Ideas on Europe Blog

Yesterday, 15 June, Britain celebrated the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta. The text proclaimed some of what we now call “human rights”, related to fair trial and the rule of law. It was meant to be a peace treaty between English barons and a particularly bully monarch, King John. Magna Carta did not really apply at the time, war resumed soon after and most of the text was repealed throughout history. However, yesterday, the birthday was greeted with royal splendour and the Prime Minister said that Magna Carta “changed the world”. Not bad for someone who not long ago didn’t know the literal translation of Magna Carta (it’s “Great Charter”, by the way).

David Cameron is not alone in his enthusiasm. Others have claimed that we still enjoy the rights “won” in 1215. BBC refers to Magna Carta as “the document that heralded modern democracy”. And the rather obsessive-looking historian David Starkey is convinced that the proclamation of property rights in Magna Carta was “the foundation of everything else”, in a way that other countries, like China and Russia, have not experienced to this day; Magna Carta was “unique in Europe” and Americans and continental Europeans learned about civil liberties from it.

I must confess my fascination. As a citizen of Spain, I think democracy and civil liberties only got to my home country during the short republican experience between 1931 and 1936, and more strongly, in the late 1970s after Franco’s death. I now live in England and I am impressed to see that my host country has apparently enjoyed freedom and rights at least for seven more centuries.

I suppose Brits must have learned quite a lot over time. I am eager to hear all the lessons should they care to share.

Yet, leaving that aside for now, something else calls my attention. What do the celebrations mean about Britain and the British idea of human rights?

Politicians, scholars and discussants have managed to reconstruct the Magna Carta as a document deeply rooted in the history and the identity of the nation. (Incidentally, England? Britain? UK? I never know! But, then, I hold a Spanish passport, so who am I to speak about nationality!?) The rights enshrined in that text would be British-born and therefore detached from the surge of the idea of human rights in continental Europe, with civil rights from the Enlightenment and social rights from workers’ movements in the 19th century.

There is something else, though. The narrative suggests that human rights would also be the product of a negotiation between the Crown and an élite, which at the time was represented by aristocracy. This idea claims that human rights would come from a gentlemen’s agreement among equals, or rather, as if equals. Moreover, it assumes that the top stratum accurately represents the wishes and interests of everybody, regardless of their socioeconomic origin.

The message goes approximately like this: We invented human rights in Britain, or at least we invented the idea of human rights that applies in these islands. We have had these rights for centuries. We agreed on them much earlier than anybody else. We won’t tolerate intrusion. And human rights are not supposed to generate conflict among us. We are all together on this, as a nation of free men (and women, but later… ehem).

I am not a historian, but I consider the idea of human rights truly appealing, and therefore I find hard to believe that one country could keep this wonderful discovery from its neighbours for centuries.

However, this rosy story about Magna Carta and its role in British history and identity can serve political purposes pretty well. And so does PM Cameron, who wrote in The Sun just yesterday:

Britain will not be told what to do on human rights by euro judges because we invented them 800 years ago.

It’s also about restoring the reputation of rights.

We should all be proud of what happened 800 years ago. So let’s celebrate today’s anniversary. Let’s put human rights right.

To those who say we can’t, I say of course we can – we’re the country that wrote Magna Carta; that has one of the oldest democracies and most respected legal systems the world over.

Human rights weren’t invented with Labour’s Human Rights Act – they’ve been part of the fabric of our country for decades.

If we are lucky, yesterday’s pompous celebration does not say as much about Britain as it does about Tory manifesto. Now, only if we are super-lucky and we work on it, we will manage to save the Human Rights Act.

(Find out more about why it’s worth fighting for the Act here).

Koldo Casla

@koldo_casla

(Cartoon: Steve Bell in The Guardian)

The post What the celebration of the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta tells us about Britain’s idea of human rights appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Nobody should take anything for granted when it comes to Britain’s vote to stay or leave the EU. Many of the mistakes and inaccurate assumptions that have overshadowed recent votes could be repeated with the EU vote and lead to Britain leaving the EU.

A British referendum on its EU membership vote was not something many in the EU (and some in the UK) wanted. A renegotiation and referendum are seen as an unwanted headache for a union with enough already on its plate. An exit would be unprecedented, opening a Pandora’s Box of problems for both sides.

Some pro-Europeans may now seek comfort in analysis that argues that when all is said and done the British won’t actually vote to leave. They’ll be buoyed by some polling data, arguments that Cameron is the best Prime Minister to secure an ‘in’ vote, that British businesses will be behind membership, that UKIP will lead ashambolic and divided ‘out’ campaign and so forth. Given what is at stake it pays to take a more cautious analysis.

Do you believe pollsters anymore?

Polls might point to an uphill struggle for the ‘out’ campaign, but we should all be cautious of taking polls too much for granted after the polling farce of the 2015 UK general election (the most polled vote in UK history). Pollsters also made a bad call over last year’s Scottish independence referendum. They correctly tracked the growth in support for independence, but the final result of 55:45 was much wider than many had thought in the final weeks. Despite the few polls in the closing weeks of the independence referendum, there have only ever been a few that point to Scottish independence. By contrast there have been numerous polls pointing to a vote to leave the EU.

Will Cameron secure a renegotiation?

It’s not clear if Cameron can secure much by way of a renegotiation. Britain’s EU debate is often blind to how the rest of the EU must agree to its demands. The rest of the EU wants to see reform, but survey the member states and you find limited sympathy for a UK that can appear to be blackmailing them. What they will offer is therefore unclear. The crunch area of free movement of people in particular looks set to cause tensions throughout the EU. If Britain’s 1975 renegotiation is anything to go by then Britain will get largely token changes.

Will the British public believe in Cameron’s renegotiation?

Nobody should assume the British people will swallow another token renegotiation. Eurosceptics, the media, academics, perhaps even some supporters of an ‘in’ vote (those uneasy with the nature of the renegotiation) will shine many lights on and through the deal. When in a 2011 referendum the British people rejected AV they did so in large part because the referendum turned into a vote on the popularity of Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg, but also because they recognised that AV – to quote Nick Clegg himself – was a ‘miserable little compromise’. After the experiences in Scotland, voters are also now likely to see through any last minute commitments in the face of a rising ‘out’ vote.

Is Cameron the best Prime Minister to win a referendum?

Cameron is hailed as the best man to lead the UK through a referendum because he can guarantee a large proportion of the Conservative party and its supporters will follow him in a vote to stay in. Yet he is a prime minister who has played fast and loose with the unity of the UK and the UK’s membership of the EU. He governs with a majority of 12. He led a lacklustre election campaign that seemed to win by accident. He has struggled to hold his party together over Europe, making repeated concessions to Eurosceptics. Finally standing up to them may split his party and lead to a leadership challenge. His concentration could turn to holding his party and premiership together more than holding the UK in the EU. It is unclear whether he will bind ministers through collective cabinet responsibility, or punish those reluctant to back fully any ‘in’ campaign. If his position becomes exposed then expect leadership hopefuls to sense danger in backing him and the ‘in’ vote. Other parties may back off if they sense a danger from tying themselves too closely to the leader of a losing campaign. This was one reason behind Labour leader Ed Miliband’s reluctance to get behind Nick Clegg in the AV referendum.

Will ‘in’ or ‘out’ run the most shambolic campaign?

Both campaigns will struggle to define a clear message and strategy thanks to political differences, personal dislikes and financial problems. The ‘in’ campaign is likely to break-up as soon as the referendum is concluded. UK pro-European campaigns have a record of struggling to exist let alone campaigning effectively. Similar problems beset Scotland’s unionist campaign. There has been much speculation whether the ‘out’ campaign would be better off not relying on UKIP and the one-man show of Nigel Farage. But UKIP can provide some single-party unity that if played right could mirror the SNP’s role as the core of the independence movement. The ‘out’ campaign may struggle to find the grass roots movement that drove Scotland’s independence campaign. That said, UKIP has shown that it can sometimes reach out to disaffected voters by presenting itself as a party apart from the Westminster elite. Like the SNP, the ‘out’ campaign could also be buoyed by the campaign, coming to see any defeat as a tactical as opposed strategic one. UKIP will likely continue to grow, fuelled by factors that are not just about Europe. Left wing Eurosceptic groups, until now largely hidden in the UK, will be given attention thanks to their rejection of what they see as the EU’s imposition of neo-liberal agendas on the whole of Europe.

Who will be better at selling an unknown?

The ‘out’ campaign will struggle to set out a clear agenda for a post-EU Britain. Even UKIP is vague about what relationship it wants the UK to seek. This does not mean the ‘in’ campaign will be in a stronger position. The ‘in’ side will have to await Cameron’s renegotiation deal and not all may back in completely. Some ‘in’ supporters – especially on the left – will be uneasy with any deal that limits such things as workers rights. The ‘in’ campaign may resort to a repeat of ‘Project Fear’, the term applied (especially by their opponents) to the approach taken by unionists in Scotland of arguing about the unknowns and dangers of independence rather than making a positive case for staying. This is in no small part down to the larger unknown of what it is that the EU itself is, ‘ever closer union’ being a vague aspiration.

Who can win hearts and minds?

Scotland’s pro-union campaign relied largely on facts and figures to back the case for remaining in the UK. Its lack of emotional appeal was a key weakness. When it comes to the EU, banging on about trade and jobs can be effective but only gets the pro-EU side so far. Britain’s political debate has long yearned for more than a commitment to the EU. Arguing Britain should accept a reduced place in the world doesn’t work as an optimistic vision to be sold to a people that still embrace a global identity. Ideas of ‘independence’ or ‘freedom’ from Europe might be completely overblown in reality, but they play to deep national desires. Growing English nationalism means using the term ‘Little Englander’ will turn hearts against the ‘in’ campaign. Arguments the EU is a project to create peace won’t work when the Cold War let alone the Second World War are distant memories. Eurosceptics will also appeal to the heart by arguing you can love Europe – embrace a European identity that ranges from food and sport to philosophy and science – while opposing the EU.

Can you bank on the business community for support?

Britons might not be sold on the idea of ‘ever closer union’ but even some Eurosceptics are uneasy at the idea of leaving the Single Market. At the same time, problems in the Eurozone, Europe’s relative decline and emerging markets mean the EU is no longer the economic future it appeared in the 1970s when Britain was the ‘Sick man of Europe’. Britain’s decision not to join the Euro does not appear to have cost it as heavily as some once warned. Business support is therefore no longer as united as it was. Some business backing could actually be harmful to the ‘in’ campaign. The City of London might be vital to the UK’s economy, but it is viewed with a great deal of suspicion. Small and medium sized enterprises, which today make up the majority of the UK economy, do not rely as directly on the links the single market creates. If inward investment is not clearly affected by fears of a Brexit – as has so far been the case – then we should expect people to be sceptical of any economic warnings.

Will the media support an ‘in’ vote?

Just as the business community is no longer as overwhelmingly in favour of UK membership, so too is the UK media. A print media beset by declining sales will continue playing to a Eurosceptic agenda which portrays Europe as a hostile other. Some titles may pinch their noses while they urge their readers to vote to stay in, but some of their columnists will not hold back. Local newspapers, still widely trusted, could be easily overlooked. When it comes to online media, one only has to read the comments sections of most online discussions on EU stories to witness how prolific ‘Cyberkips’ can be. The role of twitter or other online campaigning can be overplayed, but its growing role leaves Eurosceptics with an added edge.

Will the British people be patronised?

But surely the British people will see sense once they wake up to the horrible predictions of what would follow a Brexit – of 3 million jobs gone, of a Britain doomed to be stripped of its UNSC seat, of London sliding into irrelevance and a property slump. There will of course be costs from an exit. But the warnings can be deeply patronising and appear over the top. Pro-Europeanism can be associated with an aloof, metropolitan elite living in a bubble of their own, detached from the reality of the daily struggle of the average British man or woman. No nation’s citizens like being told what to do by other states or an elite who think that only they know best. The British are no exception.

Will the referendum really be about Europe?

