European Union

Le Kazakhstan vise une politique étrangère constructive afin de protéger ses intérêts nationaux tout en favorisant la croissance et la stabilité à long terme.

The post Tokaïev présente la feuille de route numérique et politique du Kazakhstan appeared first on Euractiv FR.

In today's edition: rent seeking, climate targets, Russian fossil fuels

In der heutigen Ausgabe: Russland: EU-Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen will den Ausstieg aus der Energieabhängigkeit von Moskau beschleunigen; Parlament: Heute entscheidet das Europaparlament, ob die Immunität der italienischen Abgeordneten Ilaria Salis aufgehoben wird; Allianzen: Die Kommission plant eine neue »strategische Agenda« mit Indien.

Kasachstan strebt eine konstruktive Außenpolitik an, um nationale Interessen zu schützen und gleichzeitig Wachstum und langfristige Stabilität zu fördern.

En 2024, le Groupe Inter-gouvernemental d'Action contre le Blanchiment d'Argent en Afrique de l'Ouest (GIABA), a franchi un cap important dans son action régionale contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme. Malgré des avancées notables, plusieurs défis persistent dans l'espace CEDEAO.

Le Rapport Annuel 2024 du Groupe Inter-gouvernemental d'Action contre le Blanchiment d'Argent en Afrique de l'Ouest (GIABA), publié le 28 août à Dakar, met en lumière les actions menées par l'institution. Des progrès notables ont été enregistrés notamment l'achèvement du second cycle des évaluations mutuelles des Etats membres du GIABA ; la sortie du Sénégal de la liste grise du GAFI, et l'amélioration des cadres juridiques et institutionnels de plusieurs États membres. « Sur la base de leurs notes de conformité technique et d'efficacité, tous les États membres du GIABA évalués, à l'exception du Ghana et du Sénégal qui ont quitté le processus de suivi en février et en août, respectivement, restent dans le Processus de Suivi Renforcé, et soumettront leurs RdS (rapports de suivi) respectifs au GIABA aux fins d'examen et d'adoption par les réunions Plénières pertinentes en 2025 », indique le rapport.

Ces évaluations mutuelles sont essentielles à la mise en œuvre d'un dispositif robuste de LBC/FT dans un pays. Le GIABA se prépare pour le prochain Cycle des Évaluations Mutuelles qui mettra davantage l'accent sur l'efficacité des dispositifs de LBC/FT. « Les États membres sont invités à entamer les préparatifs en mettant en place des équipes d'évaluation mutuelle efficaces et dévouées à l'échelle nationale, composées de responsables possédant les connaissances requises pour le processus », souligne le rapport 2024 de la GIABA. Pour l'institution spécialisée de la CEDEAO, la formation continue de l'ensemble des parties prenantes et la sensibilisation sont primordiales. La collecte et la compilation de statistiques pertinentes en matière de LBC/FT/FP restent essentielles pour démontrer l'efficacité du dispositif.

Soutien aux Etats membres

En 2024, le GIABA a aussi fourni une assistance technique pour soutenir les États membres dans la mise en œuvre des mesures de LBC/FT. 2 607 personnes ont bénéficié de programmes d'assistance technique, avec une augmentation de 21 % de la participation féminine.

Sur le plan du plaidoyer, le GIABA a intensifié sa stratégie de communication et de sensibilisation, en multipliant les actions à l'endroit des médias, des organisations de la société civile et parties prenantes. Ces initiatives visent à vulgariser les enjeux liés au blanchiment d'argent et au financement du terrorisme, et à encourager l'adhésion de tous à cette lutte régionale.

Le rapport 2024 du GIABA mentionne des vulnérabilités persistantes dans la LBC/FT. Il s'agit entre autres de l'utilisation abusive des actifs virtuels, la faible supervision des EPNFD (Entreprises et Professions Non-Financières Désignées) et les risques accrus dans les zones frontalières peu régulées.

Sur un total de 139 activités prévues pour être réalisées au titre de l'année 2024, dans le cadre de son plan d'action stratégique 2023-2027, le GIABA a exécuté 87 d'entre elles, soit un taux de réalisation de 63 %, en hause de 7 % par rapport à l'année précédente. « Les objectifs et étapes importants fixés ont été atteints », informe le rapport annuel 2024 du GIABA.

