Ideas on Europe Blog

The Nordic passport union[i] from 1957, which allows citizens from all the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland) to travel freely without passport within the Nordic countries, will effectively stop Monday 4th January 2016, where Sweden introduces ID checks at its borders. The introduction of ID check is caused by changes in Swedish immigration and asylum policies. However, the decision has severe implications for the around 30,000[ii] people who daily crosses the Øresund Bridge by train, their journey will longer and they have to change trains instead of taking a direct train. In the long term this can end the successful cross-border commuting and regional cooperation without solving the increased number of asylum seekers.

The number of asylum seeker in Sweden has doubled the past year, specifically 149,028 people applied for asylum in Sweden between January to November 2015 compared to 74,344 people during the same period in 2014[iii].  Since the summer Swedish authorities have checked people taking the train across the Øresund Bridge those seeking asylum have been registered and others have had to return across the bridge often stranding in Copenhagen Central Station, where the sight of sleeping families is not uncommon. From Monday 4th January 2016 the Swedish authorities will pass the responsibility to check people entering Sweden to all transport companies carrying passengers to Sweden.

The Øresund region is a big metropolitan area which extends from Greater Copenhagen area to Skåne (Scania) in Sweden, including Malmø and Lund. Since the bridge was opened in June 2000 there have been more regional cooperation between local councils and regions in addition to businesses, which operate on both sides of the borders. Many people in the region lives in one country and work in another. Moreover, many people cross the bridge for a day out for shopping or tourist activities or a night out in town. People are able to cross the Øresund Belt either by ferry, by car over the bridge or by train. In 2014[iv] 11.4 million people used the Øresund train, the figure for the first three quarters of 2015 is 9 million people, these people now all have to be registered by DSB, the Danish railway company.

From a transport perspective, DSB, which run the Øresund train, has to register all persons crossing the Bridge. It has decided to set up check points at Copenhagen airport (the last stop before Sweden) where all passengers from Monday 4th January 2016 have to change trains and go through designated check points, which will be run by an external company, Securitas[v]. According to Danish Radio the introduction of carrier liability is estimated to cost 200,000 DKK (€40,000) per day, and Skånetrafiken has promised to pay half the cost, which means the daily additional cost for DSB is 150,000 DKK (€20,000) yet The Danish Transport Minister Hans Christian Schmidt[vi] wants DSB to internalise the additional cost of checking ID. It is questionable if DSB in the long term DSB can continue to internalise these extra costs especially after the government has reduced its funding for DSB, which has to deliver the same for less. Thus the additional cost of registering Øresund passengers might have wider implications for the Danish railway network and rail prices. Effectively, the Danish tax payers will pay for Sweden’s introduction of border control.

The extended travel time between Copenhagen and Malmø , which is predicted to double the journey time from 35 min to over 1 hour, will mean people have to take an earlier train to get to work on time and will be home later, this extends their time away from home and have implications for day-care and afterschool activities. The question is whether these people in the long term with try to find jobs on their side of the bridge or will move to the other side of the bridge. Commuters from Sweden has set up a Facebook group called Øresundsrevolutionen[vii] and are protesting against what they see as an increased Stockholm focus, which ignores the close relations between Scania and Copenhagen and the region of Zealand. The close ties between Scania and Zealand region are historical and they have been further strengthened with the opening of the Øresund bridge in July 2000, which has created a big metropolitan area. Indeed, many Danes married to non-EU citizens moved to Scania during the 2000s due to the Anders Fogh Rasmussen governments introduction of stricter immigration rules, by moving to Scania the Danes were able to live with their spouse whilst working in Copenhagen and visiting family in Denmark.

In his New Year speech, the Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen emphasised the need for ‘us to look after Denmark’, and added that he might introduce border controls at the Danish-German border if the situation calls for it. Similar to the Øresund region the landlocked border regions between Denmark and Germany represents another example of close cross-border cooperation, where many people live on one side of the border and work on another.

Importantly, there are many successful cross-border cooperation throughout Europe, if EU member states suspend the Schengen agreement and introduce border controls what will happen to these regions? What will happen to Strasbourg, a big city on the border between Germany and France, which is a symbol of both the EU integration project and historical strife.

Finally, the EU’s principle of free movement and its support for regional cross-border cooperation, which the Øresund region is a prime example off, is challenged especially as it is unclear how long Sweden will impose these measures and if other EU member states will follow Sweden’s example. Crucially, it is unlikely that introducing border controls within Europe and between member states will reduce the number of asylum seekers and immigrants, or bring peace to the regions with civil wars and unrest instead the solution needs to be found elsewhere.

[i] http://www.norden.org/da/om-samarbejdet-1/nordiske-aftaler/aftaler/passpoergsmaal-statsborgerskab-og-folkeregistrering/den-nordiske-paskontroloverenskomst

[ii] http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/projects/denmark/cross-border-metro-could-build-capacity-over-oresund-strait

[iii] http://www.migrationsverket.se/Om-Migrationsverket/Statistik/Asylsokande—de-storsta-landerna.html

[iv] http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/selectvarval/saveselections.asp

[v] http://politiken.dk/udland/fokus_int/Flygtningestroem/ECE2995347/dsb-laver-register-over-tusinder-af-rejsende-til-sverige/

[vi] http://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/transportminister-passagerer-skal-ikke-straffes-sveriges-id-kontrol

[vii] https://www.facebook.com/oresundsrevolutionen/

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Although they will have to live with the decision for longer than anyone else, young people will have the least say on whether Britain stays in the EU.

Ironically, what is arguably the world’s oldest unelected group of legislators – the House of Lords – voted recently to give 16-to-17-year-olds a vote in the EU referendum. But this month the elected House of Commons threw out the Lord’s proposal.

It means that over 1.5 million 16-and-17-year-olds in the UK will not have a say in Britain’s future in Europe – even though it’s their future, in the long term, that will be most affected.

For sure, their votes could have clinched the referendum result, because surveys show that most younger people want Britain to stay in the EU.

It’s sometimes said that you cannot miss what you never had. But that’s not the case for many of the 121,000 16-and-17-year-olds in Scotland. They were permitted to vote in last year’s referendum on Scottish independence and most of them did.

Commented the Electoral Commission, “This referendum showed that for young people, indeed for all voters, when they perceive an issue to be important and are inspired by it, they will both participate in the debate and show up on polling day.”

“Importantly,” the Commission added, “97% of those 16-17 year olds who reported having voted said that they would vote again in future elections and referendums.”

They would vote, and last year they could vote; but now they can’t. It must seem strange winning a right that’s then taken away.

In the UK 16-to-17-year-olds can work, pay tax, join the army and get married, but they can’t vote in the forthcoming EU referendum.

Too young? Well, that wasn’t the reason given by the House of Commons for denying access to democracy for younger people. The Commons rejected the enlightened wisdom of their elders in the House of Lords, “Because it would involve a charge on public funds.”

What price democracy, eh?

But whilst 16-and-17-year-olds would vote but can’t, those aged 18-to-24 can vote, but mostly don’t. In elections, this age group is almost half as likely to vote as those aged 65 and over.

Around 40% of the 18-24s vote, compared to almost 80% of those of pensionable age.

And yet, once again, surveys show that these young people are by a large majority in favour of Britain’s continued membership of the European Union.

A poll last month revealed that EU membership is supported by 70% of  the UK’s two-million University students, but less than half of them said they would definitely vote in the referendum.

Giving lip service to the EU isn’t enough. Without casting a vote, it doesn’t matter what these young adults think. No vote means no say.

In summary:

• Most over 60s want Britain to leave the EU; they outnumber 18-24 year-olds two-to-one, and they are most likely to vote.

• Most under 25s want Britain to remain in the EU, but there are just 7 million of them compared to around 14 million over 60s, and they are least likely to vote.

In other words, it seems that the oldies may have a bigger say in Britain’s future in Europe, simply because they can vote, and they will.

And even though most young people are pro EU, they will have less of a say in the referendum because they can’t vote, or they won’t.

In addition, two other groups of citizens who will be greatly affected by the EU referendum won’t vote because they can’t.

They include most of the citizens from the rest of the EU who have made Britain their home. And they include all of the British citizens who are living in other parts of the European Union for more than 15 years.

These two groups of citizens are living the EU dream by voting with their feet for free movement of people across our continent. But they will have no say on whether that dream continues. And if the referendum decision is ‘LEAVE’, their dream could turn into an involuntary nightmare of uncertain proportions.

Yet, despite the fact that many of the people who will be most affected by the EU referendum can’t or won’t vote, latest opinion polls show that voters who have made up their minds are split down the middle.

In online polls, those voters who want to ‘LEAVE’ the EU and those who want to ‘REMAIN’ are equal at about 40%, with (curiously) slightly more wanting Britain to ‘REMAIN’ when polls are conducted by phone.

Almost a fifth of voters, however, are still unsure how they will vote in the referendum.

These undecided voters may hold the key to the referendum result; together, of course, with those young voters who can vote – if only they can be persuaded to vote. 

* Join the discussion about this article on Facebook.

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Related stories by Jon Danzig:

• Many citizens affected by the EU referendum will have no vote
• The EU referendum – who can and can’t vote?
• Isn’t it time politics grew up?

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• Comments are welcome – but please read ‘The rules of engagement’ 

The post Will old people decide the EU referendum? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

If you are not European enough but nevertheless have been living in Europe, and especially in Western Europe, for a while, it is almost impossible not to hear the following statement: “Europeans are racist.” It is an echo of Palestine-born American literary critic Edward Said’s famous conclusion that he arrived in his classic book Orientalism: “Every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric.” In a more globalized, polymorphous, fluid world where the borders are becoming more and more porous, this echo consequently sounds higher than its original; now, the Orient can be replaced by not only any non-European identity, but also some Europeans that are not European enough such as East Europeans.

Therefore, the statement that “Europeans are racist” constitutes a basic fact, a state of affairs, for millions of people living in Europe. When one grasps the gravity of this staggering situation, it takes only one step to understand the current crises in Europe, how some certain cities in Europe could have become a home for jihadists who hate Europe, how people who grew up in Europe could commit such barbaric crimes towards their “own” people?

However, the problem is that that one step is usually taken too hastily by ignoring the tremendously complex and novel aspects of these phenomena. That is, that enormously heavy statement passes before us too fast, too unreflectively. It seems to me that we take for granted too easily the “fact” that “Europeans are racist” without clearly knowing what we mean by “racism.” Rather than paying attention to the peculiarity of what is happening before us, we are still trying to fit current phenomena to previous schema; and hence, we conclude, “Europeans are racist” and that is precisely the reason why these are happening today, the reason behind Europe’s failure. But then I wonder: By repeating this reasoning over and over again, are we doing justice to Europe that has changed enormously after Second World War, which has now entirely new generations who have grown up in a Europe without internal borders, in a Europe that is becoming gradually intercultural? Are taking into consideration these facts when we accuse Europeans of being racist?

