Europe's World

In the face of a surge in the number of refugees arriving within its borders, Europe found itself in the midst of a crisis last year – one that tore at the fabric of the European Union. What we witnessed was not truly a European “refugee crisis”. Much less so a “migrant crisis”. It was a crisis of European policies; a crisis of solidarity. While governments demonstrated a lack of commitment to finding a truly European solution, the response from the general public to the influx of refugees ranged from warm welcomes to xenophobia. While the reasons behind this vary from country to country, a number of important contributing factors can be identified.

A small group of countries had to take much of the strain caused by the sudden increase in immigration – either as transit countries or final destinations. Greece, Italy and Hungary buckled under
the pressure of ever-increasing numbers of people entering their territory. Croatia and Slovenia followed. They faced difficulties in effectively processing asylum applications, as prescribed by the Dublin Convention, and struggled to provide immediate humanitarian relief. Attempts in the beginning to cope with the influx quickly gave way to a policy of waving people through to neighbouring countries, before finally turning to the (re)construction of fences. Just three countries – Germany, Sweden and Austria – were the target destinations for 95% of new arrivals. Each received large numbers of people within a few months. While other countries, such as the Netherlands, also saw an increase, it was nothing beyond what they had been able to handle in the past.

The unequal distribution of arrivals within the EU, whereby less than a third of all EU member states were countries of transit or destination, left certain countries under strain while others remained mostly unaffected. Yet the supposed threat of increased immigration was instrumentalised by populist politicians to bolster anti-EU sentiments, limiting the options for governments to find workable European solutions. There is little, if any, correlation between the number of immigrant arrivals and the degree of anti-immigrant sentiments, as the countries least affected by the crisis have displayed some of the strongest xenophobic rhetoric.

“Xenophobia has all too often merged with Euroscepticism, making support for pan-European cooperation all the more unpopular”

Fear-driven anti-European politics, amplified by the TV images of a seemingly endless stream of people, overtook much-needed cooperation and solidarity on a European level. With a few notable
exceptions, politicians from many mainstream parties refrained from correcting this narrative, and indeed often saw no other option than to adopt the same rhetoric in an attempt to prevent losses at the polls. This misguided strategy resulted in an even more reactionary stance towards immigration within societies. Few politicians chose to stand behind and strengthen the more open, but far less vocal and politically-unified, “refugees welcome” movement.

There has been an apparent lack of incentives for national leaders and governments to actually work together towards finding common solutions. Despite the existence of a powerful EU bureaucracy, politicians are accountable to their own national electorates, not Europe as a whole. In the political context of blaming Brussels for the many failures of national governments, there was little willingness to strive for a European solution to the crisis. The notion that immigration poses a threat to security, the labour market and national culture, and is an affront to the European way of life, became an effective rallying cry for mobilising the electorate. This has resulted in an unhealthy climate in which xenophobia has all too often merged with Euroscepticism, making support for pan-European cooperation all the more unpopular.

Finding a common European answer to last year’s crisis was made particularly difficult by the absence of a clearly-formulated and communicated European vision on migration. While the European Commission has, as a reaction to the developments of 2015, pushed forward proposals leading to the harmonisation of Europe’s migration, border and protection systems, these are not embedded within a wider framework of clear policy objectives. The absence of robust common policies has led to short-term restrictive measures and a race to the bottom, with member states trying to make their protection and social assistance systems less attractive to immigrants and refugees.

But a Europe in which each country only looks out for itself is a Europe that is doomed to fail. Nationalist populism cannot offer solutions for the future. It hampers progress and will prevent the development of effective approaches to dealing with the migration and protection challenges of the near future. The only way to guarantee a functioning migration management system is to implement future-orientated policies and structures at the EU level, embedded within the global objectives as set out by the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

To start with, there is a clear need to base Europe’s migration, integration and protection policies on understandable and actionable objectives. The European Commission should take the lead in formulating these objectives with the support of an advisory group comprised of migration experts, EU and member state officials, and representatives of both the private sector and civil society. This group’s work should include an assessment of demographic developments, an evaluation of future labour market needs, and consider various scenarios regarding the development of protection needs and systems. At the same time, there should be a careful examination of member states’ genuine absorption capacities and existing and expected integration challenges. There should be a sober evaluation of any potential security risks.

“There is a clear need to base Europe’s migration, integration and protection policies on understandable and actionable objectives”

More emphasis needs to be placed on explaining the EU’s functioning to the population – not just in the context of the migration discussion, but more generally too. The strengths, weaknesses and
responsibilities of national governments and European institutions need to be better understood if any healthy debate on Europe’s future is to emerge. European education systems, as well as
media organisations, should be used to bring Europe closer to the population, and provide for a debate based on facts instead of unfounded rumours or misguided criticism. With the possible exception of Euronews, the lack of a true European mass media currently limits the exposure to an alternative narrative on Europe, at a time when “experts” seem reviled.

Likewise, to develop sound migration policies, it’s important to depoliticise the topic of migration and arrive at a rational, fact-based discussion. Migration as a political issue has become inseparable from questions of security, integration and intangible values to such an extent that it has become difficult to coherently separate migration as a process and a debate from other, often unrelated, topics. Voters are mobilised around immigration as a hot-button topic – often without being exposed to the reality on the ground. Appealing to our humanitarian obligations is not enough; to move forward, Europe as a society needs an informed, honest and rational discourse on migration.

Politicians and the general public will need to accept that migration is an inextricable part of human development, and as such is unavoidable. Modern, open societies are best equipped to deal with this reality, whereas nationalist populism represents an illusion, tantamount to burying one’s head in the sand. Only once migration is an accepted fact, fully integrated along with globalisation into the political arena, can we start to devise functioning, democratically-legitimised and socially-accepted policies that are in step with broader global developments.

IMAGE CREDIT: hadrian/Bigstock.com

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Most first-year college students came into the world during Bertie Ahern’s first year as taoiseach. They were born with The Spice Girls and Oasis playing in the background and Titanic and The Full Monty on the big screen. The Good Friday Agreement was signed and Ireland was moving into the era of the Celtic Tiger.

The teen years of Bertie’s Babies were marked by the biggest global economic crisis since the 1930s, as well as an ongoing revolution in technology that continues to change how we communicate and interact.

The once dominant Catholic Church has little influence on most of their lives, and those with an interest cheered almost unanimously at the results of last year’s marriage equality referendum.

In many ways, this age group have never had as many opportunities. Those in third level represent about 60 per cent of their age group (it was just 20 per cent in 1980), and up to 10 per cent more will take part in further education and training.

The world of Facebook, Twitter and Snapchat allows them to connect instantaneously. Where once a “community” was defined by your street or village, it can now refer to other who share your interests – no matter where they live in the world.

Still, these young people will also inherit enormous global political challenges: climate change, migration crises, issues of food and energy security, terrorism, balancing technology advances with the needs of security and privacy.

The biggest challenge of all, though, will be bridging the gap between those who feel that they are part of this brave new world and those who feel excluded.

Youth unemployment continues to run at twice the average national rate, and a significant minority of Bertie’s Babies will not go on to college or have training opportunities.

They will be particularly distrustful of the establishment pillars responsible for the economic crisis, which hit their families and communities hardest: politicians, bankers, big business.

Karl Marx famously said that the revolution will come when the instruments of production are in the hands of the proletariat. With social media, that has happened.

News no longer follows the hierarchical structure handed down from the establishment via the likes of RTÉ and The Irish Times; indeed, these media are often distrusted by those who feel excluded. Facts do not matter; it is how the story is presented.

Witness the many young people who took part in the water charges protests in recent years. Seven of those arrested in connection with the Joan Burton Jobstown incident were between 14 and 18. It is highly unlikely that any of them were especially concerned about, or would be immediately affected by, water charges. But such protests represent an opportunity for a generation to kick back and voice frustration.

I have always been proud of the fact that Ireland, unlike much of Europe, has not experienced the rise of a serious anti-immigrant political movement since the crash. However, as a local councillor I increasingly hear a backlash, especially among young people who feel excluded, who cannot get an offer of social housing or who are denied services because, they believe, “the foreigners can come here and get everything”.

This, of course, is not unique to Ireland. In the Brexit vote, the biggest divides were not in geography or class but in education. The Leave vote was 30 percentage points higher among those with only GCSEs compared with those with a degree. Only 18 per cent of those with no formal education voted Remain, compared with 81 per cent currently in full-time education.

In the US, Donald Trump’s presidential campaign has relied on emotions rather than statistics. The rise of the far right and far left across Europe highlights alienation from the system. A Politico survey of young European leaders this past summer overwhelmingly identified youth unemployment as the greatest challenge facing Europe’s young people.

Those who entered college this year will soon assume leadership positions in society. Those who don’t start college, or who leave school early, will be significantly more likely to be unemployed and to feel more excluded from the possibilities of a globalised Ireland.

Bridging that widening gap will be the biggest political challenge for Bertie’s Babies in the decades to come.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Kristian Dye

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Europe’s consumers embrace digital technologies just as much as their American counterparts. But when it comes to business, there is a large gap between the level of digitalisation among European companies compared to those across the Atlantic. This matters: how businesses use digital technologies will determine the size of the economic pay-off of the digital revolution.

Europe operates at only an estimated 12% of its digital potential, compared with the United States’ 18%. But there is large variation among Europe’s countries, industries, and companies within each industry. Some countries, mostly in Scandinavia, already capture twice the potential of others (largely in southern Europe).

There is a large gap between sector and company digital leaders and laggards, a pattern captured by MGI’s Industry Digitization Index. This index uses dozens of indicators to provide a snapshot of digital assets, users, and workers by sector. In Europe and the United States, the information and communications technology (ICT) sector is at the digital frontier, and media and finance close behind. In Europe, the financial sectors of the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all perform strongly, reflecting the emerging native “fintech”, “edutech”, and other tech sectors of Amsterdam, Stockholm and London. Over the past decade, the major driver of the digital frontier has been the digitalisation of workforces: this has been the area where successful digital firms have pulled away from the pack.

