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Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Rakhi Matan holds bottles of cough syrup in her palm. This is what she gave to her kids two weeks back when they were feeling ill. Credit: Zofeen Ebrahim/IPS

By Zofeen Ebrahim
KARACHI, Pakistan, Nov 11 2025 (IPS)

When 23 children died in India’s Madhya Pradesh after consuming contaminated cough syrup in early September, the news barely registered across the border. In Pakistan—where self-medication is rampant and syrup bottles are household staples—the tragedy strikes dangerously close to home.

Many in Pakistan remain unaware that those sweet, over-the-counter syrups can be fatal. In the recent Indian case, the children—all under six—died of kidney failure after consuming syrup laced with diethylene glycol (DEG), a toxic solvent found at 500 times the permissible limit.

Investigations revealed the manufacturer, Sresan, had sourced industrial-grade propylene glycol from local chemical and paint dealers instead of certified pharmaceutical suppliers. With no qualified chemist overseeing production, the syrup went untested—and deadly.

This isn’t the first such incident. In 2022, Indian-made syrups caused the deaths of at least 70 children in The Gambia and 18 in Uzbekistan. Between December 2019 and January 2020, at least 12 children died in Indian-administered Kashmir after taking similarly contaminated syrup.

The prescribing doctor in India was the first to be arrested, followed by the suspension of the drug inspector and deputy director. The manufacturer, who had been absconding since September, has now been caught.

“It shows that even doctors can get caught in legal and ethical trouble, even when unaware of a drug’s quality issues,” said Professor Mishal Khan of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. “The tragedy is a warning for Pakistan—weak regulation hurts everyone: doctors, pharma companies, and patients alike.”

A 2024 study by Khan found that approximately 40 percent of Karachi doctors accepted incentives in return for prescribing medicines from a fake pharmaceutical company without any checks on the company’s manufacturing standards or medicine quality. Antibiotics and cough syrups were among the medicines they agreed to promote.

As Pakistan enters its flu season, Karachi’s hospitals are filling up. “Between 50 to 70 percent of children who visit our clinics have respiratory tract infections,” said Dr. Wasim Jamalvi of Dr. Ruth K. M. Pfau, Civil Hospital Karachi.

And with the flu comes a predictable companion: cough syrup.

“If a child is brought for consultation for fever, cough and cold, parents feel a prescription is incomplete without a cough syrup,” said Dr. D.S. Akram, a senior pediatrician, who stopped prescribing them two decades ago. “Cough syrups don’t work—they just make the children drowsy or irritable,” she said.

Jamalvi agrees, “We don’t recommend syrups for under-fives, but parents still give them—they’re easily available over the counter.”

Self-Medication Culture

In Pakistan, cough syrups—often called sherbet—are viewed as harmless cures.

“I swear by this syrup a doctor gave me years ago,” said Mohammad Yusuf, a 31-year-old houseboy. “One spoon at night and I sleep better.”

Two weeks ago, when Rakhi Matan’s children, aged 10 and 13, came down with the flu, she reached for a bottle of leftover cough syrup from last year. “It saved me the doctor’s fee—he’d have prescribed the same thing,” she said.

Such casual self-medication is common—and hard to control.

Dr. Qaiser Sajjad, former secretary general of the Pakistan Medical Association, said regulating cough syrup sales is nearly impossible with thousands of quacks operating in the city. Medical store worker Majid Yusufzai agreed, admitting syrups are sold freely without prescriptions and “entire families share the same bottle.”

Health experts say Pakistan’s culture of self-prescription—reinforced by weak enforcement and cheap access to medicines—makes the system vulnerable to similar disasters.

Dr. Obaidullah Malik, heading the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (DRAP), told IPS that Pakistan imported the majority of the raw materials (for several drugs, including cough syrups) from India and China.

With over 100,000 drug manufacturing companies, India, referred to as the ‘pharmacy of the world,’ is known for affordable generic drugs. But recent deaths have cast a long shadow on its safety standards.

Tighter Drug Oversight

“It is of great concern,” said Malik, adding that scrutiny of domestic quality control was enhanced after it received a global alert from the WHO on October 13, of three substandard cough syrups manufactured in India.

“Thankfully, the contaminated syrups were never exported to Pakistan,” confirmed Malik. “There’s no evidence of illegal shipments either—but we’re staying vigilant to ensure a tragedy like India’s doesn’t happen here.”