Having lived in three different Western European countries, to be sure, I would not argue that Europeans are not racist. I felt and am still feeling that I do not belong here, there are existential walls hidden behind kind smiles. I am aware of this. But still, I do not believe that the image of the racist that pops up in our mind (which still has strong connotations from cold-war era) when we accuse Europeans of being such, corresponds to the racism that we have in contemporary Europe. To be sure, there are still people, for example, who thinks that just because they are white, they are superior; but I do not believe that they constitute the majority of Western Europe, that they reflect the genuine ideas of an ordinary “white man” in the streets of Western Europe.

Then if we ask “What is this new racism? What distinguishes it from its preceding forms?”, I would answer by proposing a notion round which contemporary racism articulates itself – namely, ambivalence.

Let me try to explain what I mean by ambivalence.

As a non-European living in Europe for almost six years, it has been quite rare that I could make a Western European friend. But what is even more surprising is that I could never make a friend who was from the country I currently was living in. Absurdity of this might make you think that, it is a personal issue, but I assure you that these are quite common phenomena, as you can also see in the compartmentalization within cities amongst different cultures.

What I have noticed in this absurd reality was that I could only become friends with a certain type of a European and the condition that made our friendship possible was not that they were “open to the Other” – as it is commonly assumed. The discourse of the Other, by setting an impossible ideal for itself (namely, unconditional openness to the other), in fact impaired its own possibility. It was, in other words, too demanding to expect from someone to be open to such an extent that that very openness results in devouring his/her own singularity. Neither was it fair. What I have noticed therefore was that, rather than to the Other, they were open to ambivalence. They did not leave their singularity behind, that which makes them what they are, but nevertheless they were okay with the possibility of contamination. They were aware of the fact that ambivalence was the very ground on which different cultures meet. They were neither absolutely open, nor unconditionally closed. Rather, they were not quite sure, as the word ambivalence itself beautifully conveys, they had “mixed feelings or contradictory ideas about” what was going on. It was precisely the uncertainty, unsureness that comes with ambivalence which they were open to. Of course, we were making “racist jokes”, mocking each other; that is to say, there was no “political correctness”, no “discourse of the Other” between us; rather we were negotiating our differences, and this was precisely the way we could get to know each other. It was both the price and the gift of accepting ambivalence, that is, of not being afraid of contamination – the very acceptance that there can be no pure, untouched cultures.

On the other hand, there were the majority of Europeans beyond whose kind smiles I could not take a single step further. They were always gentle and kind, so incessantly were they smiling that, sooner or later, it lost its meaning. It did not matter anymore if they were smiling at me, or if it was the default setting of their character towards the Other. They were taught to respect the Other; no matter what, they had to respect the Other – which means, first of all, that they needed to have the Other. As Sartre put years ago, if there were no Other, they would have to invent it indeed – but with a slight difference this time, not to dehumanize but to respect him or her! So they invented me. Whenever we encountered, it was not me who they saw, it was rather a general figure, a category, of their own imagination which they invented to respect. The question if they really had any sympathy, admiration, interest, or knowledge about that which they respected was of no importance at all. The Other, on this account, was just an undifferentiated, blank face who was put into distance and hindered from any possibility of touching their singularity; and this was done precisely by respecting his or her otherness. What they really wanted was thus “un-contamination”; and they had the strongest tool for building insuperable walls between “them” and “us”, to keep “themselves” safe from people like me, from the Other. That tool was “political correctness:” an indifferent respect, a desolate smile. What they deny was precisely ambivalence that ensues from the cultural encounters. They did not want it. That equivocation scared them. They rather insisted on their conformity and security with which they were endowed by the alleged purity of their singularity, call it, whiteness, Dutchness, Germanness, or Flemishness. And furthermore, they asked themselves, “Why on earth would we leave the safe borders of our singularity while everything outside is falling apart? Why would we really open ourselves to them while we could still enjoy the privileges of being white, European, and wealthy? Why would we welcome ambivalence and become not so sure about our own singularities, while millions of people waiting behind our borders to become one of us?” They thought that they had enough reasons to be the way they are, they acted as if they knew what they are, what whiteness, Dutchness, Germanness, or Flemishness essentially consists in. As such essences returned to us in a new fashion which demanded un-contamination precisely by respecting the Other.

Hence, when you face this smiling racism, you know that everything has been decided for you at the very moment when you say where you are from – at that very moment you become a blank face that has to be respected. No doubt that he or she will tell you how beautiful your country was when they visited it, after all what is the non-European world but, as it were, an enormous zoo for the European. They pay the entrance fee (for them it it cheap), walk around the world, look at us who are dwelling behind the fences, feed us, and leave. And when they encounter one of “us” beyond those fences, of course, they would say how beautiful our cage was, which is a “politically correct” way of saying “You are not one of us! Remember your place!” Liberal multiculturalism and political correctness are perfect tools to keep “them” outside even when “they” are inside, keep “our” cultures un-contaminated by draining others of any significant singularity.

What I have tried to reveal with the latter type is precisely what I meant by the new form of racism that took hold of contemporary Europe today. What is important to notice there is that this new form of racism is not a reactive hate, not a projection of our own wickedness. It is rather a peculiar, insidious defense mechanism, a selfish nihilism that is trying to cling onto the very last piece of privilege and joy before the world collapses. It is a consoling lie that Europeans tell themselves in order to remain blind to the atrocities around the world. It is not simply lacking consideration for the other people, rather it is a stubborn attempt to deny that they do not care about other people. It is a generous way of becoming selfish.

Though essences returned, European racism is no longer a form of Nazism. It has also learned from its mistakes. Therefore, it has a very idiosyncratic, self-agonizing structure, for deep inside it knows very well that it has to acknowledge ambivalence, that what it is doing is selfish and hypocritical, that it cannot remain pure and un-contaminated — nothing can! Its explicit denial (i.e., respect for the Other) indicates the hope trapped behind its nihilist surface. Put differently, political correctness and teh stubborn attempts to live together show that contemporary racism in Europe does not derive any longer from prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against some certain people, rather it derives from nihilism. By nihilism, I am referring to the last man of Nietzsche, to quote from Slovaj Zizek’s article on Charlie Hebdo massacre:

Long ago Friedrich Nietzsche perceived how Western civilisation was moving in the direction of the Last Man, an apathetic creature with no great passion or commitment. Unable to dream, tired of life, he takes no risks, seeking only comfort and security, an expression of tolerance with one another: “A little poison now and then: that makes for pleasant dreams. And much poison at the end, for a pleasant death. They have their little pleasures for the day, and their little pleasures for the night, but they have a regard for health. ‘We have discovered happiness,’ – say the Last Men, and they blink.

The contemporary racism in Europe no longer consists in the alleged superiority of the racist. To the contrary, the racist no longer cares about the Other. The Other is a blank face that he respects. The less the racist knows about the Other and his culture (though he knows all the stereotypes and cliches about it), the better for him, for then he can wallow in his comfort and security and enjoy his life that he loves so much without having have to think about the Other. Beyond that blank face, there is a risk for him, there is ambivalence. Why would he care? If you force him, if you insist on having a face before him, if you insist on existing, he would shout in distress and pain:

“I respect you whoever you are, is this not enough?”

I venture to say, no, it is not.

I can easily find substantial reasons to join the chorus and repeat that “Europeans are racist”, for many years I have been living in countries where I have been treated as if I am one of those TV channels which do not have any signal. Countless times I experienced that abrupt and brutal transformation into an undifferentiated, blank face, that sudden collapse into nothingness accompanied by kind, politically correct, gestures of the Europeans. Yet, I do believe that there is something peculiar about this attitude which, instead of being dismissed, if it can be understood properly, maybe, can be transformed into a new form where ambivalence is slowly being accepted so that we can finally in the genuine sense of the word begin living together.

The post Are Europeans racist? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

So, according to the front page of today’s Daily Express, the EU referendum result is already done and dusted and Britain has decided to leave. Really?

Yes, a majority of voters want Britain to quit the EU, if the results of a poll by Survation are to be believed.

(Readers here will remember that last month the Sun newspaper commissioned Survation to do a poll and subsequently ran an entirely untrue front page story claiming that 1-in-5 British Muslims ‘have sympathy for jihads’).

Claimed the Daily Express on their front page today:

“Fifty-one per cent of people who expressed a firm opinion in a survey of more than 10,000 adults across the country supported exit from the European Union.”

Please look at the sentence above again. It is, actually, a classic example of how numbers can be twisted with clever words.

On first glance it may seem from the Daily Express report that just over half of those 10,000 people polled favour exit from the EU.

But actually, the Daily Express sentence didn’t say that at all. It said only that 51% of people who “expressed a firm opinion” want Britain to leave the EU.

It’s a convoluted and misleading way to present numbers. Let’s look at the facts.

Survation asked 10,015 people in an online survey the following question:

‘Imagine there was a referendum today with the question “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union?” How would you vote?’

• 40% said they wanted Britain to remain a member of the European Union (-2 since the last poll, which is statistically insignificant and within the margin of error)
• And 42% said they wanted Britain to leave (+2 since the last poll, which is statistically insignificant and within the margin of error)

So where does the 51% figure come from? Well, 51% represents just over half of all those who provided either a ‘remain’ or ‘leave’ answer.

But many could be forgiven for thinking the Daily Express ’51%’ meant that just over half of 10,000 people polled wanted Britain to leave the EU.

That seems to be what Nigel Farage, leader of the anti-EU party, UKIP, wants people to believe. In a centre-piece article in today’s Daily Express – a major funder of UKIP – Mr Farage concluded from the poll:

“This new landmark poll of 10,000 people showing that the ‘leave the EU’ side is now ahead demonstrates that the tide has turned.”

There’s more…

There’s something much more interesting about the Survation survey that doesn’t get a mention on the Express front page, and is only briefly referred to at the end of their story.

It’s this: many Britons haven’t yet made up their minds about the country’s future in the European Union.

Almost a fifth – 18% – of those surveyed by Survation responded that they were “undecided” on whether or not Britain should remain a member of the EU. Furthermore, that figure hasn’t changed since Survation’s previous poll on the EU referendum question last June.

That almost-a-fifth-of-voters-who-are-undecided could dramatically and decisively swing the EU referendum result one way or the other (so long as they actually vote). And as yet, nobody, not the Daily Express, not Survation, and not even those voters themselves, yet know which way they will vote.

