Europe's World

The President of the European Court of Justice, Koen Lenaerts, spoke for many in the aftermath of Britain’s vote to leave the European Union. He said that he was completely in the dark on whether, when and under which conditions Brexit would happen, concluding ‘it’s all pretty speculative’. The question – Remain or Leave – was binary and offered no additional guidance. Now, the British government has to implement the people’s choice.

It will do so under the leadership of a new Prime Minister, Theresa May. She is investing her time in developing ties with European leaders despite her government’s rhetoric of global engagement. The EU, meanwhile, has produced a global strategy document asserting that the idea of the Union as an exclusively civilian power doesn’t reflect the evolving reality, in which soft and hard power go hand-in-hand. We’re perhaps at an inflection point where all actors are reassessing recent orthodoxy.

To some in London, the idea of focusing attention exclusively on NATO might seem an attractive simplification. But it’s likely that things will become more complicated. The range of inter-related issues now bundled under the heading of defence and security has become so broad that dealing with them in any single institutional framework, whether it be the EU or NATO, is impossible. A constructive dialogue for understanding key questions, and better synergy in implementing policies and conducting operations, has been a shared goal within the transatlantic community since the EU was created.

Broadly speaking, that community has held together reasonably well, but there have recently been some spectacular failures of solidarity over important questions. And there’s unease over future unity, as problems become more complex and actors more diverse. Even the largest powers no longer act alone, and it can’t be a good thing for a country with significant resources to disengage from discussion and action. There is a risk that fragmentation and disunity will lead to paralysis.

Former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright perhaps provided the recipe for the future with her “3D” speech: avoid transatlantic decoupling, avoid duplication of effort on problems, and don’t discriminate against any country that wants to make a constructive contribution on the grounds of institutional affiliation. That formula is already being applied to a degree – for example, when the EU or non-allies such as Finland and Sweden participate in key meetings convened by NATO – and could be extended to facilitate the participation of the UK and other countries in EU meetings.

“Choosing a British official as Commissioner for the Security Union is an indication that the EU and the UK want to preserve their close association and cooperation in areas like counter-terrorism”

Issues that are a high priority for both the EU and the UK, for which the EU either already has legislation or is likely to legislate in ways that affect the UK directly (for example, through laws with budget implications), should be the main focus for attention at the moment. For internal security, this approach seems to be favoured. The decision that a British official, Sir Julian King, should become the Commissioner for the Security Union is an indication that the EU and the UK want to preserve their close association and cooperation in areas like counter-terrorism, fighting violent crime and combating transnational organised crime, including cybercrime.

It may also be possible to identify issues on which it’s important for the UK and the EU to continue seeking a common approach, but which don’t require new procedures to preserve cooperation. Opening meetings that discuss and decide the broad approach on vital issues would be a minimum expectation. Even if decisions lead to either legislation or budgetary commitments, participation without voting or veto rights might be justifiable and fairly easy to organise. But the informal meetings of the “27” suggest that this approach isn’t preferred at the moment.

Then there is the cluster of issues where the UK has questioned the need for initiatives that others think would be useful. Without the 1998 settlement between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac, there would probably be no Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) at all, as the UK agreed not to block all EU initiatives in the military sphere and France agreed to become a constructive partner in NATO. Nonetheless, the speed and trajectory of the CSDP has been influenced by a residual British caution over the role of the EU as a military actor.

Implementing development assistance, the security implications of climate change, energy security, advanced research and technology investment, and the mass movement of people though irregular migration or displacement in conflict are all areas where specialist advice might be valuable to parts of the EU that have no internal military expertise. But the UK’s reluctance was one factor blocking initiatives to strengthen the EU’s military staff, or develop pathways by which military advice could be accessed more easily across EU institutions. In this respect, Brexit might bring about a useful change.

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For all the talk during the referendum campaign of the risk of Brexit to UK-EU police and intelligence cooperation, the issue now seems to have drifted from the headlines. But now Britain has voted to leave, what will be the real damage?

After the Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009, there was a four-and-a-half year period during which member states could announce a blanket opt-out from all former “third pillar” measures (covering police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters). Member states could then, at any time, subsequently re-join and participate in chosen measures. The UK did just this, opting back into 35 of the 130 measures.

In these measures, there are consistent references to formal cooperation between member states; several – such as that relating to the creation of EUROJUST in 2002 – allow for an element of non-member state collaboration if relevant to the investigation or prosecution.

Five of the chosen measures related to the Schengen agreement. One of these – covered in Schengen Article 40 – is particularly pertinent for police cooperation as it allows for continued surveillance of suspects when they move between countries affected by the Schengen agreement.

During her time as home secretary, Theresa May’s department wrote that ‘the loss of Schengen Article 40 would have an impact upon the ability of UK law enforcement to carry out operational activity overseas. While Article 40 is not the only way for UK requests for continued cross-border surveillance, it is the most effective.’

The paper further stated that the UK could pursue “police to police” international letters of request (ILOR) bilaterally, but this was deemed to be slower and less effective than Article 40, and ‘does not cater well for ongoing surveillance’. By opting back into these kinds of measures in 2014, the UK was able to reap the benefits of EU cooperation on the continent and of intelligence-sharing without an obligation to integrate further.

Brexit has the potential to affect this favourable situation for the UK, negatively impacting formal cross-border intelligence-sharing in an interconnected world that is more susceptible to transnational organised crime. A particular risk for police and judical cooperation in the forthcoming Article 50 negotations will be whether EU countries and the UK will be legally bound to give each other formal assistance in intelligence and operational requests. If they are legally bound, the UK will continue to get the best of both worlds. If not – a situation that currently seems more likely – the UK
will be stuck with something similar to the cumbersome case-by-case ILORs – with British requests given a lower priority than legally-bound Article 40 requests from other EU countries.

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In the eyes of most Europeans, the EU is cold and remote. “Nobody could ever fall in love with the Single Market,” warned Jacques Delors in the late 1980s, when the pioneering Commission president was at the height of his popularity and making the single market a reality.

There’s little love of any sort for the EU nowadays. The Union plumbs new depths of distrust and antagonism. To survive and flourish, the EU must become more directly relevant to the people of Europe – and there is a way to do it.

An EU-wide unemployment benefit system has been mooted since 2012, if not before. Earlier models have been refined into one that looks feasible.

But while the details are important, the key point is a bigger one: the need to rebrand the European Union as a caring organisation rather than an arrogant and unfeeling bureaucracy.

“To survive and flourish, the EU must become more directly relevant to the people of Europe”

Youth unemployment is widely seen as symptomatic of the EU’s failure to deliver the economic benefits it promised. It’s an unfair criticism: job creation policies to overcome mismatches and speed young people into work are defined at a national level – and often locally. But as we all know, in politics, perception is everything.

And that’s why a European benefits scheme is a good idea. It would be a high-profile sign that the EU is recovering the spirit of solidarity between member states that is currently in full retreat. Another reason – more complicated, but fundamentally more important still – is that it would move social policy back near the top of the EU’s agenda.

Saving the euro is vital, and a European benefits scheme would be a first step towards the fiscal integration the eurozone needs. It would also focus attention on Europe’s huge but overlooked demographic problem. By the middle of this century there will be only two working-age Europeans per pensioner (down from a four-to-one ratio today). Social protection will fast become the hottest political challenge of all time.

The latest European unemployment benefits model comes from a German research outfit – the state of Baden-Württemberg’s Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). Its approach would be to harmonise national systems and pool relevant national budgets to create common levels of benefits.

“A European benefits scheme would be a sign that the EU is recovering the spirit of solidarity”

Quite apart from the scheme‘s public relations value, its authors claim significant economic advantages. They reckon it would help smooth out the disparities between regions suffering from the uneven impacts of unemployment, and in the longer term would cushion the asymmetric shocks that have been a feature of the eurozone crisis.

Not everyone shares this view. Critics of the idea raise the ‘moral hazard’ question and ask whether it wouldn’t encourage weaker eurozone countries to keep on delaying reforms. They also argue that the wider benefits system could serve as a magnet to ‘benefits scroungers’ – and so encourage even more joblessness.

But the bottom line is, of course, the potential cost to the eurozone’s richer northern countries. Led by Germany, they are already opposed to proposals for eurozone bonds to help tackle sovereign debt problems.

So on the face of it, the unemployment benefits scheme stands no chance at all. But that is to ignore populist Euroscepticism – a far greater threat to the European project.

If the benefits scheme could be presented as a more human face of the EU, as well as a means of breaking the deadlock over the eurozone’s future, then maybe it has a future. That would offer Berlin an opportunity to refute the notion that, in the words of Oscar Wilde, it “knows the price of everything, but the value of nothing”.

Related content

• Friends of Europe: Ten ideas to make Europe more relevant to its citizens
• Europe’s World: Protect and survive, by Luuk van Middelaar
• Debating Europe: Can apps like BlaBlaCar and Deliveroo help cut EU unemployment?

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Nearly a year on from the Paris Agreement, the European Union is developing its own 2030 “climate and energy package” to meet its commitments – notably to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% compared to 1990 levels. Climate policy is an area of real “shared competence” for the EU, and the UK has played an active role in shaping it for the last decade. So what are the implications of Brexit for the EU, and for international climate negotiations more broadly?

Britain’s credentials in this area are strong. With the Climate Change Act of 2008, the UK took a pioneering role by adopting the first legally-binding climate change target in the world – with an 80% emissions reduction target by 2050 (again based on 1990 levels). The UK was the catalyst for cooperation between the more progressive EU member states on this issue, building the so-called “green growth coalition”. In 2014, the UK was the only major member state that pushed for a tougher EU climate target for 2030. It’s open to speculation as to whether the “at least 40%” goal could have been agreed without British advocacy.

Brexit is set to weaken the green growth coalition, make climate talks more difficult, and shift the power balance in favour of countries opposing an ambitious climate policy.

