Ideas on Europe Blog

This post was first published in NBXMain in October 2015

Genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are international crimes and, since 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) can investigate individuals accused of having committed acts of that nature. From 2017, under certain circumstances the ICC will also have jurisdiction in relation to the crime of aggression. These are the four international crimes recognised in the Statute of the ICC. There was a time, however, when scholars, international bodies and even some government officials spoke about a possible fifth international crime: Ecocide.

Ecocide was a crazy idea promoted by a bunch of visionary/loony academics of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Aware of the fact that human action was causing irreparable damage to the ecosystem, they argued that humanity as a whole could be considered to be the victim of premeditated forms of aggression against the environment.

The idea could have remained an exercise of academic engineering had it not resonated, even if mildly, in international political discourse. Most famously, the then Prime Minister of Sweden, Olaf Palme, said in his opening address of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Environment:

”The immense destruction brought about by indiscriminate bombing, by large scale use of bulldozers and herbicides is an outrage sometimes described as ecocide, which requires urgent international attention.” 

Click here to view the embedded video.

In the 1970s, the environment became part of the ongoing conversations held at the International Law Commission (ILC) in relation to the Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind. Yet, mysteriously ecocide was dropped from the agenda in the mid-1990s (find out more details here).

It cannot be by chance that this happened precisely when deliberations on the Statute of the ICC were coming to an end (they were completed in 1998). States were only willing to let the ILC play with the notion of ecocide to the extent that enforceability remained weak. Governments were not ready to eliminate safe havens and to let independent bodies judge individuals for the commission of crimes against the environment.

As it stands now, international law sanctions the intentional damage of the environment in wartime situations, and trans-boundary ecological damage can be a source of state responsibility. However, partly due to its blurry definition but especially because of the lack of support from key international actors (mostly Western European states), ecocide never got to the point of development of the prohibition of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Ecocide disappeared from the policy and legal agenda nearly two decades ago. For now, it still is the international crime that could have been but never quite was.

In recent years, there have been attempts to resuscitate ecocide under new frames, connected to indigenous struggles and climate change. Time will tell if, as a normative project, ecocide performs better in this second life. However, considering the failure of the first attempt, and the growing mistrust on the ICC and international justice in general, one must remain cautious. Unless sudden changes revolutionise international politics, the Earth will remain unprotected in international criminal law in the foreseeable future.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Koldo Casla

@koldo_casla

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In the three years since its foundation, the Green Investment Bank (GIB) has made waves in the green investment scene in the United Kingdom (UK). But rather than resting on its laurels the UK government needs to realise the work of GIB has not gone far enough, that the level of green investment in the UK is still woefully low, and that the state still needs to play a role in green finance.  

In August 2014 I wrote a piece for this blog on the GIB. Established and owned by the UK government, GIB was then the fresh-faced poster child of environmental finance in Britain. The Bank was a bold experiment, set-up to demonstrate the financial viability of green investment.

Already GIB has become an established, successful feature of the green finance scene in the UK. Because of the Bank’s success, a month after the May 2015 election, the new Conservative government announced its decision to sell a majority stake of GIB. For the Conservatives this sale is a natural continuation of the Bank’s commercial model; as the GIB has been shown to work as a model for green investment it now has to go a stage further and prove that it can operate “free from the shackles of state ownership”, to quote Savid Javid, the Minister who announced the sale.

The decision to privatise part of GIB has caused a furore in political and environmental circles (though fears about the future of GIB seem overstated, it is likely to continue to play a solely environmental role). However, with government funding commitments to GIB due to expire in March, the sale seems imminent and unavoidable. Rather than fighting over the ownership of one bank, it is better to focus on the attitudinal influence that the Bank has had. Has GIB really had the ‘demonstration effect’ impact that it was intended to? Have other investors looked to the example set by GIB in the last few years and moved into the field of green investment? Will the UK reach its £200bn green investment target by 2020 (the low end of the £220 – 330 billion needed for a green transition over this decade)? The answers to these questions are important to understanding what should follow the inevitable sale of GIB.

Undoubtedly, GIB has done great work in the brief period since its launch. Through committing £2.1bn in its capital it has contributed to 62 UK green economy projects worth £10.1bn. At a near 1:5 ratio of leveraging private capital and with a 10% projected return on investments, GIB has shown it’s ability to act effectively and demonstrated the potential for green investment.

When I wrote on GIB previously, the Bank was the most active investor in the UK green economy. Upon the publication of their latest financial report this was a position that they still held. Yet GIB alone is not doing enough to reach the investment levels thought necessary to build the green economy. Even under private ownership, GIB’s long-term strategy is to have an investment run-rate of £800m to £1bn a year. Therefore, there will be no astronomical boom in GIB investment levels after privatisation.

GIB recognises that ‘Investment levels in the UK’s green economy remain well below what’s required’. With waves of government green subsidy cuts it seems that little is being done to help promote any increase in those investment levels. Tellingly, the Director General of the Confederation of British Industry spoke out against the government’s record in September of last year saying, “Today’s investors are more uncertain about the UK’s low-carbon future. From the roll-back of renewables to the mixed messages on energy efficiency these changes send a worrying signal about the UK as a place for low-carbon investment”.

That there isn’t another institution rising to threaten the supremacy of GIB shows that to-date the rewards of the bank’s demonstrative mission have yet to be reaped. Other UK investors in the same field don’t have anywhere near the level of capital needed to get the UK closer to the £200bn target. Organisations like the Foresight Group and Oxford Capital Partners, to give just two examples, manage investment portfolios that run into the low hundreds of millions. These are hardly competitors for GIB with its annual running-rate of near £1bn.

The tone of Ministers’ public statements on GIB has been of a ‘good-job, well-done’ nature. There is no recognition that while GIB has in itself been a success it is has barely raised 5% of the 2020 green investment target. Currently, even the conservative £200bn green finance target appears near astronomical. Much more needs to be being done to promote green investment in the UK. Current debates over the sale of one bank seem to be little more than a distraction.

A solution to the current lacklustre situation may well be right before us, albeit one that is unlikely to appeal to more ideological Conservatives. Javid stated in his GIB sale speech that the Bank was a model for “a government successfully involving itself in the markets”. Perhaps the government should follow on from this success, after the sale of GIB, with the creation of second bank for green investment – GIB 2.0. This could introduce a healthy dose of competition for GIB, further demonstrate the sustainability of green investments, and bring the UK that bit closer to its £200bn goal by 2020. Meanwhile the original GIB, privately managed and owned, would continue to demonstrate the viability of green investment.

There is much that can be learnt from the UK government’s first venture into green investment banking. There are notable market gaps at present (though it would unfair to put the blame for these solely on the shoulders of GIB) that a GIB 2.0 could help correct. The unfortunate demise of the Green Deal leading to a serious lack of national energy efficiency efforts is one such case. There are also plenty of other examples of state-supported green finance that lessons can be learnt from. Germany’s state-owned KfW bank, which partly funds sustainability projects through the sale of green bonds, could offer one model under which GIB 2.0 could operate (capital sourcing is an issue which has hindered the GIB since its inception).

Unfortunately, this is an idea that is unlikely to see the light of serious consideration. Fears of the “shackles of state ownership” and of raising the deficit could easily trump green investment shortcomings. Whatever comes next though, the UK government needs to recognise that after the sale of GIB it can’t wash its hands of green investment. Like it or not, the state still has an important role to play in the abatement of climate change and the financing that is needed to achieve this goal.

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Threatening to leave a club is often a balancing act. Push the other members too hard and you may face a brick wall; push too little and the exercise becomes useless. What’s more, to have any degree of success you need ambitious goals and a realistic strategy to achieve them. This is more or less the situation David Cameron is in, as he wields his threat of pulling Britain out of the European Union. Alas, his goals are weak and his strategy is creaking.

The British Prime Minister outlined his conditions for staying in the EU in November 2015. Eagerly awaited both in and outside Britain, the shopping list proved disappointing when unveiled.

Michael D Beckwith / Flickr Creative Commons

Cutting benefits for EU migrants coming to Britain and a symbolic request for exemption from the idea of ‘ever closer union’ were among the conditions laid down. But they are hardly the big issues that affect people’s daily lives. Threatening to pull the country out of a union which underpins the world’s largest economic market, unless these sorts of conditions are met, betrays some worrying thinking.

Of course, Mr Cameron doesn’t intend to exit the EU. The chances are he cares little about any damage to his reputation among other EU leaders. His real priority is stopping the haemorrhage of Tory Party members to the United Kingdom Independence Party, a right-wing party whose raison d’être is to get Britain to quit the EU.

What better way to outflank UKIP than to defeat it in a popular vote on its favourite territory: Europe.

But here too David Cameron is revealing some disturbingly poor strategy. He, like many in his party, is averse to the institutions in Brussels . He has spent his political career criticising the EU. When he eventually does start campaigning, voters will find it hard to believe him when he says Britain should stay in the EU. His messaging will certainly have a whiff of Jekyll and Hyde about it.

The situation on the ground is worrying, though not yet desperate. Polls today show a victory for those who want to leave the European Union. Much of the mainstream media supports a British withdrawal. Hysterical, partisan headlines like ‘Millions of jobless Bosnians could be headed for Britain as country applies to join EU’ are all too common [1]. The main political parties are still too divided. Labour and the Conservatives will not be backing one side or the other, instead allowing every Member of Parliament to campaign how he wishes.

Weakness plagues the other side too of course. Those campaigning for a ‘Brexit’, or British exit of the EU, are currently divided into two bickering groups (Vote Leave and Leave EU). But they are likely to merge sooner or later in outrage at Mr Cameron’s weak demands in his renegotiation of Britain’s EU membership. The Brexit campaign has so far been far more effective at rousing its supporters with emotional arguments.

The one sector that has been vocal is big business. They have most to lose from quitting the EU as their cheerleader, the UK government, would no longer be able to frustrate rules governing the single market. But messaging about falling turnovers and weaker job creation is hardly the stuff of campaign victories. We need stories about people.

This means Mr Cameron has to change course quickly if he wants to avoid hitting the iceberg.

He has little time in which to do this. This means he of all people needs to start campaigning passionately about the benefits of Britain in the EU. That also means getting those in his party to start being vocal. It means
ministers should be travelling up and down the country to spread a positive message.

It’s time to start using the things that Europe has given us, like the ERASMUS programme, cross-border travel or strong consumer rights. And to start using the things it can do for us, like more cooperation on research, migration or foreign policy. Where are the celebrities campaigning for Britain to stay in the EU? Another good starting point would be to inject some life into the online platform for the Stay In campaign.

The referendum is likely to take place in mid-2016. The British people deserve a real debate on what being part of the EU is about, not hear the usual stories about bureaucrats and bendy bananas. The EU isn’t perfect, but then nor is Westminster. Both Britain and the EU have too much to lose if they divorce. If Mr Cameron doesn’t start moving soon, the UK is at risk of sleepwalking towards Brexit.

[1] Daily Express, 27 January 2016.

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When talking about Yemen, one of the most common phrases amongst analysts is that “it’s complicated.” True, to a very large extent. Tribal politics, new movements being infiltrated by old power political structures and when looking at the political actors involved, it becomes less clear how the conflict falls under the ‘Sunni-Shia’ divide that seems to be a top theme when discussing MENA politics. Yet the fact that Yemen is “complicated” does not mean there is no clear power political dynamic.

