Europe's World

Last summer, at the height of the onslaught against Gaza, I recall a charged meeting with a group of young Muslim constituents whose sense of frustration and powerlessness led them to threaten arson and other forms of civil unrest if we, the elected representatives, did not act.

That experience clearly shows how problems in other parts of the world affect us all, making it essential that we take a pro-active global view on radicalisation.  The goal should be to build a more secure future for everyone, sharing resources, ideas and learning; meeting the threat of violence with dialogue; being brave enough to engage with the issues.

The terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen this year have raised profound questions. Although most terrorist incidents in Europe are not jihadist and the majority of jihadist terrorists have criminal records or suffered from mental illness, there remains a central concern: why do violent extremist ideas hold any appeal for European youths and how do we respond?

“The answer to radicalisation is to encourage social inclusion and tolerance”

The dilemmas of how to deal with terrorism and jihadist radicalisation in Europe test our fundamental values. The answers that we, as European citizens and decision-makers, provide will come to define us.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic compromised human rights and made rash, sometimes grotesque, declarations about who was “with us” or “against us”. We now understand, or at least should understand, that in order to defend our values we must stick by them. The answer to radicalisation is to encourage social inclusion and tolerance, greater civic engagement and democratic participation, and increased investment in education and jobs, particularly in marginalised communities. This robust and self-assured multiculturalism offers a vision of hope and opportunity able to tackle the root causes of radicalisation. Progressives in Europe must shape this debate to stem the rise of xenophobia, Islamophobia, and knee-jerk policy reactions that undermine human rights.

Three key areas need special attention. First, we must be sensitive in defining jihadism and radicalisation, to avoid painting identities and communities as monolithic. Second, education policies should emphasise inclusion and platforms must be provided for voices in Muslim communities that offer progressive and humanist narratives. Third, there must be engagement with the authorities, civil society and human rights activists from Muslim-majority countries where jihadist organisations operate.

Fortunately, these elements were all present to varying degrees in statements made by European institutions following the Paris attacks. Conclusions from the European Council and the Council of Ministers focused on promoting community dialogue and educational initiatives – the European Parliament’s Resolution on Anti-Terrorism Measures elaborates on these points at some length. Yet although there seems to be a conviction that inclusivity, democratic participation and dialogue must be promoted, more work is needed to ensure these ideas are implemented.

The European Union has always excelled at creating networks for exchanging best practice. The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) was launched by the Commission in 2011 as a European platform to facilitate the work of “first line local practitioners”, combating radicalisation in communities. However, RAN is part of the EU’s counter-terrorism programme PREVENT, which has been criticised by some on the left for providing vague definitions of extremism, and inaccurate interpretations of Sharia law and jihad that tarnish peaceful devout Muslims. This has contributed to the lack of trust between authorities and certain Muslim communities.

“[...] extremism is not a Muslim problem, but can afflict any religious group.”

RAN must encourage civil society organisations to focus on empowering activists, scholars and community leaders who provide humanist visions of Islam, and engage in inter-faith dialogue and gender empowerment. In my region, that includes the Manchester Muslim Jewish Forum and the Christian Muslim Encounters research project at Lancaster University.

Community engagement must lead to meaningful democratic participation with local and national institutions, from getting citizens out to vote to encouraging greater public debate by young people. There should be more citizenship and political education programmes, such as those developed by Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) in the UK during the run up to last year’s European elections. At the same time, cases of people turning to violent jihadism after a history of mental illness show differentiated care and rehabilitation services should be made available.

It is also important to remember that extremism is not a Muslim problem, but can afflict any religious group. The continuation of the Ku Klux Klan is just one example, with its message of “hope and deliverance to white Christian America”.  The fundamentalism practised by the Iranian regime, Al Qaeda and Islamic State abhors the modern age, with its freedom for women and young people. In doing so, it creates fear and oppression, restricting civil society and the media, introducing cruel Medieval punishments.

Education is key to countering extremism. Although the EU’s competences in this field are limited, the Commission should issue Country Specific Recommendations on inclusion of marginalised communities, citizenship education and inter-faith dialogue. Higher education must be more accessible, particularly for marginalised groups. Vocational training and apprenticeship programmes may provide social and economic opportunities in marginalised communities.