So far, it’s unclear how the UK will commit to burden-sharing after Brexit. Sectors included in the Emission Trading System (ETS) are regulated at EU level, but emissions reductions from the sectors are covered by its partner policy, the “Effort Sharing Decision”, which is the responsibility of member states. They define and implement specific national policies to meet the targets set for 2020. The European Commission’s “Effort Sharing Regulation” proposal, published on 20 July, foresees binding emissions reductions for member states from 2021 to 2030 – and the UK’s target in non-ETS sectors is set at a 37% reduction from 2005 levels.

Brexit also raises a question mark over ratification of the Paris Agreement. The timeline for the United Nations’ global stocktaking summit in 2018 will be negatively impacted. The UK was instrumental in gaining the support of the Visegrád countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) in the vote for emissions reduction commitments. Which country will step up to play that mediator role? Which member state will push for timely implementation? Will climate laggards such as Poland, which is pushing for a change in the burden-sharing arrangements before ratifying the Paris Agreement, gain greater influence?

“Brexit could open a window of opportunity for a transition to renewable energy that favours low-carbon technologies and more ambitious energy-efficiency efforts”

As a result of Brexit, the EU will lose a decisive proponent of European energy market integration – a topic that inspires great scepticism from a significant number of member states. Some national governments still consider security of supply to be better ensured by closed national markets and national energy utilities. It’s undeniable that in eastern Europe there is a strong will to maintain national state control of the energy sector.

But Britain has not been uniformly supportive of progressive green policies. The scrapping of ambitious and nationally-binding targets for renewable energy in the EU’s 2030 Energy and Climate Policy Framework bore the signature of the UK government, as did the rejection of an efficiency target. Brexit could open a window of opportunity for a transition to renewable energy that favours lowcarbon technologies and more ambitious energy-efficiency efforts. Britain has often aligned with the Visegrád countries in calling for non-discriminatory energy and climate targets with regard to the choice of low-carbon technologies.

This quest for “technology neutrality” allowed room for the further exploitation of nuclear power and coal in conjunction with carbon capture and storage (CCS) solutions. Both of these technologies are perceived as risky, even among the general public in the Visegrád countries; opinion polls suggest that renewables and energy efficiency are the preferred options for the future. There are further open questions regarding controversial technologies, including the possibility of fracking in the UK, to ensure security of domestic energy supply.

Britain’s renewables sector is likely to become more vulnerable, as the UK is the largest beneficiary of allocations from the European Investment Bank (EIB). In 2015, the UK received around 35% of the €3.6bn that the EIB granted for renewable-energy and energy efficiency projects worldwide. Overall, the EIB has lent Britain around €7.8bn – and it should be noted that only member states can be EIB shareholders. It’s possible that the UK could, in the future, play a role similar to that of Norway, which is part of the single European electricity market through membership of the European Economic Area. If so, Britain would still have to comply with the EU’s renewable energy quotas and energy efficiency targets, but without the political power to influence those standards.

“The UK was instrumental in gaining the support of the Visegrád countries in the vote for emissions reduction commitments”

There is greater uncertainty over how the UK’s new energy policy will develop if it no is longer required to meet the EU’s targets. Although Britain’s goals have historically been more ambitious than the EU’s joint target, British climate action may drop down the policy agenda, as the targets established through national legislation can simply be overturned in Britain’s parliament.

Britain’s exit could trigger a more ambitious EU transition to renewable energy, but the speculation that Germany will drive this effort forward seems unfounded. It is unlikely that the Energiewende (“energy transition”) policy of the Merkel government will be exported, especially if one considers the new amendments to the German Renewable Energy Sources Act. Energy generation from conventional fossil sources is still high in Germany, and the feed-in tariff system, once the motor of renewables’ rapid growth, is to be replaced by a more market-based auction system. This favours large companies and holds back the further engagement of small-scale actors that are the driving forces of the Energiewende.

For pessimists, the future means a weakened climate policy agenda and implementation in the UK, a struggling ETS, and active policymakers becoming passive “policytakers”. Even optimists see only the Commission and national governments “muddling through”, looking for new windows of opportunity to make progress, especially in the areas of renewable energy policy and energy efficiency.

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As the shocking outcome of the Brexit referendum made utterly clear, Europe lacks a credible response to populist deceit. When overlapping economic and political crises threaten the wellbeing of ordinary citizens, technocratic arguments cannot inspire enthusiasm for the EU. A more emotional approach is needed. After a prolonged and self-imposed period of silence, it is time for the Erasmus generation to get organised, speak up and take the lead.

The EU’s founding fathers came together grudgingly, having lived through some of Europe’s most abhorrent experiences – totalitarianism, continent-wide conflict, genocide. Today’s Europeans see the continent as a space for freedom. For many young people, studying abroad on an Erasmus scholarship is the first step in breaking into Europe’s cultural complexity, pursuing the most rewarding educational, professional and social opportunities on offer. They see the EU as more than overregulation, fiscal austerity and ineffective responses to crises. By sharing life-changing experiences with friends from all over Europe, the Erasmus generation feels “European” and embraces togetherness. They are not reluctant peers, but the first generation of “Europeans”.

Despite its great attachment to the European cause, the Erasmus generation is one of the least politically-engaged groups. In June, only 36% of Britons aged 18-24 participated in the Brexit referendum, as opposed to 83% of people over 65. A similar phenomenon could be seen at the European Parliament elections in 2014, when a plethora of anti-EU movements seized an impressive number of seats. Several Erasmus alumni are professionals now in their late thirties or early forties. They are experienced and highly-qualified. But with the notable exception of the EU’s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, they haven’t yet taken on roles of high responsibility.

Brexit has shown European integration is not irreversible, and nobody can be complacent about the status quo. The time has come for Europe’s enthusiasts to make their voice heard and be more passionately involved in the making of Europe – finding a middle way between the idealistic arguments of the technocrats and emotive drivel of the populists. Their enthusiasm about the European project may be infectious, and instil some optimism for the future. By highlighting to even the most sceptical European the benefits of economic integration for ordinary citizens, they can refashion the European narrative beyond halting old animosity between war-prone countries, and focus on the emergence of a truly European people.

“The time has come for Europe’s enthusiasts to make their voice heard and be more passionately involved in the making of Europe”

More than 90% of Europeans have no direct experience of the Second World War. Barely 50% have clear memories of the Cold War. Living in a peaceful continent – one that for centuries ran with
blood – is now taken for granted. So Europe needs new arguments to appeal to today’s Europeans. The Erasmus generation proves that Jean Monnet’s original plan of ‘uniting men’ rather than forming coalitions of states was not utopian. But rather than calling on prominent artists and scientists to explain what being European means, as the Juncker Commission recently did, Brussels should turn to its most genuine supporters. An abstract idea of European identity can turn into a reality only as a result of spontaneous, mutually-beneficial and continuous social interactions between individuals from different cultural backgrounds.

To increase its influence in the debate, the Erasmus generation needs to mobilise itself with active citizenship initiatives that transcend traditional parties and lay down the foundations for truly pan-European movements. Being fervent supporters of a fully-integrated Europe, they can push for more solidarity between countries when a crisis strikes or can build momentum for ambitious plans sketched out in Brussels. The Five Presidents’ Report, which called in 2015 for further economic (and, in reality, political) integration, cannot work if imposed from the top without popular backing.

Social networks are powerful tools for mobilising Europe’s optimists, creating groups at a national level that can turn into proper political movements represented in Brussels. With their ideologies becoming outdated, traditional parties are inadequate promoters of the European dream, which was often just a corollary of their political platform. UKIP existed to remove the UK from the EU, the Front National and Alternative für Deutschland question several of the European pillars like labour mobility, and Italy’s Movimento 5 Stelle wants to discard the euro. Why shouldn’t pro-EU voters create their own pan-European movement to defend their values against those who want to destroy them?

“The focus of the European Commission should shift from building transcontinental infrastructure to creating a truly European identity”

But strong engagement is not enough. Numbers matter too. Only five percent of all university graduates participate in this student-exchange programme, so the Erasmus alumni may be perceived as yet another elite. This is against the original spirit of the programme, which aimed to open up the continent to all Europeans. EU optimists should realise that the majority of the population, who have never had educational and professional experiences abroad, see only the costs of European integration. For the group of EU enthusiasts to grow and amplify its voice, Brussels should invest in a comprehensive common linguistic policy, in courses on European civics, and in exchange programmes for adults. As Italian intellectual Umberto Eco once provocatively said, ‘the Erasmus idea should be compulsory – not just for students, but also for taxi drivers, plumbers and any other worker’. Like it or not, the EU makes the most vulnerable, such as the least-skilled, even more vulnerable. To be engaged in a constructive and enlightened debate with the whole population, the Erasmus alumni should only be inspired by the European project, not blinded by it.

The focus of the European Commission should shift from building transcontinental infrastructure to creating a truly European identity, using the Erasmus alumni as a powerful tool to dissipate some of the pessimism surrounding the European project. And even more importantly, EU leaders should persuade younger generations, through ad hoc educational programmes, of the importance of actively participating in the political debate. The Erasmus generation is the living example of what the European Union is all about. It is now the group’s own responsibility to spread the word.

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For several decades, the United Kingdom has been vital to the formation of the European energy market. It was one of the first European countries to privatise and deregulate its national electricity and gas markets, and has since benefited from the collective power of the EU to counter the threats of energy exporters such as Russia, thereby minimising the risks for national energy security. How Britain’s exit will affect EU-Russia energy links and the EU’s energy security is of critical importance to Europe’s currently tense relationship with its large neighbour.

The British energy market is, at present, deeply integrated into the European energy market. Brexit will exclude the UK from a number of important European energy projects, the institutions responsible for the development of cross-border electricity interconnectors, and the harmonisation of energy prices. It will also force the EU to rethink its energy strategy and reorganise its institutions. If the UK decides to remain a member of the EU’s energy institutions, additional negotiations with EU member states will be needed, holding back substantive progress on the internal energy market and having unpredictable effects on its further design.