So rather than the EU referendum result being decided, done and dusted some two years before it might take place, the referendum decision is right now completely undecided. Despite today’s Daily Express headline, the referendum result is far from being ‘in the bag’.

This means that for both sides of the referendum campaign, there is everything to play for. Especially since we don’t yet even know when the referendum will take place, and neither the ‘Remain’ or ‘Leave’ campaigns have yet started in earnest.

And although today’s Daily Express editorial asserted, “Among people who have already made up their minds a majority now want us to leave the EU…”, there’s something that should never be forgotten:

In a democracy, those who have made up their minds today, can change their minds tomorrow.

*Join the discussion about this article on Facebook.

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Related stories by Jon Danzig:

• Daily Express business model: selling prejudice and bigotry?
• Are some newspapers stirring up trouble?
• The value of being ‘citizens of Europe’

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• Comments are welcome – but please read ‘The rules of engagement’ 

According to @Daily_Express #Britain is leaving the #EU. Really? Read my Facebook today: https://t.co/Oqf5fi4fsk pic.twitter.com/eGQXZdTXWK

— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) December 15, 2015

The post Britain is leaving the EU, says Daily Express. Really? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Benedict Anderson most certainly did not think of football when he published his compact masterpiece Imagined Communities in the early 1980s. Yet I cannot think of another book that has been quoted or referred to as often by football researchers from all over Europe and beyond.

For me Imagined Communities certainly was a major eye-opener, and I remain grateful for the thought-provoking thesis the book develops. When I started to want to have a better understanding of why football does to us what it does, I felt I needed to learn as much as I could about the sociological and psychological mechanisms of nationalism. And when thanks to works like Imagined Communities I began to understand what nationalism does with us what it does and how difficult it is for 21st-century humans to emancipate from its emotional stronghold, I came to the conclusion that doing research on European integration from this angle was actually a stimulating perspective.

The book owns a lot to its incredibly catchy and precise title. Nationalism’s main strength lies precisely in the fact that it’s not an ‘imaginary’ – i.e. entirely unreal or made-up community – but an ‘imagined’ one : actively conjured up by the masses at regular intervals and passively taken for granted. Strangely enough, the concept, which made a fantastic career in academia, did not translate easily into French or German. ‘L’imaginaire national’ or ‘Die Erfindung der Nation’ do not have the same appeal, although they actually describe very pertinently what the book is about. I had first come across the French version, and although I had appreciated it a lot, soon bought the English original, too, and preferred, unsurprisingly, to quote the English title like everybody else.

Benedict Anderson has died, aged 79, in Indonesia. It seems very appropriate to me that his name and the title of his great book will be cited at a moment when nationalism is raising its head again even in regions of the world where it was supposed to be half-asleep, and when – simultaneously – the nations of the world are starting to find out that they better think beyond national borders in the fight against climate change and the ensuing ecological catastrophe. Imagine all the people imagining a global community, living life in peace. It isn’t hard to do, but if you want to understand why we’re still not there yet, I can recommend you some good reading.

Albrecht Sonntag, EU-Asia Institute
at ESSCA School of Management.
Follow us on Twitter: @Essca_Eu_Asia 

The post Imagine all the people appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This summer’s press was once again abuzz with headlines and images of the exodus of thousands of migrants, knocking at Europe’s door. The scenario of a massive number of vessels overflowing with people fleeing from their countries towards southern European shores is no news to Europe. Although the state of alarm has long been declared, the escalation of this summer’s dramatic occurrences forced Brussels and the Member States to raise their level of attention towards the Mediterranean Sea.

New measures were drafted and the on-going debate regarding their implementation is one of the hot topics jeopardizing the stability of the European Union to the core. The States more decidedly issuing for a direct intervention were those located on the southern shore, held responsible for the rescue of the migrants in their territorial waters. Italy declared the costs of “Mare Nostrum” operations unsustainable and thus disconfirmed their renewal for 2015, entrusting the management of the migrants’ emergency to the new EU-flag operation, “Triton”. The state of emergency was declared both from a humanitarian and a logistical perspective, and the key-role of Italy in the happenings is well known. Nonetheless, there is a chapter of the story that has not yet found its representation in the media. Everybody knows about those rescued, but has anyone ever wondered about the rescuers?

One expects the navy and the coastguard ships to be the main rescuers of migrant vessels but data tell a different story. Of the 982 units employed in rescue operations in 2014, less than a half belonged to the military navy. The merchant navy ranks second for the number of rescue missions, actually outnumbering the coastguard. So far, 1,300 merchant ships were diverted to provide first aid to 42,000 people in 2014 and over 15,200 in 2015[1]. If we focus on the meaning of these numbers, we will not fail to realize that about 254 cargo ships, contract bound to delivery dates and crewed by men untrained for these kind of operations, were first in line to face the humanitarian emergencies.

This constitutes the biggest rescue work ever accomplished in the history of the merchant navy. Providing first aid to these people is certainly a duty for all seafarers in the fulfillment of the long established maritime tradition of recruiting those in danger, as well as under the obligations determined by the United Nations Convention on Law at Sea (UNCLAS) and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR). Still, these obligations refer to ordinary circumstances in which rescue at sea is considered an exceptional event for civil vessels. However, in the past few years, the extraordinary has become ordinary and the involvement of merchant ships in rescuing migrant vessels has become systematic.

What’s wrong with that?

Consider a ship with dangerous cargo, for example inflammable goods (oil, petrol, gas), rescuing immigrants drowning from a sinking vessel and having to board 500 to 1,000 people who cannot speak English or Italian. How are 10 to 15 crew members supposed to handle such a crowd of men, women and children, all the while trying to prevent any accidents that such a situation may implicate? Additionally, restrooms and emergency kits on cargo ships are stocked in proportion to the crew and cannot sustain a massive load of passengers, which makes it difficult to provide help to the rescued in need of immediate medical assistance, such as women who are pregnant or in labor (as per reported circumstances). In 2014, even supply vessels deputed to the emergency escape service of the staff on oil platforms were employed in rescue missions. One of this vessels received no less than 62 calls for rescue missions during 2014 and 26 in 2015, boarding up to 1200 people in a single operation with a crew of 10 people[2].

From a strictly economical perspective the costs of rescue operations, sometimes requesting up to 2 additional days of travel, rest on the ship-owners and on the ports, frequently in Sicily or Calabria, where migrants are disembarked. This issue was emphasized by the Italian merchant navy, Italy being the country responsible for the broadest Search and Rescue zone in the Mediterranean. In this regard, the implementation of the operation, “Triton” partially mitigated the pressure on the merchant navy (around 160 interventions in 2015 against 254 in 2014), but the numbers are still high and the integration of the SAR operations with the commercial activities is unsustainable to the ship-owners.

To all seafarers, there is an unbreakable law, which constitutes a seaman’s code of honor since the beginning of times: when a ship is sinking, it has to be rescued, no matter the cost. The merchant navy has not missed a call and will keep rushing to help as long as someone will call.

But to preserve the safety of their crew and operability of their ships, merchant vessels cannot be viewed as vehicles for humanitarian rescue in large-scale operations.

In March 2015 the European Community Shipowner’s Association (ECSA) and the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), together with other labor organizations, issued a call for help, in order to better face what seems to be a migratory flux which is not going to decrease in the short run. In such conditions, the employment of UN vehicles for humanitarian assistance at sea, with UN designated ships and aircrafts to monitor and coordinate the SAR regional centers and the rescue operation could be an important contribution.

Another issue to be faced in the context of one of the biggest humanitarian crisis of the last decades.

[1]Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Rome – MRCC

[2]Report Confitarma 2015

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Filipa M.Ribeiro

What do subjects like personalized learning, curriculum reforms, research agendas and institutional frames have in common? Interdisciplinarity. Whether we discuss the duality of vocational versus general education or the impact of ideologies on research, interdisciplinarity is an in-between topic. Interestingly enough, it is often overlooked even if interdisciplinarity is one of the most hotly debated topics among academics and has spun a complex web of development strategies and theorizing. However, its lack of standardization continues to be an issue, namely in universities that have traditionally hermetic departments and a lack of communication embedded in the academic culture. The various definitions of  interdisciplinarity converge into two main axis: 1) powerfull insights found by applying intellectual resources of different disciplines to particular problems; or 2) rhetorical mechanisms that reinforce the discourses on productivity and competitiveness which, in turn, produce an ideological system that serves the economic regulation at universities, encouraging an overemphasis on research projects and courses (e.g., the proliferation of summer schools).

Favoring or disregarding interdisciplinarity?  

Interdisciplinarity is also at stake with regard to the practices put in place by the management bodies of research institutions, university departments or governing bodies to assist, seduce or repel the individual researchers. These practices include institutional restructuring, reorganisation of curricula, the implementation of information, communication technology, changing patterns in knowledge production, the changed role of education in societies, and new modes to manage and assess higher education and research. This is often explicitly phrased in prescriptive documents (e.g. strategic plans of universities and official documents that try to outline the  criteria and “good practices”, whose very title already implies a simplistic outreach to interdisciplinarity) that aim to assume a given role in civil society at large. Thus, the paradox arises: there is a conventional discourse in favor of interdisciplinary research and, at the same time, much indifference or even disregard for such research (Sperber, 2003).

Interdisciplinarity demands constant proactiveness, responsiveness and the ability to adapt to changing situations. As Sperber (2003) notes, often disciplinary boundaries and routines stand in the way of optimal research and that is why a common solution is to go ahead with new research programmes, which requires hasty institutional reshaping. In addition, research shows that constraints to interdisciplinarity are posed both in scientific terms (e.g.: Collinet et al.,2013) but also in institutional terms (e.g.: Su, 2014), especially concerning governance modes (Cooper and Farooq, 2013). As a matter of fact, the idea that interdisciplinarity in higher education is related to the framework of institutions, departments and courses is not new (e.g.: Carpenter, 1995; Pirrie et al, 1999; Becher, 2001; Wall and Shankar, 2008; Dykes et al., 2009). A less debated dimension of interdisciplinarity concerns the individual and social epistemology of knowledge and science. How and why interdisciplinarity emerges at the individual level? Andersen and Wagenknecht (2013) remind that interdisciplinarity involves epistemic dependence between researchers with different areas of expertise, the combination of complementary contributions from different researchers through shared mental models and conceptual structures, and shared cooperative activity with interlocking intentions, meshing sub-plans and mutual responsiveness.

Does belonging to a department increase interdisciplinarity?

