Ideas on Europe Blog

On BBC Question Time last week, Frank Field, MP, got it wrong by repeating that old myth that the EU accounts hadn’t been signed-off. I wrote him an open letter – to which I am still awaiting a reply:

Dear Mr Field

On BBC Question Time last night (2 June) you told the audience:

‘I can’t remember the last time your money was accounted properly in Europe and was signed-off by the auditors. They actually cannot justify how they’re spending your money.’

This is wrong. The EU accounts are signed-off every year by the independent European Court of Auditors. Every penny of our money sent to the EU is accounted for and justified. See my full report at: www.Audit.Reasons2Remain.eu

As a leading Labour MP supporting Brexit, isn’t it important that facts are accurately presented to the electorate?

Can I please ask you to issue a correction to your comment on Question Time, or at least to give an undertaking not to repeat your inaccurate statement that the EU accounts aren’t signed-off?

Yours sincerely

Jon Danzig
For Reasons2Remain

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Other stories by Jon Danzig:

• The EU accounts ARE signed off
• What does Brexit look like? Nobody knows
• They want their country back, not yours
• List of the latest articles by Jon Danzig

To follow my stories please like my Facebook page: Jon Danzig Writes

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— Reasons2Remain (@Reasons2Remain) 3 June 2016

The post Frank Field, MP, gets it wrong on Question Time appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Eurovision Song Contest can be a useful and fun allegorical tool for explaining the dynamics of the EU, writes Anna Wambach. She argues that, although comparisons between the two can create strong cognitive associations over time, if taken too seriously such links can lead to misunderstandings about how the EU works in practice.

Conchita Wurst Press Conference, Greens/EFA, CC-BY-2.0

It is tempting to equate the Eurovision Song Contest with the EU. The EU itself can appear mind-bogglingly complex and boring. So why not use the ESC to explain the EU’s unappealing institutions to its citizens in an entertaining way? There seem to be so many parallels. The ESC provides a useful means of breaking down complicated processes of supranational decision-making through a commonly shared pop culture reference. However, the equation – although tempting – is not without negative consequences, since the discursive links have the potential to mislead judgement about the EU.

Despite its objective as an opportunity for European countries to showcase themselves, the ESC has always been a political event. Voting patterns have long been interpreted as symptoms of international alliances or tensions. In the week prior to the 2016 ESC in Stockholm, this trend intensified, particularly in the UK’s debate on EU membership. British journalists, commentators and campaigners explicitly linked Eurovision to the in/out referendum in June.

The BBC started a Snapchat campaign in which it explicitly – although light-heartedly – combined the referendum debate and the Eurovision Song Contest. Vote Leave, the official campaign for the UK to leave the EU, produced a video in which it compared the UK’s status in the EU with its past performances in the ESC. The conclusion is simple: the UK is persistently outvoted by its European neighbours.

Two years earlier, in 2014, the Guardian published an op-ed in which Christina Patterson explained that the British regard both of them as a frivolous waste of money. The EU would need to change in order to lose this ESC reputation.

The list of examples goes on. The discursive link between EU politics and the ESC is reinforced every year. Discourse in this context does not refer to one communicative event or an extended piece of text but rather – in Foucault’s sense – to socially constructed knowledge or social practice, a more or less regulated way of doing things (Van Leeuwen 2008). In this case, knowledge about the EU is constructed by linking it to knowledge about the ESC.

It is understandable. Few people are interested in the details of EU policy-making. It is boring and somewhat distant. The ESC, however – love it or hate it – is certainly not boring. People can relate to it.

Particularly in the UK, many of the dominant discourses about both the EU and ESC seem to match perfectly, as the above examples illustrate. The UK’s lack of success in the ESC can be interpreted as a symptom of feelings towards the EU: no support, no understanding and blocs of nations ganging up against the UK.

The voting system combining jury and public votes can be interpreted as undemocratic – just like the EU with its unelected bureaucrats infringing on British sovereignty. The whole show – be it ESC or EU – is a waste of money in which Britain invests but never gets anything in return.

Shared cultural knowledge is used to explain a complex political process – to make it relatable. This is a handy and effective shortcut. No further explanation is needed. From a journalist’s or commentator’s point of view, this is appealing because it saves time and space. However, by discursively linking, repeating and reinforcing it year after year, it becomes manifested in citizens’ minds.

It is a powerful discursive link, but one that is misleading in two ways. Firstly, it can lead to a factual misunderstanding of the EU. Secondly, it may have an effect on attitudes towards the EU and European integration. This effect, however, is based on misjudgement. During a campaign like the British in/out referendum, but also in more routine times, this can have a negative impact on support for the EU.

The factual differences between ESC and EU are more obvious and can be pointed out easily. ESC participants go far beyond the EU’s borders – for example, the 2016 final included Australia, Israel and Azerbaijan. The ESC is run for entertainment purposes – the EU for political and economic ones. The outcome of the ESC has practically no impact on citizens’ lives, whereas the outcome of EU decision-making does very much.

The effect of this discursive construction of EU knowledge by linking it to social practices of the Eurovision Song Contest may, however, be resistant to factual clarifications. By illustrating shared, historical discourses about the relationship between the UK and the EU with ESC metaphors, common myths are reinforced rather than overcome. Because the discourses about the EU and ESC, as well as the UK’s position in either, can be so elegantly integrated, disentangling the discourses again is difficult.

If they match so nicely, and help citizens understand the EU, then one could argue that the discursive link between ESC and EU might be useful after all, if only to engage citizens in the debate. The equation of the EU and the ESC, however, is akin to drawing a caricature of the EU. It oversimplifies, exaggerates and can even be plain wrong. It might fit into historical discourses about the EU, but even those can often be misleading with regard to the relationship between the UK and EU. Therefore we should attempt to unpack and challenge those dominant discourses instead of fuelling them with pop culture references.

In the end, the link is a misjudgement of both the EU and Eurovision. Neither of them can receive a fair verdict from its audiences. In the case of Eurovision, this might not seem too dramatic. It could have more far-reaching consequences for attitudes towards the EU among its citizens, if they judge it based on a cheesy entertainment spectacle.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Anna Wambach | @AnnaWambach
Newcastle University

Anna Wambach is PhD Candidate in Politics at Newcastle University and a Committee Member of the UACES Student Forum. Her research focuses on how the the EU is portrayed in the UK news media.

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As we’ve moved into the last stretch of the referendum, we’ve seen the emergence of a new dynamic: the referendum-as-general-election.

In setting out more clearly what a post-Brexit future would look like, the key figures in the Leave campaign – Boris Johnson, Michael Gove, Chris Grayling and Priti Patel – have also been sketching what a post-Cameron government would look like, presumably with them in positions of power and influence.

This trend has been really come through with yesterday’s announcements on immigration – extending the non-EU points system to EU nationals – but was also arguably visible in the various pronouncements on reasserting sovereignty, via a constitutional court or a British bill of rights or a sovereignty act.

At a tactical level, there is something to this approach. Given the difficulty of keeping public engagement with the EU issue turning the referendum back into something that looks more like a general election looks potentially productive: focus on people’s unhappiness with ‘the government’ and David Cameron and kick them/him out.

Of course, this assumes people overlook that you’d be replacing one Tory government with another, but one might argue that this model is part of the explanation for why Jeremy Corbyn isn’t fighting too hard to save Cameron’s political skin: maybe the turnover of power splits the Tories and gives him more of a chance in 2020. It certainly rubs the same way as Corbyn’s general ambivalence about the EU.

There is a certain circularity in that view, since it has been precisely Corbyn’s ambivalence that created the space for Johnson and co to make this push: it’s not coincidental that the biggest figures in Leave have come from the Tories, given the depth of feeling on the EU issue and the additional prize of the party leadership.

This dominance has become self-reinforcing, as they have been able to set Leave’s agenda more and more. UKIP and Nigel Farage have been active, but marginal at the strategic level, unable to make this kind of government-in-waiting play. This suits the Leave Tories, who not only re-direct UKIP’s populist challenge, but also get Farage campaigning for them. In the long run that might cause ‘the establishment’ a problem, but not just yet.

To see the referendum as a power-play within the Conservative party is a cynical position, and I wouldn’t pretend it’s anything like the whole story, but it feels like it’s going to be the most consequential one in the short- to medium-term. Either EU membership is secured and pushed hard off the agenda by Cameron and his successor, or it’s a few years of trying to find a model that works: not there’s no rupture, no breakpoint where everything changes.

However, there is a certain irony here. As my economist colleagues like to note, there’s never a free lunch. The price that Leave Tories look like paying comes from the choices they’re making now.

Their choice of immigration control is simple and clear, but it necessarily precludes an EEA-style post-Brexit agreement, since it’s incompatible with free movement: the EU has no good incentive to break the habit of its lifetime and offer full market access without free movement of workers. That in turn closes down the option that would offer the smoothest transition out of the EU for the UK and raises the costs of building a more arm’s-length relationship, not mention the likely economic costs that most analysts suggest will be incurred.

Likewise, the legal options being laid out sound lovely – who doesn’t want have control of our decisions – but are in practice terribly complex. Having spent a day in a room with legal experts this week, I’m happy to take their opinion that the proposals are either meaningless or would imply restrictions on politicians’ power that they are going to have be incredibly selfless to accept. Making no judgment on any future government, the fact that such selflessness hasn’t been shown by any previous administration suggests that we might be sceptical about the chances of change. Moreover, even if they do happen, then they imply a change in the British constitutional order much more wide-reaching than even EU membership has wrought.

Whether the village will let itself be destroyed to save it is very much an open question.

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My five years as a PhD student, first in Oxford (Brookes) and then as a post-doc at LSE, have told me that the smart people from the UK, especially those working in the City, see the Euro project thus:

Cartoon by Schrank (The Economist)

European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is like a ship that has been built badly from the start. The Brits have warned the Continental Europeans about this structural flaw even before the ship left harbour (think of Thatcher), but the latter wouldn’t listen. They left port anyway, while the Brits stayed ashore convinced that this was a journey doomed to fail.

History has proven the smart people from Oxbridge and the City right. In 2010, confronted with the first big storm (the Global Financial Crisis), the European ship showed its deficiencies and water started to break into the vessel. The Brits screamed: “we told you so”, and enjoyed their Schadenfreude.

