Agrégateur de flux

On Monday 13 October, SEDE Members will discuss the draft 2025 Annual report on the Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy as well as the draft report on drones and their impact on contemporary warfare. SEDE will also hold a joint item will the TRAN Committee to discuss the amendments tabled to the joint draft report on Military Mobility.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

While the Democratic Party leader has taken an uncompromising stance, President Lee Jae-myung is attempting to foster solidarity and cooperation.

At the annual alumni conference, the transformative power of people-to-people programs was on full display.

Mercredi, Jens-Frederik Nielsen s’est adressé aux députés à Strasbourg. C’est la première fois que le chef du gouvernement groenlandais prend la parole au Parlement.

Source : © Union européenne, 2025 - PE

A Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal (NKFIH), mint Program Operátor a Svájci-Magyar Együttműködési Program II. időszak „Kutatás és innováció” tématerületén SM02-RES-PC3-AB és SM02-RES-PC3-C jelű, „Kutatási Infrastruktúrák együttműködésének támogatása” című pályázati felhívások beadási határideje meghosszabbításra került.

On Wednesday, Jens-Frederik Nielsen addressed MEPs in Strasbourg as the first leader of a Greenland government to speak at the European Parliament.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On Wednesday, Jens-Frederik Nielsen addressed MEPs in Strasbourg as the first leader of a Greenland government to speak at the European Parliament.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Napjainkban egyre többen nyitottak arra, hogy valamilyen intim kelléket használjanak a hálószobában. Van, aki a magányos estéit akarja így feldobni, mások a párjukkal együtt hódolnának az élvezeteknek.

Szerencsére ezek a kiegészítők ma már online is megrendelhetők. Sexshop többféle is található a neten, elsősorban a desirel.bg oldalán érdemes szétnézni, mert itt nagy a választék. Nézzük, hogyan juthatunk hozzá a felnőtt játékszerekhez, és mit kell még tudni a tárolásukról!

A rendelés menete

Az a jó, hogy az internetnek hála szinte bármit meg tudunk már rendelni otthonról is: ez egy sexshop tekintetében külön hasznos, hiszen így nem fenyeget bennünket a lebukás veszélye. Nem fogunk ismerőssel találkozni, nem néznek ránk érdeklődve vagy épp megvetően az eladók a válogatás közben. Ehelyett egy csendes estén le kell csak ülnünk a laptop elé, és ráérősen végignézhetjük a kínálatot.

A termékleírások a desirel.bg oldalán is nagyon részletesek, ezért nem fog bennünket csalódás érni. Fel vannak tüntetve a méretek, az alapanyagok, sőt még az is elolvasható, milyen hasznos funkciói vannak a termékeknek.

A kosárba helyezés után kiválaszthatjuk opcióként azt is, hogy automatába kérjük a csomagot, így biztosan nem kell találkoznunk a kézbesítővel. De akkor sincs gond, ha a házhoz szállítást kérjük, hiszen a dobozon nem szerepel a feladó, senki nem fogja tehát megtudni, mit és hol rendeltünk.

A használati tudnivalók

A felnőtt játékszerek többségéhez a gyártók ajánlanak különféle síkosítókat, illetve tisztítószereket. A biztonságos használat érdekében ezeket is mindenképpen szerezzük be! Ha pedig sérült a termék, ne használjuk!

Arra is figyeljünk, hogy mit írnak a leírásban, milyen körülmények között alkalmazható a kellék. Vannak, amelyek vízálló tulajdonsággal is bírnak – ezeket akár este a fürdőkádban vagy a zuhany alatt is kipróbálhatjuk.

Minden anyag más-más tisztítást kíván, így a speciális ápolószerekről is gondoskodjunk. Sose tegyük vissza a terméket a használat után a fiókba anélkül, hogy le ne töröltük volna: a higiénia miatt ez nagyon lényeges.