But large traditional private- and public-sector activities, including manufacturing, mining, healthcare and education, lag far behind. Companies in these areas tend to focus on only some aspects of digitalisation: for example, manufacturing and mining companies use digital tools to engage customers, suppliers and partners, but digital penetration in their physical assets remains relatively low. In the retail sector, supply chains have been highly digitalised; small and medium-sized retailers less so. Overall, Europe’s performance is being held back, with only five percent of Europe’s asset base digitalised, and workplaces only nine percent digitised.

In Europe, digitalisation is less of a game-changer than it is in the United States, where the most digitalised industries have experienced the fastest profit growth over the past two decades. This dynamic is not seen in Europe – possibly because Europe’s economy is not as digital as that in the US.

American companies also benefit from hyper-scale opportunities. Broadly internationalised European internet companies remain rare: Spotify, which is present in more than 60 countries, is relatively unusual. By market capitalisation, there are no European firms among the world’s largest digital companies. Europe is clearly making progress in the creation of “digital unicorns” in new areas such as the Internet of Things or big data, but start-ups with billion-dollar valuations are still not sprouting up to the extent that they have in the United States. This matters because large firms tend to lead smaller firms in terms of digital adoption. The fact that venture capital and growth investment in Europe is significantly lower as a share of GDP than in the United States casts doubt on how quickly Europe can travel toward its full digital potential.

Europe’s relative lack of scale is one reason why it generates relatively few digital assets at home, and relies heavily on US (Europe runs a digital trade deficit of nearly 5.6% of total EUUS services trade). Europe does not rival the United States as a producer of global content, a developer of major platforms, or as an incubator of successful internet companies. But there are bright spots in Europe. Like for like, our “‘Digital Quotient” analysis suggests that one-fifth of European companies are faring better than the average US company. The Netherlands is a net exporter of digital services to the rest of Europe. Sweden’s venture capital investment as a share of GDP is four times that of the United States. Stockholm is producing more than three digital unicorns per million inhabitants – double the rate of Boston.

But Europe has much to do to foster innovation, scale up, and capture more of its digital potential. The Digital Single Market envisaged by the European Commission may help. Estimates suggest that the DSM could add €375bn to €415bn to European GDP each year by providing a common platform for domestic firms to achieve scale. But such a gain would be dwarfed if sectors that need to catch up to the digital frontier were to double their digital intensity – something that could add €2.5 trillion to GDP by 2025, with GDP growth of one percent per year over the next decade. In reality, the potential boost to GDP is likely to be much greater as the digital frontier moves forward rapidly with waves of innovation.

Governments have a major role to play to ensure that Europe reaps the potential economic benefits from completion of the DSM. It can help unlock higher investment and develop the skills needed to power the digital revolution (helping the many workers whose jobs will be lost to automation). But the onus is squarely on companies to do more to adapt their business models and digitalise their operations.

They need to assess why and how a market might be disrupted by digital, and work out whether to engage or withdraw. Thinking about digitalisation within a supply and demand framework can help: digital technologies can reveal sources of supply that were previously unknown or uneconomic to provide, while digital gives consumers more complete information and unbundles or rebundles products and services in new ways, as streaming services have done with music. The dynamics on both sides create an opportunity for companies to play the role of market maker, particularly if they can find a way to lower transaction costs. The most successful digital platforms are particularly adept at this market-making function.

Innovation in companies’ own operations is vital. In research and development, data-sharing initiatives, crowdsourcing, and virtual collaboration can all raise productivity. To deepen their engagement with customers, companies need an online presence that goes well beyond a passive corporate website. They need the right capabilities to accelerate their digitalisation, from infrastructure to processes. And they need to put digital tools in the hands of their employees to ramp up productivity – from online talent platforms to screening tools using sophisticated algorithms during the hiring of new people. Companies that have made digital a central component of their human resources have set themselves apart from the rest.

The time to act is now. Even those sectors and businesses near the digital frontier have to perform superlatively to keep up as the frontier moves ahead at an accelerating speed. Those that are already a distance from the frontier will need to work even harder – and quickly.

IMAGE CREDIT: Solarseven/Bigstock.com

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Helle, Hajer and Hussein are young, articulate and ambitious. They dream big and aim high. They want the best for themselves and for the countries – Tunisia, Libya and Syria – they live in.

You won’t read about them in traditional newspapers. They aren’t making headlines just yet.

But more, much more, than their governments, these young people and millions of others like them hold the key to our future.

Almost 65 per cent of the population in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is under the age of 30.  The choices that Helle and her friends make will determine the fate of their own countries. But they will also have a strong impact on Europe and the world.

I met these “Young Mediterranean Voices” – teachers, journalists, environmentalists, social entrepreneurs, peace and democracy activists – at the MedForum 2016, organised last week in Malta by the Anna Lindh Foundation.

The energy and enthusiasm of more than 500 savvy, young Europeans and Arabs whom the Anna Lindh Foundation had identified as “change-makers” rang through the Valetta conference centre. The talk was of crafting a narrative of hope, dialogue and cooperation that runs counter to the extremist discourse of hate and violence.

‘No-one is born a terrorist’, says one young man. Instead of trying to counter the extremists’ poisonous voices, many underline the need to articulate an inspiring vision of societies where people can live in peace.

Religion is the last thing on their minds. These young people want to fight for better education, jobs, clean government, stability and hope. And forget the stereotypes: the girls – including the small number who wears headscarves – are even more confident than the boys.

The focus on civil society and young people as agents of social change is not new. But there is a consensus on the need to act urgently.

The good news is that the Anna Lindh Foundation is getting the attention and support it deserves. The message of the EU High Representative, Federica Mogherini, to the Forum highlighted Europe’s commitment to engagement with young people.

And there are growing opportunities for young people to make a difference.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250, agreed last December, emphasises the crucial role they can play in managing conflicts and establishing peace. And building stronger Euro-Mediterranean bonds is going to be a key priority for Malta, which takes over the EU Council presidency in January 2017.

The conversations in Valetta provided many lessons for policymakers.

First, stop obsessing about religion and start putting money where it really matters: into schools, job creation and investment schemes.

Second, engage with civil society – don’t fear it. MENA governments too often reject the ideas and passion of young people instead of seeking to channel their enthusiasm for change and reform into positive contributions to national policymaking. And while many EU cooperation agreements include an important people-to-people component, these programmes need to be made more crucial and more exciting.

Third, even as it seeks to engage with MENA governments, the EU should invest in the region’s young people. This is essential if the region is to have long-term peace and stability.

Certainly many parts of the Arab world are jolted by conflicts and wars. Violence and economic deprivation are driving many young people to come to Europe.

But the gathering in Malta is proof that Europe’s southern neighbourhood need not be a place of death and destruction. With the right policies, the right people in charge, and sustained support, it can be a region of hope and peace.

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IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Anna Lindh Foundation

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There is an old American saying, ‘politics should stop at the water’s edge’. It means foreign policy should be driven by a country’s national interests and values, not its domestic politics. But it’s a myth.

Britain’s vote to leave the European Union is one example of exploding this myth. Overnight, British citizens fundamentally altered the structure of their foreign policy. David Cameron had tried to use the referendum as leverage for concessions from Brussels, with the goal of addressing long-standing tensions within the ruling Conservative Party regarding EU membership. But he underestimated the British electorate’s growing anti-establishment sentiment. The Brexit vote was dramatic, but hardly unique. In this world of global networks and instant messaging, where almost anyone can draw millions of online spectators to the scene of an unfolding drama, public opinion is more dynamic than ever.

Existing assumptions about the world seem to be routinely overtaken by unexpected events. Political leaders who traditionally counted on public ambivalence regarding foreign affairs are finding it hard to keep up. No political leader can afford to ignore what his or her street is thinking, doing and tweeting, with democrats focused on the next election and autocrats fearing the next uprising.

Five years after political protests swept across the Middle East and North Africa, revolutions, counter-revolutions, crackdowns and civil wars have left hundreds of thousands dead and millions displaced. The mayhem enabled the rise of Daesh, which established a caliphate defined by its opposition to the modern secular world. Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, saw the 2014 revolution in Ukraine spiralling beyond his control and sought to undermine it, appropriating Crimea in the process. The US and Europe imposed sanctions in response, but the successful Sochi Olympics, combined with the Ukraine crisis, reminded the Russian people of the halcyon days of the Cold War. What political leader would change course with approval ratings above 80%? Putin, far more a gambler than a grand strategist, doubled down in Syria. He will be antagonist-in-chief for the next American president’s entire term in office.

Putin, the Syrian civil war and Daesh have been significant issues in the 2016 US presidential campaign, far more so than Brexit. Nonetheless, the political dynamic that powered Brexit is evident in the astonishing emergence of Donald Trump as the Republican presidential nominee. Trump embraced a neo-isolationist political credo of “America first”, which appealed to a narrow sub-segment of the population. He promised to construct walls and impose bans to keep immigrants at bay. He rejected multilateral trade agreements that, in his view, favour China and others who don’t play by accepted international rules. He called NATO obsolete and conditioned the United States’ alliance commitments on whether America’s friends were shouldering their fair share of the security burden. He even saluted Brexit as an effort by the people to take their country back.

Trump’s contest against former secretary of state Hillary Clinton quickly embodied the prevailing tension between two different conceptions of America’s global leadership role. Clinton, a strong internationalist, is an ardent believer in American exceptionalism. She sees the US as uniquely positioned to lead the world in solving pressing global challenges. Clinton helped set the table for the international agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear programme, arguably the signature achievement of the Obama administration, and promised to vigorously enforce it as president. She was an ardent supporter of the NATO intervention in Libya, concluding that the only way to protect the Libyan people from a vengeful leader was to create favourable conditions for Gaddafi’s overthrow. Her vote in favour of the Iraq invasion probably cost her the Democratic nomination and election in 2008.

