Europe's World

Brexit is too important to leave just to the British. Yes, of course it will be up to UK voters to decide, but that doesn’t mean that the rest of the EU should stand silently on the sidelines.

Europeans elsewhere than in the UK have much to contribute to the Brexit debate. With the discussion in Britain deteriorating into a dialogue of the deaf, and into internecine political infighting and score-settling, better informed proponents and critics of the European project could do much to lift the debate to a higher and more constructive plane.

Voices from the continent should include those of senior people in the EU institutions. So far, their views have been muted because the EU and its officials avoid involvement – usually termed ‘interference’ – in the domestic politics of a member state.

“Few people throughout Europe doubt that a British exit would be catastrophic”

But Brexit isn’t just about the British, and the issue is in any case far too serious and potentially destructive for that ‘hands off’ formula to apply. Few people in Brussels, or indeed in political and business circles throughout Europe, doubt that a British exit would be catastrophic, not just for the UK but for the EU itself. Some may be exasperated by the way the UK membership issue is sidelining more urgent EU questions, but that doesn’t mean they would welcome Britain’s departure.

The level of debate in Britain has so far been disappointing; it’s much more emotional than rational. A striking feature has been the absence of factual accuracy, even among Prime Minister David Cameron’s supporters now campaigning to stay in the EU. On issues as far-ranging as trade, immigration and military capabilities, Britain’s debaters on both sides of the argument demonstrate daily their ignorance of how the EU works.

On these topics and many others, there’s a wealth of authoritative research at the finger-tips of EU officialdom and key players and politicians around Europe. Instead of remaining aloof, they should be joining the fray and bombarding British media with facts and figures that correct misleading claims. A prime example of this is immigration, where the ill-informed prejudice that EU membership is opening the door to millions of “job stealing” eastern Europeans could easily tilt undecided voters towards Brexit.

The reality pointed out by a recent Eurostat report is that in 2014 the UK topped the EU league for residence permits, granting well over half a million that went overwhelmingly to Americans, Chinese and Indians. The refugee crisis is not a British problem, and the European Union’s spokespeople should be ramming that point home at every opportunity.

“There’s always a risk that hectoring from across the English Channel could prove counter-productive”

Getting the tone of voice right will be important; there’s always a risk that hectoring from across the English Channel could prove counter-productive. On the other hand, informed comment and objective analysis by major corporations that invest and trade in the UK would help to correct the notion that the cost of Brexit would be minimal, involving no more than a quick and painless re-negotiation.

David Cameron’s error has been to frame his demands for EU reform in a purely British context. The multiplying challenges to the EU’s future are highlighting the slowness and divisiveness of its decision-making. So signals from the UK’s European partners that they, too, want to address these problems would do much to reassure British voters while also setting a more positive course for the European project.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Jeff Djevdet

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The deal on climate change, concluded on December 2015 in the UN Climate Conference in Paris, can justifiably be described as a game-changer or, in U.S. President Barack Obama’s words, humanity’s “best chance to save the planet”.

195 countries – including the U.S. and China which account for 35% of greenhouse emissions – managed, thanks to the competent and determined leadership of the hosting country’s Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, to set a limit to the increase of global temperature since the Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries at 2 degrees Celsius and pursue the effort so as to lower it to 1.5 degrees.

The attainment of this target would require, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), spending about $16.5 trillion on renewables and energy efficiency until 2030. Policies would include incentives for clean energy production, scaling back support for fossil fuels like oil, making emissions more costly and reducing deforestation. Carbon pricing through markets or taxes, planting trees, burning biomass instead of fossil fuels are some among the tools to be used. The accord is not legally binding but relies on rigorous monitoring rules to secure transparency.

The agreement’s paramount aim is to pass the message that fossil fuels carry financial and legal premiums while clean energy is subsidised. It will take effect in 2020 provided that it is ratified by 55 countries accounting for 55% of emissions. A key feature of the deal is that developed nations committed $100 billion in annual aid to the developing nations so as to overcome the inevitable tensions that undermined past efforts to control emissions.

The effective implementation of this accord is fraught with dangers of economic as well as political nature, inherent in any endeavor that involves many players and spans over a long period of time. Here we shall focus on two such factors which have recently reasserted themselves, namely the volatility of the price of oil and growing geopolitical uncertainties.

Recently the world experienced a precipitous fall in oil prices. The slowdown in energy demand, as a result of weaker growth in emerging markets as well as the switch of the Chinese economy to a more diversified and less energy-intensive growth model, largely explain this development suggesting that the market for oil will eventually rebalance via higher demand and lower growth of supply. The supply response is more uncertain than demand – which sooner or later will pick up – as it depends on the policies of OPEC as well as of non-OPEC producers.

According to IEA estimates, more resilient non-OPEC supply and higher Middle East output could hold the oil price close to $50/bbl until the 2020’s. However, an investment slowdown in the oil industry – in response to low prices – will tend to increase the risk of a sharp market rebound destabilising the market.

Crucially, a prolonged period of lower prices would undermine support for the energy transition by stimulating oil use and diminishing the case for efficiency investment and switching to alternative sources. Policymakers will, therefore, have to adjust market rules, policies and subsidies so as to maintain the momentum towards cleaner energy. In order to minimise the additional fiscal cost that this will entail governments should ring-fence policies against potentially large market swings.

If the world stays the course, renewables are set to become the leading source of new energy supply by 2040. In the U.S. and India renewable-based power generation will represent about 25%, in China and Japan 30%, and in the EU 50% (IEA estimates).

Besides sharp swings in the oil price, the other major threat to the transition process concerns energy security. Geopolitical risks are rising, particularly in areas which hold strategic positions in the global energy map. Russia is attempting to restore its former great-power status by taking action in areas traditionally claimed by the Russian and Soviet empires, such as Ukraine, and intervening militarily in Syria. NATO is redeploying forces close to East European frontiers while a serious incident at the Turkish-Syrian borders led to the downfall of a Russian military aircraft and the loss of the life of one pilot.

In the Middle East itself, the process of resolving the Palestinian question is frozen, Syria is in the middle of a horrendous civil war and other Arab countries, like Libya, are in turmoil as a consequence of the destabilising effects of the Arab Spring. The only bright spot is the eventual re-integration of Iran into the international system as a result of the nuclear deal, although this is inflaming the Sunni-Shia rivalry involving major powers like Saudi Arabia.

Low oil prices, by concentrating global supply to low-cost but unstable Middle East producers, would aggravate energy security. In a conference organised in early December by the Bosphorus Energy Club in Turkey talks focused on security and the future of the gas relationship with Russia. The history of major gas pipelines planned to be constructed in the area covering Russia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East indicates the existence of unresolved, economic and geopolitical, conflicts. The Nabucco pipeline, linking Azerbaijan with Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, was abandoned in June 2013. The South Stream, linking Russia with Austria via Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia, was cancelled in December 2014. The Russian Stream, linking Russia with Turkey, was abandoned in December 2015.

Conflicts or accidents may disrupt supply flows and destabilise markets as viciously as market forces. The world’s governments should be watchful and pro-active in both the economic and political sphere so as to ensure a smooth passage to clean energy – fulfilling thus a vital condition for saving the planet.

IMAGE CREDIT: FLICKR/Takver

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Europe needs a positive agenda to define its future. We need real innovation, intelligent product design and quality, and that means we have to stop using sustainability concepts, which are only trying to correct unfixable errors in our old system. Sustainability is not innovative by definition. Innovations are disruptive and change the status quo, whereas sustainability preserves it. Efficiency rhetoric isn’t getting us anywhere, and for us to aspire only become less bad at what we do is simply not good enough.

Today, we have a socio-economic system that creates waste and harms people and the environment, suffers from design errors and lacks real quality. We have no other choice than to leave that linear economy behind. We are capable of thinking in a circular way and creating high-quality alternatives that are beneficial for people and nature. This would be a ‘Cradle to Cradle’ economy in which material flows, products, buildings and cities support a symbiotic relationship between ecological systems and economic growth. All materials would maintain their status as resources and could then be used over and over. New business models will enhance this transition in which Europeans pay for the use of a particular service, and not the ownership. The Cradle to Cradle design frees us from our current responsibility to reduce any negative environmental effects from our behaviour.

Overcoming fear and feelings of distrust will need more than bureaucracy and rules as a response. However different our cultural backgrounds might be, we all desire to live in a safe and healthy environment. When you’re unsure if companies and institutes can guarantee you this, people worry about the health of their children, family and friends. We don’t want to live in a Europe where we have to distrust consumer goods and the people providing them. Those feelings are based on fear, and are poisoning our society with greed and anger. If people feel safe, accepted and valued, they are always warm-hearted and generous – even the poorest of the poor. This is why it is so important to celebrate our human footprint. Although it is difficult to step out of our comfort zone and dare to question the fundamental errors causing the latest crises, we need to counter fear and tradition with inspirational approaches.

Without defending the European Legacy, we are undermining our human rights. Our economies, cultures, social relations and political systems are so intensively intertwined that all European countries and citizens cannot exist without each other. This continent of economic possibilities, a high quality of life and human values should consequently be protected, otherwise we will lose our global credibility and right to speak. But lasting prosperity, solidarity and peace are not things we can take for granted. Every day, now and in the future, we have to fight for these European conditions. People are capable of doing this without losing their sense of nationality – a person can have more than just one identity. Europe must stay a safety beacon, and one that we’re proud of.

In Europe, we celebrate our individuality and freedom but it remains a challenge to think differently. With the ongoing unification of our educational systems, individuals have freedom but are taught to think within standardised concepts. We need to respect people, and look at what they as individuals can do instead what they cannot. New social models can make it possible for people to extend their contribution to society and increase their dignity at the same time. Instead of Al Gore’s global warning to fight overpopulation wherever we can, Cradle to Cradle has another message: “Welcome to the planet, how nice it is that you are here!”

IMAGE CREDIT: FLICKR/PLAN C Vlaams transitienetwerk voor duurzaam materialenbeheer

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Mainstream Europe’s near-audible sigh of relief is premature. The failure of France’s militantly eurosceptic Front National to win control of any of the country’s 13 powerful regional administrations does not signal an end to the threat of right-wing populism. On the contrary, far from being defeated the FN is still set to be the standard-bearer around which Europe’s other extreme nationalist and anti-EU parties can rally.

This time in France, the centre-right and centre-left parties colluded in a tactical voting pact to block the FN. But they will not be able to do that in the presidential elections of Spring 2017. For those, they must each field a candidate knowing that one of the two mainstream presidential hopefuls may very well be knocked out for the final round of voting by FN party leader Marine Le Pen.

Her setback in failing to win outright control of any of the regions is a respite, but not a sign of dwindling FN support. The FN won a record 6.7m votes and its seats in the regional assemblies skyrocketed from 118 to 358. Marine Le Pen looks on course to be a serious contender for the Elysée Palace.