Akpédjé Ayosso

By CIVICUS
Sep 17 2025 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses the deaths of Indigenous activists in custody in Tajikistan with Khursand Khurramov, an independent journalist and political analyst.

Khursand Khurramov

Five Indigenous Pamiri activists have died in Tajikistan’s prisons in 2025, reportedly after being denied adequate medical assistance. Since 2021, around 40 Pamiris have been killed and over 200 activists arbitrarily detained. Civil society organisations condemn these deaths in custody and the state’s broader pattern of systematic repression against the Pamiri ethnic minority, who make up less than three per cent of Tajikistan’s population.

What’s the background to the state’s persecution of Pamiri people?

The Pamiris are an Indigenous minority who have lived on their land for thousands of years. Throughout history, they have been part of various empires – from the Achaemenids and Alexander the Great to the Arab Caliphate and the Timurids – but have always retained de facto autonomy. At the end of the 19th century, the Pamir region was divided between the British and Russian empires, and the Pamiri people found themselves separated by the borders of modern states – Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and Tajikistan – while retaining their cultural and linguistic characteristics and, importantly, their historical attachment to their land.

In Tajikistan, the Pamiris live in an area called Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO). The Soviet period was favourable for them in terms of demographic, economic and technological progress. The region had good transport links with Kyrgyzstan, while the road to the central regions of Tajikistan was only accessible seasonally.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil war broke out in Tajikistan in 1992. The Pamiris supported the United Tajik Opposition and became victims of mass repression. Many were murdered, with the number of victims unknown to this day. Following the war, the authorities continued to persecute former opponents, including the Pamiris, and several military operations have been carried out in the region, resulting in dozens of deaths and hundreds of arrests.

This means the Pamiri identity formed amid difficult conditions, largely in response to state pressure. Tajik authorities apparently fear recognition of Pamiri identity will lead to separatism, although there have never been any calls or demands for separatism within the Pamiri community.

It’s clear the authoritarian regime perceives Pamiri people’s desire for democratisation and freedom as a bad example for the rest of Tajikistan’s population, and it uses collective punishment to suppress any challenge to its authority.

What led to the recent wave of deaths in custody?

In November 2021, Tajikistan’s security officers carried out an operation in GBAO, in which a local resident was killed. This sparked mass protests, which in Tajikistan are prohibited by law and therefore extremely rare. Activists tried to hold those responsible to account by cooperating with law enforcement agencies. But instead of investigating, the authorities launched a large-scale crackdown on protesters, instrumentalising the law to justify violence by security forces.

In 2022, when protests flared up again, the authorities classified them as terrorist acts, allowing security forces to use firearms against protesters. As a result, around 40 people were killed. They also conducted mass arrests of activists. Some 300 people were imprisoned with sentences of over 15 years, and 11 received life sentences. Considering the entire Pamiri population is only about 220,000, these numbers represent a catastrophic scale of persecution. Prison conditions are extremely harsh, with relatives of prisoners repeatedly reporting overcrowding, lack of access to medical care and systematic psychological pressure. In 2025 alone, five men from GBAO aged between 35 and 66 have died in Tajikistan’s prisons.

How has the crackdown on civic freedoms affected GBAO?

Restrictions on civil liberties affect the whole of Tajikistan, but GBAO is subject to particularly harsh repression. In 30 years of independence, not a single independent media outlet has existed in GBAO. International media outlets such as the BBC and Radio Liberty have been unable to obtain accreditation to cover events in the region. As a result, most of what happens in GBAO remains unknown to the public, and state propaganda interprets events in a light favourable to the authorities, demonising Pamiri people in the eyes of the rest of the population.

At the national level, these restrictions take the form of a ban on political activities, a complicated procedure for registering associations and informal bans on the creation of parties and movements within the country and abroad. Any political or civic activity outside Tajikistan seems to be viewed by the authorities as a potential threat. Until 2022, Pamiris had a fairly powerful informal youth diaspora structure in Russia, but this has been effectively destroyed with its key figures arrested and returned to Tajikistan. The main reason for this was a rally they organised in November 2021 outside the Tajik embassy in Moscow.