In a nutshell, if former president Ali Abdullah Saleh did not form an alliance with the Houthis, a group who he has fought six wars with since 2004, including one in 2009 where he requested Saudi support via area bombardment, they would not have been able to stage a coup on Sana’a in September 2014. Before Saleh stepped down, he warned that if he let go of power, Yemen “would turn into another Somalia,” indicating his vengeful intentions. By looking at Yemen today, not only is it clear that Saleh has taken his revenge on his own people for revolting against him, but also against the city that has suffered the most as a result of the Saleh/Houthi tactical alliance: Taiz – the birthplace of the 2011 revolution.

Taiz city, whose province is directly on the old North-South border is currently under a siege imposed by Saleh and Houthis forces. All roads that lead outside the city are blocked. Food prices have soared dramatically as it has become scarce due to the Houthis blocking aid and hospital have run out of medical supplies, including oxygen. The largest public hospital in Taiz, Al Thawra has been forced to close multiple times over the past year and it is only able to function if medical supplies are smuggled through the mountains. Those who do attempt to smuggle basic living needs into the city are usually caught by Houthi and Saleh forces and shot or kidnapped.

When looking at the logistics supporting anti-Houthi forces in Taiz, it is clear that power politics have to a large extent influenced the assistance of the resistance movement. Taiz is well known for being an Islahi (Muslim Brotherhood) stronghold, which despite being the perceived lesser evil in Yemen’s context still has unstable relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This has politicised the resistance movement because of a fear of what may come after the Houthis leave Taiz and how local successors would serve the security of their Arab allies. In some ways it looks as though the Arab coalition has learnt its lesson from its experience in Aden. After Aden province was liberated a security vacuum emerged, which gave enabled sporadic ISIS and Al Qaeda attacks. To ensure this mistake is not repeated in Taiz, there needs to be a guaranteed form of security for a post Houthi order. The main problem with this is that the more days go by, the more lives are lost as a result of daily shelling and the deadly siege. Moreover, there is some evidence for an alternative view that the lack of assistance to anti-Houthi forces in Taiz is because the UAE does not want to extend its military assistance to allies of the Muslim Brotherhood, however much the Saudis under King Salman are willing to ally with anyone against Iran.

Saleh needs to be beaten at all fronts

In light of these tensions within the Saudi-led coalition, what external powers need to do beyond defeating Saleh and Houthi militias militarily is to undermine them diplomatically and financially. While no party in the anti-Houthi movement recognises Saleh’s legitimacy, there are still ways to corner him. One of Saleh’s sons, Ahmed, is still living luxuriously in the UAE. Last April Riyadh even expressed suspicion towards Abu Dhabi’s intentions in Yemen, though this is unlikely to extend past the discontent of political officials in the foreseeable future because both are still in a formal military alliance. Saleh needs to be beaten at all fronts, not just militarily, because it is becoming clearer that as long as Saleh has the capability to destroy he will not surrender under any circumstances regardless of whether chaos will lead him to regaining power or not.

If a solution is not found, Europe will potentially face an influx of Yemeni refugees. Russia’s involvement has also become increasingly apparent, with Houthi and Saleh officials meeting with Russian ambassadors in Sana’a. As a consequence Yemen risks becoming another Middle Eastern political quagmire for EU policy. The policy mistake made in Syria must not be made in Yemen. With the growth of AQAP, terrorism remains a threat and EU policy should not look towards beating it through collusion with a former dictator who has perpetuated terrorism. A policy that aims for stability in Yemen should work in conjunction towards democracy and self-determination to ensure leaders who refuse to give up power do not have the tools to destroy all around them.

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Remember the spy novels of Cold War times? Where pretty much everybody was suspected of being a ‘mole’? The master storyteller of brilliant double agents was John Le Carré, and one of his very best novels was Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy,  published in the spring of 1974, incidentally one month after Willy Brandt had resigned because he had an East German spy among his closest collaborators.

The more the Brexit referendum debate unravels, the more it reminds me of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, the title of which refers to the code names given to some of the suspects and borrowed from an old nursery rhyme (not that this is of any importance for this post). The parallel between the Cold War spy novels and the Brexit referendum campaign is the haunting question whether there is a double agent, seemingly pursuing a publicly proclaimed preferred outcome, but secretly aiming at provoking the exact opposite.

If the Brexit referendum was a TV series like Borgen or Deutschland 83, the best possible cast for the double agent would undoubtedly be David Cameron. He would actually be too good to be true. The most brilliant and efficient ‘moles’ always have the appearance of bland people, underestimated by everybody. They are unspectacular, not really stupid but not particularly bright either, sometimes clumsy, but almost touching in their awkwardness. They have cover stories that have been built over years, so patiently that they have become entirely credible, so convincing, so obvious. If I had to write the scenario of this TV fiction I would therefore lay great emphasis on the perfect fake identity for my double agent.

The cover story would go like this:

Here is a rather average politician who has been put by circumstance in the position to lead the country. From the beginning it has been ‘evident’ that he was not madly in love with the European Union, but had come to the pragmatic conviction that EU membership was on the whole a better option for Britain than splendid isolation.

Then, the scenario would unfold like this:

Unfortunately, to his sincere regret, he has to put up with a bunch of obnoxious backbenchers and an aggressive, populist alliance of Eurosceptics and xenophobes that forces him – against his will! – to commit to holding a referendum about EU membership. There’s no danger, though, the polls predict a stable majority for remaining. Relief!

In the meantime he is bravely trying to limit the damage, by cleverly turning things into a win-win situation. He engages in a renegotiation of the terms of membership with his European partners, the positive outcome of which should strengthen his position and enable him not only to keep Britain in Europe but actually be perceived as an energetic reformer. Of course, he goes about it in somewhat clumsy manner, almost jeopardising his chances of success. And he also seems to handle all other details – the wording of the question, the fixing of the date, the issue of party discipline etc. – in his own hesitant, awkward way.

Some cliffhangers later the dénouement would be written in the future past, why not narrated in emotional flashbacks. He will have dauntlessly fought and argued in favour of membership, and once it’s all over and the leavers pop their (probably EU-produced) champagne, he remembers the day when he warned all stakeholders that his personal commitment and charisma may not be sufficient to counter-balance the momentum of nationalism spurred by a hateful press.

Looking back, the spectators will recognise that there will have been something inevitable about Brexit from the beginning; it’s just they were tricked by the scenario and the main protagonist into not noticing it. And with relations between the UK and Europe being what they are, the end of the story would be somewhat open, leaving the possibility to shoot a second season soon.

If this sounds all too silly, it’s probably just that I read too many Cold War spy novels in my Cold War youth. Apologies for letting my imagination run wild. At the same time, you will have to admit: if ever there was a soviet master spy like John le Carré’s mysteriously named ‘Karla’, driven by the long-term objective to dislocate the European Union, he could not possibly have recruited a better double agent than David Cameron, could he?

 Albrecht Sonntag, EU-Asia Institute
at ESSCA School of Management.
Follow us on Twitter: @Essca_Eu_Asia

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Meng-Hsuan Chou and Pauline Ravinet

Higher education is undeniably global. But this did not prevent interested policy actors, meeting on the occasion of the 650th anniversary of the University of Vienna in 2015, to emphasise the significance of the global and international dimension, as their colleagues have done at the 800th anniversary of the University of Paris nearly 20 years ago. As academics, we know that higher education has a deep relationship with globalisation: from rankings to mobility of students, faculty, and staff; from quality assurance to student-centred learning outcomes; from university governance to the digitalisation of teaching and research collaboration. It is nearly impossible to separate the two. Yet we are still lacking a clear and shared definition of ‘global’ and ‘globalisation’ among higher education practitioners, scholars, and observers—the very people who have been struck by their intensifying relationship since the very beginning, whenever that was. Our handbook chapter develops a set of conceptual tools and lenses to understand the global transformation of the higher education sector by focussing on a particular pattern of this phenomenon we call higher education regionalism (Chou and Ravinet 2015).

 

Scanning the globe, we see regional initiatives in the higher education sector. For instance, in Europe, we have the Bologna Process towards a European Higher Education Area, familiar to the readers of this blog. But there are many more. Indeed, there have been consistent efforts in building common areas in Africa: the African Union’s harmonisation strategy, sub-regional initiatives of the Southern African Development Community, and activities of the African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education. Similarly, in Latin America, there is the ENLACES initiative, the MERCOSUR mechanisms for programme accreditation (MEXA) and mobility scheme (MARCA). Looking East to Asia, there are the many initiatives from the AUN and the very exciting SHARE programme. These are manifestations of higher education regionalism, which we define as referring to:

 

[A] political project of region creation involving at least some state authority (national, supranational, international), who in turn designates and delineates the world’s geographical region to which such activities extend, in the higher education policy sector (Chou and Ravinet 2015: 368).

 

We derived this definition after a review of what has been written on higher education regionalism in political science and in higher education studies—two distinct sets of literature that have much to say about this phenomenon, but rarely engage each other in a fruitful conversation on the subject. From political science, we learned from scholars who examined regions, ‘new regionalism’, and European integration (Caporaso and Choi 2002; Fawcett and Gandois 2010; Hettne 2005; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000; Mattli 2012; Warleigh-Lack 2014; Warleigh-Lack and Van Langenhove 2010). From higher education studies, we obtained insights from scholars who are serious about the impact that the re-composition of space, scales, and power have on past, current, and the future state of higher education (Gomes, Robertson and Dale 2012; Jayasuriya and Robertson 2010; Knight 2012, 2013).

 

The lessons from our review led us to these three positions concerning the study of higher education regionalism:

• It must be comparative. Studying higher education regionalism means comparing varieties of higher education regionalisms to consider the sector’s apparent isomorphism.
• It must be sector-based. Studying higher education regionalism is to take serious the particular dynamics of higher education and how they interact with the wider multi-purpose regional organisation (EU, ASEAN, AU, etc.) and national needs.
• It must be differentiated. Studying higher education regionalism means to distinguish between intra-regional initiatives (within one geographical region) and inter-regional initiatives (between at least two geographical regions).

 

With these points of departure, we proposed a heuristic framework to study higher education regionalism along these three dimensions:

1. Constellation of actors central and active in these processes: this means identifying the individual and collective actors involved and mapping their interaction patterns.
2. Institutional arrangements adopted, abandoned, and debated: this refers to identifying the institutional form and rules and the instruments considered and accepted.
3. Ideas and principles embedded and operationalised: this points to identifying the paradigms, policy ideas, and programmatic ideas guiding the instances of higher education regionalisms.

 

These three dimensions require intensive fieldwork with the key actors involved, which we are currently undertaking in the Southeast Asia region. But we invite researchers - especially those examining less studied regions such as Africa and Latin America – to get in touch so that together we can contribute to the conversation about higher education and globalisation from the regional perspective.

 

Meng-Hsuan Chou is Nanyang Assistant Professor of public policy and global affairs at NTU Singapore and Pauline Ravinet is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Lille 2. They both acknowledge the generous support from Singapore’s Ministry of Education AcRF Tier 1 and Institut Français de Singapour (IFS) and NTU Singapore’s Merlion grant for this research.