Tárolási kisokos

Sokan tanácstalanok a tekintetben, hol tárolják ezeket a kütyüket. Nyilvánvaló, hogy semmiképp sem illik őket közszemlére tenni – még ha csak egy ártatlannak tűnő társasjátékról is van szó. Kerüljenek zárt helyre a játékszerek!

Az éjjeli szekrény fiókja vagy az ágy alatti tároló biztonságos lehet, de ide is dobozba tegyük őket. A gyerekek ne férhessenek hozzá!

Amennyiben ruhákat rendelünk egy sexshopból – például szerepjátékokhoz –, akkor azokat is elkülönítve tároljuk. Ugyanígy a testápolással kapcsolatos termékeket is zárható szekrénybe tegyük.

Kaphatók utazáshoz való intim darabok is, ezek jellemzően kis dobozban kerülnek értékesítésre, diszkrét csomagolással. Mindig gondoskodjunk ettől függetlenül a játékszer megfelelő védelméről!

A sexshopokban való vásárlást ma még sokan szégyenteljesnek gondolják, pedig érdemes nyitottnak lenni: sok örömet szerezhetünk ezáltal magunknak és a párunknak is.

The post Intim kellékek pároknak: mire érdemes figyelni? appeared first on Biztonságpiac.

On Wednesday, MEPs approved EU aid for laid-off workers following the closure of chip manufacturer BelGaN.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On Wednesday, MEPs approved EU aid for laid-off workers following the closure of chip manufacturer BelGaN.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Mercredi, les députés ont approuvé un plan d’aide européenne en faveur des travailleurs licenciés à la suite de la fermeture du fabricant de puces BelGaN.
Commission des budgets

Source : © Union européenne, 2025 - PE

On Wednesday, MEPs approved EU aid for 915 former Goodyear employees in Hanau and Fulda, Germany.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On Wednesday, MEPs approved EU aid for 915 former Goodyear employees in Hanau and Fulda, Germany.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On Wednesday, MEPs approved EU aid for 915 former Goodyear employees in Hanau and Fulda, Germany.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This policy brief discusses how developing countries should continue leveraging the G20 and UNFCCC platforms while improving South–South and North–South cooperation, amid a combative geopolitical scenario, to 1) quantify their finance, technology, and capacity needs for transition and adaptation; 2) ensure – and enhance – finance flows; 3) develop or acquire appropriate at-scale technologies blending modern and traditional expertise; and 4) shape bespoke national energy transition pathways that best suit their developmental priorities and resources.

This policy brief discusses how developing countries should continue leveraging the G20 and UNFCCC platforms while improving South–South and North–South cooperation, amid a combative geopolitical scenario, to 1) quantify their finance, technology, and capacity needs for transition and adaptation; 2) ensure – and enhance – finance flows; 3) develop or acquire appropriate at-scale technologies blending modern and traditional expertise; and 4) shape bespoke national energy transition pathways that best suit their developmental priorities and resources.

This policy brief discusses how developing countries should continue leveraging the G20 and UNFCCC platforms while improving South–South and North–South cooperation, amid a combative geopolitical scenario, to 1) quantify their finance, technology, and capacity needs for transition and adaptation; 2) ensure – and enhance – finance flows; 3) develop or acquire appropriate at-scale technologies blending modern and traditional expertise; and 4) shape bespoke national energy transition pathways that best suit their developmental priorities and resources.