“Putin, the Syrian civil war and Daesh have been significant issues in the 2016 US presidential campaign, far more so than Brexit”

On the other hand, Trump called the Iran nuclear agreement ‘one of the worst deals ever negotiated’, although he was more circumspect than other Republican presidential candidates over what he would actually do about it. Trump promised to restore respect for American power, calling Obama’s struggles with the Syrian civil war – in particular the red line he drew over the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons – a ‘humiliation’. While he pledged to be tough and strong as president, he also promised to be more selective on US intervention. A Trump administration would not engage in nation-building. Trump riled the Republican establishment too by denouncing the Iraq War as a ‘big fat mistake’, and accusing George W. Bush of lying about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

Given the shock of the 11 September attacks, Bush faced little political opposition when he declared a war on terror and developed an aggressive strategy of ‘with us or against us’ that illuminated a path from Afghanistan to Iraq. Obama represented a counter-narrative, leading a US prepared to find common cause with friends and constructively engage adversaries. By and large, Obama’s foreign policy mirrored what he offered on the campaign trail in 2008. And to a great degree, he delivered the foreign policy the American people said they wanted. He was unable to close the prison at Guantanamo, but he made the problem smaller. Forces remain in Afghanistan and Iraq, but as allies, not occupiers. Given his mandate to end wars and avoid new ones, Obama struggled to find a viable strategy in Syria. He declared war against Daesh but not Assad, and in so doing avoided placing large numbers of American troops in the middle of a conflict that plays into the narrative of an intractable war between Islam and the West.

Notwithstanding Trump’s populist appeal, underestimated ever since his campaign began, it’s not clear the American people are looking for a dramatic change. They continue to support American leadership in the world even if, after Iraq, they are wary of its costs. Confronting a world that seems to be changing dramatically with each passing day, the American public is most likely to stick with the foreign policy they know. But, as with Brexit, it’s the actual votes that count.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Matt Wade

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Spaniards were asked to vote once again on 26 June, six months after inconclusive parliamentary elections. These second elections confirmed the change in the political landscape that had previously been dominated by two parties – the centre-right Partido Popular (PP) and the Socialists (PSOE). Whereas governments had previously been formed with an absolute majority, the rise of the left-wing Podemos and centrist Ciudadanos (Citizens) means a future of pacts and strategic alliances.

Surveys suggested that in June young Spaniards opted for the two new parties, who came third and fourth respectively in the overall election result. Among voters aged 18-34, Podemos polled at
36% and Ciudadanos at 26%. The establishment parties, PSOE and the PP, received 18% and 11% respectively. But the overall result gave the PP victory, with its leader, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, delivering a triumphant speech that boasted of Spain’s economic growth, the progressive creation of employment, and four years of stability. This message resonated heavily with the stability-driven older generation throughout the campaign.

Despite their popularity with young people, Podemos came third in June’s elections. This support for the leftwingers largely reflects young people’s difficult social and employment situation. Spain’s youth unemployment rate currently stands at 45%. 15.6% of those aged 15-24 neither study nor work (the EU average is 12%). Spain’s young people have greatly suffered the effects of the economic crisis and austerity policies. Last year alone, 209,000 young Spaniards between the ages of 20 and 35 left the country.

Podemos has channelled the growing indignation of young Spaniards. The party was very critical of how the PP government implemented EU austerity measures, damaging Spain’s longstanding
support for the EU. According to a June study by the Pew Research Center, 53% of Spaniards now view the EU unfavourably. The rate among young people is only slightly lower, at 47%. The study also found Spaniards to be especially critical of how the EU has handled the economic crisis.

2016 sees Spain celebrating the 30th anniversary of its entry into the EU. It’s a crucial and timely moment to assess pro-EU sentiment in Spain, particularly among the country’s young people, in the light of anger over EU-led austerity. To have a chance at mending the bridges between Spain and the EU, we Spaniards must move on from blaming the EU for our misfortunes and finally understand that our success is based on mutually dependence. Young Spaniards, especially, must strengthen their commitment to the EU, and support the European project – which is also the Spanish project.

IMAGE CREDIT: SeanPavonePhoto/Bigstock.com

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In the hours after the dramatic news of the UK’s vote to leave the EU, Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative, had a decision to make. She was due, days later, to publish the Union’s new “Global Strategy’” for foreign and security policy – the first since Javier Solana published the initial European Security Strategy thirteen years ago.

Her decision to go ahead was not an obvious move. Some may have thought it was yet another instance of the EU’s detachment from political reality. Indeed, in the months leading up to the UK’s referendum, many of us in the High Representative’s office thought that we would delay in the event of a Leave vote. As the devastating news of Brexit hit home, I assumed it would all be called off – and this was Mogherini’s first inclination. Yet as the hours went by, it became clear that the months ahead would see the EU all-consumed by Brexit, and the magnitude of the earthquake risked being so great that the Global Strategy, known as the EUGS, would probably have been dropped if it were delayed.

Mogherini felt that scrapping the EUGS would have done a grave injustice to the Union, given the depth and breadth of its internal crisis. The EUGS has been the outcome of almost two years of EU-wide strategic reflection that has seen the active involvement of all member states and EU institutions, along with the broader foreign policy community. The process involved input from academics and students, human rights NGOs, defence industryassociations, think tanks, trade unions, business associations and religious organisations. As Mogherini put it to me on 24 June, ‘the work is done’. And after all, isn’t it an act of political responsibility, precisely at such times of crisis, to show the world that Europe can still be united?

“Scrapping the EUGS would have done a grave injustice to the Union, given the depth and breadth of its internal crisis”

The content of the EUGS was never going to change because of the UK’s decision to leave the EU. The first purpose of the strategy was to engage in a broad strategic reflection, an extensive and in-depth process that achieved unity among all players. What we must do in the Middle East and Africa, in Latin America, or at the United Nations; what we should aim to achieve on defence, trade, development, climate or migration; this has not fundamentally changed. The second purpose of the EUGS was to outline our common action. And this is the most important reason why the
EUGS could not be postponed. It had to be published to start the engine on implementation, with or without the UK.

There is no doubt that Brexit has altered our capacity to deliver. By losing the UK, the EU has lost one of its largest member states, perhaps the one with the most global outlook, be it in terms of trade, development, defence or diplomacy. The UK’s diplomatic network, defence capabilities, development budget and outward-looking trade agenda have been critical assets of Europe’s projection abroad. But likewise, without the EU, the UK has lost the ability to magnify its global voice and priorities. Successes such as the Paris climate agreement, the Iranian nuclear deal, reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo, or the work towards a national unity government in Libya are all examples that have seen the EU, and the UK within it, occupy centre stage. Perhaps even more importantly, both the EU and the UK have already suffered a major blow to their respective soft power capabilities. The EU, which for decades has prided itself on its power of attraction, has repelled one of its largest member states. The UK, which has long prided itself on its openness, multiculturalism and tolerance, is now seen as a country stuck in a time warp, lured by the illusion of retrenchment and the return to a grandiose past that cannot be rediscovered. The extent to which these perceptions reflect reality is of secondary importance. In today’s world, perception is as important – if not more so – than reality.

“The time has come to discover the extent to which the UK was the real block to deeper security and defence integration, or whether other member states hid behind the British”

Others may argue that without the UK, the EU will finally be able to press the accelerator on integration in a number of key areas, most significantly security and defence. There are a number of issues on which the UK has acted as a brake in recent years. These include the establishment of a permanent headquarters and common financing for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, permanent structured cooperation between groups of member states on security and defence, and the institutionalisation of deeper defence cooperation. Whereas the UK has cooperated on defence with other member states, notably France, it has resisted doing so within an EU framework. More broadly, it has opposed moves that would question national sovereignty on defence matters or rival NATO’s role in collective defence. The time has come to discover the extent to which the UK was the real block to deeper security and defence integration, or whether other member states hid behind the British. The onus is on the remaining 27 member states to demonstrate how far they are now willing to go.

Both the EU and the UK will, in any case, have an interest in developing a structured relationship on the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the CSDP, among other areas. Back in the early 2000s there was a lively debate regarding the participation of non-EU NATO members, such as Norway and Turkey, in the CSDP. The debates revolved not only around their participation in CSDP missions and operations, but their involvement in decision-shaping (not decision-making). After the 2004 enlargement, those ideas and plans were shelved. But there is no reason why some
of them could not be dusted off today. This would benefit both the EU and the UK, and could offer a model for other non-EU European partners too. In other words, the blow to the EU and the UK’s standing in the world can be tempered over time – if Brexit is well managed.

The interests and goals that the EUGS set out remain vital after Brexit. The EU has more, not less, of a duty to keep its citizens secure, free and prosperous, and to do so by being united and engaging responsibly in the world. If the EU and the UK succeed in developing a structured relationship on foreign and security policy, both will gain, and the prospects for successful implementation of the EUGS will grow. In many ways, now is when the real work starts.

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The decision of the British people to leave the European Union is not a catalyst for questioning European integration. It is another marker – a very significant one – in a series of events that have cast doubt on the concept and practice of European integration, which has enabled prosperity, security and the advancement of the continent since the Second World War.

Ever since France and the Netherlands voted against the draft European constitution, there have been increasing signs of “Europe” losing its appeal; claims that the project is exhausted; demands that it be replaced by other models.

This is also evident in the growing number of election victories for Eurosceptics and anti-EU parties within the founding states of the Union. Some of these parties have won seats in the European Parliament. Public support for the EU, regularly recorded by Eurobarometer, is falling in almost all of the 28 member states. Pro-EU sentiment remains high only in a few candidate countries, such as those of the Western Balkans.

Despite its progress in strengthening democracy, empowering the European Parliament and bolstering the subsidiarity principle, the Lisbon Treaty – this last attempt to create an EU based on firm ideals – did not bring a true fresh start or fuel enthusiasm for Europe.

On the contrary, Europe’s responses to major crises over the last few years – the global economic crisis, the eurozone crisis, the unresolved refugee crisis – have been hesitant. Citizens’ confidence in the EU, and its ability to control Europe’s fate, has been shaken.

Some member states’ solution was to return to policies that serve only the national interest and disregard European standards and European solidarity. As a result, the European Commission and the Parliament have lost much of their authority and ability to act.

It would be too simple and superficial to look at personal factors – in some cases, weak leadership at an EU and national level – as the primary or lone cause of this trend. Stellar names and visionary personalities – think Jacques Delors, Sicco Manshold or Sir Leon Brittan – are no longer on the European stage. Even the leadership of the German-French axis, which was predominant during the era of Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle or Helmut Kohl and François Mitterand, has grown weaker (although this axis remains essential).

European ideals are fading away and the desire for unlimited national autonomy has been revived. But the reasons for these changes must be analysed very carefully, not simply reduced to obvious factors such as the growing Brussels bureaucracy, its alienation from the people and its unrealistic decrees.