 

References

Caporaso, J. A. and Y. J. Choi (2002) ‘Comparative regional integration’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons (eds) Handbook of International Relations (pp. 480–500) (London: Sage).

Chou, M.-H. and P. Ravinet (2015) ‘The Rise of “higher education regionalism”: An Agenda for Higher Education Research’ in J. Huisman, H. de Boer, D.D. Dill and M. Souto-Otero (eds) Handbook of Higher Education Policy and Governance (pp. 361-378) (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan).

Fawcett, L. and H. Gandois (2010) ‘Regionalism in Africa and the Middle East: Implications for EU studies’, Journal of European Integration, 32(6), 617–636.

Gomes, A. M., Robertson, S. L. and R. Dale (2012) ‘The social condition of higher education: Globalisation and (beyond) regionalisation in Latin America’, Globalisation, Societies and Education, 10(2), 221–246.

Hettne, B. (2005) ‘Beyond the “New” regionalism’, New Political Economy, 10(4), 543–571.

Hettne, B. and F. Söderbaum (2000) ‘Theorising the rise of regionness’, New Political Economy, 5(3), 457–472.

Jayasuriya, K. and S. L. Robertson (2010) ‘Regulatory regionalism and the governance of higher education’, Globalisation, Societies and Education, 8(1), 1–6.

Knight, J. (2012) ‘A conceptual framework for the regionalization of higher education: application to Asia’, in J. N. Hawkins, K. H. Mok and D. E. Neubauer (eds) Higher Education Regionalization in Asia Pacific (pp. 17–36) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

Knight, J. (2013) ‘Towards African higher education regionalization and Harmonization: functional, organizational and political approaches’, International Perspectives on Education and Society, 21, 347–373.

Mattli, W. (2012) ‘Comparative regional integration: Theoretical developments’, in E. Jones, A. Menon and S. Weatherill (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Warleigh-Lack, A. (2014) ‘EU studies and the new Regionalism’, in K. Lynggaard, K. Löfgren and I. Manners (eds) Research Methods in European Union Studies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

Warleigh-Lack, A. and L. Van Langenhove (2010) ‘Rethinking EU Studies: The Contribution of Comparative Regionalism’, Journal of European Integration, 32(6), 541–562.

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The grandness of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy lies in its potential to render the existing conundrum of various EU strategies into a more orderly set of strands with a clear vision regarding their mutually complementary role.

Strategies are in-built in EU’s genome. These policy documents define EU’s aims, approaches in tackling challenges and addressing common issues.  EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (hereafter – EUGSFSP) is being designed with an aim to “enable the Union to identify a clear set of objectives and priorities for now and the future. On this basis the European Union can align its tools and instruments to ensure that they have the greatest possible impact”. The EUGSFSP refers to other existing initiatives, which should be streamlined according to the needs of this particular strategy. This short overview of several EU’s strategies is aimed at providing a broader context on how the EU Global Strategy of Foreign and Security Policy fits in the existing conundrum of EU strategies. Consequently, it provides few suggestions for consideration in the context of the EUGSFSP drafting and implementation process.

EU strategies are designed, coordinated and their implementation is overseen by Directorates General of the European Commission, as well as European External Action Service. It is a common practice that prior to the drafting process a public consultation takes place. Then, during the drafting process of a strategy states come together to identify areas of mutual interest, where they see the added value of a joint action. It could be termed as the “business as usual” practice.

Broadly speaking, these policy documents are being discussed on two levels. The European level encompasses inter-service consultations and public consultations, as well as the European Council and its working groups. The national level is characterised by working groups which gather all national (and in certain cases subnational) entities involved in the implementation of the relevant strategy.

Overall, EU strategies vary in structure, level of details in terms of implementation process, approach on measuring achievements, as well as vagueness or concreteness of goals. For example, DG MARE coordinates the EU Maritime Security Strategy (hereafter – EUMSS) which excels in its detailed approach towards actions to be pursued. One of DG REGIO’s facilitated strategies is the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (hereafter – EUSBSR), which, as its name suggests, has a regional focus and is characterised by broad descriptions of policy areas, getting closer to implementation once the flagship projects are explained. The European External Action Service is leading the EU Central Asia Strategy, which since 2007 defines a tailored approach to each of the five countries involved. These are just three examples of a much wider pool of EU strategies dedicated to regional matters or a specific policy area.

The reason why EU strategies are described as a conundrum is that they are far from being unique in terms of issues they are addressing and geographic areas they are aiming at covering. Here are few examples of overlapping responsibilities. Both the EUMSS and the EUSBSR aim at strengthening the cross-sectoral cooperation and synergies between information, capabilities and systems of various authorities in domains of maritime surveillance, preparedness for emergency situations and marine pollution. Moreover, the EUMSS has its own external dimension (called “Workstrand 1”), which defines actions to be undertaken in cooperation with the third parties. Similarly, EUSBSR encompass cooperation with non-EU countries. In addition, the Strategic Review “The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex world” covers regions which have already their specific EU strategies in place, such as the previously mentioned EU Central Asia Strategy.

Why it is worth pointing out these commonalities? The success of EU tools and instruments lies in their complementary nature. When it comes to the EUGSFSP, it would be advisable to go beyond the “business as usual” practice outlined above and render the existing EU strategic conundrum in a more orderly jigsaw. Namely, the EUGSFSP would explain the role of other relevant EU strategies and clarify their unique contribution to attaining the EUGSFSP goals. Such an approach would also help to pool the existing expertise for more coordinated actions and streamline initiatives taken under various EU frameworks, as well as avoid duplication of activities.

However, such an endeavour demands additional coordination of input and effort both from European and national levels. On the European level, it requires brainstorming regarding the future inter-service coordination of various strategies in order to increase the overall awareness on various EU strategies among different divisions of EU institutions. On the national level, it requires extended consultations. These discussions should not be limited to the so-called “usual suspects”, such as authorities dealing with foreign affairs, defence and military matters. It should incorporate inputs from other governmental bodies involved in national steering of different EU strategies. All in all, if the EUGSFSP really is aimed at being grand, these suggestions might help to render the EUGSFSP impressive and overarching not only in words but also enshrine it in its nature and scope.

 

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Aristotle suggested that every political system should be tested as to whether there is any contradiction between its founding principles and the implementation of its governance. The Eurozone crisis seems to have generated precisely such a contradiction between the democratic principles of the European Union and its new modus operandi.

The EU’s democratic principles are fundamental to its purpose, and yet it has long been argued that it suffers from an inherent democratic deficit in its operation, given that its added level of supranational decision-making has always lacked the necessary corresponding citizen input.

Of late, in order to tackle the unprecedented situation created by the Eurozone crisis, a number of institutional modifications have been implemented, including most notably the provision of financial assistance to member-states conditional upon structural adjustment. A core initial problem in terms of democratic process was the fact that the ideological basis of the approach adopted seemed to offer no alternatives. From the side of both creditor and borrower states – a division that in itself has been contended to be democratically problematic in terms of the purported equality of EU member-states – fiscal austerity has been presented as the only way forward. In fact, it has been suggested that Germany’s heavy promotion of ordo-liberalism has reached the point of ideational hegemony. What is more, as revealed by multiple demonstrations across the Eurozone, and especially in member-states receiving conditional financial assistance, the European electorate seems increasingly to oppose this ideological direction.

The institutional framework adopted during this period also gives rise to democratically problematic issues. Many of the measures introduced, such as the permanent financial stability mechanism, further enhanced and specified the concept of policy conditionality, linking it directly with core national policies, such as budget-setting, tax levels and even healthcare policies. Moreover, delegation from the national to the supranational level for such intricate and salient national policy-making arenas has not been restricted to member-states in need of financial assistance. Within the Eurozone, the Eurogroup now has the right to review national member-states’ budgets and to request revisions of them. However, neither the Eurogroup, nor indeed the European Commission, are elected, representative bodies and certainly do not enjoy the benefit of adequate safeguards in terms of accountability to the European electorate. The growing influence of supranational technocratic actors in setting not only budgetary policy but also the overall budgetary framework has become manifest with the Fiscal Compact, which stipulates that Eurozone member-states are obliged to introduce a legally-permanent, and potentially constitutionally-founded, deficit ceiling.

Furthermore, as has been very publicly seen, the so-called Troika – the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund – has assumed a strong role within the Eurozone, despite the fact that it is an ad hoc cooperation that lacks a clear institutional framework or set of democratic safeguards of any kind. In fact, as argued by the European Parliament, the roles of the EU institutions within the Troika, and more generally across the crisis, appear to suffer from a conflict of interest with their prescribed institutional mandates, from an expansion of their decision-making authority beyond those mandates, and from questionable democratic standards.

For example, the European Central Bank, which is a solely monetary-policy actor, has appeared to acquire increased influence over fiscal policy measures through its participation in the Troika. In addition, across the Six-pack – secondary legislation aimed at tighter fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance – the European Commission has assumed a strengthened position in the areas of setting fines and conducting in-depth surveillance of EU member-states, especially considering the newly adopted voting system in which the Commission’s decision is immediately enforceable unless a blocking majority of Eurozone member-states is assembled.

Across all of the above measures, citizen input remains almost unchanged and is thus effectively reduced, given the increase in decision-making authority attained by these other EU actors. The European Parliament seems to be minimally, if at all, involved within this new EU-Eurozone decision-making framework, with its role restricted in most cases to an informational or advisory capacity that is unable to influence policy. In sum, the only purely representative body within the EU plays a miniscule role in the EU’s new modus operandi.

So, where do we all stand in terms of democracy in relation to what might be called the ‘new’ EU established during the Eurozone crisis? It has become clear that the rigid, ideological foundations of the measures adopted during the crisis have met strong opposition from the European and, more intensely, the Eurozone electorate. This was amply demonstrated in the outcome of the 2014 EU elections, the first to be conducted since the beginning of the crisis. Approximately 30% of MEPs belonged to either far-right or far-left anti-EU parties, with extreme anti-EU sentiments, across several major EU member-states. Even more remarkably perhaps, in the January 2015 Greek elections a left Party, running on an anti-austerity platform, assumed power or the first time in the country’s modern political history, whilst polls show that a similar result might occur in the upcoming end-2015 Spanish election.

Overall, a contradiction between the founding democratic principles of the EU and its new operational structure during the crisis has left the quality of the EU’s democratic order adversely affected. In the spirit of Aristotle’s criterion, then, the EU’s political system of governance does not any longer seem to adhere to the organisation’s principles. The ramifications of such a divergence are truly far-reaching. In particular, EU democracy has been weakened, damaging at the same time the whole moral stance of the EU and the advocacy and promotion of democracy that is at the heart of its foreign policy.

First published on April 22, 2015 at speri.comment

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Explainer: why everyone is giving Poland a hard time

Kamil Zwolski, University of Southampton

Since coming into power at the end of October 2015, Poland’s new, right-wing government has caused a stir at home and drawn international criticism.

Hardly a day passes at the moment without EU officials or European leaders questioning decisions made by the government.

In its analysis, Der Spiegel warns against Poland’s “creeping autocracy”. Some observers have even compared the situation in Poland to Putin’s Russia. While such comparisons are exaggerated, there are serious questions to ask about the Polish government’s commitment to the principles of liberal democracy.