However, the ship hasn’t sunk yet. The Continentals are trying hard to fix it while at high sea. They have patched over the leaks for now, although the enterprise is hampered by the divisions in the crew (too many nationalities) and by a lack of leadership. The French and German officers do not agree on the end solution, and the only one keeping the vessel afloat is the Chief Engineer called Mario Draghi.

These troubles make the Brits, and especially the English, feel even more self-righteous about their decision to not join EMU. They are pretty convinced the ship will eventually sink. Nonetheless, they don’t want to be overconfident. They know deep down in their soles that it would be a mistake to underestimate German engineering and French keenness for grandeur so they have a speed boat ready to join at high see in case the ship is eventually fixed. Because one thing is certain. If the ship sails on, the Brits need to have a say in the direction it should take.

This metaphor sums up the view of the City of London in regards to the Brexit debate. In general the Brits have looked at the European Union project from a purely transactional perspective: “What can I get from this arrangement?” This is very different in the Continent, where emotional elements such as angst from your past (Germany), obsession to be bigger than you are (France), desire to belong to a rich club (Italy and Spain and almost everyone else) and fear from your neighbour (the CEE countries) are much more pronounced.

If there is a sentimental bias to be detected among the English (less so among the other Brits) towards the EU it works usually against further integration. The main reason is the British Empire. The Brits have not been invaded since William the Conqueror in the 11th Century and this counts. As a German official told me once: “For the Brits democracy means Westminster. They cannot envision it beyond”. This explains the British obsession to consider the European Parliament as an illegitimate body.

Both the very rational (and so far dominant) approach towards the EU but also the Empire-clinging sentimental rejection against it are very present in the City of London. As a matter of fact, these two perspectives are on opposite sides in the Brexit debate. The former is represented by the big American investment and the European universal banks. They want to stay in the EU because doing so allows them to have access to the biggest and richest market on earth. The latter is usually embodied by the smaller wealth management firms, hedge funds and stockbrokers. They think Brussels curtails the good old English tradition of laissez-faire.

This division is centuries old. The Square Mile of the City is actually the best example of a Global Village. Since London after the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 overtook Amsterdam as the world’s most important financial centre, two tribes have co-existed in the City. The “Nativists” (mostly English) who have seen the success of the City intrinsically related to the British Empire. And the “cosmopolitans” (the smartest and more adventurous from the rest of the world) whose functionalist approach has always been the following: “To be as far from politics as possible to make business at ease (the off-shore component of the City being always attractive), but as close to power as necessary in order to influence it”. Thus, London was, and remains, the place to be due to its close connections to Washington and its influence in Brussels.

Of course, if the Brexit camp wins the forthcoming referendum this ideal configuration would change. The City would be further away from politics, and perhaps enjoy less regulation (although that is not assured), but at the same time it would be further away from power (both in Brussels and in Washington) and perhaps even more importantly it would give up completely on joining the EMU ship.

But what happens if eventually the ship gets fixed? Will the smart money of the City of London let it sail away? Unlikely. The ECB is already more powerful than the Old Lady. It will be even more so if EMU survives. This is why Goldman Sachs and the rest of big American and European banks have funded the “Bremain” campaign. They feel the “Nativist” camp led by Boris Johnson is stuck in an imperial illusion which won’t come back. And while they do so, they are thinking: “perhaps we should consider getting closer to Frankfurt. Not only because EMU might get fixed, but also because Westminster is becoming too insular”. And insularity is something you certainly don’t want as a banker.

EU-Asia Institute at ESSCA Ecole de Management, Angers
www.essca.fr/EU-Asia / @Essca-Eu-Asia

 

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Insert metaphor about how toasters can kill if you’re not careful, apply to referendums

One of the most interesting aspects of the EU referendum campaign so far has been the extent to which things haven’t changed.

Six weeks into the official period, we still have polling that gives no clear advantage to either side, nor even an indication that attitudes have changed at all: the don’t knows still make a solid 10-15% and have done for months. As we’ve been reporting on our social media monitoring, there’s no big explosion of public interest that can be detected.

All the lines of attack taken by either side have been ones that were long apparent and all have been countered (broadly speaking) almost immediately.

There’s been no big shock (unless you though Boris Johnson was actually doing the donuts himself), either within the UK or outside.

In short, things looks very much like they did: close.

Which makes this week’s sounds from the Remain camp all the more perplexing.

To read the Telegraph, following a poll that showed a big lead for Remain, was to read a worldview that said ‘job done’: the swing had come in, the messages had got through and now it was time to just cross ‘t’s and dot ‘i’s.

Regardless of what politics might be going on behind this, this looks at best irresponsible and at worse, damaging.

If last year’s General Election taught us anything, it’s that polling has a problem and for all the remedial work done by the industry since, they still have a problem, as evidenced by the continued divergence of telephone and online polling results. If even if they didn’t have a problem, then to take one of two polls as hard and fast evidence for a swing is bad practice (as Tuesday’s ICM poll neatly demonstrated).

If that’s irresponsible, then it’s equally important to stress the scope for damage to Remain’s case.

One of the more robust findings we have to date is the ‘enthusiasm gap‘ (Leavers are noticeably more committed to their cause than Remainers, as so more likely to turn out). Remain’s big challenge has always been to convince people that they need to get excited enough about the (roughly) status quo option to go and vote. As one Remain campaigner put it to me last week, “what do we want? the same” isn’t a great rallying cry.

In such a situation, one way to get the vote out is precisely to focus on the closeness of the campaign: Austria’s Presidential elections has provided a nice demonstration that one’s vote does actually count for a lot. But if Remain try to play up a swing (whether or not it exists), then the urgency and importance of voting drops, to Leave’s benefit. With all modelling suggesting that turnout is the crucial factor, any message that plays down the importance of mobilisation is going to hurt Remain.

To be clear, there’s no suggestion that the Telegraph (or any of the other outlets that ran with the story) are trying to work to engineer a Leave vote. Instead the issue is one that has been endemic in other referendums on European issues.

Where governments have lost such votes, in every case one of the key factors has been complacency. In the case of treaty ratifications, that has been driven by the weight of other member states’ ratifications and by the impression that the government’s hard bargaining on the text will be enough to carry the day. In the case of joining policy areas, the difficulty of the government reaching agreement to get to a vote in the first place does the same.

Here we have something a bit different. The government clearly didn’t expect to be holding this vote and it has recognised that the ‘new settlement’ agreed by Cameron in March isn’t enough to make the case, so it hasn’t gone in with its eyes shut. However, the capacity to bring many big guns to bear – international leaders, all but one party leader, most economists – and the subsequent command of the rational agenda has lent the impression that things must come right. Tony Blair is the purest expression of this sentiment to date.

This is very much to miss the dynamics of what is happening. As Janan Ganesh wrote yesterday, the EU ‘debate’ looks and feels a lot like the elite talking with itself, rather than actually engaging the wider public. With old notions of deference long gone and the lure of populism hanging nearby, it seems all too possible to envisage a situation where the referendum is determined more by the alienation of the public from the political sphere than by any substantive issue.

I’ve framed this mainly as an issue for Remain – which it is – but it’s also something that Leave have to address too: if they win, then some of them will be stepping into the corridors of power very soon and they will have to make good on their promises if they are not to generate another cycle of disillusionment and disengagement.

The fight for this referendum is still very much on, but so too is the ability of politicians and other elites to speak for the people: ultimately, that matters more than any outcome on 23 June. And that’s why we have to recognise that this matters not just in-of-itself, but also as a marker of our democratic lives.

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“Taking back control” from an anti-democratic EU is a central theme of the “leave campaign”. Even some of those advocating “stay” concede the EU needed to “reform” to become more democratic and accountable.

This response is puzzling given the existing opportunities to influence EU as well as critics’ vagueness and disagreement about how a more democratic EU should look like. The focus on allegedly undemocratic Brussels institutions misses that most of the problems as well as solutions to democracy can be found closer to home.

The most obvious way in which citizens can influence the EU is through the election of the Westminster parliament. Any transfer or sharing of new competences with the EU had to be agreed by national parliaments and the House of Commons has ratified each Treaty change since 1973 with solid majorities. Supranational law and its interpretation to the European Court of Justice only takes effect because this is what the people’s elected representatives legislated for.

Major changes to the EU such as Enlargement have been strongly advocated by successive British governments, whilst they have also blocked in the past more wide-ranging proposals for direct democracy fearing that more legitimacy for EU bodies will give them also greater power. National ministers appointed through general elections wield significant power over day-to-day legislation in the Council of Ministers and, for strategic direction, the European Council.

The UK retains exclusive competence in the areas most sensitive to UK citizens such as taxation, pensions, health, policing and remains exempt from legislation associated with the Schengen free-border or the Eurozone. The UK has consolidated its status as Eurozone outsider with guarantees that it will not be discriminated against, does not need to contribute to any bailouts and can keep its own financial supervision.

The previous government’s extensive audit of EU’s competences involving business and civil society was broadly supportive of the current distribution. It is true that the UK does not always have its way, but as my LSE colleagues have shown, British governments have voted in 97 percent of cases with the majority in the period 2004-2009 and 87 percent in 2009-2015 in the Council.

Hence, it is somewhat meaningless to measure which proportion of UK laws emanate from the EU. The widely cited study of the House of Common’s library arrived at figures of 6.8% for primary legislation and 14.1% for secondary legislation. Even these figures overestimate EU influence as the ‘degree of involvement varied from passing reference to explicit implementation’.

The second democratic channels are the elections to the European Parliament (EP). Not only has the EP acquired real power to block or change legislation in most policy areas, for instance, its rejection of the controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).

The EP has also increasing powers over the European Commission as a hybrid body combining the powers of a regulator with more political functions of proposing new legislation. The first function relies on having appropriate expertise and is typically-shielded from undue political influence in most countries. The second function no doubt requires political accountability and democratic responsiveness and the primary body to do this is the European Parliament.

In 1999, the EP brought about the resignation of the Santer-Commission after a transnational network of investigative journalists exposed cases of corruption and wrong-doing. This case also illustrated vividly that national-based media can hold supranational institutions to account and that pan-European debates are possible.

At the 2014 elections, the major European party groupings, Socialists and Democrats and the European People’s Party (EPP) campaigned with lead candidates for Commission president after a change in the Lisbon Treaty allowed for this personalisation. When the EPP emerged as the winner on a decent turnout of 42.6 percent, its candidate Jean-Claude Juncker became President against the opposition of the UK and Hungary.