Now even likes of social media posts by opposition groups are classified as extremism. According to the Tajikistan Prosecutor General’s Office, 1,500 people have been convicted for this, including nine journalists and bloggers. Many of them were not involved in politics at all. Their posts were exclusively about social rather than political issues.

How are Russia and other states in the region involved?

Russia and other post-Soviet states play a role in this process as political allies of the Tajik government. For Russia, the regime is an important partner in the areas of security and labour migration, so it tries to prevent the strengthening of forces that could threaten the status quo. As a result, it supports Tajikistan’s official position, including in international organisations, and often returns wanted political activists and opposition figures to Tajikistan.

Some post-Soviet states share a similar political logic, because they fear recognising ethnic or regional diversity within their borders. By supporting Tajikistan in suppressing Pamiri identity, they are consistent with their domestic policies of denying minority rights. Russia and the other member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – cooperate on security matters, exchanging data and coordinating operations against opposition activists, including Pamiris. This is a mutually beneficial practice that strengthens authoritarian solidarity and reduces the risks of alternative centres of political influence emerging in the region.

What role can civil society and the international community play in holding the government accountable?

In Tajikistan, civil society in the classical sense has practically ceased to exist. Even those organisations that continue to operate are forced to coordinate their activities with the government. Although on paper these organisations may address civic space or human rights issues, their activities are largely formal: they function more as a facade than a mechanism for protecting rights within an authoritarian system. Over the past decade, any human rights work has been effectively equated with political activity, which carries serious risks.

Outside Tajikistan, diaspora civil society is also underdeveloped, with no strong institutions yet in place. However, the main thing activists and the diaspora can do is to draw international attention to the problem, talking about it as often as possible in different forums and in different languages. Only then can we expect the international community to put pressure on the Tajik authorities.

Despite these efforts, the situation for Pamiri people in Tajikistan has remained virtually unchanged. Authorities continue to deny the existence of their distinct identity. In prisons, people continue to die from torture, disease and inhumane conditions, but these facts are silenced and their deaths are presented as natural deaths.

The international community must move beyond statements to tangible action by strengthening monitoring and reporting through the European Parliament, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations. They must impose personal sanctions on officials responsible for repression and torture, and condition aid, loans and grants on Tajikistan’s compliance with human rights obligations. Support for the diaspora and independent media is also essential to provide alternative information channels and prevent the regime isolating GBAO.

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SEE ALSO
Tajikistan: end systematic repression of Pamiri people CIVICUS 04.Aug.2025
Tajikistan: ‘Authorities silence dissent by accusing activists of extremism, terrorism and spreading false information’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Leila Seiitbek 20.May.2025
Tajikistan’s crackdown on dissent: erosion of rights and civic space CIVICUS Monitor 17.Feb.2025

 

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Damage to the water tank at the Maisat water pumping station. Credit: WaSH Sector Lebanon

By Ed Holt
BRATISLAVA, Sep 17 2025 (IPS)

Just under a year into a fragile ceasefire, 150,000 people in southern Lebanon continue to deal with the potentially lethal aftermath of Israeli bombing, highlighting the devastating long-term effects of conflict.

A report published late last month (AUG) by Action Against Hunger, Insecurity Insight, and Oxfam said that at least 150,000 people remain without running water across the south of Lebanon after Israeli attacks had damaged and destroyed swathes of water sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities since the beginning of the conflict in Lebanon.

The report, When Bombs Turn the Taps Off: The Impact of Conflict on Water Infrastructure in Lebanon, laid bare both the immediate and long-term effects of repeated attacks on Lebanese water infrastructure between October 2023 and April 2025.

It said that more than 30 villages were without any connection to running water, leading to long-term disruption to supplies of fresh water, fueling dependence on water trucking that many people cannot afford and, according to the World Bank, losses estimated at USD171 million across the water, wastewater and irrigation sectors.

A severe rainfall shortage in recent months has exacerbated the problem, increasing risks of outbreaks of waterborne diseases as  vulnerable communities are forced to resort to utilizing unsafe or contaminated water sources for their daily needs.