Poland has been praised for years for its successful transition from communist state to liberal democracy. Now, it is the subject of criticism, worry and disappointment. What happened?

After eight years in power, the centre-right, pro-EU and relatively moderate Civic Platform government lost the 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections. In its place came the nationalistic, conservative and EU-sceptic Law and Justice (PiS) party, led by Jarosław Kaczyński, the twin brother of former president Lech Kaczyński, who died in a plane crash in 2010.

Changing the rules overnight

Things quickly changed after the election. Kaczyński appointed Beata Szydło as prime minister but it is clear that he pulls all the strings. For his part, president Andrzej Duda appears to be limited in his role to formally approving whatever the parliament (i.e. Kaczyński) throws his way.

Under the auspices of this peculiar administrative set up, the parliament has set about making drastic reforms at breakneck speed. Laws are changed overnight and without consultation. Critical voices are summarily ignored.

Szydlo and Kaczynski. One of them is Prime Minister, but no one can remember which.
Reuters/Kacper Pempel

So far, the parliament has significantly curtailed the powers of the national constitutional tribunal, which is supposed to impose judicial checks on the government. Another law seeks to curtail the freedom of the press by allowing the government to appoint the heads of media organisations.

Next on the list is foreign policy. The government is still in the process of developing plans on this front but it is already facing a predicament. On one side, the new government dislikes Russia, and on the other, it is increasingly fed up with the EU. The two positions are not particularly compatible.

The bear or the overbearing?

Poland has traditionally been sceptical of Russian foreign policy. While Western European countries, notably Germany, have been forging political and economic links with post-Soviet Russia, Poland has been working hard to join NATO, the EU, and to nurse the independence of the post-Soviet republics.

The wars in Georgia and Ukraine have proved to Poland’s elites that their concern was justified. Under Putin, Russia’s neighbours would have to watch their borders.

However, Poland is strongest as part of a team. It relies on its more powerful EU partners on the international stage and would struggle alone. When introducing the proposal for the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, Poland worked together with Sweden. In the Ukrainian conflict, Poland accepted the leadership role of Germany.

It is unclear whether the new government appreciates this. On one hand, the anti-Russian sentiment seems to run deeper than ever. This government seems to be more emotional and less pragmatic about the relationship than its predecessors. This is fuelled by the widespread belief among PiS politicians and supporters that the 2010 crash that killed president Kaczyński was Russian sabotage, rather than a tragic accident.

On the other hand, Poland’s new government is deeply eurosceptic. It is particularly suspicious of Brussels and Berlin. The liberal EU arguably presents a threat to Catholic, conservative, Polish values.

There are longstanding tensions between Poland and Germany stemming from their difficult history but there is now resentment over Germany’s desire for Poland to remain a pro-EU, liberal democracy.

And grumbles about Brussels’ alleged interfering on issues such as gay rights have grown to alarm as the migration crisis has worsened. Pressure to take in refugees from Syria has not gone down well and Kaczyński is more often to be found siding up with Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s notoriously anti-immigrant prime minister, than Poland’s western EU partners.

While EU sanctions against Poland are unlikely, there are informal ways in which Brussels and EU leaders can seek to influence Poland. They might, for example, apply pressure to the EU funding channelled to Poland. And of course, they could remind Poland of its desire for European solidarity in support of Ukraine.

This is the dilemma for the Polish government. How can it be anti-Russian and anti-EU at the same time? Where will it seek allies? Kaczyński has always been fond of Orbán and the sympathy seems mutual, confirmed by their recent meeting.

But Orbán is famous for his pro-Putin policy. PIS is uncomfortable when confronted with this fact. Washington is only interested in supporting Poland as a pinnacle of liberal democracy in the region and a committed EU member. What are the options then? Either way, the current policy is bound to crash.

Kamil Zwolski, Lecturer in Global Politics and Policy, University of Southampton

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

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Most of the current discussions on the possible ‘Brexit’ — the United Kingdom leaving the European Union — are concerned with issues of the Eurozone and its economic implications, the ongoing migration and refugee crisis, and the potential economic, political and social consequences for the UK in case of leaving the EU. What has been missing from the heated debates though, is the question about the implications of the Brexit for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). During the Cold War, European states relied on the security community in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. With the fall of the iron curtain and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and thus the downfall of the biggest threat to Western states, the EU slowly developed its own security and defence structures. In 2003, the Union declared its full operability and launched two of its exemplary military operations, Operation Concordia in the FYRO Macedonia and Operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina. So far, the EU has launched 22 civilian missions and 9 military operations. In several of these operations, the United Kingdom played a significant role in terms of operational planning and contributing military capabilities. What would therefore happen to the EU’s security and defence structures as well as its military capabilities if the UK were to exit? How will it cope without the contributions of the UK in future operations?

 

The UK’s Position in the EU’s Security and Defence Structures

In most of the EU’s military operations, the UK has played a key role. The Union’s operational headquarters are situated in Northwood, just north of London. The UK maintains a great share of the overall defence budget of the 28 member states. Even though it has often hampered the process of developing the EU’s security and defence structures further, it remains as one of the most important contributors to operations under CSDP. The EU’s overall military expenditure amounts to €192.5 million and with €43.7million, UK’s military expenditure represents more than a fifth (22.7%) of the EU’s expenditure. Also, it possesses the second biggest troop contingent and has currently deployed a great quantity of its personnel in current military operations as well as civilian missions, such as in Bosnia Herzegovina under Operation Althea which was taken over from NATO under British command. And in the case of Operation Concordia, the UK was even among the key actors in brokering the peace deal between the conflicting groups. By signing the Franco-British Joint Declaration in St. Malo in 1998, the UK has committed itself for a defence policy on the EU level and thus paved the way for further developments. This demonstrates the country’s importance to the Union’s operability and effectiveness as a military actor.

 

Brexit’s Implications for CSDP

Without the United Kingdom, the European Union might not be able to make such contributions to future military operations. Numerous questions concerning the relationship between the UK and the EU would need to be raised especially in security terms. What would happen to operational planning of future CSDP operations? How would the EU deal with a decreased military budget and less military personnel? And since the UK is the most important linkage between Europe and North America, what implications would a European Union without the UK have for future EU-NATO relations?

Regarding all of these questions, the EU and especially its security and defence policy would not make such a good image. This would then have negative effects on Europe’s role on the global stage. The EU would lack a great amount of important personnel, strategic planning capabilities as well as potentially loose its operational headquarters. Unless the UK would become a strategic partner of the EU and would still participate in operations under CSDP, the Union would not be able to develop its security and defence structures any further and the desire to become a global player would once again be at stake. As far as EU-NATO relations are concerned, the gap might become even wider. This special relationship already suffers from deeply rooted issues between its member states. Having another European member state without EU membership would complicate relations, especially in terms of collecting and exchanging intelligence as well as sharing military capabilities and assets.

Brexit would thus have severe implications for the EU as a security and defence actor not only in Europe but also beyond its borders. It is therefore essential, from the European security perspective, for the United Kingdom to remain in the European Union.

The post Why the EU needs the UK – A Security Perspective, by Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

One of my biggest frustrations on watching BBC TV’s ‘Question Time’ is that when UKIP representatives make incorrect statements about the EU, there’s usually nobody on the panel or in the audience to correct them.

Take last Thursday’s broadcast of Question Time. Among those appearing on the panel was UKIP MEP, Patrick O’Flynn, who made a number of statements about the European Union that were wrong.

As I discovered, shouting at the telly made not a blind bit of difference. He carried on regardless, without anyone in the studio able or willing to put him right.

So instead, I’ll share with you here on my ‘EU ROPE’ blog three examples of Mr O’Flynn’s misleading statements on Question Time and explain how they were wrong.

Mr O’Flynn said:

“On the flooding it turns out that there are regulations from the EU that stop us dredging the rivers that have arguably made the flooding worse.”

UKIP has been trying to blame the EU for Britain’s flood disaster. This is completely without foundation.

The anti-EU party, along with some of the media, have claimed that the EU Water Framework Directive ‘bans dredging’. But that’s not true; the directive doesn’t ban dredging.

Whether or not to dredge is a decision of each member state, not the EU, and based on the local situation. The UK Environment Agency recently announced that it had spent £21m on dredging in the past two years, so clearly, dredging hasn’t been banned at all.

It’s also been claimed that the EU directive prevents dredged sediment being spread elsewhere. Again, this isn’t correct, unless the sediment contains toxic substances, in which case dredging could poison land and rivers endangering the health of humans and wildlife.

Experts have commented that dredging can sometimes be an effective measure against flooding, but sometimes it can make matters worse. It’s up to our UK government agencies to decide whether to dredge, and not the EU.

Furthermore, the EU has emergency funding of about £125 million to help Britain’s flooded areas. So far, the British government has turned down this fund, with the Prime Minister, David Cameron, claiming that Britain can afford to deal with the flooding from ‘our own resources’.

Mr O’Flynn also asserted:

“You can’t sack the European Commission. It’s unelected. We’re not a democracy.”

This is also incorrect.

The laws and regulations of the European Union are debated and democratically agreed (or rejected) by the elected Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), in collaboration with the European Commission.

We elect MEPs to represent Britain in the European Parliament; it’s nonsense to claim this is not democratic.

The European Commission comprises 28 Commissioners, one from each EU member state, appointed every five years.

The President of the Commission is decided by a majority vote of the democratically elected heads of each EU member state, which of course includes the UK.

However, the choice of Commission President has to be agreed by a vote of the European Parliament, which can reject the candidate for President.

Once Parliament has democratically approved the appointment of the EU Commission President, the President-elect selects the 27 other EU Commissioners, on the basis of suggestions made by each EU member state, including of course the UK.

However, EU Parliamentary committees assess the suitability of each proposed Commissioner.

Then, the Commission as a whole requires the democratic consent of the European Parliament, to whom the Commission is ultimately responsible.

In fact, the European Parliament has the democratic power to sack the entire Commission of the European Union at any time during its 5-year tenure. This is the same as national governments that can be booted out of office by national Parliaments if they lose a vote of confidence.

The European Parliament is one of the world’s largest democratic assemblies, representing over 500 million citizens.

The Parliament has elected representatives from all the main political parties in Europe – conservatives, socialists, liberals, greens, variants of the extreme left and extreme right, as well as anti-EU parties, such as UKIP.

I have visited both Parliaments of the EU, in Brussels and Strasbourg, and witnessed democracy at work by hard-working elected MEPs. It’s an insult to them, and to all of us who voted in the European elections, to suggest that the EU is not democratic.

The EU is not quite the same as our democratic system in the UK, but the European Union is still a democracy none-the-less. It’s not perfect, but there is no perfect democracy in the world.

In the UK, we don’t get to vote for who sits in the Cabinet or holds ministerial positions. We don’t directly elect our Prime Minister. We don’t elect our Civil Service. We have an unelected second chamber, and an unelected ‘head of state’.

To paraphrase Winston Churchill, “Democracy is the worst form of government, apart from all the others.”

Over the past few decades, however, much more democratic power has devolved to the European Parliament, and I hope this ongoing process of democratisation will continue in the years and decades to come.