The reason why this outcome appeared as a surprise to British voters in contrast to those of other countries was because Labour and Conservatives had pretended that the Treaty change was meaningless and most British media uncritically bought this line and thus gave the candidates hardly any publicity in contrast to, for instance, Germany as the LSE’s Simon Hix showed. Given this precedent, it is likely that next time more citizens will vote in European elections according to the candidates and policies on offer, not the popularity of the domestic government.

The last avenue of influence is the Citizens Initiative which obliges the European Commission to consider new legislation on a particular issue as long as it is backed by at least one million EU citizens, coming from at least 7 out of the 28 member states. Even though if it does not force the Commission to actually legislate, it is a powerful tool to put issues on the agenda.

Given the diversity of national systems and cultures, there is no ready-made blue-print available for democracy above the nation-state. The greatest potential lies not in protracted constitutional reforms involving governments with little interests to cede power, but in changing everyday democratic practice within and across member states.

There needs to be greater scrutiny of ministers’ actions in Brussels by the media to prevent them getting away with ‘saying one thing in Brussels, and another thing to the domestic audience’ (Boris Johnson). It has been argued that the House of Common’s scrutiny of European affairs has been weak and many MPs have lacked the motivation to invest time in this role as they feel this was not going be sufficiently visible in the media and appreciated by constituencies.

The media should also report more extensively and accurately about who takes what decisions with which consequences in the EU. And civil society organisations and citizens could use more fully the existing opportunities to influence the direction of the EU and campaign for the changes they want, both at home, and with citizens in other countries. A more democratic EU starts at home, but cannot stop there.

Christoph Meyer is Professor of European & International Politics, King’s College London

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Ahead of the University of Edinburgh’s free online course Towards Brexit? The UK’s EU Referendum and one month before the referendum, here are five things you need to know about the Brexit debate:

European Flag, European Parliament, CC-BY-NC-ND-2.0

1. We’ve been here before

In 1975, the UK held its first-ever nationwide referendum on whether to stay in the European Economic Community (the precursor to the EU). The result was a two-thirds majority in favour of remaining in the Common Market. That said, it’s very unusual for a country to hold a vote directly on the question of EU membership. Most past referendums on the EU in member states have been about ratifying new treaties.

2. The UK’s not so different

Over the years, the difficult relationship between the UK and the EU has become legendary. For instance, it has opt-outs from a number of European policies, like the euro or borderless travel (Schengen). This reputation can sometimes give the impression that the UK is particularly alone or different. However, that’s not really the case. In reality, every member has its own issues with the EU – some are just more obvious than others.

3. Global interest is high

Although the referendum will be decided by UK voters, many countries, along with companies and organisations around the world, have a substantial interest in the outcome. For this reason, a number have broken with the convention of not engaging in a country’s internal debates and have expressed their views on the UK’s EU membership. However, it’s not clear what impact these interventions actually have on public opinion.

4. The facts? It’s not as easy as that

The EU can be quite complicated and the referendum debate has featured topics such as the economy, migration, security and democracy. Many people will be looking for information before the vote. However, most of the questions around these issues come down to personal opinion, rather than factual answers. While facts and evidence do naturally exist, they can only inform. In the end, voters will have to make up their own minds on whether EU membership is worthwhile or not.

5. The referendum won’t end the debate

This June’s vote is just the latest landmark in the UK’s history with the European Union. Whatever the outcome on 23 June, the referendum won’t settle the issue. If the result is to leave, the negotiations that follow will focus on what kind of relationship the UK will have with the EU going forward. If the result is to remain, the debate on EU membership will continue and calls for a second referendum will likely materialise. Either way, the saga will carry on.

Find out more – join the free online course: 
Towards Brexit? The UK’s EU Referendum

This article was originally published on the FutureLearn blog.

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Shortened link: britainseurope.uk/22

How to cite this article:

Salamone, A (2016) ‘Five Things You Need to Know About Brexit’, Britain’s Europe (Ideas on Europe), 24 May 2016, britainseurope.uk/22

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The EU debate is a minefield, with half-truths and whole-lies coming from both camps. The reason for this, as I understand it, is twofold. Firstly, it is impossible to know what will happen in the event that the UK leaves the EU, or indeed what will happen in five, ten or fifty years’ time if we vote to stay on 23 June. Ergo, objective fact is largely off the table from the get-go. Secondly, the notion of ‘truth’ is tricky in ideological discussions. I recently saw Peter Hitchins make a brief intervention on the EU debate and was struck by his point that the signatories of the Irish Proclamation did not stand on the steps of the General Post Office with a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the impact on the economic forecasts and trade balance of the country. They held an ideological belief and made an impassioned political decision. By the same measure, the reason that ‘facts’ aren’t working as well in this referendum debate as some (myself included) might like, is because it is not a decision that can be based solely on fact. Moreover, in most cases, there genuinely are (at least) two answers to the question at hand. Untangling the accumulation of myths, misnomers and soundbites which permeate the referendum narrative is a job for someone more intelligent (not to mention more patient) than myself. However, in the spirit of ‘have blog, will air musings’, I draw attention here to one incident which has stuck in my mind (and which I noted down at the time) as emblematic of the problem with the EU referendum campaign.

On 3 March, BBC Radio 4’s Today programme conducted an interview with Conservative MP Bernard Jenkin, a member of the board of the Vote Leave campaign. Today presenter Mishal Husain put to Mr Jenkin that Sir Peter Ricketts, a recently-retired former ambassador, has raised concerns that if Britain were to leave the EU, France might cease to conduct border checks on those seeking entrance to the UK. Unusually for an MP on the Today programme, Mr Jenkin went on to directly address Sir Ricketts’ point with an equally valid counter-argument, but before he did, he made the following remarks:

‘Find me a diplomat that’s anti-EU…one of the reasons we’re in the mess we’re in is because we have diplomats who have religiously and slavishly pursued the European integration policy…they all have a certain view…it’s interesting, as soon as they retire they turn out to have this very pro-European view. I’m afraid I think it rather discredits the idea that we’ve got an impartial diplomatic service.’

In the interest of brevity, I will side-step the wealth of nonsense which Mr Jenkin managed to pack around his perfectly reasonable point that the French government is a rational and responsible body and is unlikely to severe all agreements with the UK overnight should we vote to leave. I will also by-pass the irony that I agreed with this central point, and yet he managed to present it and its contribution to his broader position in a way that was so infuriatingly exaggerated, misleading and childish that, in the end, it served only to convince me that I don’t want to be on any team that he is a part of. Instead, I draw attention to Mr Jenkin’s utterly bizarre string of logic which led him to conclude that, since British diplomats are commonly pro-EU, they must have been harbouring this dirty secret for many years and are somehow damaging British interests with their partiality.

I don’t have much difficulty accepting the premise of Mr Jenkin’s concern – it seems quite likely that many British diplomats (and, I imagine, diplomats from most other member states too) are pro-EU. What I find confusing is why he thinks that this is an innate characteristic, a preference which exists and pre-existed in British diplomats independent of their professional or personal experience, as if he suspects that they all went to a secret boarding school where they were drilled in the values of ‘ever closer union’ and prepared for infiltration into the UK’s diplomatic corps, only revealing their true, traitorous identities upon retirement. To my mind, the trend that Mr Jenkin identifies can best, if not only, be interpreted as follows: British diplomats (to accept Mr Jenkin’s premise that they all hold the same view as Sir Ricketts), having spent many years living in and working with the EU, have reached the conclusion that it is a project worthy of our support and participation. Possessing what is probably the most direct experience and expertise in the matter that it is possible to have, British diplomats consider the UK’s membership of the EU to be highly valuable and have chosen to voice this view in the context of the referendum campaign. Essentially, an expert group has presented its arguments for why the UK should vote ‘remain’.

This is an example of precisely the kind of rational contribution which should be being made in the referendum campaign. The view of Sir Ricketts and his colleagues, in light of their experience and expertise, carries value and voters should be exposed to it. This is not to say that it is wholly objective, of course it is not. British diplomats have particular experiences and, to that extent, their position is unavoidably biased. Furthermore, it would be impossible for me to say that I am certain that the argument they put forward is nothing but the unequivocal truth. These things are, incidentally, also true of any view aired by Mr Jenkin and his colleagues in the Vote Leave campaign, by those in the ‘remain’ camp, or by anyone else. However, by making his background known and ‘presenting his credentials’ to the British public, Sir Ricketts has made a valuable contribution which they can scrutinise and evaluate in the forming of their own judgements. Perhaps, rather than it being pro-EU campaigners who ‘lack confidence in this country’, as Mr Jenkin asserted later in his interview, it is those (on both sides of the issue) who exploit the inherently ideological nature of the referendum debate by framing informed opinion as inherent bias who lack confidence in British voters to decide for themselves.

—

Having finally submitted my thesis and in light of the impending referendum, I digress in this post from health governance – please excuse the misleading platform.

The post Fact, ideology and logic in the EU referendum campaign appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The UK’s referendum on EU membership is now firmly on the horizon. Referendum Day – 23 June – could well be remembered as a landmark in the UK’s relations with the rest of the world, as well as for its own constitutional settlement.

EU Grunge Flag, Nicolas Raymond, CC-BY-2.0

Campaigning has been in full swing for a number of weeks, with a plethora of claims and counterclaims from all sides on issues ranging from the economy and migration to democracy and sovereignty. Depending on the perspective, the debate has been characterised by too much information, too little, or perhaps not enough of the right kind. Many are looking for a clear explanation of the facts and an informed analysis of what’s going on.

In truth, the EU referendum has brought about a different kind of political debate in the UK. The European Union is a particularly complicated organisation, even to those of us who study it every day. Although important and worthwhile, it can be a real challenge to discuss each of the many policy areas connected with the EU in an informed and meaningful way.

In that sense, the referendum has produced a national conversation on a set of international (and often rather technical) issues. This reality makes it more difficult to have a thorough debate. It also risks demotivating those who are interested in the referendum but find the whole affair excessively complex.

This process is also a novelty for the EU. It is not the first time a country has seriously considered leaving – that was, of course, also the UK, with the 1975 Common Market Referendum (in which over two-thirds voted to stay). Nevertheless, it is out of the ordinary for a country to unilaterally seek a renegotiation of its own terms of EU membership, and then hold a referendum specifically on the question of staying in or leaving the EU.