But groups behind the report warn that without mitigating action, the situation could become even worse.

“We can see there is the potential for some severe long-term repercussions of these attacks. There are 150,000 people without running water at the moment, but that number could rise in the future,” Suzanne Takkenberg, Action Against Hunger’s country director, told IPS.

Among the groups’ biggest concerns is the effect of the destruction on local agriculture.

In villages near the southern Lebanese border, farmers’ irrigation networks have been destroyed, cutting off vital water supplies to farms. Trucked-in water supplies have not been sufficient to replace this and allow them to irrigate land or give drinking water to their livestock, farmers say.

Meanwhile, farmers have also been unable to access their land due to security concerns—a November ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah has held only partly, with violations reported regularly—compounding problems with food production.

“One of our major worries is the mid- to long-term effects of the difficulties for farmers to irrigate their land,” explained Takkenberg.

“They have been struggling to irrigate their land since October 2023, due to security concerns hindering access to their land, as well as water problems. We have seen as a consequence of these attacks that food prices have increased and food productivity has decreased.”

Another concern is the growing reliance on trucked-in water for communities.

“Worryingly, people are becoming dependent on using water that is trucked in. This is sometimes ten times more expensive than using water from a public network, and the checks on that water are not the same as those carried out on public water supply networks,” said Takkenberg.

“Water quality after any kind of conflict is a concern and we are definitely worried about it in southern Lebanon after these attacks,” she added.

Illness and disease related to water quality and shortages are major concerns.

A destroyed water pumping station in Tyre, Lebanon, following an airstrike in November 2024.
Credit: Insecurity Insight

While the report states that waterborne and water-related illnesses were not reported by people interviewed, some highlighted the limited resources available for testing water quality and possible contamination. There are also worries that water may have been contaminated by white phosphorus, the use of these munitions in Lebanon having been verified by Human Rights Watch.

Meanwhile, there are further concerns that residents may resort to using unsafe water sources due to limited supplies, a situation exacerbated by low rainfall and water shortages at critical reservoirs.

Local officials interviewed for the report also highlighted damage to sewerage networks in some areas. This, combined with the known large-scale damage to water infrastructure and the possibility that damaged sewerage infrastructure has contaminated water sources, ramps up the potential of negative long-term effects on health if the water supply crisis is not adequately addressed, the report states.

It also points to evidence from Ethiopia, Ukraine and the Middle East, demonstrating clear links between damage to water and sanitation infrastructure during conflict and adverse public health outcomes.

“People are cutting back on their water use, which can have an effect on health and hygiene and raises disease risk—cholera is already epidemic in Lebanon and this situation could exacerbate that. Other diseases could also be spread. We have already seen cases of watery diarrhea, which is bad not just in itself, but also because in children it can cause problems with malnutrition as their bodies struggle to absorb nutrients,” Takkenberg said.

But while the potential long-term impact of the damage and destruction to water infrastructure is severe, early action could mitigate the worst possible outcomes, experts say.

“There is an urgent need to repair systems and while this is ongoing, to track water into the area. The consequences of water system destruction are rarely immediate. Most often, the impacts accumulate over time. It is the combination of destroyed infrastructure with the failure to repair it, insufficient water trucking, or lack of access to trucked-in water that eventually produces devastating outcomes for individuals and communities,” Christina Wille, Director of Insecurity Insight, told IPS.

“This is why the destruction of infrastructure demands close attention: if not effectively mitigated, cascading consequences are inevitable. People may be forced to leave, adding to the numbers of displaced populations, or they may fall ill. Yet there is also an opportunity—by addressing damaged infrastructure early—to prevent the worst outcomes of displacement and disease and to save lives,” she added.

But while repairing and rebuilding water infrastructure is essential to preventing the most severe long-term impacts on local communities, implementing it is a different matter.

Authorities have managed to carry out some limited repairs to some networks, but issues around the continued presence of Israeli forces and concerns about ongoing conflict violence have prevented wider-scale or more extensive reconstruction. Finances for repairs are also under strain amid the socio-economic crisis the country has faced since 2019.

