Europe's World

When the laser was invented, somebody said that it was a wonderful solution waiting for a problem. Something similar can be said for the EU Battle Groups (EU-BG).

At first, it looked as if the concept of the EU-BG was rather clear and would provide solutions to various security problems. The European Council Summit of 1999 had decided to set up “smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness”, while the 2010 Headline Goals, adopted by the European Council in 2004, specified the EU’s military goals as “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks, task of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making.” The EU-BG was supposed to play the role also of an initial entry force to be followed, if necessary, by more sizable European units, as well as to provide support for a country affected by a terrorist act and assist in state-building operations.

The idea was to always have two Battle Groups ready for active deployment, to be replaced by another pair every six-months. Since 2005, when the first two BGs were formed, not a single one of the over 20 that have so far been set up has been called to action. This is not because there was no need for them. Throughout this period, the EU has sent troops to address various crises like those in Chad, the Congo and Mali, just to name a few. On each occasion, the deployed EU military force has always been formed from scratch, from outside the EU-BG system. The most natural question to ask is why?

It is worth reminding ourselves that the decision to use the EU-BG can only be taken by full EU consensus, so any reluctance from one of the contributing countries is absolutely decisive. To hide a country’s true reasons for objecting, which very often result from internal politics, various technical arguments have been used. Often the point is made that the mission requires a totally different kind of force than what the EU-BG can provide – either because it’s too small or of the wrong composition. Sometimes the obstacle was cited as timing – the mission was supposed to go beyond the BG period of availability, with the other BG not yet ready for action. Sometimes the genuine reason was financial. In the EU, unlike in the UN, the main bulk of the mission’s costs are covered by the nations providing the deployed troops.

One solution is simply to scrap the programme altogether. But another is to draw lessons and introduce amendments; so how exactly can and should this be done?

• It’s absolutely necessary to streamline the decision process regarding BG deployment. If the deployment request comes from the UN or OSCE, the power to veto should be with the countries that are the main contributors to the BG under consideration. For other missions, a rule of “consensus minus one” seems quite appropriate.
• The system of financing the EU operations should be radically changed to mirror that of the UN. In EU operations almost all the costs are covered by the participating countries, whereas in UN operations all costs including the use of equipment are on the UN side. This is why, for many countries, participation in the UN operations is a reasonable source of income and the largest contributors to UN operations are countries like Ghana  or Nepal.
• Of the two on-duty BGs, one should be capable of engagement in a more demanding mission like ceasefire enforcement or a rescue operation in a hostile environment, whereas the other one should be dedicated to more peaceful tasks like the supervision of an election, natural disaster relief or classic peace monitoring. It means that the composition of these two specialised BGs should be completely different.
• To avoid a situation in which BG deployment is not possible because the end of the BG’s on-duty period is approaching, it is necessary to extend the 6-month period to at least 9 months, allowing for a 3-month overlap with the readiness time of the next BG.
• All procedures should be adapted for compliance with NATO standards, including a common set of rules of engagement. Thereafter, closer co-operation with NATO must be secured by working out the details of a BG co-ordination concept and deployment strategy, especially in anticipation of a more demanding mission that may require a more substantial military deployment.

By revising rather than scrapping its present arrangements, it is indeed possible to make the EU Battle Groups much better suited to the needs of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Following these steps will make the BG an effective, and indeed readily deployable, solution to Europe’s security threats.

IMAGE CREDIT: FLICKR/IRISH DEFENCE FORCES

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Reversing Europe’s demographic decline is a key domestic argument for encouraging refugees to settle in Europe. But amid the cacophony over European attitudes to the flood of refugees from the Middle East and beyond, it scarcely gets mentioned that among these refugees are the human resources vital to having any chance of reconstructing society and polities in the Middle East and elsewhere. And Europe can have a direct role in ensuring these skilled individuals bring their war-torn regions a better and safer future.

There is an analogy for this situation in which a European patient is being treated by a doctor originating from Afghanistan, imported to fill the shortage of skilled European medical manpower. Few European patients, if any, are aware that in Afghanistan there are 3 doctors for every 10,000 citizens. Europe’s “shortage” finds the figure nearer to 3 per 1,000.

The argument rages on as to whether refugees are seeking a better economic future, fleeing from hopelessness in failed states, or escaping from war and violence. Few reliable statistics are available. But it is clear that the overwhelming bulk of these refugees are young, and many of them have professional qualifications. So to the massive physical and moral destitution of refugees’ countries of origin is now added a great haemorrhage of precisely those talents and skills that are essential for the resurrection of damaged societies. And this haemorrhage will go on for the foreseeable future. While the European Union, its member states, local authorities and humanitarian agencies struggle to provide for the immediate needs and resettlement of refugees, it is worth starting to look at rehabilitating selected refugees who have the skills needed to put the pieces together again in their countries of origin.

The EEAS is currently in the middle of a strategic review. No one has any illusions about the scope of the European Union to help engineer peace and stability in the Middle East, with all the complex components involved. But somewhere in a European policy revamp towards the Middle East there should be room for an element of earmarking and training young leaders for the rehabilitation of their countries when circumstances better permit. Certainly, there is always a danger that these young people will suffer from being labelled back home as stooges of European imperialism. But such a programme is worth a try. Incidentally, it would also provide a signal for Europe’s own nervous citizens that the EU is not only trying to cope with the tidal wave of immigration, but is also looking constructively towards a future where Middle Eastern and other refugees may find enticement to return.

The post Refugees: A stolen resource appeared first on Europe’s World.

Allow me to begin with two short stories. The first story follows my husband, who has worked for a major Dutch company with branches across the globe, including the U.S. One time while he was on a training session with colleagues from different parts of the world, they had a free day on Sunday. His colleagues went for a hike, while my husband went to a church and to see a modern art exhibition, as he always does. They met again for supper, where his colleagues asked him why he didn’t spend the day with them. He answered that he went to a church, which caught them by surprise; a religious eastern European was something of an exotic animal to them. Only the reaction of his colleague from the U.S. was different: “Why didn’t you say so before?” he asked, “I’d take you along to our church, where I am one of the presbyters.” They continued talking – my husband, who had to take part in mandatory military service during the Communist era, and an American Vietnam veteran.

The second story finds me where I have worked for rather a long time, at the Czech Ministry of Environment. While I was the minister, one of my duties was to take part in discussions about the conservation status of the Šumava National Park. Environmentalists wanted to keep part of the park safe from any human impact under a project called “The wild heart of Europe”. The naysayers protested belligerently, and were supported by a large group of people, especially after the Kyrill tornado damaged a large area of the park. One man who wanted to interfere with the conservation and try to “help” the park invited me for a walk, saying that he will show me what no environmentalist would. We travelled up the hills, among dead and uprooted trees, through an environment that was ruined. It took a lot of time and eventually, on our way back, we had to pass through a part of the park that had not been meddled with for some time. The uprooted trees were there too, and seemingly had been for a number of years, but the nature around us was very diverse, and the vegetation was vast, full of flowers I had not seen before in my life. That said, there were no roads or even paths there – navigation became extremely difficult and we were without mobile phone signal or any other means of navigation. After getting back to the civilised, artificially-changed world, I realised that a protester against conservation had shown me the exact opposite of what he had wanted – nature helped itself over a few years, resulting in a state we could not even have imagined before.

There are two lessons to take from these stories that should inform our thinking going forward. First, knowing and embracing our cultural roots makes us free, more understanding of other cultures and ultimately powerful. Second, diversity is the source of ideas and creativity, it is a source of rebirth, not only in nature.

These lessons have a bearing on the EU’s digital debate. The technical solutions that are enabled today by widespread internet access, and the transfer and storage of large amounts of data, are not only desirable, but things we cannot do without; this ever more apparent. The creation of a standardised and united environment for these solutions is therefore extremely important. The Internet of things and services is not only one method we may take, it is a concept that will strongly influence the way we live and the way we see things. Self-production of electricity and heat will become widespread, our kids will be taught via e-learning platforms along with their regular schooling, our self-driving cars will be shared among people as is already common with bicycles we will more often purchase goods over the Internet, and we will use public services without the need for a physical contact with clerks. The orientation on the customer and the citizen in preparation for this new kind of existence is readily apparent. The dynamics of our Internet usage shows that it’s high time to act.

It remains a question whether the target set by the European Commission to cover all Europe with high-speed Internet before 2020 is ambitious enough. But on the other hand, it seems that it will be reached despite all the bureaucratic circumstances; should it not be, it will have a widespread impact on the competitiveness of our economies. If the Commission takes the unification of digital market rules as its priority, this change will be successful. Then again, if the related directives get stuck in the European Parliament with all the others, we might very well not succeed. Europe 2020 is a worthwhile set of necessary steps, but we have no priorities in place. Do we even properly understand the gravity of the issue?

The Internet of things and services is not only a matter of consumers, citizens and voters, the production of goods and services will have to undergo a profound change as well. Even today, 3D printing works miracles, and it seems that it will put a lot of manufacturing companies out of business. The just-in-time concept will no longer be relevant for logistics, rather for production of parts in the place where the final good is made. For countries such as the Czech Republic, this is indeed a significant challenge, as most Czech goods end up in products that are finalised elsewhere. I am not entirely convinced that the new ways of production will lead to a reindustrialisation of Europe in the common meaning of the word “industry”. We have to expect a significant change in both the method of production and the products themselves. This will be especially pronounced because of applied robotics – many roles currently held by people will belong to robots. The only things that remain are basic human needs – eat, sleep, health, social ties. The ways of fulfilling those will needlessly change.

What surprises me most is the nonchalance of Europe’s citizens. Every European strategy or rule is preceded by an analysis in which the impacts are evaluated in the fields of business, employment or public service. What we keep forgetting is assessment in a global context. In the 1990s, there were 6 billion people living in total, and this figure reached 7 billion in 2011. Europe accounts for merely 7%. At the same time, our well-being is high compared to most other countries and cultures. People living in those countries are motivated to attain the same life quality we have, and they can work hard for it. The Vietnamese community in the Czech Republic is a good example of this – a relatively small community gave rise to high number of skilled people. The rest of the world outside our windows is similarly motivated and is able to be skilled, and they have the numbers too – if we take for a fact that 10% of people in a given population have an exceptionally high IQ, it is a million people in the Czech Republic and more than 130m in China. Furthermore, this world outside our windows holds most of the resources we need, even in the new digital economy. Our riches are not something to be taken for granted; we need to innovate in order to keep them.

The new reality we’re approaching provides great possibilities for innovation, but it also calls for expanding research and development. What is currently an issue in this context is the low number of technically-skilled people, in Europe as well as in the U.S. It is also surprising how lacking in social science skills we are. Half the young population is spending years in universities, studying mostly non-technical subjects, and the number of published academic papers grows every year. But despite that, we are not educated or ready enough for the new conditions, new possibilities, ageing population or the profound change of the labour market – how will the taxation of work and capital function in a society in which most manufacturing jobs are taken by robots?  Technological standardisation is not only a way of democratic, free and equal access to good and factors of production, it also poses a threat of unification of language and thinking. We need to embrace our roots and at the same time embrace our vastness of languages, traditions and cultures in Europe, because that’s precisely where our strength and contribution to the world lies.

If I may break convention again, I have a joke on which to end, and it goes like this: God has decided he will flood the world once again in three days, but this time without Noah and his Ark. When the Pope, Grand Imam and Chief Rabbi learn of this, they go back urgently to speak to their communities. The Pope tells his people to pray for salvation. The Imam talks about martyrs’ deaths in waters and subsequent life in heaven. The Rabbi tells his peers that they have only three days to learn how to live underwater.

A time of great change is at our doorstep. Digitalisation is only one symptom of that, and we’d better start coming up with ideas of how to make a use of it – to live underwater.

The post Life lessons for Europe’s digital economy appeared first on Europe’s World.

This has been a shameful summer for Europe. We have witnessed the daily news coverage of Mediterranean drownings, suffocated truckloads, razor-wire fences, baton-wielding police and half a million desperate and dispirited migrants. They are now the focus both of Europeans’ fear and sympathy.

The ‘migrant crisis’ has revealed a topsy-turvy world of prejudices, misunderstandings and sheer political opportunism. The absence of an EU policy to cope with the flow of conflict refugees and others who are simply seeking a better life is shaming, yet at its root is a European mindset that sees immigration as a danger instead of welcoming it as an opportunity.

World opinion has derided the spectacle of European governments squabbling over sharing the burden of who should shelter the victims of war or poverty. So yes, it’s shameful, but why topsy-turvy? Because Europe needs more migrants, not fewer.

“It is clearly time for the EU and its member governments to analyse the migrant crisis and its solutions in a far more structured way than the woolly thinking and buck passing that has characterised their efforts so far”

The surge of people seeking a better life in Europe has caught almost all the EU governments on the hop. Yet even in the short term it was predictable. The outbreak of the Arab Spring in late 2010, and the ousting of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi the following year were early portents, and the exodus of people from Arab countries became inevitable when Syria was engulfed by civil war three years ago.

In the longer term, the UN agencies that grapple with migratory issues and the estimated 250m displaced people worldwide have been warning that the revolutions in transport and communication are stimulating migrations. The means to travel are more available than before, and the lure of western lifestyles fills TV screens. The exploding populations of developing countries have created a new generation of under-employed but ambitious young people. With Africa’s population of a billion set to double within 30 years, these migratory pressures are sure to grow.

Policymakers at national and local levels right across Europe should have begun some time ago to plan for this ‘surprise’ crisis. But politicians in most EU countries have either preferred not to risk voters’ disapproval by addressing immigration, or they have made political capital out of opposing it.

And that’s where we Europeans need to fundamentally alter our mindsets on migration. No one would deny that integrating millions of non-Europeans into our societies will be difficult and costly, but the key point to be driven home is that Europe has no choice. EU countries need more people if their standards of living are to be maintained, and perhaps even improved.

When urging austerity policies as the solution to the eurozone crisis, Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel’s mantra has been that Europe cannot go on accounting for half of the world’s spending on social benefits. But the challenge is far greater than slimming down with healthcare and pension cuts. Europe’s ageing is so dramatic that by mid-century the number of working-age people to support each pensioner will have shrunk from four today to only two.

Demographic projections are complicated by unknowns like the number of immigrants, but the signs are that the population of the EU will within just 35 years be down to 450m from the present 500m. Europe’s active labour force of 240m looks set to drop to 207m people by then, assuming that immigration has run at around the present level. If there were to be a sharp reduction in immigration, or even a halt, then the result would be an EU workforce of some 169m. The effect of removing some 70m jobs, and therefore taxpayers, from the European economy can only be guessed at.

This shrinkage of the EU workforce would be disastrous for a number of reasons, and none of them has attracted attention in the often hysterical media coverage of the migration crisis. To the contrary, migrants from Arab countries and Africa have been portrayed as benefit scroungers who will impose intolerable social and economic burdens on Europe.

The projections of Europe’s demographic trends are no secret, but they are given little prominence by political parties and their leaders. That’s not only because of populist pressures but also because politicians aren’t very interested in macroeconomic trends when they believe they can garner votes by championing their own specific policies.

