Two years after the major attacks by non-state armed groups, a considerable number of forcibly displaced people have returned to Palma. Credit: UNHCR
By Kevin Humphrey
JOHANNESBURG, Jan 17 2024 (IPS)
There is cautious optimism regarding the conflict that has been raging in northern Mozambique, largely in the province of Cabo Delgado, since 2017. There are encouraging indications that the Islamic State (IS)-driven insurgency has significantly decreased thanks to the deployment of the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM), Southern African Development Community (SAMIM) forces, and a contingent of Rwandan troops (RSF).
Leleti Maluleki, a researcher at Good Governance Africa, told IPS: “With regards to the current state of the conflict, people are slowly moving back or returning to their villages and communities. It’s a sign of progress being made by the troops, and we hope it’s a sign of peace.”
There had been a decrease in the number of attacks by insurgents.
“That’s a good thing as well, but it does not mean that the insurgency is over. We need to remember that there were stories of insurgents infiltrating the communities, so they are still among the people; they might have radicalized certain individuals, and they might have recruited some citizens. But we are seeing fewer and fewer attacks on a daily basis.”
The insurgency has claimed over 4,000 lives and displaced 946,000 since it started. According to a report from the United Nations Security Council published in February 2023, the number of IS fighters in the field has decreased from a peak of 2,500 (prior to SAMIM and the RSF joining the fight) to roughly 280.
Last year, Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, said in August 2023 that counter-terrorism initiatives in Egypt, Mozambique, and Yemen had significantly limited the insurgents ability to conduct operations.
He warned, though, that “force alone cannot lead to changes in the conditions conducive to terrorism,” noting that it can fuel more violence and aggravate grievances exploited by terrorists.
At the same meeting, Domingos Estêvão Fernandes, Deputy Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the UN, pointed to the rising spread of terrorism in Africa, where fatalities linked to Al-Qaeda and Da’esh reached more than 22,000 over the past year—representing a 48 percent increase over 2022.
Fernandes it was important to address poverty, inequality, social exclusion, and discrimination based on religion and culture to address insurgency and recognize the risk of the misuse of emerging technologies.
He pointed to the achievements of the deployment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission in Mozambique.
Amanzi Amade Bacar is a fisherman who has fled and returned several times from and to his house in Bagala, Mozambique. The 39-year-old husband and father hopes to return to his home and his original livelihood. Credit: UNHCR
“We must ensure predictable, flexible, and sustained funding for African Union peacekeeping operations,” Fernandes said, adding that government agencies and defense and security forces must partner with local communities to provide early warning systems.
Maluleki added that a new challenge is the insurgent’s use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), a tactic that works when the insurgents numbers are dwindling, which means decreasing the likelihood of insurgents getting up close to security forces. The use of these causes panic among civilians, which leads to further destabilization of the region regarding displaced persons and refugees.
When security forces reportedly killed Ibn Omar, the purported IS leader, and two of his followers, the anti-insurgency campaign also gained momentum. Mozambique’s president, Filipe Nyusi, recently made an announcement to this effect.
In terms of the future, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) heads of state at a summit in July 2023 laid plans for SADC forces to begin to leave northern Mozambique by December 15, 2024, and to complete the withdrawal by July 15, 2025. It was also noted that for this to happen, there was an urgent need for Mozambique’s defense forces to be capacitated to a degree where the removal of SADC troops would not compromise the gains of the past few years. Training and other help coming from the European Union and the United States to beef up the Mozambican forces were also mentioned at the summit.
Two years after the major attacks by non-state armed groups, a considerable number of forcibly displaced people have returned to Palma. Credit: UNHCR
Since the beginning of the insurgency, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that one million people had been displaced in the region. More recently, the International Organization for Migrants (IOM) reported that in September and October 2023, about 8,000 Cabo Delgado residents had become displaced.
“When it comes to the issue of displaced individuals, a lot of people lost their homes and ran away for safety. People displaced by the conflict went to neighboring, safer communities. Host communities are faced with overcrowding, and basic services are under severe pressure so the security situation needs to improve so that more people can return to their villages and relieve the burden on these host communities,” said Maluleki
This increase in displaced persons occurred in the run-up to local government elections in the area and also when the €20 billion liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, put on hold due to the conflict in the region, was being considered for being given the go-ahead. Fortunately, the October 11, 2023, municipal elections in Mocimboa da Praia went ahead, with four political parties taking part.
Nyusi has said it is safe to restart the Cabo Delgado liquefied natural gas (LNG) project that was halted in April 2021 after rebel attacks on civilians.
“The working environment and security in northern Mozambique make it possible for TotalEnergies to resume its activities at any time,” Nyusi said. TotalEnergies confirmed it was working on restarting the project.
There are, however, still concerns, especially for the civilian population.
“The deployment of troops was primarily in two districts, and this is concerning because these are the districts where the government has its own interests because they are where the LNG project is. Only two of the five or six districts that the insurgents heavily targeted have received adequate security. All districts affected by the conflict need to be secured so that we can reach a true level of peace and stability and address the root causes of the conflict,” said Maluleki.