“Disease outbreaks are very predictable and the cost of not dealing with them is much worse than dealing with them now. The health ministry has been good in warning [of potential health risks] but there is a limit to what the government can do with the resources that are available after years of economic crisis. It is a very difficult situation,” said Takkenberg.

The report ends with a call for, among others, all parties to the conflict to strictly comply with the ceasefire agreement and adhere to international humanitarian law (IHL) and ensure the protection of civilians, health workers, and essential infrastructure.

It urges humanitarian programmers and donors to support the rehabilitation and operationalization of conflict-affected water infrastructure and ensure temporary access to safe water and basic sanitation services through the provision of water trucking, emergency water points, and safe wastewater discharge.

The report also says UN member states should push for the establishment of independent, impartial, and transparent investigations into all allegations of IHL violations.

Satellite imagery shown in the report indicates that in at least several incidents the damaged or destroyed facilities were located in large open areas without clearly identifiable military targets, suggesting that in some cases they may have been specifically and deliberately targeted.

The authors of the report point out that under IHL, parties to a conflict must always distinguish between lawful military targets and civilians and civilian objects and that deliberately targeting civilians and civilian objects is prohibited and amounts to a war crime. The various kinds of water infrastructure are protected as civilian objects under IHL and must never be attacked.

“Determining whether each incident deliberately targeted water infrastructure would require access to confidential military decisions, which is not available, as well as information on whether any military objectives were present at the time of the attacks. Our data is limited to the observable effects on the ground following the attacks. Nevertheless, the scale and nature of the observed damage raise serious questions regarding compliance with international humanitarian law, which governs the conduct of hostilities,” said Wille.

While it may not be possible to determine whether the attacks were deliberate, their impact is clear and highlights the need to look at not just the direct but also indirect effects of conflict, said Wille.

“Conflict deaths are not only direct (caused by weapons) but also indirect, when the destruction of systems produces cumulative and deadly consequences. The more complex and interconnected our societies become, particularly in securing food and water, the more vulnerable they are to such systemic shocks. At the same time, it becomes harder to trace devastating outcomes back to a single act of destruction.

“This is why we must learn to examine conflicts through the lens of systems and interconnectivity and to apply this knowledge to our legal analysis of the conduct of warfare,” she said.

“The public needs to ask more direct questions about the conduct of warfare and how the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution are being applied. We need a broader debate on how these principles should be interpreted in today’s conflicts. Modern societies rely on highly interconnected and complex infrastructure to secure basic needs such as food and water, while warfare is increasingly conducted remotely through advanced technologies. In this context, what counts as proportional? And what kinds of precautions are necessary in today’s world?” she added.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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The iconic blue whale looms over the Milstein Hall of Ocean Life at the American Museum of Natural History. Credit: UN Photo/Mark Garten

By Peter Bridgewater and Rakhyun Kim
SHEFFIELD, UK / UTRECHT, The Netherlands, Sep 17 2025 (IPS)

Other articles in this series on clustering conventions that are addressed by the Triple Environmental Crisis of pollution (Stanley-Jones), biodiversity (Schally) and climate change (Azores) I have touched on the idea of clustering not only conventions but the science-policy bodies established separately to serve them. We address the question of the negative consequences of maintaining status quo and identify how “consolidating knowledge” might make a difference.

Azores notes the progressive evolution of environmental challenges and their governance from the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, resulting in today’s institutional landscape – a complex web of multilateral agreements aiming to foster sustainable development, living in separate spaces with inefficient coordination mechanisms.

From 1945 onwards establishment of the UN and its specialised agencies including UNESCO and FAO, saw increased focus on the knowledge needed to address environmental issues. From its founding in 1974 UNEP also became increasingly active in this area.

UNESCO established a range of research agendas in biodiversity, earth sciences and water with a range of human-environment links, as did FAO for its areas of responsibility. This research pointed to the interconnected nature of global environmental challenges.

The links between climate adaptation, mitigation and biodiversity were identified in the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (ipbes) “Nexus” assessment (ipbes 2024a).

Both Azores and Schally cite the successful clustering of the Basel, Rotterdam, and Stockholm agreements demonstrating that formalised arrangements can enhance operational efficiencies, scientific coherence, and policy alignment.