Despite this deep integration, the UK is dependent on fossil fuel imports from, among other countries, Russia. This dependency has increased significantly over the last decade due to the depletion
of British oil and gas reserves in the North Sea and the cessation of domestic coal mining. Before the referendum, Amber Rudd, a Remain backer and then energy secretary, signalled that Britain’s
withdrawal could make the country’s energy market vulnerable to Russian gas supply, saying that Russia could use Britain’s dependence as a weapon. This warning could now very plausibly
become reality.

Russian gas supplier Gazprom is currently negotiating with several major energy companies in the UK to increase its supply to Britain and several other European countries, acting via its subsidiary, Gazprom Marketing & Trading, which operates in Britain. Russian oil company Rosneft is working together with the UK’s BP – which just so happens to own 19.75% of Rosneft’s
shares – having seen the referendum result for Brexit as a great opportunity for the development of offshore projects. Since the implementation of EU economic sanctions against Russia, imposed
in response to the Ukraine crisis in July 2014, BP has not been able to participate in joint projects with Rosneft. Brexit could change this situation and grant Rosneft access to BP’s European projects. Russian national energy companies could, as a result, strengthen their position on the EU energy market for considerable economic benefit.

“For now, it’s unlikely that Brexit will weaken the EU’s position in its energy relations with Russia”

But the UK was one of the biggest supporters of economic sanctions against Russia. After the referendum, some high-ranking Russian politicians expressed their pleasure at the result, and hoped that economic sanctions would now be lifted sooner rather than later. European officials wasted no time in prolonging them until January 2017, and plan to further extend the sanctions until full implementation of the Minsk agreement on ending the conflict in eastern Ukraine. This isn’t a case where Britain’s engagement is significant enough to change the decisions of EU officials. The UK
will not leave the EU for two or three years at least, and negotiations on the look of the EU’s institutions without the UK will take time. It’s therefore unlikely that Brexit will seriously change the EU-Russia economic relationship.

Nonetheless, there should be no doubt that Moscow will try to force a review of the EU’s restrictive measures. It will play on the differences between European countries, lobbying those that criticise the EU’s stance on Russia, such as Greece and Hungary. It will back Eurosceptic movements across Europe. But it would be an exaggeration to think that Russia could significantly strengthen its influence on European decisions during and after the UK’s departure. The EU relies on Russian fossil fuel imports (Russia provides 45% of Europe’s oil, 39% of its gas and 28% of its coal), but around a third of Russia’s export revenues depends on the EU’s energy demand. That mutual dependency hinders Moscow’s ambitions for greater influence. And Russia isn’t immune to the market instability caused by the referendum vote. The Russian economy has already been suffering from the effects of Western economic sanctions, and a further serious political and financial crisis in Europe would have devastating effects for Russia too. This is not at all in line with the country’s interests.

The EU gives its members a free hand in taking decisions on energy production, the energy mix and energy supply, as well as on internal trade regulations. It has limited influence on national energy policies. But over several decades the EU has become a key actor in addressing the security of supply and climate dimensions of energy policy for its member states. With the implementation of the Third Energy Package for the internal gas and electricity market in 2009, the EU developed a tool that not only affects the foreign policies of member states in energy matters, but also challenges Russia’s dominance over the EU energy market.

“The EU relies on Russian fossil fuel imports, Russia’s export revenues depend on the EU’s energy demand. That mutual dependency hinders Moscow’s ambitions for greater influence”

For now, it’s unlikely that Brexit will weaken the EU’s position in its energy relations with Russia. But there is the possibility of a negative turn in many fields of European cooperation, and a shift
in the balance of energy policy away from Brussels to national governments, thereby weakening future collective action. This threat, if realised, would make the EU more vulnerable to Russian
influence. Brexit may open up more doors for Russia to achieve its foreign policy goals, but it will not necessarily make the EU an easier partner for the Kremlin.

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The rapid pace of digitalisation will have a dramatic impact on the world of work. A popular view is that the advance of digitalisation, automation and “Industry 4.0” doesn’t augur well for low-skilled workers in European industry, with some reports forecasting a massive contraction in the job market for low-skilled workers. According to an extremely popular 2013 study by Carl Frey and Michael Osborne, almost half of all employees in the United States could be replaced by computerised systems over the next two decades. A study presented at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos this year stated that digitalisation and automation will lead to a net loss of five million jobs in industrialised nations by 2020.

But this isn’t realistic. It would be ill-advised to deal in nightmare scenarios of unemployment in the thousands or millions. We still can’t confidently say whether and where jobs will be lost. In any case, no company, especially a small or medium-sized enterprise, is in a position to digitalise everything overnight, either commercially
or organisationally. There won’t be wide-scale technological unemployment or factories and offices devoid of people. One survey of almost 500 companies from the metal and electrical industry, carried out for the Institute for Applied Work Science (IFAA), found that fewer than one in five companies have initiated any plans or projects for implementing digital ideas. Industry 4.0 is yet to make its presence felt across all companies, and this will remain the case for years.

The potential offered by automation for professions and workplaces is, typically, overestimated. The implementation of new technologies often fails to take sufficient account of social, legal and ethical barriers. And no conclusions can be drawn with regard to the effect on the workforce as a whole. Rather than eliminating jobs, new technologies often change the nature of work. Employees are freed up to focus on activities that can’t be automated. For example, having previously centred on precision craftsmanship, the profession of watchmaking is now evolving to encompass the programming of digital models for 3D watch printing. The result is a vast increase in creative freedom.

Just as with previous technological evolutions, some roles will be eliminated. When diesel and electric locomotives came along, steam boilers – and stokers – were no longer needed. But new professions and opportunities emerge. We will need app programmers and 3D modellers. Vehicles will increasingly have electronic control systems, requiring engineers specialised in this field.

But the advance of digital technologies doesn’t mean the only jobs remaining will be ones requiring a high degree of technical expertise. Creativity won’t be the only thing occupying the employees of the future, although the proportion of routine tasks performed by employees will decline. Some routine activities can be eliminated from simple work, thereby enabling low-skilled workers to increase their share of value added. This will help to make work productive and competitive across different levels of expertise, thereby keeping this work in Europe.

Digitalisation is expected to have another positive effect. Low-skilled workers, particularly those who are less physically able, can increasingly be positively integrated into the workforce with the help of robot-assisted work systems and body suits – “exoskeletons”. These technologies lower the physical impact of ergonomically-unfavourable movements on the assembly line, reduce the strain posed by heavy weights, and lead to improved quality thanks to precision process control.

“The integration of refugees can be made easier by the use of data glasses that explain work processes in various languages and media formats”

It’s also conceivable that low-skilled workers will be integrated into the labour market to a greater extent as a result of digital assistance systems – tablets, smartphones, data glasses, networked monitors, and so on. Employees could be deployed more flexibly and in more varied roles as they will receive the necessary information on-site and in real time. This can happen quicker and at shorter notice, as assistance systems will massively expand the options for on-the-job training, with information provided intuitively. Like today’s smartphones, the use of assistance systems must be simple and user-friendly. This includes multimedia information with extensive possibilities, including choices of languages, images, and video sequences. Even the integration of refugees can be made easier by the use of data glasses that explain work processes in various languages and media formats.

With digital technologies evolving at a considerable pace, low-skilled workers will have to develop a strong willingness to learn and adapt. Needs-orientated qualification measures, such as for operating equipment, can help support employees. The relevant learning content for digitalisation can still only be described in general terms, which makes it necessary to permanently compare training content with the relevant requirements while also focusing on the interplay between everyone in the production process.

“The advance of digital technologies doesn’t mean the only jobs remaining will be ones requiring a high degree of technical expertise”

Digitalisation offers a number of attractive opportunities. It means greater flexibility for employees, more demanding tasks, the provision of tailored information and relief from monotonous routine work. As well as the increased availability of information, digitalisation will improve companies’ coordination and communication processes. We will need many highly-qualified employees to get Industry 4.0 and digitalisation on the road, and low-skilled workers will remain in demand. But for all this optimism, there is a risk. Digitalisation could go too far if we end up shaping the work of the future so that we humans become mere appendages of intelligent digital systems and machines. To counter this, we need a fundamental debate about morality and ethics – one that takes into account not only the numerous benefits
of digitalisation, but also occupational safety.

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The Slovak Presidency of the European Council declared in the summer that the end of 2016 is still a feasible deadline for the finalisation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). But this deal – and several others – are under threat.

Despite all previous declarations, the Commission took the unprecedented political decision to subject the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA) to approval by national parliaments in addition to the European Parliament. That’s at least 36 parliaments, both national and provincial, who need to approve the deal. It could mean four or five years before
the agreement takes effect.

The Commission is striving to react to criticism. It has come up with a new model of investment protection, the investor-state dispute settlement model (ISDS). It has substantially increased negotiation transparency. It publishes reports on the potential benefits of successfully-concluded trade deals. But this isn’t enough to reach out to those across the EU who are hostile to free trade. Member states remain under intense pressure from strong lobbies and civil society.

The EU is growing more protectionist, and has been since well before Britain voted to leave. It’s true that discontent with globalisation and suspicion of the EU’s trade – and other – policies were prominent in the debate leading up to the British EU referendum. But the EU itself reacted to the Brexit vote with a protectionist stance. Some EU capitals were keen to punish London for fear that other countries would follow Britain out of the EU but with favourable access to the single market. Pursuing this strategy would be damaging for both sides, so a more sensible and “depoliticised” approach needs to be found. Taking into account the significant trade deficit the UK has with the rest of Europe, currently at a record high level, one could even argue that the EU needs the British market more than Britain needs the EU single market.

