European Union

By CIVICUS
Feb 4 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses the situation following the US intervention in Venezuela with Guillermo Miguelena Palacios, director of the Venezuelan Progressive Institute, a think tank that promotes spaces for dialogue and democratic leadership.

Guillermo Miguelena Palacios

On 3 January, a US military intervention culminated in the arrest and extradition of President Nicolás Maduro, who had stayed in power after refusing to recognise the results of the July 2024 election, which was won by the opposition. However, power did not pass on to the elected president, Edmundo González, who remains in exile, but to Maduro’s vice-president, Delcy Rodríguez, under a pact that preserves the interests of the military leadership, ruling party and presidential family. Hopes for a restoration of democracy are fading in the face of a process that is prioritising economic and social control.

What led Donald Trump to intervene militarily in Venezuela?

The US intervention responds to a mix of economic pragmatism and the reaffirmation of a vision of absolute supremacy in the hemisphere.

First, it seeks to secure nearby stable energy sources in a context of global instability. In his statements, Trump mentioned oil and rare earth metals dozens of times. For him, Venezuela isn’t a human rights issue but a strategic asset that was under the influence of China, Iran and Russia, something unacceptable for US national security.

Second, it represents the financial elite’s interest in recovering investments lost due to expropriations carried out by the government of former president Hugo Chávez. Trump has been explicit: the USA believes Venezuela’s subsoil owes them compensation. By intervening and overseeing the transition, he’s ensuring the new administration signs agreements that give priority to US companies in the exploitation of oil fields. It’s an intervention designed to ‘bring order’ and turn Venezuela into a reliable energy partner, even if that means coexisting with a regime that has only changed its facade.

How much continuity and change is there following Maduro’s fall?

For most Venezuelans, the early hours of 3 January represented a symbolic break with historical impunity. The image of Maduro under arrest shattered the myth that the regime’s highest leaders would never pay for their actions. However, beyond the joy experienced in Venezuelan homes and in countries with a big Venezuelan diaspora, what happened was a manoeuvre to ensure the system’s survival

Chavismo is not a monolithic bloc, but a coalition of factions organised around economic interests and power networks. Broadly speaking, there are two main groups: a civilian faction and a military faction. Both manage and compete for strategic businesses, but the military is present, directly or indirectly, in most of them as coercive guarantors of the system.

The civilian faction controls areas linked to financial and political management, while the military faction secures and protects logistics chains, ports, routes and territories. Within this architecture there are various conglomerates of interests. There’s oil, an opaque business managed through parallel markets, irregular intermediation and non-transparent financial schemes. There’s drug trafficking, sustained by territorial control and institutional permissiveness. There’s the food system, which historically profited from exchange controls and the administration of hunger. And there’s illegal mining, where the military presence alongside Colombian guerrilla groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) is dominant and structural.

Maduro’s downfall appears to have been part of an agreement among these factions to preserve their respective businesses: they handed over the figure who could no longer guarantee them money laundering or social peace in order to regroup under a new technocratic facade that ensures they can enjoy their wealth without the pressure of international sanctions.

A revealing detail is that, while Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were captured, their children remain in Caracas with their businesses intact. Their son, Nicolás Maduro Guerra, continues to operate in the fishing sector and in the export of industrial waste such as aluminium and iron. This suggests the existence of a family protection pact.

We are seeing an economic transition, but by no means a democratic transition. Rodríguez has the reputation of being much more efficient and has had greater international exposure than the rest of Chavismo. She’s backed by a new business elite, young people under 45 who need to launder their capital and gain legitimacy in the global market. Their goal is to improve purchasing power and reduce hunger in order to confer respectability on the regime, while maintaining social control.

What caused the recent resurgence of the territorial conflict with Guyana?

The conflict over the territory of Essequibo is neither new nor improvised: it’s a historical dispute and Venezuela has legal and political arguments to support its claims over the territory. For decades, the two states agreed on a mechanism to contain the dispute, which involved a temporary cessation of active claims and a ban on exploiting the area’s natural resources while a negotiated solution was sought.