They also suggest similar clustering of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the ipbes, and the nascent Intergovernmental Science-Policy Panel on Chemicals, Waste, and Pollution (ISP-CWP) could similarly enhance better links between the knowledge – policy links in resolving the polycrisis of climate change, biodiversity and pollution.

Yet the question remains can such science-policy bodies be clustered easily, or is it preferable to seek ways to enable them to work more effectively?

The science-policy bodies.

Since its establishment in 1988, the IPCC has delivered six Assessment Reports at approximately seven-year intervals. Each of the reports is on climate change and approaches to mitigation and adaptation, yet with changing overall themes.

An independent science-led exercise on status and trends in biodiversity and ecosystem services funded by UNEP with support from UNESCO, UNCCD, the Ramsar Convention and a wide range of scientific support was launched in 2000. This Millennium Ecosystem Assessment was designed to help not only the CBD make more informed policy choices, but also influence all biodiversity-related Conventions, including UNCCCD.

But while it was always to be a “one-off”, the Millennium Assessment led to pressure for a “biodiversity counterpart to the IPCC”, resulting in an intergovernmental meeting that established ipbes in 2012.

Since its establishment, ipbes has developed in ways that are different from IPCC – producing a range of thematic, regional and global assessments on issues including; pollination, land degradation, regional and a global assessment on biodiversity and ecosystem services status and trends, sustainable use of wildlife, invasive species, and the values of nature.

Its most recent products are an assessment on how to achieve transformative change in managing the environment and an assessment of the nexus between climate change, biodiversity, human health, food and water. Crucially, it has embraced a range of knowledges beyond science.

The third Intergovernmental Science-Policy Panel – on Chemicals, Waste, and Pollution (ISP-CWP) was officially established on June 20, 2025, by UNEA Resolution 5/8: The ISP-CWP Secretariat is Hosted by UNEP, with its first Plenary Expected in 2026.

After extensive negotiations, governments have agreed its role is to provide policy-relevant scientific advice to support sound management of chemicals and waste in the environment and to prevent chemical pollution and protect human health and ecosystems.

So, there are now three science-policy platforms dealing with apparently very different issues. Yet as the ipbes nexus report details there are multiple synergies between the topics covered, and the role for the ISP-CWP alludes to including ecosystems in its work.

The existence of a report from a workshop in 2021, sponsored by IPCC and ipbes, on biodiversity and climate suggested changes might be afoot, but thus far each silo remains resolutely separate.

How do the Science-policy bodies work?

The IPCC uses a rigorous, consensus-driven process where assessment drafts undergo multiple rounds of expert and government review to ensure accuracy and neutrality. In similar vein ipbes has drafts that are subject to a range of external reviews, culminating in the government- member plenary carefully reviewing the Summary for Policy Makers draft before approving it.

Both use a range of subsidiary bodies to manage technical and political issues. And both use scenarios and modelling in developing the assessments. Ipbes has had more emphasis on bringing a range of knowledges to bear in its assessments, and there is some evidence IPCC is embarking on a similar pathway.

It is not yet fully clear how ISP-CWP will operate, but it seems more focus will be on horizon scanning and links with the corporate world.

All three have a range of constraints: weak funding structures; the need to build capacity in the global south; the elaborate and frustrating approval processes; ensuring material is “confidential’ over the life of the assessment, which inhibits the flexibility needed in managing todays environmental pressures; managing data gaps; dealing with rapidly developing novel issues; balancing transparency while ensuring rigour; and avoiding capture by any particular sectoral voices.

Despite the activities of these global science-policy bodies, individual conventions have been producing “global outlooks”. The UNCCD has its own science-policy interface, with an unfortunate result that its first Global Land “outlook” was released at the same time as the ipbes assessment on Land degradation and restoration, a considerable duplication of effort.

The CBD has produced five Global Biodiversity Outlooks since 2001, the last in 2020. And the Ramsar convention has produced two Global Wetland Outlooks, one in 2018 and the most recent in 2025. A State of the World’s Migratory Species Assessment was published in February 2024 under the CMS.