“Germany’s emergence as the EU country most open to migrants is not the surprise portrayed by many reporters and commentators. Its demographic decline is Europe’s steepest”

There’s a widespread consensus, though, that the growth of a country’s workforce helps significantly to power its economic growth. Although the chorus of conservative voices in the United States has helped stem the flow of migrants across the Rio Grande, many American economists point to high birth rates in immigrant communities and the arrival of more newcomers as positive indicators to the country’s wellbeing.

The U.S. population is set to rise from around 300m now to 400m by mid-century, promising an even more muscular economy. And Americans are also well aware that their immigrants bring quality as well as quantity; over half of Silicon Valley’s start-ups and breakthroughs are led by people born outside the U.S.

Europe’s shrinking workforce, on the other hand, has for some time been seen by economists as a major headache. A decade ago, Europe’s World published an important article by German economist Klaus Regling warning of the ceiling being imposed on the EU’s potential GDP growth.

He calculated that the maximum economic growth rate of western Europe’s richer EU-15 member states would fall from 2.3% in 2005 to appreciably less than that after 2010. Labour shortages and the absence of an expanding workforce would, he forecast, limit to 1.8% those countries’ average growth rate throughout the two decades up to 2030. And from then until mid-century it will cut that still further to only 1.3%.

Regling’s is an influential voice; he was at that time the European Commission’s Director-General for economic affairs and is currently head of the eurozone’s bail-out fund, the European Stability Mechanism. But his warnings came on the eve of the 2007-8 global financial panic and the ensuing economic crisis, and so were eclipsed by sharply slower growth prospects throughout Europe. The ceiling on GDP growth rates he cited became of purely academic interest once recession gripped Europe.

The positive economic effects of immigration are all too evident in one EU country that is among the most opposed to the arrival of non-native job seekers – the United Kingdom. The British government is powerless to prevent citizens of other EU countries from finding work there, and has repeatedly voiced its frustration with net immigration figures now running at an annual rate of 300,000 people. Fuelled by youngsters from eastern Europe and the Baltic states eager to price themselves into work, Britain is enjoying a boom. Prime minister David Cameron points proudly to GDP growth that is considerably higher than on the continent, but gives no credence to the idea that it is the expansion of the UK’s active labour force that is largely responsible.

The sluggish economic outlook for Europe as a whole doesn’t mean that its labour shortages are any the less damaging. The shrinkage of the EU workforce has been hidden by rising unemployment. But European countries will in the years ahead all need substantial pools of employable young people if their economies are not to wither and die. It’s hard to argue this case, of course, when the natural reaction of many people is to ask why, with youth unemployment so high, should Europe import more young people whose lot will be to join the ranks of the jobless and discontented?

There are five answers to this question, and each on its own is a powerful argument for re-thinking our attitude to the hundreds of thousands of people wanting to come to Europe now, and the tens of millions who will be heading our way in the future.

The first is that Europe’s youth unemployment crisis is not as severe as it appears. The second is that Europeans’ low fertility rates make today’s labour market conditions irrelevant to tomorrow’s. The third is that employers in sectors as far apart as hotels, restaurants or seasonal agriculture at one end of the scale and high-tech manufacturing and services at the other are already complaining of acute staffing difficulties.

The fourth is that the problems of Europe’s very patchy regional economies can only be addressed by increasing the availability of local labour. The fifth and arguably most important reason of all is that newcomers to the labour market do not take jobs away from anyone. Economists have long derided what is known as the lump of labour fallacy – the idea that there is a finite number of jobs in an economy that have to be divided up. In fact, each new arrival also brings demand to the economy, and is therefore a source of dynamism.

Misguided lump of labour thinking gave rise to France’s 35-hour week, which after a decade has yet to create more jobs. But it takes a brave politician in France or elsewhere to denounce the concept of sharing out the available work. It takes even braver politicians to tackle the first of the myths listed here and say that joblessness amongst the under-24s isn’t as high as the figures tell us. It nevertheless is true; there are two sets of unemployment figures collated by the EU’s Eurostat statistical service. The one the media unerringly selects is the more dramatic unemployment rate, whereas the alternative calculation, the unemployment ratio, gives a far more realistic picture.

Youth unemployment rates of around 50% in Greece and Spain and 30% in Italy and Ireland are calculated as a percentage of unemployed people divided into the total number of people in the labour force. They make big headlines, but distort the picture and make tackling joblessness appear hopeless. That’s bad politics, of course, and one of the reasons that public opinion across Europe is increasingly sceptical of the benefits of the EU and the goal of deeper European integration. It has also encouraged the rise of populist parties at both ends of the political spectrum.

“The shrinkage of the EU workforce has been hidden by rising unemployment. But European countries will in the years ahead all need substantial pools of employable young people if their economies are not to wither and die”

The more revealing way to calculate youth unemployment is to work out the ratio of under-24s without a job in relation to the total youth population. This method cuts Spain’s youth unemployment rate to 19%, Greece’s to 13% and those of Ireland and Italy to 12% and 8% respectively. For the eurozone as a whole, it reduces the percentage of under-24s without a job from over 20% to under 9%.

That doesn’t mean there’s no challenge to be addressed through better training and improved methods of matching job seekers with possible employers, but it does mean that the excuse of a “lost generation” to justify the immigration barriers of a Fortress Europe is hollow.

The second reason for saying today’s youth employment figures aren’t relevant to the debate over migrants is indisputable. Birth rates across Europe have been falling for half a century, and at around one and a half children per family are not only far below the 2.1 ‘replacement rate’ but with successively smaller child-producing generations Europe’s indigenous population cannot possibly provide the workforce needed in years to come.

Drawing a true picture of labour shortages across the EU is difficult because local conditions vary so much. And it is certainly wrong to dismiss the difficulties young people face when looking for a job; university graduates reduced to taking banal work for which they are vastly over-qualified and youngsters from under-privileged backgrounds facing discrimination on racial or social grounds are a very real challenge. But that doesn’t alter the hard facts of Europe’s dislocated labour markets.

Universities and technical colleges aren’t delivering job seekers with the right skills. Employers’ organisations reckon that there’s an EU-wide shortage of approaching a million ICT workers with the computer and software writing skills they need. It’s a problem that has been brewing for many years, illustrated perhaps by the Stuttgart-based Daimler company that makes Mercedes-Benz automobiles. Daimler’s main worry is that about half of its workers are now over 50 years old, and it sees no way of replacing them.

On top of the skills gap, there’s the mismatch problem. Europeans, including its young, don’t move to where the jobs are. Often they can’t because of language barriers or housing shortages. For immigrants, however, the mobility issue is likely to be far less important. If they offer attractive incentives in terms of housing and education, Europe’s disadvantaged regions should be able to attract the labour they need to revitalise themselves.

The silver lining to the clouds of this summer’s migrant crisis has been the heart-warming welcomes laid on by many German communities, notably small towns and villages. Rural Germany, along with ‘la France profonde’ and all those parts of Europe that have undergone population drifts to the cities, is acutely aware of its manpower needs. The French call it “desertification” and see it as a major structural challenge, although those areas are often strongholds of the anti-immigration Front National party.

Germany’s emergence as the EU country most open to migrants is not the surprise portrayed by many reporters and commentators. Its demographic decline is Europe’s steepest; on present trends its population of 82m will by 2060 have shrunk to 65m and it will most probably have been overtaken by the UK as Europe’s largest nation. And without an influx of young people, Germany’s pensioners will have grown from a fifth of the population to a third. It is a scenario that haunts the country’s policymakers, but has made little impact on the overall political debate.

Never a country to neglect planning, Germany has for some years been making itself a magnet for migrants. For instance, the federal government’s powerful GIZ development body has a programme for recruiting young women in South East Asia to train as nurses in Germany and after working there for several years to return home should they wish with a substantial gratuity.

“The need to protect free movement cannot disguise the costs of accepting migrants. Their housing, education and re-settlement in Germany this year is being estimated at €3bn-plus”

That sort of initiative is easily managed, of course, whereas the arrival this year of huge numbers of people – at least 400,000 and possibly 800,000 in Germany alone and well over a million for the whole EU – is a very different proposition. To put this year’s figures into a wider context, a 2010 study led by Spain’s former prime minister Felipe Gonzalez reckoned that to keep the workforce at its present strength, Europe will need to bring in 100m migrants over the 40 years to mid-century.

It is clearly time for the EU and its member governments to analyse the migrant crisis and its solutions in a far more structured way than the woolly thinking and buck passing that has characterised their efforts so far.

Several different although linked policy developments are needed if Europe is not to find itself assailed by ungovernable floods of migrants whose arrival, although pitiful, divides governments in the EU and exacerbates anti-immigration prejudices. Action is therefore needed in six areas:

• The chaos of unregulated arrivals has to be addressed. That will demand EU-level agreement both on asylum criteria and the acceptance of economic migrants.
• These rules must then be applied at EU borders and also at points of departure. That will mean constructing camps while applicants are being processed and then organising transport.
• Migrants’ final destinations in the EU must be established at these points, with acceptance and integration mechanisms that link national and local authorities.
• A clear picture of immigrants’ gender, age, qualifications and languages must be established and made public. Rabble-rousing politicians’ claims of benefits scrounging will be deterred by a transparent profile of migrants.
• An objective EU-level research project should be launched to establish the extent to which economic migrants burden social welfare systems or have a dynamic effect. Europe’s governments need to be much clearer about the differences between EU and non-EU job seekers.
• The challenges of assimilating non-European migrants are considerable, but the cost of failing to do so is greater still. New intra-EU mechanisms are needed to share best practices.

The reality, of course, is that Europe’s governments are a long way from such an organised and forward-thinking approach. Shifting the emphasis away from attempts to block migrant routes northwards through the Balkans or across the Mediterranean and Aegean seas is not going to happen overnight. The spotlight looks firmly fixed on quotas under which each EU country would accept a share of asylum-seeking refugees.

As much as countries like Germany and Sweden understand the value of the influx of migrants, the strains created by the lack of solidarity between EU members is a growing irritant. Chancellor Merkel has made it plain that the Schengen Agreement on the free movement of EU citizens within the Union is at risk. As free movement is one of the benefits most widely appreciated by voters in Europe, and is fundamental to the single market, it would be catastrophic to sacrifice Schengen to short-term squabbling between governments.

The need to protect free movement cannot disguise the costs of accepting migrants. Their housing, education and re-settlement in Germany this year is being estimated at €3bn-plus; even if it’s a good investment, it is not a minor consideration in these cash-strapped times. And for transit countries like Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Balkan states there clearly needs to be an equitable financial burden-sharing arrangement.

The uncomfortable fact is that the efforts made so far to integrate immigrants into European society have not been successful, and that has contributed to the rise of nationalist political movements. Germany’s large Turkish community lags behind academically and complains of being discriminated against, and in France and Belgium people originally from Maghreb countries are underprivileged and after many generations are still seen as outsiders. Britain’s post-colonial wave of English-speaking West Indian and Pakistani immigrants are sometimes presented as a success story, but even there the integration process has been complex and often expensive. The spectre of ‘home-grown terrorism’ fostered by the tensions surrounding immigrant communities has also inflamed xenophobic protests against people of other races and religions.

Right now, Europe’s fevered debate over the migrant crisis veers from discussion of the correct ethical responses to human misery on such a vast scale to reviews within the European Commission of when and how economic migrants can be repatriated. The subtext to these discussions is that this is a temporary problem best resolved by agreeing short-term measures. The meetings between various EU leaders smack of ‘Canutism’, the laughable effort of an 11th century King of England and much of Scandinavia to demonstrate his authority by ordering the ocean’s tide to recede.

The tide of humanity displaced by conflict or poverty is not going to recede because Europe finds it uncomfortable and is too short-sighted to understand its advantages. The European Union has been pre-occupied since the beginning of the 21st century with its internal challenges, and has failed to raise its sights to the horizon. Stabilising its southern neighbourhood, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring, and extending its economic benefits to Africa and the Arab world have been very secondary considerations.

Pulling up the drawbridge of an even more redoubtable Fortress Europe is not the answer. There are instead twin solutions to the migrant crisis. The first is to reach out across the Mediterranean with a far greater determination to stabilise security there and strongly develop economic growth. If Europe doesn’t meet trouble half way, trouble will come to it. The second is for the EU’s political elites to understand the sheer necessity of attracting more migrants, and to convince voters that Europe’s future is at stake. As Giuseppe di Lampedusa’s novel The Leopard, set in Garibaldi’s risorgimento Italy, put it: “Everything must change, so everything can remain the same.”

The post The refugee crisis: Europe needs more migrants, not fewer appeared first on Europe’s World.

Faced with the greatest human displacement crisis in the history of the European Union, leaders must now accept greater international sharing of responsibility. We have to welcome more refugees and resettle them in Europe, and we must also dramatically increase our humanitarian aid.

Europe is facing just one facet of a worldwide crisis. Every two seconds, a person was forced last year to flee from conflict and persecution. The total number of people displaced is now close to 60m, the largest figure since the aftermath of World War II and the 1947 partition of India.

The refugees and migrants camping around the French port of Calais, and the people making the perilous journey across the Mediterranean to Greece or Italy, are just the tip of the iceberg. In a world ravaged by conflicts, we must now expect a growing number of people to take increasingly desperate measures in bids to get themselves and their families to safety. Only a small percentage of them will head towards Europe, yet many Europeans believe we are at risk of being overwhelmed. The facts are as follows: Europe is today housing only about 6% of the world’s refugees and displaced people. It is Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Pakistan, Iran, Ethiopia and Kenya that are shouldering the main burdens of the global displacement crisis. Yes, the number of refugees has increased in Europe, but Turkey alone received more refugees last year than the whole of Europe combined.

“If Europe responds to increased migration by increasing border controls or building walls like Hungary, we will just be sweeping the problem under the carpet”

In their attempts to control immigration, European countries are tightening their border restrictions and making it more difficult for people displaced by war and conflict to apply for asylum. But Europe cannot hide from global realities by building higher walls and increasing its border controls. We will only end up pushing desperate people to take increasingly dangerous routes as their path to safety.

During the first seven months of this year, more than 180,000 people crossed the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe, a sharp increase on last year. The majority fled war-torn countries and thus have a right to protection under the Refugee Convention. By summer 2015, some 2,000 people died in their attempts to reach Europe.

Media coverage in Calais has vividly portrayed the same desperation as migrants and refugees try to cross into Britain. The UK government has responded by funding more guards at the Eurotunnel terminal there to stop the few thousand that Prime Minister David Cameron has described as a “swarm of people”.

If Europe responds to increased migration by cracking down on migrant smuggling networks, increasing border controls, or building walls like Hungary, we will just be sweeping the problem under the carpet. These people are not fleeing because there exist ruthless people smugglers – the smugglers are there because there is a demand from vulnerable people who have given up all hope of a better life by remaining where they are.

The civil conflict in Syria is the single most important driver behind the increase in global displacement figures. Syrians also constitute the largest group crossing the Mediterranean. Yet only 6% of all Syrian refugees have been able to seek asylum in Europe – the vast majority of refugees are being forced to seek protection in neighbouring countries to Syria.