In this context, Chávez chose to de-escalate the conflict as part of his international strategy. To gain diplomatic support, particularly in the Caribbean, he reduced pressure on the Essequibo, and as a result several Caribbean Community countries supported Venezuela in multilateral forums such as the Organization of American States. Guyana interpreted this not as a tactical pause but as an abandonment of the claim, and decided to move forward unilaterally and grant concessions to ExxonMobil to conduct oil exploration. These operations revealed the existence of large reserves of high-quality crude oil.

The reactivation of the conflict is, therefore, a combination of legitimate historical claims and political expediency. This wasn’t simply Maduro’s nationalist outburst but an attempt to capture new revenue amid the collapse of Venezuela’s traditional oil industry.

Oil remains the linchpin of the regime’s geopolitics. Although Venezuela has the largest reserves in the world, most of it is extra-heavy crude, which is expensive to extract and process and profitable only when international prices are high. In contrast, the oil discovered off the Atlantic coast of the Essequibo is light, comparable to Saudi oil, and therefore much cheaper to produce and refine. This economic differential explains much of the regime’s renewed aggressiveness in a dispute that had been contained for years.

What’s the mining arc and what role does it play?

In addition to oil and gas, there’s another source of strategic wealth that sustains the regime. The Orinoco Mining Arc is a vast exploitation zone in southern Venezuela, rich in coltan, diamonds, gold and rare earths. The ELN operates there under the protection of the army. It’s a brutal extraction system that generates a flow of wealth in cash and precious metals that directly finances the high military hierarchy, maintaining its loyalty to the system regardless of what happens to oil revenues or the formal economy.

It is noteworthy that, despite the US intervention and the rhetoric about strategic resources, the mining arc has hardly been mentioned. We presume it was part of the negotiation so the military would not resist Maduro’s arrest. The USA appears to have chosen to secure oil in other areas of Venezuela and let the military maintain its mining revenues in the south, since intervening there would mean getting involved in guerrilla warfare in the jungle.

What’s your analysis of the announcement of the release of political prisoners?

The announcement was presented as a gesture of openness, but the so-called releases are actually simple discharges from prison. This means political prisoners are released and go home, but still have pending charges and are therefore banned from leaving Venezuela and must appear in court periodically, usually every few days. In addition, they are absolutely prohibited from speaking to the media and participating in political activities.

This reduces the political cost of keeping prisoners in cells, but maintains legal control over them. Released prisoners live under constant threat. The state reminds them and their families that their freedom is conditional and any gesture of dissent can return them to prison immediately. This is a mechanism of institutional whitewashing: it projects an image of clemency while maintaining repression through administrative means that are much more difficult to denounce before the international community.

What’s the state of social movements?

Social and trade union movements are in a state of exhaustion and deep demobilisation. After years of mass protests between 2014 and 2017 that resulted in fierce repression, people have lost faith in mobilisation as a tool for change. Increasingly, the priority has been daily survival, particularly food and security, with political struggles taking a back seat.

Authorities have been surgical in their repression of the trade union movement: they imprisoned key leaders to terrorise the rank and file and paralyse any attempt at strike action. While organisations like ours have continued to provide technical support and training in cybersecurity, activism is now a highly risky activity.

What are the prospects for a democratic transition?

I see no signs of a genuine democratic transition. The regime’s strategy seems to be to maintain for the next two years the fiction that Maduro has not definitively ceased to hold office and could return, in order to circumvent the constitutional obligation to call immediate elections, which the opposition would surely win. During those two years, which coincide with the final two years of Trump’s term, they will flood the market with imported goods and try to stabilise the currency to create some sense of wellbeing. They will surely use the Supreme Court to interpret some article of the constitution to justify that there’s no definitive presidential vacancy.

Halfway through the term, they would no longer need to call elections. Instead, they could declare Maduro’s ‘absolute vacancy’ so that Rodríguez could finish the 2025-2031 presidential term. Thus, they would try to reach the 2030 election with a renewed image and a recovered economy, on the calculation that a sense of economic wellbeing would prevail over the memory of decades of abuse. They could even enable opposition figures to simulate a fair contest, but would maintain total control of the electoral system and media.