Only one-third of the British electorate actually vote in the European Parliament elections. Maybe that’s why so many might wrongly believe Mr O’Flynn’s claim that the EU is not democratic.

Mr O’Flynn also stated on Question Time:

“The Governor of the Bank of England is admitting that untrammelled freedom of movement for working class jobs has caused massive wage compression over ten and fifteen years for working people in this country.”

The Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney (himself a foreign worker) didn’t say anything of the sort.

Let me be frank about this: Mr Carney did not say migrant workers bring down the salaries of existing British workers. In fact, Mr Carney has strongly praised ‘free movement of people’ as being good for Britain and Britons.

Mr Carney actually asserted that foreign workers are helping to increase the UK’s productivity. On the BBC Radio 4 ‘Today’ programme, presenter John Humphrys asked Mr Carney if “cheap foreign labour” was actually stopping productivity increasing.

But Mr Carney replied, “I would really dampen down that explanation.”

He explained that most of the increase in labour supply has been down to British workers taking more hours, and older workers staying in employment. Over the last two years, increases in those factors have been 10 times as important as migration, Mr Carney asserted.

Contrary to the implications made by Mr O’Flynn on Question Time, the Bank of England Governor has consistently supported Britain’s continued membership of the EU.

In a lecture last October, Mr Carney said Britain’s membership of the EU since 1973 had improved the dynamism of the economy and increased the prosperity of all people in Britain.

Mr Carney added that “the UK is the leading beneficiary” of the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour enshrined in European treaties.  

Furthermore, Mr O’Flynn’s description of ‘free movement of people’ across Europe as “untrammelled” is also misleading.

There is not “untrammelled” free movement of people. Yes, as EU citizens we have a right to live, work, study or retire in any other EU/EEA countries. But under EU rules, we cannot just move to another EU country unless we have the means to look after ourselves.

It’s a myth to suggest that it’s possible for EU migrants to come here, or for British migrants to go to another EU country, and immediately start claiming benefits. It’s only free movement if you can afford to move.

*Read response from Bank of England Press Office to the comments by Mr O’Flynn: BBC Question Time: Response from Bank of England

* Join the discussion about this article on Facebook.

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Other stories by Jon Danzig:

• EU referendum: It’s going to get nasty
• What Nigel Farage told British expats in Spain
• UKIP’s Hall of Shame

To follow my stories please like my Facebook page: Jon Danzig Writes

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I managed to get through to the James O’Brien phone-in show on LBC radio. James asked me, “Jon, have you changed your view as a result of this sparkling re-negotiation presided over by our wonderful Prime Minister, David Cameron?’ (4 minutes)

Click here to view the embedded video.

 

• Comments are welcome – but please read ‘The rules of engagement’ 

• Join and share the discussion about this article on Facebook and Twitter:

 

#UKIP MEP @oflynnmep gives the wrong answers on #bbcqt about the #EU. Please share my blog: https://t.co/2DAG3TZnLb pic.twitter.com/vAfte5zXgO

— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) January 17, 2016

Wrong answers on #bbcq by UKIP MEP @oflynnmep Join the discussion on my #Facebook page: https://t.co/0XZ5lyEa7n pic.twitter.com/crttc6lyV8

— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) January 17, 2016

Multiple wrong answers on #bbcqt by #UKIP MEP @oflynnmep Please share my blog: https://t.co/ASKwmoy7fa pic.twitter.com/awXaJnPd2V

— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) January 18, 2016

Response from @BankofEngland regarding comments by #UKIP MEP @oflynnmep on @BBCQuestionTime about #migrant #labour https://t.co/rDB9CqUgcA

— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) January 18, 2016

 

The post Wrong answers on BBC Question Time appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In his Chatham House speech setting out the UK’s demands for a renegotiated relationship, David Cameron argued Britain’s EU membership is not merely a question of jobs and trade but of national security. Eurosceptics argue Britain’s leaders have too often allowed such foreign policy concerns to be put before domestic priorities, especially economic and democratic needs. Recent events in Paris and Brussels have raised questions about the vulnerability of EU member states, not least over the practicality of Schengen. As the UK’s new Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) made clear, traditional state-based threats and renewed challenges posed by terrorist organisations do not recognise national borders. Britain’s security is – and has long been – shaped by EU membership, whether by enhancing the UK’s international power, allowing the UK to shape European geopolitics and transatlantic relations, or by holding the UK together. As a result, as Ian Bond of the Centre for European Reform recently argued, ‘The British government’s obsession with the details of its relationship with the EU has led it to lose sight of the big strategic picture and of the EU’s role in managing the national security threats identified in the SDSR.’

European integration has long had a security side to it whether as Franco-German reconciliation or integrating former Communist states in Eastern Europe. To what extent the EU has itself been able to keep the peace is open to debate. Nevertheless, for post-war prime ministers such as Harold Macmillan, Britain’s ability to shape the world around it was declining as rapidly as its economic base. Joining the then European Economic Community was, in part, a step forward for the security and stability of a country that had recently ended its retreat from empire and was struggling internally and externally to find a place in the world. Support for membership amongst Conservative MPs in the 1970s was driven by hopes that EEC membership would lock Britain into a capitalist, free market club allowing the country to shed its ‘sick man of Europe’ label, a reason some on the left resisted membership. Membership would also enhance Western European unity in the face of a still formidable Communist world, Saigon having fallen to North Vietnam only a month before the 1975 referendum.

Today, EU membership still means a lot to Britain’s national security. As the UK’s Strategic Defence and Security Review showed, Britain’s own economic and military capabilities remain substantial, but being able to draw on the EU as a force multiplier has become increasingly central as they have been stretched to their limits. For David Hannay, the EU allows Britain to better manage challenges as diverse as a newly assertive Russia through to climate change and instability in the Middle East. Working through the EU is not without its flaws, but other options for Britain to pursue its interests such as by rebuilding the Commonwealth, developing the ‘Anglosphere’, joining NAFTA, or becoming a ‘Switzerland with nukes’, are either limited or overplayed. Leaders from around Europe and the world have regularly cast doubts on whether a Brexit will boost Britain’s international standing and security. Eurosceptics will argue that Britain is weak in the EU, frequently outvoted and sidelined. Such an approach views the EU through the prism of Westminster’s majoritarian politics: a zero-sum game where you either win or lose. Through such an outlook every EU member state struggles to win. The one thing that does set you up for failure is isolating yourself, an approach the UK has in recent years adoptedmore than ever before.

Close relations with the USA remain, despite all the arguments, the cornerstone of UK and European security. Brexit is not going to end such arrangements as ‘Five Eyes’ or cooperation on Special Forces. But wider relations with the USA would be tested. Only a few on the fringe of the US political right think a Brexit would be a sound idea for the UK, USA, EU and transatlantic relations. As Condoleezza Rice, former Bush Administration Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, recently told Chatham House: ‘It is a very different Europe if it is a continental one’. The US has been a long-standing supporter of European integration and Britain’s part in it. A Britain that challenges both of these could find it damages relations with the USA and the USA’s commitment to Europe at a time of heightened US exasperation at Europe’s inability to think about geostrategic concerns – whether they be Russia, China or ISIS – and invest in the necessary defence commitments.

In his Chatham House speech David Cameron argued that the prosperity and security of the rest of Europe are vital for Britain. In doing so he came close to the often overlooked question of what Brexit would mean for Europe. A Brexit could change the European geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape in ways that would not be in Britain’s interests. It would see the departure of the EU’s largest and keenest supporter of Atlanticism and outward looking economic liberalism. The EU could become more inward looking and protectionist. The idea that Brexit could lead to the EU and Eurozone’s disintegration is not to be casually overlooked given the likely costs for the UK and Europe. As HM the Queen warned in June 2015 during a state visit to Germany, Europe’s division is in nobody’s interests. While a British exit is not going to lead to war, it would add to strains on an organisation which however imperfect remains with NATO one of the two pillars on which European politics and security have been built since 1945 and 1989.

At the same time, is the unification of Europe in Britain’s interests? For Eurosceptics, ‘ever closer union’ threatens Britain’s sovereignty, democracy and allows immigration to pressure its social unity, meaning Britain’s security and stability would be better preserved by leaving. But Britain’s departure could allow the EU to further unite. One of Britain’s longest standing international aims has been to prevent any single power dominating Europe. The EU would be a benign power compared to previous attempts, but such an outcome warrants careful consideration.

Finally, if the first concern of any state is its own survival then the referendum could tear the UK apart. The immediate concern is Scotland:  a vote by the rest of the UK to leave the EU while the Scots vote to stay could trigger another independence referendum. This would lead to an avalanche of political, economic and social costs to say nothing of the costs for UK defence and national security, most notably over Trident. Northern Ireland might seem peaceful from the perspective of the UK mainland, but the peace process is under constant pressure and a Brexit could test it to breaking point. A descent into violence in the province should not be overlooked. Brexit could also add to tensions within England. In focusing on Scotland we have overlooked that the part of the UK that is increasingly different is London. An international metropolis that doubles as the UK and England’s capital, London has thrived from immigration, Europe and globalisation, much to the chagrin of some elsewhere in England and Britain who feel they have been left behind.

For scholars of international relations and the EU, Brexit confronts us with the need to theorise European disintegration. Theories are tools that allow us to focus on certain aspects of developments in the world around us, highlighting – and testing – their importance over others. In a simplified way, a constructivist approach would point to the role of ideas as paramount in shaping how a Brexit is handled in international relations. For example, will Brexit push to the fore ideas of European disintegration or lead the rest of the EU to push forward with ideas of unification? For realists it will be economic and security interests, especially ones shaped by international pressures, that will define how the UK and EU handle a Brexit. Institutionalists will point to the role existing institutions and networks – the multiple links that are part of or defined by the EU, EFTA, EEA, NATO – will play in defining what happens to the UK and EU (or might not define it if Brexit exposed any weaknesses in them). Liberal intergovernmentalists will point to a mix of interests, institutions and ideas to show that Britain and the EU (especially Germany, France and other big states) are so caught up in a deeply enmeshed set of interdependencies that Britain (and the EU) suffer from the Hotel California dilemma: you can check-out anytime you like, but you can never leave.

Note: this piece first appeared on the blog of the LSE’s International Security Society. 

The post Britain and the EU: a Question of International Relations appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Much is being made of the potential for Big Data to improve governance in Europe. But all data sets require context. Unless this is available, the contents is less than useful.

Summer 2015 saw the EU Publications Office, through the Open Data Portal website, begin making a selection of  public procurement data available, drawn from the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) website. This site is the main route for publication of the Official Journal Supplementary series and contains all contract advertisements and awards made by public bodies (that exceed a financial threshold). Prior to this point, the data was only available to either the Commission, or paid subscribers to the TED database.

The scope of the data is incredible, with every advertised procurement project detailed from 2009 to 2015 across thousands of Contracting Authorities. Garnering meaning from such a rich resource is however difficult for all but the initiated few. While this may well be ‘open’, without a glossary, or guide to the data, one is left floundering.

To help remedy this information deficit, and provide some much needed context, the Commission assembled just such a guide to the data table headings. This should help anyone looking through the databases to ascertain the areas that they will find most interesting or applicable for their research.