In recent years, the international relations of African countries have been increasingly analysed through the lens of multipolarity and the growing economic, political and strategic competition between external powers. This debate started to gain prominence around 2018–19, when The Economist identified a “new scramble for Africa”. It has since intensified in the context  of the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine finally
exposed the sharp divides as Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and its Western partners, on the other, sought to mobilise African governments in pursuit of international support for their respective positions within the UN.
The world’s political superpower – the US – has been in a process of relative disengagement from Africa for more than a decade now. By contrast, China, India, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expanded their presence on the continent in the areas of trade,
investment, diplomatic support and security engagement. At the same time, Russia, a major player during the Cold War, has renewed its engagement, although, arguably, its activities remain more limited both in scope and in scale. The increasing presence in Africa of the BRICS – South Africa became a member in 2010, while Egypt and Ethiopia followed in 2024 –
is another manifestation of today’s shifting power relations and multipolarity. Similarly, the recent entry of the African Union (AU) into the G20 underscores the external recognition of Africa’s importance. Moreover, it demonstrates the continent’s growing ambition to shape international politics and defend its interests vis-à-vis the rest of the world. [... ]A common thread running through all the chapters in this volume is that in Africa, multi-polarity is not simply a tale of the decline of the West and the rise of competitors like China, Russia, the UAE and Turkey. Rather, there is a complex reconfiguration of power relations under way in which African governments, institutions and societies have their say in negotiating the terms of engagement with the rest of the world, despite the undeniable persistence of asymmetries in terms of material power.

In recent years, the international relations of African countries have been increasingly analysed through the lens of multipolarity and the growing economic, political and strategic competition between external powers. This debate started to gain prominence around 2018–19, when The Economist identified a “new scramble for Africa”. It has since intensified in the context  of the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine finally
exposed the sharp divides as Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and its Western partners, on the other, sought to mobilise African governments in pursuit of international support for their respective positions within the UN.
The world’s political superpower – the US – has been in a process of relative disengagement from Africa for more than a decade now. By contrast, China, India, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expanded their presence on the continent in the areas of trade,
investment, diplomatic support and security engagement. At the same time, Russia, a major player during the Cold War, has renewed its engagement, although, arguably, its activities remain more limited both in scope and in scale. The increasing presence in Africa of the BRICS – South Africa became a member in 2010, while Egypt and Ethiopia followed in 2024 –
is another manifestation of today’s shifting power relations and multipolarity. Similarly, the recent entry of the African Union (AU) into the G20 underscores the external recognition of Africa’s importance. Moreover, it demonstrates the continent’s growing ambition to shape international politics and defend its interests vis-à-vis the rest of the world. [... ]A common thread running through all the chapters in this volume is that in Africa, multi-polarity is not simply a tale of the decline of the West and the rise of competitors like China, Russia, the UAE and Turkey. Rather, there is a complex reconfiguration of power relations under way in which African governments, institutions and societies have their say in negotiating the terms of engagement with the rest of the world, despite the undeniable persistence of asymmetries in terms of material power.

In recent years, the international relations of African countries have been increasingly analysed through the lens of multipolarity and the growing economic, political and strategic competition between external powers. This debate started to gain prominence around 2018–19, when The Economist identified a “new scramble for Africa”. It has since intensified in the context  of the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine finally
exposed the sharp divides as Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and its Western partners, on the other, sought to mobilise African governments in pursuit of international support for their respective positions within the UN.
The world’s political superpower – the US – has been in a process of relative disengagement from Africa for more than a decade now. By contrast, China, India, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expanded their presence on the continent in the areas of trade,
investment, diplomatic support and security engagement. At the same time, Russia, a major player during the Cold War, has renewed its engagement, although, arguably, its activities remain more limited both in scope and in scale. The increasing presence in Africa of the BRICS – South Africa became a member in 2010, while Egypt and Ethiopia followed in 2024 –
is another manifestation of today’s shifting power relations and multipolarity. Similarly, the recent entry of the African Union (AU) into the G20 underscores the external recognition of Africa’s importance. Moreover, it demonstrates the continent’s growing ambition to shape international politics and defend its interests vis-à-vis the rest of the world. [... ]A common thread running through all the chapters in this volume is that in Africa, multi-polarity is not simply a tale of the decline of the West and the rise of competitors like China, Russia, the UAE and Turkey. Rather, there is a complex reconfiguration of power relations under way in which African governments, institutions and societies have their say in negotiating the terms of engagement with the rest of the world, despite the undeniable persistence of asymmetries in terms of material power.