All referendums run the risk of becoming votes on something else and the EU vote could be no exception. Talk of holding the vote in 2016 instead of 2017 reflects a desire to get the issue out of the way while Cameron still enjoys something of a honeymoon. Holding such a vote towards the middle of any government’s time in office risks turning the vote into one on the government’s – and in particular, Cameron’s – popularity. But 2016 might not be possible if the Lords delays the referendum bill or the EU refuses to agree any speedy renegotiation. The day chosen may itself affect the result thanks to anything from bad weather through to an unexpected event. Finally, have the political class fully understood what it is that the British people are angry about with regard to the EU? Is the key issue immigration, trade, sovereignty, suspicion of foreigners or anger at the dysfunctional nature of the UK’s political system? UK political parties have often misjudged what has been driving Scottish nationalism. They could do the same over Europe.

Will Scotland be a factor?

The SNP does not want to see Scotland forced to leave the EU by a UK-wide ‘out’ vote. Nevertheless the vote could provide the SNP with the reason to call another independence referendum, should Scotland vote in favour of remaining in the EU while the rest of the UK votes to leave. The SNP will also be uneasy at forming part of a grand-alliance with those UK parties it accuses of neglecting Scotland. The possibility of Scotland splitting from the UK if the UK splits from Europe may not lead some – largely Conservative – politicians to reappraise their opposition to the EU. The connections between Euroscepticism and English nationalism mean that some in England would welcome an England separated from Europe and Scotland.

Will European events sink a British vote?

The EU today is not something that can be sold with much of a positive image. If a Grexit comes about and the EU struggles to cope then any UK ‘in’ campaign may find itself overwhelmed by hostility to staying in what can appear to be a deeply dysfunctional union. Britons might underestimate the extent to which Britain can separate itself from such events, but there could still be a strong desire to reject any close relationship. It may not take any cataclysmic event to influence the vote. Smaller disputes over the budget, controversial new laws or policy, or questionable behaviour in the EU’s institutions and leadership would be jumped on – as they have long been used – by the ‘out’ campaign as evidence of the EU’s inherent flaws.

Who gets to vote?

Recent headlines that ‘immigrants’ would be denied a vote in the referendum (except Commonwealth and Irish immigrants) highlighted tense feelings on both sides of the campaign about the inclusion of EU citizens, seen as highly likely to vote to stay in the EU. The UK is home to several million citizens from other EU state. The potential influence of their vote may not be as big as some might believe. The same might be said of voters who have lived outside the UK for more than 15 years (and are therefore excluded), and 16 and 17 year olds who some would like to be given a vote, as happened in Scotland. But if the vote is a close one then the government may rue the decision to exclude these people. A similar decision to exclude Scots living elsewhere in the UK from voting in Scotland’s independence referendum may have cost the unionist side crucial votes. Excluding these groups has setup a potential fight with both the House of Lords and some other EU member states, potentially delaying the date of any referendum.

Will it settle the issue?

The European question is about more than whether to be or not to be in Europe. Referendums rarely settle issues that are this complex. As with the Scottish referendum it merely provides a temporary way of managing an issue. Had Scotland voted to leave the UK what would have followed would have been decades of bitter debates about implementing separation, the meaning of sovereignty, managing shared responsibilities and coming to terms with changing identities. An EU referendum is unlikely to be any different, especially if the majority is a slim one. Britain could easily face another referendum sooner rather than later.

This article first appeared on E!Sharp. 

The post Why it might not be all right on the Euro-referendum night appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The European Parliament (EP) descended into disarray earlier this week as MEPs failed to speak with one voice about the way negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are being handled by the European Commission. A key discussion and vote on the controversial trade agreement between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) had been scheduled for midday Wednesday 10 June but Parliament President Martin Schultz announced late the night before that this would be postponed.

Following months of debate within the EP political groups a common position was due to be adopted but has fallen apart as divisions in the Socialist and Democrat (S&D) party risked the collapse of the consensus. The primary sticking point has been and remains the Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism. This would allow individual corporations which have invested in a given country to sue that country’s government for anticipated harm to speculative investment; for instance, if a policy to protect public health by banning alcohol advertising were shown to damage alcohol company profits, the company would be able to claim financial compensation. Notable cases that have been launched under current ISDS mechanisms include Phillip Morris v Australia, where the tobacco giant is contesting the introduction of plain packaging laws, Phillip Morris v Uruguay, where the same corporation is suing for profits lost in light of legislation requiring health warnings on tobacco products, and Achmea v Slovakia, where the company investing in health system privatisation sued the government for its lost profit as a result of renationalisation.

ISDS foresees that cases such as these should be dealt by a private arbitration tribunal, overseen by high-level lawyers agreed by the parties, rather than by a national or international court, without judicial review, circumventing the authority of national and EU legal systems and giving preferential legal treatment to foreign investors. MEPs, civil society and the general public have expressed significant reservations about ISDS but the US and the European Commission continue to insist upon its inclusion.

The draft resolution which was due to be voted on by the EP plenary in Strasbourg this week contained a compromise text in favour of a cosmetically reformed version of ISDS. The S&D group, the second-largest political group in the Parliament, is opposed to the ISDS provision but the final compromise that it reached at committee level supported the inclusion of a ‘reformed’ ISDS. A group of unhappy S&D MEPs joined with colleagues in the Green (Greens/EFA), European United Left (GUE/NGL), European Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and EPP groups to table a stronger amendment, excluding the ISDS mechanism completely. This split the S&D party line and presented the wavering plenary consensus with a choice between different ISDS positions. On Tuesday night it became apparent that holding the vote would risk rejection of the full resolution and the president took the decision to postpone. Shortly after the announcement the two biggest groups, S&D and EPP, took to Twitter to blame each other for the breakdown.

Within the rest of the EP, support for ISDS hangs in the balance. Politico reported on Wednesday that the EPP, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) had been prepared to veto the whole resolution if the anti-ISDS amendments were included. However, there are sceptical MEPs in most groups and five of the 13 Committees which have offered opinions on the resolution have included provisions to limit or exclude ISDS, including the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee. To compound the issue, the European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, published a report in January which heavily criticises the Commission’s conduct in the TTIP negotiations, denouncing the lack of transparency and public access to documents, meetings and information about lobbying activity. Public opinion is also overwhelming against inclusion of any form of ISDS. The Commission received over 150,000 responses to its public consultation on ISDS and TTIP in mid-2014, the most ever received for a consultation of this kind, and more than 97% of the contributions rejected ISDS.  Many civil society organisations have criticised the Commission for obscuring the extent of this opposition and ploughing ahead with its commitment to inclusion of the mechanism.

Negotiations between US and Commission officials are ongoing based on the negotiating mandate given by the Member states and continue behind closed doors. In the EP, the file has been sent back to committee level so is now unlikely to be agreed before the next plenary session in July, meaning that it will be September before a plenary vote is held. This adds considerable pressure, since TTIP is high on the agenda for President Obama and his administration are eager to finalise before the US elections in November 2016.

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On 6 March 2015, the Finnish Parliament passed the Finnish Climate Change Act (FCCA), the first of its kind in Finland. Pro-environmental organisations and political parties generally heralded the act as a symbolic success, as it enshrines the goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050. However, the act has also been described as relatively unambitious[1], given that it focuses mainly on administrative procedures and monitoring and does not require, for example, interim carbon budgets – a specific amount of carbon dioxide equivalent that can be emitted over a 5-year period, a key aspect of the related UK Climate Change Act.[2] The FCCA thus reflects Finland’s role as a follower, rather than leader, on climate change in Europe. But does this ‘backbench approach’ reflect the attitudes of the Finns or merely of their political elite? In this post, we consider to what extent the FCCA is in line with climate policy preferences among the Finnish public. Drawing on nationally representative survey data from the Finnish Climate Barometer 2015[3], we focus on the design of the Act, as well as the public’s preferences for Finland’s role in international climate change politics.

Climate Change in the Finnish Mind

A good starting point to gauge general attitudes towards climate change is how concerned people are about the issue. In the Finnish Climate Barometer survey, 69% of the Finnish population indicated that they were either concerned or very concerned about climate change (Figure 1). This finding squares with a 2014 Eurobarometer survey on climate change where, compared to other European countries, nearly a quarter of the Finnish population ranked climate change as the ‘single most serious problem facing the world as a whole’. A similar survey focusing on climate change attitudes among Finnish businesses found similar results.

Figure 1. Responses to ‘I am concerned about climate change’

This high level of baseline concern about climate change translates into an even higher sense of urgency to address it. 78% of the Finnish population – an overwhelming majority – indicated that addressing climate change was either urgent or very urgent (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Responses to ‘Addressing climate change is urgent’ 

These high levels of concern about climate change and a clear sense of urgency to do something about it generally provide fertile ground for strong climate policy. It is thus not surprising that the previous Finnish Parliament approved the FCCA and that the newly-appointed government’s programme promises active measures to mitigate climate change. But to what extent is the FCCA in line with general policy preferences among the Finnish population? 

Mandatory interim targets?

As we discussed above, the FCCA is mainly procedural and largely symbolic. For example, it clarifies Ministerial responsibilities and specifies regular planning activities for long-term, mid-term and adaptation policy plans, but fails to enshrine clear, stepwise targets to reach its goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050.[4] However, it has also been pointed out that the Act does provide for more transparency – which could in turn create “political pressure for more effective policy measures if monitoring shows a discrepancy between objectives and performance”.[5] But is this approach in line with general policy preferences in the Finnish population? To this end, one survey question asked people whether they would prefer a carbon budget approach similar to the one used in the United Kingdom, where there are absolute limits on carbon emissions over five-year periods. Results indicate that 65% of Finns would prefer a stronger approach to climate policy similar to that of the UK, while about 15% did not know (Figure 3). Thus, the new legislation falls short of a more ambitious and serious climate approach based around interim targets favoured by most Finns.

Figure 3. Responses to ‘Finland should imitate the UK’

Finland as a climate leader?

How does this desire for greater climate ambition fare when Finns consider what other countries are or should be doing? Figure 4 reports to what extent Finns thought that Finland should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions regardless of what other countries do. Again, a clear nearly two-thirds majority of the Finns surveyed (60%) agreed or strongly agreed that Finland should address climate change regardless of what others are doing. These responses thus indicate Finns wish to see Finland as a leader, rather than a follower. This vision is clearly out of sync with the rather unambitious FCCA and the national energy and climate strategies adopted so far. 

Figure 4. Responses to ‘Finland should mitigate regardless of others’ 

Where next?

A new government has just taken office in Finland and is currently in the process of specifying its policy priorities. So far Finland has been a backbencher on national climate policy, indicated by a willingness to accept EU-level climate targets, but with little ambition to exceed them and take leadership. A weak signal of greater ambition can be detected in the new government’s programme that sets as its target to reach the EU 2020 climate goals by the end of the current legislature in early 2019. The FCCA can support this, but is in itself a very cautious step to develop climate policies. The survey data presented here indicate a strong desire in the general public for Finland to become a real forerunner in addressing climate change. Indeed, vast majorities of the population are concerned about climate change and would prefer their government to take much more decisive, carbon budget-driven steps to address the issue. Future evaluations of Finnish climate policies will show if the relatively unambitious FCCA can support such radical change.

[1] Pölönen, I. (2014). The Finnish Climate Change Act: Architecture, Functions, and Challenges. Climate Law, 4(3-4), 301-326.

[2] Benson, D., & Lorenzoni, I. (2014). Examining the Scope for National Lesson‐drawing on Climate Governance. The Political Quarterly, 85(2), 202-211.

[3] The survey was commissioned by the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation (Tekes) the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), the independent fund reporting to the Finnish Parliament (Sitra) and an independent think tank Demos Helsinki. TNS Gallup Oy collected a sample of 1005 persons between 15–74 years of age across Finland using Gallup Forum – (Response Panel 5.–14.3.2015). The margin of error is approximately +/- 3 percentage points.

[4] Pölönen, I. (2014). The Finnish Climate Change Act: Architecture, Functions, and Challenges. Climate Law, 4(3-4), 301-326.

[5] p. 314 in Pölönen, I. (2014). The Finnish Climate Change Act: Architecture, Functions, and Challenges. Climate Law, 4(3-4), 301-326.