The data guide is available here: http://open-data.europa.eu/repository/ec/dg-grow/mapps/TED(csv)_data_information_v1.doc

A link to the main data set (2009 onwards) is available here: https://open-data.europa.eu/en/data/dataset/ted-1

A CSV (comma separated value) version available here: https://open-data.europa.eu/en/data/dataset/ted-csv

By way of example, one may draw upon columns CPV and CAE_NAME to ascertain relationships between the Contract Authority type (local council, centralised procurement office etc) and the type of goods or services they contract (facilities management, uniforms, infrastructure etc). This may throw light on the organisation of a State’s policy implementation. While case study research may give a more granular level of detail in such matters, there is something to be said about looking across the whole Union’s economy and seeing the patterns emerge from within.

The post The Meaning of ‘Open’ Procurement Data appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

According to Prime Minister, David Cameron, Britain doesn’t need EU funds to help areas devastated by floods because ‘it’s quicker and better’ to use the country’s own money.

So it seems that Britain is so flush with cash that it can turn down around £125 million in EU emergency help for areas of the country devastated by record levels of rain. Really?

• If that’s the case, then why does the government need to impose £12 billion of austerity measures that will mostly hit the poor and needy?
• If that’s the case, then why did the government scrap flood defence plans that could have saved hundreds of homes and businesses from ruination?
• If that’s the case, then why does the country have a shortage of homes, hospitals and schools?
• If that’s the case, why are patients being denied life-saving drugs on the grounds of cost?
• If that’s the case, then why isn’t there more help for the hundreds of thousands of people who have to use charitable food-banks because they can’t afford a proper meal?

Labour MP for Bury South, Ivan Lewis, asked David Cameron in Parliament, “When are the Government going to apply for the European solidarity fund money?”  (Hansard, Column 41)

Mr Lewis explained, “Hundreds of my constituents in Radcliffe have had a terrible Christmas due to the flooding that has devastated so many people’s homes and businesses in Greater Manchester and across the north of England. Bury and other councils have to pick up the infrastructure costs.

“The European solidarity fund exists to help in such circumstances. It would be unforgivable to put Tory party management and posturing on Europe ahead of the national interest.”

Mr Cameron responded, “First of all, I send the hon. Gentleman’s constituents my sympathy for the flooding that they suffered”

But he made clear, “I think it is quicker and better to give people the help they need from our own resources.”

Mr Cameron explained, “I have looked very carefully at the question of EU funding; we looked at it previously in 2013. It takes a very long time to get hold of any money and it is very uncertain whether you get it. Indeed, you end up paying for it in many ways as well.”

He added, “Let me say that we will do everything we can, including through the Bellwin scheme, to make sure that his council is fully reimbursed for all the emergency measures that it had to take. We will also make sure that we put in place the flood prevention measures and investment that are coming down the track.”

As I reported here last week, EU member states are entitled to apply for money from the EU Solidarity Fund when a natural disaster causes substantial damage, calculated as a percentage of Gross National Income.

According to calculations by accountants, KPMG, the floods have already caused over £5 billion of damage, meaning that the UK is entitled to apply for emergency EU help.

Catherine Bearder, Liberal Democrat MEP for south-east England, said that EU officials told her that the UK government could apply for £125m in grants for flood victims, 10% of which could be available within six weeks.

Although some of the grants would be clawed back from our EU rebate, the European Commission explained to me today that this would only affect a proportion of the funds, and overall Britain would gain a net benefit from the receipt of the emergency money.

I asked Defra, the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, whether the Prime Minister’s reply definitely meant that the UK would not be applying for EU funds to help with our floods disaster.

Defra emailed me a reply from ‘a government spokesperson’ that I could use as a quote for my story:

“We are committed to supporting communities hit by the recent flooding. We have opened the Bellwin scheme for local authorities, with 100% of eligible costs to be met by the Government, and our investment in recovery from Storm Eva and Storm Desmond now stands at nearly £200m.

“This will help people directly affected by the floods, support homeowners protect their properties and ensure flood affected businesses that have had their trading disrupted can get back on their feet.”

I immediately complained to the Defra Press Office:

“Thank you, but the quote doesn’t even mention the EU Solidarity Fund, which seems somewhat odd. Is the government going to apply for the fund or not? Is it the case that the country is rich enough not to need the EU emergency help?”

I will report back here if I receive a reply.

* Join the discussion about this article on Facebook.

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Other stories by Jon Danzig:

• Britain rejects EU help for food and flood victims
• Does the Prime Minister know what he’s doing?
• Benefit tourism: why ‘fix’ a non-existent problem?

To follow my stories please like my Facebook page: Jon Danzig Writes

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According to @David_Cameron UK doesn’t need EU funds for floods. My Facebook report: https://t.co/IAPuIcXx3vpic.twitter.com/fAHnKsFv6k

— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) January 8, 2016

The post Britain doesn’t need EU help for floods, says PM appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

20 years ago, when television broke the news around midday that François Mitterrand had died aged 79, the collective emotion in France was almost disproportionate. A surprising number of Parisians simply stopped what they were doing, went to their flower shop, bought one red rose and deposited it on the doorsteps of the former president’s apartment. The rose as symbol for the French socialist party was of course also a reminder of the manner in which Mitterrand had orchestrated his victory in 1981, with the famous televised staging of his tribute to the great men of the left in the crypt of the Pantheon.

I know quite a few people who 35 years later consider that 10 May 1981 was one of the finest days of their entire lives. Seeing the left win the presidential elections was something they never had dared hope for. It was the promise of ‘another tomorrow’ as Barbara sang, the ‘Yes, we can’ moment in contemporary French history. It is probably the memory of that moment that brought so many people to tears on 8 January 1996.

A lucid regard on François Mitterrand’s heritage, however, will reveal a more ambivalent picture, to say the least. Yes, there were the sweeping reforms of 1981/82, with the highly symbolic abolition of the death penalty and the refreshing liberation of the media, the long-awaited social anti-austerity measures, and of course the 5th week of paid holidays for everybody. But these were very quickly followed by the so-called ‘rigour turn’ in early 1983, apparently imposed by the European Monetary System – an economic U-turn which may ring a bell with Alexis Tsipras forced to embrace European austerity policies he had just held and won a referendum against.

Other politicians in other democracies would have kicked out in no time after having turned their back on their promises in less than two years of office. Mitterrand stayed on in the Elysée for another 12 years (!). And that’s exactly where his heritage becomes so poisonous for the France of the 21st century. An extraordinarily gifted power politician endowed with an overdose of Weberian charismatic domination and Machiavellian leadership qualities, Mitterrand has left a series of open wounds to French society and politics that are far from healed 20 years after his death. Three of them are particularly serious.

First, in publishing The Permanent Coup d’Etat in 1964, the trained lawyer Mitterrand had clearly shown that he had fully understood the pitfalls of the Fifth Republic with its constitution and presidential regime tailor-made for de Gaulle. He certainly would have had the political clout to reform things, shorten the 7-year mandate, redefine and clarify the respective roles of the president and the government, push for an effective decentralisation rather than a half-hearted creation of fake regions, perhaps even abolish the presidential elections, this curse of French political life. Instead he clang to power over more than a decade (despite a cancer he concealed from the public), cultivated the ‘presidential monarchy’ he had pretended to despise, and seemed to take delight in humiliating right-wing prime ministers during the two periods of ‘cohabitation’ he imposed on the French public in 1986-88 and 1993-95 respectively. Mitterrand could have changed a system that inevitably leads to massive and dangerous frustration, and he did not. That’s even worse than being a lame duck.

The second poison he injected into French politics is the Front National. He obviously only had contempt for a vulgar racist like Jean-Marie Le Pen and took pleasure in his immense intellectual superiority, but he understood very quickly in the early 1980s that this fringe party was about to benefit from the widespread disenchantment with unemployment and growing unease with immigration. For Mitterrand, the emergence of the Front National actually came quite handy. Instead of employing his tremendous authority against it, he instrumentalised the FN for his own power purposes, in order to weaken his Gaullist or Centrists opponents. In 1986, he softened the Socialists’ defeat in the legislative elections by introducing representation and thus allowing the FN to take away 35 seats from the moderate right-wing parties (and gain political legitimacy on the way). Moreover, it does not seem exaggerated to claim that Mitterrand’s manner of clinging to his presidential power, his cunning manipulation of the media and public opinion, as well as the numerous grey zones in his biography contributed to pave the way for the general disillusionment with politics and the renaissance of ugly populism.

The third poison is not entirely of his own making, but it has a lasting impact beyond the borders of France. When in 1990 German reunification threatened to become a reality out of the blue, Mitterrand all of a sudden forgot the Franco-German birthday speeches and his presumed ‘friendship’ with Helmut Kohl, and revealed himself obsessed with German ‘power’ and French ‘rank’. In a series of desperate diplomatic travels he tried to hinder or slow down the process. And when this did not work, he pushed Kohl into publicly sacrificing the D-Mark on the altar of a precipitated common currency, as a token of German commitment to European integration. He was not alone in doing so, and he was already gone when the final details of monetary union were negotiated. But he bears his part of responsibility for the incomplete and immature aspects of the Eurozone that are now causing so many troubles.

The anniversary of the death of a remarkable statesman is always an occasion for nostalgia, especially when his name is linked to days where some things still seemed possible. But it is also an opportunity to look behind the myth-making and story-telling, of which François Mitterrand was an accomplished master.

Albrecht Sonntag, EU-Asia Institute
at ESSCA School of Management.
Follow us on Twitter: @Essca_Eu_Asia

The post The poisonous heritage of François Mitterrand appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527)

Yet again the European Union is sleepwalking into a diplomatic disaster. According to China’s interpretation of article 15 of its WTO accession protocol signed in December 2001, after 15 years (hence in one year’s time) it will automatically acquire market economy status (MES). For years this was the consensus view in Europe too. Not any more. For two reasons. Washington is starting to reject this interpretation in an electoral year in which being tough on China is popular, and China’s overcapacity (evidenced by the recent fall in steel prices) is starting to trigger a protectionist reaction in the Old Continent.

In this context many officials in Brussels and the national capitals are having second thoughts to the point that there is now a legal battle between those that think that China will obtain MES automatically, and those that believe that although paragraph 15(a)(ii) will expire, the rest of article 15 remains, which means that China will continue to have to prove that it is a market economy to avoid anti-dumping duties.

This matter could be seen as too legalistic and economically trivial. It affects only 2% of EU trade with China. The issue is important, however, for several reasons.

It shows that the EU is divided, even in trade relations, which are supposed to be competence of the European Commission. Italy – the country that launches the most anti-dumping investigations against China – is the only member state that has openly declared that China should not be given MES. The rest of the members are reluctant to position themselves. This lack of unity among the Europeans is a constant and highlights that the relationship between the EU and China remains asymmetric (as it has been for decades), but now it is in China’s favour, as we argue in a recent report written with other leading European think tanks.

Contrary to what is commonly assumed, China is not in the business of ‘divide and conquer’  in Europe. It does not need to. The Europeans are already divided. So much that I was told that officials at the European External Action Service (EEAS) are reading the late 15th Century and early 16th Century Discourses of Niccolò Machiavelli where he lamented that the Italian city-states were culturally and economically incredibly sophisticated but they were too small and divided to compete with the empires in-the-making (and nation-states in-formation) that were Spain, England and France at the time. This led him to write:

‘we [in Italy] have become prey of anybody who has wanted to overrun this land’ (Discourses, II.4).