The reasons include the so-called “democratic deficit”. Many EU citizens feel powerless. They no longer expect political processes to solve their daily problems – especially in those areas administered by Brussels. This residual feeling intensifies when populist forces, such as those pushing for Brexit, blame Europe for all problems – old and new, related and unrelated.

However, it is debatable whether the unease many European citizens feel towards national and EU/European policies could be overcome simply by strengthening national sovereignty at the expense of EU (or even pan-European) bodies and institutions. Many of the causes of this unease have an authentically national origin – a fear of the future due to an increase in social inequality, environmental degradation or threats to public safety and security, regardless of whether they are real or only perceived. Slogans such as “More Europe” or “Less Europe” are, therefore, not useful for getting to the heart of the issue.

In fact, a sensible combination of national and EU/European measures is needed to restore Europeans’ confidence in their joint project – for overall prosperity and safety. National and supranational measures are necessary to secure our common social model, the European welfare state. Only a strong EU/European can protect people in Europe from the consequences of unrestrained globalisation. And member states have to ensure social justice within their own borders. There is no alternative.

The call for more autonomy and civic participation requires not only national but pan-European action. The democratic deficit exists not only at a European level – the EU institutions certainly need a surge of democratic ideas and practices – but within many of the member states. The limitations of a dismal representative democracy come to light when they only partially portray the will of the people.

If it is possible to address the needs and concerns of citizens, then it is also possible to continue with EU integration in the best interest of European family of peoples. National particularities and diversities – a firm characteristic of Europe – must be taken into account much more than is the case now.

But a reinvigorated EU, under this banner of diversity, can remain the Union of the four fundamental freedoms and its other accomplishments – the achievements that defined its historical cause and will define the lives of its people now and in the future.

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Nothing defines “British exceptionalism”, a recurrent theme of the UK’s European Union membership, like the decision to leave the Union. The implications of Brexit for the British healthcare sector, employment policies and social assistance schemes have been much discussed. But what about the impact on the other side of the negotiating table? Could the EU, liberated from its “reluctant partner”, proceed more rapidly towards a more social Europe – or will the EU’s social policy begin its disintegration?

Throughout the British referendum debate, depictions of the European impact on Britain’s welfare state were tainted by inaccuracies and outright lies. One was the assertion that immigrants abuse freedom of movement within the EU to scrounge off the UK’s generous benefits system. This simplistic view can easily be contested: the data has consistently suggested that, over time, European immigrants have paid more in taxes than they have received in benefits. Yet although not at all evidence-based, the argument shot to the top of the political agenda, with David Cameron proposing a four-year ban on EU migrants receiving inwork benefits and a ban on “exporting” benefits for children living outside the UK.

But what about the underlying assumption that social policy decisions – including the allocation of benefits – should be free from EU interference? The development of the welfare state has been linked historically with ideas of national identity and citizenship. Proponents of this rather old notion of a self-sufficient nation state consider EU membership, and the grounds it offers for the enjoyment of social benefits, as a threat to sovereignty. For the British, the repatriation of welfare policy was seen as the way to reclaim an important part of national sovereignty. Even though the EU has limited formal competence in the field of social policy, many British citizens felt left out of decisions affecting the UK’s welfare system. Alienation from the European project is not unique
to British people – so an important challenge for post-Brexit EU social policy is to reconsider ways in which EU citizens could meaningfully participate in and help make decisions that directly
or indirectly affect their social wellbeing.

“The EU should clarify the set of social rights standards to be respected by all member states, serving as a real guarantor of minimum social protection”

Recent social policy changes in the UK have followed the general European trend – responding to the financial crisis by introducing austerity measures that entail cuts in social benefits and assistance. At the same time, industrial closures and job losses resulted in the casualisation of wages and working conditions. The real wages of the average British person have fallen by about 10% since 2007, with the burden of austerity felt most by vulnerable populations, multiplying the disadvantages to which they were already exposed. These developments were particularly decisive for the outcome of the UK referendum, as the areas with the biggest falls in average wages had the strongest anger towards the EU. In other words, the EU’s attempts at financial recovery alienated the very sections of the British population that might have been expected to support the European project. These people felt the EU didn’t live up to their expectations of it as a protector of social rights, which begs the question of what “Social Europe” really means, and how it can now ensure a minimum level of social protection for all EU citizens.

In the aftermath of Brexit it would be simplistic to expect that the EU, without its reluctant British member, could rapidly deepen social policy integration. The UK was by no means the only member state opposing integration initiatives, especially when it comes to EUwide transfers or solidarity mechanisms. To address member states’ reluctance to share the burdens of multiple economic and social crises across the continent, the EU has to listen seriously to their claims of national sovereignty over social welfare. Paying attention to concerns about sovereignty doesn’t mean pandering to them, but rather having the openness to rethink the ways in which the EU can guarantee member states’ real and equal participation in and co-determination of social policy decisions. Exclusive meetings of a limited number of leading states, like the one that took place immediately after the Brexit vote, are not the way forward. On the contrary – when it comes to the regulation of provision of public services such as social assistance or healthcare, the Union must ensure transparency and the level of consultation necessary for the genuine involvement of state officials, citizens and stakeholders in EU decision-making. Only by providing a democratic forum for discussion of social policy will the choice for membership be more attractive than the choice for exit.

For the EU to regain its lost legitimacy in the area of social policy, it can’t pretend its influence is restricted to its competences. The EU must openly address the knock-on effects of its economic
policies on the welfare state. This doesn’t mean that labour costs or pension schemes should be strictly separated from budgetary coordination, but that when confronted with an economic decision
that has direct or indirect consequences for social policy, the EU should accommodate concerns beyond efficiency. These include objectives such as equity, accessibility and quality of social
services for all citizens. The Union has to emphasise the qualitative difference between economic and social policy, and control the risk of the blind subordination of EU social policy to the market.

“For the EU to regain its lost legitimacy in the area of social policy, it can’t pretend its influence is restricted to its competences”

Initiatives such as the introduction of a European Pillar of Social Rights are definitely a positive sign, but rather than simply multiplying the existing regulatory framework of EU social policy, the Union should strive to specify and operationalise the existing elements of the European social constitution – for example, through the introduction of a basic, common unemployment insurance.
Through comprehensive and consistent secondary legislation and jurisprudence, the EU should clarify the set of social rights standards to be respected by all member states, serving as a real
guarantor of minimum social protection. Fostering the European social model with decent working and living standards for all EU citizens is the only way to fight inequalities and the downward spiral of Eurosceptic populism.

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‘Send not to know for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee.’

Ernest Hemingway borrowed the title of his celebrated Spanish civil war novel from 16th century English metaphysical poet John Donne. Now, the words are fast becoming a solemn knell for the European Union.

There is a sense of complacency enveloping much of Europe, contrasting uncomfortably with the resentful anger that is fuelling Eurosceptic populism. Unfortunately, when it comes to policymaking, complacency has the upper hand.

The warning bells that tell of Europe’s decline in terms of global influence, solidarity between EU governments and economic wellbeing have so far been little heeded. But they must be – or they risk becoming akin to Donne’s funeral chimes.

As I noted in my last column, the European project’s achievements over half a century still far outweigh its present shortcomings. But in a global economy and European political climate undergoing such rapid change, this is no time for the EU to rest on its laurels.

“We Europeans need to take a long, hard look at our current position and future prospects. They’re not encouraging”

We Europeans need to take a long, hard look at our current position and future prospects. They’re not encouraging. Quite apart from the ‘live’ issues pressing in on the EU – Brexit, the refugee influx and propping up the eurozone – Europe has deep and unresolved structural problems.

Generalisations are difficult. What’s defined as poverty or social progress in one EU country may not be perceived in the same way in others. Average figures, nevertheless, have the value of pointing to overall weaknesses.

Take demographic patterns. Patchy as they are in some member states (Germany is shrinking rapidly but the UK’s population is growing healthily, in economic terms), they offer vital lessons.

Europe has roughly four people actively in work for every retired pensioner. By the middle of this century, if not before, that ratio will have dwindled to 2:1. The implications for virtually bankrupt pension and social security systems are horrendous. So the first step is to get unemployed young people into work, whatever the cost. They are among Europe’s most precious assets.

Perhaps Europeans can square the circle by escaping the economic doldrums in which many have been trapped since 2008? If only. The forecasts point towards Europe falling further behind in the global wealth race. Average GDP per capita in the EU is now about two-thirds that of the United States, and is set to drop to three-fifths by 2025.

And the 2020s are shaping up to be a most unpleasant watershed. When top European business executives were surveyed by consultancy firm Accenture, a substantial majority thought China would draw ahead of Europe on technological innovation by the early part of the next decade.

“The first step is to get unemployed young people into work, whatever the cost. They are among Europe’s most precious assets”

Every year, Europe’s universities still account for half of the world’s major scientific breakthroughs. But for reasons that are well known – mainly a lack of capital and government help, but also an absence of entrepreneurism – these discoveries often don’t translate into commercial innovations.

These are uncomfortable facts. But they aren’t secrets hidden away from the public gaze. Sadly, nor are they part of the policy debate animated by national politicians or by the EU itself. If Europe’s voters are both complacent and seduced by the simplistic solutions of populism it is in large part because they don’t have the bigger picture.

The EU’s various arms grapple daily with most of these issues, and they report their progress in piecemeal ways and technocratic detail. What they avoid doing is tolling the bell that warns of overall, and perhaps irreversible, decline. That’s because they fear to appear ineffectual. But it is the only way to wake Europeans to the reality that no single EU country has the means to resolve these problems alone.

Giles Merritt is Founder and Chairman of Friends of Europe, and the author of Slippery Slope – Europe’s Troubled Future (Oxford University Press) which is shortlisted for the 2016 European Book Prize.      

Related content

• Friends of Europe: State of Europe high-level conference: read our Storify summary of the event
• Europe’s World: John Bruton – The lessons of Brexit: how British and European leaders can deal with the disruption
• Debating Europe: Can Britain survive outside the Single Market?

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – European Parliament

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The EU can’t pretend Brexit isn’t happening, charging on with business as usual in the hope this crisis will pass. We have to be proactive. Europe has to reform itself to survive. The Greek crisis already showed the very clear need for change, but the EU seems not to have heeded even such a loud wake-up call. Moreover, the EU has, over the last few years, demonstrated its ineffectiveness in dealing with the refugee crisis, failed to reduce unemployment, and still not created a truly functioning single market. Brexit is the Union’s last chance. Europe’s citizens are angry, and are failing to grasp the EU vision.