Widespread public concern over free trade agreements is understandable. We are negotiating a new generation of trade deals that go beyond the elimination of tariff barriers and include discussions on food safety, international standards and consumer protection. In the case of TTIP, it even has geopolitical and strategic importance. Citizens want to know whether these deals will help growth to be restored and new jobs to be created. They want higher, not lower standards of health, labour and environmental protection. Opposition is often based on the perception that deals are negotiated in secret, for the benefit of multinational companies and at the expense of ordinary people.

If we are serious about fighting protectionism, we have to make a more convincing case about the benefits of trade liberalisation. Trade increases spending power, especially for those on low incomes, and enlarges the variety of goods and services people are able to buy. We must also be clear about the scope of trade agreements. The Commission has already made considerable
efforts in terms of transparency, but more has to be done. It’s clear that the benefits aren’t evenly shared across the EU or inside countries. We have to (re)define the responsibility institutions,
both at the EU and at national level, have towards those who may be affected. We must prevent crisis situations and be more pro-active.

Rejecting free trade means we are on the defensive. It’s an admission we aren’t competitive enough to progress on the global stage. Protectionism is very much a European and American problem; it’s not by any means a general global trend. We have to understand that the future of global trade doesn’t depend on our participation anymore. Canada, China, Australia and others are actively negotiating trade and investment agreements. We can either take the lead, conclude deals and set new models and standards, or we can stand by and let others set conditions for us. We face enormous challenges: chronically slow economic growth (especially in the eurozone), persistently high unemployment, and energy insecurity. We have to make clear to our citizens that open trade is a crucial instrument for growth and a way out of these difficult situations. Free trade was one of the engines of the prosperous decades following the Second World War in Europe, America and beyond. We should have the courage and political will to champion it.

IMAGE CREDIT: cylonphoto/Bigstock.com

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Did you know that 16 November is the ‘International Day for Tolerance’? This year, more than ever before, let’s take a moment to contemplate.

Talk of openness and inclusion may appear quaint in a world dominated by hate and harshness. Who wants to “respect and recognise the rights and beliefs of others” – as the United Nations would like us to do on Wednesday – when there is so much fear to spread, and so many angry ‘strong’ men and women to elect?

Life is just too short to be polite. People want tough leaders, not more soppy political correctness. Let’s leave softies like Canada’s Justin Trudeau to fight injustice, oppression, racism and unfair discrimination. The rest of us have better things to do.

Actually, we don’t.

Being mean and nasty can be exhilarating for a naughty moment. There is a thrill in breaking taboos, hurling insults and breaching red lines. Building walls and fences and deporting immigrants can sound like great fun.

But the excitement won’t last. And a permanent state of hate and anger is not a recipe for societal well-being. Living together – even without ‘them’, just among ‘us’ – requires a degree of courtesy and polite interaction.

“Being mean and nasty can be exhilarating for a naughty moment… but the excitement won’t last”

Taming the demons of racism, nativism and populism unleashed by America’s president-elect Donald Trump during his election campaign – which may be cultivated over the next four years – will not be easy. But here are six ways can be done.

First, let’s remember that millions of Americans did not buy into Trump’s toxic rhetoric. While the Electoral College certainly voted for Trump, Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton secured a majority of the popular vote.

In other words, those who embrace pluralism, tolerance, inclusion – and who reject the nightmare version of a new Trumpian world order – cannot be easily shunted to the side lines. Their voice will continue to count. It may become even louder.

Second, it’s more important than ever to craft an inspirational narrative to counter and outsmart Trump’s European wannabes in France, Germany and the Netherlands.

As elections in these and other countries draw closer, instead of pandering to the ‘Populists International’, mainstream political parties in Europe must reach out with more conviction and passion to the majority of Europeans who believe in an open and tolerant Europe. Their voices are currently drowned out by extremists and ignored by others.

This is no time for old, wishy washy slogans and bland speeches. It’s time to fight fire with fire.

Third, underlining the principles of liberal democracy – as German Chancellor Angela Merkel did in her message of congratulations to Trump – is a good first step. But it will mean very little unless EU leaders take tougher action against those inside the EU – including Hungary’s Viktor Orban and the Polish government – who violate these very values.

Fourth, even as they lecture Trump, Russia’s Vladimir Putin or Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on human rights, EU leaders should make sure that they practice what they preach at home and that their own treatment of minorities – as well as migrants and refugees – is above reproach. For the moment, it isn’t.

“Not so long ago racism and discrimination in Europe led to wide-spread devastation, death and destruction – history should not be allowed to repeat itself”

Fifth, even seemingly small things matter. Christmas traditions like ‘Black Pete’ in the Netherlands may seem harmless to white Dutch people but they send a harmful message of exclusion to the country’s many black citizens.

Offensive language, of the kind European Commissioner Gunter Oettinger used recently when speaking of his Chinese counterparts, sends the wrong message to European citizens and a watching world.

Last, let’s debate and discuss the reasons for Trump’s success, the rise of populists, the flaws of liberal democrats and the pros and cons of globalisation. As with Brexit, there are important topics to analyse and reflected upon.

For the moment, the killing fields of the 21st century happen to be far away, in Afghanistan, Africa and the Middle East. But not so long ago it was here in Europe that racism and discrimination led to wide-spread devastation, death and destruction.

History should not be allowed to repeat itself.

Related content

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• Debating Europe: Changing the Politics of Fear – new series

 IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Alexandros Plakidas

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The UK would still be a member of the European Union if only the young people who supported Remain had actually bothered to vote. This analysis was impossible to ignore in the days and weeks following the Brexit vote, and was tempting enough for many to enthusiastically agree with it. After all, we know how bad turnout is among young people in election after election, and that’s based only on those who’ve actually registered.

The problem is that it wasn’t nearly as true as it first appeared. The original figure of 36% turnout among young people, compared to 72.2% overall, seemed to originate from Sky Data, based on conclusions they had drawn from 2015 UK general election data. Sky Data also claimed that if Scots had turned out in the same numbers as we had for our independence referendum, we could
have swung the result – never explaining how a 1.3 million vote margin would have been closed by 430,000 Remain votes north of the border. Despite this, the figures weren’t questioned and the
narrative was established: young people just hadn’t bothered. Fortunately, data compiled at the London School of Economics, released in mid-July, painted a different picture. Turnout among 18- to 24-year-olds was 64%, almost double the Sky Data figure, but not enough to compete with a turnout of more than 90% among over-65s, who overwhelmingly voted Leave.

Even with this new data, the question still stands: why, when faced with a decision that may have life-changing consequences for all of us, did one in three registered young voters not go to the
polls? There are, of course, a range of domestic reasons for this, and it’s worth looking at them before examining the wider issue of youth alienation and apathy across Europe.

First, the EU referendum debate itself was just terrible. The tone of both official campaigns was unreservedly negative, and often boiled down to two wings of the Conservative Party arguing about immigration and sovereignty in an entirely top-down manner. This was a referendum conducted by a few men in suits through televised debates and massive spending on billboards and newspaper adverts. Compare that to the UK’s previous experience of a high-turnout referendum, the 2014 vote on Scottish independence, which was an immersive affair with debates taking place at bus stops, in offices and classrooms across the country. In 2014, Scotland’s young people felt that politics was something we were all doing together, in which each of our voices was powerful. In 2016, the young people of the UK felt politics was something being done to them by largely remote and unlikeable establishment politicians.

“Why, when faced with a decision that may have life-changing consequences for all of us, did one in three registered young voters not go to the polls?”

The EU debate started off with most people very ill-informed. One senior Member of the European Parliament I know does not pretend to understand completely how the Union works. So what chance did we have of getting young people engaged and excited if, instead of positive and substantial debate, we offered a bitter and personal campaign – one that seemed far more about settling old scores than informing and persuading the public?

The referendum itself can’t be seen in isolation. British democracy hasn’t been at its healthiest for some time. A winner-takes-all and largely unrepresentative voting system, coupled with a distant,
arrogant political class drawn in large part from a tiny elite has persuaded many people – especially women, young people and working class people – that their vote won’t count and their voice
doesn’t matter. Expecting a single referendum – regardless of its importance – to undo this doesn’t begin to address the reasons why people aren’t voting. Even in Scotland, where the independence vote has had a legacy of high voter registration and increased turnout in the subsequent Westminster and Holyrood elections, it’s clear that 2014’s politics of mass participation is fading.

And just as the EU referendum didn’t happen in isolation from the rest of the UK’s electoral politics, British democracy doesn’t exist apart from European democracy – even if that’s how 52% of voters in the UK seem to want it. Across Europe, young people – and plenty of others – are uninterested, apathetic or alienated from the democratic process.

Like in the UK, there is a range of domestic reasons for this – some strikingly similar, others unique. In Greece, the anti-austerity coalition Syriza won an election and re-election with significant
support from young people. Those same young people, joined by many more, also voted overwhelmingly to reject the terms offered by the Troika of European and international institutions to deal with the crisis in their country. Despite three electoral victories in quick succession, their voice was resoundingly crushed by external forces. Is it any wonder those young people are disillusioned not just with their national democracy, but with Europe too? In Ireland, the economic crash caused many thousands of young people to leave the country in search of work. Though this led to heartwarming scenes last year, as many came “#HomeToVote” for equal marriage in a referendum, it again points to economic issues contributing significantly to young people’s alienation.

“Young people have watched the relative economic security of the previous generation destroyed by mistakes made by that very same generation”

And it’s important to recognise much of this as alienation, rather than apathy. Young people are often unfairly painted as lazy or even ignorant; instead, we should recognise how the political system has failed them and work to address it. Alienation is not apathy. Young people do care about their community, their society and the world they (and we) live in, but many feel powerless to do anything to change it. They feel defeated by forces far beyond their control, which more often than not seem abstract and difficult to identify in the real world.

