel Researching the governance of knowledge policies: methodological and conceptual challenges made further comparisons among countries engaging in research innovation and explored ways to avoid methodological nationalism.  The panel Trade agreements and the supranational shaping of knowledge policies discussed the progress of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations while explaining the relationship to the services sector of higher education. Themes on higher education governance, international cooperation in education, and research policies were dominant throughout the session over three days. All panels were well-attended and led to lively, high-quality discussions.

 

ERA CRN lunch meeting (Photo credit: Mari Elken)

Next year the 10th general conference of the ECPR will take place in Prague, Czech Republic at Charles University from September 7 to 10, 2016.  We welcome scholars at various stages in their careers to participate in the ECPR and the ERA-CRN workshops and activities in the future. At the moment the network is preparing an application for the ECPR Standing Group ‘Politics of Higher Education, Research, and Innovation’; if you would like to join, please sign up here.

 

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Some of the media seem to be in a state of panic this week with the news that the number of foreign-born people living in Britain has reached 8 million, and net migration to the  UK has reached record levels.

So what’s the big deal here?

Not all those born abroad can be described as ‘foreigners’, contrary to the alarmist reports splashed in newspapers such as The Express, The Telegraph and the Daily Mail.

For example, London Mayor and Conservative MP, Boris Johnson, was born in the USA. Ashes winning cricketer, Ben Stokes, was born in New Zealand.

Actress Emma Watson was born in France. Mo Farrah, Olympic gold medallist for Britain, was born in Somalia. Actress Joanna Lumley was born in India. And the Queen’s husband, the Duke of Edinburgh, was born in Greece… to mention just a few.

In any case, why does it matter? Where we live is surely more important than where we’ve come from.

We have all arrived from a long ancestral journey that spanned the planet for tens of thousands of years. We are, actually, all descended from migrants.

But it’s not only the record number of foreign-born residents in Britain that has been targeted as ‘bad news’ by much of the media and many politicians this week. The word ‘migration’ now seems to have become toxic. So also presented as ‘bad news’ this week was the report that net migration to the country reached a new record high in the year to March 2014, with 330,000 more migrants coming to the UK than left.

This was reported as presenting a big headache for UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, because he had promised to bring down ‘net migration’ to tens of thousands from the current level of hundreds of thousands.

But why is migration here considered such a terrible thing? Instead, the record numbers of people wanting to come to Britain could be celebrated as a huge success story.

The fact is that most migrants come to Britain to work or study – and that’s primarily what they do. Most migrants who come to work in Britain are in gainful employment, making significant net contributions to our treasury and helping the British economy to thrive.

And those migrants coming here to study are contributing billions to the running costs of our colleges and universities – foreign revenue which those educational establishments very much need, and which the wider community also benefits from through extra spending by foreign students.

The reason so many migrants are currently coming here to work is because the British economy is doing so well compared to other European countries – resulting in many new vacancies being created which cannot simply be filled by those unfortunate to be registered as unemployed.

Benefit tourism? Where’s the evidence for that? The proportion of migrants claiming benefits is considerably lower than for British citizens. Three times the European Commission asked the British government for evidence of so-called ‘benefit tourism’ by EU migrants coming to work in the UK. Three times the British government failed to provide any.

And migration is not a one-way trip. Many British people also migrate to other countries mostly for the exact same reason that migrants mostly come here: to work. Britain is the biggest exporter of people to the rest of Europe, and the world’s third biggest exporter of people across the planet.

Isn’t it a bit odd that people in Britain should consider migration here to be such a bad thing, when British people make fuller use of ‘free movement of people’ across Europe than any other EU nationality?

And another thing: many migrants quoted as coming to Britain were actually British people returning home from living abroad. How many newspapers reported that?

The British government has pledged to reduce net migration to less than 100,000. Why? I cannot find any economic reasons for such a policy. And in the absence of an economic reason, what other reason could there be to want to reduce migration to the country? Could it simply be that the government has been responding to an irrational fear and dislike of foreigners?

Has anyone actually considered that reducing net migration to Britain to less than 100,000 might make the country – and all of us – poorer? Do we really want to deter workers and students coming to the UK who are making such a significant contribution to our economy?

Rather than continually trying and failing to stem the flow of natural and legal migration here in pursuit of jobs and studies, wouldn’t it be more cost effective for the government to invest considerably more in our infrastructure, such as homes, schools and hospitals? In that way, the residents of Great Britain – of whatever nationality – could be properly accommodated, allowing them to get on with what most of us want to do: work or study.

Other articles by Jon Danzig:

• Eurosceptic plan to stop Brits retiring to Spain
• Fact: Most migrants come to work or study
• The free movement of people: it works both ways

To receive regular updates on this and other ongoing stories, please click the ‘Like’ button on my new Facebook page: Jon Danzig Writes

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When I ask racists if they believe the descendants of immigrants should ‘go home’, they invariably reply, ‘Yes’. Watch the video to hear my withering response. (1 minute):

Click here to view the embedded video.

