This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
Le 25 juin 2026, Emmanuel Macron et Giorgia Meloni se sont retrouvés à Antibes, sur la côte méditerranéenne, à l’occasion du 36e sommet franco-italien. Organisée dans le cadre du traité du Quirinal, signé en 2021 pour approfondir la coopération bilatérale, cette réunion intergouvernementale a mobilisé les principaux ministères des deux pays. Le sommet a débouché sur plusieurs résultats concrets : une nouvelle feuille de route de défense pour la période 2026-2031, des avancées en matière de défense aérienne, de nucléaire civil et de coopération spatiale, ainsi qu’une coordination renforcée sur l’immigration, les enjeux méditerranéens et la lutte contre la criminalité organisée. Dans un contexte géopolitique marqué par la guerre en Ukraine, les tensions au Moyen-Orient et une politique étrangère américaine incertaine, Paris et Rome ont voulu démontrer la solidité retrouvée de leur relation.
Un dossier manquait pourtant à l’appel : l’Indo-Pacifique. Cette omission interroge, à l’heure où la région est devenue le principal centre de gravité de l’économie mondiale et l’un des foyers majeurs de la compétition stratégique internationale. La temporalité du sommet s’y prêtait pourtant : la France a actualisé sa doctrine en 2025 ; l’Italie y accroît sa présence diplomatique et navale ; l’Union européenne tente, depuis 2021, d’y donner davantage de cohérence à son action.
Faut-il y voir une simple hiérarchie des urgences ? Sans doute. Les enjeux transfrontaliers, méditerranéens et transatlantiques mobilisent naturellement l’essentiel de l’agenda politique bilatéral. Mais cette explication ne suffit pas. De nombreux sujets transverses affectent largement les deux régions : sécurité des routes maritimes, accès aux technologies critiques, résilience des chaînes d’approvisionnement, transition énergétique et rivalités normatives relient plus que jamais les deux espaces.
Une coopération franco-italienne dans l’Indo-Pacifique ne se substituerait ni aux stratégies nationales ni à celle de l’Union. Elle pourrait en revanche servir de lien entre ces différents échelons. La France apporte une présence souveraine, diplomatique et militaire ; l’Italie, une puissance industrielle et navale avec une volonté affichée de lier la Méditerranée à l’océan Indien. Ces différences ne sont pas un obstacle, elles sont le point de départ d’un partenariat utile.
L’article Après Antibes, l’Indo-Pacifique : le prochain chantier franco-italien est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Adapting to climate impacts is more critical than ever. Average global temperatures surpassed the 1.5°C threshold in 2024, and the ten worst climate-related disasters of 2025 caused over $120 billion in insured losses alone. Yet just as adaptation becomes more urgent, climate has slipped down the global agenda, leaving the developing countries most exposed to climate impacts—and least responsible for them—to adapt with shrinking international support.
This issue brief gives an overview of the history and current state of adaptation finance and examines how it overlaps with development finance and with loss and damage. It sets the goals agreed at COP29 and COP30 against estimated adaptation needs of $310 to $365 billion per year by 2035 and explains why, for many small island developing states and least developed countries, the form finance takes—grant-based and directly accessible—matters as much as the amount.
The brief argues that adaptation, sustainable development, and loss and damage should complement one another rather than compete for scarce, siloed funding. It makes the case for strict criteria on what counts as climate finance rather than the automatic separation of climate and development projects, and for multilateral climate finance to grow, grant-based funding to expand, and climate resilience to be mainstreamed across all development efforts. This will ensure the international system is ready to deliver when political will to tackle climate change returns.
The post Synergies and Challenges in Financing Adaptation, Sustainable Development, and Loss and Damage appeared first on International Peace Institute.
The United States has accused China of conducting secret nuclear weapons tests in violation of international norms and testing moratoria. Because of its comparatively limited historical testing record, China has strong incentives to obtain additional test data for the modernization of its nuclear weapons programme. Thus, it would be disadvantageous for Washington to respond by resuming underground nuclear testing, as Russia and China would benefit more from the erosion of international testing norms. For their part, Germany and Europe can take only limited action by promoting greater transparency and confidence-building measures.