Scottish trade unionist Jimmy Reid defined alienation, its causes and solutions in his legendary “rat-race” speech to Glasgow University in 1972. Printed in full by the New York Times and compared to the Gettysburg Address, it’s strikingly relevant to post-Brexit Europe. The solutions to this alienation are ambitious, far-reaching and will be met by considerable resistance from those who benefit the most from the status quo. They are the radical redistribution of economic power and political decision-making ability from a small number of people to our societies at large.
In our pursuit of a better Europe, one which will never again be shattered by war and where cooperation and solidarity are at the heart of the project, we must recognise that institutions have been
constructed that are unaccountable, distant, easily-caricatured by those who stand opposed to the European project, and used to the advantage of a tiny elite – thereby justifiably reinforcing the
caricature.

“Alienation is not apathy. Young people do care about their community, their society and the world, but many feel powerless to do anything to change it”

Young people have watched the relative economic security of the previous generation destroyed by mistakes made by that very same generation. They see the promise of democracy – which in many parts of Europe their parents and grandparents fought and often died for – swept aside by market forces and institutions so powerful and distant they don’t know how or even whether it’s possible to fight back. Their experience of politics is of something done to them, not something we all do together. That cannot last. To save the idea of a Europe united in pursuit of peace and economic, social and environmental justice, we must together take back power over our economy, our governments and the European institutions. A Europe in which every one of us has a stake is one worth turning out and voting for.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Garon S

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Luxembourg’s highly-developed economy and location in the heart of Europe have attracted spectacular levels of immigration. Foreigners currently make up 47% of the total population, so Luxembourg is a country where integration and social cohesion are part of daily life and of social policy. Luxembourg’s targeted investments and projects have been used successfully to avoid cultural tensions and promote the peaceful coexistence of around 170 nationalities.

One challenge, though, is the job market. Luxembourg has three official languages, which can be an obstacle for immigrants looking for work. Although unemployment has decreased over the last few years, it remains a challenge in terms of integrating immigrants, especially those with lower levels of education. But access to employment is essential to integration. Struggling to find work can lead to dangerous frustration with the country itself.

The Ministry for Family Affairs and Integration offers, among other things, a “Welcome and Integration Contract” (CAI), including language and citizenship classes and an orientation day. This contract allows immigrants to get acquainted with the history, customs, values and, most importantly, languages of our country. We put a lot of effort into increasing the numbers of language
classes as well as continued professional training classes. Many initiatives – from the government, the private sector or NGOs – facilitate training paths and offer access to special training and
conversation classes.

Municipalities play a very important role in the integration process, as they are on the front line, welcoming immigrants. Some of Luxembourg’s local authorities have even developed local integration plans. The Luxembourg Reception and Integration Agency (OLAI), which is part of the Ministry for Family Affairs and Integration, in collaboration with the Union of Luxembourg
Cities and Communes (SYVICOL), elaborated a practical guide to integration at the local level. This guide aims to help municipalities and local policymakers implement a long-term integration policy. The OLAI also grants subsidies to municipalities, to help them get started.

But social cohesion can be achieved only if integration works both ways. Immigrants need to make a step towards the host country, just as we need to consider their needs. Successfully integrating foreigners also hinges on good collaboration between the various government bodies, the municipalities and civil society.

The importance of this approach becomes clear when looking at the real estate market, for which Luxembourg tops the list of the most expensive countries in Europe. The housing shortage is a known issue for immigrants and nationals alike. For this reason, housing is also a priority on the government’s agenda. In an attempt to create affordable housing, the government launched a lower-cost housing scheme. It also financially supports municipalities that create and offer social housing. An important partner in the housing sector is the social real estate agency (Agence immobilière sociale), which helps socially-deprived people access housing and offers support and advice. Immigrants are systematically directed towards this body.

These measures, of course, have financial implications. But it’s first and foremost an investment in the future of our society and a necessary step towards social cohesion. It’s essential to support
immigrants in finding affordable housing, which can be a very difficult endeavour for anyone, and to offer them various services to which they can turn for help. By supporting them, we promote
their independence and boost their integration. We appeal to the immigrants’ sense of responsibility and ensure that the same support is offered to immigrants and nationals alike – thereby helping to avoid cultural and social tensions. So far, Luxembourg has managed this balancing act very well.

Education is a different story. There is no shortage of school places. Immigrant children, who may lack the necessary language skills and knowledge, are assessed by the Ministry of Education, which identifies the right class or school for those children. Specially trained teachers – so-called “intercultural mediators” – have been employed. They speak the most common native languages
of immigrants – such as Serbo-Croatian and Arabic – and help children catch up with the national school programme. Welcome classes, with the ultimate goal of integrating children and young adults into regular classes as soon as possible, have been multiplied recently to receive refugee children. This also entails costs, but our system has proved very effective. School is an important element in the integration process, as it allows the children to become familiar with Luxembourg’s culture and connect with local people. Furthermore, it can also be an incentive for their parents to integrate as fast as possible into society.

The arrival of refugees fleeing the Syrian conflict has presented new integration challenges for Luxembourg, from the lack of housing possibilities to communication problems. All our good practices were put to the test, as they weren’t necessarily designed for the particular needs of people from such a different cultural, linguistic, political and often religious background. We face a double challenge. First, we have to offer housing opportunities and social support for all – financially as well as psychologically. Second, when we integrate these people into our society we must make it understood that integration is not a one-way street, but a process that demands effort from both sides.

So far, we have managed this exceptional situation well thanks to good collaboration between various government bodies, the municipalities and civil society. Special language classes are offered, some municipalities provide housing, and the ADEM job agency is assessing employability. OLAI has launched a project called “Welcome to Luxembourg”, which is designed to give asylum-seekers basic information about the country and help them understand where they live. At the invitation of the Ministry for Family Affairs and Integration, and with government financing, the Red Cross created “LISKO”, a service that promotes integration and social cohesion for those granted refugee status by supporting them in administrative procedures and creating links to services and the population.

Cultural tensions can arise in a society where different religious beliefs, political views and cultural backgrounds have to mix and merge over a long period of time. But Luxembourg has proved that this doesn’t have to lead to permanent conflicts in a country whose multiculturalism is reflected in all aspects of society. We have succeeded because we give immigrants the tools and means to understand and integrate into a new society. We offer them the opportunity to participate in our society. That is what integration is all about.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Franz Ferdinand Photography

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Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free’. These words may sound grotesque today, but they were used in good faith as an opening line of the first European Security Strategy only thirteen years ago. Its successor, published in June by the EU’s foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, begins with a starkly different assessment of the world: ‘We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union’. This point of departure in the new strategy may indicate the EU is finally ready to take off its rose-coloured glasses of the early post-Cold War era.

The European neighbourhood, both to the east and south, is plagued with democratic backsliding, fragility and war. Even more disturbingly, the European project is facing unprecedented internal challenges to its unity and stability. To cope with this rapidly-deteriorating environment, the EU Global Strategy has pushed several new ideas, such as strategic autonomy, principled pragmatism and resilience. While in principle these ideas might refresh a stale strategic discourse in the EU, the new strategy has articulated them in a rather ambivalent fashion.

Let’s begin with so-called “strategic autonomy”. Instead of taking this idea to its logical conclusion, the strategists hastened to water it down to pre-emptively appease Atlanticists. The Strategy has thus pledged to ‘keep deepening the transatlantic bond and our partnership with NATO’. Building the autonomy of the EU within NATO is inevitably a step to full autonomy from NATO. More integrated defence in Europe doesn’t automatically mean the end of NATO, but it does mean a decreased political need for having both. An organised denial of this simple geopolitical reality may massage the concerns of certain capitals, but it’s also a recipe for inaction.

Second, the Global Strategy has endorsed “principled pragmatism”, which combines ‘realistic assessment of the strategic environment’ with ‘idealistic aspiration to advance a better world’. While striking a better balance between realism and idealism is a welcome move, old habits die hard. The Global Strategy has declared the EU’s intention to ‘invest in win-win solutions, and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game’. As a result, the “realistic assessment” that the strategy allegedly endorses relapses into a worldview according to which power politics is nothing but an illusion. This is too sloppy for a global power wannabe.

Third, the strategy has strongly endorsed the concept of “resilience”, or the ability to reform in the face of internal and external crises. Moreover, the EU aspires not only to enhance the resilience of its own democracies but to promote resilience throughout its neighbourhood. A cynic would suggest that resilience is just another smoke-screen buzzword adding little substance to the debate. While there may be a grain of truth in this, the use of the term is also a symptom of increased anxiety over the EU’s own fragility, as well as its inability to Europeanise its neighbourhood. If the EU is serious about promoting resilience abroad, it has to first demonstrate that it is itself resilient.

“The most resilient thing the EU could do in the face of Brexit would be to push forward defence integration”

Brexit is a big blow for the EU’s security and defence policy, as one of the most powerful military, diplomatic and economic states is due to leave the bloc. Brexit, though, has also created a unique window of opportunity for the EU to bounce back. The first step is for the Union to be honest about its own weaknesses. The EU cannot be both a normative power and a strategic player; a civilian power and a military powerhouse; autonomous from NATO and dependent on it; democratically deficient and a champion of democracy. The EU cannot have its cake and eat it. It’s about time the EU made some bold choices.

Some easy wins may arise from the fact that the UK has, for decades, slowed down Europe’s defence integration. London has blocked many initiatives that could have increased the EU’s strategic autonomy and weakened the role of NATO, from CSDP Operational Headquarters to the use of Battle Groups. If resilience is the ability to withstand crises and emerge from them stronger, the most resilient thing the EU could do in the face of Brexit would be to push forward defence integration, which is long overdue and  widely supported by a majority of Europeans. This will signal that the EU means business in world politics and that ever-closer union is a vision to be reckoned with.