Media in panic because 8 million foreign-born live in Britain. So what? See my Facebook post: http://t.co/QfDdquebx5pic.twitter.com/suEOToSbFN

— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) August 28, 2015

Click here to view the embedded video.

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The European Union very often likes to remind us that it is a community of values – solidarity, non-discrimination, human rights, and so on. This is all very well but, as Khrushchev once reminded Marxist enthusiasts in the Politburo, you cannot simply put theory into your soup. The question therefore is, what do these values mean in practice?

European citizenship is perhaps an area that raises eyebrows on all sides: it confuses eurocrats, while EU citizens merely understand its meaning beyond having the same coloured passport, or the right to vote in the European Elections, including in Member States they might be residing that are other than their own. Consular assistance to EU citizens is, however, one area that clearly deserves more publicity than it is given. Why? Well, numbers speak for themselves: according to the Commission, 90 million EU citizens travel annually outside the EU, of which 7 million travel or work in third countries where their Member State has no consulate or an embassy. Now, with a new Council Directive in place, this under-estimated but extremely important (and, it is safe to say, sensitive) area of European cooperation deserves a few words from an analyst who has been following its development now for a number of years.

Although consular cooperation in one form or another has been in existence since the Single European Act (1986), it was the Maastricht Treaty that explicitly stipulated that ‘every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he or she is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that Member State’.

In 1995 the Council agreed on a Directive (95/553/EC) which included basic provisions on issues such as stolen passports, detention, victims of crime and repatriation. The Directive, however, was not ratified by Member States’ legislatures until after the September 11 Attacks in the US brought the security of EU citizens abroad high on the agenda.

The post-9/11 debate opened two big questions. Firstly, string of man-made and natural disasters (Asian Tsunami, Bali bombings, Mumbai bombings or the 2006 war in Lebanon) shifted a focus on cooperation to post-disaster response, such as immediate humanitarian relief and repatriation away from the disaster area.

With lack of coordination between Member States (for example, planes carrying aid South East Asia in the wake of the 2004 tsunami have been accused of flying back to the EU empty), the Civil Protection Mechanism within the European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (DG ECHO) was re-organised to provide support in case of consular emergencies. This included a monitoring centre, and the possible dispatching of EU-funded transport and medevac planes.

Secondly, from 2006 and, in particular, from the coming into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon, further debate emerged on the possibilities of shared or even EU consulates in EU delegations. When the European External Action Service (EEAS) was created, a Consular Crisis Unit was put together in order to create a monitoring centre and work on possible EU-level synergies.

True, EU delegations (also backed up by the EEAS’ inherited Consular Online communication system) have provided armoured buses to evacuate 100 EU citizens from Gaza in 2009, and in March 2011 the EU Delegation in Tripoli provided important assistance on the ground to Member States’ evacuation efforts, as well as the Civil Protection Mechanism’s sponsored flight.

However, the possibility of the EEAS and its Delegations abroad to receive any formals role in consular assistance remained wishful thinking. The fact of the matter was that (except for obvious legal challenges) the EEAS continuous to have neither the funding nor the expertise to provide such service. Delegations abroad continue to be the reflection of their former past in DG RELEX, and their staff work on technical projects, rather than being representatives as in the case of national embassies or consulates. Quite frankly, the setting up of fore-mentioned monitoring centre within the EEAS was a useless duplication that Catherine Ashton sought to unsuccessfully address through a merger with DG ECO structures.

Further, while Member States continue to wrestle with falling foreign ministry budgets, very few have been prepared to give up sovereignty over an area where the foreign ministries have direct access with the public. Nevertheless, through the period, and as was reflected in the lengthy negotiations over the new Directive, financing remained a big issue.

Bigger Member States, in particular, became increasingly afraid that they will bear much of the burden of ‘open access’ consular assistance. Some Member States, including the United Kingdom, refused to formally accept consular assistance as a ‘right’ of EU citizens (despite it being enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU), but merely an ‘entitlement’, stipulating neither the minimum nor maximum level of protection a Member State consulate is obliged to provide.

Not surprisingly, the new Directive reflects this pain-staking development. Firstly, the consultation was launched by the Commission in 2006 and a proposal to the Council and the European Parliament was only published in November 2011. The Directive was eventually concluded in April of 2015, and a long road of ratification in Member States is expected.

At the same time, the Directive sees a shift from the debates of the previous decade; speculations about the role of the EEAS and its network of Delegations have been put to rest. Enthusiasts of a truly European diplomatic and consular service (including the former French foreign minister and EU Commissioner Michel Barnier) will be disappointed to find a mere supporting role of the EEAS, including provisions for providing relevant information on their rights to EU citizens, and organising local consular cooperation.