“DRAP has made it mandatory for all pharmaceuticals, including herbal and nutraceutical manufacturers as well as importers, to pre-test additives such as glycerin, propylene glycol, and sorbitol—either in their own laboratories or through public sector facilities like the Central Drugs Laboratory (CDL) in Karachi or the 12 provincial drug testing,” said Malik. The authority is double-checking vendor credentials and certifications and instructed field teams to step up sampling and testing—both of raw materials coming in and the finished syrups.

Recently, it trained pharma company reps from Nepal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Maldives, and Sri Lanka on a quick detection method called Thin Layer Chromatography (TLC), which helps spot contamination early—saving time, cutting costs, and improving safety checks nationwide.

There are between 700 and 800 pharmaceutical companies across Pakistan, but only about 300 are members of the Pakistan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association—leaving much of the industry operating with little oversight. Yet, despite its fledgling state compared to India’s, Pakistan’s pharma sector is eager to expand into global markets. Khan cautioned that the recent scandal over unsafe medicines could jeopardize those ambitions before they even take off.

To avoid a similar crisis and protect its reputation abroad, Pakistan’s regulator has stepped up oversight at home. “Since November 2023, DRAP has recalled 63 finished products contaminated with diethylene glycol (DEG) and ethylene glycol (EG), identified 44 impurities, and issued 13 alerts about contaminated raw materials,” said DRAP’s CEO.

As Karachi’s clinics continue to fill up this flu season, syrup bottles are flying off shelves—often with no pharmacist in sight. “It’s just a syrup,” said Yusuf. He does not know, but for dozens of families across the border, that sweet bottle brought irreversible loss.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Excerpt:

India’s cough syrup tragedy is a warning for Pakistan, where self-medication is common and the sweet cure fills every home. Experts call for tighter safety checks.

Vom 8. bis 9. Juli 2026 findet die 16. Internationale SOEP-Nutzenden-konferenz in Berlin statt. Ab sofort rufen wir zu Einreichungen von Beiträgen auf. SOEP-Forscher*innen aller Disziplinen sind eingeladen, sich mit einem Abstract zu bewerben. Besonders willkommen sind Beiträge, die sich mit ...