The post-1945 EU is a bit like Florence, Milan and Venice after the Peace of Lodi in 1454. It has overcome pernicious parochialism and managed to become a regional quasi-state but ‘its members are distinct and each has its own capital; which makes it difficult for them to consult and to make decisions’ (ibid). This is a disadvantage in a globalised world where the great powers are no longer mid-sized European states, but rather continental-sized economies such as the US, China and India. This is the main reason why the Europeans do not know how to deal with the rise of China. On the one hand, they want to protect their national and sectorial interests, but on the other the Chinese market is too big, and therefore too attractive, to alienate China by not granting it MES.

Because of their divisions, the Europeans have played the MES card very badly. For years China has begged for this recognition and the EU could have used it as a political bargaining chip. Now it is too late. The Europeans are in a cul-de-sac. If the EU does not grant China MES in December 2016 after years saying that it will do so, they would be categorized in Beijing as hypocrites, with a possible diplomatic or economic backlash. Contrary, if the EU does finally grant China MES, it would fail Italy, important business associations such as AEGIS Europe and the European Chemical Industry Council, trade unions such as IndustriAll, a great part of European public opinion who does not believe that China is a market economy, as well as the US, an important ally which will not grant China MES anytime soon. Washington shows the advantages of a politically united, continental-sized economy. While in the treaty-constrained, legalistic EU, granting MES would require changing EU law (meaning the Commission, the Council and the Parliament need to approve it, a cumbersome process), in the US the executive branch has full discretion in this matter.

So what would Machiavelli suggest in this situation? Most likely, he would opt for a nuanced approach. First he would divide the problem in its legal, political and economic dimensions. On the legal side, the sensible thing to do is to grant China MES. In this way the Europeans would demonstrate that they respect international law, and what they have signed 15 years ago, even though now it might go against their interests. This can be done immediately in one year’s time. The alternative is to continue applying anti-dumping duties, wait for China to sue the EU before the WTO and then accept the resolution of the dispute settlement mechanism. The danger of Chinese retaliation is higher in the latter option so perhaps it is better to go for the former.

However, politically the EU needs to use this opportunity to show that it is united. Under international law China might have MES, but that does not make it a market economy. Thus, ideally, all three institutions: the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament should issue a joint ‘political’ statement declaring that although some progress has been done over the past 15 years, China is not a full market economy according to the five criteria used by EU. The evidence is very clear on this.

This show of unity would please the constituencies in the Old Continent that are more critical with China and surprise Washington and Beijing, which always think that the Europeans cannot get their act together. Consequently, it could turn the MES into a bargaining chip for the EU again, especially if finally the WTO decides that article 15 – even without paragraph 15(a)(ii) – continues to oblige Chinese firms to prove that they operate in a market economy. In any case, on the economic front, the EU should make clear that it will continue to use all the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy tools at its disposal, and even propose and apply innovative ones, to protect its industries while there is no level playing field with China.

This might provoke a protectionist reaction from Beijing. The risk exists. But with the threat of Chinese overcapacity only increasing, sending a clear message to China is no doubt what Machiavelli would do (if he was appointed counsellor to the EU). If China wants to deepen trade and investment relations with Europe under the One Belt and One Road (OBOR) initiative, and see more Chinese companies buy European ones and obtain public contracts, it needs to open up its market to European products and investments. Ultimately, it is a give-and-take.

This post was simultaneously published on the website of the Royal Elcano Institute.

EU-Asia Institute at ESSCA Ecole de Management, Angers
www.essca.fr/EU-Asia / @Essca-Eu-Asia

The post Should the EU grant China Market Economy Status? What Machiavelli would say. appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As reported in today’s Daily Mirror, the Conservative government has admitted that it has no concrete evidence to prove that so-called ‘benefit tourism’ exists.

And yet, Prime Minister David Cameron has vowed to ‘crack down’ on benefit tourism to reduce the numbers of EU migrants coming to Britain.

Mr Cameron wants EU migrants in Britain to wait four years before they are eligible to claim benefits – longer than British workers currently have to wait.

His proposal would break an EU foundation principle: that when EU citizens move to another EU county for work, they will enjoy the same benefits as the natives of the host country.

In a Parliamentary question, former Labour leader, Neil Kinnock, requested “all factual evidence” held by the Department for Work and Pensions that proved migrants were lured to Britain because of benefits.

The response provided by the DWP was analysed by expert Jonathan Portes, a Senior Fellow at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research.

He concluded, “This answer doesn’t show any connection at all between people coming here and wanting to claim benefits. If they wanted evidence of benefit tourism, they could commission a study – the government knows that perfectly well.”

As I have reported on numerous occasions, no evidence has emerged of any serious problem of so-called ‘benefit tourism’.

In fact, even prior to Lord Kinnock’s intervention, on three occasions the European Commission asked the British government for evidence of ‘benefit tourism’ – and three times the government wasn’t able to provide any.

Only 2.2% of welfare claimants in Britain are EU migrants – just 114,000 out of a total of just over 5 million benefit claimants.

The evidence is that welfare systems don’t generally drive immigration, according to Mr Portes. Nobody from the rest of Europe comes to Britain to claim benefits; they come here for employment.

Britain currently has more job vacancies than can be filled by the native workforce. That, in a nutshell, is why we need migrants. The country has a chronic skills shortage and without migrants helping to fill that gap, Britain – and Britons – would be poorer.

According to Bank of England boss, Mark Carney (himself a foreign worker), Britain has one of the strongest jobs market in the world, and it’s mostly British workers who are taking up the jobs. But foreign workers are also needed, he said, and they are contributing to Britain’s increase in productivity.

A major study by University College London showed that EU migrants coming to Britain in the last decade made a net contribution to the Treasury of around £20 billion, during a time when British natives were taking out more than they were putting in.

So this is the question: why is the Conservative government concentrated on fixing problems that don’t exist (e.g. ‘benefit tourism’, ‘too many migrants’) and ignoring problems that do exist (e.g. poor people relying on food banks; flood victims not getting sufficient support)?

* Join the discussion about this article on Facebook.

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Related stories by Jon Danzig:

• Does the Prime Minister know what he’s doing?
• Fact: Most migrants come to work or study
• Why Britain needs migrants

To follow my stories please like my Facebook page: Jon Danzig Writes

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#BenefitTourism: Why try to ‘fix’ a non-existent problem? Please share my Facebook report: https://t.co/SETycIIZWF pic.twitter.com/uuoHjRsndM

— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) January 7, 2016

The post Benefit tourism: why ‘fix’ a non-existent problem? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Any second now…

Christmas is always a tricky time for politicians: on the one hand, everyone’s packed up for a break after a long autumn, but on the other, there’s usually something that needs urgent attention, like a flood. However, on balance this Christmas past has been generally quite quiet on the referendum front, before bursting back on front pages this week.

Tempting as it is to write about Cameron’s decision to give the Cabinet a free vote in the referendum, there’s little to be said. There has never really looked to be a good alternative position to take on this, especially given the folk-memory of the 1975 campaign, where the free vote produced all kinds of positive effects for Wilson. Faced with a front bench strongly determined in its views, Cameron’s best hope is that none of the senior team will want to take a very visible lead role with the Leavers, in case it damages their prospects for the Tory leadership contest that must be held in the next couple of years.

Likewise, much as the mini-drama of Nigel Farage’s ‘assassination attempt‘ (to be clear, someone trying to kill him, rather than vice versa) trundles on, it merely underlines the marginal position that UKIP find themselves in of present. The poor state of Carswell-Farage relations does not help in this, but more generally the party has yet to find its groove in the way that it did during 2014-15: that might not be so important in the referendum context, but certainly matters for the next cycle of local elections, where a strong performance is going to be essential.

Which brings us to one of the more marginal developments, namely the Labour reshuffle: shuffle being the operative word, given its (lack of) speed.

The broadly accepted reading of the reshuffle was that Corbyn wanted to exert some authority over his shadow cabinet, removing those who had spoken against him or his policies. However, after the protests at the removal of Michael Dugher at Culture, the whispers about replacing Hilary Benn as Foreign Secretary seemed to stop, along with any clear direction about what to do. Finally, Benn stayed in post, but Pat McFadden was taken out of the shadow Europe minister role, followed by a couple of other junior roles resigning in protest. Together with the changes at Defence, to bring a more Trident-unfriendly team, it has been foreign affairs that have taken the main hit of change.

Even if European policy has not been singled out as a point of contention in all of this – instead, Trident and security issues have been the bones of argument – then that policy is likely to suffer. Indeed, the willingness to replace McFadden, who was widely seen as being effective in his role, with Pat Glass, chair of the pro-EU group in the party, suggests no issue with working towards a Remain position in the referendum, but rather a lack of intra-party mobilisation on the referendum at all. The debate about whether Benn has been ‘muzzled’ by Corbyn has principally focused on security, but the scope for disagreement after the end of the EU renegotiation is also considerable.

In short, Labour look like a party that is studiously avoiding the referendum right now. And that matters if Cameron is serious about trying to wrap up a deal in February.

Whether he can achieve that is very up in the air. The Polish suggestion that they could accept limits on free movement in return for support for a NATO base was probably more about Polish concerns about rebuilding some support in the EU after the installation of the PiS government, and indeed everyone seemed to step away from the reports when pressed, but it potentially opens up a new phase of discussions. Given the need for unanimity, every other member state has a strong incentive to name a price for agreement and that incentive only increases as other make their demands.

As White Wednesday noted yesterday, odds on a summer 2017 vote have shortened considerably of late, so many punters remain to be convinced that speedy resolutions are at hand. Given the track record of the government to date, such a delay is not at all unthinkable, even if it comes with some very dubious benefits.

Whatever’s happening, there is a sense that things are picking up some speed: both sides are getting into the swing of campaigning, with videos, joint op-eds and the rest. To that list I will also add my own news, namely that during 2016 I will be a Senior Fellow of the ESRC’s “UK in a Changing Europe” programme, working on the campaign materials around the referendum, as well as more generally trying to help inform the public debate. There’s a lot planned, so I’ll keep you updated about events as we do.

And remember, it all has to be over by Christmas. 2017.

The post Gear-shifting the referendum? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

I think this is my all time favorite quotation from a European philosopher.

“There lies something unique [in Europe humanity], which all other human groups, too, feel with regard to us, something that, apart from all considerations of expediency, becomes a motivation for them – despite their determination to retain their spiritual autonomy – constantly to Europeanize themselves, whereas we, if we understand ourselves properly, will never, for example, Indianize ourselves.”