We are concerned the international community will accept the idea of an ‘efficient authoritarianism’ that reduces hunger but maintains censorship and persecution of dissent.

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SEE ALSO
Venezuela: the democratic transition that wasn’t CIVICUS Lens 30.Jan.2025
Venezuela: ‘Each failed attempt at democratic transition reinforces the power of the authoritarian government’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Carlos Torrealba 25.Jan.2025
Venezuela struggles to hold on to hope CIVICUS Lens 15.Aug.2024

 

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Deux hommes soupçonnés d'être impliqués dans des vols de motocyclettes ont été arrêtés à Pahou alors qu'ils tentaient de revendre un engin volé.

A la suite d'informations signalant la vente d'une motocyclette de marque Wave 110 volée, les agents du commissariat de Pahou organisent une filature.

Les forces de l'ordre interpellent deux individus à l'issue d'une brève poursuite.

Une clé universelle, généralement utilisée pour forcer les antivols, a été retrouvée sur les suspects.

Les deux individus ont reconnu s'être déplacés dans le but de vendre la moto Wave 110, sans fournir d'indications sur les circonstances exactes du vol.

Ils ont été placés en garde à vue.
M. M.

2 voleurs présumés de motocyclette ont été interpellés après avoir vu leur fuite brutalement interrompue par une panne d'essence, dans la nuit du vendredi 30 janvier 2026 à Koko, dans la commune de Tchaourou.

Profitant d'une fête villageoise animée à Koko, une localité de la commune de Tchaourou, deux individus se sont emparés d'une moto de marque Bajaj stationnée à proximité du bal. L'engin a été démarré sans difficulté, mais n'a parcouru que quelques kilomètres avant de s'arrêter à l'entrée du village voisin d'Ayégourou.

Faute de carburant, les suspects ont abandonné la moto et sont revenus sur les lieux des festivités, où l'un d'eux a été reconnu par des habitants. Confronté, il a reconnu les faits, dénoncé son complice et guidé la police jusqu'à la moto retrouvée intacte.

Les deux hommes ont été placés en garde à vue au poste de police de Tchatchou. Ils devront répondre de leurs actes devant la justice.
M. M.

The United Nations Security Council meets on the situation in Yemen. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 4 2026 (IPS)

In recent weeks, Yemen’s humanitarian crisis has sharply worsened, as escalating food insecurity and brutal clashes between armed actors have prompted United Nations (UN) officials to warn that the country is approaching a critical breaking point. Intensified violence has increasingly obstructed lifesaving humanitarian operations, while deepening economic and political instability continues to erode access to essential services. As a result, millions of Yemenis now face the growing risk of being left without the support they need to survive, with children being the hardest-hit.

Late December and early January proved to be a particularly volatile period for Yemen, with political turmoil acting as a key driver of instability, particularly in the nation’s south. Recently, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) launched major offensives across the south, seizing key provinces such as Hadramawt and al-Mahrah, prompting Saudi-backed government forces to launch a series of airstrikes to reclaim key infrastructure in cities such as Mukalla and Aden.

While a military de-escalation was achieved in the following days, humanitarian experts warn that the overall security situation remains extremely fragile without a durable political and economic solution—both of which continue to threaten national stability. According to UN experts, years of political turmoil have severely weakened the economy, driving inflation, pushing food and fuel prices further out of reach, and leaving large numbers of public sector workers with unpaid salaries.

On January 14, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg briefed ambassadors on the urgent need to establish a credible, transparent, and inclusive political process. He explained that the “developments in southern Yemen highlight how quickly that fragile balance can be disrupted,” and how critical it is “to re-anchor the process in a credible political pathway”.

“Absent a comprehensive approach that addresses Yemen’s many challenges in an integrated manner, rather than in isolation, the risk of recurrent and destabilizing cycles will remain a persistent feature in the country’s trajectory,” said Grundberg.

Grundberg also underscored the importance of protecting Yemen’s economic institutions—particularly the Central Bank—from political and security conflicts, warning that even short-lived instability can trigger currency depreciation, expand fiscal deficits, and hinder urgently needed economic reforms.

