Cohabitation in Hungary?

Cohabitation is when a different party in France provides (provided) the president and the prime minister. Despite their difficulties, these constructions, born in a tense situation, have worked well for the French, they did not cause a political crisis, they solved governability and thus promoted the development of the country.

The appointment of László Torockai, the president of the "Hungarian People's Party" (radical right), to head the committee investigating the executive mafia was a brilliant move by Hungarian PM, Péter Magyar.
Why?
- On the one hand, if Toroczkai achieves a feat, everyone is well off, and it can also be communicated as a government success for TISZA.
- On the other hand, it keeps Toroczkai busy doing real, meaningful work - until then, he will not attack TISZA (so much), and by making him a part of the process of tidying up and renewal, he will not have much legal basis for doing so. (Quasily "involved in the government".)
- Thirdly, if Toro fails, it is also politically good for TISZA, as it will further embarrass MHM among its own supporters and potential new supporters: "See, they couldn't even solve this., would they want to govern?"
- The offer could not be refused for the above reasons:
CHECK-MATT.

2.) A second such brilliant decision could be to leave President Tamás Sulyok in power as long as he actually cooperates and only then "fiddle" with the constitution and other things as soon as he resists.

The French were initially very afraid of cohabitations, when the prime minister and president of different parties were forced to cooperate, but since both parties were very careful not to appear as a cog in the wheel and not to violate democracy, they operated successfully.

- TISZA would only cross the bridge when it got there. If president Sulyok really started obstruction. Whether you like the current president or not (albeit within a perverse electoral framework), he was still appointed by a democratically elected authority. The constitution clearly states in which cases his replacement is legal: "a president of the republic who intentionally violates a law or commits an intentional crime" (13/2). We do not see any of these cases.

- Note that obstruction will not be in Sulyok's (or Fidesz's) interest, because it would not win even a fraction of an extra vote. As they realized, if they did not hand over power, it would also have taken more than it would have brought.) They would realize that the TISZA government has the power to "take away" this position from them, and that this is not in their political interest either - that is why they insist on it so much. (It is obviously a perverse democratic situation that the president is a mameluke of a party, but Hungarian democracy has not been able to resolve this delicate issue completely successfully before. Nota bene, even my benchmark Mádl was previously a minister in the Antall government.)

- Prime Minister Péter Magyar's popularity with international public opinion would increase enormously if he resolved this issue not by force, but with a skillful compromise. It would also have an impact on the arrival of EU funds.

- A "cohabitation" is always a division of responsibility, Fidesz would have a much harder time attacking TISZA, especially before the parliamentary election, since they were indirectly involved in every decision. President Mitterrand successfully disarmed Chirac in the presidential candidates' debate in 1988. We wrote about it here.

- Hungarian Prime Minister could thus prove in black and white that he understands what democracy and the rule of law does it mean: if we accept political constellations that are not favorable to us without interfering with the democratic "rules of the game" and are able to make reasonable, workable compromises.

Dr. habil. András István Türke (HDR/Privatdozent)