Those countries in the region are now reeling under the pressure of more than four million Syrian refugees. With only 30% of the regional refugee response plan funded, many people are not being given the support they need. The living conditions of these millions of Syrian refugees are worsening, with families living in destitution, often without access to medical care and whose children are deprived of education.

“We in Europe urgently need to increase our humanitarian assistance – not only to Syria and its neighbours but also to the many other countries in acute crisis”

The patience and dignity of the Syrian families coping with this situation is impressive, but an increasing number of people are losing all hope. Unless more support is given to these refugees and their host communities, many more will find themselves forced to choose between returning to Syria’s crossfire or to face the perils of the journey to Europe. We in Europe urgently need to increase our humanitarian assistance – not only to Syria and its neighbours but also to the many other countries in acute crisis. Providing hope and opportunity, and education and livelihoods is also the best way for Europe to promote stability and prevent disaffected youths from turning to extremist groups.

There will in any case be many who cannot, even with humanitarian assistance, find the protection they need. The UNHCR warns that about 10% of refugees from Syria look to be particularly vulnerable and in need of resettlement outside the region – they number widows with children, stateless Palestinians and individuals facing persecution.

These are the people who should be welcomed to Europe. But currently only Germany has offered a substantial number of resettlement places for the most vulnerable refugees. There seems to be a race to the bottom among Europe’s leadership, with politicians apparently saying “how can we get short-lived popularity with our own public and avoid taking in refugees we know need our protection?” Here in Norway, a recent campaign by humanitarian organisations has convinced Norwegian parliamentarians to double the number of refugees to be welcomed, and it’s clear that other countries could do the same.

The EU’s discussion about sharing responsibility for refugees coming to Europe must break free of its paralysis and offer many more people a legal way to enter the European continent without risking their lives at sea. At present, though, the refugees and migrants who make it to Europe are met with a reception system that’s in crisis. It has become impossible to ignore the spectacle of the Greek islands, where European holidaymakers are sunbathing on the beaches while refugees and migrants are seeking shelter in overcrowded camps and reception centres. Aid and emergency workers have been witnessing devastating scenes as exhausted refugees struggle to continue their journey north from Greece through Macedonia and Serbia. These relatively poor countries badly need EU support to strengthen their reception systems if they are to tackle the crisis.

“The need is for a more energetic and coherent European effort to address the root causes of today’s displacement crisis”

More than anything else, a peace settlement in Syria would reduce the refugee push factor. The need is for a more energetic and coherent European effort to address the root causes of today’s displacement crisis. The wish of most of the world’s displaced people is to return home, so when new peace talks are under way in Geneva, Europe must do what it can to make it more attractive for the parties at the bargaining table to settle and more unattractive to continue fighting.

In several of the conflicts raging around the world, both regional and global powers still add fuel to the flames by providing the warring parties with weapons and money. Europe’s leaders must therefore work to get Iran and Russia to sit down with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the U.S. to help UN mediators rather than allow them to be undermined.

Back in the 1990s, when conflict exploded in the Balkans, European leaders demonstrated their willingness and their commitment to helping the region and to resettling refugees in their countries. Today, that sort of European leadership is missing. Too many European politicians and their voters apparently wish to hide behind higher walls. It is high time for Europe to step up to this latest and greatest challenge.

Image Credit: FLICKR/FREEDOM HOUSE

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The year 2015 marks the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the European Union (EU) and the People’s Republic of China. Since 2003, China and the EU have enjoyed a strategic partnership, which includes a multitude of activities in areas such as trade, international security and environment protection. The “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” outlined many of these new areas of co-operation, including the strengthening of dialogue and communication on international and regional issues with major implications at the global level, with a particular focus on enhancing consultations on Africa.

In light of high-profile trade deals by China in Africa, the EU has become aware of China’s growing presence. European policymakers increasingly fear that China’s policy could affect the interests of the EU with regard to energy, natural resources and trade, as well as the dissemination of the EU’s norms and values. Since 2007, there have been calls to develop EU-China-Africa trilateral co-operation, but with limited success. One of the main factors for this failure has been the nature of both China and Europe’s economic interaction with Africa. While EU aid, investment and trade with Africa are conditional in order to promote good government and democracy, Chinese economic interaction is unconditional. China claims this arrangement allows African states to find the path to development that best suits their unique context. Both the EU and China claims it is contributing more than the other to Africa’s economic future.

“While the EU is a key trading partner for Africa, as well as a source of aid, China is driving African development”

China and the EU are both important trading partners for Africa. In 2009, China became Africa’s number one trading partner. From 2009 to 2011, the scale of Sino-African trade expanded rapidly. According to the 2013 State Council policy document, China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation, the total volume of China-African trade in 2012 reached $198.49bn. Of this, $85.32bn consisted of China’s exports to Africa, up 16.7% from the previous year, while China’s imports from Africa accounted for $113.17bn, up 21.4%. Natural resources accounted for the lion’s share of Africa’s exports to China, and huge Chinese demand has raised the price of these products, increasing overall GDP growth in Africa. Between 2007 and 2012, the value of EU imports from Africa increased by 46% to €187bn. Exports to Africa were €152bn in 2012. In total, 37% of African trade in 2012 took place with the EU. However, it is as an investor where the EU is Africa’s strongest partner. In 2012, the EU accounted for 48% (€221bn) of FDI stocks to Africa, making it the biggest provider of FDI to Africa. These investments are spread throughout all sectors of African economics, not just in natural resources, which helps to spread economic development across the population. Africa’s GDP is expected to accelerate from 3.5% in 2014 to 4.6% in 2015. This is in part due to strong Chinese demand for African resources as well as Europe’s investment on the continent. However, Africa’s human capital and economic infrastructure remain underdeveloped. Both China and the EU have engaged in aid programs to help overcome this underdevelopment.

Despite a decrease in bi-lateral aid to Sub-Saharan Africa between 2012 and 2013, the EU still remains Africa’s largest aid donor; 27.5% of the EU’s entire 2013 aid budget of €14.86bn went to Sub-Saharan Africa. In exchange for aid, the African, Carribean and Pacific (ACP) countries are asked to promote human rights, processes of democratisation, consolidation of the rule of law, and good governance. However, it is claimed that China’s provision of an alternative source of economic and political support to Africa has weakened the effect of positive conditionality. According to the 2014 Chinese white paper on foreign aid, development aid to Africa in 2009 made up 45.7% of China’s total aid, while the share for Africa had climbed to 51.8% by 2012. Chinese foreign development aid uses a no-strings-attached policy, which means the Chinese do not assign the politically difficult and often unpopular conditions that accompany EU aid.

“While EU aid, investment and trade with Africa are conditional in order to promote good government and democracy, Chinese economic interaction is unconditional”

However, it is unclear if China’s model of aid is preventing the development of good governance in Africa. A 2011 study by Christine Hackenesch on Ethiopia and Angola found that domestic factors – notably the level of challenge to regime survival – rather than Chinese aid were the biggest problem to the adoption of good governance. Despite this, the EU reacted to China’s no-strings aid policy in 2007 by readjusting its own development aid policy to promote the effectiveness of aid: First, it adopted the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in order to reduce fragmentation of aid among the EU donors; second, it transformed its donor-recipient relationship to the donor–partner countries relationship; and third, it changed the nature of conditionality. These changes have reduced the conditionality of EU aid. The Chinese, too, have reformed their aid and investment methods, distancing themselves from some private Chinese actors such as the Hong Kong–based consortium known as the 88 Queensway Group, which was involved in a questionable $2.9bn construction project in Angola.

China is Africa’s main trading partner and an important aid donor, but is China now contributing more than traditional actors, such as Europe, to Africa’s economic future? It is very difficult to provide a simple answer to this question. While the EU is a key trading partner for Africa, as well as a source of aid, China – and particularly its huge demand for natural resources – is driving African development. Nevertheless, the EU is by far Africa’s most important source of FDI, which is needed to develop the continent’s economics beyond supplies of resources.

Both the EU and China have helped to develop Africa in different – sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting – ways. However, it is important for both Chinese and European policymakers to remember that the African people are the greatest contributors to Africa’s economic future, and both actors’ policies need to ensure that they support the development of those people.

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China’s manufacturing boom is well known; over the past 25 years the Chinese share of the value-added by the manufacturing sector worldwide has increased almost tenfold. Nor has the pace of that change eased, for in the six years since the onset of the financial crisis China’s share has still risen by more than one percentage point every year – faster therefore than in the previous 12 years. Chinese value-added manufacturing overtook the combined output of Japan and Korea in 2009, that of the United States in 2014 and by 2016 or 2017 may well surpass than of the European Union.

But China’s population is more than double that of the EU and four time that of the U.S. The value-added of its manufacturing industry would need to quadruple to achieve the same per capita output as in Europe or America. Despite the rapid advances of recent years, the Chinese economy’s resurgence may have only just begun.

Historically, China’s manufacturing has been driven by its state-owned enterprises, but their dominance began to change a quarter of a century ago with the arrival of the Chinese or foreign-owned contract processing companies that assembled products without even owning the raw materials. Along with the reform of its state-owned enterprises, China also saw foreign direct investment in manufacturing gain ground steadily, and all of these developments were aided by special tax regimes for domestic profits as well as imports.

The change in ownership of manufacturing industry became even more pronounced in the middle of the last decade when China’s constitution was changed to recognise private property, and when company law was simplified by reducing the capital needed to form an enterprise. In the six years before that change, private sector value-added had been growing three percentage points faster every year than the state-owned sector, and in the following decade the gap widened to almost five percentage points. The domestic private sector was, meanwhile, expanding in relation to companies owned by shareholders from outside the Chinese mainland.

Private sector enterprises in China’s industrial sector have achieved extremely high rates of return. Despite the international financial crisis, the average return last year on equity before tax was 25%. With high returns and low taxation, private sector manufacturing in China has generated a large number of billionaires, even when measured in U.S. dollars. Of the 58 people with identified wealth last year of over $3bn, nearly 40% had amassed their fortune in manufacturing.

Rising wages have been seen as a threat to the development of the Chinese economy, and certainly average pay has risen significantly in real terms. The pay of a migrant worker in China relative to that of an unskilled worker in the United States, let’s say as a janitor, has almost doubled since 2008. Yet an unskilled American worker still earns almost five times more than a Chinese counterpart. This rapid increase has pushed the earnings of migrant workers in China well above their average earnings in countries like Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.

The rise in migrants’ earnings has also boosted domestic demand in China. Labour intensive industries have been able to switch output to the domestic market just as their shares of export markets for products like clothing, textiles, footwear and toys had begun to stabilise or even to fall. And Chinese entrepreneurs in these industries have reacted to higher wage costs by boosting manufacturing investment. The domestic value-added of the labour intensive industries’ output has risen faster since 2008 than that of the most capital intensive industries.

China’s industrial polices have long aimed to upgrade existing industries to higher value added by moving up the global value chain. China’s industrial policies have been typified by changes in its semiconductor industry. The first policy phase attempted to create national champions, but that was a failure. In the past decade, a new set of policies encouraged foreign investment with the aim of transferring technology to China. High-tech zones were created and foreign companies offered a special tax regime. The end result has been a strong rise in the semiconductor industry’s output, but chiefly for domestic consumption. China uses over half the semiconductors produced worldwide, but its semiconductor companies account for only 2% of global sales.

The overall result is that while China is now the leading exporter of high-tech products, the impact on its local economies has not been in line with that. Around four-fifths of China’s high-tech exports are by processing companies that import and then assemble parts in China, and re-export finalised goods. The sector’s share of gross domestic value-added is less than 45%. After allowing for royalties and the profits of the foreign-owned companies, the share of high-tech exports that are genuinely Chinese is below a third.

The government introduced new guidelines for the semiconductor industry a year ago that featured a National Investment Fund with a capital of just under $20bn. It is to be used for capital injections and to aid consolidation amongst Chinese companies, and some provincial governments are expected to create their own funds along the same lines. The objective is to raise overall Integrated Circuits (IC) production by 20% a year by 2020.

Chinese firms have struggled to enter the main semiconductor industry, but a number are making headway in communication devices. The boom in low-cost smart-phones from Chinese manufactures such as Huawei, Xiaomi, ZTE and Coolpad has been built on local semiconductor design companies specialising in communication chips.

Another key development has been the new foreign investment law and related regulations making it easier foreign companies to invest. The new law means investors will no longer have to obtain pre-approval before setting up a company, unless the investment is in a restricted area and on a negative list. China’s revised list of restricted or prohibited industries is now limited to only some mining areas, utilities, energy, finance and automobiles. From a European or American point of view, the main disappointment has been the placing on the restricted list of joint ventures in automobile production, and significant restrictions also remain in the finance sector.

The joint venture requirement for automobiles is designed to ensure technology transfers needed for a Chinese car industry. Allowing foreign companies to produce cars in China has been a major success, with vehicle production three times greater than before the 2008 onset of the western financial crisis, making it significantly larger than in North America or the EU. Although the Chinese sometimes claim that their six major companies account for 85% of domestic sales, the fact is that 70% of these domestically produced cars are from foreign joint ventures. Only one in six of the cars attributed to China’s six major automobile companies is produced by the Chinese partner. China’s car exports are insignificant because of poor productivity, design and quality.

The joint venture structure has also failed to yield technology transfers as foreign partners keep the JV separate from their Chinese partner, which will generally provide senior staff for marketing, human relations and government relations while the foreign partner contributes the engineering and technical staff. To overcome this problem, the Beijing government has insisted that JVs produce a Chinese model, with the JV partners responding by re-badging models from their global model portfolio not yet produced in China. To differentiate such products from their foreign brands, prices were set at a level competitive with domestic Chinese models. Consumers then turned to the new cheap JV brands and so accentuated the decline in the market share of the domestic Chinese producers.

The major industrial policy successes in the upgrading of its manufacturing industries have so far been confined to areas where both producer and the purchaser companies are state-owned, rather than by selling to consumers. Key examples are high-speed trains and wind turbines, and even in these areas, as with semiconductor foundries, there have been allegations of intellectual property theft, with severe penalties sometimes imposed.

China’s aircraft industry falls between the automobile and railways sectors as an industrial policy success. The Chinese government has long wanted an aircraft industry capable of competing on world markets, but so far no Chinese commercial aircraft has obtained foreign type approval. China’s development of new aircraft is running well behind schedule, highlighting the lack of advanced engineers.

Human capital is key factor to all forms of innovation. China’s physical capital is quickly renewed and replaced and half of the capital stock in its manufacturing industry is less than three years old. But human capital takes much longer, and although the human capital stock has grown rapidly, achieving the average education levels of advanced countries will take decades. This lack of experienced and qualified managers is reflected in a growing number of research projects where quality is lagging.

Chinese manufacturing has expanded rapidly over the past two decades, but is still far from being a mature, advanced sector. Rapid wage increases have put pressure on traditional labour intense industries, even though they are adapting. Return on equity remains high, dropping only slightly in the recent downturn, and that provides an incentive for the private sector to increase investment. In labour intensive sectors, investment is still increasing at a rapid pace, suggesting that private entrepreneurs who are responsible for nearly 90% of that investment are moving away from labour intensive production so as to remain competitive.

