Expresso.pt Interview / Hungarian Elections and Russia

Catarina Maldonado Vasconcelos, reporter for Expresso.pt, contacted the Europa Varietas Institute with the following questions. The questions were answered by Dr. habil. Andràs Istvàn Türke, director of the EuVI.

CMV: How credible are the allegations that Russia may be trying to influence Hungary’s upcoming parliamentary elections?

AIT: As a historical precedent, we should know that before the regime change, a very close relationship developed between the Hungarian and Russian secret services, and since there was no revolution or court proceedings in Hungary, the threads of the relationship did not disappear overnight, but rather, we can speak of their continuation. The first case that caused a major resonance was the case of Béla Kovács (nickname "KGB Béla") from the first half of the 2010s, who was a member of the Hungarian far right and worked as a representative in the European Parliament. (For more details in French See my article pp. 7-8).

Viktor Orban was the first to publicly call for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Hungary in 1989, under the auspices of the still-existing Warsaw Pact, in front of a large crowd. Something may have happened to Orbán, who was still militantly anti-Russian in the opposition cc. in the periode 2008-2014, although as we saw above, the Hungarian far-right party Jobbik had the closest Russian relations in the early 2010s. According to unconfirmed (but heard from several sources) Hungarian foreign ministry rumors, Orbán is being held in check by the "KGB" (FSB?) with some kind of Kompromat case and his existence depends on the whims of the Russian secret services. The point is that with a radical, 180° foreign policy U-turn, the Hungarian Prime Minister has been one of the most committed supporters of Putin's policies for many years. In this, his loyal partner is the Hungarian Foreign Minister since 2014, his former confidant. It is interesting to observe to what extent the otherwise aggressive, vocal Hungarian foreign policy remains completely silent when Hungary is harmed by the Russians or, for example, when the Hungarian minority in Ukraine (Transcarpathia) is affacted by Russian military attacks.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that we know from BND (German intelligence) materials what a serious influence the Russian-Ukrainian mafia can exert on Hungarian politics. For example, when (in 2003) they managed to get the Hungarian authorities to release a high-ranking Albanian politician wanted by INTERPOL through their Hungarian intermediaries in Serbia. And from the recent past, we can mention the Russian hacking of the servers of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry (which the Hungarian side also practically acknowledged without a word), and according to the latest news, the Russian connection can also be detected in the raid against Ukrainian cash-carriers of Ukraine's Oschadbank.

The Hungarian EU Commissioner was also recently questioned in the case of the fact that informants from the Hungarian Permanent Representation in Brussels surrounded several European Commission employees in order to obtain classified documents. The method is very reminiscent of the Hungarian intelligence gathering carried out in the 1970s and 1980s, which functioned as an “extended arm” of the KGB and was "remotely controlled" by the Russians.

So: On the one hand, the threads of connection are deep, multifaceted and have existed for a long time, and on the other hand, it is in the fundamental interest of Russian power politics to preserve its useful idiots, its Trojan horses, within the European Union. Hungary does not derive any economic or political advantage from its close friendship with President Putin. Although we assume that the current elite can also derive financial benefits from secret business relationships between the oligarchs.

CMV: If the reported Kremlin-linked operation in Budapest exists, what might its strategic goals be?

AIT: In terms of strategic goals, they are essentially using the same tools that they developed to perfection with the Wagner Group in Africa. (We wrote about this in detail here.) By manipulating public opinion, infiltration, fake Facebook profiles and fake propaganda videos, they managed to turn the French against them in the Sahel in an instant, supporting the local Islamist opposition forces. We see many examples that the methods are the same in Hungary, the latest example being the activation of those Romanian and Moldovan fake profiles (to speed up the algorithm) on the Hungarian ruling party's Facebook content, which were proven to have been created by the GRU to influence the Romanian and Moldovan elections. Hungarian News portals whose Facebook articles had only garnered a few hundred likes suddenly gained nearly 50,000 links.

CMV: How would you characterize Viktor Orbán’s political relationship with Vladimir Putin and Russia over the past decade?

AIT: (Please see below.)