The French and German elections that will determine Europe’s political landscape are not due until 2017, but next year already promises to be turbulent. It will most probably see the long-awaited referendum on whether the UK stays in the EU, and Brexit fears are rising as the ranks of UKIP’s 4m voters in last May’s general elections are liable to be swelled by concerns over immigration.

Elsewhere in Europe, the anti-EU populists are in the ascendant. Some opinion polls in Germany put support for the right-wing AfD party at over 10%, creating major uncertainties about the outcome of the autumn 2017 elections. Anti-immigrant sentiment in Sweden and the Netherlands is powering respectively the rise of the populist PVV and SD parties. The hard right Danish People’s Party has forced itself inside the governing coalition and in Poland and Hungary the populists are in power.

How then, have all these shifts come about? Who or what is to blame for the new face of European politics and the seemingly inexorable decline in the progressive values that so many Europeans have long prided themselves on?

The blame game of 21st century European politics is complex, but deserves much closer analysis. The mainstream elites are being blamed for the woes that have befallen so many people in Europe; falling living standards since the financial and economic crises that erupted in 2008 have been paralleled by a widening wealth gap between rich and poor. Mainstream politicians who promise a better tomorrow cannot easily escape blame when tomorrow turned out to be worse than yesterday.

Many voters in Europe also blame globalisation, believing that the employment opportunities of youthful jobseekers are “stolen” by low wage competitors, either migrants or workers in the factories of Asia. As well as singling out their own governments and political leaders as having failed to defend their interests, disappointed voters are also placing the blame on “Europe”.

The European project may be the first victim of the new populism. So it’s up to the EU and its supporters and institutions to confront it and systematically demolish the arguments that Europe’s ever-closer union has somehow aggravated the problems of people in its member states.

Yes, Brussels is to blame, although not for the reasons its detractors advance. It is to blame for playing down the demographic dangers that confront Europe and the structural weaknesses slowing economic growth. The rapid ageing that within a quarter-century will cut the average ratio of Europe’s workers to retirees from four to two demands a major re-think on immigration. And so too does Europe’s steadily declining productivity.

This isn’t to say that the Commission and all the other players in EU institutions have actively disguised these major problems. But they have failed to highlight them; the EU’s impenetrable jargon and its reluctance to become embroiled in national politics have prevented it from rebutting the eurosceptics’ rabble-rousing accusations.

Like the politicians who promised golden tomorrows, Brussels is blameworthy for having oversold the EU’s capacity to deliver. But its value remains that of an honest broker that reconciles competing national demands in the wider interests of all 500m Europeans. That means naming and shaming member governments that don’t deliver, publicising league tables of successes and failures, and owning up to the EU’s own bureaucratic sins.

Above all, it means refuting far more forcibly than Brussels has ever dared the populists’ siren call that Europe’s economic weaknesses and security vulnerabilities are better addressed nationally than at a European level.

IMAGE CREDIT: FLICKR/BLANDINE LE CAIN

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Daesh, the so-called Islamic State, has again wreaked havoc and destruction around the world. Attacks in Paris, Beirut and against a Russian airliner flying over Egypt have sparked a clamour for our military forces to do more. Many are even suggesting thousands of U.S. or European ground-forces be dispatched to fight Daesh directly in Syria and Iraq.

In order to succeed, military action should only be used to support a strategic political plan to rid the world of Daesh and to ensure groups like it are no longer able to grow, recruit and function.

Such a multifaceted effort must accept that death-cult groups like Daesh do not operate in a vacuum. They may have been created and led by sociopaths, but they survive and grow by different means.

We need to understand and confront the political, social and economic disenfranchisement that has allowed terror groups to gain growth and sustainability. To resolve these issues, we need to confront the root-causes in Syria and Iraq, and then the wider issues around the Islamic world.

First in Syria where the civil war caused by the Assad regime’s brutal repression of its own citizens – with military support from outside countries – has led to the disenfranchisement of the vast majority of Syrians. Daesh has been able to take advantage of Assad’s murderous campaign and usurp the Syrian people’s hopes for democracy.

In Iraq, the Government of the radical Dawa Party has excluded Sunni groups from the political and economic process. It failed to follow-up on promises made after the so-called Sunni-Awakening that rid Iraq of Al Qaeda, and continues to roundup and jail Sunnis, while forcing Tehran-backed militias into Sunni communities. The government in Baghdad so disillusioned the Sunni communities, that Daesh was able to take over cities and towns across western Iraq and even threaten the capital.

Daesh and groups like it have taken these local political problems and matched them with deeper feelings of disenfranchisement in the Islamic world.

As the world becomes ever more interconnected and globalisation reaches almost every society, many parts of the Islamic world have suffered economic and social collapse after years of stagnation and lack of progress. Young people in these communities look to the great wealth of the Gulf and the vast opportunities of the West and they feel left behind.

Daesh exploits these feelings to recruit. It tells the vulnerable this is due to some conspiracy to undermine Islam and that the only way out is to join them

Without dealing with these complex political issues, no amount of military action will ultimately solve the problem. Instead of leading with the military, the strategy to defeat Daesh should be based around five key initiatives:

- the international community should coalesce around building a peace-process in Syria. This will not be easy and will need to be matched with a long-term rebuilding and reconciliation process that brings in all those forced to leave and ensure the country does not slip back into civil war;

- the international community should ensure that a full reconciliation process is started and sustained in Iraq to bring the Sunni community back into political and economic life. This will entail a wide review of the present constitutional settlement, ensuring that Iraq does not fall back into sectarian conflict;

- a significant economic and social regeneration plan for the whole Middle East and North Africa should be created, based on opening-up of education, markets and capital. It should focus on participation for the region’s youth to offer them the sort of opportunities many in the West take for granted;

- military action should only be used in a limited and targeted fashion. It should ideally be led by Arab forces who could remove the sociopaths without stoking further anti-Western feelings;

- political leaders in the region must offer a brighter future for their citizens. The people of the region must be shown a future that is better than the past, one that can strengthen their society and culture while offering wealth and opportunity for all.

Ridding the world of groups like Daesh will not be easy and it will take time. Without a well thought-out and fully implemented political, social and economic plan, we will fail, and be confronted by more attacks like those we have recently seen.

IMAGE CREDIT: Flickr/Alisdare Hickson

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Most university seminars on the European Union begin with a seemingly simple, yet in truth remarkably complex exercise: defining Europe. Some answers can be quite creative, ranging from definitions based on who partakes in the Eurovision Song Contest to geographic, cultural, as well as political definitions. Very clearly, Europe means different things to different people.

Even the political entity that is Europe needs an expert to distinguish between the European Union, the eurozone, the Schengen area, as well as a variety of judicial and defence arrangements in which only some EU member states engage. The confusion is worsened by a large-scale lack of everyday “Europe” in public consciousness. While Europeans have probably never heard as much about the EU as over the past few years, the news has only been about the debt crisis, the refugee crisis or the Ukraine crisis. The European Union would appear to function in a constant state of emergency.

When one combines the difficulty of understanding how the EU influences everyday life with this perpetual nature of European crises, it is hardly surprising that public support for the European idea is faltering. Bridging this divide is crucial to ensuring the Union’s survival, and is a herculean task that requires a multitude of responses. Just like the European Union’s motto, “unity in diversity”, there needs to be diversity in the messages that point citizens to the added value Europe can bring to them as individuals.

Today’s 28-member European Union is considerably larger than it was little more than a decade ago, and is home to more than 500m people. With this size and scope come very different realities for different Europeans.

When asking an average German, Spanish or Greek citizen about Europe ten years ago, their answer may have included something about the facility to travel, the common currency or the country’s economic success – with the added twist for Spain being Europe’s role in the country’s democratisation. Today, a German would probably cite a feeling of the EU being a lame duck that’s unable to come to an agreement. Today’s radically-different Spanish response would see the European Union blamed for the country’s disastrous economic and labour market outlook. The Greek assessment would be even worse, since political contests in the country now appear a mere movement of pawns in a big game of European chess.

Looking to a country like Latvia, on the other hand, the answer would probably be based much more on security concerns, and the European Union’s apparent disregard for the country’s difficult situation vis-à-vis its gigantic neighbour Russia. When asking a Briton, meanwhile, many of the commonplace answers about borderless travel or the common currency would not even be present, as the UK does not partake in either.

The way in which Europe’s elites communicate on the European Union has not helped bridge the gaps. After important sessions of the European Council, all heads of state and government disappear into different rooms and hold separate press conferences tailored to their national audiences. The established discourse is one of securing gains for national benefit, or the defence of crucial positions against a strong tide. The one thing these national messages have in common is that they are completely incompatible. The on-going debate on the refugee crisis offers perfect examples of such communication strategies.

On the other side of the aisle stands a grand message on the benefit of Europe at the largest possible scale. Not a single week will pass without a senior politician pointing to the well-established fact that the EU has brought peace to the continent for longer than it has ever known. The problem, though, is that neither of these two kinds of messages matches the reality of individual Europeans. With instant access to all kinds of information, it is all too easy to see that an alleged national success or a supposed common European interest is a lie compared to the actual inactivity of Europe’s political apparatus.

Europeans have to be able to connect messages on the merits of Europe to their daily realities. Looking at the history of our neighbour across the Atlantic could help us realise this. When the founding figures of the United States tried to rally their population around the idea of full political union, rather than remaining a confederation of separate states, the situation was equally diverse. New Englanders worried about the British threat from Canada; those living on the seaboard feared a loss of trade to pirates now that ships were no longer protected by the Royal Navy; residents in the Carolinas were worried by the Spanish presence on the continent; and those living on the internal frontier were afraid of native Americans. While their reasons for signing on to the project of the United States were broad, they were nevertheless convinced by tailored messages that it was the only insurance policy to effectively alleviate their fears. European leaders now too have to tailor the right messages on the European Union to the different concerns across the continent.

When looking to Europe’s south, which has been hit hard by the economic crisis, one can observe an increasing concern about the state of democracy. When political contest has to bow to economic necessities dictated by abstract Europe, one need not wonder about the current lack of EU support. The late British historian Alan Milward posited that the very reason why European states signed onto the European project in the 1950s was a “European rescue of the nation state”. Europe’s economies were in such a disastrous shape and found themselves suddenly sandwiched between two superpowers; the only way to guard some sovereignty was to give other, less crucial aspects of it up. Today, one similarly needs to communicate to citizens in the EU’s south that to best preserve their right to democratic contest, their voice needs to count at European level more than at an increasingly-irrelevant national level, hence the need to pursue fully-empowered representative European institutions.

For those to the east, it is important to consider citizens’ increasing security concerns about the unpredictability of Russia. No contemporary European nation can uphold even the semblance of being capable of defending its own territory alone; only a reformed and deepened European Union with NATO can compensate for the diminished U.S. interest in our continent’s security.