Finally, if the EU seriously seeks to be a credible promoter of resilience in its neighbourhood, it will need to step back from its liberal tunnel vision that has characterised so much of its external action. Instead of trying to copy-and-paste European institutions into Africa or the Middle East, where they often produce façade democracies, the EU should start fostering organic solutions to security problems. These will often diverge from European practices, but allowing them to flourish is the only path to a neighbourhood that can take care of itself.

It is a moment of truth for the European project – a time to see whether the EU’s leaders can seize the opportunity and turn ambivalent rhetoric into a new strategic paradigm that will make the EU stronger, safer and better off.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – European External Action Service

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When I start thinking of the Czech general public’s view of the European Union, my thoughts are almost all negative.

Public trust in the EU – and politics overall – has been damaged by the misuse of EU funds and by red tape. It has been harmed by senior politicians who appear not to listen to citizens’ views, or to admit that some problems may need to be solved at European level. It has been eroded by abuse of European themes in domestic political campaigns – notably the refugee and migration crisis, which in reality doesn’t affect our country at all. Watch any Czech media, and it’s almost impossible to hear anything positive about the EU. As a PhD candidate researching European integration, I strongly believe in the European idea – yet I am unable to hide from this ubiquitous Euroscepticism.

Although the current Czech coalition government initially presented itself as willing to improve cooperation at EU level, this promise doesn’t seem to have been fulfilled after three years in power. Domestic debates concerning the EU are focused almost entirely on winning European funding, or on regulations that, in the end, are rarely the result of imposition from Brussels. There have been several attempts to communicate a Czech European policy to the public, but these initiatives usually don’t come from the government – instead, they are the work of think-tanks or civic organisations. Moreover, the ideas and policies generated by these groups struggle to find support in the government or in parliament.

So are the Czechs really Eurosceptic, or do we just ignore what happens beyond our borders? For people who’ve spent time abroad, it’s often difficult to connect again with friends who stayed. You can’t stop wondering how people can narrow-mindedly believe whatever fallacy the media serves them, without any thought of verifying claims or understanding their wider consequences. People have a lot of other issues in their lives to solve, true; their reliance on the media for political opinion is, from their perspective, entirely justifiable. Such division between a generally uninformed public and people with a wider knowledge or experience is, of course, not specific to the Czech Republic – but we do have a particularly small number of people who go abroad to work or study.

In my opinion, it should be the responsibility of our most educated elites, especially politicians, to ensure that the public debate on Czech foreign and European policy is at a satisfactory level and
there is some common understanding. When there is no such effort to provide this standard, no-one can reasonably blame the media for not reporting European issues seriously or comprehensively.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Roman Boed

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Although many of us may find it difficult to say so given recent events, it is important to recognise that the European project is – and remains – a success. For my generation, and all those who were born and grew up afterwards, “freedom without borders” in Europe is second nature. It is modern Europe’s greatest achievement. Where I go, where I live, where I work or study, who I trade or do business with – as a European, my opportunities are almost limitless. But history teaches us that some things cannot be taken for granted.

The fact is that building Europe has taken decades of laborious compromises. And now, yet again, we need people who are willing to fight hard – and honestly – for the continent’s future. Europe is
at a pivotal crossroads. This is not only the result of Brexit. Even before June’s vote, it was clear that the European Union has to change. The EU is a sluggish colossus that no longer touches or
engages with many of its citizens. Solutions to urgent problems are often not found, or are too slow to come forward. And Europe’s almost permanent fire-fighting mode, as it oscillates between the
financial and the refugee crises, gives many people the impression that decision-makers in Brussels are no longer setting the agenda, but are on the back foot.

Since the refugee crisis began in earnest last year, the question was not whether Europe wanted to help. We should help to eradicate oppression, first and foremost, in the regions from which refugees are fleeing, but we must also support those people arriving in Europe who are in need of protection. The offer of refuge, though, has to come with conditions. Someone who sets out by boat and reaches a European island cannot automatically expect to remain indefinitely in the EU, and certainly cannot choose the country in which they will settle. Smart management and setting boundaries are as much part of Europe as the desire for freedom and the willingness to help.

“We need a strong and effective European border police to protect the EU’s external borders and curb irregular migration”

Without this management, our social welfare systems and rule of law will be eroded, tolerance in society will be stretched, and those who sow the seeds of fear on the far-left and far-right of the political spectrum will be strengthened. Whenever our focus on this clear European position becomes even slightly blurred, illiberal and sometimes anti-democratic forces bring their shallow answers successfully to the fray. This phenomenon, which we know exists in France and is part of daily life in Italy, is emerging in other countries as well – including here in Germany. We need a clear
strategy to deal with it.

We also need a strong and effective European border police to protect the EU’s external borders and curb irregular migration. This must include harmonised rules on asylum and migration based on
fair burden-sharing among member states, with processing taking place at the external borders, not in Central Europe.

Europe must also invest far more in cooperation with its neighbours in the Middle East and North Africa to combat the causes of displacement and migration, and promote regional stability. By taking action at the local level, where the need is greatest, we can also make the most of the resources at our disposal.

It is precisely in a diverse and pluralist society that boundaries and governance are needed, internally as well as externally, to enable freedom to be a reality. The high level of immigration experienced in recent years, coupled with increasing individualisation, has created new conflicts and fault lines within society, partly in response to the different traditions, cultures and faiths that many immigrants bring with them. Social integration has been successful in millions of cases, but there are too many instances in which it has not worked, especially among immigrants from the Arab world. Too many regard their faith as incompatible with our Western values. Terror has become a bitter consequent reality.

But along all these fault lines, where many see only fear and change, there is a great opportunity. We need committed Europeans, who do not bury their head in the sand, to discard “business as usual” – let alone “even more integration!” – as their reflex response. We need to make sure that all the people are with us as we embark on this new path, and show them that their lives are better when Europe is united.

“Europe must invest far more in cooperation with its neighbours in the Middle East and North Africa in order to combat the causes of displacement and migration”

To many in Britain, it must have been obvious that Brexit would come at a price and that their own costs of living would go up – and yet they voted to leave. Many of them surely did so because
they felt Brussels was too remote and their voices were no longer being heard. But “Europe” does not just mean “Brussels”. Europe is held together by the diversity of its nations. The union should not try to make everyone the same. It is all-embracing. We simply need to prove that yet again.

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Lulled by the opinion polls and its own wishful thinking, Europe expected US foreign policy continuity following a Hillary Clinton victory. Now, Europeans must awaken to the unpredictable change and volatility a Donald Trump presidency will bring.

The EU’s foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini tweeted her reaction only minutes after Hillary Clinton conceded defeat. It was, as is usual with the tweets of political leaders, or those generated by their staff, anodyne. She said that transatlantic ties “are deeper than any change in politics. We’ll continue to work together, rediscovering the strengths of Europe.”

Waiting to see whether President-elect Trump implements his campaign pledges once he moves into the White House is definitely not the course the EU should adopt. On the contrary, Europe must set out very clearly what it sees as the transatlantic and even global agenda for 2017 to 2020.

All too often, the European Union only reacts to developments, and even then reveals its disarray. It is usually loath to set out in advance its own red lines on foreign policy issues. That’s understandable, due to the EU’s complex consensus-building mechanisms – but it’s also a major hindrance.

“Hoping for restraining influences is not a policy the EU should espouse”

The prospect of a Trump administration signals not just a tectonic shift in American politics but also a potentially huge disruption to global growth and security.

It may be that the Republican Party, with its majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, will furnish the new president with a cabinet, and especially a Secretary of State, with the authority and experience needed to mitigate his campaign promises and threats.

But hoping for restraining influences is not a policy the EU should espouse. Europe’s national leaders must resist the temptation to grandstand with their own reactions to Trump’s election win, and instead fashion a common European response. And they must do so proactively, before President Trump sets foot in the Oval Office in the third week of January.

The elements of the agenda the EU must set out are clear enough. On security, the countries grouped in both the EU and NATO need to reassert their commitments to collective security, and invite the United States to do the same within the Alliance. Trump’s campaign rhetoric has raised significant question marks over the future of NATO, as well as over developments in the Washington-Moscow relationship.

Security is set to be among Europe’s greatest concerns, given the uncertainties in Ukraine, Syria and the wider Mediterranean and Caspian regions.

Far from being the main security guarantor, it seems possible the United States will soon be the source of greater instability. That possibility demands the preparation of a concerted European position capable of heading off trouble.

“The EU must unite to ensure that surging American nationalism does not further disrupt the extremely vulnerable international system”

On the economic front, Trump’s protectionist sentiments and his opposition to multilateral trade deals like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) pose a serious threat to US and EU trade and investment – and to the global economy too. Trade in goods and services between Europe and America is worth US$1.5 trillion a year, and transatlantic investment stands at $2.5 trillion annually. A dent in that would send shockwaves around the world, so the EU needs to set out its intentions clearly and quickly.

Donald Trump’s election reflects an alarming mood swing in America. It echoes the Brexit referendum in the UK and populist trends around Europe. Many voters in the rich industrialised countries of the West now contest globalisation. At first it was welcomed, opening new markets; but increasingly globalisation is being rejected as unfair because business investors are moving to lower-wage countries.

If Trump’s ‘America first’ slogan means that the US will oppose the global governance reforms being demanded by emerging economic giants then great dangers lie ahead. Instead of being the world’s policeman, America will become its principal threat.

That’s why the European Union must prepare to take centre stage. The EU’s governments must unite to ensure that surging American nationalism does not further disrupt an international system whose economies and security are already extremely vulnerable. Doing so will prove the true worth of the European project, and would reverse its decline.

 Related content

• Friends of Europe: Ten ideas to make Europe more relevant to its citizens
• Europe’s World: US exceptionalism or withdrawal from the world?, by Philip J Crowley
• Debating Europe: Will President Trump make America great again?

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The whole world has felt the shock of the UK’s cataclysmic decision to leave the European Union. In China, people are concerned most about how much the vote will affect the bilateral Sino-British relationship, which was declared as entering a golden era by leaders of the two countries only last year.