What else we would add: Through the settlement bond business, the Orbán government has granted EU citizenship to countless dubious figures, and in the past, an amazing mafia was built on the dual citizenship introduced by Orbán (granted to Hungarians living across the border). According to conservative estimates, tens of thousands of Ukrainians, Russians, and Serbs may have obtained citizenship with forged papers, and the administration was largely carried out by the Ukrainian mafia.

Hungarian diplomacy fought hard to remove countless Russians from the EU sanctions list, which is also completely contrary to Hungarian national interests. This is how Patriarch Kirill, who was also involved in a pedophile case in Hungary, was removed from the sanctions list. He was a KGB agent under the codename "Mikhailov" from 1976 as Bishop of Vyborg and later as Bishop of Smolensk. As is well known, Budapest has consistently opposed the restrictions imposed on Russian oil and gas.

Viktor Orbán and the Hungarian government media often use Kremlin terminology (e.g. "peace-loving", "sanction inflation") and hold Ukraine responsible for the prolongation of the conflict. Viktor Orbán was the first EU leader to shake hands with Putin in Beijing (2023) after the outbreak of the war, and then visited Moscow in July 2024 as part of a "peace mission", which was sharply condemned by the EU leadership. The Hungarian government has indicated that it would not arrest Vladimir Putin if he came to Hungary, despite the fact that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant for him.

CMV: To what extent does Hungary’s energy dependence on Russian oil and gas shape its foreign policy decisions?

AIT: The issue of Hungarian energy dependence is a complex one. First of all, there is the issue of the expansion of the Paks power plant, which from a professional point of view could be divided into two elements from the beginning: In the mid-2010s, it did not seem like an irrational decision for a Russian company to build a new one next to an earlier Russian investment. Especially since after Chernobyl, ROSATOM was forced to de facto introduce the world's strictest safety measures in the design and construction of new reactors in order to remain commercially viable. (And the earlier, but more modern than Chernobyl, Paks power plant has also been operating reliably for decades.) Undoubtedly, the investment from outside the EU already posed certain political risks. The other element was how committed the Hungarian state was to nuclear energy, essentially completely ignoring (even then) green energy, i.e. whether the planned new nuclear capacity was actually needed, or whether about half of it would be enough.

The second question is the issue of fossil energy. Hungarian politics very wisely assessed the possibilities for building gas storage facilities back in the 2000s and built the appropriate capacities. (My company, the Europa Varietas Institute (EuVI), also participated in this, and we wrote analyses, among other things, on the extent to which North African alternatives were limited by the fact that the Russian side had essentially already acquired control and majority ownership over the main gas pipeline networks there. In Hungary, the Hungarian gas storage facilities were built on time and with adequate capacity, and the Hungarians were even able to help Serbia several times with the gas stored here.

Similar wise foresight and thinking did not take place with regard to oil pipelines and oil storage. And in this, it is likely that the Russian lobby and background activity can also be felt. The point is that the Hungarian refinery in Százhalombatta can essentially only refine "Russian-type oil" and it was not developed further, partly due to the decision of MOL (Hungarian Oil Company) and partly due to the decision of the Hungarian political elite, be able to process oil of other origins. Officially, this was justified by the high costs. There would have been time to prepare, since EuVI had already indicated to the Hungarian government in 2008 that the Russians were only waiting for a favorable opportunity and were going to retake Crimea. All this resulted in a warlike situation, with a protracted geopolitical crisis, which could also make oil supplies uncertain. However, Hungarian politics did not take any action and, despite our predictions, was completely unprepared for the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014.

Even then, it would not have been too late to take action and start diversifying, fully or partially separating from Russian oil. But nothing happened then or in 2022. In the latter case, Hungarian politics, which had already openly turned against its European partners and become a close ally of Russian diplomacy, practically took on Russian interests, despite common sense and by giving up Hungarian national interests. After all, at that time they could have already started securing alternative sources and accelerating green energy investments, even while partially retaining the Russian source (Druzhba pipeline). (Nota bene, Switzerland decided at that time to achieve complete energy independence by 2050, and it was at that time that it also launched its large-scale green energy programs. This did not happen on the Hungarian side.) Furthermore, it also contradicts rationality that Hungarian-Croatian relations have also reached a low point with the continuous attack of the Croatians on the Hungarian side, while the Adriatic pipeline could represent one of the alternatives.