“It is up to decision-makers and citizens to promote a progressive and inclusive Europe”

Cooperation and exchange with countries in the Middle East and North Africa region   are key EU policy goals. They should not only provide support for those countries’ fight against extremism, but also introduce more voices into the European debate. As the Commission reviews its European Neighbourhood Policy programmes, it must provide for civil society and academic exchanges between the EU and MENA countries to emphasise support for human rights, democracy, gender equality and empowerment of women and girls. This will bring about the gradual overhaul of patriarchal power structures that make fighting extremism all the more difficult. Exchanges between European and MENA academics and activists can greatly enrich the debate.

Faced with both jihadist extremism and rising Islamophobic nationalism, it is up to decision-makers and citizens to promote a progressive and inclusive Europe, strong in its diversity, tolerance and multiculturalism. By stimulating citizen participation, investing in inclusive education and promoting open exchange with our neighbours, we can challenge the politics of fear and offer instead a politics of compassion and understanding. We would all be wiser and safer for it.

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Britain appears to have finally decided to become European. Not that it is falling deeper in love with the European Union’s project of ever-closer union; quite the contrary. Perhaps the most curious aspect of this election is how small a role Europe has played throughout the campaign despite the emergence of UKIP as a major force.

The Conservatives have, after all, promised an in-or-out referendum on a “reformed” EU to please their euro-sceptic faction and ease pressure from the staunchly anti-Europe UKIP. However, the campaign has focused more on immigration, which all parties say they want to control more tightly, despite the obvious economic benefits migrant workers bring. Remarkably, it was only in the last days of campaigning that the issue of the UK’s continued EU membership surfaced as a substantial point of contention. The possibility and implications of a Brexit featured strongly in the leaders’ televised “question time” event. Latest opinion polls suggest a shift away from satisfaction with Europe, with only 36% of the population seemingly keen to stay in the EU.

It appears Britain’s love/hate relationship with Europe will rumble on, whatever the outcome of the election. British politics, however, has become, by any conventional metric, more European than ever. The running of the country is now dependent on coalitions, minority governments, arrangements cooked up behind closed doors, and deals on government programmes cobbled together by parties after the election and therefore not subject to voter approval. Of course one person has to be prime minister, even without an absolute majority. David Cameron was forced to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats in 2010 rather than govern with only Tory ministers, and had to dilute some – though not all – of his manifesto pledges. The parties are announcing red lines, beyond which all insist they won’t budge during coalition talks. Yet everyone knows a compromise will have to be reached, as it was when the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats got together to form the current government in 2010.

“It appears Britain’s love/hate relationship with Europe will rumble on, whatever the outcome of the election”

So after a century of red or blue majority governments headed by either the Conservatives or Labour, Britain is becoming more continental. In Denmark, no single party has won an overall majority since 1909.  The Federal Republic of Germany has always been governed by coalitions, including, of course, the current Grand Coalition between the centre-right Christian Democrats and centre-left Social Democrats. British electors no longer seem to trust any single party to govern well or fairly. The financial crisis and its aftermath have had a role to play here, calling into question the economic competence of all parties.

That readiness of electorates to punish parties that under-perform is something else the British now share with other Europeans. In Greece, for example, the parties which formed a grand coalition in 2012 have all lost huge support. The decades-long dominance of Greece’s two main centre-left and centre-right parties came to a crashing end as voters punished both in January this year for the austerity measures and economic mismanagement which left the country with massive unemployment and a 25% fall in GDP.

The era of absolute Conservative or Labour majorities in Britain is relatively recent. The 19th and early 20th centuries saw frequent minority governments. In January 1910, for example, 274 Liberal MPs were elected along with 272 Conservatives and 71 Irish MPs who fought on a platform of independence for Ireland. In December 1910, another election was held, but it too produced an inconclusive result – 272 Liberal MPs, 271 Conservatives and 74 Irish nationalists. Yet the minority Liberal government that was formed produced some of the most radical reforms in British history – notably the introduction of state pensions. Irish MPs kept the government in power by refusing to support the Conservatives in any vote that threatened the Liberal administration, which was seen as more favourable to Irish independence than the Tories. These days, it is the Scottish National Party that may well tilt the balance of power in the House of Commons. Though it was unable to win the September 2014 independence referendum, the SNP has since gained support for its separatist and anti-austerity policies.

“That readiness of electorates to punish parties that under-perform is something else the British now share with other Europeans”

Where does Britain go from here? So far, the political establishment has not really adapted to the new electoral realities. Membership of the main parties has been reduced considerably. Single, or narrow, issue parties such as the Greens, the SNP or UKIP have grown in importance. The printed media no longer has the same influence to shape opinion. It was long assumed that Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system delivered stable, solid majority governments able to take tough decisions – until they ran out of steam and were replaced by the other big party. Although the electorate appears to be content that this no longer holds true, the reaction of the markets to the prospect of a hung parliament points to a period of economic uncertainty which may not have been factored into voters’ calculations.