My recent article “Interdisciplinarity in ferment: The role of knowledge networks and department affiliation”, published in Technological Forecasting and Social Change, posits that social networks shape interdisciplinarity because universities are formed by networked actors whose relations are not only centred on place-based affiliation (though highly shaped by them), but also on niche knowledge and skills affiliations. However, we lack enough empirical data on the knowledge networks of researchers to better understand how these networks shape the influence between faculty structures and knowledge creation in terms of interdisciplinarity and what the optimal structure for interdisciplinarity is. In other words, the paper addresses interdisciplinarity forwards rather than backwards, exploring the relation between the present and the future through the conditions from which interdisciplinarity arises. The focus is not the processes of network structure emergence and tie formation, but rather how those networks and ties affect interdisciplinarity. Based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the personal knowledge networks of academics of higher education institutions from Catalonia (Spain), the study used a mixed methods approach combining the delineation of personal networks with the analysis of the ties’ content, proposing a conceptual model specifically developed for this study.

Findings suggest a strong correlation between the network members nominated in the influence generator and interdisciplinarity. In fact, a quite surprising finding is that collaborators are not the ones who most influence either interdisciplinarity or individual knowledge creation. On the other hand, stronger ties (the ones with whom respondents have more affinity, more time of interaction and higher frequency of contact) seem to be more conducive of interdisciplinary research than weaker ties (if those strong ties do not belong to the same department of the respondent). Belonging to a faculty department may increase tie strength but reduces interdisciplinarity.

This study shows that the concept of interdisciplinarity itself is changing on the emergence of new modes of knowledge creation, especially the rise of peer production, which presents a stark challenge to conventional thinking about interdisciplinarity. Indeed, interdisciplinarity should not be understood only as the traditional concatenation of different disciplines. This study offers corroboration for the claim that interdisciplinarity is more about epistemological commitments and exchanges rather than disciplinary training. It is important to see these phenomena not as exceptions or ephemeral fads, but as indications of a fundamental fact about transactional knowledge forms and their relationship to the institutional conditions of knowledge creation.

Therefore, this new way of looking on interdisciplinarity reinforces a third form of transaction in higher education institutions: social sharing and exchange. On the other hand, we produce and exchange knowledge, but we do not count this exchange in our institutional design. This, in turn, may be the reason why social knowledge creation and interdisciplinarity have been shunted to the peripheries of academic organization landscape.

Filipa M. Ribeiro is in the final year of her PhD at the University of Porto. She has a diverse background in science and medical journalism, digital media, innovation, project management  and science communication. She graduated in Communication Sciences and has a master degree on Sociology of Science. She has been doing research on Higher Education since 2009 and was  a member of the Portuguese team in the ESF funded project TRUE (Transforming universities in Europe). She is also one of the co-founders and executive members of ECHER – Early Career Higher Education researchers’ network. Her current research involves topics on ubiquitous knowledge, sociology of science, social networks, interdiciplinarity and diversity in higher education.

References

Andersen, H., Wagenknecht, S. (2013) Epistemic dependence in interdisciplinary groups.Synthese, 190: 1881–1898. Springer.

Becher, B. (1987). Disciplinary discourse. Studies in Higher Education, 12: 261-274.

Carpenter, J. (1995) Interprofessional education for medical and nursing students: Evaluation of a programme. Medical Education ,29: 265–72.

Collinet, C., P. Terral, P. Trabal (2013) Forms and Modes of Apprehending Interdisciplinarity: a Socio-Computer Analysis of Sports Sciences. Bulletin of Sociological Methodology, 119(1): 61-78.

Cooper, A. F. and Farooq, A. B. (2013), BRICS and the Privileging of Informality in Global Governance. Global Policy, 4: 428–433.  doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12077

Dykes, T., Rodgers, P., Smyth, M., (2009).  Towards a new disciplinary framework for contemporary creative design practice. CoDesign, 5 (2) 99-116.

Pirrie, A., S. Hamilton, V. Wilson (1999) Multidisciplinary education: Some issues and concerns. Educational Research 41(3): 301–314.

Ribeiro, Filipa M. (2015) Interdisciplinarity in ferment: The role of knowledge networks and department affiliation. Technological Forecasting and Social Change. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2015.07.021

Sperber, D. (2003) “Why rethink interdisciplinarity?”. In Heintz, C. (ed.), Rethinking interdisciplinarity. Paris: C.N.R.S. and Institut Nicod.

Su, X. (2014) Academic scientists’ affiliation with university research centres: Selection dynamics. Research Policy 43: 382-390.

Wall, S., Shankar, I., (2008). Adventures in transdisciplinary learning. Studies in Higher Education, 33 (5): 551–65.

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In the course of my research on budgeting in international organizations, I just stumbled over this quote from 1947 article in the journal “International Organization” titled “The Refugee: A Problem for International Organization” which seems quite timely again today:

“Even the governments which are most concerned over the welfare of individuals and the economic and social and political stability of Europe devote few of their resources of personnel and finance to refugee thought and action. Despite occasional prolonged periods of highly-publicized wrangling over general principles, they do not make up their minds on practical policies until the very last minute. The stubborn facts are that there are too many other problems of greater size and urgency, and that the refugee problem discourages attention because it is disproportionately tangled and expensive.“ (Malin 1947: 445, my highlights)

The article’s introduction speaks of 25 million displaced persons in China, 10 million Soviet citizens, and 8 million Germans, with 2 million European refugees being those “with whom a general international organization for uprooted people must deal” and who were “bristling with political complications”, providing more details on the many different groups and the respective challenges later on.

When it comes to the topic of repatriation and whether refugees will stay, the conclusion also seems almost like today:

“The advance of industrialization, even where it is far from complete, has produced vested interests among workers already established in those countries, and a pervasive community fear of unemployment. National societies think of their racial, religious and political pattern as fixed, and dread the importation of Europe’s feuds. (Unofficial anti-Semitism is rising almost everywhere.) Hence, though reception countries are beginning to realize that the refugees are not typically a mass of miserable and demoralized human beings, but a reservoir of sturdy and independent-minded workers of many crafts, the emphasis is sure to be kept on careful individual selection by the reception countries‘ own representatives.” (Malin 1947: 457)

Just in case you wondered how much has changed in the last 70 years when it comes to refugees, refugee policies, and the public perception of those who are refugees…

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How might the EU respond to the unprecedented event of a Brexit? Its response will be defined by 5 I’s: ideas, interests, institutions, the international, and individuals. Looking at these 5 I’s also sheds light on various theoretical approaches to understanding Brexit.

How would the rest of the EU respond to a British vote to leave? Would the EU’s approach to a withdrawal be defined by institutional links, opinions of key leaders, economic and security interests, international pressures, or ideas about integration or disintegration? Will it be a mix of these, in which case, which will be the most influential? What should the British government and public look to in order to understand what to expect from the EU? How should academics theorise a Brexit?

We can understand how the EU might respond to a British withdrawal by looking at five I’s: ideas, interests, institutions, the international, and individuals. No one ‘I’ will dominate, and identifying which will dominate more than others will be a key challenge in understanding and applying theoretical approaches to a Brexit.

Ideas

A vote to depart completely from the idea of an ‘ever closer union’ would challenge the very idea in an unprecedented way. Will the idea of European disintegration then take hold across the EU as somedomino effect sees other governments and their citizens give up on the EU? Or will other EU member states respond in much the same way as they have to many other crises by trying to integrate further? If so, then any new deal with the UK would prioritise EU unity, blocking any UK-EU deal that allows Britain a privileged alternative relationship that could weaken the Union.

Individual member states will assert their own ideas of what Brexit means for them. For example, the Irish Government has made clear it will not be caught in the slipstream of British decisions. Independence and links to the EU are viewed as equal to or of greater importance than relations with Britain. For statesranging from Greece and the Baltic states through to France and Germany, the UK and the Brexit debate are already something of a distraction from various ideas of how European integration can better ensure the security and stability of Europe.

Interests

With Britain as one of the world’s largest economies, some Eurosceptics argue the EU needs the UK more than the UK needs the EU. Britain does run a trade deficit with the EU (£61.6 billion in 2014), meaning the rest of the EU has an economic incentive to find a solution. However, from the perspective of the rest of the EU it is the UK that is vulnerable. Britain represents somewhere around 16% of total EU trade (admittedly excluding services) while the EU represents 44.6% of the UK’s exports of good and services in 2014.

Nevertheless, economic, social and security interests can play a powerful role. To take one example, fear amongst German car manufacturers at a bad UK-EU exit deal could force the German government to push for a relationship that avoids any disruption to trading links. The potential costs for Ireland (including violence in Northern Ireland) could force it to reconsider its ideas of resisting British decisions. The large EU population in the UK and UK population elsewhere in the EU mean a mutually beneficial deal will need to be hammered out.

The argument works against Britain as some states will seek to gain economically by seeking to attract investment that would have gone to Britain.  Some countries might also use a Brexit to push a more social and protectionist EU, limiting any UK efforts to use a Brexit as a means to undercut the EU economically.

If the potential economic interests are not strong enough, then the same cannot be said for Britain in European foreign and defence cooperation. Common areas of concern such as Iran, Russia or migration mean the UK and EU could continue to need one another. At the same time, the UK has been one of the blocks to cooperation in this area, with its exit potentially paving the way for further such efforts.

Institutions

Several processes and institutions will shape a Brexit. Article 50, the EU treaty’s withdrawal clause, provides a degree of structure for both sides, albeit one that is untested and which contains a range of flaws. The legal and administrative issues alone make Article 50 a Pandora’s Box that both sides will face with a sense of trepidation. Agreeing a new UK-EU relationship will require the consent of every member state, the European Parliament, and potentially may draw in the European Court of Justice. None of these can be relied on to grant a quick agreement that meets UK demands.

The UK and EU would also be constrained by existing wider European and international structures. If no new relationship was reached then the EU would still have to work within the limits of World Trade Organisation rules, although Britain is highly unlikely to benefit much from a WTO defined relationship. The European Free Trade Area and the European Economic Area have existing agreements that Britain would have to fit into with the agreement of members such as Norway or Switzerland.

International

International pressures on the UK and the EU could define how they manage an exit. The negotiation of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) reflects a desire by the USA and the EU to use their interdependent economic relationship to shape global economics and politics. While the UK could be locked out of the main processes by which TTIP will be setup and launched, its long-term exclusion would run counter to the aims of TTIP to extend beyond the EU and USA. The agreement will also frame how the UK attempts its own trade deals with countries such as China or Brazil.

International events may also drive UK-EU cooperation. Terrorist attacks, aggressive behaviour by Russia (perhaps creating an ‘other’ against which common UK and EU resolve is formed), common concerns about environmental or migration crises could mean international events push the UK and EU into a harmonious new relationship. British ideas about restructuring the EU and freedom of movement have gained some traction thanks to developments connected to Syria. That said, international events could cause divisions and animosity between the UK and parts of the EU, such as happened over the Iraq War.