IPS UN Bureau Report
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By Jomo Kwame Sundaram
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Jan 17 2024 (IPS)
World Bank aid encourages governments to enable illicit financial outflows to offshore tax havens by reducing capital controls, thus draining precious foreign exchange and government resources.
Aiding elite wealth
Aid disbursements to highly aid-dependent countries coincide with sharp increases in bank deposits in offshore financial centres known for banking secrecy and private wealth management.
Jomo Kwame Sundaram
Using Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data, Jørgen Juel Andersen, Niels Johannesen and Bob Rijkers found trends suggesting wealth accumulation abroad by national elites coinciding with World Bank aid disbursements.Capital outflows follow aid inflows apparently captured by ruling politicians, bureaucrats and their cronies. In the 22 most World Bank aid-dependent countries, aid disbursements coincide “with increased deposits in foreign bank accounts in tax havens”.
National elites capture World Bank aid to poor developing countries. Such ‘leakages’ came to 7.5% of inflows, rising with aid-reliance. Earlier, ‘petroleum rent’ leakages to secretive offshore tax havens were estimated at 15%.
A modest share of all aid, World Bank disbursements averaged over 2% of low-income countries’ GDPs yearly. For Bank disbursements of at least 1% of GDP, leakages from 46 countries increased deposits in havens by 3.4%. But at a 3% of GDP threshold, leakages from seven countries rose to 15%!
Elites capture aid
The conventional wisdom is that aid promotes economic development in the poorest countries, while a few disagree. Many believe aid effectiveness depends on institutions and policies in receiving countries, with some warning corrupt elites may capture aid.
Many suspect elites who capture aid, or funds freed up by aid, hide their ill-gotten gains in private accounts in tax havens. Some countries receiving foreign aid are quite corrupt, with aid inflows captured by ruling politicians and their cronies.
There is much evidence that very high aid inflows foster corruption, with development projects failing due to greedy elites. The poorest countries supposedly receive the most aid but are often the worst governed. The study shows World Bank aid has been no better than others, further burdening poor countries and people.
Its data does not allow identification of those involved or the mechanisms used. Nonetheless, it concludes “the beneficiaries … belong to economic elites” with other research showing “offshore bank accounts are overwhelmingly concentrated at the very top of the wealth distribution”.
Illicit outflows enabled
Such aid capture by ruling elites helps explain its diversion abroad, how such funds end up in tax havens, and related surges in illicit outflows. Hence, large increases in offshore haven bank accounts coincided with aid disbursements.
Such abuses get worse when countries are more corrupt and have less effective checks and balances. Unsurprisingly, there are larger outflows to havens when projects fail, suggesting elite responsibility for such failures.
Conversely, there are less outflows to havens when procurement is from local contractors. When taxes can easily be evaded without using offshore accounts, and such abuses are unlikely to be penalised, outflows to havens become unnecessary and decline.
Foreign aid has also been used to get governments to reduce capital controls. Although assured by the International Monetary Fund’s Articles, the Bretton Woods institutions have eroded them since the 1990s. They claim doing so will ensure net inflows when all evidence suggests the contrary.
Reducing capital controls enables and boosts illicit capital outflows by reducing exit barriers. Such outflows have greatly exceeded World Bank aid inflows, draining precious government foreign exchange resources.
Study underestimates outflows
The study tries to minimise other factors influencing aid inflows and financial outflows. It excludes observations when wars, natural disasters, financial crises, oil price hikes and exchange rate volatility triggered such flows.
The study only covers World Bank aid leakages diverted to offshore tax havens. Spending on real estate, luxury goods, pet projects, and outflows using offshore intermediaries who help “hide and launder assets” are also not counted. Besides ignoring such outflows, it also rules out other possible causes.
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ leaked data on offshore corporations, especially the Panama Papers, showing many secretive offshore havens used to hide illicit outflows, especially in Switzerland and Luxembourg.
Financial transparency has improved significantly, with more information on offshore financial centres from 2009. But more transparency has not stopped illicit outflows, including aid-derived wealth accumulation in havens.
Unsurprisingly, more corrupt countries, less local procurement and more failed projects have generated more outflows. But the study suggests more donor monitoring and control may have lowered leakage rates for aid compared to natural resource extraction.
Adding insult to injury
It is bad enough for the World Bank to enable the theft of scarce financial resources by influential elites. Worse, such enabling reforms have been required or advised by the Bank despite prior knowledge of their likely consequences.
To add insult to injury, the poor countries themselves are blamed for such abuses and their consequences. Unsurprisingly, the beneficiary elites are the political and economic allies of those who control the Bank and its policies.
These same elites have incurred much debt in the names of their countries and people. But much market-based debt dried up as the US Fed, European Central Bank and others sharply raised interest rates from 2022.
Thus, most poor countries face punishing market credit terms in the face of massive international economic contractions due to policies pursued by the US and its European allies.
IPS UN Bureau
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