I don’t give much credence to the term “golden era”. Long before its announcement, China and Britain had built up cooperation in many areas. The two countries have been important trade and investment partners. Bilateral trade reached $80.9bn by the end of 2014; the UK’s direct investment in China amounted to $18.5bn by the end of 2013; since 2000, China has poured more direct investment into Britain than any other EU country. Former prime minister David Cameron began his second term last year with an expressed desire for a stronger partnership with China. Britain, at present, urgently needs to invigorate its economy after the grave international financial crisis. For one thing, the UK must attract more outside investment if it’s to improve and update its infrastructure. The City of London serves as one of the most important services centres in the world, contributing around 20% of Britain’s overall GDP and creating huge numbers of jobs. In the age of increasing global competition, Britain naturally wishes to play a leading role in financial and services cooperation with China, the second largest economy in the world.

After more than 30 years of rapid development, China faces vitally important reforms to create new patterns of growth by innovation. The country has had to transform its cooperation strategy from “inviting in” to “reaching out”. While China possesses the largest foreign reserves in the world, and Chinese enterprises are generally strong in production capacity and equipment manufacturing, the Chinese need more experience of international operating and have to explore wider business. As one of today’s great economic powers, China also feels it necessary to push for the internationalisation of its currency, the renminbi. All things considered, China finds that Britain, an old and experienced developed country, could be the right partner for this cooperation. Both powers, therefore, have come to recognise that strengthening their cooperation is in full accordance with their interests.

It’s no real surprise, then, that the leaders of the two countries reached agreement last October that China and the UK would build a global comprehensive strategic partnership for the 21st century and declared the opening of a golden era in the Sino-British relationship. We can clearly see the decision wasn’t taken on impulse, but out of a strong common desire and with common interests. Irrespective of Brexit, the fundamental elements and necessities for Britain to strengthen cooperation with China remain, with enduring and solid foundations.

“Irrespective of Brexit, the fundamental elements and necessities for Britain to strengthen cooperation with China remain”

But beyond any doubt, Brexit has caused uncertainties. First, we can’t be sure whether Britain can quickly resolve its internal divisions – mentally, socially and geographically – and realise some kind of basic national unity. The root cause of Brexit was a growing anti-globalisation populism in society, and if the British remain confused and divided on this issue for a long time, the negative influences of Brexit will be extended, affecting Britain’s ability to handle foreign relations coherently. Second, it’s also not certain the British economy can escape the dilemma into which it was thrown by Brexit and get back to a comparatively fair shape. If these difficulties endure or worsen, Britain will gradually lose its attractiveness to foreign business. But Britain is a mature country,
and quite experienced in dealing with a challenge.

People are generally still waiting to see what kind of result Britain’s exit negotiations with the EU will yield. A poor deal for the UK would mean yet more trouble, further weakening Britain’s position internationally. The negotiation will, of course, not be easy. Nevertheless, there is a mutual need for cooperation between Britain and the EU. There is reason for us to be hopeful of them reaching some kind of beneficial agreement in the end.

Some suggest that since Britain has placed itself in difficulty with the EU, the country will lean towards even closer cooperation with China out of economic necessity. But the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, has never been directly involved in Britain’s relationship with China. Her attitude to China is almost totally unknown. Nobody can say whether she shares the view of her predecessor and his closest ally, the former chancellor George Osborne. And May’s cabinet has few members with direct experience of working with China. Her early decision to postpone and review Cameron’s project for the Hinkley Point nuclear plant project, to which China agreed to commit huge funds, offers some indication of her hesitant stance.

It’s understandable that the most urgent and pressing task for May is managing domestic issues and relations with the EU. She cannot give too much attention at this time to Britain’s relations with
China. But I believe it necessary for her to nuture the relationship – given its importance to both countries – and the sooner, the better.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Number 10

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A big question was asked in many EU capitals after the British referendum on 23 June: would Eurosceptic voters in other countries demand similar votes, risking the whole European project?

Denmark was one of the countries analysts expected would be most easily inspired by the Brexit vote – not only in terms of demand for a referendum, but also for wanting to leave the EU. The Danes entered the European Economic Community with the Brits in 1973, and has since been a close ally of the United Kingdom (certainly in terms of votes in the Council of Ministers). Denmark has voted against EU treaties several times in the past, leaving it with four opt-outs. Like Britain, it is one of the EU’s most reluctant players. Take into consideration the political climate in Denmark over the past five years or so, with its centre-right and centre-left parties increasingly affected by the popularity of the highly-Eurosceptic Danish People’s Party (DPP), and the idea that the Danes may leave too, or at least demand a referendum, isn’t so far-fetched.

The EU policies of Danish centrist parties over the past half decade have been characterised by a fear of losing votes to the Eurosceptic extremes, both on the Left and the Right. The DPP in particular has been able to set out an authoritative Eurosceptic agenda. It has forced the more moderate liberals, conservatives and Social Democrats to swing in that direction. The landslide
victory of Morten Messerschmidt, who won a record 465,000 personal votes as the DPP’s top candidate in the 2014 European Parliament elections, pushed the moderates even further towards
Eurosceptic rhetoric and positions.

So the idea that the Danes could push for their own referendum was not entirely unrealistic. In the months leading up to the British vote, several surveys showed a substantial part of the Danish
electorate wanted a similar remain-or-leave poll: 40% were in favour of a referendum, while 45% were against (although these surveys also suggested that a majority of Danes actually preferred
to stay in the EU). But what is even more telling is that after the British voted to leave the EU, the number in favour of a referendum dropped to only 32%.

EU-friendly sentiments have had proven strength in other polls too. In a post-Brexit referendum survey asking whether people fully support EU membership, 70% of Danish voters answered positively. The same tendency has been apparent in Sweden and the Netherlands. Contrary to what was predicted by many doomsayers, few European voters have been won over by the
Brexiteers’ victory. A Eurobarometer poll published in July suggests that the free movement of people, goods and services is viewed as the most positive result of the EU, and no country other than Britain registered less than 68% support for the principle of freedom of movement. In Denmark, this continued support for the EU has meant the Unity List – the country’s most left-wing party – is now alone in making a rather lacklustre request for a Danish referendum.

“Contrary to what was predicted by many doomsayers, few European voters have been won over by the Brexiteers’ victory”

Though Danish Eurosceptic sentiments have cooled in the aftermath of the UK vote, the British situation may still pose challenges for Denmark’s EU policy. The issue is delicate, as shown by the government’s first reaction to the result. It very quickly dismissed any prospect of a similar referendum in Denmark, but also rushed to emphasise the need for reform of the EU. So far, the government can count on the support of the Social Democrats, but the pro-EU social liberals – the Radical Left – are critical of the government’s recurrent signals of wanting to diminish EU powers in a bid to accommodate sceptics. There is little doubt that the DPP will be watching the Brexit negotiations intently, and in time may use them and their outcome to stir up fresh Euroscepticism or raise new demands with the pro-EU majority in the Danish Parliament.

Denmark’s Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, has stressed that securing Danish interests when negotiating the UK’s exit will be a top priority, but keeping Britain as a close ally will also be a plus for Denmark. The balancing act for the Danish government will be to secure a favourable deal for Britain but not make it attractive enough for Danish Eurosceptics to gain a new impetus in their push for a referendum. It’s also important to stress that Denmark is greatly concerned about an EU without the British. The UK is one of Denmark’s principle trading partners and an important EU ally on issues such as trade and social policy.

Nevertheless, there are important differences between the two countries. Denmark has never felt quite as detached from the continent as the UK has. In fact, Germany is becoming increasingly
popular among Danes, who are buying real estate in Berlin like never before. These days, Danes probably feel more attached to northern Europe than to the British Isles.

It would be wrong to suggest that Europe’s leaders have nothing to fear from Denmark or elsewhere, or that there are no lessons to be learnt from the British decision to leave the EU. There is still
dissatisfaction to be found in many parts of the European public. But what the polls suggest, at least for now, is that European electorates aren’t tempted by the unpredictable impulsiveness of
Brexit and the post-referendum chaos playing out in Westminster and beyond. To put it differently, Europe’s voters may want to reform the EU, sometimes drastically, but they want to work with
what they already have.

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Last year’s Conference of Presidents (COP21) meeting provided an important impetus for enhanced action to tackle climate change. The adoption of the Paris Agreement was clearly the political milestone of the transition to a low-carbon development.

But keeping the global temperature rise to below two degrees Centigrade, the target set by the agreement, requires coordinated action that cannot rely solely on nationally-determined contributions.

Multilateral organisations have to seize the political momentum provided by the Paris Agreement to build their own climate action. The COP22 in Marrakech, which starts today, will be to formulate these multilateral actions.

Morocco’s geographical position and proactive policies in this field – along with the importance of the Mediterranean climate change “hotspot” – means a favourable environment for enhanced and coordinated action by the Euro-Mediterranean region at COP22.

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) brings together 43 countries – the 28 EU member states and 15 southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. It is a key player in overseeing the unprecedented challenges facing the region, of which climate change is a major one.

Since 1990, the average greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of UfM members have been stable, at +0.05%. This is a good sign, as during the same period, the GDP of the region has more than doubled. Countries on both sides of Mediterranean are making huge efforts: their carbon intensity – the amount of GHG emitted per unit of GDP – has decreased in approximately the same order of magnitude: down 54 percent for non-EU southern and eastern Mediterranean states, and down 64 percent for the EU.

But by strengthening regional cooperation, UfM member states could improve the efficiency of their climate policies. After all, they are collectively responsible for implementing the Paris Agreement across the region.

Let’s consider two key sectors for the transition to a low-carbon economy: energy and trade.