Lastly, when looking at the current influx of refugees into Europe, a similar message can be tailored to citizens in all affected countries. Europe is currently a strange space of concurrently semi-open and semi-closed internal and external borders, with small outlying countries easily being overwhelmed by the influx of refugees. So again, no European country can cope on its own.

All in all, Europe needs more messages of this kind, tailored and actively communicated to Europeans in different parts of the Union. The task ahead is not easy, but if we do this right, we can create a symphony of reasons as to why Europeans should support the continuation of the European project towards an ever-closer, yet diverse union.

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Cybercrime is a reality. It is not just a matter of attacks against machines but a threat to the core values of democratic societies. This is illustrated by the proliferation of private data theft; by cyberattacks against the media, civil society organisations, parliaments and individuals; denial-of-service attacks against public institutions and critical infrastructure; sexual violence against children; xenophobia, racism and radicalisation; and terrorist misuse of information technologies.

Even when they are not committed against, or by using, computers, most criminal offences nowadays involve electronic evidence stored on computer systems, including on servers somewhere in the cloud. Electronic evidence is volatile and securing it for criminal justice purposes is fraught with technical, practical and legal complexities.

Governments cannot argue the problems away. They have an obligation to protect society and individuals against crime in cyberspace.

“Most cybercrime is never reported, particularly in the private sector where organisations tend to stay clear of criminal justice”

At the Council of Europe’s Octopus Conference on Cybercrime in June 2015, cybercrime experts from all over the world were asked about the rule of law online. Survey results showed they did not consider that “cyberspace is basically safe, that crime and violation of rights are the exception and that offenders are brought to justice.”

Most cybercrime is never reported, particularly in the private sector where organisations tend to stay clear of criminal justice. A large share of reported cybercrime is never investigated, few of the offences that are investigated result in prosecutions and, of those, few end up with court rulings.

Progress has been made in recent years, in Europe and worldwide, to establish legal frameworks, set up specialised cybercrime units at police and prosecutorial levels, and intensify international cooperation. The Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on Cybercrime serves as a framework for cooperation for a growing number of countries. International police-to-police cooperation is improving with the support of organisations such as the European Cybercrime Centre at EUROPOL and the Global Complex for Innovation at INTERPOL.

Many governments are realising that considerable resources need to be allocated not just to protect critical information infrastructure but also to beef up the criminal justice response. Increasing investments in capacity building programmes by the European Union, the Council of Europe, the United Nations and others are beginning to yield results.

Nevertheless, the ability of governments to ensure the rule of law in cyberspace will remain limited unless they can overcome impediments to accessing data and thus to electronic evidence for criminal justice purposes. No data means no evidence, no justice and thus no rule of law.

Many investigations are abandoned for lack of data. This is also true for non-cybercrime offences which involve electronic evidence, including serious and violent crime, such as location data in murder cases, subscriber information related to a ransom e-mail sent during kidnappings, data to identify and locate victims of child abuse, or data on communications between terrorists.

The sheer scale of cybercrime, the number of devices, users and victims involved, and technical complications such as encryption or anonymisers, present major challenges for criminal justice.

These issues become much more complex in the context of cloud computing. While law-enforcement powers are tied to the principle of territoriality, data may be stored somewhere in the cloud, held by, or moved between, multiple layers of cloud service providers in various jurisdictions.

“In the absence of clear international rules, governments increasingly take unilateral action. The result is a jungle of diverse approaches with risks for state-to-state relations and the rights of individuals”

“Cloud services may entail a combination of service models (Cloud Software as a Service (SaaS), Cloud Platform as a Service (PaaS), Cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)). It is often unclear … which service provider is in possession or control of which type of data – subscriber information, traffic data, content data – so as to be served a production order” according to the Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention Committee in May 2015

Current mutual legal assistance practices are not sufficiently effective. To whom should a mutual legal assistance request be sent in such situations?

In the absence of clear international rules, governments increasingly take unilateral action. The result is a jungle of diverse approaches with risks for state-to-state relations and the rights of individuals.

That raises other fundamental issues: how to reconcile the need for efficient law-enforcement access to data while respecting rule-of-law and human-rights requirements; and how to avoid the trap of undermining the rule of law through actions meant to protect it?

Searches of computers, interception of communications or other law-enforcement powers can interfere with the rights of individuals. They must be prescribed by law, pursue legitimate aims, be necessary and proportionate, allow for effective remedies and be subject to guarantees against abuse.

For criminal procedures and coercive measures at domestic levels, safeguards are normally in place and rule-of-law conditions can be met, at least in democratic societies.

When it comes to access to evidence in foreign jurisdictions, the mutual legal assistance process is designed to ensure that conditions are met and the rights of individuals are protected.

This however presents a dilemma: how to allow for more efficient access to evidence in the cloud in order to strengthen the rule of law through criminal justice, and at the same time ensure that rule-of-law and human-rights conditions are met where current mutual legal assistance rules and procedures are of limited effectiveness.

The Cybercrime Convention Committee of the Council of Europe – comprising the State Parties to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime – has been reflecting on this for some time. In December 2014, the Committee adopted a set of recommendations to render the mutual legal assistance process more efficient. At the same time, the Committee created a “Cloud Evidence Working Group” to identify additional solutions.

Specific proposals should become available in the course of 2016. They may take the form of non-binding guidelines or of an additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. Such a binding international legal instrument may be necessary to meet rule-of-law as well as data-protection requirements. It remains to be seen whether agreement can be reached on such a complex matter, but the Budapest Convention appears to be the most realistic framework for negotiating additional international rules.

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The year 2015 marks the 40th anniversary of China-EU diplomatic relations. It is also a year that ushered in a new chapter of China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

This autumn, President Xi Jinping paid a successful visit to the UK, followed by visits to China by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande, culminating in a “China-Europe season”. Earlier, Premier Li Keqiang visited France and Belgium. The year also saw the organisation of several important meetings, including the 17th China-EU Summit, the High-Level Strategic Dialogue, the High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue and the High-Level People-to-People Dialogue. These encounters allowed the two sides to identify the direction of their relations and to reiterate their commitment to a positive, long-term strategic perspective and a rational approach to handling their relations while transcending differences in social system, cultural tradition and ideology.

China and the EU reaffirmed that they would respect each other’s choice of development path, take their respective development as major opportunities for cooperation, treat each other as equals and enhance mutual trust, with a view to developing China-EU relations in wider scope, greater depth and at a higher plateau.

The China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation is now being fully implemented. Negotiations for a China-EU Investment Agreement are yielding progress. Cooperation in finance, energy, technological innovation, sustainable development and urbanization has been intensified. China-CEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries) cooperation is pressing ahead. Consensus has been reached between China and the EU in five new areas: drawing synergies between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and EU Investment Plan, establishing a new Connectivity Platform; collaborating in digital economy and cyber security; launching a legal affairs dialogue; and facilitating people-to-people exchanges.

China and the EU share such objectives as transforming growth models, accelerating structural adjustment, raising the quality and returns of growth, promoting employment as well as improving people’s wellbeing. Determined to press ahead with the times, China and the EU have endeavored to enrich and upgrade their cooperation for the long term benefit, which has greatly inspired all sectors on both sides to participate and opened up broader prospects for a win-win relationship.

The celebration of the 40th anniversary of China-EU relations has presented an opportunity for both sides to conduct a series of cultural exchanges, including traditional dance dramas such as The Grand Canal, The Legend of the Sun, Dream of the Maritime Silk Road, the Chinese Film Festival, China Unlimited creative contest, Fashion China, China-EU Friendship Table Tennis Tournament, Chinese Health Qigong Week, and the China Day. In the meantime, the Chinese Cultural Center was launched in Brussels early in the year and exchanges among think tanks, academic institutions and the media on both sides have significantly increased. This was paralleled by growing numbers of student, tourism and entrepreneurial exchanges. China-EU people-to-people exchanges – communication between hearts and minds – have injected new momentum into the healthy and stable development of China-EU relations.

To promote regional stability, world peace and development, China and the EU have maintained dialogue and communication at such multilateral fora as the UN and the G20. The Joint Statement of the 17th China-EU Summit reiterates that as amongst those who built and maintained the post-World War II international order based on the UN Charter, China and Europe will continue to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter and work for a more equitable international order by building a stronger and more effective multilateral system based on the Charter and international laws.
The China-EU Joint Statement on Climate Change reaffirms a joint determination to join the international community in combating global climate change – a formidable challenge facing humanity – and promoting sustainable development and the long-term well-being of human beings. Coordination and cooperation between China and the EU on regional issues such as the Middle East, the Iranian nuclear program and Syria have played a constructive role in facilitating proper solutions.

It is true that China and the EU differ in their social systems, ideology and levels of development. However, as the Chinese economy enters a phase of “new normal” and EU integration progresses, exchanges and cooperation between China and the EU will expand and deepen. We will see more space for development and greater opportunities for cooperation. In the course of cooperation, some differences will be patched up, some may grow and new frictions may crop up. It is therefore of critical significance that both sides keep the overall situation and long-term interest in mind, adopt new initiatives and narrow the gap by increasing the opportunities for cooperation. This is the valuable experience derived from 40 years of China-EU relations and the most significant political wisdom that will chart the course of China-EU cooperation in the years to come.

Looking ahead to 2016, we have every reason to believe that the launch of China’s 13th Five-Year Plan and continuing integration of the EU will enable the two sides to find more synergies in their development strategies. We are confident that China and the EU will focus more on enhancing mutually-beneficial cooperation, surmounting disturbances, and consolidating the sound momentum of their bilateral ties to achieve shared growth and take their relations to a new height.

Mme. Yang Yanyi is Chinese Ambassador to the EU.

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The Single Market is seen as a major European Union success. Twenty percent of the world’s trade flows among EU member states, taking advantage of the free movement of goods under the single market.

This success was achieved by tearing down regulatory walls, standardising rules, and creating a transparent business environment for both supply and demand. Now, the European Commission has announced its plans for a Digital Single Market.

Under the slogan “bringing down barriers to unlock business opportunities”, Digital Economy Commissioner Günther Oettinger has identified the sector’s fragmentation and obstacles to online trade as among the factors most holding back growth.

“Europe needs to assess whether the current competition policy framework is adequately equipped to deal with the increasing occurrence of platform markets and their challenges to market power”

Oettinger says an integrated digital market could contribute an extra €415bn to the European economy – roughly the size of Poland’s entire GDP.

Europe is lagging behind the United States where companies enjoy a level playing field free from the array of legal frameworks that are a nightmare especially for start-ups in Europe.

The multiplicity of European systems might be one of the reasons why leading digitised and innovative research hubs are found in Palo Alto, New York or around the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, rather than on this side of the Atlantic.