The fundamental factor affecting China’s drive to upgrade manufacturing will be the rate at which well-educated engineers graduate from universities at home and abroad. That can already be seen in areas where knowledge evolves most rapidly, such as communications and internet applications. But it will take time for a new generation of engineers to make a difference. The best industrial policy for China is that it announced in 2013 of letting the market decide on the allocating of resources.

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Although there is a strong element of grievance in the politics of populism, one factor which is common to almost all of the continent’s populist parties is an anti-EU sentiment. It is the degree of this – and fundamentally its effect on governments – which is causing most concern among mainstream parties.

A fanciful book, Apocalypse 2000, written in 1987, features the use of the European Parliament as a continental political platform for a populist Left/Right demagogue elected in Britain – Olaf D. Le Rith (Adolf Hitler) – who eventually seizes power across Europe. With centrist parties like the British Conservatives giving ground to populists at home and now across Europe, we should all be watchful. Let’s look at some of the most recent, worrying developments.

The populist challenge to the UK

In the UK’s May general election, the eurosceptic UK Independence Party (UKIP) came second in 120 of the 650 constituencies and third in the popular vote, garnering nearly 4 million votes, although it won only a single seat. David Cameron’s tour of EU capitals seeking a redefinition of the UK’s relationship with the EU does not stem from any conviction on his part – Cameron has always been content-free on Europe – it comes about because of his fear of UKIP, and of the hardline eurosceptics in his own party.

I was involved in a minor skirmish at the beginning of the Conservatives’ European turmoil when, as leader of the 36 Conservative members of the European Parliament in 1999, I was tasked with negotiating a more detached relationship with the Christian Democrat/Conservative European People’s Party (EPP) Group. Ten years later, David Cameron, under yet more pressure from the Right, pulled the Conservatives out of the EPP and created the European Conservatives and Reformists group with nationalists like Poland’s Law and Justice and controversial fringe parties such as Alternative for Germany (AfD), to which Cameron’s grouping now gives credibility. I left the Conservative Party in protest. Cameron’s split with the mainstream only adds to his negotiating task ahead of the UK’s EU membership referendum. Within the EPP, he would have had direct access to most of the EU’s top leadership in Brussels and national capitals.

The populist challenge to Europe

The rise of populism, especially on Europe’s Right, began to cause international concern after the European Parliamentary election of 2009, when Time magazine’s cover story, ‘Far Right Turn’, argued that “extremist parties in Europe are feeding off the economic crisis and the loss of trust in mainstream politics to extend their reach”. In May of last year, following the next and even more shocking European election, Time wrote, ”Anti-E.U. populists may have scored big at the ballot box, but they’re wrong on foreign policy”; not just wrong, but dangerous.
By last summer, one-third of the 750-member European Parliament was of the Right, largely a consequence of the continuing eurozone crisis and economic stagnation across much of Europe.  A new phenomenon had also emerged: populism of the Left, represented notably by Greece’s Syriza and Podemos (‘We can’), a Spanish party founded in early 2014 based on the radical Indignados movement. The success of Podemos in Spain’s recent regional and local elections, coupled with the success of the anti-establishment Ciudadanos movement, has shattered previous expectations for the general election later this year.

The populist opportunity for Putin

While Europe’s mainstream was anxious, these results encouraged Vladimir Putin’s international ambitions. His developing support for populist parties of Left and Right came into its own over his annexation of Crimea, which many supported. Putin’s strategy is based on his continental ‘Eurasian Union’, the brainchild of Moscow guru Aleksandr Dugin. Decrying liberalism, the aim is to break up the EU, sever transatlantic links and promote nationalism. Marine Le Pen is the most prominent of a troupe of populist or extremist leaders to visit Russia or Crimea. Tellingly, a resolution criticising Russia in the European Parliament on the 10th of June drew out these populist parties. UKIP and the Front National teamed up with other anti-EU parties to vote against the non-binding resolution, which ultimately passed by 494 votes against 135 with 69 abstentions.

Like the totalitarian dictators of the 1930s who funded foreign populist movements, whether Mussolini, Hitler, or indeed Stalin’s early funding of Hitler through Kurt von Schleicher, Time magazine’s ‘Man of the Year’ in 1932, Putin has been funding today’s extremists. Last November, French investigative journalists revealed that the Front National have received at least €9 million in loans from a Kremlin-linked bank. German media and the Austrian opposition say the AfD and the far-Right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) are also financed by Russia; allegations they each deny. And in Greece, Putin’s funding of the neo-Fascist Golden Dawn did not stop Syriza’s Alexis Tsipras making Moscow his first port of call as premier, resurrecting old geostrategic fears.

Reversing the trend

German political scientist Florian Hartleb, who specialises in the rise of populism, has written that “while there is no incontrovertible proof that demystification through participation in government is an effective strategy for successfully combating Right-wing populists, there is no doubt that the worst response strategy is ‘toleration’ because this allows populists directly to exert influence on a country’s political decision-making without being directly held to account for it.”

Polish columnist Paweł Świeboda has called for more pro-EU activism, saying “Much of the frustration of European citizens has to do with the policy that originates in Brussels. The institutions have tended to assume that they are bound to be on the virtuous side and their case will prevail. They have feared becoming embroiled in national party political squabbles. This strategy has run its course and will need to be replaced by more active messaging.”

What we can be clear about is that far-Right populism will not disappear of its own volition. Ms le Pen has recently announced the formation of a new Europe of Nations and Freedom group in the European Parliament. This gives her a front row seat and her far-Right team a platform, and €17.5m of public money over four years. As le Pen put it, “far more firepower than ever before”.

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Relations between Russia and the European Union are in deep crisis – perhaps the most serious crisis since the end of the Cold War. As the Russian Federation’s former foreign minister, I particularly regret this bleak state of affairs as along with my European counterparts I myself invested much time and effort in building a stronger Russia-EU partnership, with all its political, social, economic and humanitarian dimensions.

Many of our past plans and hopes now look like pipe-dreams that are remote and seemingly irrelevant to today’s grim realities. I am sure that many in Europe share my frustrations and concerns, although there is little sense in just being disappointed and pessimistic. We should instead analyse the mistakes and blunders of the past in order to reveal the opportunities of the future.

“Russia and the West should refrain from hostile and inflammatory rhetoric that fuels public mistrust”

The most graphic manifestation of the deep gap that has emerged between Brussels and Moscow is, of course, the situation in and around Ukraine. We can debate endlessly about who is to blame for this situation and whether it could have been avoided. Both Russia and the European Union have, in my view, contributed to the escalation of Ukrainian problems, and so both should bear their fair share of responsibility for the unfortunate developments in that country since autumn 2013. As I see it, though, Ukraine has not been the main cause of the Russia-EU crisis; rather it has been a catalyst of the more fundamental rifts that had emerged between Moscow and Brussels over the last few years. In short, the Russia-EU partnership has not worked out in the way that had been anticipated some 10-15 years ago.

So the question must be, what went wrong? Unless we look back into our past, we cannot realistically plan our future. Twelve years ago, we agreed at the 2003 Russia-EU summit in Saint Petersburg to proceed with the so called ‘four spaces’ in our co-operation. I was personally involved in drafting these four spaces, and I still believe that it was a very important achievement in the relationship. Later, these four spaces were to be complimented by the EU-Russia Roadmaps supposed to define specific goals, schedules, and benchmarks in each of the spaces.

Since then, we have not made a lot of progress. In many ways we lost ground and not gained it. We failed to sign a new EU-Russia Partnership agreement to replace the old one that had expired long ago. We couldn’t move to a visa-free regime between Russia and the Schengen zone, and were unable to reconcile our differences on the EU’s ‘third energy package’. Even on less controversial matters like research co-operation, environmental protection and transportation, our progress was modest, to put it mildly.

That said, I would not want to downplay the efforts of the committed men and women in both EU and in Russia who did much to bring co-operation to a new level. Yet the overall balance sheet isn’t impressive. It is true that our economic co-operation continued to grow until 2014, as did the scale of EU companies’ investments in Russia and the number of joint ventures. But the relationship’s institutional framework failed to catch up with these new economic realities, so the gap between businessmen and the politicians grew wider and wider and then turned into an abyss during the crisis over Ukraine.

Why didn’t we succeed in using the last 15 years to their full extent? Why could the private sector on both sides not lobby for a new level of political partnership between Russia and EU? One of the most common explanations is that on both sides politicians were distracted by such other priorities and events as the global economic crisis of 2008-2009, the conflict in the Caucasus, complications in the eurozone, the relentless rise of China, the Arab Spring, the U.S.-EU transatlantic trade and investment negotiations (TTIP) and so on. There may be some truth in this explanation, but what does that prove? It only tells us that for both the European Union and Russia their mutual relations seemed of secondary importance, and could therefore easily be shelved or even sacrificed for the sake of more central and more urgent needs.

The Ukrainian crisis has thus become a very explicit manifestation of the fragility of our relations. Both sides pursued their own policies toward Ukraine without any co-ordination, or at least consultations, with one another. The question of the “European choice” for Ukraine was raised only in the old “zero sum game” logic of the Cold War. I am myself convinced that with the necessary efforts on both sides we could have avoided the Ukrainian tragedy – at any rate in the dramatic form it has finally taken.

Rather than emphasising the differences in our approaches and blaming each other, we should have looked for what unites us in this extraordinary situation. Above all, neither the European Union, nor Russia has anything to gain from Ukraine becoming a ‘failed state’ in the centre of the European continent. On the contrary, such a development would create a whole range of fundamental threats and challenges to everybody in Europe, not to mention the countless tragedies and suffering it means for the Ukrainian people. It will now be much more difficult to restore the relationship between Russia and Europe than it was only a year ago, but we have no alternative to limiting the damage and moving ahead.

“Rather than emphasising the differences in our approaches and blaming each other, we should have looked for what unites us in this extraordinary situation”

A lot has been said about the European institutional deficit that was clearly demonstrated by the Ukrainian crisis. And it’s certainly true that the many European and Euro-Atlantic organisations and mechanisms that were specifically designed to prevent or to resolve crises failed to do so – with the qualified exception of OSCE, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Instead, the crisis gave birth to new forms of international co-operation like the so-called “Normandy process”. This new format may look extremely fragile and shaky, but it at least demonstrates our common ability to make tangible progress under even the most difficult circumstances.

Where, then, should we go from here? In my opinion, five urgent steps are needed if we are to start repairing the badly damaged EU-Russia relationship.

First, we must prevent any further escalation of the military conflict in the centre of Europe. The Minsk agreements have to be implemented in full by all the sides without any exceptions or procrastinations. All violations of the agreements by rebels in the east or by the Kiev authorities should be brought to light and properly investigated without resort to bias or double standards.

Second, we have to enhance and to broaden the Normandy format. Aside from sporadic meetings at the very top or at foreign ministers’ level we need a permanent high-level Contact Group in Kiev that will work on a day-to-day basis with the parties to the conflict. It is critically important that U.S. should be included in the Contact Group to avoid any misunderstandings or failures of communication across the Atlantic.

Third, Russia and the West should refrain from hostile and inflammatory rhetoric that fuels public mistrust and hatred. The vicious spiral of today’s propaganda war has to be stopped and reversed – at least at official level, if we do not want to turn the current crisis into a long-term confrontation that will divide our common continent for years, if not decades, to come.

Fourth, both sides have to invest political energy and capital in rescuing what can still be saved from the best days of EU-Russia co-operation. So far as is possible, we should maintain our joint projects on education and research and in culture and civil society, environmental protection and climate change. We should try to preserve our successful trans-border co-operation, contacts between Russian and European regions and between ‘twinned’ cities. These are the seeds of the future renaissance of the EU-Russia relationship.

Fifth, the time has clearly come to explore opportunities for closer and more intensive contacts between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The EU has little to lose by reaching out to this neighbouring integration project, while in terms of influencing the emerging EEU’s standards, mechanisms, procedures and modes of operation, the rewards could be handsome.

I don’t want to imply that we should be getting back to “business as usual” by ignoring the deep political divisions between Moscow and Brussels. That approach wouldn’t work even if both sides were prepared to stick by it. But one of the positive side-effects of this crisis is that there is today less hypocrisy and political correctness between Moscow and Brussels. Unless we learn the lessons of this crisis, mistrust, instability and losses in both east and west will continue to multiply.

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From the challenge of Russia to the on-going tragedy unfolding in the Mediterranean to the persistent sense of economic drift, Europe finds itself at an inflection point. The disaffection of European citizens looms large, and institutions in Brussels are perceived as uninspiring and directionless. This leads to an uncomfortable but urgently necessary question: What is the point of the European Union?

Last autumn, Jean-Claude Juncker was widely hailed for the radical redesign of what he himself proclaimed a “last chance” European Commission, but after nearly nine months the outlook is hazy. So far, Juncker’s new commission has chiefly led to much confusion within the EU bureaucracies. It has disrupted the traditional matching of the European parliamentary committees with the commission’s directorates-general, and the prior structure in which directors-general reported to a single commissioner has turned into a hodge-podge of solicitations, responses and endless co-ordination between many members and vice-presidents of the commission.

Juncker’s aim was to clean up all the red tape, but the drive for better regulation has so far seen a move away from formal legislation towards soft rulemaking, which means recommendations, guidelines, comprehensive assessments or even no regulation at all. The decision to scrap legislative proposals left unfinished from the previous commission, notably the “circular economy package”, has raised hackles, many in the Parliament where the move is seen as an institutional attack.

“Last autumn, Jean-Claude Juncker was widely hailed for the radical redesign of what he himself proclaimed a “last chance” European Commission, but after nearly nine months the outlook is hazy”

This bad blood has spilled over into the commission’s 2015 work programme, which parliament has yet to approve. Some major initiatives have been launched – the digital single market, the energy union and Juncker’s infrastructure investment plan – but on the whole these so far lack meat. Clouding the commission’s early months of 2015 was the uproar surrounding the ‘Luxleaks’ revelations about tax holidays for Luxembourg-registered corporations and the subsequent debate at the European Parliament with the tensions it created. The European Council, meanwhile, has maintained a level of unity and activity on key topics, but EU member states too often continue to display parochial attitudes driven by national interests. All in all, the make-or-break EU with its much heralded institutional structure has so far been characterised by narrow expectations and great disorientation regarding Europe’s future.

The tragedy of all of this is that it comes at a time the European project faces troubling challenges that require concerted effort, bravery and most of all leadership, which have been lacking except at rare moments of emergency. This has been the case while Europe’s overall economy has moved from crisis to morass, with occasional moments of high-tension brinksmanship over “Grexit”, or the even more likely “Graccident”. The EU’s tendency has been to act quickly until a threat subsides at which point interest wanes. During the 2010-2014 EU mandate, under Herman Van Rompuy’s Council Presidency, this gap-closing was impressive and resulted in fundamental changes in the Union’s structure. Yet it is far from complete and sorely lacks drive. Where, for instance, is the finalised Banking Union?