The Mediterranean has exceptional weather conditions for renewable energy. Solar radiation and wind speeds are among the greatest in the world. Hydroelectricity is widely used. EU gas and electricity interconnections are with its neighbours, not with countries further afield. Having a more integrated energy market across the Euro-Mediterranean region would not only lower the cost of the EU’s energy transition, but also make it more efficient.

In 2014, southern and eastern Mediterranean countries had a €49bn trade deficit with the EU, making them the second-largest contributor to the EU’s trade surplus after the United States (at €103bn). Considering that there is already a significantly integrated market in areas such as motor vehicles, there are clear mutual benefits on both sides of the Mediterranean to consider the development of low-carbon transport at a Euro-Mediterranean level.

It is clear that Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on climate change has to be further enhanced. Today, with ten regional climate-related projects labelled by the 43 UfM members, accounting for more than €2.6bn, the Union for the Mediterranean is an important actor in enhancing climate action in the Euro-Mediterranean region, with a particular focus on the southern and eastern Mediterranean shores.

With the support of its co-presidencies, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the European Union, the Union for the Mediterranean is setting an ambitious, action-oriented climate agenda for the region.

Achieving the Paris Agreement target will be challenging. But through cooperation, dialogue and mutual support, the Euro-Mediterranean region is ready to engage to build a solution for the region and look towards a broader geographical scope, including the whole African continent. Marrakech will be the start of that important work.

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As Theresa May and her new government prepare to trigger Article 50, many questions have been raised over how the UK’s exit will affect EU trade policy and the fate of ongoing external trade negotiations. These issues are intrinsically connected to the formation of the UK’s future trade relationship with the EU, so until the withdrawal agreement is finalised, there will be no change in the formal negotiating strategy of the EU. But despite this best intention, Brexit may have several unintended ill effects.

Initially, the European Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström, sought to provide reassurance that everything will proceed normally. The UK is – and will for at least another two years formally be – an EU member state. It is, however, questionable whether negotiators can ignore the elephant in the room. A well-noted issue is the UK’s traditionally open and liberal approach to trade. Politically, it is unacceptable for the UK to continue shaping EU trade policy. But losing this voice will certainly have an impact, with the balance of power in the European Council shifted and the types of mandates the European Commission receives from member states altered. We should also take into account the possibility that the UK’s economic structure may change depending on what kind of economic and trade policies the British government seeks to pursue outside the EU. And this is on top of the broader EU trade issues such as the growing popular opposition to trade deals and the recent decision to make the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada a so-called “mixed” agreement. This, and several other issues, will diminish the confidence of external partners in the EU as a reliable trade and negotiating partner.

Talks on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are progressing, but with significant hurdles still to be overcome. The UK is, in general, one of the member states most willing to show openness in overcoming the many hurdles that block the way to a deal. Its absence may dampen hopes of concluding a more comprehensive agreement soon. The US trade representative has already indicated that the negotiations will need to be adjusted to account for Brexit. That could change the final agreement. The British market’s importance to the US is undeniable, so it’s difficult to imagine this issue not being addressed by American negotiators.

The EU may need to adapt its strategy accordingly. There may be options for including the UK in a future deal, such as by opening up TTIP for other countries to join. Another solution could be that the UK negotiates a parallel US trade deal modelled on TTIP.

“Britain’s withdrawal negotiations must start as soon as possible to remove uncertainty from current and future EU and UK trade negotiations”

The EU’s negotiations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been suspended since 2009, but bilateral free trade agreements with individual ASEAN members are being pursued. Brexit or not, I don’t think this situation would have changed. ASEAN countries’ trade relations with the UK may alter, depending on the future EU-UK relationship and the fact that the UK is an important trading partner for several ASEAN members. The UK will prioritise free trade deals with ASEAN countries, so depending on the individual agreements, this may influence
future negotiations that the EU conducts. Free trade negotiations that have already been concluded are unlikely to be affected at this stage.

The UK’s withdrawal may have greater consequences for the eventual content of the EU’s bilateral deal with India. The negotiations have ground to a halt, and recent attempts to breathe new life into them seem fruitless. One of the sticking points – wines and spirits – may be influenced by the UK’s withdrawal due to the relevance of whisky for bilateral trade relations, as British producers
seek to tap into one of the world’s biggest consumer market for the spirit. But Brexit may also help the EU-India talks progress, as the UK’s concerns over “Mode 4”, covering the movement of skilled workers, could cease to be an obstacle.

The EU’s negotiations with Japan have similarly stalled of late. At this May’s G7 summit in Ise-Shima, leaders expressed their willingness to resume the negotiations, but ultimately we will have
to see how this develops, especially after Japan’s recent upper-house elections. Outstanding issues still need to be resolved, and as with other trade deals, the removal of UK interests in an EU trade deal with Japan could impact the way negotiations move forward, especially considering Japanese business interests in the UK.

At this stage, these questions revolve around a highly uncertain and theoretical issue. The key, in terms of impact on EU trade negotiations, will be the type of relationship negotiated between the EU and the UK. If the UK retains full access to the EU’s single market, the impact could be minimal as market access conditions for external trading partners wouldn’t change, or at most only to
a small degree. The EU would retain its negotiating power and its attractiveness as a partner. In my view, Britain’s withdrawal negotiations must start as soon as possible to remove uncertainty from current and future EU and UK trade negotiations. This will be instrumental in ensuring that the EU remains a credible, strong and reliable negotiating partner.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – European Parliament

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Europe’s demographic landscape shows a cluster of “fertility champions” – the north-western countries that have birth rates close to or slightly above population replacement level (and which also have some of the highest life expectancies in the world). But the post-communist countries to the east are enduring an unprecedented demographic collapse. These countries must critically re-think
their traditions of communist demographic policies, which are inadequate in modern times.

In the 1990s, eastern Europe went through a period of “lowest-low fertility” – below 1.3 children per woman. Countries in the region are gradually recovering, but the “demographic problem” persists in each of them. An ageing population, very low fertility, extensive emigration among young people, and emerging ethnic tensions related to the higher reproduction rates of minorities raise concerns in the media, among policymakers and in civil society.

Bulgaria is one of the countries in which the transition to democracy and a market economy has had some of the most negative implications for demographic development. As a country that was, until 1990, an example for an almost ideal two-child society, and that in the mid-1960s had one of the lowest mortality rates in the world, Bulgaria has turned into one of the poorest countries in the EU, with an extremely worrying demographic situation. Bulgaria has the worst population growth rate in the EU. When combined with a persistent trend of huge emigration, population decline becomes steep and irreversible in the short term. And while Bulgaria’s population not only shrinks with unprecedented speed, it is “greying” very quickly.

“The post-communist countries to the east are enduring an unprecedented ‘demographic collapse'”

Since 2000, Bulgaria has escaped from the “lowest-low fertility” group. In recent years, birth rates have approached the EU average of 1.58 children per woman, reaching 1.53 in 2014. But a one-child model prevails for 64% of families, with many couples also deliberately postponing marriage and childbirth. Half of young people surveyed in 2011 expressed a strong desire to emigrate, their values and preferences regarding family, marriage and children being more liberal and non-conformist. Life expectancy for men and women, although increasing, is one of the lowest in the EU. Crucially, infant mortality – especially among ethnic minorities (the Roma population) – is double the EU average, at 7.6 per thousand live births (although it has fallen from 17.5 in 1997).

These demographic tendencies provoke the question: why does the country show so little improvement in this area, given that the last decade has seen economic stability and significant increases
in living standards? One of the explanations – though not the only one – relates to the specific character of Bulgaria’s demographic policy, which is strongly biased towards fertility and reproduction,
and underestimates the importance of effective state intervention in public health and mortality.

This bias dates back to communist times, when coercive pronatalism was seen as the main tool for optimising the country’s demographic development. But health and survival reflect socioeconomic conditions far better than fertility. Several prosperous societies – Germany and Austria, for instance – have very low birth rates.

In recent times, Bulgaria has struggled with chaotic healthcare reforms. Healthcare organisation has been decentralised. Private healthcare has been introduced along with the general practitioner model of primary care, clinical pathways, co-payments and rationing of care. The resulting huge inequalities in access to high-quality medical services turned healthcare from universally accessible
under communism into a luxurious commodity affordable mostly by upper echelons of society. Guaranteed access for the most vulnerable social groups to adequate medical care and treatment is a must if Bulgaria is to have an effective demographic policy.

In 2007, Bulgaria’s EU membership was celebrated as an important milestone that would bring additional stability to the political and economic life of the country. But it also meant accepting many European states’ common vision of social policies and protections. The country’s financial resources, though, were insufficient to maintain the legacies of the quasi-communist welfare system and invest in social protection for vulnerable groups or high-quality welfare infrastructure like nurseries and homes for the elderly. The extremely low financial support for families and children – currently, family benefits are less than €20 per month distributed on a means-tested principle – meant that EU social policy principles were accepted only on paper.

“Guaranteed access for the most vulnerable social groups to adequate medical care and treatment is a must if Bulgaria is to have an effective demographic policy”

Very recently, Bulgaria has experienced a new challenge. The current refugee crisis, with its transient migration, found formerly “closed to immigration” countries like Bulgaria completely unprepared and unable to provide adequate facilities or financial help for refugees. The same Bulgaria that still experiences the huge emigration of ethnic Bulgarians today faces becoming a country of immigration – something for which the country is politically,socially and financially unqualified. In public discussions, the role of the EU is seen as supporting the protection of national security, since illegal migration is considered not only an economic burden for the “poorest state in EU” but also a demographic threat to “the most quickly depopulating country in Europe”.

One of the messages we can draw from these short reflections on Bulgaria’s demographic situation, which could be valid for the majority of the post-communist countries, is that recent policy interventions concerning demographic development should be critically re-evaluated. The persistent overlooking of health and mortality should be replaced by a multi-dimensional, comprehensive and sustainable demographic policy that takes into account the complexity of population development, and incorporates effective measures in all domains of social life relevant to people’s health, survival and reproduction.

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