Standardising and simplifying the framework sounds sensible, but it’s easier said than done. The Commission is currently trying to bundle together insights from various consultations covering areas as diverse as audio-visual media and the reform of telecoms rules.

One important aspect not yet covered is competition policy. Europe needs to assess whether the current competition policy framework is adequately equipped to deal with the increasing occurrence of platform markets and their growing market power.

It is debatable whether current rules dealing with the abuse of dominant market positions is defined widely enough. Another aspect that warrants adjustment is merger control. Mergers and acquisitions in the offline world are covered precisely. Digitised businesses, however, often fall through the cracks. The most prominent example is Facebook’s purchase of WhatsApp.

“European data protection legislation is needed urgently to provide consumers and businesses with a sense of legal certainty”

Digital business models work differently. Data is at the centre of most of these online companies. They often offer services that are free of charge, at least initially, while generating, analysing and using the massive amounts of data that accompany the service provision.

Consequently, even if such companies generate little or no revenue, the data they possess makes them valuable. Competition authorities, including at EU level, should take this into account when examining prospective mergers. To do this, they need to look beyond turnover, to consider indicators that better show the worth of digital businesses. Alternatives could include user numbers or the market capitalisation of acquired companies.

The Commission’s consultations on the digital single market strategy are already taking into account some of the market changes stemming from this focus on data.

However, the European legislative process is not keeping up with the pace of digitisation. European data protection legislation is needed urgently to provide consumers and businesses with a sense of legal certainty. Delay causes disruption for thousands of businesses and millions of consumers.

“The European legislative process is not keeping up with the pace of digitisation”

The suspension of the EU’s “Safe Harbour” regulation on transatlantic data transfers, following a ruling from the European Court of Justice in October, is bad enough for business. EU institutions now need to at least get the legislation for Europe done quickly.

Establishing the European Digital Single Market by levelling the playing field is an excellent idea to trigger cross-border supply and demand for digital services.

Aligning European legislation and regulative frameworks is, however, just part of what’s needed. Digitisation is moving forward quickly, becoming more complex each day. Finding the balance between protecting consumers while stimulating business and opening up the seemingly endless opportunities of the internet is a pressing challenge for the EU institutions.

Speed is essential because, in the words of Cisco Systems’ former CEO John Chambers: change will never again be as slow as today.

IMAGE CREDIT: EUROPEAN UNION 2015

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As Brussels began a lockdown on November 21 to search for suspected terrorists following the murderous attacks in Paris, I was on my way to Jakarta to attend the second world Forum for Muslim Democrats, a still little-known but potentially powerful platform for reflection on 21st Century Islam.

Islam was on the agenda in both cities – and on both continents. But with a big difference.

In Brussels and other European capitals, the talk was of militant Islam, the alleged link between Islam and violence and why young European Muslims were being drawn to fight with and for the so-called Islamic State.

The talk was harsh, angry and negative, at times darkly Islamophobic. Europe was hurting and it wanted to know why. What was wrong with its Muslim minority? What was wrong with Islam?

As the Far Right thundered “I told you so”, many blamed the refugees streaming in from Syria, others raged against Belgium for “allowing” its towns to turn into hotbeds of Jihad. It was nasty and unpleasant  – but understandable as a first, raw reaction.

The Forum in Jakarta also fretted about IS and its global ramifications – and the damaging shadow the terrorist group and its sponsors had cast over the world and over Islam.

But, refreshingly and importantly, discussions were also about renewal and revival of the religion, the importance of democracy and good governance and replacing the IS/Wahabi version with a fresh narrative of Islam as a religion of moderation, tolerance, understanding and inclusiveness.

Although none of the official documents mention Wahabism by name, the message was loud and clear: it was crucial to get Islam out of its Arab stranglehold, to end the equation between Islam and IS. It was time to listen to other voices, other interpretations and to highlight diversity and freedom of thought.

There was consensus that to counter the cruel Wahabi interpretation of Islam, non-Arab Muslim nations would have to take the lead in spotlighting what the organisers of the Forum described as the “true, peaceful and pluralistic nature of Islam.”

“Muslim democrats must not allow the deep state or terrorists to continue hijacking the course of history. We must chart a new course,”  according to the Forum’s initiator Malaysian opposition politician Anwar Ibrahim who is still in prison.

In a speech read out by his daughter Nurul Izzah, a Malaysian member of Parliament, Anwar insisted, “we must strive to stamp out bigotry and intolerance within ourselves. Islamophobia begins at home.”

“Islamic resurgence is about ensuring the rule of law, clean government, social justice and cultural empowerment where women are not treated as second class citizens…and minorities are not marginalised,” he underlined.

The message from others, including Surin Pitsuwan, the former ASEAN Secretary General who is from Thailand’s small Muslim minority, was that Muslim nations on the “periphery” should have the self-confidence to take ownership of Islam, to take the dominant narrative of the religion “away from the heartland”.

As economic power moves to Asia, the continent should also take the lead in crafting and disseminating a different narrative of a religion to challenge existing interpretations. As one participant put it, “let’s forget the Middle East for a while and focus on our priorities: good governance, education, science and technology”.

“Diversity of opinion is a blessing, we should be critical, curious and question,” said Surin. “There must be an open space for a dialogue amongst ourselves.”

The Forum illustrates the importance of “track two” civil society initiatives in tackling much-needed global challenges.  Plans for expanding membership are being considered – current members include Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey – but it’s not going to be easy. Authentic Muslim democrats are few and far between. And even the existing members face trouble at home.

Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, is clearly well-placed to lead the struggle for Islamic renewal given its largely positive record in transiting from dictatorship to democracy. Nahdlatul Ulama, an Indonesian Muslim organisation which claims more than 50 million members has taken the lead in campaigning against extremism.

But even as we met to discuss the role and challenges facing Muslim Democrats, Jakarta was on alert against terror attacks. Human rights organisations warn against creeping intolerance in the country. There are sporadic attacks on churches and against Ahmediya.

Malaysia’s political troubles are worsening, with Anwar Ibrahim still in prison, and Turkey is slipping dangerously towards authoritarian rule.

The challenges are enormous. As Anwar underlined in his message to the Forum, many Muslim countries are poor, ruled by ruthless dictators and autocrats who act as “incubators of fanatics” whose only option is to blow themselves up.

But the meeting in Jakarta showed that the future need not be as dark as many predict, that Islam and Muslims can thrash out a new course for their religion and themselves. But it requires a fundamental shift in attitudes and mindsets.

The future of Islam’s renewal probably does lie in Asia and the non-Arab world. But for that to happen the region’s intellectuals, scholars and democrats will have to stop looking to the Middle East.

Instead, they should consult and dialogue more with each other. And become more assertive and self-confident. If they succeed, the world could still become a more peaceful place.

This article was written by Friends of Europe Director of Policy, Shada Islam, after the World Forum for Muslim Democrats held in Jakarta last week.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Matthew Kenwrick

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Tackling challenges related to the collaborative economy appears to be a priority for the European Commission as it seeks to strengthen the EU’s Internal Market.

A section on “enabling the balanced development of the collaborative economy” features prominently in the Commission’s Internal Market Strategy published October 28. In it, the Commission quotes a recent study suggesting global revenue from the five main collaborative economy sectors – peer-to-peer finance, online staffing, peer-to-peer accommodation, car sharing and music video streaming – have the potential to reach €300bn by 2025.

The Commission launched a public consultation in September that deals, in part, with the regulatory environment for the collaborative economy. It aims to develop a European agenda for the collaborative economy that will include guidance on how existing EU law applies to collaborative economy business models.

For these initiatives to be successful, the Commission will require input from stakeholders to develop a European approach for tackling some of the tricky issues raised by the new business models.

“Increased competition between traditional taxi services and car-and-driver hire and technology mobility services would respond to demand from consumers for greater flexibility”

The collaborative economy offers clear benefits in terms of jobs, competitiveness and consumer choice. However, it also raises uncertainties in areas such as consumer protection, labour laws and potentially unfair competition with traditional service providers. There is considerable divergence in national regulations covering the sector.

Competition law can be invoked by both new collaborative economy operators using digital platforms and traditional service providers. The former may argue current regulatory measures hamper effective competition; the latter will contend that fierce competition is unfair because the new businesses models are not subject to the same regulatory rules imposed on traditional services.

From both point of views, it is the regulation that seems problematic. Member states’ reactions differ. Several wonder about the legality of companies operating under these new business models.

The Uber saga illustrates this situation very well. In France, UberPOP has been banned since July following violent protests from taxi drivers claiming the new service represented unfair competition. The French Constitutional Court upheld the ban in September on the basis of a law banning services that use private car owners without a formal license or training. Similar bans are in force in Germany and Spain.

Uber has complained to the European Commission that Germany’s law on taxis and other competition rules violate EU legislation. These rules date back 50 years and are no longer adequate for covering new services being made available to consumers. A similar complaint was launched against France.

“The collaborative economy raises uncertainties in areas such as consumer protection, labour laws and potentially unfair competition with traditional service providers”

Uber’s supporters ask why there are bans on a service that is more effective and beneficial to consumers in order to preserve traditional taxis from competition.

In response to the complaints, the European Commission has opened probes into whether French and German laws respect general principles on freedom of establishment. By doing so, the Commission has answered Uber’s call for help against national regulators and reiterated its will to embrace the opportunities of the collaborative economy.

In Spain, a national court has referred several questions on Uber to the European Court of Justice. If it is considered a transport company, the main question will be whether Uber will be subject to the regulatory regime applied to the provision of public services. If it’s considered a digital service it will be difficult for national regulators to impact upon Uber’s activities.

In Italy, while UberPOP faced a court ban based on passenger safety, the Transport Regulation Authority and the Competition Authority have advocated reducing differences among the various non-scheduled transport services.

Increased competition between traditional taxi services and car-and-driver hire and technology mobility services would respond to demand from consumers for greater flexibility and more price competition between service providers.

It is clear from the Internal Market Strategy, that the Commission does not intend to oppose collaborative economy business models, but rather wants to create a level playing field so they can compete fairly and effectively with traditional providers for the benefit of consumers.

This is a difficult challenge. It is crucial all relevant operators engage in dialogue with decision-makers to find a way for these different business models to compete fairly for the benefit of citizens.

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Back in 2008, Kevin Rudd, then Prime Minister of Australia, proposed an initiative to create an Asia-Pacific community by 2020.

He told the Asia Society in Sydney that he aimed to bring together countries as disparate as the United States, China, Japan, India, Indonesia and Australia – a community of about three-and-a-half billion people or half the inhabitants of the planet.

By his side was Richard Woolcott, the Australian envoy who had negotiated the formation of APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic Community, in 1989. With ambitious talk of security pacts and free-trade agreements, Rudd announced he was recalling Woolcott – at the tender age of 80 – to persuade other countries to set up the new community that would cement the region’s position “at the centre of global affairs”.