While it could be argued that the more information available to inform policy development and implementation the better, this is not an evident result. Rather, production of the outlooks resembles “zombie activity” – producing material for its own sake, without reference to the wider global situation.

Do we need three separate Science-policy Bodies?

It can be argued that we already know which policies need implementation, yet many nations still argue strongly for the need to inform policy development through the best available knowledge. IPCC reports inform UNFCCC & its COPs, ipbes assessments inform CBD, and other biodiversity-relevant conventions, while ISP-CWP aims to support the “chemicals conventions” cluster and guide global regulation of chemicals and waste.

A major player is UNEP-GEO (Global Environment Outlook) that has been in operation since 1995. It has become more all-embracing in recent years and strives also to be a science-policy interface. Inevitably it covers some ground also covered by the IPCC, ipbes and the putative ISP-CWP.

GEO operates a more flexible approach, offering continuing assessment processes with regular reporting to provide updates on the changing environmental situation, the effectiveness of policy actions, and the policy pathways that can ensure a more sustainable future, with increasing focus on using a full range of knowledges.

How can this be made more efficient and this effective?

Clustering of the chemicals conventions was achieved relatively easily, resulting in considerable savings on efforts. Schally has alluded to the desirability of clustering the “ biodiversity regime” to replicate the practical synergies achieved in the chemicals and waste cluster – to avoid missed outcomes during a critical decade for nature. Should such clustering occur, there would be argument for greater synergy, if not fusion, between science-policy bodies.

Given the urgency of the polycrisis, time is of the essence, there are several possible ways co-operation between the bodies can be enhanced without full clustering. Such cooperation can lead to products that are policy-helpful, rather than simply policy-relevant, using, rejuvenating, and refining structures already agreed and in place, without damaging and time-consuming reorganisations. UNEP, through its GEO work, and with guidance from the UNEA, is certainly well placed to foster and manage such cooperative arrangements.

– Firstly, given the strength of links between Climate change, biodiversity, food water and human health demonstrated in the ipbes nexus report (ref), the biodiversity-related convention liaison group (BLG) should be strengthened by the addition of UNFCCC, UNCCD, FAO, WHO and UNESCO and meet regularly (at least 6 monthly) at secretariat level.

– Secondly, Chairs of the Scientific Advisory Bodies of the biodiversity-related conventions (CSAB) originally met as a sub-group of the BLG. However, CSAB met only five times before disbanding due to lack of resources, leaving coordination efforts solely to the secretariats. To ensure full co-ordination and buy-in from government, CSAB should be regenerated, and expanded to include the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of UNFCCC, UNCCD, and the of the bureaux of IPCC, ipbes, ISP-CWP and GEO, with this group chaired by Deputy Executive Secretary of UNEP. This body should resolve overlaps and duplication and highlight crucial up-coming knowledge needs.

– Thirdly, continuous reporting should be adopted as the norm by all assessment bodies, with CSAB being the body that shapes the direction of assessments, with the concurrence of the plenaries of each organisation involved. GEO could supply horizon-scanning/Foresight to enable this work.

– Fourthly, the rationale for continued production of “outlooks” from conventions must be questioned, with efforts directed towards developing one key source of knowledge to assist policy development and implementation.

UN80 enables an opportunity of addressing how best science can support the Triple Environmental Crisis. Adopting these four strategies would decrease duplication, improve the quality and information in the assessment products, without upsetting the existing frameworks and systems that have been in place over a range of time periods.

This would allow also fusion and regrouping at a pace and direction that plenary members are comfortable with, without losing momentum. It can also help the UN system deliver transformative change as outlined in the ipbes Transformative change report (ipbes 2024b), and in the context of UN80.

Peter Bridgewater is an Associate Researcher at the Advanced Wellbeing Research Centre, Sheffield Hallam University, UK.; Adjunct Professor at the University of Canberra, Australia; a former Director of the Division of Ecological Sciences in UNESCO; and Secretary General of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands.

Rakhyun Kim is Associate Professor in Earth System Governance at the Copernicus Institute of Utrecht University, the Netherlands.

Ipbes 2024a Summary for Policymakers of the Thematic Assessment Report on the Interlinkages among Biodiversity, Water, Food and Health of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13850289.