I am inclined to agree with the overall vision of President of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Group, Guy Verhofstadt – who has now been appointed to represent the European Parliament in the forthcoming Brexit negotiations. We need to clean up the institutional chaos created after decades of compromises that have resulted in a “Europe à la carte” based
on opt-ins, opt-outs and derogations, and introduce two kinds of cooperation – “full membership” and an “associate status”.

A new set-up could be used as a framework for future cooperation between the EU and the UK. There are a number of good proposals for how to solve the refugee crisis and deal effectively with cases of financial irresponsibility, and there are interesting suggestions for how to ensure Europe’s defence and fight against terrorism. The new institutional set-up should make the Union more effective on issues where citizens see the added value of European cooperation.

“We need to clean up the institutional chaos created after ‘decades of compromises'”

The main challenge, and the point of departure from “business as usual”, is how to take on board the views of the EU’s critics. The distance between the so-called “elite” and citizens is expressed
through the results of referendums like June’s vote in the UK, and the success of populist parties and individuals. This can’t be eliminated by building walls, creating ghettos for immigrants or other similar ideas. Changing the EU’s institutional set up may be necessary, but the EU needs first of all to reinforce the values and spirit that have been at the heart of the EU for decades and remain the core idea of the Union – the creation of the single market. This project must be put on a super-fast track as one of Europe’s biggest priorities, because it will benefit both businesses and consumers.

A competitive economic strategy is needed to ensure EU member states’ economies grow closer to one another; to converge rather than diverge. This is the only way for the EU to progress and
compete with the US and fast-growing foreign markets. The other ingredient is less government interference in the economy. The EU must stop funding uncompetitive businesses that survive only
thanks to its donations. It should also stop funding numerous unaccountable bureaucracies and unreformed social systems. Change can’t be boosted by subsidies and protectionism – it requires the empowerment of the market and investment in innovation and skills.

It’s time to dust off Mario Monti’s report on the single market re-launch, introduced in the wake of a global economic crisis. Today, its vision is crucial to solving the EU’s unity crisis. The “new
frontiers” described in the report, notably the digital sector, aren’t the future anymore; they are the present. For market reforms to succeed, it’s crucial to show concrete examples of how the single
market works for citizens, consumers and SMEs. Citizens need the real belief that they can control their own lives and can afford a European standard of living – something many people see, but only outside their own households. As long as businesses are forced to spend vast sums on administration costs instead of increasing wages, we can’t expect living standards to pick up. But we have to be realistic about what we can achieve. We need a fully-integrated single market as well as a “convergence code” with minimum and maximum standards on socio-economic policy, such as labour market reforms and pension reforms.

“The single market must be put on a super-fast track as one of Europe’s biggest priorities, because it will benefit both businesses and consumers”

Brexit is a greater challenge for the EU than for the UK. Britain itself will be fine. The country has the capacity to deal with the referendum’s consequences, and Brexit may not have the hugely
negative impact so often predicted. That said, these are early days. Yes, the referendum hurt the value of the pound sterling; yes, it may be a challenge to attract talent to tech jobs in London.
Overall, though, I have faith that Britain will be able to make even better bilateral trade deals with rapidly-emerging markets and other countries such as the United States or Australia. Sadly
– perhaps ironically – the UK was one of the EU single market’s biggest proponents. Watching the British leave scares me that EU reform will mean just another discussion, not the delivery of
real change. The clock is ticking. Citizens of other member states won’t wait long before turning to pro-leave politicians in their own countries.

I try to stay confident that the EU is capable of reform. Before the Brexit vote, I wrote a letter to the leaders of the Leave campaign offering a bet of €1m that the UK would remain, such is my belief in the value of the EU. That’s also why I have since written numerous letters to British tech and car companies inviting them to consider relocating their businesses to Lithuania for restriction-free access to the European single market. The job to remove barriers and eliminate protectionism in the single market becomes crucial if we want more innovative jobs in the EU. This, in turn, will convince citizens to believe in the value of integration.

The EU’s leaders must urgently boost economic growth, tackle terrorism together and reduce youth unemployment. I truly hope that its efforts won’t be yet another series of cosy chit-chats, but instead will bring forward a new reform plan and produce a credible European vision. Otherwise, “business as usual” will inevitably bring similar exit referendums.

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Never has global trade been so complex and inter-dependent. So it was no surprise that the initial shock of the UK referendum result was wide-reaching, prompting policymakers and analysts everywhere to ponder the new situation.

The dust is starting to settle, and we are starting that as well as challenges, there are also ample opportunities for economic growth, competitive advantage and innovation in the market. Given the global importance of the UK’s economy, the Brexit vote has sharpened the focus on the road ahead in shaping international trade.

Like all our European partners, Iceland is working to adapt to the new realities before us. The Icelandic government is advocating a pragmatic and realistic approach that assumes relations with Britain will continue to be as strong as they have been in years gone by. There are clear reasons behind this conviction. Today, Britain is Iceland’s largest trading partner, accounting for 11% of all our exports and imports. For the Icelandic economy, the future relationship with Britain is of critical importance.

In recent times, Iceland and the UK have had similar approaches to regional economic integration. In 1970, Iceland joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which Britain helped to found in 1960. And although our common journey within the EFTA turned out to be brief, with Britain joining the European Economic Community in 1973, the EFTA remains under British influence to this day: English is the working language, and pragmatism is the magic word. The four EFTA countries – Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein – have cast a wide-reaching net of free trade agreements with the EU and partners around the globe, and continue to be pragmatic and flexible in expanding and deepening their network.

The course has now been set for Britain to leave the EU. This poses a challenge for Iceland’s trade with the UK in goods and services, the free movement of people and participation in various programmes and projects that have been functioning on the basis of the European Economic Area Agreement with the EU. In short, there is an urgent need to find a new contractual basis for these processes with the UK. The first priority for the Icelandic government is to safeguard our common interests and maintain our access to the British market. The first priority of the British government will presumably be to safeguard British interests and preferential access to the single market, although it’s clear that negotiations can only begin in earnest after the British government has invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.

EFTA has, in the past, often joined various EU agreements with third countries after the EU has concluded negotiations. But given the importance of our relationship with Britain, it’s not an option to sit idly by and wait for the final outcome. In this context, there are three scenarios that Iceland is working with as possible outcomes for its future relationship with Britain. The first is simply a bilateral free trade agreement, with substantial provisions for the abolition of tariffs and technical barriers to trade (TBTs), opening up trade in services and cooperation on research and development, education and culture, mutual recognition of standards, and other areas.

The second possibility is that the four EFTA countries negotiate an agreement with the UK. We already enjoy excellent cooperation and, from our viewpoint in Iceland, we see no reason to fear a conflict of interests. And should Britain at any time in the future consider re-joining the EFTA, I am confident I will not be the only Icelandic politician willing to take that into favourable consideration. But Iceland is a full member of the EU’s internal market through the EEA agreement, and for the UK to join the EEA is an entirely different matter that would entail complications of almost the same order as re-joining the EU.

The third scenario on the table is that Britain and the EU make an exit agreement and EEA countries opt into the terms not long after to safeguard their interests. It’s my firm belief that all three options should be seriously considered: there’s a great deal of uncertainty around these processes and it’s difficult to forecast what the future relationship between Britain and the EU will look like.

For Iceland, there are important aspects of our relations that aren’t directly a part of the EEA Agreement but will still be affected by Brexit. Britain will leave the Common Fisheries Policy and enter international fisheries agreements on straddling stocks in its own right. This shouldn’t change much in substance, but certain elements of Iceland’s fisheries policy may well be of interest to the British authorities now that they must establish a fisheries policy of their own – and these must be the subject of any upcoming discussions. Britain outside a common trade policy will, however, have leeway to negotiate independently on tariff reductions and market access. If the will is there and British interests permit, the UK could, for instance, be free to negotiate on full free trade in fisheries products. Maybe Britain on its own will be quicker in seizing opportunities with partners like Iceland and Norway.

It’s still too early to assess what Brexit’s regional implications will be, let alone its long-term influence on international trade structures. Whatever the outcome, 2016 has marked an important milestone, and it’s clear to Iceland that the next two years are pivotal in setting the parameters that will govern trade relations between us and our largest trading partner. Iceland will use this time well and approach the imminent tasks with a combination of pragmatism and a progressive approach, with the end goal of developing closer trade relations.

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Hungarians went to the polls on 2 October to vote on the following question: ‘Do you want the European Union to be able to order the obligatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the Hungarian National Assembly?’

The referendum was supposed to give citizens a decision that will then be enacted in legislation. But the referendum could not have had such a result. The misleading phrase ‘obligatory settlement
of non-Hungarian citizens’ alludes to the resettlement of applicants for international protection, who must belong to a nationality with a minimum acceptance rate of 75%. With two legallybinding decisions taken in September 2015, the European Council had already established the mechanism. What purpose, then, did the referendum serve?

First, it had an international dimension. Hungary has consistently refused to participate in the refugee mechanism, and so the government was looking to bolster the group of like-minded states who
don’t want to be involved. But while the Hungarian government is against relocation, it’s more frustrated by the fact that such a decision could be made by a qualified majority in the first place. Like Slovakia, Hungary has brought the issue to the European Court of Justice on the grounds that the European Council decision has ignored the principle of subsidiarity. Given the pressing need to find a European solution, Hungary has little hope of winning its case, but it can continue to seek wider public support.

Domestically, the vote was a show of force in the run-up to the 2018 general election. It diverted attention from issues such as corruption, decreasing social mobility or segregation. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the centre-left Democratic Coalition (DK) argued that the referendum was a test of Hungarians’ views on EU membership. Over the last six years, polls suggest an average of 49% of Hungarians trust the EU.

But the public media seems to be preparing the ground for a battle between EU membership on one side, and security and secession on the other.

The way the question was formulated put domestic political opponents in a bind. Not to engage with it would have meant staying silent on a topic that made headlines, but engaging was problematic too: advocating a “Yes” was made to sound like openly relinquishing sovereignty.Not surprisingly, the Eurosceptic far-right Jobbik supported “No”, and the centre and the Left were
divided. MSZP, DK and three other parties called for a boycott of the vote. Only the Liberals (MLP) urged a “Yes” vote.