More broadly, uncertainty has been a central feature of the debate. This is a consequence of the lack of precedent – no Member State has ever withdrawn from the EU – and the volume of issues that would need to be addressed in the event of exit. It is also a reflection of the bargaining and compromise-driven nature of the EU. Many of the questions to be answered would be decided by political leaders as they went along. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the variables at play.

Even if the UK stays, the EU will not be the same. The renegotiation would be implemented, which, if relatively limited in its reach, could still set the trend for a whole new kind of differentiation between how countries work in the EU. Beyond that, the EU is faced with a host of major challenges, each of which is and will continue to put pressure on it to adapt. This impetus may necessitate decisions on how far countries are willing to integrate.

Many are in search of facts and analysis on the EU referendum. To that end, the University of Edinburgh, in partnership with FutureLearn, is offering a free online course: Towards Brexit? The UK’s EU Referendum.

This three-week course, run by experts in the field, guides participants through the referendum – before and after the vote.

In the first two weeks, we look at the how the UK ended up having a referendum on EU membership, the campaign issues, public opinion and alternatives to being in the EU. In the final week, we reflect on the result and what it means for the UK and the rest of Europe. The course also serves as a forum to discuss the referendum as it happens with participants from around the world. It features resources to learn more about the issues and includes the opportunity to put questions to experts each week.

Whatever the result, the referendum will change the UK, and the EU as well. Join us as we explore one of the biggest decisions facing the UK in a generation: to remain in or to leave the European Union.

Towards Brexit? The UK’s EU Referendum, the free and open online course with Anthony Salamone, Laura Cram and Charlie Jeffery, begins on FutureLearn on 13 June 2016. The course is also on Twitter @EUrefMOOC and with the hashtag #EdinEUref.

This article was originally published on European Futures.

Please read the comments policy before commenting.

Shortened link: britainseurope.uk/21

How to cite this article:

Salamone, A (2016) ‘Towards Brexit? The UK’s EU Referendum’, Britain’s Europe (Ideas on Europe), 23 May 2016, britainseurope.uk/21

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The approaching referendum on the UK’s EU membership is set to be historic, whatever its outcome. It will either be only the second time in European history that the people of a Member State has specifically endorsed continued membership (the first also being the UK with the 1975 Common Market Referendum), or the first time such a people has explicitly opted to end membership.

Plenary Session in Strasbourg – Jan 2016, European Parliament, CC-BY-NC-ND-2.0

It is abundantly clear that either result would have implications for both the UK and the rest of the EU. However, knowable specifics are in short supply. This is particularly so for the option of exit from the EU, as it would by its very nature change the status quo. The high levels of uncertainty surrounding the consequences of the referendum options is partly a function of genuine unknowns of what would happen next and partly a product of the various objectives of the different campaigns.

One certainty is that this referendum will not settle the question of the UK’s relationship with the EU. In fact, it is quite likely that another EU referendum will take place in the UK in the short-to-medium term.

If the UK votes to leave the EU, the UK government will at some point afterwards notify the EU of its intent to withdraw and a process of negotiation will begin. The procedure is outlined in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. However, the guidelines are relatively broad and leave a wide margin of manoeuvre for the negotiating parties to find an agreement on the shape of UK-EU relations. One point of clarity is that the negotiations can last up to two years – unless an extension is agreed by all parties – else the UK will automatically withdraw from the EU with no agreement.

As with many aspects of the post-vote, we cannot say how long negotiations would take (particularly if extended), what they would focus on or what the outcome would be. Consequently, the substance of an agreement could vary significantly, dependent upon the demands of the remaining EU Member States and the expectations of the (possibly reshuffled) UK government.

Separate from treaty ratification requirements, any UK-EU agreement will need to be legitimated at home in some way. Another referendum is a plausible option, for two principal reasons. First, the current referendum consults on membership, and not on alternatives to membership. The people will give an answer only on whether they wish to stay in or leave the EU, not what kind of relationship they would want in the event of exit.

Second, the shape of that relationship upon exit could vary so widely that it might necessitate the consent of the people. For instance, if significant numbers vote to leave because they want to limit EU migration to the UK, and the subsequent agreement continues to allow the free movement of people (as part of maintaining access to the single market), how could that be politically sustainable? Conversely, if the agreement takes away features of EU membership which people would prefer to retain, that could also create difficulties.

If the UK votes to stay in the EU, the question of EU membership will undoubtedly persist. With the recent precedent of holding a referendum on the issue, it will become easier to argue for a similar vote in future. Political motivations, from internal party politics to the impact of the fringe on the mainstream, could generate momentum for another referendum. It could well become a question of when rather than if the next referendum will be held.

Moreover, the UK government is obliged under the European Union Act 2011 to hold a referendum if it proposes a substantial further transfer of power to the EU. While EU treaty change is not an imminent prospect, it will happen at some point in the medium term, and it is possible that a referendum on the treaty would have to be held in the UK. Although such a vote would not be an explicit decision on staying or leaving, the result would nevertheless serve as an indirect judgement of the UK’s EU relationship.

All of these possibilities point to the prospect of another EU referendum in the UK in the foreseeable future. For a country not in the tradition of holding many (nationwide) referendums, the UK may well become more accustomed to them. Their success as a means of regulating the UK-EU relationship will depend on the turnout in the votes, how the results are interpreted and acted upon and whether they are deemed to ‘solve’ the questions that they ask.

This article was originally published on European Futures.

Please read the comments policy before commenting.

Shortened link: britainseurope.uk/20

How to cite this article:

Salamone, A (2016) ‘This June’s EU Referendum is Unlikely to be the UK’s Last’, Britain’s Europe (Ideas on Europe), 22 May 2016, britainseurope.uk/20

The post This June’s EU Referendum is Unlikely to be the UK’s Last appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Have you ever noticed how you never see Cameron and Flynn in the same place at the same time?

After what feels like a lifetime, we move into the final weeks of this EU referendum campaign. A quick peek at the calendar only gives us five weeks until the vote and all the talk of long campaigns and attention deficits feels pushed to one side, as we flip into rushes for the line, tales of thousands of miles covered and last minute surprises.

I exaggerate. But only a bit.

So far, the real mark of the referendum has been how predictable it has been. Neither side has produced a killer argument, neither side has given any hostages to fortune that weren’t already out there. Even this week’s excursus into “EU as fourth Reich” by Boris was notable more for having taken so long to come out than for its content: I recall Nigel Lawson saying something similar back in February and no-one really noticed/cared.

It’s not that no one’s tiring to make the debate come to life. Remain, in particular, have thrown a lot at the debate, from Obama to the IMF, with a cavalcade of foreign leaders and experts bringing their gravitas and research to present a pretty robust economic case.

However, like the famous Crimean engagement, it’s magnificent, but it’s not effective, or at least as far as the polling goes. Admittedly, there’s obviously some issue around polling, which effectively places everyone in a state of profound uncertainty about who’s where. Given that uncertainty, fighting as if you still had everything to play for makes sense.

Leave appear to be taking the path of keeping back on the big guns, assuming they have them to produce. If public opinion is hard to measure because few people are really engaged, then it makes sense to wait until it’s more pressing and engaging. Of course, this might be as good as it gets, in which case the last-mover advantage is weaker. Our work on social media campaigning suggests that if there is an uptick of interest it has been small so far.

If there is a dog that has yet to bark very loudly, then it’s immigration. Vote Leave, in particular, has not been willing to go too far down that route, but there is both opportunity and incentive, given the persistently high levels of public interest in the issue. Seen in this light, Turkey might find itself been encouraged not to pull the plug on the refugee deal just yet.

Whether things will change gear in these last weeks remains unclear. Part of the problem is that the arguments are all very well-rehearsed, so finding lines that cut through and engage is very difficult. Even Cameron’s ‘security’ framing has fallen to the wayside somewhat, despite the potential it displayed.

In addition, the scope for external events to play in the debate looks to be limited. Should the Turkey deal fall apart, it will still take some time for volume of refugees and migrants crossing to Greece to reach last summer’s levels. The postponing of any major EU policy initiative, and of most of the British government’s work, also takes some of the potential for heat. The apparent resolution of the doctors’ strike is a symptom of this wind-down, and part of the reason others are looking to make advantage in the next month.

However, while this might play to Remain’s advantage, there is a sting in the tail. Turnout looks to be a crucial factor, as Leavers are much more enthused about the referendum. If the government and Remain draw too much of the life from the debate – to avoid annoying people – then they might find they still lose. Moreover, Leave have every incentive to help them make this happen. Difficult choices all round.

The post Charge of the Light Brigade appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Τον Μάρτιο του 2016 η Κύπρος έγινε το τέταρτο από τα πέντε Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης που έλαβαν οικονομική βοήθεια από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (ΕΕ) και το Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο (ΔΝΤ). Ολοκλήρωσε το πρόγραμμα του με το ΔΝΤ την 7η Μαρτίου και με τον Ευρωπαϊκό Μηχανισμό Στήριξης (ΕΜΣ) την 31η Μαρτίου. Αυτό παρουσιάζεται συχνά ως ‘έξοδος από τα Μνημόνια’. Είναι όμως πραγματικά έτσι; Τι σημαίνει η ολοκλήρωση ενός προγράμματος οικονομικής βοήθειας με την ΕΕ και το ΔΝΤ, και πότε επέρχεται η πραγματική έξοδος από το Μνημόνιο;

Τα προγράμματα οικονομικής βοήθειας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ αποτελούνται από δύο μέρη: (1) την δανειακή σύμβαση ή σύμβαση διευκόλυνσης, και (2) τις διαρθρωτικές μεταρρυθμίσεις υπό τον όρο ικανοποίησης των οποίων απελευθερώνονται οι δόσεις της οικονομικής βοήθειας. Οι μεταρρυθμίσεις αυτές περιλαμβάνονται στα διαβόητα πλέον Μνημόνια (Memorandums of Understanding – MoUs), τα οποία συνάπτονται μεταξύ του Κράτους-Μέλους που επωφελείται της οικονομικής βοήθειας, του ΔΝΤ και της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής (εκπροσωπώντας τον ΕΜΣ, μέλη του οποίου είναι τα Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης). Η αξιολόγηση τήρησης των όρων του  Μνημονίου διεξάγεται από την λεγόμενη ‘Τρόικα’: Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα (ΕΚΤ) και ΔΝΤ.