The post The Finnish Climate Change Act – In Line with What Finland’s Public Wants? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

- This article was originally published with ‘E-International Relations (www.e-ir.info)  on     11 June 2015-

British politics has gone through turbulent times since the public referendum on Scottish independence took place in September 2014. A majority of Scottish voters narrowly backed remaining part of the United Kingdom after the opinion polls in the weeks before the referendum had indicated that the Scottish National Party (SNP) would succeed in its ambition to make Scotland independent from the rest of the UK (Nardelli, 2014). The 55 per cent no vote against Scottish independence was essentially achieved through a concerted effort made by the leaders of the three main Westminster parties. Conservative prime minister David Cameron, Labour leader Ed Miliband and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg signed a vow which was printed in the Scottish daily newspaper Daily Record on September 16th 2014, two days before the referendum took place. In the vow the three leaders publicly committed themselves to devolving ‘permanent and extensive new powers’ to Scotland (Clegg, 2014). Most significantly, the Labour Party in Scotland decided to throw their weight firmly behind the ‘no’ vote, with former prime minister Gordon Brown acting as an outspoken advocate of maintaining the Union in the final days of the campaign. In his firebrand speech for the pro-union ‘better together’ campaign Brown compared Scottish independence with an ‘economic trapdoor’ from which there would be no escape once the decision had been made (Watt, 2014).

Prime minister Cameron swiftly backtracked on the pledges made in the vow. Already in his first statement on the morning after the referendum he emphasised that the devolution of further powers to Scotland should only occur if voting rights of Scottish MPs in the House of Commons on English laws were restricted:

So, just as Scotland will vote separately in the Scottish Parliament on their issues of tax, spending and welfare, so too England, as well as Wales and Northern Ireland, should be able to vote on these issues and all this must take place in tandem with, and at the same pace as, the settlement for Scotland. (Cameron, 2014)

This statement resulted in a surge of SNP support in Scotland which most of all damaged Cameron’s referendum allies, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats. Both parties lost all their seats but one to the SNP in the UK general election on May 7th. The SNP landslide and the almost complete collapse of electoral support for pro-union parties in Scotland could indeed be an indication that, as long as Westminster fails to deliver further devolution of powers, public support for independence will grow. Alistair Crighton argues that the long-term goal of the SNP is to hold a second referendum which, in the post-general election absence of strong and credible pro-union voices North of the border, is almost certain to result in a resounding ‘yes’ for independence (Crighton 2015).

The re-election of David Cameron as prime minister with a narrow Conservative majority has made it certain that a referendum on Britain’s EU membership will be either held next year or by 2017. If the majority of voters in England opt for Brexit while a majority of Scots decide to stay in the EU, the SNP is almost certain to demand another independence referendum to be held in Scotland. SNP leader Nichola Sturgeon has warned the British government of a ‘groundswell of anger’ if Scotland was forced to leave the EU on the basis of a UK-wide overall majority. Sturgeon demands that the Brexit should only be possible if  in all four regions of the UK (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) a majority is in favour of leaving the EU (BBC News, 2015). Scotland has traditionally displayed a more pro-European attitude than many parts of England, which is reflected in opinion polls on EU membership. The latest major survey on attitudes towards EU membership in the UK, which was conducted by Populus in April this year, shows that 48 per cent of Scots would back staying in the EU. Support in English regions for staying in ranges between 34 and 44 per cent, with the Midlands showing a clear majority for Brexit (Populus, 2015). It is therefore quite possible that the EU referendum may result in a split between an overall majority support for Brexit in England and against in Scotland.

It is obvious why Scotland shows a stronger affiliation with the EU than most English regions. Britain’s reputation as an ‘awkward partner’ in the EU (George, 1998) emerged mainly from the sceptical attitude of the English political class towards the project of institutionalised European integration. For the English eurosceptics, who can be mostly found in the Conservative Party and the English nationalist party UKIP, engagement in the EU’s system of multi-level governance boils down to a constant and difficult battle to defend national sovereignty (Usherwood 2015). In the Westminster-focused and London-based media the perception that the EU’s policies and regulations undermine Britain’s national interest has been promoted for decades. At the same time no British government  has been bold enough to make a sustained and outspoken argument in favour of the economic and political benefits EU membership offers to the UK.­­­ In contrast to the predominantly negative English public debate, people in Scotland seem to be more aware of the political and economic benefits that being part of the EU Single Market has for their region. These range from the export market for the Scottish whisky industry, gas and oil production (Springford, 2015) towards benefits for Scotland’s business, society and the country’s infrastructure provided by the financial support under the EU’s Structural Fund Programmes. Scotland continues to receive substantial financial support under the EU’s Social Fund and Regional Development Programmes (Scottish Government 2014).

Like in the case of the Irish Republic, Scotland seems to perceive EU membership as an indispensable tool to maintain economic and ultimately also political independence from England. For the Irish Republic joining the European Community in 1973 was an important symbolic political step to re-emphasise their political independence from the UK (Fitzgerald and Girvin, 2000, p. 273). Ultimately the significant financial support from the EU Ireland received since its accession in 1973 provided the platform for the development of its investment-friendly Celtic Tiger Economy in the 1990s. EU funds helped Irish governments to keep corporation tax on the lowest level in the whole of the EU and to invest in the infrastructure of business parks across the country (FitzGerald, 2004, p. 72). These attracted major North American high-tech companies in the computing sector as well as in the pharmaceutical industry. Major companies such as Dell, Google, Facebook, Bayer, Glaxo SmithKline and Roche positioned their European headquarters in the Irish Republic.

Former SNP leader Alex Salmond hence not only controversially compared Scotland’s pro-independence movement to the ‘Irish freedom struggle’ (Peterkin 2015). Salmond also argued that an independent Scotland in the EU could replicate the pre-financial crisis economic dynamism of the Celtic Tiger by creating a ‘Celtic Lion’. In his speech at Harvard University in 2008 Salmon argued that as a small nation Scotland, like the Irish Republic, could achieve economic success by offering investors a flexible environment that is built on a strong political consensus on the country’s national interest and overall economic strategy. The crucial factor for this success would however be membership of the EU:

Where this occurs within the framework of a European Union and single market place of 600 million people, it creates the ideal environment within which small nations can take the most of their comparative advantage. (Salmond, 2008)

Scotland can of course not assume that it would automatically remain in the EU if another independence referendum was held in the aftermath of a Brexit decision. Former EU Commission president Barroso warned the Scottish government in 2014 that it would be ‘extremely difficult’ for an independent Scotland to join the EU (BBC News 2014). Barroso’s intervention was nevertheless widely considered as an attempt to strengthen the pro-union camp in the September 2014 referendum rather than a statement of legal facts. In their assessment of the road to EU membership for an independent Scotland, constitutional experts Stephen Tierney and Katie Boyle from the Centre on Constitutional Change in Edinburgh point out that an independent Scotland would have to apply to join the EU. Accession of a independent Scottish state would ultimately depend on the unanimous agreement of all existing EU members (Centre on Constitutional Change 2014). The concerns raised in the report about potential hostility of the UK and other EU member state towards an the accession of an independent Scotland’s appeared in the context of the circumstances of the 2014 referendum. If Scotland held another independence referendum after the UK referendum had opted for Brexit, the situation would be entirely different. The departing rump United Kingdom, consisting of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, would certainly no longer have the ability to veto Scottish accession to the EU. Moreover, it can be expected that the remaining 27 EU member states will show a positive attitude towards gaining Scotland as the new 28th member state. Rejecting Scotland would not only be against the EU’s general spirit of national self-determination and devolution of power which it has been promoting under the subsidiary principle since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. Most obviously the collective EU Council is unlikely to reject the application of a small country which has been part of the internal market since 1973 and could help to partly fill the economic gap that will be opened up by Brexit (Keating 2015, p.  204).

Brexit within the next two years, followed by another Scottish independence referendum is not an inevitability. The British public may overall turn out to be pragmatic about EU membership and decide to vote in support of continuing membership. This outcome is of course more likely if David Cameron manages to achieve the substantial renegotiation of British membership terms and possibly even wider institutional reform through the revision of the Lisbon Treaty. The latter is, however, unlikely to be achievable within the short timeframe of the next two years. It is therefore more realistic to assume that Cameron will return from Brussels with a half-baked compromise deal on the freedom of movement and further safeguards for the UK to be sucked into the deepening of political integration in the eurozone. The hard-line eurosceptics in the Conservative Party, UKIP and in large parts of the UK’s foreign owned tabloid press are unlikely to be satisfied with such a deal. Cameron will therefore encounter great difficulties to sell a weak negotiation result to both his party and the British public, even more so because he will be a lone voice amongst what has become a rather deserted pro-European camp. In the absence of charismatic pro-European voices, such as Robin Cook, Mo Mowlam, Charlie Kennedy but also David Miliband, who continues to remain in the political exile in the US, the pro-EU camp will struggle to make its voice heard against a barrack of eurosceptic voices. If British pro-Europeans fail on this historic occasion to make the convincing case for staying inside the EU the days of the United Kingdom as we know it may indeed be over for good.

References

BBC News (2014) ‘Scottish independence: Barroso says joining EU would be “difficult”‘, 16 February.

BBC News (2015) ‘Nicola Sturgeon warns of EU exit “backlash”’, 2 June.

Cameron, D. (2014) Scottish Independence Referendum: statement by the Prime Minister, 19 September.

Centre on Constitutional Change (2014) ‘An Independent Scotland: The Road to Membership of the European Union’, 20 August.

Clegg, D. (2014) ‘David Cameron, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg sign joint historic promise which guarantees more devolved powers for Scotland and protection of NHS if we vote no’, Daily Record, 15 September.

Crighton, A. (2015) ‘The UK is now a failed state: Why the SNP’s unprecedented landslide victory means an end to Union’, Aljazeera, 11 May.

Fitzgerald, R. and Girvin, B. (2000). ‘Political Culture, Growth and the Condition for sucess in the Irish Economy’, in Nolan, B., O’Connell, P.J. and Whelan, C.T. (eds), Bust to Boom? The Irish Experience of Growth and Inequality, Dublin, Institute of Public Administration: 268-285.

Fitzgerald, G. (2004), ‘The Economics of EU Membership’, in Hourihane, J. (ed), Ireland and the European Union: The First Thirty Years, 1973-2002, Dublin: Liliput Press: 67-80.

George, S. (1998) An awkward partner: Britain in the European Community. Oxford, University Press.

Keating, M. (2015) ‘The European Dimension to Scottish Constitutional Change’, The Political Quarterly, 86 (2), April-June: 201-208.

Nardelli, A. (2014) ‘Were Scottish independence opinion polls misleading?’, The Guardian, 19 September.

Peterkin, T. (2015) ‘Scottish independence referendum: Salmond claims links to Irish freedom struggle‘,The Scotsman, 4 June.

Populus (2015) ‘EU Exit, Party Leaders, and the Budget Deficit’, April.

Salmond, A. (2008) Free to Prosper: Creating Celtic Lion economy, Speech at Harvard University, 31 March.

Scottish Government (2014) European Structural Funds: Approved Operational Programmes 2014-2020.

Springford, J. (2015). ‘Disunited Kingdom. Why “Brexit” endangers Britain’s poorer regions’. London, Centre for European Reform, April.

Usherwood, S. (2015), ‘Britain and Europe: A Model of Permanent Crisis’, in: Demetriou, K.N. (ed), The European Union in Crisis: Explorations in Representation and Democratic Legitimacy, Heidelberg, Springer: 3-14.

Watt, N. (2014). ‘Gordon Brown makes passionate appeal to Labour voters in final no rally’.

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Welcome to the Brexit Blog. This blog is not simply about British debates over the UK’s future in the EU. It is more about what Britain’s debate, attempted renegotiation, referendum and the outcome of that referendum could mean for the rest of Europe. As a start I’ve compiled below an overview of the literature that exists on what the ‘British question’ could mean for the rest of Europe.

The Conservative party’s victory in the May 2015 UK general election leaves the EU facing its British question sooner than many were expecting. It also means the EU faces an issue that only a few have given much in-depth thought about. This is not to say the idea of a British renegotiation, referendum and exit have not been hot topics of discussion for some time. They have been much discussed over dinners in Brussels or coffees in Berlin, Paris and elsewhere. There has also been a range of short pieces in the media, blogs and comments by politicians, sometimes at a series of events in the UK and elsewhere held to discuss the subject. The governments of some other EU member states, along with allies such as the USA, have undertaken private discussions and analysis.