This confusion reflects the worrying trend in Europe in which there is a growing reticence towards forming an ever-closer union while openness to the membership of “any European State” committed to the EU’s core values dims. Throughout the European project there has always been tension between the widening and deepening, but now both are waning. Juncker’s announcement before taking office that there would be no new membership for the next five years was significant. Although none of the candidate countries was at all likely to achieve membership before 2020, formally foreclosing this avenue sent a message as did the downgrading of the enlargement portfolio vis-à-vis the neighbourhood policy. These two ethics, the embrace of the idea of Europe whole and free and the push for ever-closer union, have propelled the EU and its successes. Without them there is a real danger of an unravelling of the European project.

“Looking beyond Europe, there is a new world emerging in which the EU’s place at the table, or that of any of its member governments, is not a given”

Europe’s hesitant mood is exacerbated by its daunting neighbourhood. Pundits solemnly note that the Union has gone from seeking to create a “ring of friends” to having to deal with a ring of fire, but this turn of phrase only in part captures the reversal in the EU’s relationships with others. It has gone from generous and benign but what is generally considered non-essential activities in its near abroad to a moment in which the events in the EU’s neighbourhood have a direct impact on Europe’s own internal dynamics.

In the EU’s southern neighbourhood, the disorder that now extends from Syria to Libya to Mali has fostered the spectre of domestic terrorism in Europe, and has also brought to the fore fundamental questions over identity and immigration. To the East, Vladimir Putin has not only created the menace of Ukraine sinking into chaos, but is also dangerously threatening the political and territorial stability of some EU member states. Moscow’s insidious attempts to weaken Europe from within by courting populist and eurosceptic political parties like Hungary’s Jobbik, Syriza in Greece and most openly the Front National (FN) in France are aimed at more than breaking EU unity over sanctions policy but at breaking the Union itself. For Putin has identified the most fundamental challenge facing Europe: political disaffection.

The rise of emerging powers has created self-doubt among Europeans about the role of the Union in the world. Seven years of austerity have brought much uncertainty about governments’ ability to fulfil their end of the social contract. High unemployment and the bleak outlook for youth in many parts of Europe, along with the general perception of growing income inequalities, are fuelling support for re-packaged old ideas, anti-system rhetoric and rose-coloured nationalistic nostalgia for bygone days. It has been seen in Syriza’s electoral victory in Greece, the growth of populist Podemos in Spain, UKIP’s ability to pull the Conservative Party to the right, the sudden rise in Germany of Alternative für Deutschland, the comeback of the former True Finns Party and the FN´s string of successes in French local and regional elections.

This constitutes a serious threat of dysfunctional government at a national level, but it also poses an existential threat for the European construction. People’s identification of the economic crisis with the European Union is near-universal. Germans resent the EU for funnelling their taxes into bail-outs for the southern eurozone countries, while Mediterraneans, epitomised by Greece, scorn Brussels for the hardships of austerity. Everywhere there is the view, however contradictory, that the EU has both done too much and too little. The bulk of the criticism is in fact well-founded, as the EU has acted slowly and insufficiently. But some is plainly undeserved: Brussels has too long served as a convenient scapegoat for national governments. Regardless of who is actually to blame, the economic downturn has seen the perception of failure firmly attaching itself to the European Union.

“Pundits solemnly note that the Union has gone from seeking to create a “ring of friends” to having to deal with a ring of fire”

Looking beyond Europe, there is a new world emerging in which the EU’s place at the table, or that of any of its member governments, is not a given. This requires a reset in the way that we Europeans think of ourselves, of the role we want to play and the strength of acting together.

The palpable sense of disappointment and insecurity in Europe ignores our many assets. We enjoy all the advantages of free circulation, peace and genuinely high social standards. In general terms, Europe has an educated, healthy and diverse population, the vitality created by innovation and research and a belief in the rule of law and human rights that is ingrained in its DNA. But Europeans have not recognised these strengths and do not know how they can be translated into a new global role. Thus the fear persists of a world that belongs to others, and in more concrete terms Europe’s economic and social systems remain unadapted. This represents a particular danger for the European project, because it has increasingly relied only on prosperity as the central justification for its existence.

It was not always so. The original impetus for European unity was peace. The Schuman Declaration opened with the exhortation: “World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it”. But with the early death of the proposed European Defence Community, and the Atlanticisation of security in the context of the Cold War, peace became less of a guiding force.

Prosperity – which was initially seen as a means – gradually became the end. The economic boom of the 1960s saw growth become a centripetal force within the shell of Cold War security. This was reinforced in the 1980s when, with François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl’s backing, Jacques Delors thrust prosperity to the fore with his Single Market drive.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 saw Cold War fears evaporate, leaving Europe to generate its own momentum. A push for a distinct rationale for the EU gathered momentum in governmental corridors through elite-driven projects, notably institution building and enlargement, with an emphasis on shared values. But these efforts were not enough to generate a political centre of gravity, particularly among the broader public, that would be separate from the overarching goal of prosperity. Now, the blame for Europe’s faltering economy has been placed at the feet of the EU, with more than half of Europeans telling pollsters the lives of their children will be more difficult than their own. This begs the question: Why have the European Union?

Societies tend to mobilise around big ideas. This can, as in the Cold War, be a threat, or a cause as with the American civil rights movement. Or it can be a project, such as European integration at its inception. What we lack right now is just such a big idea. These are concepts that cannot simply be manufactured, there must be a match between a push forward and public yearning. This has been the central problem of recent attempts to coalesce public support at the European level, notably the ill-fated EU constitution. There was just not a perceived need, so the narrative faltered. But today there is a simmering desire for something to rally around, along with a sense of Europe’s disarray. In the absence of a clear vision of the future from Brussels or any of the national capitals, the overly simple and uncomplicated messages of populism or nationalism are enticing for Europeans.

There is nevertheless a hunger amongst many for inspiration that offers an opportunity for a visionary message that would strengthen the self-confidence and legitimacy of the European Union. There are openings, but they must be seized: recent events within Europe and its immediate neighbourhood should translate into a convincing narrative that Europe’s very real security threats can only be faced in common; or more broadly engaging citizens in an ambitious new drive that would fulfil Schuman’s vision of a Europe that is a beacon of peace and ideas for the world. But first it is necessary for European leaders in general, and those in Brussels in particular, to be more ambitious and brave and to look beyond narrow short-term interests.

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To address the question of whether Federica Mogherini can shape a smarter foreign and security policy for the EU than Catherine Ashton did, the answer, assuming there is one, must come in several parts.

The first concerns the nature of the position itself. When Ashton was appointed EU High Representative (HR) in 2009, many commentators, reacting to the widespread feeling that several other higher-profile candidates would have been preferable, argued that the personality of the incumbent was irrelevant because all decision-making power lies in the hands of the member states. Whoever is in post, it was argued, will simply have to toe whatever line member states collectively think appropriate or desirable. This line of reasoning has also greeted the appointment of Mogherini, though it is at best a half-truth, as most member states are actually looking for guidance in defining and promoting their interests. Institutionally, the HR indeed has to work within clear political constraints. But she also enjoys a considerable margin of manoeuvre and, given creativity and imagination, can succeed in influencing, if not actually setting, the agenda to a meaningful extent. Commentators agree that Javier Solana, with far fewer resources than Ashton, succeeded far better in making a real difference.

As a result of Ashton’s tenure, there are those who suggest that the position of HR has been weakened or even undermined – precisely because of her relative failure to deliver on the undoubtedly exaggerated expectations of the security community. But that view overlooks the extent to which the new post-holder has succeeded in avoiding the many early mistakes for which Ashton was constantly pilloried. It also ignores the new geopolitical context in which Mogherini is operating, with the specific remit given to the HR by the December 2013 Council. That remit confers on the new HR a clear mandate to develop, not a new institution as in the case of Ashton (the EEAS), but a new strategy and new policy preferences for the EU as a whole.

“A smart policy is one that is clear, appropriate to the objective being pursued and achievable”

The second issue is the respective candidates’ qualifications for the job. Here, Mogherini scores heavily, with her previous experience as Italian Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Italian Parliament’s Defence Committee. Whereas Ashton had to start from scratch and learn on the job, Mogherini hit the road running. During her October 2014 audition hearings before the European Parliament, all observers were as impressed by her solid mastery of the issues as they had been disconcerted five years earlier by Ashton’s apparent amateurishness. Mogherini is also solidly advised and assisted by her chef de cabinet, Stefano Manservisi, one of Italy’s most distinguished European officials. Whereas Ashton appeared constrained by ambivalent signals from the UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron, Mogherini benefits from the enthusiastic Euro-credentials of Matteo Renzi.

The third issue is the political content of the word “smart” as applied to European foreign policy. A smart policy is one that is clear, appropriate to the objective being pursued and achievable. Ashton put more time and effort into the Middle East than any other geographical area. But it was not clear what she hoped to achieve, and her actual achievements were extremely modest. Her main diplomatic successes – Kosovo and Iran – stemmed from her personal human qualities rather than from diplomatic finesse. Whereas Ashton toed the British line of ambivalence towards the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and appeared to consider it with indifference, expressing a clear preference for NATO, Mogherini strongly believes in and attaches genuine importance to European defence and security co-operation, which she perceives as necessarily operating in harmony with NATO.

It is in the area of the respective post-holders’ main priority remits that the biggest difference can be detected. Ashton was charged with creating the EEAS and she is rightly credited with achieving this – and within a year of taking office. Yet the mid-term reviews of the EEAS were generally critical, and in her own observations of the service, she seemed far more concerned about its internal workings than about its diplomatic reach or objectives. Mogherini has been charged with developing an EU “grand strategy”. The Council remit specifically asked her to “assess the impact of changes in the global environment” and to report to the Council on “challenges and opportunities” for the EU arising from that shifting global context. The way she has gone about this offers considerable reason for optimism. The most important element is that she is asking the correct questions. Not, ‘how do we export our values to the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods?’ But, ‘what can the EU realistically hope to achieve in these neighbourhoods given the massive changes they have recently undergone?’

The strategic review process will not be rushed. In the first phase, it has sought to understand shifts in the global environment, assess internal changes within the Union and their foreign policy implications, and review EU foreign policy instruments across the board (CSDP, cyber, energy, trade, development, counter-terrorism). In a second phase, starting immediately after the June Council, it will address the real questions required behind a genuine strategy: what are the EU’s interests, what are its realistic goals and how does it link these to appropriate means?

Mogherini has established a clear set of priorities, has developed a good working relationship with the policy community, with national and European officials and above all with the media. Whereas Ashton, for the overwhelming majority of commentators, got off to a decidedly rocky start, Mogherini’s performance to date has been virtually flawless. Whether this eventually delivers a “smarter” policy than that of her predecessor, of course, is largely in her own hands.

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Only four years after the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) underwent its first major review at the time of what was over-enthusiastically being called the ‘Arab Spring’, the ENP is once again in flux. The adoption of a consultation paper in March earlier this year called ‘Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy’ so soon after the previous review was supposed to have made the ENP fit for purpose says much of the Barroso Commission’s shortcomings. Certainly, a genuine overhaul is now timely and much needed.

The EU’s eastern and southern neighbours have been going from crisis to crisis, with 12 out of 16 of them now directly exposed to unresolved conflicts, territorial occupation or even war. Bad governance, untransparent and ineffective state institutions, corruption and frequent violations of civil and political liberties are the rule rather than the exception in most of the partner countries in Europe’s neighbourhood. The European Union’s policymakers, whether in the Commission, the Parliament, the External Action Service or in EU member states’ capitals have all pointed to the ENP’s failure to respond adequately to these challenges.

Europe’s domestic problems are obviously an important factor. These times of austerity, rising nationalism and xenophobia, of growing concerns over illicit immigration, together with the looming threat of a Grexit and a disintegrating eurozone make costly and unpredictable foreign policy initiatives unattractive to public opinion. The latest ENP review is therefore faced with considerable constraints and seemingly bleak prospects. Yet meaningful reform of the ENP can be achieved, and it doesn’t necessarily have to come with a high price tag. For this to happen, though, decision-makers in the EU institutions and in member states’ capitals need to take five points into account.

In the first place, they must resist the ‘back to basics’ logic that some say should be put at the centre of the ENP review. Much as this sounds sensible, it is flawed. Not only did the basics of 2002 and early 2003, when the concept of a ‘wider Europe’ was agreed, relate to a neighbourhood very different to today’s, but also these basics were rooted in a false belief that the recipe for enlargement – conditionality and incentives for lasting reform – could be replicated without the carrot of EU membership.

“Playing for time is no longer an option now that the neighbourhood is in reality a ‘ring of fire’”

The second point to be emphasised is that although all concerned on the EU side underline the central importance to the ENP of Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA), they have all stayed tellingly silent as to whether full implementation of these stipulations is a means to an end or the end itself. The absence of a clear end-goal is hugely problematic on the EU side in terms of foreign policy planning and the appropriation of targeted funds, and for EU neighbours it saps their efforts to generate domestic support for the approximation, implementation and enforcement of EU rules and norms.

Third, although the revised ENP of 2011 spoke of a ‘new response to a changing neighbourhood’, in practice its marked lack of innovation led to a gradual erosion of its credibility and therefore its effectiveness. This resulted from the de facto perversion of its ‘less-for-less’ principle into a ‘less-for-more’ practice which rewarded instead of sanctioning reform laggards in the neighbourhood. Also, it was the consequence of an overly-ambitious incorporation of issue-areas and policy fields the ‘new response’ was suddenly supposed to address, lacking, however, the means to do so.    

Fourth, ENP partners are shown by various EU Neighbourhood Barometers to have very different views of the EU. Last year, 56% of respondents in the eastern neighbourhood had a negative or neutral image of the EU, while in its southern neighbourhood only 38% held a positive view of the EU. This looks like being a major constraint on governments’ room for manoeuvre on ENP-related reforms.

Fifth, the original 2003 ENP and its 2011 successor fell victim to ill-informed and misleading interpretations of the underlying dynamics of the wider neighbourhood. The consequence has been that many in Brussels and in EU member states misinterpreted as signs of stability the stagnating politics of the countries in the neighbourhood and in some the re-emergence or even consolidation of authoritarianism.

Provided the consultation process now underway takes these points into account, a number of recommendations are in place.

The first is that further reform of the ENP will be bound to fail unless all 28 EU member states increase their involvement in both the review process and the implementation of a new policy framework. Developments like Russia’s unlawful actions in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s rivalry in the EU’s southern backyard compel all EU governments to incorporate the ENP into their foreign policy DNA. That also means the EU will need to abandon the ENP’s open-endedness because playing for time is no longer an option now that the neighbourhood is in reality a ‘ring of fire’. Europe’s neighbours need to be given a clear-cut roadmap; only an end-goal – not necessarily EU membership – will allow them to glimpse light at the end of a long reform tunnel and help justify costly and painful reforms.

Increased financial assistance and a wide-ranging liberalisation of trade, services and public procurement would undoubtedly benefit any neighbour implementing DCFTA stipulations. But because they remain confined by EU commercial policy, future ‘more-for-more’ formulae should envisage the more far-reaching integration of successful neighbours into some parts of the EU’s single market providing they approximate to EU rules and norms, and even adopt and enforce them.