Η εκτενής δυνατότητα της Τρόικα να επηρεάζει σχεδόν άμεσα ένα μεγάλο εύρος πολιτικών των Κρατών-Μελών υπό οικονομική βοήθεια, πολλές από τις οποίες θεωρούνται καίριες για ένα κράτος (π.χ. προϋπολογισμός, φορολογία, κλπ), όπως και η σημαντικά μειωμένη συμμετοχή αντιπροσωπευτικών θεσμών (π.χ. εθνικό Κοινοβούλιο),  έχουν εγείρει  ανησυχίες σχετικά με την επίπτωση της διαδικασίας αυτής στις αρχές και σωστή λειτουργία της δημοκρατίας. Η ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος οικονομικής βοήθειας παρουσιάζεται συχνά ως η πολύ-αναμενόμενη λύση των ανωτέρω προβλημάτων και η επαναφορά της κανονικότητας και ορθής λειτουργίας των δημοκρατικών διαδικασιών. Στην πραγματικότητα, όμως, η ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος δεν συνεπάγεται και έξοδο από τα Μνημόνια.

Όσον αφορά στο ΔΝΤ, μετά την λήξη του προγράμματος και εάν το επωφελούμενο κράτος χρωστάει περισσότερο από το ποσό βοήθειας που αντιστοιχεί στο 100% της ποσόστωσης του στο ΔΝΤ (ή εάν κριθεί αναγκαίο από το ΔΝΤ ανεξαρτήτως του οφειλόμενου ποσού), άρχεται η διαδικασία παρακολούθησης μετά το πρόγραμμα – το λεγόμενο Post-Programme Monitoring (PPM). Η διαδικασία περιλαμβάνει την παρακολούθηση των πολιτικών του επωφελούμενου κράτους, ώστε να  εντοπιστούν αυτές που θα έθεταν σε κίνδυνο την οικονομική βιωσιμότητα και πρόοδο του κράτους και, κατ’ επέκταση, την αποπληρωμή του ΔΝΤ. Το PPM διεξάγεται δύο φορές το χρόνο.

Όσον αφορά στην ΕΕ, έχει δημιουργηθεί μία παρόμοια διαδικασία παρακολούθησης, με την ονομασία Post-Programme Surveillance (PPS), σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 14 του Κανονισμού 472/2013. Η διαδικασία εφαρμόζεται μετά την ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος οικονομικής βοήθειας ενός Κράτους-Μέλους της Ευρωζώνης και έως ότου εξοφληθεί το 75% της χρηματοδοτικής βοήθειας που έχει ληφθεί (είτε από τον τωρινό και μόνιμο ΕΜΣ, είτε από προηγούμενους μηχανισμούς οικονομικής βοήθειας που είχαν συσταθεί παλαιότερα). Σύμφωνα με την διαδικασία του PPS, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και η ΕΚΤ διενεργούν τακτικές αποστολές και επιθεωρήσεις στο Κράτος-Μέλος, για να εκτιμήσουν την οικονομική κατάσταση του. Σε περίπτωση διαπίστωσης πολιτικών που θέτουν σε κίνδυνο την οικονομική βιωσιμότητα, και συνεπώς την δυνατότητα αποπληρωμής της βοήθειας που έχει χορηγηθεί, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και η ΕΚΤ συντάσσουν έκθεση σχετικά με τα διορθωτικά μέτρα που το Συμβούλιο των Υπουργών της ΕΕ έχει τη δυνατότητα να ζητήσει να θεσπιστούν απο το Κράτος-Μέλος προς διόρθωση των αποκλίσεων. Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι η διαδικασία ψηφοφορίας της ανωτέρω έκθεσης στο Συμβούλιο των Υπουργών είναι η αντίστροφη ειδική πλειοψηφία ή Reverse Qualified Majority Voting (RQMV). Αυτό σημαίνει ότι η έκθεση της Επιτροπής θεωρείται ότι έχει εγκριθεί, εκτός εάν σχηματιστεί πλειοψηφία καταψήφισης της – δηλαδή είναι εύκολο η έκθεση να υιοθετεί και πιο δύσκολο να απορριφθεί.

Στην ουσία λοιπόν, η ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος, η οποία παρουσιάζεται συχνά και ως το τέλος των Μνημονίων, αφορά ουσιαστικά μόνο στην ικανότητα του επωφελούμενου Κράτους-Μέλους να δανειστεί από τις αγορές. Το μέρος του προγράμματος που αφορά στην παρακολούθηση πολιτικών του Κράτους-Μέλους παραμένει για ένα σημαντικό χρονικό διάστημα μετά τη λήξη της οικονομικής βοήθειας. Το ίδιο παραμένει και η επιτήρηση της Τρόικα.

Ως εκ τούτου, είναι πολύ σαφές ότι η Κύπρος είναι μακριά από την πραγματική έξοδο της από το πρόγραμμα οικονομικής βοήθειας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ, όπως και τα υπόλοιπα κράτη μέλη της Ευρωζώνης που έλαβαν σχετική βοήθεια. Η Κύπρος είναι σε θέση να εξασφαλίσει οικονομικούς πόρους από τις αγορές και δεν λαμβάνει πλέον οικονομική βοήθεια. Παρά ταύτα, η επιτήρηση και αξιολόγηση των πολιτικών, ήτοι, επί της ουσίας το Μνημόνιο, θα παραμείνουν τουλάχιστον μέχρι το 2029 για την ΕΕ, δηλαδή 13 χρόνια μετά την λήξη της οικονομικής βοήθειας και, για το ΔΝΤ, έως ότου εξοφλήσει περισσότερα από €820 εκατομμύρια.

Οι δημοκρατικές επιπτώσεις των ανωτέρω είναι σημαντικές. Μέσω της διαδικασίας οικονομικής βοήθειας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ, η Κύπρος θα είναι υπό στενή παρακολούθηση των πολιτικών της επί τη ουσίας για σχεδόν 20 έτη. Και αυτό, δεδομένης της περιορισμένης οικονομικής βοήθειας που έλαβε η Κύπρος σε σύγκριση με άλλα Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης, όπως π.χ. η Ελλάδα. Για τα κράτη αυτά, η περίοδος επιτήρησης των πολιτικών, ήτοι του Μνημονίου, θα είναι πολύ μεγαλύτερη.

The post Πότε μία χώρα “βγαίνει από το Μνημόνιο” ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Political myths are a particular kind of narrative used to shape the legitimacy of a political system, writes Jeremy F. G. Moulton. He argues that, despite the difference between the academic and common usages of ‘myth’, political myth theory can generate important insights for political authority, and that it may prove useful in understanding questions around the EU’s legitimacy.

Flag of the European Union – Berlin 2012, Thomas Quine, CC-BY-2.0

Last week, I presented a paper at the 2016 UACES Student Forum Conference at the University of Kent’s Brussels School of International Studies. The paper focused on EU climate action and its interpretation as political myth; that is, a story that is used to explain and justify political authority.

Like most in academia, I like to flatter myself that my chosen field of study is both interesting and important – the reaction from the other attendees at the conference at least gave me reason to believe that the former may well be true. The discussion following my presentation revealed that political myth is a subject that has the potential to be of great interest and to promote spirited discussion, but it also showed that, as of yet, it has a limited readership.

This did not come as a great surprise. Within the academic writing on political myth theory, it has been recognised that sparse attention is paid to the matter. Yet, there is reason to argue that this should be (and is) changing. Since JCMS’s special issue on the subject in the EU in early 2010, more overt attention has been given to the European project’s political myths. But misconceptions about what political myth is remain prevalent.

What a Political Myth Is

Political myths are narratives that become central to a polity’s, or other political authority’s, raison d’être. They are used both by those in political authority and the wider population in order to legitimate that political authority. A political myth is a story that must be widely accepted as true, though its veracity is not the central issue. In fact, the truth behind a myth may well be questionable. What matters is the dominant belief and acceptance of the story.

I think political myths are best understood as developing in four stages (an approach I’ve adapted from the work of Della Sala 2010 and Bouchard 2013).

1. Initial framing – in this stage, a potential myth is framed as a narrative – one would imagine by those acting within or in favour of a given polity or political authority.
2. Diffusion – here the narrative is told and spread. Two distinct roles emerge: storytellers and listeners. For a potential myth to be successful, initial listeners must become storytellers and further diffuse the story. According to Della Sala, aside from political actors, initial storytellers are likely to be ‘cultural elites, public intellectuals and academics’.
3. Ritualisation – in this stage, a narrative becomes part of normal life, it is widely accepted as fact and becomes a basis of political, social, cultural and collective action.
4. Sacralisation – in this final stage, the narrative becomes a central part of a polity’s mode of being and the two become inextricably linked.

There are a number of ways to classify and differentiate political myths, but one set, that of foundational and functional myths, is especially useful in relation to the EU.

Foundational myths are the stories that relate to the how and why of a polity’s formation. In the EU, foundational myths are of European peace, necessitated by two World Wars originating in Europe, and that of a united Europe being a prosperous Europe.

Functional myths are those that are used to justify a polity’s political authority and existence based on the functional benefits the polity provides. Of special interest to me is that of EU climate action, but other functional political myths in the EU include the EU as a sui generis international actor, as a protector of fundamental rights and as the Single Market and source of competitiveness.

What a Political Myth Isn’t

One of the queries that arose from the presentation of my paper was whether political myths were not simply narratives. In the political myth literature, one finds many references to narratives. Some who write on narratives also find it useful to conflate the two (e.g. Manners and Murray 2016).

However, there is an important analytical distinction between them. Political myths can be understood as extensions of narratives. One can state that a truly successful narrative is one that becomes a political myth – as Della Sala writes ‘political myths are sacred narratives’ – that is, narratives that have progressed through the stages of mythification to the point of become sacralised.

The central difficulty with political myth is the terminology. ‘Myth’ is a term that has such a clear definition in the vernacular that, without background reading on political myth theory, one naturally approaches the term thinking it denotes a fiction. This is something that Flood has written on, saying:

Studies of myth almost invariably open with the caveat that the reader should not confuse the popular, pejorative term myth as a synonym for falsehood, distortion, or delusion with the scholarly usage which stresses that myths have unquestioned validity within the belief systems of the social groups which cherish them.

I would temper Flood’s certainty that the scholarly term identifies narratives of ‘unquestioned validity’ with the addition of ‘largely’, as every story has its disbelievers. With that aside, the quote from Flood necessarily establishes the two separate uses of the term.

Whilst it might appear desirable to create a new, academic term for ‘myth’ that steers away from any confusion, I would maintain that this is not the best course. It would mean, at least, partial divorce from the rich body of political myth literature that exists to date and would represent something of a disruption to the field and its theoretical development.