The Civil Protection Mechanism has clearly been highlighted as an important tool to be used in crisis situations. However the Mechanism’s most important input is the financial reimbursement mechanism, which the Hungarian Presidency used in March 2011 to dispatch a plane to Tripoli. In practice, however, dispatching and coordination of transport or consular teams remains more practical on the Member State level, where a designated Lead State is responsible in particular third country, without the necessity to community back and forth with Brussels.

Finally, financing was solved two-fold. Firstly, an EU citizen cannot be charged for assistance by a consulate more than the citizens of the Member State assisting them. Secondly, if costs cannot be paid immediately, the Member State of his or her nationality will pay the costs incurred, but only once the citizen signs an undertaking to repay such costs to his or her Member State upon safe return.

The question then remains, was this low-profile Council Directive part of a long-term strategy or a vision, or did it symbolise a loss of interest in cooperation? In short, there is no loss of interest, but grand ideas are missing. Michel Barnier will clearly not see his vision of EU consulates fulfilled any time soon, nor will we necessarily see EU-hatted rescue teams appearing too often.

The Directive is, however, an important step in clearing up a technical mine field. The 95/553/EC Directive was vague and opened more questioned than it helped to answer. That the new Directive has 14 detailed pages, in comparison to 4, is a testament to this. They are not 14 pages of delightful bed-time reading that will stand proudly on one’s book shelf, but they are 14 pages of important details that help to pave a way towards a better organised cooperation in the next decade.

Grand visions might be buried for now, but a more practical framework has been created instead. Writing this piece in a day dominated by terrorist attacks in France, Tunisia, Kuwait and conflicts across the globe, providing better protection to EU citizens has never been more important. That this new Directive has not been given a fanfare is more a testament to the EU’s awful ability to communicate with the citizens, than its capacity to provide a better managed system to save and protect well-beings of those travelling further and farther.

It is a welcomed decision that deserves a better recognition but, nevertheless, a telling reflection of our ability to create a Europe serving its citizens and, perhaps, making people proud of their burgundy-coloured passports. Overall, a positive conclusion for a debut article!

Igor Merheim-Eyre

This piece was originally published in the Vocal International (July 7, 2015)

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I have been crossing the river Rhine north of Strasbourg between Iffezheim (Germany) and Roppenheim (France) for as long as my driving licence can remember. In the late 70s and early 80s, passport control and the usual question whether there was anything to declare were part of the ritual (although in a much more relaxed manner than on the checkpoints on the border to Eastern Germany…).

Some years later the border guards were still there but they did not control anybody any more, except some suspect lorries. There were no barriers any more either. What remained, though, was the habit, on the way back, to get rid of your last French Francs in small shops in unlikely places like Soufflenheim, Roeschwoog or Bischwiller. It was only logical that at the beginning of the 1990s, when the guards had left, their post was temporarily turned into a small money exchange house.

Former border post near Roppenheim, August 2015.

Obviously, once the Euro had come, even the exchange house had no reason of being any more. Since then, the building has been waiting, shutters down, in a kind of wasteland nearby a roundabout where mother nature has taken over.

For more than a decade it did not seem to have a future. But who knows? Now that daily news from the refugee drama that is taking place between Lampedusa and Calais are putting the border issue centre stage again, it has become fashionable among politicians across Europe to put the Schengen agreement into question again and ask for tougher border controls. Clearly the tide has turned since the 1980s when the abolition of borders was celebrated as a civilizational progress and a logical step in the process of European integration.

This is not surprising. The control of territorial borders is a central component of the legitimacy of the classical nation-state. Losing this control – even if on a voluntary basis – is by definition a wound to sovereignty, a phantom pain that fear mongers of all political colours may reactivate any time. It is most likely that in the current circumstances speaking out publicly against Schengen will become (of it has not already) a compulsory rhetorical figure in electoral campaigns in many member states.

While unlikely for the time being, it cannot be totally ruled out that in my driving licence’s lifetime systematic border controls may be reintroduced along the Rhine. If Schengen was to be dismantled, why should Roppenheim be different from Calais?

‘The Style Outlets’ Roppenheim: clearly ‘designed to provide you with a unique and unforgettable shopping experience’. Postal address: 1, route de l’Europe.

A nightmare vision for many, especially for all the commuters and travellers between Iffezheim and Roppenheim. If they have recently started to slow down again on the border, it is not (yet) in order to show their passports, but rather their credit cards in the posh factory outlet village that was built right next to the abandoned border post (where ‘more than 100 must-have brands offer you a minimum of -30% off’).

Might as well benefit from the single market as long as it lasts.

Albrecht Sonntag, EU-Asia Institute, ESSCA School of Management.
A French version of this blog can be found here.

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