Individuals

If there is one place where animosity could be a particular problem it is in the relations between leaders. David Cameron is likely to resign should he lose a referendum where he backed the UK staying in. A victorious Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative party would then deliver a Conservative British Prime Minister unlikely to be in a position to compromise in negotiations over a new UK-EU deal.

EU leaders could also be in a mood to concede much, particularly if the British people had rejected a renegotiated relationship the rest of the EU made the effort to craft at a time when they would rather have been focusing on issues such as the Eurozone, Russia or migration. Angela Merkel, in particular, could find herself in a difficult position. With German elections scheduled in 2017 she may be in no position – or personally inclined – to offer much. Without German support, Britain will face a much bigger struggle in securing the agreement of every other EU state and its leadership.

Theorising Brexit

The study of the EU is filled with theories of European integration. Brexit confronts us with the need totheorise European disintegration. Theories are tools that allow us to focus on certain aspects of developments in the world around us, highlighting – and testing – their importance over others. These 5 I’s above touch on some of the various theoretical approaches we can use to try and understand where a Brexit could take the EU and UK. In a simplified way, constructivism points to the role of ideas as paramount in shaping how a Brexit is handled. In realism it is the interests and international pressures that will be decisive. Institutionalist or neofunctionalist theories throw light on the powerful limits existing institutions and networks will play (or might not play if Brexit exposed any weaknesses in them). Liberal intergovernmentalism draws in a mix of interests, institutions and ideas to highlight that Britain and the EU (especially Germany, France and other big states) are caught up in a deeply enmeshed set of interdependencies from which there is no easy escape whatever their leaders may want.

This article first appeared on the LSE’s Brexit Vote blog.

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Colombia is in the middle of negotiating a peace deal with FARC rebels and the number of discussion points between the two groups range from the implementation of justice for crimes committed to the finer nuisances of the deal that could save many lives. Armed conflict in Colombia has resulted in numerous bloody battles, and the loss of many lives because of fighting inbetween paramilitary groups and guerrilla forces. But what President Juan Manuel Santos has done is, he has gone ahead and agreed to pardoning people responsibile for these atrocities in exchange for swifter national peace.

Santos believes that the more lives that peace can solve faster the better it will all be for economic growth, which is true but the nature of the feuds cannot be simplified so much. Most of the people involved in the fightings have been civilians and this has also both raised the profile for criminal violence in the country and thrown some six million Colombians from their homes right into the countryside. Pardoning so many wrongs in the name of peace and a stronger Colombia seems to ask people to forget all of their bruises.

The FARC rebels are known to not really stick to plans of disarming, which result in blood-fueled battles and too much of violence can mean negotiations breaking down once more and that cannot be a positive outcome for either of the two parties involved. Public support for the negotiations often waiver, while the government and the rebels both try to extert their point of views over the agreement. The last fifteen years has seen a reduction in national violence in Colombia but economic growth has gone the opposite way, fuelled by a heightening of incomes and a drop in oil price.

Colombia is individualistic in South America: it does not really have too much of military dictatorship written in it’s history, considers itself as the oldest democratic country in the region, has wet areas and portions of the Amazon rainforest, counts the rich as people who love political responsibility, there is land ownership that breeds inequality, violence with seeds in politics and and guerrilla fighting. A peaceful national climate can aid with getting back those lands grabbed by guerrillas and reducing the victimisation of Colombians on a daily basis.

The FARC has contributed to many ills of Colombian society, from drugs trafficking to extortion, and sometimes they have even fed into troubled land owners. Coming back from the brinks of societal failure, is not an easy task because once upon a time Colombia used to be a land filled with frequent reportings of kidnappings and murders. Villages would be invaded and child soldiers would be recruited into rebel groups. The economy was in a pitiful state of recession then as mass unemployment and growth of banks failure become commonplace.

The problem is trusting the FARC will not go back on their words because on previous accounts of striking a peace deal, the guerrillas only used those opportunities to grow their forces, both in paramilitary terms and politically, or simply kill idealists. FARC has stated that they are no longer interested in power-grabbing because military growth is happening nationally and the country is improving but it is not too much of an assurance when there is income inequality, and Venezuela is persistant with it’s support of the FARC rebels, spelling political trouble in its shores for it.

Education rates for children are mending, but universal healthcare seems to be asking too much because only a fraction of the population can contribute to it, whilst the government pays for the other half. No one political figure in the country has been able to solve this crisis, and whenever any had gone far, it would later be revealed that innocent civilians were murdered and passed off as guerrilla fighters. Perhaps this time it will be different and that “much awaited” peace deal will bring home national reforms, from rural areas to the provincial countrysides.

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cui Bono?
(I am available for after-dinner speeches, at modest rates)

Probably the single most frustrating aspect of the EU referendum is the lack of a clear timeline. It’s frustrating for voters, who’d like to know when this is all coming to a head; it’s frustrating for the media, who’d like some notice of when to ramp up coverage; it’s frustrating for other EU member states, who’ve got other things to deal with and really don’t need any more surprises; it’s frustrating for academics, who’ve got much less flexibility in planning research projects than you’d imagine; and it’s even frustrating for the government, who’ve also got other things they’d like to tackle.

In short, everyone seems to suffer from the uncertainty about the dates. With the possible exception of David Cameron. And, unfortunately for the rest of us, he’s the one person who actually gets to decide these things.

For Cameron, uncertainty is his friend. It allows him an adaptable timetable within which to improve his position – both externally with EU partners and internally with his party – and to keep those who would oppose him on the back foot. No one wants to peak too soon, in case it’s a long run campaign, so everyone has to hold fire. In a context where the Leavers seem to have a financially strong position, better to nullify that by forcing them to delay much of their spending to the official campaign period, when spending limits apply.

But this is only one aspect of the timing issue. The other is the matter of when to hold the vote.

Now at this point, I’d be linking to articles about timing, but there are so many, with such contradictory views, that it’s actually not very helpful so to do. Instead, let’s flesh out the main options.

First option is the ‘early dash’. In it’s purest form that has now passed: a rapid renegotiation and vote by the end of the summer would have built on the surprise win of May and used the opposition’s disarray to minimise resistance. However, the shock of winning seems precisely to have disorientated Number 10, who clearly lacked any developed plan to press their advantage: making it up as you go along sounds simple, but in practice it often slows things down.

In its current form, the ‘early dash’ means wrapping up the main points of renegotiation around this month’s European Council, then moving towards a June 2016 vote. This would avoid foot-dragging and provide some focus to the renegotiation, which has had to compete with other major issues all through this year.

The slower option is the ‘late summer glow’, extending things out to a September vote. This gives more time to negotiate on more contentious issues (i.e. welfare) and to build up a Remain campaign that knows better what works. This is probably as late as one would want to leave matters for a 2016 vote, assuming the ‘wintry’ half of the year isn’t the best environment for getting out a largely unenthusiastic Remain vote.

However, there is also the opposite view, the ‘why do today what you can put off to tomorrow?’ option, that says 2017 is the right time to vote. To expand on the ideas already mentioned, it gives most time to negotiate more substantial concessions (partly because everyone will be sick and tired of it by then; even more than now) and to arrange the pieces to best effect.

But this also comes with great costs. 2017 is littered with electoral perils: most obviously, French and German elections that won’t lend themselves to the making of concessions. It also moves the UK a lot closer to the 2020 general election, which – you’ll remember – Cameron isn’t going to contest as party leader, so the Tory leadership election becomes ever more pressing. And, as 2015 has shown, events do get very much in the way: it’s hard to see how a repetition of this year’s migrant/refugee crisis can be avoided next summer, for example. And finally, everyone knows that the end of 2017 is a hard deadline for Cameron, so he has to hold his vote by then, so leaving it until much closer to then invites other parties to fail to concede ground, because he’ll probably have to take what’s on the table.

In short, 2017 looks like a rubbish option, even among the other not-good alternatives. so why does it keep on coming up?

The first thought is that this is partly a negotiation tactic. Cameron can occasionally float the notion of delay to scare/bore partners into trying to get a move on: no-one seems to like this sitting on the table, as Tusk’s letter this week highlighted. However, it’s a tactic that will only have diminishing returns, especially as the patience of others runs out (as this nice piece demonstrates).

The second thought is that this is some nefarious plan by sceptics, to run the whole process into the mud, where it can flounder (yes, I know that’s a mixed metaphor, but you know what I mean). Polly Toynbee suggested this version of events this week, although it did read as a rather paranoid view of events and one that required such a concerted effort on the part of the sceptics as to inspire some disbelief.

Which leaves a final possibility. If there’s no intentionality behind it, perhaps it’s just a reflection of the lack of strategic planning by Cameron, whose attitude to date has been one of making a silk purse from a sow’s ear. This explanation most closely matches what has already been seen so far; there’s scant evidence of a grand plan, only tactical responses to events. More personally, it also reflects my preference for what I now discover I should term Hanlon’s razor. How far Cameron can go with trying to make the best of a bad situation (of his own making) remains to be seen. Maybe until 2017.

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For most people observing – including myself - the existence of two major groupings on the Leave side of the referendum wasn’t really an issue. Arron Banks’ Leave.EU hasn’t looked nearly as serious a proposition as Vote Leave, either in terms of ideological breadth or of general respectability (however you’d like to define that). Vote Leave has been sober, serious and generally had the feel of an official campaigning group. A bit dull, but worthy of communicating that side of the discussion.

Obviously, someone’s had a meeting at some point in recent weeks and decided that being a bit dull wasn’t the right play.

Hence, Students for Britain’s heckling at David Cameron’s CBI speech earlier this week. The stunt got some coverage, but was actually more noteworthy for Vote Leave’s support in the organising it: as Robert Oxley, Vote Leave’s media head, said:

“We will be working together closely during the campaign to do more of these protests – particularly at the AGMs of big companies who try to scare the British people into voting to remain”

This is not unreasonable as a strategy, and certainly the CBI looks rather less able to push a strong pro-EU line after this week’s events, so the logic is not that tenuous.

However, it has had the unexpected side-effect of moving Eric Pickles to complain to the Electoral Commission that Vote Leave’s stated intention to campaign ‘nasty’ should disbar them from becoming the official group. Pickles is broadly sympathetic to Cameron’s approach, enough that Vote Leave chose to portray the complaint as a sign that Cameron’s team was rattled and trying to deflect attention from the general indifference to his letter to Donald Tusk, which spelled out the broad areas for negotiation.

Obviously, in all of this, there’s a lot of spinning going on, but a number of things look pretty clear.