Instead, in academic texts, the term should be defined clearly, with the alternative meaning addressed. In less academic, more public-facing discussions of the subject, I would suggest that alternatively terminology is used. Perhaps Della Sala’s ‘sacred narratives’ would be suitable.

Myths and the European Union

The future of the EU is dependent on the Union finding narratives that resonate with European citizens to the point of becoming sacralised. It should be remembered that political myths can be used to both bolster the legitimacy of a polity and undermine it. As Aning and Nsiah have written, if leaders fail to provide a new myth, then ‘any passionate fringe group will fashion a political myth – positive or negative – for the state’.

In the context of EU crisis and raised levels of Euroscepticism, I believe that political myth theory allows for EU scholars to ask important questions on European unity and can provide insight into possible pathways for the future of a unified Europe.

Academics have a role to play in the establishment, diffusion and interpretation of these potential myths. For example, scholarly investigations into the negative myths that have developed around the EU, such as the democratic deficit, would make fascinating additions to a field which has largely focused on positive myths to date. I certainly look forward to the development of the field in the coming years, and hope to see others sharing my enthusiasm for it.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Jeremy F. G. Moulton | @JFMoulton
University of Hull

Jeremy F. G. Moulton is PhD Candidate in Politics at the University of Hull. His research focuses on EU climate action, political myth and multi-level governance.

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On March 2016, Cyprus became the fourth out of the five Eurozone Member States under European Union (EU) – International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance to end its program – a so called ‘exit’ (IMF on the 7th). Despite appearances and terminology, however, this is actually not a whole-out, true program exit. What does it really mean to end an EU-IMF program, and is it really an ‘exit’?

Cyprus requested financial assistance on 25th of June 2012.  The request came amid growing problems within the Cypriot banking sector, primarily due to its exposure to Greek debt and Private Sector Involvement (PSI) Greek bond ‘haircut’ process. However, the program was entered into almost a year after (29th of April 2013), on account of differences that arose during the negotiations between the Troika and the Cypriot government. Because of the prolonged negotiating period and the consequent increasing flight of capital from Cypriot banks, a bank holiday was imposed for almost two weeks and ensuing capital controls continued for two years until April 2015. Cyprus borrowed a total of up to €10 bln from the EU-IMF financial assistance: €9 bln from ESM and €1 bln from IMF (equal to 563 per cent of Cyprus’ IMF quota).

What of the process of EU-IMF financial assistance? The financial assistance program consists of two parts: (1) the financial assistance or loan agreement, and (2) the policy adjustment that this assistance is conditional upon, outlined in the now infamous Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). This policy conditionality is monitored by the so-called Troika: The European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF. The MoUs, as well as the intrusive monitoring capacity that the Troika has in the Member States under this policy conditionality framework that cover an extensive amount of policies that are key to a State (e.g. budget or taxation), have raised concerns in terms of the democratic process. The end of the program is often portrayed as the long awaited remedy and redemption of democratic process. But is this really the case?

The process of ending a financial assistance program is similar for the EU and the IMF. For the IMF, after the program concludes, and provided that the State concerned owes more than the amount of the assistance equivalent to 100 per cent of its IMF quota (or should it be deemed necessary by the IMF regardless of the amount owed), the process of Post-Program Monitoring (PPM) is initiated. The process was introduced in 2000 and is provisioned under the IMF’s operating principles. PPM aims at ensuring that the State concerned returns the amount owed to the IMF regularly and on time, by monitoring policies and circumstances of that State in order to identify and address risks that could jeopardize its progress to external viability and thus impair repayment of the IMF.  PPM is conducted normally twice a year.

For the EU, there has been a similar process instituted, termed Post-Program Surveillance (PPS), under Article 14 of Regulation 472/2013. PPS applies as long as the Eurozone Member State concerned has repaid less than 75% of the financial assistance under the ESM (or the previous EFSM and EFSF SA). Under PPS, the EC and ECB conduct regular review missions to the State concerned to assess its economic situation and, where applicable, report on corrective measures, which the Council can then request be adopted by that State. It is also worth noting that the voting procedure in the Council is reverse qualified majority (RQMV), i.e. the Commission’s report is deemed adopted unless a blocking majority is formed, making it easier to adopt the report and harder to reject it.

In essence, then, the ending of the program only refers to the ability of the State concerned to procure capital through the markets on its own. The policy monitoring and conditionality aspects remain very much in place for a substantial amount of time after financial assistance has ended, as does the Troika monitoring and supervision.

As such, it is clear that Cyprus is a long way from actually exiting its EU-IMF program, as are the rest of the Eurozone Member States that received assistance. While Cyprus is able to procure financial resources on its own, policy conditionality and monitoring is still in place, and will be for a substantial amount of time. The EU’s PPS will last at least until 2029, i.e. 13 years from now, while the IMF’s PPM will last until Cyprus has repaid more than €820 mln to the IMF.

The democratic repercussions of this in the political realm are considerable. Through the EU-IMF financial assistance process, Cyprus will have been under close policy monitoring and conditionality effectively for close to 20 years! And this is considering Cyprus’ limited financial assistance; consider, for example, the rest of the Eurozone Member States which have received considerably more assistance (e.g. Greece through the EU).

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Boris Johnson has spoken out against holding a referendum on whether the UK should remain part of the European Union.

The Guardian reported that Mr Johnson’s intervention would help the prime minister, David Cameron.

Mr Johnson told BBC Radio Five Live, “Whether you have an in/out referendum now, I can’t quite see why it would be necessary.”

He added that the prospect of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU would not “appeal”.

Mr Johnson asked, “Suppose Britain voted tomorrow to come out: what would actually happen?”

He continued:

“We’d still have huge numbers of staff trying to monitor what was going on in the community, only we wouldn’t be able to sit in the council of ministers, we wouldn’t have any vote at all. Now I don’t think that’s a prospect that’s likely to appeal.”

It should be noted that this report was from 25 November 2012.

On February 21 this year, Mr Johnson stunned Prime Minister, David Cameron, by announcing he was joining the referendum campaign for Britain to leave the European Union.

Winston Churchill’s grandson, Sir Nicholas Soames, immediately Tweeted:

“Whatever my great friend Boris decides to do I know that he is NOT an outer.”

Just two weeks previously, Mr Johnson had written in his Telegraph column:

“It is also true that the single market is of considerable value to many UK companies and consumers, and that leaving would cause at least some business uncertainty, while embroiling the Government for several years in a fiddly process of negotiating new arrangements, so diverting energy from the real problems of this country – low skills, low social mobility, low investment etc – that have nothing to do with Europe.”

A spokesman for the ‘Remain’ campaign commented, “Everybody in Westminster knows that Boris doesn’t really believe in Out. He’s putting his personal ambition before the national interest.”

Yesterday (11 May 2016) Mr Johnson was quizzed by BBC Radio 4 ‘Today’ presenter, John Humphrys, on whether he had been close to backing Britain to remain in the EU.

Asked Mr Humphrys, “Did you, as the rumour goes, have two columns written, for the Telegraph that is, one for either side of the argument?

“Only at the last minute did you decide to run with the column that said actually, I’m in favour of Brexit, not on staying in. Is that true or is that not true?”

Replied Mr Johnson, “I’ve written all sorts of things”.

Mr Humphrys interjected, “Is that true what I just said?”

Mr Johnson didn’t deny the rumour about two columns, but said instead, “It is perfectly true to say I have thought long and hard about this decision.”

Did Boris back the wrong campaign? We’ll know on 24 June.

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Other stories by Jon Danzig:

• Boris Johnson’s big bluder
• The EU accounts ARE signed off
• What does Brexit look like? Nobody knows
• List of the latest articles by Jon Danzig

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- New Blog Post by Alexandros Kyriakidis: “Is the IMF necessary for the 3rd Greek Program?“

The post NEWS appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Inga Ulnicane

‘Crisis should not be wasted’. Since the beginning of the global economic crisis in 2008, this idea has been repeated many times suggesting that crisis should rather be used as an opportunity for innovative solutions and necessary reforms. One of such potential changes emphasized by European institutions has been prioritization of research and innovation as sources of sustainable growth and a way to avoid similar crisis in future.  What actually happened to research and innovation policies in Europe during the times of crisis? Which measures have European institutions taken to facilitate research and innovation? Has the crisis been used as an opportunity to facilitate research and innovation? These are some of the questions I address in my recent article ‘Research and innovation as sources of renewed growth? EU policy responses to the crisis’ (Ulnicane 2016). The article is part of a special issue ‘EU policies in times of crisis’ comparing the impact of crisis on nine EU policies, e.g. energy, migration, and health.

The article primarily analyses EU research and innovation policy which during the recent decades has considerably expanded (see e.g. Chou and Gornitzka 2014; Chou and Ulnicane 2015; Metz 2015) and combines a number of funding and coordination instruments. However, as research and innovation policy is a shared competence between the EU and national level and most research and innovation funding is allocated nationally, it is also important to look at developments at national level.

 

Increasing expectations vs. decreasing or stagnating budgets

While expectations that research and innovation will help to solve major societal and economic challenges increased during the crisis, funding for research and innovation at the same time decreased or stagnated in a number of countries. Although according to Eurostat data overall share of research and development funding within the European Union increased from 1.85% of GDP in 2008 to 2.03% in 2014 (which nevertheless is still far from declared target of investing 3% of GDP in research and development by 2020), there are huge differences across European countries. The table below shows the data from the Public Funding Observatory 2015 (page 11) of the European University Association. According to these data, during the times of crisis from 2008-2014 public funding for universities continued to increase considerable in Norway, Sweden, and Germany, where it also was part of economic stimulus package. In some other countries like in Austria the increase in funding continued but at a slower pace than before the crisis. At the same time, in many countries in Southern and Eastern Europe public funding for universities has experienced smaller or larger cuts. This has led to growing concerns about increasing innovation divide in Europe among leading and catching-up countries. However, in recent months austerity measures have also affected universities in leading innovation countries – Finland and Denmark.