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The call is often from a worried teacher. They are noticing changes in students from immigrant backgrounds. Before, they defined themselves by nationality, as Kosovars, Bosnians or Turks, now they say they are Muslims. Before, they took part in art classes, now they insist their religion prohibits art. Then there’s a second change: these young men and women start to talk of a war against Islam that targets Muslims – targets them.

When I listen, I remember myself as a 16-year-old, the daughter of a diplomat from a secular family, coming back to my home country, Yemen, after four years in Morocco. It was 1982 – a period that saw the mushrooming of Islamist ideology in North Yemen. I was fascinated by a religious group led by a charismatic young woman of 17. The group met in the schoolyard. I would later learn it was part of a strong Islamist movement that saw Salafists work hand-in-hand with the Muslim Brotherhood.

“My father was not my father anymore; he was an enemy of Islam, I was told”

The sessions were fascinating. Our leader explained about the love of God. The moment we enter into Islam, she said, all our sins are washed away and we become equal. The fate of those who are not Muslims was never mentioned. She told us that we could be better people if only we embraced the message of Islam – the true Islam, not the corrupted form of our society. For a teenage girl, lacking direction, the message was mesmerising, and I embraced it wholeheartedly.

The changes in me were gradual. It started with language. Instead of greeting others with “good morning” or “good evening”, I used only the salute of Islam: “assalamu alaikum”, peace be upon you. Later I would learn that this salute is only reserved for Muslims. “Do not use it with non-Muslims”, I was told.

My days took on a rigid religious structure: prayer, Quran recital. It was strict, but simple and reassuring. “You have to wear the hijab”, I was told. “Hell will be filled with women hanged by their hair because of the way they seduced men by their beauty”. I was used to walking with my hair open. I covered up nevertheless. I did not like it. It suffocated me. But I did it – if this is the price for God’s love, how could I object?

“Militant radicalisation feeds on non-violent Islamism”

I was told all those around me including my practicing mother were living in Jahiliyya – “the state of ignorance and false belief that prevailed before the time of Islam”. I was told that painting, sculpture, art and music were all part of Jahiliyya and prohibited by Islam. I started to feel uncomfortable. I grew up surrounded by art and was fascinated reading about it in the encyclopaedia my father gave me when I reached 13. I was told that, like the companions of Mohammed, I had to renounce my parents and their society. I was told I belonged to a “chosen group” made supreme by adherence to the real Islam.

The more I embraced their message, the more I was drawn away from my father – an intellectual, a philosopher. He was a man of wisdom who taught me about life, philosophy and religion through poetry, books and critical thinking.  My father was not my father anymore; he was an enemy of Islam, I was told. He objected to my wearing of the hijab. He objected to what I started to tell him about Islam and the world. He was telling me this is fundamentalism, and I was starting to be angry with him. When I told my group about our fights, they repeated the message about the companions of Mohammed and how sometimes they had to fight their own fathers, brothers and uncles, even on the battlefield.

I started to be separated from my surroundings. Our meetings were no longer in the school, but in houses of young members of the movement. Older women were talking to us now.  They were telling me killing is OK. I was given a booklet about the life of Khaled Eslamboli, the army officer who planned the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Eslamboli was treated as a “hero of Islam”. Sadat was a Pharaoh who made peace with Israel, who worked with Jews intent on destroying Islam.

It was not just the militant dimension of their message that finally made me realise that something was fundamentally wrong with this group, it was the gender aspect. It was when I was told a saying of the Prophet about a woman who ignored her husband to visit her sick father. I was told the Prophet said, “the angels are cursing her, for she defied her husband’s order”. Later I came to understand that the Prophet might not have said this at all.

“Violence is often the last step of the radicalisation process”

I left our meeting that afternoon knowing I would never return. Who should be cursed here, I asked myself, the woman who wants to visit her sick father, or this husband who has no mercy in his heart?

It was with a sigh of relief that my father witnessed the end of my short flirtation with Islamism – taking off my headscarf was its first sign.

I was lucky. I was raised in a context that provided me with the tools to question everything I was told, not to take things at face value. Others are not so lucky and become entangled in a web of radicalism.