“The feature that makes the EU stand out amongst the alphabet soup of regional organisations around the world is the fact that European law is binding upon the member states”

Reading Rudd’s recent article in Europe’s World, ‘Asia needs its own EU more than ever’, it is difficult to avoid the impression that seven years on nothing much has been achieved.

A lot of consultations, a ‘high level’ of interest and (of course) a Policy Commission, but a limited appetite for new institutions and, despite the title of Rudd’s article, a definite reluctance to have anything like the EU.

Partly this is for the perfectly valid reason that Asia’s history and traditions are very different from those of Europe. It is also because Rudd doesn’t want anything that smacks of pooled sovereignty – and the pooling of sovereignty is the one necessary condition for any grouping of nations that aspires to be more than a talking shop.

The feature that makes the EU stand out amongst the alphabet soup of regional organisations around the world – ASEAN, MERCOSUR, SICA, ECOWAS, SADC and so on – is the fact that European law is binding upon the member states. Member states who infringe this law are subject to sanctions, usually in the form of fines that increase until it is in their overwhelming economic interest to pay them. This has been an essential condition of the development of an effective single market.

In the early days, when there were just six member states, it was soon recognised that barriers to the free movement of goods between members of the European Economic Community (as it was then called) could easily be maintained even after customs duties had been abolished. You could deem the products of your neighbour unacceptable on your own market on the basis of technical considerations. These disputes could only be resolved if there was a judicial body whose decisions could be binding on all concerned. Here the role of the European Court of Justice was crucial. The binding nature of its decisions could certainly be controversial but without them the achievement of the free movement of goods would face insuperable national obstacles.

Rudd wants a ‘free-trade area’ in Asia, but one of the well-known paradoxes of economics is that you don’t get free trade without regulation. Some judicial body has to ensure that market forces are not being interfered with. It can only do so effectively if its decisions are binding upon everyone involved. Attempts to create single markets elsewhere in the world have shown that nothing else will be effective.

Of course Rudd faces a problem. If he really wants to begin with China, India and the US all inside the same regional organisation, he clearly can’t even whisper the phrase ‘pooling of sovereignty’. The Americans and the Chinese would walk away at the very mention of such an idea.

It was possible in Europe amid the ruins left by the Second World War. For defeated Germany, shared sovereignty appeared better than none at all. For France it was harder to accept, but Paris recognised it was the only way to recover economically. In the UK, which emerged from the war victorious and retained delusions of grandeur, the system took much longer to accept. Once the Common Market was in place and the UK recognised it might be missing out on something interesting, the country took the plunge and joined. A degree of reluctance never went away and will be tested again soon in a referendum, but it is likely that the economic arguments will prevail. Does the UK want to be outside the most powerful trading bloc in the world? Does it want to have the sort of deal with the EU that Norway has, signing up to the single market and even contributing to the EU budget without having any influence on the way the single market operates? It’s unlikely it will vote to leave – though referendums are unpredictable things.

When it started, the EU was a modest affair. It had a limited number of members and of policies in which they were prepared to pool sovereignty – initially it was just a Coal and Steel Community. Only gradually did it bring in more members and expand its remit to include a broad range of economic activities.

This gradualist, one-step-at-a-time approach contrasts with Rudd’s ambition which appears to want half the world involved from the start discussing everything from a comprehensive free-trade pact to security and foreign policy – including holding ASEAN defence ministers’ meetings under the umbrella of the future Asia-Pacific Community.

This approach is unlikely to succeed. It would be better to do something of real substance within a smaller range of policies and a more limited number of countries. That however would involve a pooling of sovereignty in some areas. If that is successful with a small grouping of nations, it can attract more hesitant – and perhaps larger and more powerful – neighbours.

The European Economic Community was the sprat to catch the British mackerel and the same would be true for Asia. Let Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia, for instance, agree to pool sovereignty and create an Asian Economic Community. After some time, as it began to work effectively and produce economic results, China and India might be enticed to join.

“Europeans are in no way superior to others around the world, but they happen through adversity to have tripped over the right way of ordering their relations”

Perhaps Australia, an agricultural powerhouse, could help to build an Asian Food Security Community running a regional food reserve. The idea would be to moderate the natural price volatility of agricultural markets. It could prevent farm prices falling to catastrophic levels, threatening the livelihoods of Australian and other farmers. It could prevent food prices becoming unaffordable to millions of Asians who live on or close to the poverty line. That could be a modest beginning, requiring a very modest sharing of sovereignty. If it worked, it could lead to the broader and deeper Community Rudd argues for.

Kevin Rudd’s idealism is to be applauded, but there is a reason why it has not yielded results after seven years of hard work and endless meetings. What he calls the ‘EU model’ is a model of sovereignty-pooling which took hold in Europe because a shattered continent needed to find its way back after two horrendous world wars.

The situation in Asia is different, but the EU model remains appropriate. A form of binding law above the level of the nation-state is the one and only method of ensuring a peaceful and prosperous future for any region of the world, or indeed for the world itself (since the UN is certainly not modelled in this way and as a result has had very little success). Europeans are in no way superior to others around the world, but they happen through adversity to have tripped over the right way of ordering their relations. It is a model that other regions might well adopt, but not if they reject the very engine that makes effective regional governance possible.

The post If Asia wants its own EU, it will have to bite the bullet of pooled sovereignty appeared first on Europe’s World.

On November 3 1988, computer users were surprised by one of the first large-scale malware attacks. The so-called Morris Worm paralysed an estimated 10% of all computers connected to the internet. The incident also motivated the creation of CERTs – Computer Emergency Response Teams dedicated to cyber-security.

Since then, the internet has gone through dramatic changes. In 1988, it connected just 60,000 computers. Today there are 3.2bn users, 40% of the world’s population. By 2020, the number of connected devices is expected to reach 50bn – from refrigerators to “smart” jewellery. Computers control services and devices that make our daily life work. Attacks on them could damage the core functions of society, threatening the health and well-being of citizens and the security of any state.

In 2015 cyber-attacks have become a 24/7 reality. Yet policy makers seem to have only a fragmented understanding of their nature. Most cyber-security discussions centre on improving defensive instruments and systems, forgetting that the most effective defence is actually interrupting attacks and striking at the attackers’ motivation.

“Most cyber-security discussions centre on improving defensive instruments and systems, forgetting that the most effective defence is striking at the attackers’ motivation”

The cyber-security market today seems to focus on the business of building fences and locks without really knowing who they are defending against. It is common in high-level cyber-security discussions to hear statements comparing computer users with gun owners, placing blame on average users whose computers are hijacked for use in cyber-attacks without their knowledge. This kind of approach seems to forget some basics: that a computer in itself is not a high-risk threat source; that average users are probably unable to defend themselves against advanced attackers; and that responsibility for attacks should first and foremost be placed with the attacker who has created a malicious use for technology.

In order to find cyber-security solutions, it is therefore important to focus on the real threat – the attacker. There are as many ways of stopping attackers as there are motives behind the attacks. From the international law perspective, substantial work has already been done, such as within the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, to clarify perspectives for the use of force against cyber-attackers.

However substantial gaps remain in both legal policy and instruments for international co-operation in situations that fall below those where the use of force could be evoked. Most of the attacks that cyber-security professionals are faced with on a daily basis fall into this category, outside the context of military conflict. Even these can however endanger critical infrastructure and may pose a direct threat to human life.

Has a private person the right to defend himself or herself in a cyber-attack in a same way as with physical attacks? Timid discussions about the possibilities for active defence measures have so far been held mainly within the viewpoint of military conflict.

Yet in everyday life, people responsible for handling cyber-incidents are faced with a grim choice: when all passive measures have been exhausted, can the defender stop the attacker’s access to platforms being used for the ongoing attack? What if this platform is physically located in another country and requests for help directed at authorities there go unanswered? It seems quite clear such action to protect life, property and the state should be possible and legal if all other means to stop the attack are ineffective.

However, although work on the second volume of the Tallinn Manuel should provide a more transparent and sophisticated approach to self-defence in cyber-space from a nation state’s military perspective by 2016, there is a lack of similar discussions on the right of self-defence for citizens or companies.

“In many countries cyber-security agencies operate under different institutional frameworks, with varying working methods and mandates that hinder effective cross-boarder collaboration”

International co-operation in the cyber-security domain is not easy. In many countries cyber-security agencies operate under different institutional frameworks, with varying working methods and mandates that hinder effective cross-boarder collaboration. One solution could be to standardise risk-management and notification procedures so authorities can better understand the frameworks and practices used by others.

This is where the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive currently under discussion in the European Union could come into play. The directive should improve member states’ national cyber-security capabilities. It should boost co-operation between member states, and between public and private sectors. It will require key internet services as well as companies in critical sectors – such as energy, transport, banking and health – to adopt risk management practices and report major incidents to the national authorities.

Discussions on the directive showed, that although state practices in cyber-security vary, there is a shared level of concern and an acknowledgement of the need to improve co-operation across the EU.

Cyber-security co-operation among state authorities, and between the private and public spheres, should be quick and efficient taking into account the often rapid escalation of cyber-attacks. Artificial bureaucratic barriers must be overcome.

Cyber-security is vital to the security of European citizens and the defence of state security. It can only be achieved through practical co-operation that keeps its focus on the attackers themselves. EU policy seems to be moving in the right direction, but states must work together more.

The post Strengthening cyber-security in the EU appeared first on Europe’s World.

The human tide of refugees and migrants finding their way north via the Western Balkans, primarily to Germany, showed how ill-equipped and underfunded to cope with them the Balkans countries are. It also underlined the fact that the refugee crisis may well deepen in months and years to come. In any case, it has come almost exactly a year after European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker’s declaration that the time has come for the EU to “take a break from enlargement”, so that new members will join over the next four and a half years.

Juncker was just stating the obvious; none of the aspiring members will be able to tick all the boxes on their pre-accession “to-do” lists during the mandate of this Commission. True, accession country leaders would have preferred Juncker to state the obvious more gently, as that would have made their lives back home easier, not least by quietening their local eurosceptics. Juncker has, however, a duty to keep his finger on the pulse of opinion in EU member states, and for some time now that opinion has definitely not been in an enlargement mode.

“I myself do not believe there is a standstill, even if I do acknowledge the general lack of enthusiasm for further enlargement”

The refugee/migrant crisis, the eurozone crisis, Greece, Ukraine, foreign fighters in the Middle East and the UK threat of a Brexit all weigh on the minds of EU citizens. There is simply no interest in enlarging a European Union that already has enough problems of its own. But although Juncker needs to bear this kind of public sentiment in mind, he should do so only up to a point. He could also try to shape public opinion and lead it in the direction that is best for the EU. And embracing the Western Balkans is good not just for the region but for the EU as a whole.