In summary, it can be said that Hungary is at least 4 years late in starting diversification, which is the result of a flawed energy policy on the one hand, and a flawed diplomacy on the other, which is also marked by an excessively strong Russian relationship that threatens sovereignty.

In Hungary, strategic hydrocarbon reserves are stored at several locations, depending on geological conditions and industrial centers.
Strategic gas storage facilities:
>Hungarian natural gas storage facilities are located in porous rock layers (depleted gas fields). The strategic (safety) reserve is primarily stored in the Szőreg-1 storage facility, but the country's entire storage capacity is distributed among the following locations:
>Algyő (Szőreg-1): This storage facility was specifically created for strategic purposes and is operated by HEXUM Földgáz Zrt.
(Nominal storage capacity; NSC: 12.723.644 MWh )
> Zsana: The largest storage facility in the country, where gas is stored in limestone.
> Hajdúszoboszló: Underground storage facility with a sandstone structure.
> Pusztaederics: Also constructed in sandstone.
> Kardoskút: Smaller capacity, sandstone-based storage facility.
Strategic oil storage facilities:
The storage of crude oil and petroleum product stocks (petrol, diesel) is coordinated by the Hungarian Hydrocarbon Stockpiling Association (MSZKSZ). Storage is partly on its own bases and partly in rented capacities:
> Százhalombatta: One of the most significant storage capacities is located in the vicinity of the Dunai Refinery. (NSC: 52500 m3)
> Tiszaújváros: Warehouses in the area of ​​the Tisza Refinery. (120000 m3: MOL; 160000 m3:Hexum)
> Vámosgyörk (180000 m3) , Komárom (40000 m3: Terméktàrolò Zrt.; 20000 m3: MOL ), Pétfürdő (140000 m3: Hexum): Other important logistics points and storage bases where MSZKSZ and its partners stockpile.
> Fényeslitke: A strategically important point near the Ukrainian border.

CMV: How significant is the upcoming Hungarian election for the country’s political trajectory after more than a decade of Orbán’s rule? What impact could the Hungarian election have on the European Union’s unity regarding Russia and Ukraine?

AIT: In this regard, I would caution against overly optimistic expectations. In the event of a TISZA victory, the political line will definitely be much more pro-European and will keep a greater distance from the Russians. The question (and I am skeptical in this area, since the problem has not been solved since the 1989 regime change) is to what extent the Russian threads will be cut back in the areas of the deep state and mafia networks. A closer friendship with America is obvious, but a serious condition for this is that Trump's unprofessional diplomatic rampage ends and American politics normalizes. On the other hand, good Russian relations are important to Hungary (if only because of the aforementioned Paks investment) so it is never in its interest to become as anti-Russian as Poland.

The second half of the question is much more complex and requires a little historical political review. After the 1989 regime change, a broad political consensus emerged in the Hungarian political elite that, due to the Hungarian minorities in the countries surrounding Hungary, the fundamental goal of Hungarian diplomacy is to promote the Euro-Atlantic integration of all neighboring countries. This made it possible to blur the borders between Hungarians and Hungarians, alleviating the injuries of the so-called Trianon trauma. The initial contact went well, but the Ukrainian side did not ratify the passages regarding Hungarian autonomy. In any case, even Viktor Orbán's own politics supported the issue of Ukrainian accession until recently, and then - with the Russian turn - they overturned this political consensus.

As we know, the Ukrainian accession to the EU has been being pushed by the Poles within the EU for a decade and a half, even if it openly goes against the official EU position. <Note: I wrote an essay about this, in the context of Hungarian-Polish diplomacy, regarding the Visegrad syndrome of Hungarian politics.> Another question, however, is that the overwhelming majority of Hungarian society opposes the accession of Ukrainians, they only have a very good opinion of the Ruthenians, but they do not have a very good opinion of Ukrainians and Ukrainian politicians en bloc (although the relatively broad Hungarian social solidarity towards refugees has changed in this regard), since they immediately associate it with Ukrainian border petrol smuggling and the Ukrainian mafia.

Therefore, TISZA does not have a fundamental interest in pushing the issue of Ukrainian accession. They will probably not become obstacles to EU policy, but will rather strengthen political circles that slow down integration processes and oppose "excessive support" for Ukraine.