 

Evolution   of public funding for universities 2008-14 (adjusted for inflation) Countries   Between 20% and 40% increase Germany, Norway, Sweden Between 10% and 20% increase Austria, Belgium, Denmark,   Poland Between 5% increase and 5%   decrease France, Netherlands, Portugal Between 5% and 10% decrease Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia Between 10% and 20% decrease Czech Republic, Serbia, Spain,   Iceland, Italy Between 20% and 40% decrease Ireland, Lithuania, United   Kingdom More than 40% decrease Greece, Hungary, Latvia

 

At times when national public funding is cut, universities are increasingly looking for other sources of funding either from industry or from international programs such as EU Structural Funds or Horizon 2020. Although an overall EU budget for 2014-2020 was cut for the first time, funding for Horizon 2020 program increased for 30% in comparison to the previous Framework Program 7 and reached almost 80 billion euros (which is less than 10% of the overall EU budget). Since then some funding has been redirected to the European Fund for Strategic Investments. First predictions about the next post-2020 EU Framework Program do not foresee a big increase in budget.

Since World War II research and innovation funding and system has expanded tremendously in many European countries. Might the prolonged and predicted stagnation in many European countries and potentially also at EU level imply that in future expansion of research and innovation activities in Europe will slow down? Would expansion of knowledge-based activities move to other world regions like Asia?

 

Reinforced focus on fast and quantifiable impact

In times of austerity, idea of doing ‘more with less’ became more popular expecting research and innovation system to become more efficient and deliver more economic and societal impact with limited resources. Representatives of European research and innovation stakeholder organizations interviewed (Ulnicane 2016) recognize importance of impact but also pointed out challenges of quantifying it and choosing appropriate time horizons for evaluating it. While idea of research impact has been widespread also before the crisis, experts have experienced that during the times of crisis focus on impact increases. One of them explains: ‘Pressure to have to demonstrate that your research is going to produce that many euros in return, it comes and goes but during the times of crisis this is very strongly present.’ A leader of a stakeholder organization tells that research and innovation organizations increasingly have to prove their impact using quantitative indicators:

‘You have to prove your value even tougher in the environment where the budgets are lower. Am I paying for research which may bring something back in years or am I paying for health care? The national governments and politicians have to answer. If you are going to pay money which is long-term and not helping cohesion of society today, you need to prove your impact much more. So research organizations are even more scrutinized by the national governments with very strong knowledge indicators. And reporting on institutional funding they get is getting more and more detailed every year: How many patent applications? How many cooperations you developed with industry? How many contracts you get from industry? How many researchers go to the industry? [...] They have to give numbers. When I talk about impact, it is real economic impact. And how do you show that in research? It is tough. It is not an easy question. And they are asked to prove that more and more.’

Moreover, times of crisis, fast solutions are expected. An expert explains: ‘Science is expected to deliver next iPhone or innovation that creates jobs, that strengthens industry. Science can do all this but this is a long-term investment [...]. There would not be tangible results tomorrow. And in times of crisis this is a thinking that disappears completely, everyone wants a quick solution.’ Focus on impact and efficiency priotizes applied research and puts fundamental science under more pressure. There might be some good opportunities to increase effiency of existing research and innovation systems but at some point there might also be limits how much more can be done with less.

 

Old tension in Europe of Knowledge: excellence vs. cohesion

Crisis reinforced one of the long-standing tensions in the Europe of Knowledge, namely, between excellence and cohesion. Since the early EU Framework Programs in the 1980s and 1990s, major share of highly competitive and excellence oriented Framework Program funding has gone to the Northern countries, while catching-up countries (at that time Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal) mostly benefited from research and innovation support within the EU Structural Funds allocated to less developed regions. Similarly, in the EU budget 2014-2020 the Horizon 2020 provides competitive funding primarily based on excellence, while a considerable share – 83 billion Euros – of Structural Funds goes to research and innovation and small and medium size enterprises in less developed regions. When 12 more recent EU member states released a common position that Horizon 2020 should address the needs of all member states, a specific objective of ‘spreading excellence and widening participation’ was added to the Horizon 2020.

Taking into account that this division – the Framework Program funds go mainly to the northern countries (share of FP funds in national budgets can be higher in catching-up countries because their overall research budgets are lower), while the EU Structural Funds support research and innovation predominantly in catching-up countries – is some 20 or 30 years old, some questions can be asked: Is this a productive division, does it work, and what might be alternative approaches? Have the EU Structural Funds for research and innovation helped to build capacities in southern member states and are they now more successful participants in the competitive Framework Program?  Can there be any lessons drawn from the experience of southern members (e.g. under which conditions Structural Funds help to build research and innovation capacities) that can be applied to ‘new’ members? What are the first results of the EU Structural Funds for research and innovation in eastern member states which have been receiving them for twelve years since 2004? Do new features of the Structural Funds such as ex-ante conditionality of implementing country specific recommendations from the European Semester before receiving the Funds help to increase their role in reforming research and innovation systems in catching-up regions?

 

New paradigms or gradual change?

Although crises are seen as good moments to carry out radical transformations and paradigm changes, developments in EU research and innovation policy in times of crisis can be characterized as incremental and path-dependent. New priorities and funding and coordination instruments largely built on earlier Framework Programs and the Lisbon strategy. Does it mean that crisis has been wasted? Is there a need for radical changes and new paradigms in EU research and innovation policy or is gradual change a more productive way for improving it? What would these new paradigms be? – More considerable shifts of EU funding from agriculture to research and innovation or of competences from national to EU level? Are there any innovative ideas for solving excellence vs. cohesion tension? Will ongoing discussions on Open Science and the European Innovation Council lead to radical or incremental changes?

The study of EU research and innovation policy in times of crisis suggest a number of academic and policy-relevant questions for further investigation including new developments in multi-level governance (e.g. conditionality, European Semester) and their effects; the role and interests of and interactions among the main actors and institutions (European Commission, Parliament, national governments, and stakeholder organizations); and implementation of new and revised policy priorities and instruments. The special issue on EU policies in times of crisis demonstrates that comparison of changes across different policy fields is a powerful approach with a great potential for deepening understanding of recent developments in European integration. I am looking forward to engaging with others interested in these questions also in future and creating novel spaces and forums for addressing them.

 

Dr. Inga Ulnicane is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for European Integration Research, University of Vienna (Austria), where she undertakes research and teaching on European and international knowledge policies and governance. Her recent research on the role of ideas in European science, technology and innovation policy, European integration in research and innovation policy, and international research collaboration has appeared in Journal of European Integration, Journal of Contemporary European Research, and Science and Public Policy. She is one of conveners of the ECPR European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group ‘Politics of Higher Education, Research, and Innovation’ which at the moment has more than 200 members from around the world.

 

References:

Chou, M.-H. and A.Gornitzka (eds) 2014 Building the Knowledge Economy in Europe. New Constellations in European Research and Higher Education Governance  Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Chou, M.-H. and I.Ulnicane (eds) 2015 New Horizons in the Europe of Knowledge. Special issue.  Journal of Contemporary European Research 11(1): 1-152.

Metz, J. 2015 The European Commission, Expert groups, and the Policy Process. Demystifying Technocratic Governance Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ulnicane, I 2016 Research and innovation as sources of renewed growth? EU policy responses to the crisis Journal of European Integration 38(3): 327-41. doi: 10.1080/07036337.2016.1140155

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Tensions have been growing between Greece and the IMF, including a highly controversial Wikileaks leaked conversation between the IMF Mission Chief for Greece and the Head of IMF’s European Department that raised issues at the highest level, with letters being exchanged between IMF’s Managing Director Cristine Lagarde and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. Amongst these concerns, the Greek Prime Minister has questioned both the demands of the IMF, but also, indirectly, whether its participation in the 3rd Greek program is necessary or even desirable.

A brief background: The Greek Prime Minister is the leader of the Party SYRIZA, which won the majority in the January 2015 Greek elections – the first left-based, anti-austerity Party to be elected into government across the EU since the beginning of the crisis. Its electoral mandate was to renegotiate the financial assistance (loan) agreements, to sharply reshape the austerity-based conditionality of this assistance (so-called Memorandums of Understanding or MoUs), and to not accept the supervision of the programs by the so-called Troika, i.e. the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF. There were long and arduous negotiations and a Greek referendum (6 July 2015) with an outcome against further austerity measures but of questionable outcome value. On the eve of the referendum (30 June 2015), the Greek PM requested a new, 3rd Greek financial assistance program and an accompanying MoU, officially initiated in August 2015, in a somewhat dramatic policy drift from the electoral mandate of this government. Despite such drift, SYRIZA obtained a majority again in the September 2015 snap elections following through with the 3rd program.

Why, all the fuss in relation to the IMF? As opposed to the previous two Greek programs, in which the IMF participated through corresponding funding, this 3rd one was agreed only with the Eurozone Member State-based, international assistance mechanism ESM, and did not involve the IMF (the last IMF program for Greece expired on January 2016). However, the IMF participated in the drafting of the MoU with a view of providing financial assistance in the future upon satisfaction of two conditions:  (1) a detailed fiscal package that provides a sustainable economic trajectory (focus on pension reform), and (2) the provision of “significant debt relief, well beyond what has been considered so far,” since “Greece’s debt has become unsustainable and that Greece cannot restore debt sustainability solely through actions on its own.”

It is clear that none of the two aforementioned conditions have been fully met. On the structural adjustment side, the Greek government is unwilling to implement even more austerity measures, especially in relation to a further reduction of pensions, after almost 6 years of consolidation. On the debt relief side, the Eurozone Member States, and particularly some such as Germany, essentially oppose any debt relief (which has been reiterated as a necessary action by the IMF), least of all any that would go further than what has already been considered (i.e. a mediocre extension of Greek debt maturities). In the meantime, the IMF considers the targets set by the Greek program as unachievable for the medium to long terms to achieve a sustainable fiscal position.

Is IMF participation then really necessary? It is worth noting on a theoretical level that IMF participation in the Eurozone in the beginning was considered unthinkable and amounting to a testament of the Eurozone’s failure, among others because of the Eurozone’s levels of growth (IMF interventions focused mostly on developing nations), as well as their antagonistic presence (in monetary/finance terms) to the USA /USA dollar. This, however, has long been abandoned as a taboo.