Detailed publicly available analysis, on the other hand, has been more limited. This is especially so when compared to the plethora of research about what a Brexit or renegotiation might mean for the UK (the House of Commons Library has produced a short bibliography of the literature and its own review of the potential policy implications of a Brexit). Talk about what a Brexit might mean for the EU and people soon shift discussion to what it might mean for the UK. Undoubtedly the consequences for the UK would be far greater. But the question of what it might mean for the EU still stands.

This does not mean there has been no detailed analysis on which to prepare for the forthcoming negotiations and referendum. There exists a range of English language reports and papers that specifically analyse the EU’s position vis-à-vis the UK. There also exist a range of sources (often shorter than full reports, but more focused on specific issues) that provide broader insights. Further reports will emerge over the course of the renegotiation and referendum. Taking into account the EU’s perspective will also be of direct interest to the UK. Deadlock and failure will come from the UK failing to appreciate what is and is not in the interests of the EU and therefore what is a plausible relationship for Britain either as a member of the EU or for UK-EU relations if the UK leaves.

• A good overview of what a Brexit could mean for the EU is the September 2013 30-page report by the SWP entitled ‘Europe without Britain: assessing the impact on the European Union of a British withdrawal’. It covers everything from what the UK contributes to the EU to what a Brexit might mean for Europe’s geopolitics.

• In February 2014 Nicolai von Ondarza of the SWP published a 31-page report (in German) entitled, ‘Großbritannien und die EU-Reform: Empfehlungen für den Umgang mit den britischen Forderungen an die Europäische Union’ (Britain and EU reform: recommendations for dealing with British demands for EU reform). It examines in detail how to approach any UK attempt to renegotiate its relationship.

• The DGAP’s September 2014 report – ‘The UK and the EU: what would a Brexit mean for the EU and other states around the world’ – which I edited with Almut Möller, is made up of 26 views of a Brexit written by people from research institutions and universities from sixteen EU member states (France, Germany, Poland, Ireland, Slovenia, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands) nine non-EU countries (Canada, USA, China, Norway, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand, Japan, Singapore and Brazil), and a view from the EU’s institutions in Brussels. It provides the most wide-ranging overview of how a variety of EU and non-EU countries might respond to the UK’s demands for reform or exit from the EU.

• Mark Leonard of the ECFR published a 2015 report ‘The British problem and what it means for Europe’ which examines what is driving demands for reform or exit, what a Brexit could mean for the EU, and how the EU might respond.

• In December 2013, Open Europe ran the first ever simulation – a war-game – of a UK-EU renegotiation followed by a negotiation over a UK exit. The online archive contains videos and a final report of the day’s proceedings. Open Europe have also written extensively on what the impact of a Brexit might be for the UK, with some of this analysis touching on possible implications for the rest of the EU.

• In September 2014, Deutsche Bank published a 20 page report analyzing the possible implications of a Brexit, especially economic ones, for the EU. A similar but shorter 8 page report was published by the Bertlesmann Foundation in April 2015.

• In 2013 the RUSI Journal published several short pieces on the possible defence and security implications for Europe of a Brexit. A January 2013 report from the International Security Information Service and NATO Watch also considered the defence implications. Europeangeostrategy.org has produced a series of posts (here, here and here) about the possible geopolitical implications of a Brexit.

• The legal side of a Brexit has been covered by a range of authors writing on how a member state might withdraw from the EU. See here for a report by Phoebus Athanassiou for the ECB examining the legal side to a withdrawal with attention in particular on Greece. Adam Lazowski of Westminster University has written in academic journals on the legal side of the UK exiting the EU, and has a forthcoming book on the topic. The UK and Article 50 is also examined in a blog piece by Steve Peers. Phedon Nicolaides 2013 article for the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law also considers the effects of Article 50 on a withdrawing state. In April 2014 Clifford Chance undertook a legal review of the implications of a Brexit for the UK and EU financial sectors.

• In July 2013 the House of Commons Library produced a lengthy research paper examining how the UK might leave the EU, examining issues such as procedures and some passing analysis of possible implications for the EU, although the report’s focus is largely on the UK.

• The potential consequences for the EU have also been covered in some of the UK’s pro-withdrawal literature. Admittedly a great deal of the literature gives scant thought to the issue. They are more interested in what end Britain should seek in leaving the EU, meaning they can overlook analysing the ways and means by which to secure this, something only possible if the EU’s likely positions are also taken into account. Nevertheless they do offer some interesting insights. The IEA’s 2014 €100,000 Brexit prize produced a series of proposals. The winner by Iain Mansfield can be found here with a wider-ranging report by the IEA here. There also exist other proposals – to name but a few – such as Richard North’s proposal for a ‘Flexit’, David Campbell-Bannerman MEP’s ‘Time to Jump’, Dan Hannan MEP’s proposals (for the Centre for Policy Studies), proposals from Fresh Start, the Mayor of London, and Civitas, (click here for a second 2015 Civitas report and here for a report by them on the potential impact on the UK and EU car industries).

• The UK has also been the source of numerous proposals for how to reform the EU. Especially notable here is the work of the CER with its many reports. Its director, Charles Grant has written extensively on how the UK-EU relationship could develop in ways beneficial to all.

• One reason for there being so little analysis of what UK positions could mean is because there is a lack of clarity over what the UK itself is seeking. The UK’s Balance of Competences Review provides not only some insights into what may be up for renegotiation, but also one of the most detailed analyses ever undertaken of the EU’s powers. The best overview of the review is by Michal Emerson (ed.) for the Centre for European Policy Studies.

• In the academic literature the idea of European disintegration remains largely under-researched, the assumption being integration is a forward moving process. Douglas Webber’s January 2013 article in the European Journal of International Relations, ‘How like is it that the EU will disintegrate? A critical analysis of competing theoretical perspectives’ provides an excellent overview of what different theories of European integration can tell us. My own attempt, written for an academic conference, to apply a Brexit to Webber’s approach to the theories can be found here. There is also Hans Vollaard’s ‘Explaining European disintegration’ for the JCMS, and the Journal of Democracy October 2012 special issue on European disintegration. Later this month the Global Society will be publishing my article ‘Europe’s British Question: the UK-EU Relationship in a Changing Europe and Multipolar World’. The work in this area has built on some discussions at several academic conferences.

• Analysis of differentiated integration and opt-outs has been covered by a range of authors, for example Rebecca Adler-Nissen’s 2015 book ‘Opting out of the EU: diplomacy, sovereignty and European integration’.

• Some books and reports discussing the UK’s European debate include brief discussion of the possible implications for the EU. The book by Roger Liddle, Tony Blair’s former special adviser on Europe, ‘The Risk of Brexit’ (for Policy Network) provides some insights into how the rest of the EU may respond to British demands. Some other national perspectives can be found in the Foreign Policy Centre’s 2014 report ‘Renegotiation, reform and referendum: does Britain have an EU future?’, edited by Adam Hug. In May 2015, The Guardian asked five journalists from other European countries to give their thoughts on what a Brexit might mean for their states and the rest of Europe. The Guardian’s report on what might happen if the UK leaves the EU touches on some of the possible implications for the EU. As the UK and the EU move through a renegotiation and referendum we can expect more pieces such as that by The Telegraph examining how other EU member states are responding to British overtures.

It is not clear how much more time there will be to prepare further research on what a Brexit or renegotiated relationship might mean for the EU. Cameron is moving quickly to get a referendum bill through Parliament.  A referendum in 2016 instead of 2017 looks difficult, but is a possibility.

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Farah Purwaningrum

My book ‘Knowledge Governance in an Industrial Cluster. The Collaboration between Academia-Industry-Government in Indonesia’ examines the diverging strands of normative, social and territorial order of the science system. The insights from one of dynamic Asian countries – Indonesia provide interesting comparisons and contrasts with higher education and innovation policies in European countries. Several key findings of my research on Indonesian science system are as follows:

Lack of coordination

The institutional space afforded by the normative order shows a fuzzy and inconsistent norms and lack of coordination between ministries in Indonesia involved in the science and industrial sector. The Ministry of Research and Technology’s (RISTEK) science policy is geared towards national innovation system. The national research agenda composed by the National Research Council (DRN) and RISTEK is centralistic. It is decided in the capital city Jakarta. DRN itself act as a unit of RISTEK. The production of knowledge is aimed at seven areas: food security, energy, technology, transportation management, information and communication technology, defense and security, medicine and health technology, and advanced materials.

Romanticizing on the past of high-technology during the former President Habibie is also evident in the vision of IPTEK (ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi/science and technology) for the welfare and progress of civilization. IPTEK and the knowledge produced from it is viewed as a panacea. The national innovation system strategy was later on carried out as a project by RISTEK due to the apathetic response from the local government. Indeed the matter of research and development depends substantially on the regional government commitment, which can be restricted due to limited local budget capacity and clientele related matters.

Liberalization agenda

Directorate of Higher Education (DIKTI) in Ministry of National Education (MENDIKNAS) are taking measures to liberalise the higher education system. However, it is temporarily halted due to the Constitutional Court Decision that regards education as a public good and secures the right to education for Indonesian citizens. The Court is a lonely guardian of the citizen rights in contrast to the liberalization agenda pursued not only by MENDIKNAS but also Ministry of Industry. The recent legal reform proposes the introduction of non-profit legal entity (Badan Layanan Umum) for the state universities in the end of 2012. Profit or non-profit character of the organization is to be dictated by empirical reality instead of normative purview.

Industrial policy is also emphasising the liberalization agenda by reliance of its fiscal policy through tax incentives rather than through standardization mechanism. The current Master-plan for the Acceleration and Expansion for Indonesian Economic Development 2011-2025 is ambitious in its plan of connecting diverging hubs in different islands in Indonesia. The capital demands of this Master-plan is considerable large namely up to 400 billion US dollars, this is six times of Indonesia’s GDP in 2010. Java Economic Corridor focuses more on services, the remaining corridors are still largely based on natural resources.

From the analysis of the clusters related policies it becomes evident that 35 clusters specified do not point out to a bounded area of cluster either in a specific area such as the one in Ceper, or in Jababeka where there is natural industrial agglomeration. The extent of the feasibility of this policy in practice is contentious first due to the patchy bottom up planning and second due to sectoral planning due to lack of coordination between ministries. The Investment related laws exhibit friendliness towards tax holidays, tax incentives and labour policy. Less is shown in terms of reliance of smart regulation as incorporated in the technical engineering standards or national standardisation norms. The automotive industry policy also shows fiscal intervention in terms of import duty and luxury tax. There is a vacuous absence of industrial policy for knowledge transfer in the automotive sector, which exemplifies the reliance of the knowledge transfer process from the principal customers.

Research system: patronage, entrepreneurship and scattered resources

Universities are the main scientific knowledge producing organizations in terms of research as well as national publication activities. The pattern I observe from the statistical inference of the allocation of Insentif (research incentive programme) RISTEK grant from 2008-2010 and from the publication of scientific national journal indicates is geographical disparity of knowledge distribution. Practices of research-based organizations indicate that the science system still represent the tension of patronage, personal linkage harnessed with good relations. These practices enact the social space of interaction between actors. Centralization still persists. Researchers cope with the lack of funding by resorting to taking up additional jobs. Some are being entrepreneurial.

Moreover, the fluid character where ministries have their budget for research creates different doors to attain research funding. This underlines the fact that the existing capacity of research is restrained, resources are scattered due to ‘shared poverty.’ Further research is evaluated in terms of completing administrative requirements in the fiscal year, which may hamper the linkage between industry and research institutes. Nonetheless there is linkage between academia and industry as exemplified in the case of Biomaterial R&D and the Toyota case. The different modes of representation of academia and in industries may inhibit the knowledge flow. The case of Polymer Technology Center indicates how an academia is becoming more entrepreneurial.

Decentralization: connecting knowledge with locality

The territorial order then asks for the progress on decentralization and how the decentralized government as encapsulated in the pemekaran (splitting of administrative regions) process partake the role in development of bonded zone, and connecting knowledge with the locality. There is a plan of developing a bonded zone which will include Jababeka, Lippo & Delta Silicon, Hyundai, EJIP, Bekasi Fajar, MM2100 and Deltamas. It is likely that the bonded zone in the Bekasi district which will have the same fate like Batam, it will be relying to the central government funding, facilitated by the West Java Province with Estate Companies.