According to Yemeni officials, clashes between the STC, the Houthi movement, and the Saudi-backed government have driven large-scale displacement and disrupted access to essential services for thousands of civilians. On January 19, Julien Harneis, Assistant Secretary-General and the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, told reporters that humanitarian conditions are expected to deteriorate further in 2026, with an estimated 21 million people projected to require humanitarian assistance—an increase from the 19.5 million recorded last year.

This includes more than 18 million Yemenis—roughly half the population—who are projected to face acute food insecurity in February. Additionally, it is estimated that tens of thousands could fall into “catastrophic” levels of hunger and face famine-like conditions without intervention.

Yemen’s hunger crisis is projected to hit children the hardest, with roughly half of all children under five years old facing acute malnutrition. As a result of persistent funding gaps last year, only a quarter of the 8 million children targeted for nutritional support received lifesaving care. Furthermore, over 2,500 supplementary feeding programmes and outpatient therapeutic programmes were forced to close.

“The simple narrative is, children are dying and it’s going to get worse. My fear is that we won’t hear about it until the mortality and the morbidity significantly increases in this next year,” said Harneis.

Additionally, Yemeni officials underscored that recent hostilities have forced key civilian infrastructures—including schools and hospitals—to shut down or operate at limited capacity. Ramesh Rajasingham, Director of the Humanitarian Sector for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted that over 450 health facilities have closed in recent months, with thousands of others at risk of losing funding. Additionally, vaccination campaigns have been hindered, facing significant challenges in accessing children in the north, leaving them highly vulnerable to preventable diseases such as measles, diphtheria, cholera, and polio.

Rajasingham also warned of tightening restrictions on aid as a result of violence. According to figures from the UN, 73 UN staff have been arbitrarily detained by Houthi de facto authorities since 2021, restricting aid operations across 70 percent of humanitarian needs across Yemen. “We know that when humanitarian organizations can operate safely, effectively and in a principled manner, and when resources are available, humanitarian assistance works. It reduces hunger, it prevents disease, and it saves lives. But when access is obstructed and funding falls away, those gains are quickly reversed,” said Rajasingham.

On January 29, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced that it is shutting down operations in northern Yemen following severe aid restrictions, harassment, and arbitrary detainment of staff from Houthi personnel. UN officials informed reporters that approximately 365 of the remaining WFP staff members in northern Yemen will lose their jobs by the end of March, as a result of insecurity and funding challenges.

In 2025, Yemen’s UN Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan was only funded at 25 percent, forcing humanitarian actors to scale back critical services, deprioritize certain populations or sectors, and halt lifesaving operations, leaving millions without aid and exposed to heightened risks.

“The unavoidable reality is that the United Nations must continue to reevaluate and reorganize our humanitarian operations on the ground in DFA-held areas of Yemen – home to around 70 per cent of humanitarian needs countrywide,” said Rajasingham, also urging the Security Council to exert pressure on the international community to bring about the release of the 73 UN staff and scale up funding as needs continue to rise.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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De plus en plus de femmes en Afrique utilisent des tisanes naturelles pour faciliter et accélérer l’accouchement. Mais est ce réellement bénéfique ?

Die neu veröffentlichten Akten rund um Jeffrey Epstein enthüllen Verbindungen zu Schweizer Immobilien. Unter anderem wurde dem Sexualstraftäter die Villa Rose am Vierwaldstättersee angeboten. Dort wohnt nun einer der renommiertesten Kunstsammler der Welt.

Fredrik Möller stürzt in Bormio – der Norweger muss mit dem Helikopter abtransporiert werden. Marco Odermatt ist schnellster Schweizer, Bestzeit stellt der Amerikaner Cochran-Siegle auf.

ÄNDERUNGSANTRÄGE 28 - 207 - Entwurf einer Stellungnahme Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Rates zur Festlegung des Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens für die Jahre 2028 bis 2034
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Dan Barna

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Am El Prix testet der norwegische Automobilclub NAF jedes Jahr die neuesten Elektromodelle auf ihre Langstreckentauglichkeit im Winter. So extrem wie dieses Jahr waren die Bedingungen noch nie – und entsprechend gering die Reichweiten.