To be taken seriously by reform-reluctant neighbours, the EU must start to use its leverage on trade. It should suspend trade preferences in the event of non-compliance with mutually agreed commitments. Other than Algeria, none of the 16 neighbours ranks among the EU’s top-20 trade partners. What the neighbours have in common is that they are more dependent on preferential EU market access than vice versa. This applies even to energy suppliers like Algeria and Azerbaijan, whose downstream networks are directed towards Europe and which desperately need the oil and gas sales if their governing regimes are to survive.

“The absence of a clear end-goal is hugely problematic”

The EU is present in all 16 neighbours through its delegations and representative offices or through the embassies of member states. To benefit more from this presence and enhance the ENP’s visibility, greater coordination and cooperation, as well as a reduction of overlaps should be a priority. Hand-in-hand with this streamlining, the EU should engage more in political coordination, and perhaps joint programming, with external actors and donors particularly on economic, technical and infrastructure.

The EU’s search for harmony and security in its neighbourhood has forced it to rethink its policies vis-à-vis the near abroad once more. This offers a unique opportunity for stakeholders to show they have learned the lessons of past failures. But that demands the new ENP policy framework generates results so that the populations of the 16 neighbours feel that responding to EU-induced reforms pays off. Only then will the EU truly be able to help reform-minded neighbours to increase and sustain the legitimacy of their domestic reform efforts. However, this requires consistency on the part of the EU and greater coherence between the policies of the 28 EU member states and EU institutions.

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The EU is struggling to regain its lost popularity. There’s a sense of foreboding in Brussels that the radical and generally eurosceptic parties like Spain’s Podemos, Germany’s AfD, the Front National in France and even Britain’s UKIP and Greece’s Syriza are not the fleeting flash-in-the-pan phenomena they were first thought to be. Unless the EU can raise its game on communications and outreach, these ‘fringe radicals’ may soon be Europe’s game changers.

Anyone familiar with Brussels would probably agree that the institutions of the European Union generally prefer the detail of dossiers to the ‘big picture’. That’s understandable, given the sheer complexity of the technocratic issues that are the daily business of the EU. But it is also regrettable, and increasingly a problem.

Public opinion across Europe is rarely concerned with the minutiae of economic policies or even social measures. What the voters register are the things ‘Europe’ is or isn’t doing to confront the major challenges that feature so prominently in TV news bulletins.

There are times when such threats are indeed headed-off and defused by the EU; bird flu or the menace of jihadist terrorism are readily understandable examples of how Europe’s cross-border cooperation is invaluable. Most people also see the single market for goods and services as hugely beneficial.

Whether they see the underpinnings of the European economy as necessary trade-offs for what the EU’s critics call Brussels’ “high-handed interference” is less certain. The years of austerity have taken a heavy toll of people’s unquestioning support for the European project.

But the EU still has opportunities to demonstrate its value, not just within Europe but to the wider world. It should tackle the problem of refugees displaced by conflict in the Middle East and by poverty in Africa. Their plight has so far highlighted Europe’s impotence in the face of the huge humanitarian crisis on its doorstep, and the selfishness of the many European governments refusing to offer help. But it’s a chance for the EU to show its worth.

The drama of boatloads of people risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean, along with TV reports of teeming but flimsy refugee camps, is striking a chord with Europeans that’s more than a passing moment of sympathy. They feel their governments should be doing more, even though they themselves may want to resist immigration and a more multi-cultural Europe.

Jean-Claude Juncker and his fellow EU commissioners have been trying to rally member states to act, with little real results. The EU, they say, doesn’t itself have the instruments and funds to make a difference. But it does have a voice.

The refugee problem is just a symptom of the EU’s failure to grasp the dangers that follow the Arab Spring. Brussels should launch a truly ambitious long-term strategy for addressing the economic and security weaknesses of the countries that these refugees are fleeing from. It couldn’t resolve this crisis overnight, but it could show that Europe is about people, and not just red tape.

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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is embarked on a bold integration initiative that will increasingly align the member states, including through the ASEAN[1] Community to be declared in late 2015 when the region’s leaders meet in Malaysia. The enduring vision and ambition of ASEAN leaders has been the creation of a dynamic, people-centered, inclusive, integrated and globally important collective.

This ambition matters. If ASEAN were a single country, it would be the world’s 7th largest (World Bank 2013 statistics). Or, better still, 4th in World Bank purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. That puts ASEAN just behind the United Kingdom in raw GDP or just behind the combined weight of Germany and the United Kingdom in PPP terms. From 2006-11 ASEAN average growth was 5.14 %, while the EU achieved 1.03 %. Not bad for a region that barely registered in global economic terms before the 1980s.

ASEAN has the world’s 3rd largest population, with over 630 million people. It ranks behind China and India, but ahead of the EU (507 million in 2014) and the United States.   By 2020 around half of the region’s population will be under 30, creating market growth and employment opportunities.   By comparison, in 2014 about one third of the EU’s population was under 30, down from over 40 per cent in 1994 (Eurostat). In 2010 only 5.6 per cent of ASEAN’s people were aged over 65 (EU 18.5 per cent: 2014).   In addition to the population dividend that ASEAN will continue to enjoy, increasing urbanization and rapid uptake of new technology add to the attractiveness of the region as a market and partner.

ASEAN’s drive to integrate has been long in the making.   It was born out of the original wish of the six founding members of ASEAN to work together to ensure the security of their region and to increase the prosperity of their people. Emerging from colonialism and post-war conflicts involving great powers, conscious also that their development levels were low, poverty was endemic, and they had no natural ally, the original members of ASEAN agreed in 1967 to work together for mutual benefit.   Since then the membership has grown, the language and vision have evolved, but the impulse remains the same. ASEAN realizes that their best interests are served by working together to ensure their prosperity and security.

Their current objective is the establishment of an ASEAN Community at the end of year Leaders’ Summit in Malaysia. This comprises three pillars: economic, political-security, socio-cultural.

The economic pillar aims to create a single market and production base, a highly competitive regional economy, equitable economic development to narrow development and wealth gaps, and full integration into the global economy. Many building blocks are in place and others aligned with the blueprint are underway, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free trade negotiations involving ASEAN and its free trade partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand).

The political security pillar focuses on a rules-based community with shared values and norms. Some elements relate to political and institutional development within ASEAN. Good governance, human rights and anti-corruption endeavours are among the elements. Others focus on regional interests, like the South China Sea and the implementation of ASEAN’s nuclear free zone. ASEAN already sits at the centre of regional architecture, including through its leadership in the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and it wishes to cement this positioning.   There’s also work underway to develop common ASEAN positions on foreign policy issues, but this looks likely to be a long haul endeavour.

The socio-cultural pillar seeks to forge a common identity in a people-centred and socially responsible framework.   The broad-ranging elements include cooperation in areas like education, health, sport, culture, disaster risk management, humanitarian activities, sustainability and science and technology.   Narrowing the development gaps within and between countries features in this pillar, as in the economic one.

ASEAN officials have been working hard to advance the many elements of the overall Community project.   It has long been clear that the 2015 outcome will not be a complete, shining edifice that will transform links among the ASEAN countries and further strengthen their ability to meet the world.   It’s not an EU-style union. Nor at the economic level is it the kind of open partnership in goods, services, investment and labour that New Zealand and Australia have achieved.   Such comparisons ultimately miss the point.

ASEAN is forging its own unique set of arrangements that will bind its members ever more closely, while recognizing the massive differences among them not only in economic and development terms, but also in matters of language, culture and confidence. They looked at other models, but are shaping their own course at a pace and in a direction that works for them.   The progress they achieve with small, often over-worked bureaucracies is remarkable.   The 2015 outcome will reflect the start of the next phase of their journey – they will improve, tweak and nuance it over time. In short, the ASEAN Community represents a milestone, rather than a destination, in the long journey of regional integration.

Indeed, ASEAN has already begun talking about their next vision looking beyond 2020. That determination to keep moving, to keep improving, is a powerful driver for a region that does not want to be left behind and which aspires to have an ever more significant global presence.

To be sure there are challenges and problems that ASEAN must confront.

The Asia-Pacific region remains one of critical strategic significance. It has benefitted from the leading role the United States has played in supporting peace and prosperity. China’s rapid recent development has also presented fresh opportunities for ASEAN. Yet the current South China Sea debate highlights evolution in the regional dynamic. ASEAN recognizes that it needs to remain nimble, cohesive and neutral in the wider context if it is to remain at the heart of regional processes. As Indonesia’s former foreign minister Marty Natalegawa used to say, ASEAN has to earn its place in the driver’s seat of regionalism.

Within ASEAN there are challenges also. In integration terms, for example, labour mobility is currently a long term dream for most. Then there are various bilateral issues that create awkwardness among certain member states from time to time. And despite the commitment of their leaders to ASEAN, they are still working on getting the region’s people to fully embrace the notion that ASEAN should now be part of their DNA (Europe faces a similar challenge). And so on.

At its core, gradual evolutionary improvement in every facet of life and activity within the ASEAN community will make those countries stronger, with higher levels of development, improved regulation, stronger economies and fewer challenges. That will heighten their attractiveness as partners. Along the way, there will also be greater opportunities to work with ASEAN to help the grouping achieve its vision in each of the three pillar areas.   Each external dialogue partner, including the EU, is already deeply engaged in helping ASEAN in areas where there are skills and capabilities to share.   This creates an excellent base for further development of existing relationships and partnerships and the development of new ones. The EU has in fact just decided to take its relationship with ASEAN to a “strategic level”.

ASEAN is rising, quickly. The integration initiative takes account of regional realities, needs and aspirations and is unique – it does not parallel other integration efforts in other regions. It has set the grouping on a course that will have far-reaching consequences.   The opportunities for partnership and deeper engagement will increase over time as ASEAN progresses its integration project.     May ASEAN continue to have bold dreams.

[1] ASEAN members include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). Vietnam joined in 1995, Laos and Burma in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

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There is now a long list of conflicts and security threats that affect Europe directly or indirectly. As well as Ukraine, the list includes Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This list isn’t exhaustive, but it highlights the worsening international security situation, and for EU countries it means an increased terrorism risk, waves of people trying to escape the horrors of war and a need for more humanitarian aid than ever.

Europe’s number one security concern, of course, is Russian aggression in Ukraine. The Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the reaction of democratic societies to it, has gone through several phases. With the benefit of hindsight, one might well say the EU lacked effectiveness in the pre-conflict period. Before the Vilnius summit in November 2013, there had been no EU consensus on whether to conclude an Association Agreement with Ukraine. EU governments either didn’t want to commit themselves to a European perspective for Ukraine, or were using the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko as an excuse. The real reason for the delay was an unwillingness to take the step forward with Ukraine that the association agreement would have meant. And by the time they finally reached agreement it was too late. Russian pressure on Ukraine had become so great that the then president Viktor Yanukovytch didn’t dare to sign the agreement with the EU. The moment had passed, and the world knows what happened once the Maidan protests began.

“We in Estonia, and in other Baltic states, must clearly understand that in this tense situation we must be able to make choices that are free of external pressures”

Yanukovytch was ousted and Russia began its military aggression in Ukraine to prevent the country from moving westwards and away from Russia´s sphere of influence. Russia basically repeated the events of 2008 when it attacked Georgia and fostered ‘breakaway’ governments in the frozen conflict regions of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia with the aim of dashing Georgia’s hopes of NATO membership.

The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 prompted Europe along with democratic countries elsewhere to adopt a fundamentally more active stance towards the Ukraine crisis. At first, European sanctions were imposed. But the essence of the conflict had yet really to make an impact on public opinion in western Europe. The Ukraine conflict tended to be seen as merely another example of slavic bickering that had little or nothing to do with western Europe. It took a horrible tragedy to change that; for this war reached western consciousness last July, when Malaysian Airline’s Flight MH17 was shot down with the loss of all its passengers and crew. The shift in European public opinion was such that suddenly Estonia and other like-minded countries were no longer seen as “Russophobic”.

NATO took steps to strengthen security on its eastern wing, and the NATO-Russia Council was suspended. Additional planes had already been sent by the U.S. in March to strengthen the protection of Baltic airspace, and in April NATO decided to step up security, with Estonia’s Ämari airport to become the base for Baltic air policing. By the beginning of May, Ämari had become host to Danish fighter jets, which were replaced at the end of August by German planes. With U.S. army units now permanently based in Estonia, the clear message is that NATO is a well-functioning security organisation.

When President Barack Obama visited Tallinn in early last September, he made it plain that protecting Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius is as important as protecting Berlin, Paris and London. Shortly afterwards, the NATO summit in Wales was being hailed as a success in Estonia because it defined the alliance’s reinforced presence in our region as the ‘new normal’.

The unconcealed presence of Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine by the end of August last year finally made the EU act more forcefully. This mostly took the form of strengthened sanctions against Russia, and it will take time for these to have an effect. Unfortunately, there are not many alternatives to sanctions when political and diplomatic efforts have brought no success.

“There can be no political solution in Ukraine if that were to mean permanent new areas of frozen conflict”

We must keep on trying to find a political solution to the crisis, but that will be difficult as long as Russia continues preventing Ukraine or any other former Soviet Union country from moving closer to either the EU or NATO, and tries to either keep them or bring them back into its own sphere of influence. The EU’s sanctions should therefore not be lifted until the reasons for those sanctions have disappeared, which does not seem likely to happen any time soon. On the contrary, fighting continues in eastern Ukraine, there have been reports of human rights violations in Crimea and in both hundreds of thousands of people have fled from their homes.

These developments make it all the more embarrassing to hear some EU leaders call for the lifting of sanctions and a return to business as usual. The EU cannot afford to be split, while the trend towards closer co-operation between Moscow and both far left and far right populist parties in Europe is alarming, especially when financial support is involved. And there are already many members of the European Parliament whose views are clearly influenced by Russia.

There can be no political solution in Ukraine if that were to mean permanent new areas of frozen conflict. Both Crimea and Donbas are already in that situation because of Russia’s activities. Of six EU partnership countries, five have either one frozen conflict and sometimes even two; South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, in Georgia, Moldova has Transnistria, Armenia and Azerbaijan have Nagorno-Karabakh and now Ukraine has Crimea and Donbas. Russia’s purpose in creating these frozen conflict areas is to influence the choices open to these countries.

The communiqué issued after NATO’s Newport summit in Wales noted that Russia´s aggressive actions against Ukraine fundamentally challenge the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace. This kind of message would have been unthinkable a year before. Russia had previously been treated as a partner, but its use of military force against a neighbour and the forceful changing of a country’s borders as a means for dealing with disagreements has created a new situation. The security policy positions of Estonia and likeminded countries have thus become the mainstream of European security thinking.

In light of all this, one might ask whether the crisis has led to the collapse of Europe’s security architecture. For 20 years Europe has built a system relying on security collaboration with its underlying principles of refraining from either threatening or using force, of respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, and the right of states to choose freely their allies. These principles are contained in the UN Charter and in such underlying documents of European security as the CSCE’s Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, and also in the Founding Act on NATO-Russia relations.

“The EU’s sanctions should not be lifted until the reasons for those sanctions have disappeared, which does not seem likely to happen any time soon”

Russia violated these principles when its troops set foot in Ukraine. But that violation does not necessarily mean the end of Europe’s security architecture. A violation of agreed principles doesn’t make them automatically null and void, for this crisis has both unified and strengthened Europe. But even if the basic principles of that architecture still apply, the security environment has clearly changed. Borders have been changed by force and the predictability of international relations has been seriously reduced.