The District Government of Bekasi is facing challenges due to bureaucratization. The bureaucratization process is interwoven in the practices of the officials in which there is a high regard for more lucrative administrative positions than for functional positions. The rapid rotation of manpower also implies the loss of knowledge in the government. Constraints in the usage of budget is visible, this is aggravated with patron-client relations between the parliament and the local government and corrupt practices in the usage of budget. Pemekaran contributes to the bureaucratization process and the rise of bureaucratic elites. Thus pemekaran allows the geographical space in a decentralized government unit for a competition for resources.

This sketches the picture of the science system in Indonesia, where the authority relations and practices of the policy that keep the order of science system arises from differing orders. They signify on the one hand, the continuities of past practices of patronage, ‘shared poverty’ and centralization, and on the other hand formally there is increasing regulatory trend to expand and liberalize even more spaces. This collaboration, competition, centralization and liberalization construe the spaces of the science system in Indonesia.

Dr. Farah Purwaningrum is a sociologist with an interdisciplinary background in law. She holds law degrees from Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta and the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. She completed her Dr. phil. in Rheinische Friedrich Universität Bonn, Germany in 2012. She currently holds a lectureship in sociology at the Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam. She has a keen interest to do research in areas of science policy, science system and knowledge governance. She will present her recent research at the ERA CRN section on the global governance of knowledge policies at the ECPR General Conference in Montreal, Canada, August 2015. 

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So here we are, about a month into the new government. How’s it shaping up with the EU referendum thing? For me, four things stick out so far.

Firstly, David Cameron has conformed to type in his approach to the matter. Assuming that he was a surprised as the next man (that next man being Ed Miliband) to win the election, he has set about things in as pragmatic a manner as possible. That has meant some dashing between continental capitals to sound out/reassure/lobby (in that order) key interlocutors; tying in key sceptics into the negotiation team (most obviously Hammond, May and Osborne) and generally trying to keep a lid on things. The unexpected nature of his electoral victory has given Cameron a (very) brief window of opportunity with his party, and he’s using that to full effect, not dawdling on negotiations.

The obvious trade-off is that Cameron still doesn’t have a good idea of what he can achieve or ‘win’. The continued absence of a clear agenda of policy points strongly reinforces the impression that he’s biddable on most things. As the useful Cicero Group summary showed, much of what has been discussed is actually a matter for HMG itself to do, rather than any change in EU treaties or legislation: likewise, the continuing muddle about the ECHR doesn’t give great confidence that anyone in Number 10 is building a constructive agenda of work. This despite the arrival of Mats Persson of Open Europe as Cameron’s special advisor, a level-headed if critical voice.

This feeds into the second point, namely that the UK continues to navel-gaze. The debate so far has been very largely about getting something for the UK out of this, and how ‘Europe’ might try to stifle (or, more rarely, help) that. Almost completely absent have been frames of making things better for the whole EU: Cameron’s comments in Riga a couple of weeks ago suggest the tone. For Cameron, his negotiation team and most of his party, this will be not only presented as ‘us’ against ‘them’, but pursued as such.

Where the more constructive/engaged frame has emerged (as here) it has come from the few pro-EU voices to have put their head above the parapet. This is, in of itself, something to note, since there was a widespread assumption that it would take an actual referendum for the pro campaign to stir itself. Fair to say that neither side has really got going yet (this, this, this, this and this as a small sample) in part because of the uncertainty about what’s happening with the renegotiation element and in part because of the obvious personality politics involved.

The third observation is that the election itself continues to exert an influence on matters. Labour and the LibDems are busy regrouping and lack leadership to challenge Cameron’s plan; Cameron’s enhanced position vis-a-vis his backbench has already been noted; and the SNP are finding that more MPs doesn’t really help when they have little to leverage against the government. Most interesting (for me, at least) has been the winding in of UKIP in the aftermath of the Farage (un)resignation: without his presence in public, the party has lost a lot of the profile it had in the media pre-election. A quick check of their website shows they are still pumped out content and comment, but without much pick up. the Blatter/Farage comparisons also suggest that the latter has suffered at least some damage to his teflon reputation.

And so, finally, to the continuing apathy of most people, something that has been deeply palpable. There’s some evidence of a recent upswing of interest, as the chart from Google Trends (below) shows, but only back to the sort of level seen in the aftermath of the Constitutional Treaty a decade ago: far from the burning, predominant issue it sometimes is presented as. More anecdotally, there isn’t a sense of febrile political debate on the subject in the street and in the pubs of the country: it’s certainly more AV referendum than Scottish independence referendum  to date.

 Added to this, we have more polling evidence (insert witty observation about reliability issues here) that the British public is increasingly supportive of EU membership, and it’s as clear as ever that this referendum – when it does come and pretty much regardless of its content – will solve little of the underlying problems. Already, critical voices talk of a second vote, or of a set-up. Unless the renegotiation agenda firms up, and a more meaningful public debate develops, this is unlikely to be anything more than a costly diversion from the serious issues facing both the EU and the UK.

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Last week, interior ministers of the 15 countries sitting at the UN Security Council met to discuss foreign fighters. They did so as part of the follow-up of

Resolution 2178 (2014), which defines foreign fighters as people “who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training”.

This is hardly a new phenomenon, but foreign fighters are getting more and more attention in relation to Syria and Iraq. The number of foreign fighters in both countries could exceed 20,000, and according to the Director of Europol, between 3,000 and 5,000 of them would come from EU countries.

In Resolution 2178, as well as previous ones since 2001, the Security Council urges states to adopt legislative and criminal measures to prevent terrorism and bring suspects to justice.

With the intention to operationalise the mandate of the Security Council, the Council of Europe is working on a draft protocol to the 2005 European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. This text criminalises the action of joining a group and “participating” in its activities “for the purpose of committing or contributing to the commission” of terrorist offences (Article 2), “receiving training for terrorism” (Article 3), “travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism” (Article 4), “funding travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism” (Article 5), or “organising or otherwise facilitating travelling” for that purpose (Article 6).

As noted by Scheinin, the formulation of these provisions relies on the intent (“purpose”) of the person to participate or contribute towards the commission of a terrorist offence.

The draft protocol, therefore, does not call for the criminalisation of travelling to conflict zones, and individual countries have not modified their criminal legislation to punish travelling per se. The subjective element of intent is required.

However, a variety of measures are already being taken in relation to foreign fighters, ranging from passport confiscation (Germany), attempts to bar foreign fighters from acquiring national citizenship (Austria), stripping known foreign fighters of access to social services (Belgium), or revoking naturalised nationality (UK and Netherlands) (see reports here, here and here).

So far, these measures are targeting Islamic foreign fighters travelling to conflict areas with a religious motivation. However, there is no reason why these measures could not be potentially applied to other conflicts. For example, Spanish authorities recently detained eight nationals that had fought in Ukraine on the pro-Russian side. Apparently their actions may have infringed Spain’s neutrality, and therefore compromise the country’s “peace or independence”.

(Spain has recently modified its criminal legislation to persecute and punish “jihadist-style international terrorists”. Incidentally, this legislative reform coincides with a restriction of the principle of universal jurisdiction in the country. Prosecuting international terrorists is going to be easier, but doing so with genocidaires and war criminals is becoming nearly impossible in Spain.)

Thankfully, the UK, the US and tens of other countries did not think along those lines when George Orwell, Ernest Hemingway and 30,000 other international brigadiers travelled to Spain to fight Franco during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39).

The reader may argue that defending freedom and democracy against fascism is not exactly what pro-Russians and Islamists are doing in Eastern Ukraine and Syria/Iraq, respectively.

My point is different, though. The criminalisation of foreign fighters with the discourse of terrorism poses a fundamental challenge to the jus in bello, that is, to the law that regulates acceptable wartime conduct.

Terrorism is not a condition (“to be a terrorist”), but an action (“to commit a terrorist act”), and it is already prohibited in International Humanitarian Law (IHL): Articles 33 of the 1949 4th Geneva Convention, 51(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol 1, and 4(2)(d) and 13(2) of the Additional Protocol II, of the same year. The International Committee of the Red Cross has authoritatively established that:

“The term ‘terrorist act’ should be used, in the context of armed conflict, only in relation to the few acts specifically designated as such under the treaties of IHL. It should not be used to describe acts that are lawful or not prohibited by IHL. While there is clearly an overlap in terms of the prohibition of attacks against civilians and civilian objects under both IHL and domestic law, it is believed that, overall, there are more disadvantages than advantages to additionally designating such acts as ‘terrorist’ when committed in situations of armed conflict (whether under the relevant international legal framework or under domestic law). Thus, with the exception of the few specific acts of terrorism that may take place in armed conflict, it is submitted that the term ‘act of terrorism’ should be reserved for acts of violence committed outside of armed conflict.”

Being a human action and not a human condition, terrorism (the act of terrorism) is a matter of jus in bello, not jus ad bellum (acceptable justification to engage in war).

In other words, the determination of whether an act should be considered terrorist does not depend on the legitimacy of the use of force, but rather on whether such an act meets the objective and subjective elements of the crime, as defined in IHL.

Being an action, therefore, terrorist crimes can be potentially committed by ISIS as much as by the Free Syrian Army, by the Ukrainian army as much as pro-Russian groups, by Hitler as much as by the Allies in Dresden.

Again, this does not question the legitimacy of the use of force by Brits against the Nazi Germany (for which Europeans will never be grateful enough). It is not a sign of agnosticism regarding Ukrainian national integrity either. And it does not ignore that ISIS violates the human rights of the Iraqi population under its control in all imaginable ways.

The point I try to make here is that by using the discourse of terrorism in relation to foreign fighters, and by extending criminal jurisdiction over the foreign territories where these conflicts take place, we are breaching the fundamental distinction between the acceptable behaviour in warfare and the acceptable justification to use military force.

Countries must indeed hold accountable those who have allegedly committed war crimes. But the criminalisation of travelling, receiving training or joining forces in countries at war is not the way to do it, as much as we may loathe ISIS, prefer the Free Syrian Army to Al-Nusra, and fear Russia.

The post Against the criminalisation of foreign fighters with the discourse of terrorism appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Ten years ago today, the French voted down the European Constitution Treaty, which was supposed to replace existing EU Treaties and institute key changes such as the appointment of a EU foreign minister. This was followed by an even stronger ‘No’ in the Netherlands three days later. These ‘No’ votes succeeded where the Danish 1992 ‘No’ to Maastricht and the Irish 2000 ‘No’ to Nice had failed, forcing EU leaders to come-up with a new reform Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty.

At a time when the UK is gearing up for the in/out referendum on EU membership, this post reflects on the 2005 referendum campaigns and their aftermaths in France and the Netherlands. It highlights key similarities – the ‘No’ votes revealed how disconnected European elites and the general population had become – as well as central differences in the ways the two countries re-engaged with Europe since these votes. I explore these differences in “European strategies” by looking at French and Dutch engagement with EU environment and climate policy.

From pro-Europe to confused-about-Europe

The 2005 referendums revealed the thin consensus on Europe among both citizens and elites in France and the Netherlands. In 2005 the main French left party, PS (Parti Socialiste), was divided with the ‘Yes’ staunchly defended by the infamous former IMF chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn and the ‘No’ upheld by current Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius.[1] Both main right and left wing parties stood officially together for ‘Yes’, leading to an infamous picture of Francois Hollande and Nicholas Sarkozy – both party leaders at that time – standing next to each other.

Sources:  France Culture, Paris Match and Grasset

In the Netherlands, Eurosceptic parties remained at the margins throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, but put increasing pressure on the mainstream parties[2]. The clear ‘No’ vote showed how the Dutch political elite (and the Dutch media) were out of sync with the public, leaving the political class “divided and confused[3]”.