It isn’t just a question of rounding off the geography of Europe and avoiding a black hole in its south-eastern corner. Nor it is a question of honouring promises made by EU leaders at the 2003 Thessaloniki summit and repeated several times since. It certainly isn’t a question of making the EU stronger by boosting its numbers – the six Western Balkan candidates would represent little more than a glitch in the EU’s demographic and economic statistics. It is all of these things and more, and it is a move that makes perfect sense.

The EU is above all a system of values – even though the EU itself sometimes seems to forget that. Insisting on a thorough and comprehensive adherence to the accession criteria of democracy, human rights and market economy by the Balkan candidates would be a timely reminder for all EU members of the values enshrined in the Union.

At its inception, the EU was primarily a peace and reconciliation project, and as such has become the most successful in history. Yet 16 years after the end of wars in the Western Balkans, it is disappointing we in the region have still to find common ground for a genuine and successful reconciliation. Most of the initiatives we have seen have come from outside the region, primarily from the EU.

Continuation of the accession process is vital to maintaining the momentum of reconciliation efforts, and Brussels is clearly aware of that and will continue to encourage, cajole and push forward reconciliation. We in the Regional Cooperation Council take a proactive approach based on our mission statement, which tells us to focus “on promotion and enhancement of regional co-operation in South East Europe” and on supporting the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of aspiring countries.

Like many others who are now part of the EU, we in the Balkans come from societies that have little in the way of democratic tradition. We went from feudal monarchies to autocratic dictatorships, fascism and communism. Then came a long and painful transition from socialist societies and centralised economies into the world of democracy and market forces. Democracy, we all know, is more than just rules, principles and multiparty elections; it is primarily a state of mind that takes time and careful nurturing to establish its roots and to flourish. The purpose of the RCC is to help that process. In 1999, after the final battles in the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Stability Pact for South East Europe was established by the international community to assist the region in overcoming the wounds of war and speed up Euro-Atlantic integration. Less than a decade later, it was felt that the Balkans had become stable enough to take ownership of the process, so the RCC came into being.

“Continuation of the accession process is vital to maintaining the momentum of reconciliation efforts, and Brussels is clearly aware of that”

Seven years on, huge progress has been made in bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations, on reconciliation, administrative reform and freedom of the media. One Balkan country – Croatia – has “left” the region and put an EU star on its shoulders. Everybody involved in that accomplishment deserves kudos. Most of the other Balkan countries now have candidate status, but it has to be admitted that the road to EU membership is still long and full of potholes. For each and every success, there is a problem left unsolved. That is the RCC’s focus – to help in overcoming the problems and to try to fill the potholes and ensure a smoother and faster ride to membership.

A lot of our work is political, as the RCC is the focal point of efforts not only to benefit individual members but also to create a climate for regional co-operation. The RCC engages with the wider region and with overseas friends who want to help us overcome the burdens of the past and to take our place in the EU.

An indication of the path towards that membership is the Berlin Process initiated in 2014 by Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel. This explicitly endorses regional co-operation as the main engine of EU accession for the Western Balkans, and identifies the RCC as the main platform for it. In the economic field, the RCC’s chief tool is the SEE2020 strategy, which details ways and means for spreading economic growth. Connectivity is one of the crucial elements for this and this sector got a boost last August at the Western Balkans Vienna Summit which cemented agreements and EU investments via infrastructure projects to the tune of 600 million Euro.

To return to Jean-Claude Juncker and the so-called “enlargement standstill”, I myself do not believe there is a standstill, even if I do acknowledge the general lack of enthusiasm for further enlargement. I genuinely do not think we are talking about enlargement fatigue, or that the EU citizens have suddenly been bitten by a strange bug called “Scepticus Balkanicus”. It is simply that we are living in an era when the EU is going through yet another re-examination of its role and purpose in a world burdened with problems. In such a climate, the region needs to work extra hard to smooth its road to accession.

Beyond the political and reconciliation potholes, there are economy, unemployment and poverty problems. The region has been suffering from the global economic downturn, made worse by our own domestic troubles – endemic corruption, organised crime, shoddy privatisations, and political and familial nepotism. The list goes on, and much of the job remains undone. Unless we sort out these problems we cannot hope for a change in the climate of opinion when it comes to our EU accession prospects. To be accepted, we have to be recognised – if not yet as equals, then at least as peoples and nations who share the same values, aim for the same goals and accept the same principles. The RCC is committed to smoothing out these potholes, so that when the next European Commission and Parliament take office, Balkan candidate countries will be ready to move towards membership.

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The European Union is clearly the most successful regional organisation in human history. It represents the gold standard for regional co-operation, yet it is not perfect. It still suffers from structural flaws that will need to be remedied if the EU wants to go from Version 1.0 to Version 2.0.

One great paradox surrounding the EU is how on the world stage it can be both an economic giant and a political dwarf. Its economic might, despite the recent challenges to the euro, is indisputable. Indeed, its capacity to overcome the eurozone crisis shows its economic resilience. By contrast, when it comes to major geopolitical challenges like the rise of China or the challenge of ISIL, EU remains a marginal player.

Is there a structural cause for this political marginalisation of the EU? Is there something about its decision-making structures that leads to this? The answer is probably yes. But it is a complex yes; complex because in theory the EU has a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and new institutional structures to deliver its CFSP. The EU is represented in international negotiations by its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, currently Federica Mogherini.

“To make matters worse, the EU allowed the U.S. to set the agenda for the EU’s relations with its Islamic neighbours”

That’s the theory. In practice, the voice of Europe in international negotiations is relatively weak because the EU has to spend most of its time negotiating internally to arrive at a common point of view. And it is not easy to arrive at a shared viewpoint because even Europe’s three key global actors – Germany, the UK and France – have different interests. To protect their anachronistic interests as permanent members of the UN Security Council, the UK and France refuse to have their hands tied by a common EU policy. Germany, on the other hand, has a greater vested interest in a common position. And even when these three key actors agree, the EU then has to work hard to bring on board its remaining 25 members. The result tends to be an EU position that represents the lowest common denominator.

With this kind of decision-making structure, it is virtually impossible for the EU to come out with bold visionary proposals that take into consideration the EU’s common interest in dealing with a long-term challenge. There are many obvious long-term challenges coming down the road towards the EU. They include the rise of China, Asia’s renaissance, the resurgence of the Islamic world, the need to re-engage Russia and dealing with Africa’s demographic explosion.

It doesn’t take a strategic genius to anticipate the long-term geopolitical challenges that face the EU. But it will take a strategic genius to figure out solutions that will enable the EU to think and act long-term. Although there is no easy “silver bullet” solution, it may be useful to consider the creation of a high-powered strategic planning unit (SPU) whose mandate is to study, anticipate and formulate responses to all these long-term challenges.

Such a SPU should be given a clear mandate to ignore contemporary challenges, whether they be in Ukraine or ISIL, and instead to focus only on the long term. Its task should be to suggest appropriate EU strategies to deal with these challenges, and a few examples might help to illustrate this process.

Let’s take the case of the EU-U.S. relationship. The result of the years of the Cold War is a historical legacy of EU subservience to American strategic interests. During the Cold War there was a strategic rationale for this subservience, but in the post-post-Cold War era the question is whether there will always be a convergence of interests between the EU and the U.S.

“It may be useful to consider the creation of a high-powered strategic planning unit whose mandate is to study, anticipate and formulate responses to all these long-term challenges”

This is the kind of audit that the SPU should do, clearly and objectively. If the audit shows a continuing convergence of interests, the EU should move to a certain set of geopolitical impulses. If it shows a growing divergence of interests, the EU will need to fashion different impulses. To the best of my knowledge, no EU institution has tried to do such an audit. Why not? It has become an article of faith in the EU that the transatlantic alliance must remain an eternal feature of the geopolitical landscape.

Maybe it should. In the economic arena, when the EU negotiates with the U.S. over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), it strongly and shrewdly defends its economic interests. However, when it comes to geopolitical interests, Europe’s natural tendency is to be subservient to the U.S., even though their interests could diverge significantly.

The biggest problem that the U.S. faces along its southern border is Mexico. Migration flows from Mexico have always been seen to be a challenge, and the U.S. has wisely tried to manage this by negotiating and implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to export jobs to Mexico lessen the migratory pressure of Mexicans seeking jobs in the U.S.

The EU’s biggest problem on its southern border is North Africa. Migration flows from North Africa could be anticipated 20 years ago. In a 1993 article in The National Interest, entitled “The West and the Rest”, I myself wrote: “If the belief and expectation of economic development can be planted in the minds of billions of people, massive migrations may be averted. Those western Europeans who are already fearful of such migrations from North Africa should do some fundamental strategic re-thinking and begin viewing the challenge from East Asia in a different light. What is a short-term challenge could bring long-term strategic redemption.” In short, western Europe should 22 years ago have encouraged the countries of North African to learn from the successful economic development of Muslim states like Malaysia and Indonesia.

“The EU can never walk away from North Africa’s problems, and should have been careful and pragmatic in dealing with them instead of allowing the ideological interests of the U.S. to trump its own pragmatic interests”

Europe’s current migration crisis, like the Mexican migration problem, could have been anticipated. The EU should have signed a North African Free Trade Area (NAFTA) to match the American NAFTA. Yet none was proposed or even considered. Why not? The simple answer is that the U.S. has intelligence and security agencies that focus on long-term challenges, and they anticipated the Mexican challenge. The EU has had none, and failed to identify the looming migratory pressures.

To make matters worse, the EU allowed the U.S. to set the agenda for the EU’s relations with its Islamic neighbours. When the Arab spring began in Tunisia in December 2010, the EU allowed the U.S. to take the driver’s seat in dealing with the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The U.S. was able to take ideological positions because, separated by the Atlantic Ocean, it could walk away from these problems.

The EU can never walk away from North Africa’s problems, and should have been careful and pragmatic in dealing with them instead of allowing the ideological interests of the U.S. to trump its own pragmatic interests.

North Africa is only one example of diverging interests between the EU and the U.S., and over the long term there may well be other divergences. This is why, should the EU even set up an SPU, its mandate must not be to pass political judgements. Its sole role should be to objectively identify common challenges that EU countries will almost certainly face. Such an agency could help the EU to develop a capacity for strategic foresight. By 2035, the EU could become both an economic and a political giant on the world stage.

The post Here’s how the EU should start to think long-term appeared first on Europe’s World.

A referendum is intended to settle a political debate by offering a straight choice on a controversial issue such as “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union?” But the forthcoming UK referendum will do nothing of the kind. Whatever the outcome, the result will be just one stage in a never-ending process in which the UK drifts further away from mainstream Europe at a time when economic interdependence is drawing most EU member states closer together.