I am sharing this personal story with you because it connects with the phone calls I receive nowadays from Swiss teachers, overwhelmed with changes they are witnessing in their students. It connects with the questions raised by European and North American policymakers on how to tackle militant Islamism. Those policymakers often seem content with policies that address the security dimension of radicalisation, focusing on violent Islamism but ignoring its non-violent version. When they attempt to chart preventive or de-radicalisation policies, they conclude that working with “non-violent extremism” can be the best antidote to violent extremism.

I strongly disagree with this approach, because Al Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State are simply violent manifestations of that non-violent Islamism.

As a scholar, my research has always touched on Islamism. I researched the Arabian Peninsula’s social and political structures. I travelled the region for a book on authoritarian Arab states and women’s rights. I researched Sharia Councils in the UK. The more I learned about Islamism, the more one crucial message became evident: militant radicalisation feeds on non-violent Islamism – tackling the first requires confronting the second.

I tend to distinguish between two types of Islamism: societal and political.

Societal Islamism refers to those puritanical religious movements which concern themselves with changing social behaviours to conform to their rigid world view. They call for an Islamic mode of life, to separate its followers from wider society and often refrain from politics. The Salafi Islam of Saudi Arabia and Deobandi Islam of South Asia belong to these movements.

Political Islam, on the other hand, is a modern ideology that seeks political power as a means of transforming society. Its goal is revolutionary change compelled by a vision of a puritanical society governed by the law of God. In this state, identity and citizenship are defined by religious affiliation and observance.

There are different types of political Islam. Movements, such as the Islamic State, Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, seek to create this vision of society through outright violence. Others – such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami – use an incremental approach. Violence is still socially acceptable, but the strategy is gradual Islamisation through the education system, the mosque and the media. It is no coincidence that every time Islamists enter a government the first ministry they insist on having is education, and the first measure involves moulding the curriculum around their ideology.

Sometimes the two types of Islamism intertwine to become indistinguishable. Both embrace the ultimate objective of an Islamist state that implements what they consider the laws of God. Both call for a state run by a chosen supreme group of Muslims. Both actively promote concepts of military and missionary Jihad against enemies of Islam – the West included. Both emphasise control over women in their preaching of an ideal Islamist world.

I was drawn to both societal and political Islamism. The first paved the ground for the second. Societal Islamism sought to systematically separate me from my diverse Muslim North Yemeni society. It immersed me in a religious teaching that gradually turned political – the ultimate aspect of which was violence, that “it is OK to kill the enemies of Islam”.

My story took place in the ‘eighties, decades before the Iraq War and the War on Terror, which some point to today to explain the radicalisation of young migrants. It would be difficult to blame Western foreign policy for my fascination with Islamism. Nor did I come from a poor or marginalised background. I was upper-middle class, educated and privileged, but I was also young and searching for my identity.

Many of those radicalised in the West today are second, or third, generation migrants with Islamic heritage, or converts to Islam. They may face marginalisation and racism, identity crises, or the urge to rebel against family and society. However, the main driver of radicalisation is the ideological message of societal and political Islamism. It provides new recruits with direction, structure and identity. It empowers them with images of supremacy and domination.  Violence is often the last step of the radicalisation process.

Taking on militant Islamism requires policies that confront its societal and political messages in schools, mosques and religious classes. In charting these policies, it makes sense to avoid alliances with societal or political Islamist movements, however “non-violent” their message.

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With the UK’s general election on 7th May, it is looking highly likely that the Scottish National Party will displace the Lib-Dems as the UK’s third-biggest party, possibly winning almost all of Scotland’s 59 seats at Westminster (where today they hold only six seats, and Labour hold forty-one).

The SNP has campaigned not on independence but on an anti-austerity and ‘progressive’ ticket. In both Scotland and England, the debate has focused on domestic policy even though the Conservatives are committed to an EU referendum, if they win, that could lead to a potential ‘Brexit’.

With the SNP potentially holding the balance of power after 7th May – since neither the Tories nor Labour are expected to get anywhere near a majority – how might the SNP MPs impact on the UK’s approach to the EU?

Scotland and the EU

Humza Yousaf, Minister for Europe and International Development in the Scottish Government, says the campaign is going “phenomenally well in Scotland, as the polls and our own canvass results reflect”. He sees the “tectonic plates of Scottish politics shifting”.

Yousaf thinks that, in Scotland, “there is a more pro-European stance here”. There is much more outside interest in Scotland and its external policies, says Yousaf, with many more ambassadors and other visitors coming since the referendum, despite the ‘no’ vote.