The referendums thus left the two countries’ relations with Europe in shambles – pushing these member states toward disengagement with European affairs. This is because the referendums made the EU toxic for the French socialist party, striving to mend the breach between the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ sides, and for the Dutch parties in the subsequent 2006 election, who avoided raising the European issue. The referendums opened the way for a more openly critical attitude to the EU among political elites in both countries. In the Netherlands this critical view was at its strongest under the first Rutte government (2010-2012), the country’s first minority government supported by the Eurosceptic party PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid). In France the 2012 election saw both Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande going “EU-Negative”, with Hollande criticising the European Budgetary Pact and Sarkozy pledging to revise Schengen rules.[4]

Reengaging with Europe – two distinct strategies

The two countries’ trajectories diverged when it came to re-engaging with Europe. Dutch positions on the EU before the referendum were often presented as paradoxical, “for, as well as against”. On the one hand, the Dutch turned more negative on defence cooperation, intergovernmental efforts in general, any favouritism for big member states and on migration policies. On the other hand, the Dutch policy supported economic integration and a strong European Commission – but also, conventionally, environmental legislation. After the referendum the Netherlands held on to their position, supporting further European integration only in certain areas.[5]

Recent Dutch governments have been strong advocates for subsidiarity and proportionality in EU actions, and for reduced EU ‘red tape’.  Over the last ten years Dutch influence on these issues grew,[6] while crucially EU environmental policies changed status – from favoured policy to potential ‘red tape’. For example, in 2009 the Dutch Prime Minister asked for a review of Nature Policies, in 2013 the Dutch Foreign Minister, Frans Timmermans, produced a subsidiarity review, and the Dutch government initiated the “Make It Work” initiative with the UK and Germany to review EU environmental legislation. The Dutch position on green ‘red tape’ grew more influential when Timmermans became First Vice President for Better Regulation and Subsidiarity in the Juncker Commission. Subsequently, the new Commission’s 2015 working programme came under criticism for hindering environmental policy expansion, and pledging to update key nature policies.

Whereas the Netherlands were instrumental in changing the way the Commission worked in the last ten years, France appears to have grown weaker in Brussels: this is supported by its weakness inside the European Parliament, a smaller number of high ranking French officials in the Commission and constantly changing European Ministers. France has long had a problematic relationship with EU environmental policies – from the opposition of its hunter lobby to the birds’ directive, to implementation problems on nitrates pollution from farm activities or to its fisheries’ impact on young fish stocks. Thus a weakened France could in principle have been good for environmental policies. But despite its decreasing weight in “everyday” Brussels, France still managed to influence EU environmental legislation at critical points – both positively and negatively. For example, Sarkozy’s 2008 European Presidency signalled a “return to Europe” – building on the success of the 2007 German presidency it yielded a deal on the Climate and Energy package. But one should not exaggerate the impact of this French “victory” for climate policy: France did not become a green leader after 2005. This is perhaps best illustrated by the recent 2013 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform, where France opposed CAP greening, and thus undermined a key attempt to mainstream environmental policy in the EU.

Ten years later, it may be up to Laurent Fabius, then advocate of the ‘No’ to the Constitution Treaty, now head of Paris COP21[7] in December, to signal further French re-engagement with Europe. The climate negotiations offer the French another opportunity – indeed an obligation – to lead on environmental issues on behalf of the EU. But, irrespective of the outcome of COP21 and of the French flair for shining in high politics, the last ten years saw a degradation of French influence and engagement in Brussels, which will take long – and more than a successful COP! – to fix.

Lessons for the UK Referendum

While the UK situation differs considerably, the two referendums offer useful lessons: first, referendums cast a long shadow on national politics – it can be very difficult to return to ‘normal’ after a lost referendum. Second, although some issues may be given prominence during campaigns before a referendum, the outcome impacts all policies – thus, the UK in/out referendum is not ‘just’ about migration or even the welfare state. Finally no two referendums are the same: the variety of political systems in the EU means that different states will find their own unique way back in – or out – of Brussels.

[1] Previously, the French right had split on the narrowly won Maastricht Treaty referendum in 1993.

[2] Startin and Krouwel (2013, p.67)

[3] Rood (2009, p.70)

[4] Vassallo (2012, p.79)

[5] Rood (2009, p.71)

[6] See for example the diffusion of the Dutch Standard Cost Model across Europe and at EU level.

[7] Conference of Parties

The post Ten Years after the French and Dutch ‘No’: How the Two Countries Reinvented their Relationship with Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It has been sixty years between the idea to create a truly pan-European competition for football clubs and the Champions League final in Berlin between Barcelona and Juventus next week. But it has not been a linear evolution from the first tournament launched with sixteen clubs handpicked by the journalists from L’Equipe and today’s huge multi-million euro business. Right in the middle of these sixty years, on 29 May 1985, there was a traumatic watershed moment after which nothing was the same anymore. ‘The Heysel’, as the tragic event is still referred to today across the continent, has become a European lieu de mémoire.

The Heysel stadium is named after King Beaudouin today, but that does not exorcise the haunting memory of European football’s darkest hour, when 39 mostly Italian supporters died in the Brussels football stadium in a stampede after Liverpool hooligans had invaded the section reserved for Juventus supporters just before kick-off of the European cup final. Six hundred more were severely injured.

Whatever the name given to it – ‘disaster’, ‘massacre’, ‘tragedy’ – the Heysel is a European traumatism. The ‘live televised death’ as La Repubblica labelled it, left a deep mark on the millions of Europeans that had switched on their television set in excited anticipation for what was expected to be a summit of European football culture. As Michel Platini, who scored the decisive goal in the match that took finally place despite what happened around the pitch, declared in 2010, no one who witnessed this tragedy ‘will ever be able to erase it from their memory’.

In an excellent chapter in a recent book on European football memory (1), Clemens Kech describes how the simultaneous Europe-wide media coverage turned this event first into a collective experience perceived to be massively shared across national borders, then into a genuine ‘European site of memory’ by making a European public engage in the discussion and evaluation of what had happened.

He also shows how over time the interpretation of the event slowly changes. At first, there is a strong emphasis in public debate on the archaic barbarism and brutal savageness displayed on that day. Among the different emotions triggered by this perception, the most powerful is no doubt a sort of collective shame across the continent, a reaction that comes close to the phenomenon of ‘moral panic’. Most importantly, this panic was felt and expressed by a clearly transnational public despite the well-known linguistic and cultural barriers within the European media landscape. Emotions were explicitly expressed in the name of ‘European values’ or ‘European civilization’.

Years later, in the collective commemoration of the event – whose remembrance is never completely extinguished but regularly activated with peaks every five years – the symbolic value assigned to it started to shift towards issues of crowd control and security issues. From today’s perspective, ‘the Heysel’, whose impact was reinforced by other disasters like ‘Hillsborough‘ (1989), marks a turning point in the organisation of large football events. It may be considered a watershed not only in the perception of football violence in general, but also in international cooperation on European level with regard to stadium design and regulations, crowd policing and spectator safety.

One way or another, the Heysel, which has a wikipedia entry in over twenty languages, will continue to be remembered as ‘a symbol of manmade tragedy’ as Clemens Kech summarises. It has become a reference point in the history of a common, transnational culture.

(1) European Football and Collective Memory,
edited by Nils Havemann and Wolfram Pyta,
London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015, published
within the ‘Football in an Enlarged Europe’
book series.

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In my previous post I analyzed the first ruling at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), “S.A.S v. France”, concerning the full-face veil. The ECtHR introduced the principle “living together” as a legitimate aim to ban the burqa and niqab in France, on the basis that wearing the full-face veil hinders communication among individuals. I thought that ruling was dangerously opening the door to prohibit the full-face veil in other countries. Last Friday, the Dutch cabinet approved a proposal for a partial ban on face-covering Islamic veils on public transport and in public areas such as schools and hospitals.

The recent legitimate aim, “living together”, introduced by the ECtHR at “S.A.S v. France”, seems to justify a general prohibition of the Islamic full-face veil. However, I believe that these types of generalized prohibitions, apart from dangerously opening the door to prohibiting the full-face veil in other countries, will not eradicate a tradition with strong cultural and religious roots among Muslim women. Hidden under the disguise of a general prohibition is not only a fear of discrimination, but an apprehension to pluralism at its deepest core, which makes uncovering the veil a more comfortable option for westerners. This hesitation to what is foreign is that what must be altered, to learn to value and appreciate the beauty and uniqueness of that which is different. It is only when foreign ideas are viewed with acceptance and respect under a universal vision, that integration and mutual tolerance will thrive, steering far away from prejudice and inequality.[1] In fact, a general ban implies shunning that which opposes one’s views, with the idea that the foreigner should adopt the traditions of the host country. Therefore, instead of restricting such a manifestation of religion, efforts should shift toward a more inclusive approach to strengthen dialogue between states and the Muslim organizations. Such an approach would encourage communication and understanding of wearing the full-face veil throughout Europe, promoting values of respect, acceptance, and coexistence in a social, plural, and democratic state.

This blog post is based on the research I conducted for my Master Thesis at Erasmus University Rotterdam, which led to the publication “Pertinence of a General Prohibition of the Burqa and Niqab in Spain: A Human Rights Perspective” in the Yearbook on Humanitarian Action and Human Rights.

[1] See Dogru v. France, §62. See also S.A.S. v. France, §128

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A spokesman for the British Prime Minster said:

“This is a big decision for our country, one that is about the future of the United Kingdom. That’s why we think it’s important that it is British, Irish and Commonwealth citizens that are the ones who get to decide.”

But the voting franchise on who can vote in the UK has more to do with Britain’s distant past than its future.  Its roots go back to Britain’s Empire, when countries across the world were ruled by Great Britain.  At one time or another, Britain invaded almost 90% of the world’s nations.  At the Empire’s peak, atlases showed half the world coloured pink, signifying British rule.

Over time, as the British reign softened, many of these countries became self-governing whilst retaining Britain’s monarch as Head of State.  The Commonwealth of British Nations was formed in 1949 with membership on a voluntary basis.  The last two countries to join The Commonwealth – Rwanda and Mozambique – have no ties with Britain’s Empire.

Including Britain, 55 countries across the world are members of The Commonwealth, and all citizens from those countries resident with ‘leave-to-remain’ in the UK will be able to vote in the Referendum. 

They include citizens living in the UK from Australia, Canada, Ghana, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe.  Just two EU countries are members of the Commonwealth, Malta and Cyprus, and citizens from those countries resident in the UK will also get a vote.

The right-to-vote in the UK elections doesn’t end when Commonwealth membership ends.  The UK’s Electoral Commission told me yesterday, “Commonwealth citizens retain their voting rights even if the country of which they are a national has been suspended from the Commonwealth.”

In addition, citizens living in the UK from 15 ‘British Overseas Territories’ will also have a say on Britain’s future in Europe, including those from Anguilla, Bermuda, Cayman Islands and Montserrat.  The British government has announced that residents of its Overseas Territory, Gibraltar, whether living there or here, will also be able to vote in the Referendum.

Citizens of the British Crown Dependents of the Isle of Man and the Channel Island also have the vote.  And as a result of a special treaty signed between Britain and Ireland, Irish citizens living in the UK will also have a vote in the referendum.

But citizens from 24 EU countries who have made Britain their home, who reside here, work here, pay taxes here and many of whom have started families here, will have no vote on whether Britain will stay a member of the EU, even though the decision directly affects them.   Many of these EU citizens have been living in Britain for over 30 years.  They hadn’t taken out British citizenship because, under EU rules, they all have European Citizenship, meaning that, like all EU nationalities, they can move to any other EU country and enjoy the same rights as native citizens of that country.

Except that residents here from other EU countries do not enjoy the same voting rights as British citizens – or those of over 70 nationalities across the world, who because of Britain’s imperial past, still retain the historical right to vote here in our General Elections and the forthcoming referendum.

EU citizens living in the UK denied a referendum vote include French, German, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Danish, Romanian and Swedish residents  – all denied a vote, whilst those living here from nations including Grenada, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Seychelles and Sri Lanka will have a say on Britain’s future in the EU.

Also excluded from the referendum vote will be British citizens who have lived abroad for over 15 years – an arcane rule that the Conservatives promised in their manifesto would be scrapped. But it seems that the rule will not be changed in time for the referendum.

Uniquely for the referendum, members of the House of Lords will be given a vote, but unlike in last year’s Scottish referendum on independence, 16 and 17 year-olds will not. (In the Scottish referendum, EU migrants were also permitted to vote). However, the fact that the UK government can amend the rules on who can vote in the referendum, means that it is politically and practically possible to change the voting franchise for what will be a once-in-a-generation (or-two) event.