- Edmund Husserl

Why do I like this? No, not because I am racist. Because, first of all, Husserl is not a Francis Bacon who thought that non-European people were cannibals by nature. Neither is Husserl a right-wing, conservative, neocon, colonialist with his self-indulgence in his European superiority. Keep your Sartre away. Nor is he a French leftie who indulges in self-flagellation, who affirms his superiority by claiming a monopoly on evil. He is none of these. He does not babble. He is crystal clear. Of course, there are always those non-Europeans who are already Europeanized enough to strictly disagree with his claim. But they only reinforce his claim. Anyways. I love this quotation not because I enjoy the fact the Europeans in general never Indianize himself – if they were to Turkishize themselves I would be terribly sad though (I used the fact that I am Turkish in order to justify this racism – which is not something that only Europeans are privileged to do). Rather, I love this quotation because it has the courage to say what it already is without any reservations, shyness, or, slyness, and, as such, it puts a problem before us with its all gravity. It speaks the truth. You like it or not, Husserl does not in the least care about it. He has greater concerns than some’s petty, multicultural, hypocritical, liberal concerns. So, I love this parrhesiastic moment – to have the courage to say what everybody already knows because by saying this, by revealing what is already being evinced, he also problematizes it. Then you start asking asking yourself, why? Why is this so? Why are we all being Europeanized? Some politically-correct forms of life cannot even bare such an utterance. Why? Because as long as you keep it as a secret, it would “function” like a tyrant ruling a nation challenged by nobody. These people were always there, and will always be there and comprise the majority. But their existence had never impaired and will never impair the truth.

I love this quotation because it speaks the truth without any reservations, without any undeserved pride. Hence, it raises a tremendous challenge: Will we all turn into little Americans (as Europeans are already becoming Americans) not because being American is bad by nature or something of course it is not, but because there must be some alternatives, for a world without alternatives, a world in which we all watch the same youtube videos.. I don’t know, I think it will an unbearable world. But of course, you can disagree and call me that I am a racist. After all, you will be right, whatever you say: this is your beautiful world and it seems it will be always yours.

The post We never Indianize ourselves appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The English make up 85% of the UK’s population, with London home to a population equal to that of Scotland and Wales combined and an economy closely linked to Europe. But the capital and its country are at odds when it comes to Europe. Analysing patterns and differences of opinion in England, and especially the outlook of Londoners, is therefore vital to understanding how the UK will vote in the forthcoming referendum – and how the UK’s countries, regions and peoples will deal with the outcome.

Back in January 2013, when David Cameron committed a future Conservative government to holding an in/out referendum on the EU membership, he made clear that ‘it is time to settle this European question in British politics’. Today, one of the problems Cameron faces is that his European question is a multifaceted one that is more than to be or not to be in Europe. Look into what fuels the UK’s tensions with the rest of the EU and you soon find yourself grappling with such questions as the future place in the UK of both England and London. Because of its size, it will be in England where the referendum is largely won or lost. As the capital city and the UK’s biggest and richest region, what the result could mean for London will be a defining issue of the campaign and how the UK deals with the result.

A closer look at the Union

Breakdowns of the UK’s regional political differences often divide the Union into its four parts. The four may be equal constitutionally, but nothing could be further from the truth when it comes to population and economy. As the Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish know only too well, England dominates the union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

 

*UK population mid-2014 (source here)

Population (2013) GVA Public expenditure per head Variation from expenditure average £ bn %UK £ per head Variation England 53,865,817 1,298 86.5% 24,091 103.0 £8,678 97 North East 2,610,481 45 3.0% 17,381 74.3 £9,576 107 North West 7,103,260 142 9.4% 19,937 85.2 £9,276 104 Y’shire/Humber 5,337,710 102 6.8% 19,053 81.4 £8,679 97 East Midlands 4,598,729 89 5.9% 19,317 82.6 £8,219 92 West Midlands 5,674,712 110 7.4% 19,428 83.0 £8,641 97 East England 5,954,169 130 8.7% 21,897 93.6 £7,950 89 London 8,416,535 338 22.6% 40,215 171.9 £9,866 110 South East 8,792,626 227 15.2% 25,843 110.5 £7,756 87 South West 5,377,595 114 7.6% 21,163 90.5 £8,336 93 N Ireland 1,829,725 33 2.2% 17,948 76.7 £10,961 123 Scotland 5,327,700 117 7.8% 21,982 94.0 £10,275 115 Wales 3,082,412 52 3.5% 16,893 72.2 £9,924 111 UK 64,105,654 1500 100% 23,394 100 £8,936 100

 

*UK Regions and Nations: Populations, Gross Value Added, and Public Expenditure per head around the UK in 2013 and 2014 (source here)

Furthermore we rarely see breakdowns of opinions across England. This is despite 54.3 million English inhabiting a country home to a wealth of cultures, economies, and political outlooks. To be fair, the Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish are not single homogenous groups. But the debate sometimes risks overlooking differences within the English public opinion. Data (albeit to 2012) drawn from the British Election Study Continuous Monitoring Survey shows that support for the EU can vary across the UK and England.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS EU MEMBERSHIP BY REGION

Region

Response

option East Anglia (%)

East Midlands

(%)

Greater London

(%)

North

(%)

North West

(%)

Scotland

(%)

South East

(%)

South West

(%)

Wales

(%)

West Midlands

(%)

Yorkshire and Humberside

(%) Total (%) Strongly approve 11.3 9.4 18.1 10.6 11.3 15.4 10.7 10.9 11.9 10.7 10.9 12.0 Approve 33.3 35.0 40.5 37.8 37.1 43.7 36.0 34.6 40.7 35.8 36.1 37.2 Disapprove 33.6 33.6 25.8 33.2 32.0 26.3 32.7 32.5 29.8 31.9 32.9 31.2 Strongly disapprove 21.9 22.0 15.6 18.4 19.6 14.7 20.5 22.0 17.6 21.6 20.1 19.5

 

Question wording: ’Overall, do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of Britain’s membership in the European Union?’ Source: Source: British Election Study Continuous Monitoring Survey, June 2005-December 2012 (pooled monthly cross-sectional surveys). Weighted data.

*“Overall, do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of Britain’s membership in the European Union?”

Note: The data were provided by Dr Ben Clements and come from the British Election Study Continuous Monitoring Survey (BES CMS), based on the pooled June 2005-December 2012 monthly cross-sectional surveys (weighted data). The BES CMS dataset was obtained from the main BES 2009/10 project website.

Amongst the many differences that criss-cross England, London can make a fair claim to being so different as to be the UK’s undiscovered country. It has its own regional government in the form of the Greater London Authority and a Mayor. Its population will within a few years pass the 10 million mark, and if measured by metro area already stands at more than 14 million. That population is also Britain’s most diverse, with 36.7% Londoners born outside the UK, a figure that is growing. Such a fast growing and diverse population makes for distinct social and welfare challenges in terms of housing, policing, the environment and transport. Its economy – 22.6% of all of the UK’s generated by 13.1% of the population – races ahead of the rest of the UK and makes it one of the richest places in Europe and the world. As the BBC’s Robert Peston once argued when explaining why UKIP doesn’t do well in London:

Much of the rest of the UK sees globalisation and its manifestations – such as immigration – as disempowering, impoverishing and a threat. Whereas for Londoners, globalisation is an economic competition they are apparently winning.

London then is an English, British, European and international metropolis, booming thanks to its central place in the UK, Europe and the world.

The English Question and Europe

Despite people across the UK sharing some common concerns about the EU, polling data shows the English as a whole to be the most Eurosceptic of the four parts of the UK. No surprise then that UKIP scored well in large areas of England during the 2015 General Election, securing 14.1% of English votes and becoming the UK’s third most popular party by votes. It should also be noted that UKIP secured 13.6% in Wales, reminding us that other parts of the UK are not the home of pro-Europeanism as some might like to believe they are. Nevertheless, compared to the 1975 referendum when England was home to the most pro-European parts of the UK, today it is undeniably home to the parts that are the most Eurosceptic.

This can be put down to a number of reasons, not least of which is the failure of political parties in England, compared to those in the other three parts of the UK, to offer a pro-European message. It can also be attributed to the failure of the political parties to grapple with changes in English identity, with there being an often-noted connection between Euroscepticism and English nationalism. As Ben Wellings has argued: ‘Euroscepticism is the most formed-up expression of English grievance and an ideology that provides the political content for English nationalism.’

Surveys and analyses have shown an evolving sense of English nationalism is connected to feelings about an unfair treatment of England compared to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London. With no English Parliament or substantial regional governments of its own (excluding Greater London), England is run by a UK government based in London that can seem distant and beholden to other interests whether they be international ones or of the other parts of the UK. UKIP has been able to tap into this.

The European question in some areas of England is therefore not simply one of distrust of globalisation or the EU; it is also about negative views of a UK state and political parties that can seem weak, disinterested or beholden to others.

The London Question and Europe

Londoners are not known for being ‘little Englanders’. This is in no small part a result of Londoners being the least ‘English’ in England and the most likely to identify themselves as ‘British’ (according to the 2011 census). Its diverse population, economics and liberal politics make it a metropolis where parties such as UKIP struggle to make much headway. In the 2015 General Election UKIP secured 8.1% of Londoners votes, an improvement on its previous results but still its second lowest performance in the UK after Scotland. Nevertheless, UKIP has found success in some of the outer boroughs, especially in the east. That London suffers from major social, economic and community problems was all too clear during the 2011 London riots. While immigration is an issue, since the 1980s immigration has been key to the metropolis rebounding from its post-war decline. London’s Eurosceptic Mayor, Boris Johnson, has been amongst the UK’s most pro-immigration politicians.

A large part of the material wealth of London is tied to the economic vibrancy of the European market as part of wider transatlantic and global markets. Britain might not be in the euro, but that does not stop London handling more euro foreign-exchanges than the eurozone combined. Nor does it stop London being the headquarters of one hundred of Europe’s top 500 companies. Companies such as Goldman Sachs and the Lord Mayor of London have warned of the cost to London and the UK of an exit from the EU. The Mayor of London’s own 2014 report into Brexit and London – ‘The Europe Report: a win-win situation’ – might have argued that whatever the referendum outcome, London could win in varying ways (although see here for a critique). But even it made clear that close relations with the EU would be vital for any post-exit London.

London’s more pro-European outlook, its privileged position within the UK, unique population and identity have not passed unnoticed. ‘London’ has become a by-word for something that is distant, strange and out of control, similar to Brussels across the EU or Washington D.C. in the USA. While London has long been a place slightly apart from the rest of Britain, today people across the UK, and especially England, increasingly view London as a place far removed from the country they feel they inhabit. Suzanne Evans, a former Conservative councillor for Merton who defected to UKIP but lost her seat in the 2014 local elections, blamed UKIP’s poor performance in London on its young, educated, cultured, media-savvy population that can’t understand the heartache felt by the rest of the country. This might have been picked over for her insinuation that UKIP supporters elsewhere are old, not educated (to a certain extent Londoners are indeed younger and on average better qualified) or cultured and that the ‘media-savvy’ were somehow duped by media criticism of UKIP. But her warning that London is becoming a place apart from the rest of the UK has been echoed elsewhere. The EU referendum has the potential to highlight the differences between the capital city and its country and the need for this to be addressed.

A Kingdom of Many Parts

There can be little doubt that the UK’s referendum could have important implications for different parts of the UK. Most notably, Scotland’s place in the union and the Northern Ireland peace process could be changed. But by focusing on such areas we are at risk of missing the larger picture of what the result could mean for the place of England and London in the Union. It will be in England that the referendum is won or lost, and it will be in London and its relationship with England and the UK that we will see some of the most important consequences of the referendum result.

Note: this piece first appeared on the LSE’s Brexit Vote blog.

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