Ein Zugbegleiter in Rheinland-Pfalz ist nach einem brutalen Angriff durch einen Schwarzfahrer gestorben. Der 26-jährige Tatverdächtige griff ihn am Montagabend hemmungslos an, als er des Zuges verwiesen werden sollte.

Das Viertelfinale zwischen Xamax und Yverdon Sport (1:2) wurde durch ein nicht gepfiffenes Handspiel entschieden. «Wir haben ein Messer in den Rücken bekommen», wettert Xamaxs Anthony Braizat.

At a time of heightened geopolitical tensions, citizens are increasingly anxious about their future and want the EU to act with unity and ambition.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

At a time of heightened geopolitical tensions, citizens are increasingly anxious about their future and want the EU to act with unity and ambition.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Main agenda items, approximate timing, public sessions and press opportunities.

Le président de l'Assemblée nationale 9è législature, Louis Gbèhounou Vlavonou, présidera ce mercredi 4 février 2026 une cérémonie officielle d'hommage à Me Adrien Houngbédji, ancien président du Parlement.

Un ensemble d'études consacrées à Adrien Houngbédji, qui a dirigé l'Assemblée nationale lors des 1ère, 3ème et 7ème législatures, lui sera officiellement remis ce mercredi 4 février 2026.

La cérémonie se tiendra à partir de 10 heures au Palais des gouverneurs à Porto-Novo. Cette initiative vise à reconnaître la contribution de l'ancien président de l'Assemblée nationale à la vie institutionnelle et à l'enracinement de la démocratie parlementaire au Bénin.

Plusieurs autorités politiques, députés, universitaires et personnalités sont conviés à cette cérémonie.

Avocat et acteur politique de premier plan, Adrien Houngbédji est le président-fondateur de l'ex Parti du Renouveau Démocratique (PRD) fondu dans l'Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UP-R).
Me Adrien Houngbédji a été Premier ministre de 1996 à 1998, sous la présidence de Mathieu Kérékou, puis président de l'Assemblée du Bénin de 2015 à 2019.
M. M.

Une affaire de vol de vivres dans une école a été examinée ce mardi 03 février 2026, lors de l'audience correctionnelle de flagrant délit du tribunal de première instance d'Abomey-Calavi.

Un homme, la quarantaine révolue, a comparu devant le tribunal de première instance d'Abomey-Calavi ce mardi 03 février 2026, pour vol de vivres dans une école. Les aliments selon les déclarations à la barre, ont été volés lors d'un cambriolage perpétré par des hors la loi pendant les congés de fête. Dans ladite école, aucun gardien n'assure la sécurité, a déclaré la directrice présente au procès. Les malfrats selon ses déclarations, auraient emporté 7 sacs de maïs, 9 sacs de riz, 40 bidons d'huile de 5 litres, un sac de sel de cuisine, des boîtes de tomates et des pâtes alimentaires, et plusieurs autres aliments destinés aux apprenants.
L'enquête a conduit à l'interpellation d'un individu. Une partie des vivres volés aurait été retrouvée chez lui. Interrogé, il a déclaré que c'est l'un de ses parents enseignant dans la partie septentrionale du pays, qui lui a donné.
Le dossier est renvoyé au 24 février 2026, pour comparution du parent ayant fait don de vivres au prévenu et son époux, et pour continuation.

F. A. A.

The appointment of a dead opposition politician to a presidential panel caused embarrassment.

Lecture de Sergueï Essenine, Journal d'un poète, traduit du russe et suivi d'une postface de Christiane Pighetti, Allia, 2026, 160 p.

- Lire et écrire les Balkans. Out of the box • le blog de Christophe Solioz / Blogs - Diaporama

La politique de privatisation du littoral visant à favoriser l'industrie touristique en Jamaïque a laissé aux habitants de l'île moins de 1 % du littoral.

Abiy Ahmed admitted for the first time in parliament that Eritrean troops had killed people in Aksum.