The first is that Vote Leave are very confident about becoming the official grouping. In practice, the CBI heckle wasn’t the most intrusive of actions and one that can’t easily be replicated at AGMs, so the intention to ‘do more of these’ remains just that, an intention. Students for Britain might find that until the Electoral Commission makes its decision, there will be more planning than action.

The second is that Leave.EU continues to suffer from a comparative lack of media  and popular interest. Recall that bad publicity is better than no publicity at all (VW might disagree on this one), especially if it allows Vote Leave to communicate the impression that Cameron is actually concerned enough to try using a third party to halt them.

The third is that the Leave side will always enjoy benefits from its position as the change option. As much as the status quo carries great weight, being the challenger allows for such opportunistic approaches that speak to images of pluck and verve. The Remain campaign will never have a similar opportunity to the CBI heckling, precisely because none of the major meetings of economic or social actors have taken a sceptical stance to EU membership.However, ‘meeting agrees something’ isn’t nearly as good a headline as ‘hecklers disrupt meeting’.

All of this comes with a warning, however. While it is good to mix things up, Vote Leave will have to balance that with the risk that others paint them as being less than serious. The heckling might has raised the profile of those involved and the issues around the CBI’s stance, but that’s still a considerable distance from changing peoples’ minds about how to vote. And neither side have cracked that one yet.

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The point is that if I go and work in France, as an EU citizen I can expect the same rights as French workers there. If I go and work in Germany, I can expect the same working rights as Germans. If I live in Spain, I’ll have the same rights as Spanish workers. That’s the EU principle, and I believe it’s a good one.

And this affects many Britons; more than two million have moved to live in the rest of the EU. Not all of them for work, of course; but most of them.

The concept of ‘free movement of people’ would fall down if workers moving from one EU country to another were discriminated against and didn’t have equal working rights with the workers of the host country.

I don’t think it’s a difficult concept to grasp. But it seems to me that the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, simply didn’t understand this principle, until now.

One of the key reforms that Mr Cameron hoped to win from the European Union was to allow workers moving to the UK from the rest of the EU to have less rights than British workers.

If this was to be permitted, it would in my view undo the entire raison d’être of free movement of people. The domino effect of such a policy could mean the end of EU workers willingly and easily moving from one EU country to another.

If Britain could discriminate against Germans working in Britain, then of course it could mean British workers in Germany having less rights than German workers; and British workers in France, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Belgium and so on being similarly discriminated against.

And what would be the point? I can’t find any.

Mr Cameron’s great reform idea was to discriminate against workers from the rest of EU by barring them from claiming any benefits for the first four years of their residency in the UK. That would be inequitable because British workers don’t have the same restrictions on claiming benefits.

Is there a real problem of EU workers claiming benefits? Not according to economist Jonathan Portes in his excellent blog yesterday for the National Institute of Economic and Social Research.

As Mr Portes points out, EU migrants come to Britain primarily to work, and their employment rates are considerably higher than that of the native population or non-EU migrants.

Only 2.2% of welfare claimants in Britain are EU migrants – just 114,000 out of a total of just over 5 million benefit claimants.

The situation is somewhat different regarding tax credits – or ‘in work’ benefits for migrants, that Mr Cameron has described as the main problem. EU migrants make up around 7% of those claiming tax credits, so about proportionate to the numbers of EU migrants working here.

But is this actually a problem? Not really, states Mr Portes.

“People who are in work, even in low-paid jobs, are after all contributing to the economy in a variety of ways; most analysis suggests that EU migrants, overall, improve the fiscal position, both in the short and (more importantly) in the long run.”

Mr Cameron often argues that it’s unfair for EU migrants to arrive in the UK, start a job, and immediately begin to receive public funds in the form of tax credits, having made absolutely no prior contributions. But the situation is exactly the same for British citizens, who can start a job for the first time and immediately claim in-work benefits. .

It’s the same for all insurance-based systems. You could insure your home today, paying just the first month’s premium, and if your home burnt down tomorrow, you’d still get a pay-out, even though you hardly made any contributions.

Child benefit is also often cited by Mr Cameron as a problem because EU migrants here can claim benefits for children not even living in the UK. That, of course, was never the intention of the child benefit system.

However, as Mr Portes points out, “the parent(s) are working and paying tax here (by no means true of all UK parents) and the children are certainly overall less of a cost to UK taxpayers than if they were actually living here!”

Mr Cameron has stated that he wants to reduce EU migrants coming to Britain (I can’t imagine why, since most of them are in gainful employment and making a significant net contribution to the Treasury and Britain’s wealth).

But is our benefits system really a ‘pull factor’ for EU migrants coming to Britain in the first place? The evidence is that welfare systems don’t generally drive immigration, according to Mr Portes. Nobody from Eastern or Central Europe comes to Britain to claim benefits; they come here for employment.

When the European Commission asked the British government for evidence of so-called ‘benefit tourism’, three times the government failed to provide any.

According to Mr Cameron, however, “40% of all recent European Economic Area migrants are supported by the UK benefits system.” But the data to back up the Prime Minister’s claim has never been published; almost certainly a violation of the Code of Practice on official government statistics.

The fact checking organisation, FullFact, has already submitted a formal complaint to the UK Statistics Authority.

The government’s numbers “look very odd” according to Mr Portes. According to published research, only a very small number of EU migrants would be affected by Mr Cameron’s 4-year-ban-on-benefits, because most EU migrants claiming the benefit have already lived in the UK for more than four years.

The four-year-ban, since it would affect such a small number of EU migrants, would be unlikely to make any difference to the numbers of migrants coming here.

So why did Mr Cameron want to risk Britain leaving the EU for a problem that doesn’t exist, and a solution that would make no difference?

Yesterday’s front page of the Evening Standard stated, “Cameron ‘retreat’ over EU migrant benefits”. It appears that the Prime Minister has now acknowledged that he cannot, after all, secure a four-year ban on welfare benefits to EU citizens exercising their right to work in Britain.”

Mr Cameron was quoted as saying, “Now I understand how difficult some of these welfare issues are for other member states.”

Isn’t it a bit late for Mr Cameron to “understand”? Shouldn’t he “understand” the issues first, and how important or otherwise they are, before risking the country’s future membership of the EU on demands that he should have known are incompatible with the principles and function of the European Union?

I am not confident that our Prime Minister knows what he is doing. It could be his, and the country’s, undoing. 

*Join the discussion about this article on Facebook.

_______________________________________________

Related stories by Jon Danzig:

• Why is Britain so against migration?
• Fiddling whilst the rest of the world burns?
• The end of free movement to and from Europe?

_________________________________________________

• Comments are welcome – but please read ‘The rules of engagement’ 

Does @David_Cameron know what he’s doing on #EU reforms? Read and share my latest blog: https://t.co/YXdOONYd7C pic.twitter.com/qtzDT6WTvd

— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) November 11, 2015

The post Does the Prime Minister know what he’s doing? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

‘Mein Europa’ – ‘My Europe’ – the book published by Helmut Schmidt only two years ago, was not a new monograph, but a collection of different publications and speeches on European integration. It spans a lifetime – from his very first article about cooperation in a not yet existing community dating from June 1948 to his editorials about the crisis-ridden Union of the 21st century published in Die Zeit.

‘His Europe’ was not a love affair. With the pragmatic realism that the Germans automatically identify with his beloved city Hamburg and therefore refer to as ‘hanseatic’, he often pointed out that there was no need to be a ‘European idealist’. For him it was perfectly sufficient to see just how much it has always been and still is in the ‘strategic interest’ of the Federal Republic of Germany to remain a staunch defender of European integration. He had a deep intellectual and personal admiration for Jean Monnet, and he shared the Frenchman’s belief in the ‘essential rationality of people’. Asked for a wish at the occasion of his 95th anniversary last year, he said ‘My wish is that the Germans understand that the European Union must be completed – rather than putting ourselves above it’.

He also never forgot what the young Federal Republic owed to Europe’s founding fathers: ‘In 1950, the Schuman Plan appeared to me as an undeserved stroke of luck for Germany’, he wrote in his 2008 memoirs entitled ‘Off duty’. While he had, as an anglophile from Northern Germany, much greater cultural affinity with Britain and the English language than with his French neighbours, he never tired of reminding his successors to keep in mind that they should do ‘nothing without France!’ And he cultivated, over almost half a century, a somewhat surprising friendship with Valéry Giscard d’Estaing based on mutual esteem and trust, despite their obvious differences in temper and upbringing.

Like his friend, with whom he institutionalised the European Council and introduced the European Monetary System, he was always tempted to criticise the lack of leadership in today’s EU. But he recognised of course that an EEC of nine member states, which had already been sufficiently difficult to manage, was a piece of cake compared to today’s Union of 28. With the freedom of thought of the elder statesman he repeatedly called for a ‘Putsch’ of the European Parliament in order to shake up an institutional framework he considered no longer appropriate.

Helmut Schmidt was the first German chancellor I voted for in 1980. Some of the convictions he represented at that time have been a guidance ever since. The firm belief that the greatest accomplishment of post-war Europe is the welfare state, for instance. Or the will not to put his sharp intelligence in the service of an ideology or party line, but to find strong ethical foundations in a few non-negotiable, fundamental values: ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘solidarity’, as he summed them up in his own lexical update of the French revolution’s legacy.

It is a sad coincidence that Helmut Schmidt, a lifelong friend of Britain and promotor of the UK’s role in the European Union, passed away on the same day when the British prime minister defiantly throws his four-point letter on the table. At the same time there is also some ironical comfort in the fact that Cameron’s letter and speech were entirely eclipsed in the German news by the memories of a great statesman. It’s a good lesson: the ones you remember fondly are those who stand up and defend their beliefs in adversity, those who contribute to daring undertakings rather than sulk in their corner. One of my favourites quotes in class when I speak about the creation of the European Union is the one from Shakespeare’s Julius Cesar with which Helmut Schmidt concluded his elegant speech at the Labour conference of November 1974 in Brighton:

There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune ;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.
On such a full tide are we now afloat,
And we must take the current when it serves,
Or lose our ventures.

His Europe was one that took the current when it served, rather than losing its ventures.

Albrecht Sonntag, EU-Asia Institute,
ESSCA School of Management.
@Essca_Eu_Asia

The post His Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In a taste of what’s to come, two Eurosceptic students interrupted a speech by Prime Minister, David Cameron, at a CBI conference yesterday, yelling, “CBI! Voice of Brussels”.

The Daily Telegraph reported that the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign is “now gearing up for 12 months of protest, including disrupting the meetings of pro-EU companies and organisations.”

Their campaign director, Dominic Cummings, was reported to say:

“You think it’s nasty – you ain’t seen nothing yet.”