We in Estonia, and in other Baltic states, must clearly understand that in this tense situation we must be able to make choices that are free of external pressures. Our EU and NATO membership has given us the sense of security we never had before. Yet countries in our neighbourhood have had to experience such Russian actions as constant airspace violations in Finland and Sweden, the dangerous manoeuvres of Russian warplanes in the European airspace, the re-opening of charges against Lithuanian nationals who refused to join the Soviet army or the abduction from Estonian territory of police officer Eston Kohver and his unlawful detainment in Russia.

So what future actions are open to Europe? We have been accustomed to seeing the EU in the positive light of a soft power. In many parts of Europe, theis perspective has led old enemies to accept and respect each other. Europe faced almost no external opposition to its enlargement processes, let alone to its association agreements. But now that Europe’s soft power has clashed in Ukraine with Russian hard power, a whole new situation has been created that we must adjust to.

Europe values the sanctity of human life, the liberty of individual, including freedom of expression and conscience, the comprehensive protection of human rights, democracy and compliance with agreements. But to the east of our neighbourhood there are powers that question these values. Freedom of expression, including internet freedom, is being suppressed by various means and free media replaced by propaganda. The interests of state administration are more important than private property rights, so we are entering a new phase of ideological confrontation. On the one side there are the democratic values on which our prosperity is built, and on the other a “civil religion” that gives priority to the interests of the authorities. We in the EU and NATO know which is the right side to be on.

The post The Ukraine crisis is a threat to Europe’s security architecture appeared first on Europe’s World.

On 6 March, the European Union submitted its commitments for the new global climate treaty that’s due to be finalised in Paris this December. The pledge, for a 40% cut in emissions by 2030, was one of the first to be delivered to the United Nations. It went largely unnoticed, but is remarkable, not least because Europe’s pledge was delivered not by individual states, but by the EU as a whole.

European climate change policy has long been an EU-led affair. That pan-European co-ordination makes sense because tackling climate change requires concerted international action. The origins of the joint submission lay in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations back in 1997, when EU member states secured the right to meet their commitments collectively. The protocol includes a provision that allows EU members to allocate commitments among themselves.

This arrangement turned climate policy into a rare EU success story, an example of European co-ordination and solidarity. The reallocation of commitments gave southern, and later central-eastern, European countries room for substantial emissions growth which was offset by tighter targets in countries such as Denmark, Germany and the UK.

Those arrangements were followed in 2005 by the creation of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the world’s largest environmental market. Covering about half of EU emissions, the ETS is the EU’s key policy tool for meeting emissions objectives – the 40% by 2030 promised ahead of Paris and an earlier commitment to a 20% reduction of emissions by 2020, both relative to 1990 levels. By the middle of the century, the EU is committed to reducing emissions by at least 80%.

The ETS is designed to meet these objectives in the cheapest possible way. Companies that find it hard to reduce emissions can buy emission allowances, or permits, from businesses that can do so cheaply and are willing to do more. The ETS also ensures that there is a price to pay for emitting carbon. As a result, Europe’s biggest emitters are now managing their emissions much more consciously. That is perhaps the most important achievement of the scheme.

The EU ETS hasn’t gone entirely to plan. There were regulatory teething problems and instances of fraud. The main problem, however, has been with the price of allowances.

Carbon prices are meant to respond to market developments, for example, if coal prices fall, the price of carbon needs to go up to curtail emissions from increased coal use. That fluctuating price should be one of the virtues of the scheme. Unfortunately, the European carbon price developed a tendency to crash. The first price collapse in 2006 was caused by countries handing out too many permits. A tighter cap was introduced, but then the carbon market was hit by the economic crisis of 2008.  As the European economy contracted, emissions fell to a point where the supply of allowances again exceeded demand.

“It’s counterproductive to saddle the economy with overly tight regulation in difficult times”

The surplus of permits is now equivalent to at least one year of emissions. The price has only kept above zero because firms can bank their surplus for use in future years. There is also an expectation that the surplus permits will, eventually, be removed from the system. However the European Commission has been slow to do so.

One reason for this is politics. The Commission was reluctant to propose measures that would require national approval and might therefore be open to sabotage by unenthusiastic member states. There was also a strong belief that the market would put things right. The Commission argued market participants would prefer depressed and fluctuating prices over the political risks associated with an uncertain emissions cap.

That is a valid point. There is a counter argument, however. Climate policy is more cost-effective if emission reductions can be moved from periods when they are costly to periods when they are cheap. In other words, it makes sense to tighten the emissions cap during an economic downturn and loosen it in boom times.

This has to be done within reason. It’s counterproductive to saddle the economy with overly tight regulation in difficult times. The carbon price can be allowed to fall, but not by as much as it would – and did – under a fixed cap.

EU leaders took a big step towards reforming the ETS along these lines when they agreed late last year to establish a market stability reserve to address the chronic surplus of allowances and deal with potential future shocks. The stability reserve was widely welcomed, but its start date is still under debate. The Commission proposed 2021, but the European Parliament wants to bring it forward to at least 2019.

In the meantime, carbon prices are likely to remain depressed, even if markets anticipate the new rules. The size and ambition of the ETS and its firm emissions targets have given the EU a leadership role in international climate negotiations. It is a role that the EU has relished and the Union has been a hugely important and often effective player in these intricate talks.

The EU will still be a central player ahead of the crucial Paris summit in December, but its claim to lead by example is being eroded. While the EU ETS is still the world’s largest carbon market, regional trading schemes in China and in California are equally ambitious in their depth and scope. They have learned from the EU ETS and avoided many of its design faults. Their carbon prices are often higher than those in the EU.

“The size and ambition of the ETS and its firm emissions targets have given the EU a leadership role in international climate negotiations”

A growing number of countries have adopted carbon targets and are legislating on climate change. A new survey by the Grantham Research Institute, in collaboration with global parliamentary groups, identified over 800 climate-related laws in the 99 surveyed countries. This includes pertinent legislation by all major emitters, including China and other emerging markets.

By several measures, the carbon ambitions of these countries are now on a par with those of the EU. China’s 2020 target is to reduce its carbon intensity – that is carbon emissions relative to its fast-growing GDP – by 40%. The EU has a much more anemic economy, so if its 2020 ambition is translated into the same metric, we find that the EU requires cuts of only about 30% in intensity terms.

The EU’s climate change objectives were strengthened in October 2014, when EU leaders agreed the 40% target for 2030. As with the 2020 goals, the new carbon target is complemented by parallel objectives for renewable energy and energy efficiency. However EU leaders have yet to decide how the emission reduction burden will be shared out among member states.

The Commission claims that the new target puts Europe “on the cost-effective track towards … its objective of cutting emissions by at least 80% by 2050.” That seems unlikely. According the proposed schedule, member states will have to reduce emissions by slightly less than 3% a year on average between 2020 and 2030. The pace then has to accelerate to over 5% a year between 2030 and 2050.

Back-loading emission cuts to such an extent might prove costly. Clean technologies like renewable energy and electric cars will be cheaper in the 2030s – assuming they enjoy sufficient support – but in sectors with long-lived capital a 5% annual emissions cut would exceed the rate at which assets are depreciated and replaced. The Commission’s proposed path may therefore require the premature scrapping of capital after 2030, an expensive prospect which could be avoided with a more proactive timetable.

EU leaders would be well advised to review their targets once more and bring climate action forward. This applies not just to the 2030 target, but also the ambition for 2020, which looks modest in the light of recent trends. The 2020 target could easily be strengthened from 20% to 30%, as EU leaders once contemplated. The start of the ETS stability reserve should also be brought forward to boost confidence in the carbon market.

Climate change involves timeframes that go well beyond policymakers’ normal planning horizons. This means action often gets postponed. The challenge for EU leaders now is to look, for once, into the long term.

The post Keeping Europe’s climate policy on track appeared first on Europe’s World.

India and the world are still getting used to Narendra Modi. A year after he came to power, the turbo-charged, much-travelled Indian Prime Minister has earned a reputation as an astute deal-maker and skilful economic diplomat. With at least 18 foreign trips and meetings with world leaders under his belt so far, “India occupies a pre-eminent place in the world arena”, says Indian Finance Minister Arun Jaitley.

He’s right. Modi continues to fascinate a closely watching world. Opinion is divided at home, however. Defenders of Modi say he is making government more efficient, improving the business climate and combating corruption. There is praise for the government’s ambitious multi-billion dollar economic agenda and plans to improve the country’s ramshackle infrastructure. Critics complain, however, that Modi is a man of rhetoric rather than action and point to slow, incremental reforms and lack of delivery on many election promises. “The celebrations of the first year in office of this government are in sharp contrast to the plight of the common person”, say social activists Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey as quoted in the Indian Express. They add: “The callousness of the government is most noticeable in its attitude to social sector issues”.

The jury may still be out on his government’s achievements but with his vision of a new India, complete with smart cities, state-of-the-art railway tracks, highways and airports, a digitally-empowered society, sustainable green policies and a “Make in India” campaign to attract global investors, Modi is shaking up India – and world perceptions of India. Recent statements by Jaitley that India would grow at a faster pace than the 7% growth expected in China, have added to the country’s new lustre.

“Ready to welcome the world with open arms”

Turning Modi’s agenda of an India which meets “first world standards” in an array of areas will require time, effort and money. Expectations are high. India’s business leaders are looking to Modi to boost growth in the $1.9 trillion economy. At the top of their wish list are investments in infrastructure, simplification of rules for acquiring land and implementation of a proposed national sales tax. Indian executives say the government should take the lead in financing new roads and public projects to give the maximum boost to Asia’s third-biggest economy.

India’s growing list of foreign friends is also interested. Many, including German defence minister Ursula von der Leyen, have already visited India to explore ways to partner with “Make in India” including in the defence manufacturing sector which Delhi says is a priority. Much to Modi’s delight other, equally enthusiastic, potential investors from China, Japan and South Korea are also lining up. South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) and public sector Hindustan Shipyard Limited, Visakhapatnam are joining hands to build warships. Another Korean firm, Samsung, will be collaborating with Kochi Shipyard to make liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers. “India is standing ready to welcome the whole world with open arms”, says Modi.

Finally: a warm embrace also for the EU

Encouragingly, Modi’s warm embrace of foreign partners could soon also extend to the European Union, not just national European governments. Signs of a long-awaited Delhi-Brussels rapprochement have raised hopes that the two sides are now ready for action in three pivotal areas.

First, after a year of little or no high-level contact, Delhi and Brussels appear ready to resume negotiations on the much delayed Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), a comprehensive deal covering all areas in goods, services and public procurement in both markets. Once signed, the agreement could act as an important launching pad for increased European investments in “Make in India”.

Second, India’s new economic programme opens up fresh avenues for increased EU-India synergies which go beyond the two sides’ traditional interaction. This could include cooperation in areas where both sides have a strong economic interest such as infrastructure investments, sustainable urbanisation, innovation and synergies between “Digital India” and the EU’s agenda for a Digital Single Market.

Third and most importantly, there are hopes that EU and Indian leaders could meet for summit talks, possibly in November this year to coincide with the G20 summit in Antalya, Turkey. With no bilateral summit held over the last 3 years, – the last such gathering was in February 2012 in Delhi – the EU-India relationship is in desperate need of renewed political direction to give it a new lease of life.

Where there’s a will, there’s a way

EU-India relations need to be broadened to include a “beyond-trade” agenda – and Modi’s wide-ranging modernisation agenda offers ample opportunities for such new synergies. Realistically, however, a quick relaunch of the stalled BTIA negotiations is required to get the relationship back on a constructive track and for discussions to begin in new areas.

This may now happen. EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström and Indian Commerce Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, who met on the margins of an OECD meeting in Paris on June 4, have agreed to restart the BTIA talks as soon as possible. Contacts are expected to resume after the new Indian commerce secretary designate Rita A. Teaotia takes charge at the end of June, leading to cautious hopes that the deal – eight years in the making – will finally be clinched early next year.

For that to happen, key “last mile” issues will need to be resolved. The EU has made clear that it is targeting the emerging well-off Indian middle class for enhanced market access in automobiles, wines and spirits, and cheese. Brussels is also calling for reform in Indian laws on intellectual property rights, trade and environment, and trade and labour and wants liberal access in insurance, banking, and retail trade. India, for its part, is insisting on more labour mobility, professional work visas and recognition as a data secure country to attract more European investments in its high tech sector.

With two-way trade estimated at around €72.5 billion in 2014 while the EU’s investment stock in India was €34.7 billion in 2013, there is certainly ample room for improvement. But agreement on BTIA will require that both sides summon up the political will to look beyond the array of technical issues to the deeper strategic importance of their relations.

Let’s get practical

European investors are willing and eager to enter the Indian market, and India’s new global companies are setting up shop across Europe. However, Europe and India have much to discuss beyond trade and investments. European know-how could be valuable to India’s reform and modernisation agenda at a time when both sides are struggling to boost growth and create more jobs. As such, the focus should now be on hammering out a more practical, pragmatic and operational agenda which seeks to find as much common ground as possible between Modi’s aspirational programmes and the EU’s new initiatives to boost growth and jobs, including the investment plan drawn up by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and the creation of a digital European single market. Building smart cities, increasing the use of renewables and improving education and skills are other areas of possible cooperation. Also, while India may not want such counsel, the EU is well-placed to share its experience in building a single market, economic reform and modernisation, cutting back over-regulation – the new Commission priority – and improving the business environment.

Two key aspects of “Modi’s India” deserve special attention:

Come and “Make in India”

Since Modi took office a year ago, his government has been emphasising strengthening domestic manufacturing, including in defence, which is one of the 25 areas listed under the “Make in India” campaign which the Prime Minister underlined recently is “our commitment – and an invitation to all – to turn India into a new global manufacturing hub”. He added: ”We will do what it takes to make it a reality”. An EU-India deal on trade and investments will certainly ease the concerns of some European companies as they seek out manufacturing venues and projects in India. But the government must still deliver on its promises.

“Digital India”

With voice connectivity at only about 60% and data penetration far lower at about 20%, India ranks as low as 129 out of 166 countries on the ICT development index and has the dubious distinction of being placed in the group of least connected countries in the world. These are formidable challenges for making progress towards Digital India. But that’s not stopping Modi, whose own penchant for using social media is well known. Creating “Digital India” is a top government priority with plans underway to launch a dozen online portals for loans, rural e-commerce, national scholarships, lost and found children, e-hospital, tele-medicine and e-bag (online study material for students). In fact, India is considering doubling spending on a high-speed internet grid to connect villages across the country to 11 billion dollars, according to Communications Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad.

Get the leaders together

In order to get India and the EU talking to each other on these and other equally interesting topics, Modi’s “can do” spirit needs to filter down to different, less adventurous, echelons of the Indian bureaucracy. The European External Action Service, meanwhile, must work in tandem with the European Commission’s trade and other departments to hammer out a fresh EU-India agenda for action which looks at new areas and new interests. Such an action plan should be short, snappy and action-oriented, rather than the long “wish list” which the EU traditionally draws up with and for its partners. Such a hopefully pithy document could then be approved at the EU-India summit later this year.