Ipbes 2024b Summary for Policymakers of the Thematic Assessment Report on the Underlying Causes of Biodiversity Loss and the Determinants of Transformative Change and Options for Achieving the 2050 Vision for Biodiversity of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.11382230

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In today's edition: Venture Capital, Snus tax, German Pharmacy Reform

Election of the Presidents of Chambers of the General Court of the European Union

The European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) have begun consultations with Member States for the next Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the EU’s ‘State of the Union’ in defence. The report, due next year, will provide a detailed overview of Member States’ goals, plans and projects. It will highlight trends in spending and planning, and identify gaps and collaborative defence initiatives with the greatest potential impact. It aims to inform decision-making at both national and EU levels. 

Europe’s defence posture relies on striking a careful balance: meeting urgent operational needs while pursuing long-term strategic objectives. 

Belgium was the first of the 27 Member States to be consulted. During the discussions, EDA analysed Belgium’s plans and priorities and discussed the Belgian perspective within the wider European context. These consultations offer first-hand insights into how national strategies contribute to EU defence and provide a platform to explore collaboration that avoids duplication and strengthens interoperability – the ability of armed forces, systems, equipment and technologies to work together.  

Ultimately, CARD helps Member States bring coherence to the EU defence landscape and improve the efficiency of defence spending. 

Ready for November 2026  

The next consultation will take place this week in Ireland, and with all other Member States over the coming months.  

Once complete, the findings will be compiled by next May. Political recommendations will serve as a reference for current and future defence initiatives and inform decisions on joint investment priorities, including Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects. 

This is the fourth CARD cycle, building on previous reviews to track trends and propose concrete measures for cooperation. Updated assessment criteria will help identify opportunities for joint initiatives addressing short-, mid- and long-term military needs. Final recommendations will be submitted in the CARD report to the EDA Steering Board in November 2026. 

EDA’s wider role 

EDA supports its 27 Member States in improving their defence capabilities through European cooperation. Acting as an enabler and facilitator for Ministries of Defence willing to engage in collaborative capability projects, the Agency serves as the hub for European defence cooperation with expertise and networks covering the whole spectrum of defence capabilities. 

Member States use EDA as an intergovernmental expert platform where their collaborative projects are supported, facilitated, and implemented. For more details, please see www.eda.europa.eu 

In today's edition: Ominibus, EPPO, origin labels

Dans l'édition d'aujourd'hui : Ursula von der Leyen déclare que l'UE proposera une élimination plus rapide de l'énergie russe, les eurodéputés se préparent à voter la levée de l'immunité de leur collègue italienne Ilaria Salis, la Commission s'apprête à dévoiler un nouvel « agenda stratégique » avec l'Inde.

The post Sanctions contre Israël : Ursula von der Leyen renvoie la balle à Berlin appeared first on Euractiv FR.

In today's edition: Commission eyes EU data rules, EU merger guidelines rules, and consumer law enforcement

Plus an Eastern Sentry update, and the no-fly zone debate is back

Metsola makes fourth trip to Kyiv

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of the United States (US) compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2024, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate for the US was recorded at 2.8%, while the EU experienced a growth rate of 1.1%. Both inflation rates remain stable and show a declining trend compared to the years following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the start of the war in Ukraine. The inflation rate in the US was slightly higher than that in the EU. Trade between the US and the EU continues to grow, except for EU imports of goods from the US, which have been in a declining phase since 2022.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘US: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

16 szlovákiai városban tüntettek az emberek a konszolidáció ellen. Pozsonyban a SafetyCrew becslése szerint 16-18 ezer ember tiltakozott. Az ellenzék november 17-én általános sztrájkot hirdetne.

L'inflation continue de flamber en Roumanie, tandis que le déficit des comptes publiques se creusent. Très dépendant des tendances européennes, le pays est au bord de la récession.

- Articles / Roumanie, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Economie, Une - Diaporama

In today’s edition: Ursula von der Leyen says the EU will propose a faster phase-out of Russian energy, lawmakers prepare to vote on lifting Italian MEP Ilaria Salis’ immunity, and the Commission is set to unveil a new 'strategic agenda' with India