The Hungarian referendum was part of a quest to preserve national sovereignty, wrapped in a manipulative campaign against asylum-seekers. It was about inciting and exploiting hatred and
fear. The quest might have been legitimate, but it remains a dangerous gamble with unforeseeable consequences.

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Diplomatic relations between the European Union and Africa have long been shaped by post-colonial continuity: Africa exports raw materials, and Europe sends back manufactured goods. Another key aspect is Europe’s role as a source of development assistance. A number of momentous events have led to a review of this relationship. One is the rise of China as Africa’s leading trade partner. But no development has shaken the foundations of Africa-Europe cooperation as much as the seismic outcome of the UK referendum on EU membership.

Much of the initial analysis of Brexit’s impact justifiably focused on doomsday scenarios invoking “disaster” or “calamity”, and the uncertainty cannot be downplayed. The framing of the concerns,
though, reflects a traditional thinking that ignores both Africa’s economic vision and British aspirations in the post-Brexit world.

The EU has long sought to continue its traditional trade relationships by signing Economic Partnership Agreements it says are “tailor-made” for Africa’s regional realities. These EPAs are an attempt to address concerns regarding non-reciprocal EU trade deals deemed inconsistent with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. EPAs have been pursued with Africa’s regional economic communities, but not all members of each REC have been enthusiastic. Brexit has forced some of their concerns into the open. For example, Tanzania has withdrawn from the EPA being negotiated with the East African Community (EAC), citing post-Brexit uncertainties and unequal power relations with the EU.

Aziz Mlima, Permanent Secretary of the Tanzanian Foreign Ministry, expressed concerns that ‘the EPA will not benefit local industries in East Africa. Instead, it will lead to their destruction, as developed countries are likely to dominate the market.’ This view was reinforced by Tanzania’s former president Benjamin Mkapa, who said ‘I don’t understand how such a powerful trade bloc can have a free trade agreement with the developing economies of Africa. There is no way that our small economies can have free trade with Europe.’ The reference to the nascent state of African
industries underscores Africa’s shift from dependence on rawmaterial exports to an expansion of industry. African relationshipswith the rest of the world are starting to take account of the potential
impact on this vision.

“No development has shaken the foundations of Africa-Europe cooperation as much as the seismic outcome of the UK referendum on EU membership”

Countries that approach Africa in the context of competition with other nations, such as China, are unlikely to appreciate how the continent is repositioning itself. “Agenda 2063”, adopted in 2013 by the African Union (AU), seeks to refocus the continent as a collection of learning economies operating through regional economic blocs. The policy basis is laid out in the AU’s Science, Technology and Innovation in Africa Strategy (STISA-2024) of 2014. More specific strategies include efforts to transform agriculture and master the digital revolution, building on the continent’s experiences since adopting mobile technology.

This vision provides a new beginning for Africa, and a chance to engage constructively with the rest of the world through cooperation on science, technology and innovation. The scope of such cooperation with the EU and the UK will continue to expand irrespective of the outcomes of Brexit. Indeed, the UK has pledged not only to continue to work with its EU counterparts, but also to
extend cooperation to the rest of the world. Deepening science and technology cooperation with Commonwealth countries would be a natural next step. But British scientists are being dropped from EU-funded projects, prompting calls for action to safeguard their roles. This is occurring despite assurances from the European Commissioner for Science, Research and Innovation, Carlos Moedas, of continued support for existing collaborative programmes such as Horizon 2020. The benefits of scientific cooperation will probably outweigh political considerations in the end. Science offers nations the chance to work together despite political differences. It is against such a background that new relationships between Europe and Africa could build on Africa’s innovation agenda despite Brexit. This view requires analysts to temper their gloom and explore new opportunities.

There are several approaches African nations could adopt when responding to Brexit: mapping emerging trends and opportunities, enhancing economic diplomacy with a stronger emphasis on
innovation and entrepreneurship, and reforming governancestructures to reflect new global realities. A trend to watch is how the perception of diminished capabilities on the part of the UK and the EU could lead to a renewed emphasis on science and technology. This is likely to inspire stronger sub-national innovation ecosystems, with closer links between local or city governments, universities and industry. The ecosystems can then serve as focal points for international competitiveness and sources of solutions to global challenges, stimulating technology-based start-ups as well as incentivising existing businesses to scale up so they can operate in global markets.

“New relationships between Europe and Africa could build on Africa’s innovation agenda despite Brexit”

Global financial centres such as London will be exploring how to harness the UK’s scientific excellence to foster innovation and entrepreneurship. Such shifts in British and EU approaches will
necessitate adjustments to Africa’s economic diplomacy – Rwanda, Ethiopia and Kenya have in recent years modified their foreign policies to focus on economic and trade issues. Africa’s economic diplomacy will be dramatically shaped by the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) negotiations that will conclude in 2017. This builds on the Tripartite Free Trade Area covering 26 countries with 650 million people and a GDP of US$1.5 trillion. The CFTA will comprise a billion people with an initial GDP of $3 trillion. The foundations of the agreement include free trade, infrastructure development and industrialisation. This is a grand opportunity that will shape Africa’s relationships with the UK, Europe and the rest of the world.

Overlooking the doomsday scenarios, long-term perspectives reveal new opportunities to align UK and EU diplomacy with Africa’s economic optimism, which is increasingly guided by the desire to put innovation and entrepreneurship at the centre of the continent’s transformation. Failure to grasp this salient point will result in the squandering of a historic opportunity to reshape Africa-Europe relations in light of 21st century realities.

IMAGE CREDIT: lcswart/Bigstock.com

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Once Britain leaves the European Union, there will be consequences for the EU as a trading power. Britain was, in 2015, the world’s fifth-largest economy and Europe’s second-largest. It was tenth-biggest exporter of merchandise, and second-biggest of commercial services.

The UK continues to be a member of the EU with full rights and responsibilities, including on current trade negotiations. The EU has several deals on the agenda. The negotiations for the comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada were finished in August 2014, and the agreement now needs to be signed and ratified. In addition, the EU is negotiating free trade agreements with Japan, India, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Mexico and Mercosur countries. The most important negotiations, though, relate to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States, which would create the largest regional free trade area in the world.

TTIP negotiations, irrespective of the Brexit vote, have been progressing very slowly. There are still fundamental differences of opinion between the EU and the US in many chapters. Several important areas, such as government procurement, services, investment protection, agricultural tariffs and geographic indicators haven’t been agreed. Both sides went into the summer
break with hope of deciding on a framework agreement by the end of the year – while President Obama is still in office. But the window of opportunity is closing fast, even without taking Brexit
into consideration.

Shortly after the British referendum, both the EU Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström, and United States Trade Representative, Michael Froman, reiterated that the rationale for TTIP remained strong even without the UK. But the situation isn’t so simple. The UK was one of the main supporters of the deal in Europe. Britain’s departure could further delay TTIP, with criticism on the rise in major EU countries like France and Germany. And once the UK triggers Article 50, EU officials in Brussels will be busy negotiating Britain’s withdrawal agreement, and will shift their priorities accordingly.

There are also critical comments coming from the other side of the Atlantic. Despite his earlier commitment to the deal, Michael Froman conceded in July that TTIP needed to be readjusted for
Brexit, as 25% of US goods exports to the EU are destined for Britain. He also stressed that the US would lose a quarter of the public procurement market without the UK – which, he warned,
would affect the US offer on government procurement. This in an area in which the EU has offensive interests and wants to gain wide access to the US. The negotiations will probably drag on in this manner for some time.

Brexit will have fewer consequences for other trade negotiations. Even with 27 countries, the EU is still an attractive trading partner, although India may reconsider its free trade negotiations with the EU – which began in June 2007 – since the UK is its closest trading partner and strongest European ally.

Britain has always been one of the closest partners of the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany in the push for open markets, so its departure from the EU will have consequences for the use of protectionism. In March the UK was leading the opposition to stronger trade defences against Chinese steel, together with Sweden and the Netherlands. It opposed limitations to the “lesser
duty rule”, which would have allowed the EU to impose higher tariffs against subsidised Chinese steel imports. With the UK out, countries supporting a more liberal trading regime will lose out.
The group that is more inclined to protect the market – broadly consisting of France, Italy and other southern countries – will gain more leverage. So the departure of the UK may change the
negotiating dynamics of EU trade policy.

Britain was also one of the leading countries pushing for more open intra-EU trade and competition in the common market. A single market for services was at the top of the British agenda, but
there are still problems in cross-border competition for services, a situation that impedes economic growth and the creation of jobs in Europe. With Britain leaving, the new push for a common services market may also lose momentum.

IMAGE CREDIT: digitalista/Bigstock.com

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As the European Union gears up for its 60th anniversary next March, there’s good news and bad news.

Let’s celebrate the renewed interest in the EU, both at home and abroad. But let’s also be prepared for a long and difficult struggle with those working against Europe.

The surge in interest in Europe is encouraging. Demands for change and new ideas to build a more dynamic, vibrant and relevant EU are not in short supply.

Interesting ideas – some big, some small – came fast and furious at Friends of Europe’s annual State of Europe brainstorm and conference last week.

The voices of those who have thought about, talked about and worked for Europe for many years are valuable. They should be listened to.

But importantly, others across Europe are beginning to speak up too. They include young people, women and minority groups whose engagement in EU affairs has been minimal. Business leaders, trade unionists, civil society representatives, academics and journalists are making their voices heard. They should be encouraged to say and do more.

Ironically, the shock of Brexit has enlivened the conversation. The Brexiteers may have damaged Britain’s economy (and much more) but they have, unintentionally, also sparked heightened awareness of and popular interest in the EU.

“Those who believe in the EU will have to take their arguments to the people, not wait for people to fill the conference halls”

Such renewed curiosity is an opportunity to start a new conversation about Europe. It should be one which looks at the EU’s past, present and future.  It must look at the achievements but also at the failures and weaknesses of the Union.

The confrontation between different visions of Europe is already part of daily life. This contest was evident in the run-up to the 23 June referendum in Britain and will be an essential part of the negotiations on Britain’s withdrawal from the EU.