In the current situation, a Eurozone Member State seeking ESM assistance has to request IMF assistance too. Legally, there are two legislative instruments on the EU’s side that govern the request of financial assistance from a Eurozone Member State: the ESM Treaty, upon which the ESM is based, and the Two-Pack EU Regulation 472/2013, laying down the EU-based process relevant to a Eurozone Member State receiving financial assistance. The ESM Treaty, an international treaty concluded outside the EU legal framework, stipulates that not only is the ESM to cooperate with the IMF very closely, with the latter participating both at a financial and technical level, but also that “a euro area Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM is expected to address, wherever possible, a similar request to the IMF” (Recital 8). Similar provisions are included in Article 13(2)(b) of the Treaty. In addition, the Troika, i.e. wherever possible the IMF as well, is formally tasked with drafting the policy conditionality outlined in the MoU and monitoring its implementation (ESM Treaty Article 13). Similar are the provisions of Regulation 472/2013, whereby a Eurozone Member State requesting financial assistance either from the ESM or the IMF is subject to Troika supervision (Recital 12, Article 7).

Pursuant to the above legal observations, there was also a clear political commitment in the Eurosummit of July 2015 (where the 3rd Greek program was agreed upon) that Greece would request a new IMF financial assistance, to run parallel to the ESM program, stipulating that “Greece will request continued IMF support (monitoring and financing) from March 2016” (emphasis added by author).

So is it necessary for the IMF to partake in the Greek program? For the IMF itself, certainly not. The legal provisions do not contain any type of reciprocity clause, and do not commit the IMF to accepting the request of the Eurozone Member State concerned; in this case Greece. However, on the EU’s side, it seems necessary for a Eurozone Member State that receives financial assistance through the ESM – such as Greece – to request similar assistance from the IMF. In either case, Greece already committed at the highest level (Eurosummit) to requesting IMF assistance and is, therefore, restrained in perceiving a request for IMF participation as optional, especially considering the importance that some Eurozone Member States, such as Germany, place on the IMF’s participation as a guarantor for the program’s efficiency and success. This is, after all, the reason for the close cooperation between the ESM and the IMF as outlined above. However, in the case that the IMF denies the provision of assistance, then there is no stipulation as to how the process unfolds, although it would seem logical that the ESM-based program would continue. What happens remains to be seen. However, clear legal limitations exist as to the options of the Greek government to reject or not apply for IMF participation.

First published on April 20, 2016 at EUI Constitutional Change Through Euro Crisis Law

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A straightforward comparison between Britain remaining in the EU and leaving isn’t possible.

That’s because we know what ‘Remain’ in the EU means – it’s the status quo and we’ve experienced it for four decades.

But Leave?

Nobody knows; nobody can say for sure. Even those campaigning for Britain to leave the European Union cannot agree with each other on their different visions of Brexit.

And even if the ‘Leave’ campaigners could agree with each other, none of them can promise to deliver.

They are not in power, and even if they were in power, their (different) dreams of Brexit would require the agreement of over 50 countries, which would take years to negotiate, with no guarantee of the outcome.

With the exception of Russia, no major country in the world backs Britain to leave the EU.

On his visit to Britain, USA President Obama said that the EU Single Market “brings extraordinary economic benefits to the United Kingdom.” He added that being in the EU “magnifies” British influence.

If Britain left the EU, however, the President warned that it could take up to ten years to negotiate a new trade agreement between the USA and  Britain.

These sentiments were echoed by US Presidential hopeful Hilary Clinton, whose spokesman told The Observer newspaper today that, “She has always valued a strong United Kingdom in a strong European Union. And she values a strong British voice in the EU.”

There are many lists showing the benefits of Britain remaining in the EU that are credible and evidence-based.  That’s because we’ve been a member of the EU (previously called the EEC) for 43 years. We know what we get in the EU. We already have it.

But any lists of the benefits of Brexit have to be entirely hypothetical. Nobody knows for sure. No member state has ever left the EU.

The only honest answer is that there would be years of disruption and uncertainty before we discovered for sure what would be the advantages, if any, of Britain outside of the EU.

And now that the official Vote Leave campaign has indicated that it also wants other countries to leave, how would Britain’s Brexit negotiations fare with the EU?  Our former European allies would know that Brexiters didn’t just want to close a deal with them, but to close the EU itself. (See my other article, ‘What they really want: End of the EU’)

The benefits of Britain in the EU are extensive. Here’s a summary of just some of them:

Free trade

Top of the list is that it’s only because of EU membership that Britain enjoys full free trading status with all the other member states – representing the world’s most lucrative market place, and by far our most important trading partner. As such, almost half of our exports go to the EU, and over half of our imports come from the EU.

The EU has an iron tariff wall against non-members; so would we really want to be on the wrong side of that wall as an ex-member? Even non-European countries that have negotiated ‘free trade’ agreements with the EU don’t enjoy full free trade access to Europe’s internal market, as Britain does now.

Could Britain continue to participate in full free trade if we left the EU?

We don’t know for sure, but it’s less likely.

Unless, like Norway, we were accepted as a member of EFTA/EEA. However, like Norway, we would still have to obey the rules of the EU single market (including free movement of people) and we would still have to pay an annual contribution to the EU.

And like Norway, we would have no say in those rules or the size of our annual contribution to the EU. Would there be any point to leave the EU for that?

A say in Europe

Next on the list is that as a leading member of the EU, we have a say – and votes – on the rules, laws and future direction of our continent, Europe.

Would we have that as a non-EU member?

No non-EU member has a say or vote in those rules, so it’s highly unlikely that an exception would be made for Britain. Otherwise, what would be the point of an exclusive club offering exclusive benefits for members?

Living in the EU

The right to live, work, study or retire across our continent is  a precious membership benefit that around two million Britons already enjoy.

Would that right continue if we left the EU? Nobody really knows, but it’s unlikely.

The residence and other rights of Britons already living across the rest of Europe, and citizens from the rest of Europe already living in Britain, would be thrown into doubt and confusion if ‘Leave’ wins the referendum vote.

Free health care whilst travelling on business or holiday in Europe is another cherished benefit of Britain’s EU membership – that would be unlikely to continue on Brexit.

EU protection

EU laws protecting the rights of workers, consumers and travellers across the continent are probably among the most important reasons for Britain to remain an EU member.

For example, 4-weeks paid holiday a year; the 48 hour working week; anti-discrimination law; guaranteed rights for agency workers; guaranteed worker consultation – all of these protections exist because of the EU.

Would we retain those rights if Britain left the EU?

We don’t know, but it’s unlikely.

If we took away the strong armour of EU employment law, workers’ rights would be at the mercy of a Conservative government. Anyone who believes they would then be in safe hands might be in for a rude shock upon Brexit.

Consumer and traveller protection laws are also arguably much stronger as a result of EU laws than we would have enjoyed under national legislation alone.

In any event, how can a national government assure safety and protection across a continent?

The simple fact is that it can’t – it needs the reach of a pan-European intergovernmental organisation to achieve that (albeit with the democratic consensus of member states).

For example, comprehensive passenger compensation when, say, an Icelandic volcano seriously disrupts air travel – such compensation is only possible because of EU law, not national law.

Abolishing exorbitant mobile-roaming charges across Europe was also only possible because of EU law – no nation state alone could have achieved that. Europe-wide consumer protections, such as when buying products online or by phone, came about because of EU law rather than national law.

Negotiating power

Because the EU is the world’s richest, biggest market-place, and the world’s biggest exporter and importer of manufactured goods and services, it can negotiate the best trade deals with other countries.

It’s often said that when negotiating, you get better deals if you’re the same size or bigger than your opposite number. The EU is the biggest economy – bigger than the USA, bigger than China, bigger than Japan. It has the muscle to negotiate extremely favourable trading terms with the world’s countries.

Could Britain, being considerably smaller and less important than the EU, achieve similarly good trade agreements with the world’s countries?

It’s unlikely, but in any event, it would take many years to find out after we had left the EU.

Collaborations

There are many collaborations that take place between scientists, doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc, between EU member states that are made much easier and more effective because we’re all in the same club.

Could that continue on the same level if Britain left the EU?

Who knows..?

And of course, because of agreements and directives agreed between member states, there is considerable Europe-wide sharing of intelligence, information and practical collaboration in the fields of policing, security, defence and the prevention and combat of crime.

On BBC’s Andrew Marr show today, Home Secretary Theresa May confirmed that Britain doesn’t have open borders, not even to EU citizens. She said:

“We check people at our borders, but what matters at our borders is that  you have the information about people that enables you to make that decision about whether somebody should be allowed into the UK or not.

“We are more likely to have that information if we’re inside the European Union.”

Could that co-operation continue with our EU allies if Britain left the EU? Again, nobody knows – it might, but at this stage, nobody can guarantee that it would.

Is the British electorate likely choose Brexit and all the uncertainties that option offers?

Anything is possible. However, in all the referendums so far in Britain, the electorate has never voted against the status quo.

What will be important is that everybody who can vote in the referendum does vote. That way, at least the decision about Britain’s future will be decisive. 

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Other stories by Jon Danzig:

• EU is the not the USSR
• What does Brexit look like? Nobody knows
• They want their country back, not yours
• List of the latest articles by Jon Danzig

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The post The problem with Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The mandate and budget of Frontex has consistently been enhanced since its inception in 2004. Since the Agency’s role under EU law has expanded, the capacity of Frontex to deal with possible violations of fundamental rights should be strengthened as well. In this regard, the European Ombudsman and the Parliament recommended that Frontex introduced an individual complaint mechanism to handle violations of fundamental rights alleged to have occurred in the course of its operations. Moreover, the European Commission’s proposal of 15 December 2015, designing a European Border and Coast Guard System, included such a complaint instrument. Consequently, this paper analyzes to what extent the individual complaint mechanism guarantees the protection of fundamental rights and ensures that potential incidents are effectively handled by Frontex. Particularly, the strategy and instruments designed by the Regulation nº 1168/2011 of Frontex to promote the protection of fundamental rights is firstly examined. While these instruments promote respect for fundamental rights in all activities of the Agency, they do not provide individuals with an effective remedy to file a complaint against Frontex should they believe their rights have been violated. Secondly, this paper analyzes the degree to which the creation of a complaint mechanism would strengthen control of Frontex operations, given the current limitations of immigrants and asylum seekers to seek judicial redress at the Court of Justice of the European Union. Lastly, the complaint mechanism introduced in the European Border and Coast Guard System is studied as well as the limitations it presents.

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See, David Fernandez Rojo, “The Introduction of an Individual Complaint Mechanism within Frontex: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back”, Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht, forthcoming. This paper will be presented in the doctoral conference named “Democratic legitimacy without Parliament: fact or fiction?” on May 20, 2016 in the University of Antwerp.For more information and the program, see website. For more information on the authors and TBP’s special edition, see www.legalworld.be

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