The UK’s referendum is the culmination of a decade of pressure from eurosceptic MPs within the Conservative Party. Prime Minister David Cameron has never been engaged with the EU or understood its politics. His indifference was first demonstrated by forcing Conservative MEPs to withdraw from the European People’s Party. It was spectacularly demonstrated in 2011 when his late-night demands in the name of British interests led to the UK’s self-exclusion from negotiations about how to deal with the consequences of the eurozone crisis. The threat of the mass defection of Conservative voters to anti-EU candidates of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) led him to pledge a referendum on EU membership. Winning an absolute majority in last May’s general election made it impossible for him to wriggle out of that pledge.

To appease both the Tory party’s hard and soft eurosceptic MPs, Cameron has publicly committed himself to returning significant powers from Brussels to the House of Commons in Westminster. This is presented as a zero-sum conflict with the faceless bureaucrats of Brussels. If victory can be claimed, he will endorse a vote in favour of the UK remaining in the European Union. If not, he will recommend withdrawal. Leaked documents indicate that privately he wants Britain to remain in the EU, but the less he secures as concessions the greater will be the split in his own party.

If a member government’s demands are voiced in the name of the national interest, they are usually rejected. The UK’s claim that it should be allowed to opt out of the EU commitment to the free movement of people between member states was a good example of that. By presenting a reduction in regulation by Brussels as in Britain’s national interest rather than everyone’s interest, Cameron has minimised his chances of forging alliances with other reform-minded member governments. The UK’s desire to protect the City of London from the effects of eurozone policies addresses British anxieties about future eurozone policies. Although these anxieties are shared by eurozone member states, they will not allow a non-member state to veto actions they think needed to keep the eurozone intact. The symbolic demand for the UK to opt out of the Treaty of Rome’s commitment to an ever-closer union can only be met authoritatively by a treaty change unlikely to occur until after 2020.

Downing Street believes that a ballot sooner will make a ‘Remain’ vote easier. The Referendum bill requires that a vote be held by the end of 2017, but a vote before Easter of that year is the latest date a referendum could be held without the additional confusion arising from the French and German elections. Britain will, furthermore, be chairing the European Council in the second half of 2017.

Domestically, the Prime Minister has played on Westminster’s ignorance of Europe and EU matters to portray trivial or counter-productive incidents as triumphs. His cordial personal relations with Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel have been exploited as showing that Berlin will ensure Brussels delivers what Cameron wants. A whirlwind series of phone calls and flying visits this year to the other 27 members of the European Council has been portrayed as a successful bid to win influence, even though the only visible gains are favourable headlines in Britain.

Most member states are probably prepared to discuss concessions with the UK, but it is not their only priority. At the mid-year European Council meeting, Cameron was given ten minutes to present his thoughts – one continental leader described this as good for a toilet break. The post-Council communiqué devoted 25 words to his statement and said the issue would be looked at again in December.

Belatedly, Britain’s Prime Minister has realised he cannot achieve substantial concessions from Brussels in time for his self-imposed commitment to an early referendum. To avoid having to admit failure, he has been slow to define the changes that he regards as sufficient to justify a Remain vote. This tactic is designed to enable Cameron to claim for domestic consumption that whatever powers can be reclaimed are what he has wanted all along, however limited they turn out to be.

Cameron is committed to presenting whatever he gains as a triumph, but the anti-EU Conservatives in parliament and the media will define it as falling well short of what they want. Their first line of attack will be that the package contains few actual changes in EU rules and a lot of statements about the intention to consider British concerns in ongoing deliberations about the eurozone, migration and an intergovernmental conference on treaty change. A second line of attack will be the familiar refrain that today’s EU is not the EU that Britain joined in 1973. Since the few fig leaves that Cameron secures will not protect the UK from the EU’s inherent moves toward an ever-closer Union, eurosceptics will argue that the sooner Britain gets out of the EU the better.

The reductionist nature of a ‘Stay or Go’ vote on membership means that the details of negotiation will be less important than the broad political picture. That will be confused by the split in the Conservative Party. A yet to be determined number of Cabinet ministers and MPs will publicly come out for a ‘Leave’ vote, and so will a significant portion of the 37% of the electorate that voted in May for the Conservative government. The Labour Party, itself in the toils of an ideological civil war in which EU membership is increasingly contested, will probably try to avoid official engagement. But trade unions opposed to the eurozone’s austerity policy can put their money behind the Leave campaign. UKIP will campaign for a Leave vote from working-class voters left behind by globalisation.

The most committed advocates of EU membership are business people. Insofar as the British economy is doing better than those of continental EU countries, this will increase their personal authority but will also strengthen the case made by anti-EU businessmen who argue that the UK economy is strong enough to do well or better outside a political union that gives priority to saving the euro. Business leaders may have money but they have little expertise or taste for campaigning. The Scottish National Party is set to be the leading party in the UK that will campaign for a Stay  vote; it wants Scotland to stay in Europe but leave the United Kingdom. The lack of the major parties’ enthusiasm for campaigning will keep the referendum turnout low, and if the uncertainties of withdrawal produce a risk-averse vote for remaining in the EU as the lesser evil, it will be a shallow commitment to membership.

Whatever the outcome, the never-ending debate about Britain’s engagement with the EU will continue. Even if it’s a vote to remain, Conservative MPs will challenge Cameron to harass Brussels to deliver the repatriation of powers he claimed would be forthcoming. And the Prime Minister’s announced decision to leave office before the next general election is already opening an internal competition to succeed him. Contestants divide between those who are vociferously anti-EU and those who express more doubts than commitments about British engagement with Europe. If UKIP can use the referendum campaign to compensate for its lack of seats in the House of Commons, it will exert fresh pressure on Conservative MPs to represent anti-EU voters rather than defend Cameron’s achievements.

This referendum will not be the end of the story. If any EU measure is deemed a transfer of sovereign powers under criteria laid down in the UK’s 2011 European Union Act, this will trigger another referendum about whether the United Kingdom should adopt it. The additional power need not be the result of a treaty change; it can be the result of Qualified Majority Voting in Council or the accidental by-product of legislation.

An increasingly introverted cohort of British political leaders will hope that British economic success can distract attention from the debate about the EU. However, silence has its costs. It means that the British government has no answer to the challenge that former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson voiced more than half a century ago when he said Britain has lost an empire but it has yet to find a role.

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There are concerning parallels between pre-1914 Europe and today’s security tensions in maritime Asia. The Asia-Pacific region has been witnessing an emerging bifurcation between a 21st century economic order geared towards integration, and a regional security order with an increasingly sharp, 19th century edge.

Leaders in Asia can nevertheless draw policy lessons from Europe’s recent history. It was, in part, this tragic history of competing nationalisms that led me, as Prime Minister of Australia, to propose an Asia-Pacific Community (APC). When I launched this initiative back in 2008, I stressed that although the great powers of the Asia-Pacific region may live in harmony today, history should remind us not to assume that ‘peace in our time’ can ever be guaranteed. That was seven years ago. And as we all know, security tensions in the region have now become much sharper.

An APC would, of course, be significantly different from the original concepts of European co-operation. The Asia-Pacific region itself is vastly different to Europe. The history of 20th century Asia has primarily been a colonial and post-colonial history. By contrast, Europeans over the same period were the colonisers. Europe has evolved the notion of the nation-state steadily since the 15th century, whereas this was less formal across Asia. Further, despite its division into often competing nation-states, and despite the wars of religion, Europe evolved from a common Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman culture, whereas that is not the case with the vastly different civilisational trajectories of Asia.

“The challenge for Asia-Pacific leaders is to square the circle by recognising the uniqueness of Asian regionalism, while avoiding Europe’s mistakes by drawing pertinent lessons from its history”

We can, however, see the need in both Europe and Asia for the evolution of a common political and security architecture to manage regional tensions. The same idea of a long-term Asia-Pacific Community comes from this premise. An APC would foster deeper inter-dependence over time, together with new habits of transparency, trust and co-operative norms. Such mechanisms could help Asia cope with crises by managing them peacefully and reducing the strategic polarisation we are beginning to see emerge between Washington and Beijing. The concept of an APC could begin with basic confidence and security-building measures between regional states.

I did not think then, nor do I think now, that it would be easy to create an APC overnight. It would take years of consensus building. Back in 2008, I nominated 2020 as a realistic objective for the establishment of an APC with the membership, mandate and institutional muscle to make a difference to regional security.

The long menu of traditional and non-traditional security challenges confronting Asia has not changed fundamentally since I first proposed the Asia-Pacific Community seven years ago. What has changed is the way these challenges have become more salient and more urgent. The great power harmony we seemed to enjoy in 2008 now resembles the halcyon days of a distant past.

The Asia-Pacific security order is under significant strain from rising strategic frictions among great powers and regional states, driven in large part by a series of unresolved territorial disputes. Asia’s economic order, long built on the back of trade liberalisation, also shows signs of bifurcation between trading blocs that seek to exclude one another.

Watching these trends unfold, the intellectual and political leaders of the Asia-Pacific region face a clear-cut choice. The first is to look on aghast as events shape our future. The second is to accept that our future “is not in our stars, but in ourselves”. If we lean towards the second school of thought, as I believe all national leaders in Asia do, then the next question to ask is: What can we do to steer the course of events away from these rocky shoals?

Building an APC by 2020 is one possible objective for Asia. Throughout 2009, I outlined my vision of an APC to senior officials and heads of state at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the East Asia Summit and at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. In an effort to open a regional discussion, the Australian government hosted a conference on the APC that year, and appointed a senior official to travel to 21 countries to consult with more than 300 officials, 30 ministers and eight national leaders. Five points of consensus emerged. Back then, there was:

• A high level of regional interest in the APC proposal;
• A recognition that existing institutions could not adequately manage the region’s full range of economic, security and political challenges;
• A limited appetite for the creation of new institutions in addition to existing ones;
• An agreement that ASEAN must be at the core of any future APC;
• There was strong interest in giving more substance to the APC proposal.

The Asia Society Policy Institute in New York, which I joined as inaugural President last year, has launched a Policy Commission to consider the future of Asia-Pacific regional architecture, including the possibility of an APC. Our ongoing work aims to advance consensus on the reform of regional architecture, and to elaborate the details of what an Asia-Pacific Community might look like in practice.

An early critique of the APC proposal concerned whether an EU-type institution was an appropriate model for the Asia-Pacific region. The EU is by no means a one-size-fits-all model which Asian leaders should simply impose on the region. As noted above, our history, security challenges and strategic context are starkly different, so any Asia-Pacific Community should be built on a foundation of common regional norms and foreign policy realities. We cannot understand Asia’s history and future needs solely through “Western spectacles… by imitating the tinsel of the West,” as Gandhi said in 1947. It is for good historical reasons that Asian regionalism is and will be different to that of Europe.