There are Euro-enthusiasts and Euro-doubters in national capitals and parliaments, and in all EU institutions.

And then there are the populists, both in and out of government, who are not just against the EU but also fighting actively to undermine liberal democratic values. In uneasy and uncertain times, their message of intolerance, xenophobia and “Little Europe” is already attracting voters.

With elections scheduled in France, Germany and the Netherlands next year, the fight for the hearts and minds of Europeans is going to get even fiercer.

France’s National Front, the Dutch Party for Freedom and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland – like Hungary’s Viktor Orban and his friends in Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – have no scruples about publicising their dark vision of Fortress Europe. Their voices will get louder.

But those who believe in an open and compassionate Europe should be equally passionate about voicing their beliefs. Contrary to what the populists want us to believe, a majority of Europeans do not share their nightmare version. They also need to be seen and heard.

“Today, Europe is too serious and too important to be left to politicians”

In a new world where truth and facts appear to matter less than lies, perceptions and fiction, the confrontation between the two visions of Europe is going to be dirty and ruthless.

The naysayers’ simplistic anti-EU diatribes must be countered by equally simple but clever slogans.

Those in favour of Europe should be proud of what has worked, and what makes the EU relevant and important – for example, contrary to conventional wisdom, the EU “peace project” still makes sense in a world where violence and war still rage just a few kilometres from Europe’s borders.

But enthusiasts must also be frank enough to say what has not worked.

Gentle speeches in comfortable settings just won’t do the trick. Those who believe in the EU will have to take their arguments to the people, not wait for people to fill the conference halls.

Those who favour Europe must be as charismatic, eloquent and single-minded as those who oppose it.

Next March’s anniversary of the EU should trigger a discussion on repairing and renewing the EU, but must also be a moment for reflection on what it means to be European in a complex and challenging world.

As former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd told the Friends of Europe conference, Europeans must ‘buck up and not talk yourselves into a funk’.

More than ever, Europe is a vibrant mix of people, cultures and religions. The EU is an important part of peoples’ lives, often taken for granted, often criticised and much too often under-estimated and under-sold by self-seeking politicians.

French statesman Georges Clemenceau famously said that ‘War is too important to be left to the generals’.  Today, Europe is too serious and too important to be left to politicians.

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After the Brexit vote, there has been a temptation in Brussels to blame British insularity for the outcome, with the hope that some policy tinkering will suffice to bring other national electorates in line. This is a dangerous illusion. The EU needs to radically rethink the balance between the freedom and protection it aims to provide. Voters won’t be fooled by ultimately empty bureaucratic slogans such as “Europe of results”, “big on big stuff, small on small stuff” or “better Europe”. The distinction “freedom versus protection” offers a better tool for defining a political response. It reveals real dilemmas. It demands sincerity, not platitudes.

It would be a mistake to say that the “Leave” camp won the 23 June referendum merely because of lies, propaganda or a smear campaign against Brussels. The result was not simply down to British voters behaving irrationally, or because the UK press is in the chains of the likes of Rupert Murdoch, or thanks to the dawn of fact-free politics. With lies and propaganda alone, you do not convince 52% of people to vote against their economic self interest. The British public expressed something else with this vote, which may be perfectly “rational”, once you broaden the scope of the analysis. It’s not just about the economy.

The Leave slogan, “Take back control”, was so effective because it was indistinguishably about both sovereignty and identity. The fact that identity politics is beating economic interests has come as an existential shock to the EU. The reason is that it contradicts the EU’s central doctrine, the basic tenets of European integration.Since the “Coal and Steel” days, the system has been built on the ideas that economic interdependence will create grateful populations and that integration is a one-way street towards “ever closer union”. In a way, the Brexit vote was unthinkable. But it’s happened. So the doctrine has to change.

It doesn’t really matter whether people no longer believe economic warnings given by “experts”. The referendum result is obviously part of a wider Western phenomenon of voters rejecting the logic of globalisation, with its open markets and open borders. The Left focuses on trade (the proposed TTIP deal between Europe and the United States, the EU, the euro) and the Right on immigrants (variously Muslims, Mexicans, Poles and Romanians). But as illustrated by US presidential contenders Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, the net result is the same: a battle between the “extremes” and the “centre”. This face-off means danger for Europe, as the Union is one big democratic space with battles being fought at every single election across the continent. Although other battlegrounds exist, such as Austria, the Netherlands or Italy, the crucial frontline state – the place where Europe is under real pressure – is France. The country is of systemic importance because of its size, its political system and its current state of shock. The French presidential elections in spring 2017 must not be lost to populist extremes. As elsewhere, this means winning back the centre, the swing voter. It requires a message of unity, of movement – and a new strategy.

“The EU needs to radically rethink the balance between the freedom and protection it aims to provide”

To win back the centre, the Union must find a new balance between its work in favour of economic freedoms and opportunities and the role that is asked of it as a “protector”. The Brexit vote, the French election and other upcoming polls show that people either appreciate the freedom, openness and opportunities the EU provides, or they fear the disorder the EU produces in terms of migration, competition for jobs, or loss of national control. There is a split between the “movers” – the entrepreneurs, young people, students, the rich – versus the “stay-at-homes” – people who rely on welfare-state arrangements, the elderly, or those who dislike foreigners. This isn’t a matter of “the elite” against the “people”, but pretty much a 50/50 split, as shown both in the UK referendum and the Austrian presidential elections. What’s important is that the EU must not focus on its own 50%, with more of the old “market” stuff and some extra communication. It must reach out to the other half too. Otherwise we risk – in only a few years’ time – a civil war in which the EU side will be outnumbered. Alongside the old “Opportunities Europe”, we must build and communicate “Protection Europe”.

A better European balance between freedom and protection can mean one of two things: mitigating the disruptive effects of freedom, or providing order. The former is essential for social and economic security. Since the EU cannot credibly claim to replace welfare states without becoming the “super-state” voters abhor, it should at least stop undermining existing national or local places of care and protection. Three topics spring to mind in this respect. The first is to build on the UK’s “new settlement” from February 2016 and the principle of an emergency brake on free movement. Second, find a solution for the Posted Workers Directive, not least in view of the French elections. Third, handle the granting to China of Market Economy Status – by 16 December 2016 according to World Trade Organization rules – with greater care, to square the sensitive balance between freedom and protection in international trade.

Aside from respecting existing forms of protection, the Union can do more to produce order. Since the Brexit vote, the themes of internal and external security have rightly been highlighted. The June 2016 decision for a European system of border guards is useful, but what matters now is implementation. Another “border issue” is enlargement. At some point, leaders must decide for how long they want to continue playing the hypocritical game around Turkish membership. They must realise there aren’t only geopolitical considerations involved, but also costs in terms of the Union’s capacity to regain people’s trust.

The first signs are encouraging. In his letter inviting leaders to the Bratislava Summit in mid-September, European Council President Donald Tusk addressed the issues head on: ‘People quite rightly expect their leaders to protect the space they live in… [it is] crucial to restore the balance between the need for freedom and security, and between the need for openness and protection’. This is not surprising, since the security theme fits the Pole’s profile as liberal realist. More remarkable was European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s implicit endorsement of the same line of thinking in his State of the European Union speech on 14 September, both for what he said (about border guards, border controls and action against Chinese dumping) and for what he omitted (not a word on TTIP in a 50-minute speech).

The phase of denial seems to be over. In the months ahead European leaders need to build concretely on this new balance between freedom and security.

IMAGE CREDIT: aldorado10/Bigstock.com

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The European Union was created to maintain peace and resolve cross-border and common challenges. We need to become better at resolving challenges if we’re to strengthen public support for the EU – and environmental issues are a crucial area for action. With stricter climate policies, increased investment in renewable energy and new green jobs, the EU can demonstrate leadership that will resonate around the world.

The last few years have been tough for us pro-Europeans. We have watched reluctantly as the EU has unsuccessfully attempted to manage the refugee crisis sweeping the continent. As a politician in the country that has taken in by far the most asylum-seekers per capita, I have looked on with great sadness as EU members have failed to work together in a fair manner. Instead, country after country has stepped back from the asylum laws and international conventions we have all sworn to uphold. The EU should be better than this, and be able find solutions that enable us to share the responsibility equally.

The next setback has, of course, been Brexit. As Minister for the Environment, I find it particularly unfortunate that one of the EU’s most progressive voices on climate change is to leave the Union. The UK has been proactive and ambitious on crucial EU climate measures such as emissions reduction targets and the design of the EU Emissions Trading System. But Brexit is, of course, serious in a wider sense, and risks breathing life into other EU-critical forces. The answer can never be an impassive EU or inactive member states. Quite the reverse; when populist and Eurosceptic winds blow, it falls to those of us who believe in the EU to show that we are willing to give cooperation our all. Regardless of developments after Brexit, the Swedish Government is dedicated to working hard for the future of the EU.

There is now reason to carefully consider how we should develop our cooperation and, in so doing, increase public support for the EU. I am convinced that one of the most important keys to popular support is environmental and climate policy. It’s so clear-cut that the EU must tackle environmental issues, as these issues often transcend national borders. Greenhouse gas emissions and other forms of pollution do not respect frontiers. In addition, because of the internal market, it’s reasonable that environmental regulations be competitively neutral throughout the EU. European citizens should understand that this is an area where we act together. And if it’s done right, people will see and appreciate what’s being done.

Within the broad spectrum of environmental issues, I believe there are several aspects that will be of particular importance. We must begin by stepping up the pace of climate efforts and the expansion of renewable energy in Europe. The Paris Agreement places obligations upon us. The stricter target of keeping the global temperature increase as close to 1.5°C as possible means that we in the EU must also work on our policies. I am glad that the EU has ratified the Paris Agreement so quickly. Now let’s implement it.

The EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) is central to climate policy. More and more trading systems are being trialled around the world, many of them modelled on the EU system. But the EU ETS must be tightened up. There are too many emissions allowances in the system and the price is too low to send proper signals to the market. We need to further lower the emissions cap for the next trading period, reduce the possibility of emissions allowances being allocated for free, and tighten the market stability reserve to ensure fewer emissions allowances in the market. EU citizens need to see the real results generated by an effective ETS, and for this reason the trading funds that are linked to the system should be more heavily directed at the renewable sector.