Does Scotland at present have enough influence on British positions on key EU policies? “No, definitely not enough” says Yousaf. He explains there are quarterly joint ministerial meetings between the UK and Scotland on EU issues but “there isn’t enough discussion on policy formation…Smith [the Smith Commission Report which looked at further devolution post-referendum] left the door open a bit and said we would need to discuss more how to represent Scotland’s views on the global stage”. It’s a big issue that has been left hanging.

Yousaf complains strongly that even where Scotland has the most competent and experienced minister – for instance on fisheries – London will not let Scottish ministers speak for the UK in Brussels’ councils, pulling in unelected Lords or British diplomats instead when UK ministers are absent. Pressure for a more fair and rational approach for Scotland in the EU is likely to grow.

Scottish interests overlap with, but are not identical to, England’s. Scotland produces about 25% of the EU’s total wind energy, and has the most ambitious renewables targets in the EU. It has a greater focus on oil, food and drink, and fisheries amongst other areas, as well as its more anti-austerity and pro-EU attitudes, than England.

Asked about Greece’s struggles to escape austerity, Yousaf is sympathetic but cautious: “I don’t believe it is necessary for Greece to leave [the euro] for stability, any member leaving would be a disaster for the EU. I have faith they will find a manageable compromise’. He talks about Syriza having to “navigate” the promises they made to their voters to find a way to a compromise.

EU Referendum and ‘Brexit’ – only for England?

Humza Yousaf sees ‘Brexit’ as possible, if the Tories manage to put together an informal coalition after 7th May. Yousaf says “it [a referendum] is playing with fire, exit could have devastating consequences for the whole of the UK”.

But Yousaf is cautious about the impact of a possible ‘no’ vote on the push for Scottish independence if there is an EU in-out referendum: “This election is not about another [independence] referendum….If Scotland voted to stay in the EU and the rest of the UK to leave and we were about to be dragged out against our will that might be a trigger, and people would say we would rather be an independent country and in Europe.”

Yousaf refers to Irish anxieties about a possible Brexit (given shared borders and other common interests) and obviously sees similar concerns potentially for Scotland. He thinks it is better for the whole of the UK to stay in the EU. There is a conundrum here since while an EU referendum with an English ‘no’ vote might be a positive catalyst for Scottish independence, it would in many ways be better for an independent Scotland if England too remained in the EU.

Asked who might be the main allies of a one-day independent Scotland in the EU, Yousaf says “primarily the [rest of the] UK would be a natural ally in the EU and Ireland, first and foremost, we would work closely with them, and yes with some of the Nordics – Sweden, Finland and Denmark.”

Yousaf says he is sure if they had won the Scottish referendum, Scotland would have stayed in the EU: “Brussels would have found a way, there is no doubt in my mind. The EU is a pragmatic organisation as it was when East Germany joined. We have been in for 40 years and our laws reflect the acquis, we have €100,000 citizens here in Scotland, 25% of EU wind energy….so you could imagine the practical problems if we weren’t in the EU for a day, the disruption.”

Most attention on SNP foreign policies has been on their aim of getting rid of Trident. Trident, says Yousaf, has no moral, political or economic purpose. But he goes on to emphasise “we are not a party of pacifists” and attacks the current government for not investing enough in conventional forces.

Migration is another issue where the SNP has positioned itself in a progressive position compared to the UK’s main parties. Yousaf talks of needing a ‘tier and points’ system for migration and insists migration is positive and necessary for Scotland given its aging population. Such an outlook may be helpful in the debate around free movement of labour in the EU, one that is likely to continue even under a Labour government to some extent.

The SNP’s role at Westminster – plenty to discuss

David Cameron has been attacking Labour for much of the election over the possibility that it might end up as a minority government supported by the SNP, a party committed to independence from the UK.

This attack, effectively on the legitimacy of SNP MPs voting at Westminster has gone down very badly in Scotland. “The anger”, says Yousaf, “is tangible. From six or seven months ago”, he goes on, “when Cameron was saying ‘you should not leave the UK’ to saying ‘your voice is illegitimate and you should have no say in a future government’….people are apoplectic, very angry”.

Ed Miliband has also shocked some on the left in England, by not only ruling out a formal coalition with the SNP, but even a so-called ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement. This suggests he thinks he can govern as a minority government, with some votes in support on key policies from the SNP, but without negotiating with them – this seems implausible.