When building the EU on the ashes of World War 2, exhausted European empires slowly contracted and withdrew from Asia. Asian states simultaneously rediscovered national sovereignties and political independence that all except Thailand had lost for a century. Whereas Europe sought innovative ways to dilute national sovereignty – which the EU’s founders blamed for the war – Asian states sought to preserve and protect their hard-earned sovereignty. This is the reason that Asian regionalism is based on the principle of non-interference and a stronger state-centric regional order than that which prevails in modern Europe.

“The EU is by no means a one-size-fits-all model which Asian leaders should simply impose on the region. Our history, security challenges and strategic context are starkly different”

At the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, one of the earliest attempts at Asian regionalism, delegates resisted setting up a permanent regional body. The 1955 regional conference at Bandung in Indonesia again decided not to bureaucratise Asian regionalism. It was not until 1967 that we saw the founding of ASEAN, then APEC in 1989, the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, and the East Asia Summit in 2005.

The differences between Asian and European regionalism shouldn’t blind us to the fact that even though history doesn’t repeat itself, it often rhymes. I stand by what I said in 2008: what we can learn from Europe is that it is necessary to take the first step. In the 1950s, sceptics saw European integration as unrealistic. But most people would now agree that, despite current difficulties in the European economy and the unfolding refugee crisis, Europe’s visionaries have succeeded in evolving a European Union where the thought of one member state going to war again against another is simply unthinkable. That was simply not the case for the Europe of the previous 500 years. It is this spirit we need to capture in the Asia-Pacific.

European history is also a sobering reminder never to take peace for granted. Had a nascent pan-European security institution existed in July 1914, it might have made a decisive difference in leaders’ assumptions and the fateful choices that they made. Without a robust security institution, or even a mature security dialogue, there was no political “shock-absorber” between contending nationalisms. And we should never forget that Europe’s advanced state of economic inter-dependence at the dawn of the 20th century was not enough to prevent war.

Not only has Europe’s integration reduced historical security tensions in Europe. Other institutions have also played a role. For example, without the military transparency and confidence-building measures of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE), the Cold War frictions of those times might well have escalated to war. The CSCE didn’t resolve the Cold War and couldn’t prevent crises, but it was often able to create breathing space for pragmatic leaders on both sides to negotiate the keystones of international security – such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The challenge for Asia-Pacific leaders is to square the circle by recognising the uniqueness of Asia’s regionalism, without mindlessly repeating centuries of European mistakes. We in Asia need to draw pertinent lessons from Europe’s history.

A possible roadmap towards a future Asia-Pacific Community is as follows:

• Transforming the East Asia Summit into an APC by 2020 based on the existing Kuala Lumpur declaration of the EAS in 2005;
• Bringing the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ meeting under the umbrella of the EAS/APC;
• Establishing a permanent EAS/APC secretariat in an ASEAN capital – Singapore, Kuala Lumpur or Jakarta being the most likely candidates. In time, the region will need its own equivalent of a Brussels-type institution, although without the European model’s pooling of sovereignty;
• Annual meetings at Heads of state and government level to ensure high-level political direction and buy-in. This should be held in the first half of the year as a stand-alone summit, not as a “tack on” to other regional summits like APEC;
• Its first task should be to elaborate a comprehensive set of regional confidence and security-building measures, including military hotlines, transparency measures and pan-regional protocols to handle military incidents at sea and in the air;
• As a second priority is developing a fully integrated natural disaster response mechanism across the region, under an integrated virtual command, in the event of a major environmental, climatological or other incident of regional scale;

None of the above will happen magically in an Asia that is now the subject of increasing polarisation. Setting the region on autopilot would steer us along a certain path – but not necessarily a path of our long-term choosing. Building an Asia Pacific Community must begin today so that we may one day declare, as Jean Monnet wrote to Robert Schuman in 1948, that “we have moved on from preparing for war, and we are now preparing to prevent war.” The EU’s founding fathers disagreed on the practical limitations, the means and the final goal of the European project, but their achievements are undeniable. Speaking of the EU as a potential example for Asia may appear misplaced at a time when a potential Brexit, eurozone growth difficulties and an unresolved refugee crises continue to dominate international news. Nonetheless, the European community succeeded in its historic mission of eliminating centuries-old security dilemmas between France and Germany, and making a modern war at the heart of Europe unthinkable, if not impossible. Ours should be a similar aspiration for Asia.

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Forty years ago, the world witnessed one of the Cold War’s turning points – the closing of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, followed quickly by the panicked evacuation of Americans and their allies from the region. What followed was the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese fleeing across the South China Sea. I witnessed this painful denouement as a young Foreign Service officer, and I was horrified by the tales of people on rickety crafts confronting fearsome typhoons and the predation of pirates to rob them of whatever they carried. That tragedy, and the concerted generosity it drew from the international community, now seems uplifting compared to what we are witnessing today.

In the late 1970s, when huge numbers of refugees fled Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos for the open sea, the world reacted swiftly by launching resettlement efforts that carried many of those seeking settlement to safety – first to Thailand, and then to the far corners of the world. Eventually, hundreds of thousands found haven in the U.S., France, Australia and even South America. Can the same happen for today’s generation of desperate refugees?

A tide of distress is surging from the Mediterranean onto Europe’s doorstep, but this time the world’s reaction is hesitant. Unlike when our leaders forty years ago pulled together to help, the sight of those in distress is pulling today’s leaders apart. The Mediterranean has already swallowed more than 6,500 lives in just the two years since the October 2013 shipwreck off the Italian island of Lampedusa. That single tragedy took 368 lives and horrified the world. Europeans swore such shipwrecks would never again be tolerated, yet at least three catastrophes have each taken twice as many victims since then.

This is not a Mediterranean problem, or even a European one. It is a humanitarian catastrophe that demands the entire world’s engagement. Haiti’s 2010 earthquake was not a matter for one hemisphere, nor was the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami. Those disasters were met by an outpouring of humanitarian action, and so must this one.

Europe must welcome those fleeing from conflict zones by raising resettlement quotas, issuing more humanitarian visas and extending Temporary Protective Status to citizens of countries in distress. We must also ask what policies we want to put in place to better prepare us for such challenges in future. Put simply, we need a comprehensive approach that covers all facets of contemporary mobility.

We need generous asylum provisions for refugees and others who have a strong claim to protection. But we equally need properly-designed labour migration programmes to enable migrants of all skill levels to access labour markets that are crying out for supply without having to risk their lives.

The bottom line is that we, the international community, have created a world in which mobility is the norm rather than the exception. We cannot go backwards. We must ensure that people can move safely and with dignity.

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Our 21st century EU is a common area within which its citizens can move freely. Opening up our internal borders wasn’t easy, as an open Europe had always to be balanced against internal and external security needs.

The Amsterdam treaty incorporated the Schengen agreement – and with that the freedom of movement as an EU right – and set the goal of creating an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (the AFSJ). It confirmed the steps needed for free movement, and also established a mandate for the remaining elements of the AFSJ, which included immigration and asylum policy. Today, the treaties define Europe as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and oblige member states to guarantee a degree of international mobility that is unique in the world. In line with the AFSJ objectives, the treaties also established the need for a European migration and asylum policy. But the legal framework for both isn’t well balanced, with some EU states hanging on to their sovereign powers over both.

Managing immigrant and refugee flows while preserving the right to free movement and residence of EU citizens has been a major source of intra-EU tensions. And it has been thus for longer than many care to admit. One need only look back to 2011 and the episodes following the Tunisian revolution to see that the present situation is a crisis that should have been foreseen. After years of grappling with such crises, the EU has finally managed to respond to the refugee crisis of recent months. Such a show of solidarity has been long overdue. Now a longer-term vision for governing the AFSJ is needed.

The current AFSJ’s limitations are having a corrosive effect within the EU and have badly weakened our external policies just as we face enormous challenges beyond our borders. The link between external policy and what we consider to be domestic policy is becoming clearer by the day. We Europeans are now proposing a shared management of mobility to our neighbours, something that was unimaginable some decades ago, while at the same time our security is interrelated with theirs as never before.

A European space that is both open and secure requires a wholesale reform of the AFSJ. We cannot go on thinking of the area of freedom as a common construction internally, while managing asylum and immigration policy nationally without common governance rules and mechanisms. We need to strengthen the links between the different elements of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and move towards effective and complete implementation. Doing this will bring enormous political difficulties with it, but the risks of not doing it are already unacceptable because they call into question crucial elements of the European Union itself.

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Migration is the most controversial issue in Europe of this decade. It is creating new divisions between European countries and is feeding the widespread euroscepticism that far-right political movements have so promptly exploited.

The climax of these tensions, old and new, came when hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees had arrived in Europe to seek asylum. Many European governments proffered a mix of nationalist, religious and economic reasons to counter calls for greater solidarity in sharing the responsibility of the refugees. The European Commission’s proposal for modest mandatory quotas was nevertheless pushed through by qualified majority voting, and hopes are rising that EU countries have come to understand that go-it-alone migration policies would be a mistake of historic proportions. To save the whole integration project, European countries will have to work together on immigration in their common interest.

Renewed co-operation on immigration has to bring about reform of the legislation governing asylum. The so-called “Dublin system” leaves a few frontline southern EU countries to bear a disproportionate responsibility for asylum-seekers, and in any case it doesn’t conform with international human rights standards.

EU countries need to agree on a new system based on the principles of inter-state solidarity as well as on effective human rights protection. Legislation on humanitarian visas as well as on family reunifications should be eased to facilitate refugees’ safe passage to Europe. Carrier sanctions on transport companies should be abolished in order to reduce refugees’ dangerous and often deadly journeys by sea or land, and to counter the increasingly well-organised networks of people smugglers.

The EU also needs to boost search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean by mutualising efforts that so far have rested on the shoulders of a few countries, notably Italy. The increased resources and enlarged mandate given to Triton is a positive initiative that the EU must sustain in the long term.

EU countries have to team up not only to save lives but also to ensure common minimum reception standards across Europe. The European Council’s decision to help Greece, Turkey and Western Balkan countries strengthen their reception and asylum systems is a positive first step. It should now be extended to other EU countries, in particular in the Baltic and eastern regions, which often have sub-standard reception capacities and integration policies. Crucially, the EU should make more resources available to member states and their local authorities to help strengthen their capacity to integrate refugees.

Another key element is political discourse. Legislative and policy changes will hardly be possible if political leaders continue pandering to people’s fears and insecurities. Political leaders have to explain that refugees are people fleeing countries where civil wars, widespread violence or political repression leave no option other than to leave. The same leaders must promote examples of European tolerance, acceptance and solidarity. They must explain that Europe is not the problem, but the solution.

Achieving these goals demands much political determination. The EU and its member states should use the expertise we at the Council of Europe have built up and should also react more promptly to our recommendations and to the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. This would greatly improve the situation on the ground.

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