Yesterday I contacted No 10 Downing Street, the home of British Prime Minister, David Cameron.  A spokesman told me that the voting rights and rules for the referendum will be broadly the same as those of a British General Election.  But, he added, it would be subject to the consent of Parliament.

Maybe our Members of Parliament will see sense and realise that there is a serious democratic deficit in allowing so many different nationalities to vote in the forthcoming EU referendum, but to specifically exclude most nationalities living here from the rest of Europe, as well as denying a vote to many British people living abroad.  

#EUReferendum: who can and can’t vote and is it fair? Read @Jon_Danzig on our Facebook page http://t.co/nha8RDX0Xa pic.twitter.com/b7U5NoP72U

— New Europeans (@NewEuropeans) May 27, 2015

Other articles by Jon Danzig:

• Can’t vote or don’t vote?
• Britain’s human rights law: endorsed by Churchill, written by British lawyers, adopted by 47 European countries
• Censored by The Daily Telegraph

The post The Referendum – who can and can’t vote? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On the 21th of May 2015 I had for the first time in my life the honour to present my research paper as a Panelist at the VIII International Student Conference “Politics & Society in Central and Eastern Europe” at the University of Wroclaw, Poland. The heading of my Paper was “Transformation of Politics in Estonia – Contextualizing Political Accountability in the European Union” and it was built on my presentation held at the CBEES Annual Conference at Södertörn University in December 2014.

The Conferece took place in the framework of 21-22 May Dni Politologa: http://politologia.uni.wroc.pl/index.php/instytut-2/wydarzenianew/522-dni-politologia , and hosted very interesting research results from University of Wroclaw, University of Warsaw, University of Bucharest, Vytautas Magnus University Lithuania, Masaryk University in Brno Czech Republic, Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca Romania, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Iasi Romania, University of Donja Gorica in Podgorica Montenegro, and an independent researcher was representing Iran.

Not to talk about managing technical problems (and this time, in addition to the problems with the computer, I was myself too focused on the text of the presentation and concepts – to the extent that I completely forgot that it usually is an advantage to have a clear structure in the beginning of one’s presentation), I was talking about the scientific and normative concepts of political party and political party operating at European level (Europarty), the political history of Europe, comparatively about the Europarties and political parties of the EU Member States, political representation in the European Parliament. I mentioned political foundation at European level as different from Europarties and gave an overview about Europarties and Estonia’s representation in those. The overall aim was to better understand governance and accountability in the European Union (by demonstrating those through political and historical context).

The presentation distinguished between party competition / political competition (duopolism as an example of party competition) and political opposition as known from the Cold War era / understood very generally as East-West opposition (not connected with a State government solely but as applicable toward World governance). These are different phenomena and the relevance of the difference can be explained followingly: while one can see continuity in party competition, one can see discontinuity in such political opposition / conflict as referred above, maybe similarly to continuity and discontinuity in human rights history. And, being a lawyer with human rights research background, I would claim that although human rights are political rights, requiring existence of political mechanisms for their validation and implementation, that the real “career” of human rights for Europe  developed after the II World War, and that politicians have used and use human rights for achieving political aims (marking their discontinuity), human rights are emanating from something more continuous than political processes, being connected with human nature and nature of societal co-existing.

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On Tuesday I went to one of my alma maters, LSE’s European Institute, to listen to a panel on Britain’s EU policy. As well as storifying it, I’ve also been thinking about the discussion and particularly three of the things mentioned by Simon Hix, one of the panellists.

“Never underestimate the EU’s ability to find a way to muddle through”

As has been discussed on this blog before, crisis is in many ways the dominant mode of the EU and its predecessors: there’s always something that’s a problem and which requires urgent (and improvised) action. If we can accept that, then the British situation is merely another in a long line stretching from the EDC and the Empty Chair crisis, and there will be a way to sort something out.

In this context, that might mean agreements for the UK that are not embodied in treaty reform per se, but instead in some novel form, such as declarations or intergovermental accords, or the like. As was pointed out at the event, some of the key British objectives might be secured through amending directives, a much more manageable (if still tricky) process than opening a new IGC.

Of course, the danger here is that if too many people come to believe that ‘a way will be found’, then that potentially increases the risk that it doesn’t happen, because everyone assumes someone else is doing it (indeed, that’s what I’m doing here too: I’m not offering any creative solutions): it’s a bit of a ‘tragedy of the commons’ situation, only partly mitigated by the presence of one party who have a strong interest in finding a deal: the British. Now that he is locked on this path, Cameron will not want to turn up empty-handed from any renegotiation, if only for his personal reputation and for getting through the next five years with his backbench, which gives him a good reason to find solutions.

“Never underestimate British arrogance”

However, there’s a second problem. As Hix notes, the dominant way that Brits talk about themselves is a great power (think Empire, sun never setting, UNSC permanent chair, beacon of all that is good, etc.): there’s not a great deal of humility going around, certainly not with this government. The German debate of tying oneself into a European system to protect oneself and others simply wouldn’t happen in the UK. And why should it, you ask?

Exactly.

Naturally, such a view is not universal – it’s one of the reasons that recent Tory governments have been rather suspicious of the Foreign Office – but they are deeply resonant. And in the context of a renegotiation, a view that ‘they need us more than we need them’ is likely to make matters more difficult to resolve. Yes, the UK is a big market for other EU member states, but it’s not as big as the EU market is to the UK: miscalculations of strength/influence raise the risk of an impasse.

And it’s not just the negotiators: the British public will have to be convinced that a meaningful and ‘successful’ deal has been struck by Cameron, if he is to benefit from that stage of the process. If we are going for novel, non-treaty based changes (as above) then that becomes easier to challenge.

“The renegotiation deal doesn’t actually matter at all: it’ll all come down to calculations of the benefit of membership”

In Hix’s view, this might not really matter in any case, because hardly anyone will be too bothered about any ‘deal’: they’ll follow broader cues and perceptions about the value of the system. In this, it’ll be 1975 again, where Wilson’s ‘renegotiation’ really didn’t come into matters at all.

I’ve got some sympathy for this view, since it’s clear that most people don’t have a strong (in the sense of being deeply held) view on the EU, but rather pile it into a wider understanding of their situation: limiting migrant worker benefits by a couple of extra years is neither here nor there.

What does become more important is the bigger picture of the EU’s situation: all the panellists agreed that if the Greek situation worsens, then that will badly damage the ‘yes’ campaign: why shackle yourself to a corpse, in the colourful metaphor of some sceptics. That a resolution in this looks to be no closer than before doesn’t bode well.

As this referendum campaign starts to gather pace, not least with next week’s unveiling of a referendum bill in the Queen’s speech, we are likely to see more of these dynamics. Enjoy the ride.

The post The Brexit referendum: some underlying dynamics appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The return of a majority Conservative government following the May 2015 general election in the UK has made the Conservative Party’s plans for reforming human rights law in the United Kingdom a likely prospect. It is recalled that on 3 October 2014, the Conservative Party published a policy document that sets out its proposal to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and replace it with a British Bill of Rights.

In addition, the policy document raises the prospect that the UK might withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) though this is less clearly formulated. It expresses a general desire for the UK to remain part of the ECHR, but only if ‘the Council [of Europe] will recognise these changes to our Human Rights laws’. It contains the warning that in ‘the event that we are unable to reach that agreement, the UK would be left with no alternative but to withdraw from the ECHR, at the point at which our Bill comes into effect’.

The Conservative Party’s election manifesto repeats the party’s intention to ‘scrap’ the HRA and replace it with a British Bill of Rights. It also promises to ‘curtail the role of the European Court of Human Rights’ but, in contrast to the policy document from October 2014, does not mention withdrawal from the ECHR, so that one must presume that this is not a manifesto commitment.

These plans raise a host of legal questions, some of which were discussed at a workshop held at Edinburgh Law School in February, which had received the support of a UACES Small Events Grant.[1] The product is a policy paper. The following are its key findings.

It is axiomatic that the HRA can be repealed by Act of Parliament. However, any attempt to repeal and/or replace it would need to take into account the devolution settlement. The legal situation in this respect is not obvious.  Repeal of the HRA might trigger the Sewel Convention so that the devolved legislatures might need to be asked for their consent. Depending on timing, at the point at which an Act repealing the HRA is passed, the Convention may be enshrined in statute following the recommendations of the Smith Commission. This might make a repeal if not legally impossible then politically very difficult. For instance, the Scottish government seems opposed to a repeal. As regards Northern Ireland, a repeal would at present run counter to the UK’s international treaty obligations under the British-Irish Agreement, which was incorporated in, and agreed as part of the UK-Ireland obligations under the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. The Agreement places the UK under an international treaty obligation to ‘complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the ECHR’.

If the HRA is replaced by a British Bill of Rights it might require the consent of the devolved legislatures. In substantive terms, it would provide Parliament with the opportunity to provide for the protection of additional (non-Convention) rights. Having said that, the political dynamic surrounding the possible repeal of the HRA suggests that rights protected will be curtailed rather than expanded. Moreover, it would also allow Parliament to introduce certain procedural changes, such as no longer making it mandatory for courts ‘to take into account’ the case law of the ECtHR or to read legislation ‘as far as it is possible to do so’ compatibly with Convention rights.

In the unlikely event that the HRA were not replaced (or if a replacement leaves significant gaps in the human rights protection), individuals would still be able to rely on common law remedies, as far as they exist, as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in cases in which the UK has acted within the scope of EU law. Given that the Charter is based on the ECHR, in some areas a repeal of the HRA might not lead to the desired result.  Moreover, if the UK remains a party to the ECHR the right to lodge a complaint with the ECtHR would still exist.

Withdrawal from the ECHR is technically possible with six months’ notice.  It would, however, have wider consequences for the UK’s other international commitments in that long-term membership of the Council of Europe may become impossible and a withdrawal from the ECHR may be incompatible with the UK’s commitments as a member of the European Union. Importantly, it would not relieve the UK of the duty to comply with judgments already handed down by the ECtHR, for instance on prisoner voting. Moreover, the UK would also be setting a negative example internationally.

[1] The workshop consisted of presentations by Ed Bates, Christine Bell, Colm O’Cinneide, Fiona de Londras, Sir David Edward, Alan Greene, Paul Johnson, Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, and Tobias Lock.

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Nobody can tackle IUU fishing alone: Will opportunities for global leadership be grasped?

IUU fishing activity detected by Google Earth Images

Those who doubted the potential of the European Union’s Council Regulation 1005/2008 (the IUU Regulation) to change the laissez faire culture that has been prevalent for too long in respect of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities inside and outside EU borders have had plenty of food for thought over the past four and a half years. In the time since the IUU Regulation came into force, the yellow card warning system, followed up on occasion by a trade-suspending red card, have seen a significant change in the administrative practices of a number of fish producing countries.  Most importantly, the IUU Regulation has placed IUU fishing high in the agendas of nations that had previously not been predisposed to delve into the issue.

True, the regime is not perfect and there is yet much work to do to make a true dent in the global IUU trade. IUU fishing practices continue to cause vast losses to the worldwide economy (Eur. 10 Bn, according to the European Directorate for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries – DG Mare- which is equivalent to 19% of the reported value of catches worldwide). In addition, the destructive and insidious nature of IUU operations cause important harm not only to fish stocks and the marine environment, but also undermines every seafood producing fleet that plays by the rules. The ungovernable nature of covert IUU activities means that administrations that are keen to ensure sustainable exploitation have their work systematically undermined by the covert, dishonest nature of unreported captures.

Millions of people depend on seafood for nutrition as well as work and income, not just in producing countries, but also through the processing, importation and distribution and retail of seafood products. Further, many of those involved in fisheries have close, even ancestral, cultural ties to the activity. In many regions of the world (including of course the EU) domestic fishery production cannot match internal demand, and imports from third countries have become a necessity.

What this means, of course, is that the conservation and sustainable management of fishery resources is a collective, thoroughly intertwined effort of many actors and of very diverse nationalities. Nobody can tackle IUU fishing alone, irrespective of how much they may want to.