He promised a “guerrilla-style war” against pro-EU bodies and companies and said, “These guys have failed the country, they are going to be under the magnifying glass. Tough s**t.”

The two students who disrupted the Prime Minister’s speech obtained passes to the conference by setting up a fake company and website, reported The Telegraph.

The CBI has repeatedly been a target of Eurosceptics because they undertake paid research for the European Union.

In a Parliamentary debate earlier this year, Eurosceptic Tory MP, Bernard Jenkin, claimed that the CBI received funds from the European Union, “presumably to promote the EU.”

Added Eurosceptic Tory MP, Jacob Rees-Mogg: “We know that the CBI is in part funded by Europe. It is therefore under an obligation either to return that money or to support the objectives of the European Union.”

But the CBI robustly rejected the allegations.

Their Director of Campaigns, Andy Bagnall, told me, “We strongly refute these misleading claims. The EU debate has a long way to go and both sides must base their arguments on the facts if they are to have any value at all.”

Rain Newton-Smith, the CBI’s Director of Economics, added that the organisation competitively tenders to provide the EU with economic data and that this represented just 0.6% of the CBI’s total annual income.

She told me, “The CBI is under no obligation to promote the EU. We speak on behalf of our 190,000 members who employ nearly 7 million people and while the majority wish to remain within a reformed EU, we do not shy away from criticising aspects of European legislation where necessary.

And Ken Clarke, former Justice Secretary and a co-President of British Influence, wrote to say:

“It is really absurd for hard-line Eurosceptics to argue that the CBI is being bribed by Brussels to support British membership of the EU. Anyone who knows any number of senior businessmen knows that the vast majority strongly believe in the benefits of membership.”

According to the latest opinion polls, Britain is split right down the middle on whether the country should remain a member of the European Union or leave. A poll by Survation for the Daily Mail this autumn revealed that the electorate was 51/49 against Britain’s continued membership of the EU.

The poll revealed a stark difference to a poll by Ipso Mori at the beginning of the summer, which claimed that 75% of British people were in favour of Britain’s continued membership of the EU, with only 25% wanting to leave.

That’s all now changed, according to some commentators, because of Europe’s mishandling of the refugee crisis.

The new poll revealed that if the “current migration crisis gets worse”, 22% of those wanting Britain to ‘Remain’ in the EU might switch to the ‘Leave’ campaign.

So there is everything to play for by both sides of the campaign. If the new poll is right, neither side currently has enough support for a decisive win, so both sides will have to work harder. No wonder things are getting desperate.

But is ‘getting nasty’ the way to win hearts and minds, and most importantly, votes? Wouldn’t a more calm, considered and edifying debate, where both sides listen carefully and politely to both sides of the argument, be in the best interests of the country?

After all, whether Britain remains in the EU or leaves, we’ll all still have to live with each other after the referendum result is announced.

So wouldn’t it be better for the referendum campaign to be civil, rather than to become a civil war?

*Join the discussion about this article on Facebook.

_______________________________________________

Related stories by Jon Danzig:

• Many most affected by the EU referendum will have no vote
• The rich who want Britain out of Europe
• There must be 50 ways to leave your party

_________________________________________________

• Comments are welcome – but please read ‘The rules of engagement’ 

The post EU Referendum: ‘It’s going to get nasty’ appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

From 21 to 25 September 2015 the bi-annual Congress of the German Association for Political Science (DVPW) took place at the University of Duisburg in Western Germany. More than 800 participants attended the event. As one of these participants, three observations seemed to be of particular interest to me.

First, in comparison to the previous congress in Tübingen, in 2013, the proportion of international papers and paper-givers had hugely increased and gave the conference a much more international atmosphere than before.

Second, while grass-roots democracy is very much alive in this association, it is not always to the advantage of its membership! The elections of the new Chair and Committee of Governors was one such example where meddling behind the scenes and public anger about it clashed in the general assembly. It took six hours to get to the elections only to find two hours later that the newly elected Chair, Michael Zürn, had already resigned! Highly divisive, in this assembly the good and great of German political science dismantled each other to a degree that the new Committee of Governors, which remained in place after the resignation of the chair, decided only to stay for one year, rather than the normal three years, and use that time mainly to revise electoral procedures in the DVPW. They will surely consider online voting, such as in other big academic organisations such as the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES), but one way or another it will be a lost year for making the DVPW more relevant through more internationalisation, for example.

Thirdly, during the 5 days of the congress, there was a wide thematic variety of panels, from political economy to international politics and environmental policies. Most of these panels touched in their contents on the most important political phenomenon of our time, the European Union, but hardly any mentioned it by name or saw the importance of European Union aspects in their particular analyses.There was only one silver lining on the horizon, the Working Group for (European) Integration, but with about 10 people in the audience this remained a side-line panel. Quite curious for a political science association…

The question arises whether German political science is so inward-looking now that it doesn’t even notice European integration any more. In other words: does it mean that the famous ‘re-nationalisation’ of politics in Europe is not only conducted by governments but also by researchers? It is perhaps a sign of our time in which the EU seems to drift more and more into oblivion while at the same time it is becoming increasingly needed for key policies, such as the refugee crisis.

Thomas Hoerber, EU-Asia Institute,
ESSCA School of Management

The post Don’t mention the EU! appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Political progress needs to happen faster in Palestine. At the moment, the greatest concern in the country is the Gaza crisis, and the only source of hope has been economic development. But how far can economic development really drive the peace process in Gaza, and a solution that is long-lasting and beneficial to both Israel and Palestine? With a more democratic nation, Palestinians can be in charge of their own land’s development, can contribute to the economy self-sufficiently, and this shift in perspectives in the country can drive the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) closer to home for the EU because it has acted as an important reason for the EU supporting Palestine and it’s agendas, it’s demands for a very long time now.

More support from the EU can only be expected if Palestine manages to tidy up its democratic roots nationally, can assure security and stability in the region and in the country, as well as implement regular good governance. Humanitarian assistance and government-expenditure support is not inclusive to political mishaps that have become the norm in the country, but is that really a good outlook for Palestine for the long run? Political instability and a burden on security issues because of faltering dogmatic concepts, is crating a lot of hardship in the country. The EU over the last ten years has been looked unfavorably in the Middle East, so if this policy shift takes place it can be looked as a two-way street: it is going to benefit both Palestine and the EU, if the latter engages in fair dialogue, with the former and this is inclusive of more other important matters in the region.

One of the key issues that needs to be looked into is that Palestine needs to earn more of an international presence than it does so presently. Israel and Palestine share an unequal global status, and this is happening as there is no deadline in sight for a two-state solution. Palestine is almost always at the receiving end of a faltering economy, so there is always a good amount of skepticism thrown in attitudes towards external powers interested in the peace process. The economy is faltering because of Israel’s restrictive measures on Palestine in the name of greater regional security. What should be viewed as political intervention that breeds financial collapse for the country, is merely looked upon as a leeway to commercialization of standards inside Palestine.

There is not much infrastructure, and the condition of public services is constantly deteriorating, unemployment levels, especially in the Gaza Strip has reached a 41percent and poverty has hit a 39percent, according to 2014 estimates. Public consumption is dependent on what Israel allows into Palestine, and this is not just for resources; there is a restriction on free movement for Palestinians in the West Bank because Israel does not seem interested in it. Where resources are concerned there has been a lack of construction raw materials, a fluctuating manufacturing trade sector and a light industry that does not do much.

Financial support to poverty-stricken people and public sector salaries is what helps Palestinians pay for basic amenities in a country that is only fully-functional as a state. But there needs to be progress from that level of basic consumption for the general public because right now aid from EU is the only thing that is keeping Palestine from sinking. The private sector in the Gaza Strip is not really working all too well for Palestine and this is really nothing more than an untapped area of national resources: agriculture and investment in projects, are multiple capitals that can really drive home greater income tax generation and revenues.

The post Palestine: Where To Go From A Regular Diplomacy? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The country has a chronic skills shortage and without migrants helping to fill that gap, Britain – and Britons – would be poorer.

Britain now has more people at work than ever before. We also have a record number of job openings – around 750,000 vacancies in August alone. It’s no wonder that in line with that, immigration from the rest of Europe is also at a record high.

Why? Because migrants mostly come to Britain for jobs, and if there were not so many jobs, there would be little reason to come here, and therefore, not so many migrants.

Of course, none of this is any consolation to the 1.77 million people currently unemployed. But unfortunately, many of the unemployed do not have the skills now needed by employers. Britain, of course, should be spending billions in upskilling our workers, and especially the unemployed.

Similarly, we shouldn’t blame migrants that parts of the country lack sufficient schools, hospitals, homes, or that many are struggling on zero-hour contracts. For that, we should blame our political masters.

It’s too easy for the government to scapegoat migrants for our problems, when the fact is that without migrants, the country would be poorer. If all migrants went home, we wouldn’t have more schools, hospitals and homes. We would simply have a bigger shortage of teachers, doctors, nurses and builders.

In the meantime, British businesses are hungry for more skilled workers. Without them, our economy would stagnate and die. That, actually, is one way to stem the flow of migration to Britain – to trash our economy. But who would seriously advocate such a policy?

The fact that Britain now has record numbers at work, record numbers of vacancies, and unemployment at a 7-year-low of 5.4%, is a sure sign that the country is steadily climbing out of its economic downturn. And helping to propel that recovery are migrants, most of whom are in gainful employment, working hard, paying taxes and spending most of their earnings here, in Britain.

And yet, Britain still doesn’t have enough workers to fill the profound skills gap the country is facing.

Yes, of course, we should be training more people.

But in the meantime, the government has compiled a long list of skills the country needs – now, urgently. It’s called the UK Shortage Occupation List. We need, for example:

Scientists, such as geologists; nuclear medicine experts; mechanical engineers, such as for the oil and gas industries; electronic engineers for the motoring industry; software developers for 2D/3D animation; contaminated land specialists; medical practitioners, such as psychiatrists, anaesthetics and radiographers; specialist intensive care nurses; maths and science teachers; social workers; contemporary dancers; orchestral musicians; overhead lines workers; skilled chefs..

..And the list goes on and on. Skilled workers that the country needs now.

In addition, many farms, catering establishments, hotels, care homes and builders categorically state that they simply could not survive, let alone thrive, without EU migrants. Not because they are cheaper (can you really find a cheap Polish plumber these days?). No. It’s because these establishments have more vacancies to fill than British people either can or want to fill.

Eurosceptics say they are not against migration, but want the country to have fewer migrants, and to be able to choose who can come here, based on the skills needed. And they don’t want EU migrants to come here unless they have a job in advance.

But that just creates another bureaucratic barrier to EU migrants coming here at all. And in any event, the country already does choose which migrants to employ – the decision is made by British businesses, who want the right to choose their workforce from across our continent.