Both Scottish and British politics look like being interesting indeed after the results come in on 7th May. The SNP will certainly be a key voice in many areas, even without a formal agreement, if there is a minority Labour government. And a Conservative coalition or more informal agreement with the Lib-Dems, Democratic Ulster Unionists and UKIP may find itself fracturing over an EU referendum – something the SNP would not support – so in a more unstable governing context, watching the SNP is now going to be a key part of following Britain’s politics.

An earlier version of this article was published in Open Democracy.

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The impact since 2009 of the EU’s economic and financial crisis on the labour market for young people has been deep and unsettling. Youth unemployment has risen so significantly that in some EU countries, particularly in southern Europe, one in five young people are not in employment, education or training.

These levels of youth unemployment are disastrous. That there are so many young people without hope and without prospects is bad enough, but on top of that, there are huge economic and societal costs. Even if the European economy recovers, many young people will not be able to find a good job. Yet it is unacceptable that unemployment should be the first labour market experience of young people when they finish their education or training. Europe needs to mobilise all its forces in to combat youth unemployment.

EU leaders have agreed to set up a Youth Guarantee scheme designed to soften the impact of the crisis. But the high rates of youth unemployment often have deeper roots. They also point to shortcomings and structural weaknesses in such other spheres as public administration, education and labour market institutions. The Youth Guarantee’s promise is that all young women and men under the age of 25 will receive a good-quality offer within four months of leaving formal education or becoming unemployed. But labour market conditions differ around Europe, so fulfilling this promise will require a broad range of measures that must be tailor-made for each country. This implies a significant financial investment by member states that could then be topped up from EU funds. The medium- and long-term benefits of successfully implementing the Youth Guarantee are huge, making these costs the best way to ensure sustainable future growth in Europe.

“We must help disfavoured countries build structures that are better equipped to tackle youth unemployment”

With last year’s establishment of the European Network of Public Employment Services (PES), we now have a firm basis for co-operation on labour market policies. The aim is to reduce unemployment by increasing employment service efficiency, by fostering exchanges and mutual learning. This will help to improve the functioning of labour markets by better matching jobseekers and employers and by promoting mobility. The PES Network has created a formalised “Benchlearning” system that combines elements of benchmarking and mutual learning.

One of the Network’s major tasks is to enable public employment services in member states to identify optimal strategies for combatting youth unemployment. This is complicated by differences in the level of resources available to national services and by the range of challenges posed by labour markets in the various member states. Sharing experience on successful measures and adapting those measures to fit other national labour markets could be an important first step in developing new solutions to youth unemployment, but this will only be effective if there is a deep understanding of the unique nature of each country’s labour market.

All countries need to prioritise funding for tackling youth unemployment. The EU will top up national spending through the European Social Funding, the European Investment Bank and €6bn included in the Youth Employment Initiative. However, it is vital that public authorities are able to make efficient and effective use of the money. Simply handing out extra cash will not solve the problem. We must help disfavoured countries build structures that are better equipped to tackle youth unemployment.

The Youth Guarantee together with the PES Network will help, but there are a number of issues that must be addressed.

Among the most important is making sure young people get qualifications and skills that meet employers’ demands. This should be done throughout their education and not left until they are already looking for work. To do this, we need to improve educational and training systems to incorporate skills and knowledge that are directly relevant for the labour market. This requires a profound knowledge of national labour market conditions.

Another priority area is the transition from school to employment. We need specialised structures in public administrations to support young people after they finish education. It’s vital they are provided with tailor-made job placements and career counselling covering job opportunities at regional, national and European level. The authorities also need to form a better picture of the generation of young people who are seeking to enter the labour market, so they can respond to specific problems hampering young jobseekers, such as mobility costs or lack of language skills.

“Building trust between social partners could help the search for more flexible solutions to integrate young people into the labour market”

Improving public employment services should not be done in isolation. We need strong co-operation between the public and the private sector, bringing together employment services, career guidance providers, education and training institutions, employers and trade unions. Given the extraordinary levels of youth unemployment, it’s particularly important to improve the sometimes difficult relationship between employers and unions. Building trust between social partners could help the search for more flexible solutions to integrate young people into the labour market. The future of millions of young people should not be held back by ideological controversies or political negotiations. Beyond the current crisis, major trends such as the digitalisation of the world of work are beginning to shape our labour markets. By building well-functioning and flexible public structures with experts in the field of youth employment, Europe will be able to face these future labour market challenges successfully.

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