Yet, not everyone wants to. Routine commercial narratives evidence attitudes where business as usual, and turning a blind eye to stock erosion and illegality creep, are rife. A good illustration of such attitudes was a recent comment made to the Thai press by the head from a national fishery association, asserting his view that the yellow card presented to Thailand over IUU fishing by the EU must have more to do with protectionism and political intervention rather than with the relevance of Thailand’s mismanagement of the considerable presence of IUU activity in their production chains (not to mention the serious mistreatment of people, including their trafficking and abuse, marring the Thai seafood industry). If a comment ever represented a lack of consciousness as well as conscience, then this is it.

The interviewee’s suggestion that Thailand should seek to export to the Middle East, rather than put in an effort to clean up its act is sadly representative of a type of viewpoint that prioritises short-term, entrenched approaches that are not only ultimately doomed to failure, but which also represent a real risk for all administrations working toward long term, rational and fair approaches to seafood production and trade.

It is clear that a sustained collective effort is needed in order to address and change such attitudes and get to the root of IUU activity. With this in mind, the Presidential Task Force on Combating IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud has recently presented its Action Plan for Implementing the Task Force Recommendations has caused some degree of concern at House of Ocean. Whilst much of what is contained here is ambitious and commendable, it is striking that no mention is made anywhere in the report with regard to trade measure compatibility with existing programmes and regimes. In particular, coordination with the EU is only mentioned in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) agreement, the negotiations of which are still ongoing. No mention is made anywhere in the Action Plan of the specific measures adopted by the EU to combat IUU fishing to date, nor those adopted by Regional Fishery Management Organisations since the onset of the 21st Century. Perhaps the Task Force is reluctant to admit that the US has lagged behind in the development of IUU-specific trade measures?

However, it now has a golden opportunity to seek convergence with existing regimes, to make a substantial contribution to their improvement and expansion, and to become a formidable co-architect and a leading engineer in the fight against IUU operations. To sacrifice such an important global role for the sake of more self-serving solutions may yet become a tragedy of similar proportions to the uncooperative disease that has for far too long affected our ocean commons.

Sources

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/2015-04-tackling-iuu-fishing_en.pdf

http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/noaa_taskforce_report_final.pdf

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/EUs-motive-behind-yellow-card-queried-30259466.html

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Not long ago, I presented a paper at a conference, an experience many of the writers and readers of the blogs hosted in this site have probably had at some point.

In my presentation, I defended the main argument of my thesis: that Western European states promote international human rights law insofar as it fits in their idea of international order, not because they believe in human rights as a matter of justice. In this sense, I claimed that representatives of the English School of International Relations of the 1960s and 70s (so-called pluralists) were right when they argued that order is the main driver of the international society.

In her turn, one of my co-panellists made the argument that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is best explained by classical realism, that is, by the idea that the incorrigible human nature predisposes national leaders to mistrust each other, and that countries are forced to maximise their relative power as a result of the anarchic condition of the international system (please, excuse my simplicity). Not that it necessarily matters, but for the sake of full disclosure, she was a Ukrainian citizen.

There was a cocktail at the end of a day full of methods, theories, slides, metaphors, arguments and counterarguments. The Ukrainian co-panellist and I started to exchange some ideas while a thoughtful waiter made sure our glasses were sufficiently wet. As a good classical realist, she believed international law does not matter much. My view, on the other hand, had to be different, since part of my argument is built on the principle of pacta sunt servanda, “promises must kept”.

At some point, one professor from the hosting university got close to us. He wanted to make us feel welcome, which was very nice of him. He asked about the conversation topic, so we summarised our disagreement and explained that she located her argument in classical realism and I located mine (partly) in the first wave of the English School.

He smiled: “You two are quite retro, aren’t you?!”

He left pretty much right away, and we kept talking until the nice waiter decided to carry on with his life and the wine evaporated totally, a clear sign that it was time to leave.

But the professor’s comment did not leave me. I must admit I found it quite funny. And I still do. In fact, I think he picked the right word.

I hereby assert my right to be retro.

I wonder if you feel the way I do, dear reader (if you have got this far! Thanks, by the way), but I feel the pressure to follow a certain academic fashion, either because you are supposed to choose trendy topics, as if your PhD could fit in a tweet, or because you are encouraged to combine mixed methods, or, above all, because impact must drive your research.

I have no problem with any of the above, particularly with the idea of impact, if by it we mean that Academia should try to provide answers to the questions and dilemmas of the world today.

However, it sometimes feels as if that’s all there is in campus nowadays. Theoretical and interpretivist approaches would not be for this time. They were overtaken in the behaviouralist turn of the 1970s, and were left one lap behind by the post-modern, constructivist and critical turns of the 80s and 90s. Previous stuff is retro, not good for the quick and flashy taste of present times.

Well, I just refuse to accept that the interpretivism of classical realists or indeed of English School has been outpaced by other approaches in International Relations.

In university, if I have to choose, I’d rather be retro than sexy.

The post Retro, not sexy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

May 1975: Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian and ECC Commissioner for external affaires Christopher Soames.

These days, the People’s Republic of China and the European Union celebrate the 40th anniversary of their diplomatic relationship. At the age of 40 one might assume that this relationship has indeed ‘grown up’ by now.

But has it, really?

Here are three indicators supporting this view and three against it:

FOR: China established diplomatic relations in 1975 with the – back then – European Economic Community at a time that is commonly dubbed “Eurosclerosis”, with European integration stalling and a Community that was far from establishing a common foreign policy. The move thus underlines the strategic importance for global politics that China has seen in the European integration project from the very beginning, and even during an era that was clearly dominated by only two Cold War superpowers.

AGAINST: Times have changed, notably the old bipolar
world has come to an end. But even if we believe theories
of a multipolar configuration, there are still doubts
whether the now much more mature European Union,
which even has a face to show to the world, can be considered
one of these “poles” or even an actor in global politics, with
institutional crisis having become a permanent feature
and 28 members attached to their individual prerogatives.

FOR: The trade relationship between China and the EU
is still the largest in the world. For several years now,
China is Europe’s No. 2 partner and Europe is China’s
No. 1 partner. Goods and services of over 1 bn EUR
per day are exchanged between the two economic giants.
Initiatives such as the new investment treaty and
possibly a free trade agreement are likely to foster
EU-China trade further.

AGAINST: If TTIP comes, the US-EU trade relationship may
outperform the Sino-European one. The fact that Europe and
China could not even find common ground in terms of China’s
WTO-status (market economy or not) indicates the level of
difficulty to turn negotiations into concrete outcomes.
What is more, EU-China relations are still based on an agreement
of 1985 as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement failed.

FOR: Even if international relations are increasingly
dominated by business, investment and economics,
one cannot exclude politics. We’ve come a long way
over the last 40 years in terms of approaching each
other politically. Since 1998 China and the EU have
held annual summits. Politicians at all levels from
China and all member states and at EU-level constantly
meet each other. Chinese has become a popular
language to study and cities such as Beijing and Shanghai,
which host some of the finest universities worldwide,
have become attractive destinations for European
exchange students and vice versa.

AGAINST: Notwithstanding the exponential increase of
people-to-people exchange, a recent survey by the
EU-Asia Institute at ESSCA School of Management
and Oklahoma University has confirmed the negative
perceptions of Europeans towards China, notably the Chinese
government. It is noteworthy that strong trade relations do not
seem to help mitigate the situation: the Germans are among the
most skeptical Europeans vis-à-vis the Chinese.

This blogpost was published simultaneously on the website of the EU-Asia Institute and on Blogactiv.eu.

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When the European Council – the institution that sets the European Union’s agenda on broad, strategic issues[1] – published its Declaration on the Environment on December 3, 1988, climate change was mentioned briefly and in passing.[2] In 2009, the year of the United Nations climate summit in Copenhagen, the topic’s salience had risen dramatically. In that year, climate change made up more than 80% of the references to the environment in the European Council’s publicly-available Conclusions, and more than one-tenth of all references to policy issues.

This estimate of climate change’s increasingly important role is possible because of data compiled by the EU Policy Agendas Project. The project’s researchers have analyzed the European Council’s Conclusions sentence-by-sentence from 1975 to 2012 to identify which policy issues are discussed and when.[3] This information is available in a public dataset[4], which gave me an exciting opportunity to explore how much attention the Council has given to climate change in the last three decades. This post retraces how I mobilized the EU Policy Agendas Project data – and added to it – to explore patterns in the Council’s attention to climate change since 1988.

First, some context: in the EU Policy Agendas dataset, climate change is considered a subtopic of the broader “Environment” policy topic.  Between 1975 and 2012, the environment garnered an average of around 4% of the Council’s attention.[5] Overall, 32% of the references to the environment in the Council’s Conclusions are categorized as related to climate change. However, this average masks significant year-to-year changes. For example, in the six years from 1988 to 1993, climate change made up only 5% of the Council’s references to the environment. In contrast, from 2006 to 2011, climate change made up 74% of environmental references.

Figure 1. Council attention to the environment, by subtopic, 1975-2012 (1,679 total mentions). Source: Alexandrova et al., 2014.

Climate change: international negotiations and EU climate policy

Although the EU Policy Agendas dataset distinguishes between climate change and other environmental issues, it does not include analysis of the specific climate-related topics that the European Council discusses. Therefore, as a next step, I analyzed all mentions of climate change in the dataset and organized them into three overall categories: general statements about climate change, statements about the international climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and statements about European Union climate policy. Three examples of statements I placed in each category are given below in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Examples of European Council climate change-related statements in three categories: general climate change, international climate negotiations, and EU climate policy.

So which of these three categories gained the most attention? Overall, the international negotiations under the UNFCC garner almost 60% of the Council’s climate-related attention. The EU’s climate policies attract a further 25%, with 15% related to generic climate statements. Figure 4 below gives a historical perspective on these estimates (from 1997 to 2011). The first mention of climate change was in 1988 (not shown), but it did not become prominent on the Council’s agenda until after the international agreement on the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. This same pattern was repeated in relation to the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, explaining the large increase in references to the international negotiations during that year.

Figure 3. European Council attention to climate change topics by year. Author’s analysis based on Alexandrova et al., 2014.

Which EU climate policy?

Finally, I wanted to explore which specific climate policies the Council discusses. In its 132 references to internal EU policy over the period 1988-2011, the Council focused on general references to policy (39%), the EU’s targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (22%) and the EU Emissions Trading System (20%). Other policies received 5% or less of the Council’s attention.

Figure 4. European Council attention to EU climate change policies. Author’s analysis based on Alexandrova et al., 2014.

Conclusion

As I mentioned in the introduction, the data exploration presented above has a few limitations. I have looked at the basic share of attention to climate change, and have not attempted to explain why we see the patterns that we do. Although I did not have the time to do so, more detailed analysis could examine the reasons why these patterns of attention exist. I also limited the analysis to only the references that were coded as climate change-related in the EU Policy Agendas dataset. Some climate topics were categorized differently (for example, ‘the global carbon market’ was placed in the energy policy category[6]). A broader analysis could attempt to track Council attention to those climate-related issues that were categorized as a different policy topic.

What I have found is, however, quite interesting. Taken together, this analysis suggests that in the mid-2000s, climate change became the dominant environmental issue on the European Council agenda. Much of the Council’s attention focused on the international climate negotiations, but with increasing space for EU climate policies like the EU Emissions Trading System. Although the EU Agendas dataset stops in early 2012, climate change is still clearly on the Council’s agenda (as evidenced by the 23-24 October, 2014 Council Conclusions, where the EU’s 2030 climate and energy framework occupied more than half of the document). It remains to be seen whether climate change will continue to play this important role on the EU’s environmental policy agenda in the years to come.

[1] Peterson, John and Michael Shackleton. 2012. The institutions of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See pages 43-67.

[2] European Council Conclusions, 2-3 December 1988, Annex I

[3] Alexandrova, Petya, Marcello Carammia, & Arco Timmermans. 2012. Policy punctuations and issue diversity on the European Council agenda. Policy Studies Journal, 40(1), 69–88.

[4] Alexandrova, Petya, Marcello Carammia, Sebastiaan Princen, and Arco Timmermans. 2014. Measuring the European Council agenda: Introducing a new approach and dataset. European Union Politics, 15(1): 152-167.

[5] Alexandrova, Carammia, & Timmermans, 2012, pg. 75.

[6] “The strengthening and extension of global carbon markets” (March 9, 2007) was categorized under energy policy.

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