If an EU migrant can’t come here without having a job first, then chances are they will go to another country, and help their economy instead. That will be our loss.

EU regulations state that any EU citizen can move to another EU country to seek a job, so long as they have the means to look after themselves and don’t become a burden to the state. And what’s wrong with that? If they come here and don’t find a job, they usually go back home.

It’s a Daily Mail myth that migrants can simply come here and immediately start claiming benefits. It simply isn’t true.

The fact is that most migrants here have jobs; jobs that British businesses desperately need them to do. Britons shouldn’t complain – especially since more Britons are now in work than ever before. Migrants are not taking the jobs our unemployed could do. Migrants are coming here mostly to do the jobs that Britons can’t all do.

*Join the discussion about this article on Facebook.

_______________________________________________

Related stories by Jon Danzig:

• Why is Britain so against migration?
• Fact: Most migrants come to work or study
• The free movement of people: it works both ways

_________________________________________________

#Britain needs #migrants because of a chronic skills shortage. Read and share my blog today: https://t.co/Yfiz0ZThBw pic.twitter.com/kcBykzUgTi

— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) November 8, 2015

• Comments are welcome – but please read ‘The rules of engagement’ 

The post Why Britain needs migrants appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

All aboard the two-level train to a Federal Superstate. Or not.

One of the staples of academic understanding of the EU is the notion of the two-level game. The idea – first articulated by Robert Putnam - is simply that there are situations where you can only understand an actor’s intentions and actions in one game/interaction if you also accept that these intentions and actions are shaped by their involvement in other games. Putnam was interested in the entanglement of international and national political arenas, so it’s not so surprising that EU scholars have taken to using the approach, since the tensions we find in European-level negotiations are often only understandable if we know the domestic pressures that national representatives are facing.

Central to this model are those representatives, since they connect the two level. Thus they function as conduits, as well as gatekeepers, since the relevant pressures at both levels might not be public knowledge. Most importantly, they work as arbitrators, trying to find acceptable compromises to trade off the array of interests and pressures. As an aside, we might note that this has the practical implication of strengthening national executives, as they are usually the representatives, and so can use European-level negotiations to out-manouver legislative and civil society elements.

It’s helpful to look at the UK’s renegotiation-n-referendum exercise in the light of this model, because it doesn’t yet fit very neatly.

Undoubtedly, the key driver is domestic politics: as I’ve long argued, David Cameron’s European policy is no more than a function of internal party management, framing by a broad desire to pursue the path of least resistance. The referendum commitment itself still looks like a misguided effort to put his backbenchers back into their box, at a time when a Tory victory in May 2015 looked less than likely.

This isn’t inconsistent with Putnam’s model, but where there is an issue is in the nature of the European level.

George Osborne’s speech to the German BDI this week was a case in point. While the BBC and other British media providers tagged along and provided copious amounts of coverage, the lack of German media interest was palpable: beyond some wire reports, none of the major German providers ran with the story.

This might be partly explained by the continuing failure of Osborne/the UK to provide any real detail of the renegotiation objectives – the least possibly alluring Dance of the Seven Veils – but it also reflects the general indifference in other member states – and, by extension, in much of the EU – to what Cameron is trying to do.

As we roll around to the end of the first six months of this government, the persistent impression from other member states has been that this is a British problem, that the British government has to sort out. The most telling comment around Osborne’s came from the BBC’s Laura Kuenssberg: “German govt source ‘Osborne must have his crusade… We are happy to play along’”

Evidently, the inability of the government to provide any detail on its demands only reinforces this dynamic, since it conveys the impression that the key issue is whether the Tory party leadership can ‘sell’ the renegotiation package to their backbench and to the public, rather than any particular matter of principle.

The challenge to the UK then is this: do national representatives still maintain their gatekeeping function?

At a functionally level, they still do, but the increased awareness of what’s happening in the other arena of negotiation makes it ever harder for them to play an arbitration role. All of the key British negotiation team are being closely watched at home for any sign of weakness or duplicity – even in the most tenuous of ways - with the very presence of the referendum given them cause to be concerned about displeasing too many people. Likewise, the very public nature of the British debate – again, causing in part by a government that won’t set a clear agenda – means that other member states have a good fix on what Cameron’s bottom-line will be.

In short, the space for the British government to build space between the two levels is getting smaller, rather than larger. Even the broad construction of the four key areas is under constant challenge, as both British and European voices try to close down particular interpretations or approaches.

Strikingly, the situation looks to be rather asymmetric, in that British visibility of the domestic constraints in European counterparts looks to be much weaker than vice-versa. This manifests itself in a number of ways, but again Osborne’s speech gives us an insight into the problems.

Osborne knows enough that his speech needed to be framed in more positive language than that of simple demands. To read the text is to see an approach that stresses collective benefits of both EU membership and reform for Germany and the UK. This message – that British intentions are actually good for the whole EU – make clear sense in building alliances of support, but they only get made outside of the UK: Domestically, the rhetoric is about fighting for British interests (whatever that might mean). And, unsurprisingly, that domestic rhetoric is heard outside of the UK.

In essence, the British renegotiation looks more and more like a single-level exercise for the UK. Unless and until the government can come to a public statement of its intentions from the exercise, the only people it’s really negotiating with are themselves.

The post Can the UK still play a two-level game in the EU? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The literature on European environmental policy has rapidly expanded over the last ten years. Between 2010 and 2015, there were over seven hundred articles about the European Union and environmental policy, compared to only two hundred and fifty articles between 2000 and 2005.[1] Ironically, given its focus, much of this literature is written outside of the major European studies journals.[2]  However, it is important to study the topics and approaches that environmental policy scholars use when publishing in European studies journals because of the key role these journals play in the field.[3] Therefore, in this post I explore environmental policy articles in two of these journals: the Journal of European Public Policy (JEPP) and the Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS).[4] JEPP and JCMS were chosen because they “play an integrating function by holding the various subfields of EU studies together”.[5]

To keep the analysis manageable, I examined environmental policy articles in JEPP and JCMS that were published between January 2010 and October 2015. I searched article titles and keywords for environmental topics, which led to a total of thirty-six articles in both journals (eleven in JCMS and twenty five in JEPP). This amounts to approximately 4% of the articles published in these two journals during this time.[6] I then categorized the articles along two dimensions: the environmental issue studied (“climate change” or “other environmental issues”[7]) and whether the article dealt with internal EU/European policy or the EU’s external policy in international negotiations.

The results of this analysis are shown below (the full list of articles is available here). Eleven articles focus on EU/European internal climate change policy (including the EU Emissions Trading System and the Biofuels Directive). Nine focus on the EU’s role in international climate negotiations, six on external EU environmental policy more generally , and ten on internal non-climate policy.

Environmental policy articles in JEPP and JCMS (2010-2015), categorized according to environmental issue and internal/external focus

What this matrix does not show is the relationship between these thirty-six articles. Here I focus on one aspect: the references that the articles cite in common. The articles being studied here cited a total of 1,702 references. Of these, 127 (~7%) were cited by more than one article.[8] I used this data to analyze when two articles cited the same source, and created a network visualization from the results.

JEPP/JCMS environmental policy articles, connected by the number of shared references

I followed this with a “network density” analysis, which looks at the percentage of articles that are connected to each other. The highest possible network density is 100%, if every article shared at least one reference with every other article. A network density of 0%, on the other hand, would mean that none of the articles shared any references in common.

The overall density of the thirty-six article network is 25%. When the analysis focuses only on climate change articles, the density is slightly higher (28%), while environmental and internal policy articles are lower than average (19% and 23% respectively). The real outlier is the external policy category, which has a much higher density, at 51% (see figure below).

JEPP/JCMS article categories, percentage of articles in each category which share at least one reference

The higher density of the external policy articles can also be shown by visualizing the network again and color coding the articles according to the internal/external dimension:

JEPP/JCMS environmental policy articles, connected by the number of shared references. Categorized into internal policy (blue) and external policy (red)

What explains the difference? One important factor seems to be that there are more central, influential references in the external policy category. For example, the internal EU policy category has eighteen sources tied for top citations, all with three articles citing each. In contrast, scholars working on external policy are more likely to cite the same articles. Especially influential is Ian Manners’ 2002 article on the EU’s international position as a “normative power” in international negotiations.[9]

Concluding thoughts

The articles I have analyzed make up a small percentage of those on European environmental policy, and an equally small percentage of the articles published in JEPP and JCMS. Therefore it isn’t clear whether the patterns identified here are representative of the entire literature on European environmental policy, or are only a feature of JEPP and JCMS articles.

Regardless, a few key points should be highlighted. This group of articles has a strong focus on climate change and the EU’s role as a negotiator in international institutions. What drives the focus on these topics? It could be a product of scholars’ interest, or alternatively due to choices made by the journals’ editors to accept certain types of research.

The network analysis suggests that the scholars publishing articles on the EU external environmental policy are more likely to cite from similar sources than scholars working on EU internal policy. There are a number of possibilities to explain this. One is that as a more recent field of inquiry, external policy-focused scholars are more likely to cite more references in common.

Finally, focusing on the big picture, this analysis has made me realize the sheer extent and variety of the literature on European environmental policy. As the field grows, this suggests that scholars working on these issues could reflect once again on this diversity and work to find connections between their work.

[1] Based on a search carried out in the Scopus database for documents with “environmental policy” and “European Union” in the title, abstract, or keywords, carried out on October 29, 2015 for the 2010-2015 time period (742 results), and on October 31 for the 2000-2005 time period (251 results).

[2] The top five journals were Energy Policy, Science of the Total Environment, Climate Policy, Land Use Policy, and Environmental Policy and Governance.

[3] Jensen, M.D., Kristensen, P.M., 2013. The elephant in the room: mapping the latent communication pattern in European Union studies. Journal of European Public Policy.

[4] Other European studies journals include European Union Politics, West European Politics, the Journal of European Integration, and the Journal of Contemporary European Studies.

[5] Jensen, M.D., Kristensen, P.M., 2013. The elephant in the room: mapping the latent communication pattern in European Union studies. Journal of European Public Policy, pg. 1. doi:10.1080/13501763.2012.699656

[6] 36 environmental policy articles out of a total of 940 articles (as of October 29, 2015).

[7] “Other environmental issues” included articles that focused on a non-climate topic (such as fisheries management) as well as those that looked at a broad range of issues (including climate change).

[8] This figure is an estimate based on the references available on Scopus. It should be considered an underestimate, due to the fact that some types of documents (e.g., European Commission communications) are relatively likely to be counted as distinct sources by the database.

[9] Manners, I., 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40, 235–258. doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00353

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