Above all, both sides must take a fresh look at each other. European member states have already recognised the importance of India, both as a regional actor and an influential global player. It is time the EU institutions shed their reservations and engaged with India as an increasingly powerful 21st Century partner. Equally, India should recognise that while relations with national European governments are important, the EU also has much to offer. It would be a pity if the full potential of EU-India ties were to remain untapped and unexplored. Both sides have much to gain from deepening their relations. It won’t be easy to shed old habits and set off on a new course. But, yes, they must and yes, they can.

This article has been released in preparation to Friends of Europe’s debate: EUROPE, INDIA AND MODI – One year on

The post Europe, India and Modi: it’s time to start over appeared first on Europe’s World.

The success of extreme right-wing parties in last year’s European elections is a worrying symptom of the nationalism which has grown across the continent in response to austerity and the financial crisis.

Migrant communities are all too often the target of such movements, and indeed of ‘mainstream’ politicians and media who claim migrants have a detrimental impact on employment, housing and public services.

Birmingham hit world headlines in January when  Steve Emerson – a self-proclaimed ‘terrorism expert’ – told a Fox News debate on the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris that our city had become “totally Muslim” – a place that non-Muslims do not visit. The statement was completely erroneous. Birmingham is in fact one of Europe’s most diverse cities, one that has been welcoming people from different countries, backgrounds and faiths for decades.

“It is too simplistic to view issues around diversity and identity through the lens of “immigration”. The social demographics of modern cities are much more complex than that”

Typically, the people of Birmingham responded with humour, wit and intelligence to Emerson’s claims. If you missed it, the #FoxNewsFacts hashtag is well worth reading. Birmingham continues its long history of embracing new arrivals from around the world.  We welcomed a significant Irish community that arrived in the 19th Century to flee famine; post-war economic migration from the Commonwealth saw large communities from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Caribbean coming to take up important roles in our local economy; more recently those fleeing conflict in places like Somalia and Afghanistan found a home here alongside others from Central and Eastern Europe seeking employment using their rights as EU citizens.

It is too simplistic to view issues around diversity and identity through the lens of “immigration”. The social demographics of modern cities are much more complex than that. Birmingham is now the embodiment of a ‘superdiverse’ city. Around 42% of our residents are people from what we term BME (black and minority ethnic) communities, this includes 2nd or 3rd generations who are not considered, nor consider themselves, as immigrants. Coupled with the fact that half our population is under 35, this gives Birmingham an extraordinary energy and a strategic advantage in this globalised world. Over the past two decades, we have seen our societies change at an unprecedented pace. We live in a world increasingly interconnected through advanced communications, transport and trade. This has resulted in fundamental changes in migration patterns and the social makeup of urban areas.

Around 22% of Birmingham’s 1.1 million residents were born outside the UK, compared with an average of 14% across England as a whole. Those who arrived in the UK after 2001 make up 9.6% of the city’s residents. Research from Professor Jenny Phillimore at the University of Birmingham’s Institute for Research into Superdiversity indicates that people have moved to the city from nearly 190 countries in recent years. This superdiversity has had a clearly positive impact on the city – migrant communities contribute tremendously to Birmingham’s cultural life, to its day-to-day vibrancy and they bring their own trade and business links. However, it also raises significant challenges for cohesion.

Newly-arrived communities are often among the most excluded, because they do not know how to access services or where to seek advice. Superdiversity can lead to fragmentation. Many arrivals come in such small numbers that they are unable to fit in to established or emerging community clusters. Without social connections, they risk becoming isolated and disconnected.

“Young people from all backgrounds must receive the high-quality education they are entitled to”

We work hard to provide services that are flexible and responsive to the needs of our diverse population. Particular emphasis is given to newly-arrived communities, where we work with partners to develop practical solutions such as:

-       Birmingham Places of Welcome – a network of small community organisations, including faith communities, who offer an unconditional welcome to local people for at least a few hours a week.

-       Birmingham’s Near Neighbours programme which brings people together in religiously and ethnically diverse communities to build relationships of trust and is being used to create a minimum standard of service for those needing advice.

Birmingham City Council also works closely with local faith groups. We were the first in the UK to sign the Faith Covenant which was developed by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Faith and Society to facilitate partnerships between local authorities and faith groups. It sets down a joint commitment on principles for working together with an open, practical engagement on all levels.

Demographic changes also place pressure on planning and mainstream local services. For instance, a combination of net migration into the city and high birth rates has led to a population bulge among young people. Youngsters under 15 make up 22.9% of Birmingham’s population, something that would be welcomed by parts of Europe experiencing an ageing and declining population. The City Council works with schools and other education partners on innovative school place planning and providing additional primary and special school places.

In the past year, the city has had to manage a sensitive case in which individuals on school governing bodies were alleged to have made a systematic attempt to introduce an Islamic agenda into a small number of Birmingham schools. An independent government review into the so-called Trojan Horse case has since found there was no evidence of a conspiracy, but it recognised there were actions by a few people which fell far below acceptable standards. The City Council unequivocally condemns such actions.

While this case undoubtedly warranted a full and independent review, the way it was handled by the government and reported on in the media raised the spectre of Islamophobia, an on-going problem for our Muslim communities and wider society.

Important lessons have been learnt by schools, the City Council and our communities. The most crucial is that young people from all backgrounds must receive the high-quality education they are entitled to. Issues raised by the Trojan Horse case are being addressed swiftly, in partnership with the schools concerned.

Another important issue is civic engagement – making sure all parts of the community feel they have a stake in society. Low voter turnout in Britain and across Europe shows that this is clearly not just an issue that concerns migrant communities, but they are often disproportionately affected. We are tackling this by working with Operation Black Vote, a campaign group, which has developed a Civic Leadership Programme designed to nurture future leaders from Black and Minority Ethnic communities in the West Midlands with the aim of increasing their representation in all areas of civic and public life.

In another practical step, the city has hosted citizenship ceremonies over the past 10 years for Birmingham residents who have successfully applied to become British citizens. These ceremonies provide formal recognition and are an important ‘rite of passage’ for new citizens.

“Shared values are central to building strong and cohesive societies”

We are building a city where diversity is embraced, and where there are shared values and a real sense of belonging. We are currently developing a Birmingham Equalities and Social Inclusion Strategy to ensure that the Council positively promotes equal chances for all.

I firmly believe that the superdiversity of Birmingham’s community deeply enriches our city and contributes both to its social and economic prosperity and its vibrant cultural life. Promoting cohesion is at the very centre of what the city strives to do. The challenges of migration do not prevent Birmingham from developing progressive social policies. Shared values are central to building strong and cohesive societies.

I’m proud that Birmingham is a place where people from all faiths and backgrounds live and work together, peacefully side by side.

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We are often told that feeding the world requires more efficient agro-industrial units, further genetic modification of plants, or cloning of ever-more productive animals. The facts speak otherwise: we already produce enough food for 14 billion people – double the global population – but around 40% of it goes to waste. What we really need is a more sustainable and coherent food policy. That policy should cover all aspects of food production and consumption to minimise waste and ensure a more equitable distribution of global food supplies.

The European Commission had taken a step towards a common European food policy by drafting a Communication on Sustainable Food, but unfortunately its publication has been postponed and risks being withdrawn altogether. As co-chair of the European Parliament’s Sustainable Food Systems Group, I believe future food policy should incorporate health, sustainability, ethical production, food safety, productivity, affordability and quality.

The world’s obese now outnumber the malnourished. With rapid increases in the prevalence of heart disease, adult diabetes and other chronic diseases related to diet and nutrition, food policy needs to encourage healthier eating. That means more vegetables and fish instead of red meat, and vegetable oils instead of animal fat for cooking.

But buying healthy food isn’t always an easy task. Whole-wheat bread can be poor in fibre, healthy-sounding breakfast cereals can give kids their daily quota of sugar, and canned guacamole may contain just 2% of avocado.

“Future food policy should incorporate health, sustainability, ethical production, food safety, productivity, affordability and quality”

The popularity of organic and locally produced food shows that consumers want to know what their food is made of. To help consumers make informed choices, we need to improve the way food is labelled in Europe and to introduce minimum health standards for food authorised for sale in the EU market.

We also need to bear in mind that unhealthy food increases health inequalities since underprivileged people eat the unhealthiest diets and pay relatively more to get the nutrients they need. Seasonal vegetables offer a way to strike a balance between nutritional needs and the weekly food budget. Instead of having everything available throughout the year, we should give more priority to seasonal, locally produced ingredients. We don’t need to eat fresh strawberries every day of the year; and besides, they taste much better during the summer season.

Turning to ecologically sustainable food, we have to change the globalised production methods which leave enormous carbon footprints through excessive transport and inefficient land use. Intensive farming and pesticides impoverish the soil. We need to put more effort into recycling nutrients that protect our ecosystems. Instead of giving cattle access to pasture, we keep them indoors, growing huge amounts of soya to keep them fed. Through genetic modification we alter ecosystems without knowing all the long-term consequences.

 “Labelling schemes that clearly indicate origin and respect for welfare standards should be made mandatory”

Most Europeans want to eat animal products from animals that have led happy lives. Although our animal welfare standards are higher than in many places, Europe needs to do more to ensure livestock production is ethical. Long distance transportation, inhumane housing conditions and the demands of high productivity remain the dark side of livestock farming in Europe.

The answer here is again to give consumers the power to choose. In addition to strengthening wider legislation on animal welfare, labelling schemes that clearly indicate origin and respect for welfare standards should be made mandatory. A succession of food safety scandals have produced a wide consensus in Europe on the need for stricter and more harmonised rules. Yet long and often opaque food production chains are still vulnerable to fraud.

Stronger safety rules are also needed to control the use of chemicals in food. Current restrictions on residues are not set at sufficiently low levels, and are not keeping pace with scientific data on issues such as the negative effects of endocrine disruptors.

On a larger scale, millions of people are fed through public procurement arrangements. Schools, hospitals and other public institutions offer lunch based on public tenders where all too often price is the dominant criteria, to the detriment of environmental, ethical and health standards. Public procurement processes need to be adapted also to ensure that farmers who commit to produce sustainable food are rewarded. Europe-wide indicators to better define sustainability in food production would help.

Finally, it goes without saying that eating should be a pleasure. I believe that, if we stick to the criteria mentioned above, we can lay the foundation for sustainable food production for generations ahead, while treating ourselves to food that’s healthy and delicious – just like my favourite dish of Broccoli-cashew salad with cucumber and feta.

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Paradoxically, in the Western world, the fear of Islam and of terrorism carried out in its name are often strongest in places where there are hardly any Muslims.

A 2014 Bertelsmann Foundation study showed that the Germans most afraid of Islam live in places with the smallest Muslim populations. Those least afraid are found in regions with the biggest Muslim communities. Fear of Islam, it seems, is a virtual phenomenon, created neither by any risk of terrorist attack nor by personal experiences of being swamped by a supposedly growing Muslim population.

Westerners are of course not alone in this fear of the “other”. The deadly riots sparked by the publication of cartoons and other images supposedly depicting the Prophet Muhammad  are a clear sign of the inferiority complex in those who fear that Western culture aims to destroy the values of Muslim civilisation.

Although the perceived threat level is far from reflecting reality, there is some truth behind the fear on both sides. Terrorism in the name of Islam is a danger in Western countries, and the West often displays an arrogant superiority in its dealing with the Muslim world.  In places where very real and bloody wars are being waged, such fears are exploited by radicals who present conflicts in terms of a clash of civilisations between “unbelievers” and “pure Islam”. Underlying power struggles are being vested in this rhetoric, and the radical discourse becomes brutal reality.

This makes it very urgent that we debunk the overcharged rhetoric of what the Germans call “Kulturkampf”. There are two ways forward: we have to analyse what is really happening where Islam and the Western world meet, and we have to clearly identify the political dimension of current armed conflicts and search for pragmatic solutions.

The real clash of civilisations

We are living in a world that is ever-more closely connected, a world where economic interests are intertwined, where images from news events flash instantly around the globe and where migration has created diversified communities.

This confrontation unavoidably leads to tension, because the traditions, beliefs and economic and political outlook of someone who grew up in 1980s Frankfurt and, let’s say, Baghdad will differ considerably. Yet this cultural clash does not necessarily have to translate into violence.The cultural interchange between them has to be carried out on an intellectual, political and economic level. We need to develop an exchange of ideas, a space for debate and a serious respect for each other’s ideas and beliefs.

One often neglected aspect is the importance of us all knowing our own traditions and culture. We can only enter into dialogue if we have something to say about ourselves. This is a big challenge in a globalised world, and many radical movements on both sides are symptoms of this difficulty. Radical movements on all sides can prey on those searching for a communal identity, be it Christian, Hindu, Muslim or whatever. Often they offer easy answers that place blame on others, be it the “dominant West” or “violent Islam”. These rival radicalisations feed off each other: anti-Islamic sentiment adds to a sense of exclusion among Muslims, pushing them towards a radicalism that provokes a still more hostile reaction.

Like it or not, we in Europe have to recognise that we live in a multicultural society. This does not mean abandoning European traditions or giving up our identity, but it does involve sharing space with the traditions and identities of people from different backgrounds who are living alongside us. Immigrants should be better represented in the media, in public services and in academic and cultural institutions. It is vital that we form a genuinely European tradition of Islamic scholarship, that helps Muslims create an identity based both on their belonging to liberal, democratic Western societies and their traditions and beliefs as Muslims.

Identifying power struggles

But, of course, violence in the name of Islam is a bloody reality in many parts of the world, and we have to understand what is behind it. Much of what we see as Islamic terrorism is based on very worldly motives that feed off social injustice. The self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) has deep-seated ideological roots, but its success is based on causes that have little to do with Islam. In Iraq, their military success was founded on the frustration of old Baathist cadres unseated after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Their recruitment base includes frustrated young men from all over the world – many with criminal backgrounds – who are looking for an escape from their depressing personal situation. No amount of frustration can excuse IS barbarity, but we need to understand the motivations behind this recruitment.

The situation is similar with Boko Haram in Nigeria, which has built on longstanding power networks in the underprivileged north of the country. Support for its radical interpretation of Islamic values is dwindling, but it was able to resonate with a significant part the population because the political leadership was – justly – perceived as corrupt and unfair, spending the country’s resources on the predominantly Christian south.

Western support for such corrupt and authoritarian regimes makes “Muslim” arguments against the immoral West all the more convincing. Responsible leaders in the West have to carefully dissect the various layers of international conflict and address them in a pragmatic way that seeks dialogue even with groups whose beliefs we oppose.

We have to understand how these two levels of conflict – cultural and political – feed off each other if we are to tackle rising extremism in both “the West” and the “Islamic World”. We have to identify the real cultural differences and find ways to live with them, knowing they will evolve over time. And it is vital that we move away from the notion of a clash of civilisations, and recognise instead that there is a very worldly struggle for power that has to be resolved politically – and in some rare cases like IS militarily. We need patience, patience that will be rewarded by opening up new horizons for living together in a world that is growing smaller.

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