The collective will to make the ETS as good as it needs to be is currently lacking. But the Swedish Government wants results here and now, so we have chosen to go ahead alone with the required action. To increase the price of emissions, we have launched a programme to purchase and cancel emissions allowances, at a cost of €30m a year. In addition, we will make it tax-deductible for private individuals, companies and organisations to offset emissions using the ETS. We are inviting everyone to get involved in climate adaptation.

But climate policy is not just about emissions trading. The EU also needs to become better at expanding and managing renewable energy. The Energy Union is an important element in this. A functioning internal market is vital if we are to achieve the EU’s climate and energy targets in a cost-effective manner, with a view to transitioning to 100% renewable energy in the long term. A functioning market is also important for developing better transmission capacities, more integrated networks and a cohesive market. This is crucial for the future, and must be acted on as a joint task for all EU member states.

Perhaps as important is to show more clearly how environmental and climate issues are already affecting our citizens. Climate change threatens the security of all. It puts at risk access to clean
water and so the ability to avoid bacteria and other dangerous particles that cause serious illness. Air pollution claims thousands of lives every year, and affects all of us daily; it will do so to an
even greater extent in the future. Unimpeded climate change will increase the risk of extreme weather events, meaning drier and warmer weather where it’s already hot, and more extreme
precipitation in many areas. This summer, Europe received a painful reminder of what a warmer climate brings. Wild fires of the kind that have ravaged southern Europe risk becoming more common, and the consequences are serious. Here in Sweden, south-eastern parts of the country have suffered a drought following a couple of winters of reduced precipitation, causing serious damage to agriculture. In other parts of the EU, there has been heavy rainfall.

The answer to these challenges is not just about climate measures, but is contained to a large extent in other common EU policies. We need frameworks and regulations to ensure good water quality, protect biodiversity and ensure the tougher management of permits for endocrine disruptors and other chemicals. We need strict regulations on pollution from traffic and industry to reduce quantities of hazardous particles in our air. The key for the future is to show how important all of these policy instruments are to the daily lives of people living in the EU.

The EU offers many benefits, and we must highlight them. They include the possibility to study, work and live in other countries, and a larger market for goods and enterprises, as well as greater
opportunities for cross-border action for security and peace, and against terrorism. But Sweden will continue to act on the conviction that environmental issues are also crucial. We will work for the most ambitious policy possible to underscore that Brexit will only be a footnote in the successful history of the EU. Instead of backing off and fearing for the future of the Union, we will invest in it and make it even better.

IMAGE CREDIT: Sehenswerk/Bigstock.com

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No one would deny that these are difficult times for the European Union.

Sometimes deservedly, but often not, it is assailed by political disagreements among its members, policy differences over governance of the eurozone, and popular discontent (now intensified by the Brexit vote).

But the EU’s achievements in sixty years of progressive integration far outweigh its present shortcomings.

The Union can point to a wide range of activities where European solidarity and cooperation deliver benefits that no single member state could envisage alone. The snag – as ever – is that the EU fails to get the message across.

Five areas stand out. Each needs to be trumpeted. Each contributes substantially to a better quality of life in Europe while also helping to ensure that European countries maintain a competitive edge in the age of globalisation.

These “saving graces” encompass trade, technology, cultural identity, security and environmental leadership. The key question is how they can be further strengthened and more effectively communicated.

Although Europe’s share of accelerating global GDP is shrinking, the EU’s collective clout as the world’s top trading bloc remains an unparalleled asset.

Asia’s emerging economic giants are understandably eager to revise the post-World War 2 Bretton Woods arrangements that still favour the West, and the EU has a crucially important role to play. Europe’s credibility in this process is reinforced by decades of global leadership in development assistance, with two billion people raised out of poverty over the past quarter-century.

Europe’s researchers notch up half of all scientific breakthroughs around the world, and EU-wide funding and collaboration is an increasingly vital part of this achievement. Europeans are notoriously poor at turning their inventions into commercially successful innovations. The EU and its member states must raise their game in this area. Slowly but surely, the EU is directing more funding from its own and national budgets into high-technology sectors – those that will dominate the international economy and determine the winners and losers in the 21st century.

The days are long gone when Europeans’ national cultures were part of their colonialist armoury. Today the flow is if anything reversed, with Europe absorbing strong cultural influences from Asia, Africa and the Arab world. But the EU’s growing focus on the cultural affinities of its member countries is becoming vitally important.

The awareness and emulation of each other’s cultures marks an essential next step in Europe’s integration process, and in the information age the EU is well-equipped to promote this. EU-level policies should be the framework for a shared European culture – one that is capable of being strengthened by the arrival of migrants.

Ideas for an EU “Security Union” and even the creation of a “European army” are controversial. The European project eschewed a military dimension for almost half a century after the signature of the Treaty of Rome.

Now, a sense of vulnerability on its eastern and southern flanks, coupled with uncertainties over Russian assertiveness and American intentions, is pushing security up the EU agenda. Post-Cold War “peace dividends” sapped most EU countries’ defence capabilities, but now the consensus seems to be that collective security demands a common commitment to Europe’s own defence, and to the economic and political stability of its neighbours.

Last but not least, the environment. One of the EU’s best-known achievements has been its leadership on confronting climate change. That determination yielded the COP-21 global deal in Paris last year, which – although insufficient – is an important milestone. Environmental protection, like the other four areas of activity, is a long-term strategy that the EU has successfully pursued.

Now, Europe needs to underline all of its saving graces with greater vigour and clarity.

Giles Merritt is Founder and Chairman of Friends of Europe, and the author of Slippery Slope – Europe’s Troubled Future (Oxford University Press) which is shortlisted for the 2016 European Book Prize.            

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The result of Britain’s referendum on EU membership gives cause for thought for both the United Kingdom and the European Union.

In Britain, the people have spoken, and Brexit will mean Brexit. But if the UK wants talks on its withdrawal from the EU to work well, it needs to ensure that it asks itself what is good for Europe as well as what is good for Britain.

A good negotiation starts with an intelligent appreciation of the interests of the people on the other side of the table. If Britain is concerned only with its own interests, the talks will fail. The UK government needs to think: what are our economic and social priorities? And how can these be made compatible with those of the rest of the EU?

The trouble is that it is not yet totally clear what Britons want. Many voted Leave because they wanted more protection from global competition. But many of the campaign’s leaders favour the opposite: a deregulated economy, fewer social rights, more global competition.

So Britain must choose which of these contradictory economic approaches it wants, because only when it has done so can it decide what sort of relationship it wants with the EU. That choice will determine what the UK says in its Article 50 letter, to be prepared by the end of March 2017.

And the UK must use the next six months to prepare its letter and negotiations well: short-term uncertainty is a very small price to pay for avoiding a botched or ill-prepared exit negotiation.

When the moment comes to trigger Article 50, I believe that there will be two negotiations: one on withdrawal, and one on the framework of a future UK-EU relationship. The two must run in parallel.

The other 27 EU leaders rightly insist that the EU’s four freedoms of movement – of people, goods, capital and services – go together. Nobody has any idea yet how the UK will propose to get around that.

“A good negotiation starts with an intelligent appreciation of the interests of the people on the other side of the table”

Clearly, the most sensitive freedom is that of free movement of people. But immigration as political issue in the UK will decline, irrespective of immigration controls, if the UK becomes less wealthy. A fall in the purchasing power of sterling and a slowdown caused by the unravelling of the UK’s balance of payments deficit automatically make the UK a less attractive destination for migrants.

Trade is another key topic. Until its withdrawal is finalised, the UK will still be a member of the EU, bound by EU rules and a participant in all key EU decisions (except those concerning its own exit terms).

The UK cannot do trade deals with other countries while it is still in the EU. It cannot even enter into commitments about future deals, particularly ones that may undercut EU negotiating positions. Instead, the UK must, under Article 4 of the Treaty, act in ‘sincere cooperation’ with its EU partners.

But Britain’s current EU partners must also heed the lessons of the Brexit vote. The old ways of doing EU business do not inspire the loyalty of enough EU citizens. The EU needs to improve its performance on at least three topics – trade, treaty change and democracy.

If trade becomes too difficult for the EU to complete trade agreements because a few states hold things up then the EU’s utility as a trade negotiator will fade away. We should not forget that many who favoured Brexit argued that the UK could negotiate trade deals more easily outside the EU, without having to wait for 27 other countries to agree.

Treaty change must also be easier. Every living institution must be able to amend its rules. If EU treaty change is off the agenda as a matter of principle then the EU will eventually freeze up and die. If such change becomes impossible, European states will look to other, less open, less democratic and less transparent institutions to advance their collective interests.

Democracy must also be enhanced. One of the most frequent – if ill-informed – criticisms of the EU heard during the UK referendum was that the EU was ‘undemocratic’ and run by ‘unelected bureaucrats’. The best way to respond would be to make the treaty changes that enable the EU to be more democratic and accountable.

“If they are to have greater allegiance to the EU, citizens must feel they can, by the way they vote, influence the direction of the EU policy”

If they are to have greater allegiance to the EU, citizens must feel they can, by the way they vote, influence the direction of the EU policy. And they should be able to do that, collectively as Europeans, rather than just as citizens of member states.

So what does this mean concretely? I suggest three ideas.

First, the entire electorate of the EU should elect the President of the European Commission directly, in a two-round election. This should be done without changing the legal powers or composition of the Commission. The direct election of its President would help to increase the moral authority of the Commission.

Second, the President of the Eurogroup should be similarly elected. This would introduce a valuable democratic element into debates about economic policy, without threatening the independence of the European Central Bank.

Third, give national parliaments, if a minimum number agree, a power to require the Commission to put forward legislative proposals. Any proposal would then have to go through normal procedures after that, but such a move would give a positive dimension to national parliaments’ discussions on the EU.

Uncertainty will continue. There has been disruption to the system. Disorder and division are the consequences.

To overcome these consequences, both Britain and Europe need to learn the right lessons from the referendum. Britain will have its Brexit, and the UK government promises to make a success of it. Its government will need cool heads and an understanding of Europe’s position.

For the rest of the EU, it is time to turn this crisis into an opportunity – to grasp the chance to renew the Union and make changes for the better.

IMAGE CREDIT: © European Union

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