  From the battlefields of Idlib to the quiet ruins of Aleppo, Syria today stands as a paradox of survival—a nation ruled by the illusion of reform while imprisoned by the same machinery of coercion that tore it apart. Nearly fifteen years after the uprising began, the country is divided not only by geography but by truth itself: the truth of who governs, who suffers, and who still hopes that change is possible. The latest incarnation of power in Damascus and Idlib—the so-called “interim government” led by Ahmed al-Sharaa—promises reconstruction and moderation. Yet what it delivers is continuity: the same militant hierarchy dressed in civilian costume, the same war economy disguised as administration, and the same dependence on violence presented as stability.   Behind every speech about governance and recovery lies the legacy of jihad. Ahmed al-Sharaa, once known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, rose from the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq, pledged allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, and later led al-Nusra Front before rebranding his movement as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. His ideological transformation, celebrated by some as pragmatism, is in fact a tactical metamorphosis designed to survive—not to reform. When he split from al-Qaeda, it was not because he renounced jihadist doctrine but because global pressure demanded a new façade. The result is a system that maintains the language of extremism while courting legitimacy from the very world it once declared war upon.   Two successive leaders of the Islamic State—Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi—were both killed inside al-Sharaa’s territory. Such coincidence is impossible without complicity. Either the leader of Syria’s northwest knew they were there and sheltered them, or he lacked any control over his own domain. In both cases, the claim to legitimacy collapses. A government that emerges from this soil can only reproduce the logic of the underground: secrecy, loyalty, and fear.   Within this environment, governance becomes an instrument of survival rather than service. The administrative structures in Idlib mimic the forms of a state—ministries, courts, police—but their substance remains coercive. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and independent Syrian monitors describe the same pattern: arbitrary detentions, disappearances, censorship, forced morality codes, and restrictions on women. These are not the errors of an immature democracy but the deliberate instruments of control. Economic life follows the same logic. Markets are monopolized by HTS-linked businessmen; cross-border trade through Bab al-Hawa is taxed like a fiefdom; humanitarian aid is repackaged and resold. What was once jihad for ideology has become jihad for profit.   To the outside world, al-Sharaa’s rhetoric of moderation is seductive. Western diplomats, weary of endless conflict, see in him a potential partner—a Sunni leader who might counterbalance Iranian influence. But the illusion collapses under law. Al-Sharaa remains designated by the U.S. Treasury as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224. That label is not symbolic; it freezes his assets, bans his travel, and criminalizes any financial dealings with him. International reconstruction institutions—the IMF, World Bank, and UN development agencies—cannot legally transact with a government he leads. Under such conditions, Syria’s recovery becomes impossible. Every foreign investor faces the same barrier: to build in Idlib is to finance terrorism.   The paradox deepens when one considers al-Sharaa’s diplomacy. He now speaks of cooperation with Iran, the same power his movement once anathematized. He reaches out to Turkey and Qatar while suppressing pro-Turkish factions within his own ranks. His ideological compass spins toward whoever offers protection. In that shifting opportunism, Syria’s sovereignty dissolves. The country becomes an arena where foreign patrons trade influence over the ruins of a state. Tehran uses Syria as a corridor to Lebanon; Ankara sees it as a buffer against the Kurds; Moscow defends its Mediterranean base; Washington maintains its sanctions. None of them offer a roadmap to peace.   Yet amid this exhaustion, a new figure has re-entered the conversation—Brigadier General Manaf Tlass, a career officer once close to Bashar al-Assad, who defected in 2012 and refused to take part in the regime’s massacres. Tlass represents an idea long absent from Syrian discourse: that change can come from professionalism, not ideology. His proposal for a Transitional Military Council seeks to unite defected army officers, Kurdish representatives, and moderate opposition under one national command. The aim is not conquest but reconstruction—a neutral force that can secure cease-fire zones, disarm militias, and prepare the country for civilian governance under UN Resolution 2254.   Unlike those who weaponized faith, Tlass speaks the language of citizenship. He does not deny the crimes of the Assad era; he acknowledges them as the price of silence. He calls for transitional justice, truth commissions, and the reintegration of refugees. For the first time in years, a Syrian voice speaks not in the name of sect or faction, but of a state that belongs to all. It is not charisma that sets him apart but coherence: a man who understands both the army he served and the people it betrayed.   The contrast between the two men—al-Sharaa and Tlass—captures the essence of Syria’s choice. One promises salvation through continuity, the other through change. One is anchored in illegality, the other in legitimacy. The first offers a future of permanent militias and economic dependency; the second imagines the revival of national institutions and a secular order. The world, too, faces a choice. To engage with a terrorist administration is to endorse paralysis. To support a transitional structure is to risk involvement—but also to create the first conditions for peace.   The consequences of inaction are not abstract. Every month that Idlib remains under HTS control, new generations grow up in a culture of surveillance and indoctrination. Schools teach obedience instead of thought. Young men find identity only in arms. Women disappear behind walls of fear. Refugees lose hope of return because the Syria that awaits them no longer resembles a homeland. A conflict once defined by ideology has turned into one of demography: the replacement of citizens with subjects, of belonging with submission.   For the international community, moral clarity must precede political convenience. The question is no longer whether al-Sharaa can be “moderated,” but whether the world is willing to normalize a state that criminalizes dissent and profits from chaos. The price of appeasement is measured not only in dollars but in generations. Every compromise with illegitimacy deepens the conviction that violence pays.   Syria’s salvation will not come from slogans of reform or selective diplomacy. It will come from the re-creation of lawful authority, the re-establishment of institutions, and the recognition that no peace can stand on foundations of terror. The path outlined by Manaf Tlass is not perfect, but it is practicable. It builds on existing military structures, introduces accountability, and aligns with international law. It restores the idea that a Syrian state can exist without fear.   Fifteen years of war have turned Syria into a laboratory of despair. Its people have endured chemical attacks, siege, hunger, and betrayal. Yet within that devastation survives a stubborn will to live. The bazaar still opens, children still learn, and music still drifts from the cafés of Damascus and Hama. What they await is not another faction, but the return of a state.   Between illusion and renewal, Syria stands at its narrowest bridge. The mirage of reform cannot forever substitute for justice. The international community must decide whether it prefers the comfort of denial or the challenge of reconstruction. History will not remember who held Idlib; it will remember who dared to rebuild Syria.                                                                

En France, le marché de l’alimentation est de plus en plus fragmenté, tandis que les cas d’inflation alimentaire suscitent des inquiétudes dans toute l’Europe, selon une nouvelle étude de l’Institut du développement durable et des relations internationales (IDDRI).

The post En France, la hausse des prix et les inégalités fragilisent le « Pacte alimentation », selon une étude appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Growing public debt in Europe is no longer just the result of temporary crises, but a persistent, structural trend that dates back to the 1970s. The drivers are an ageing society, low economic growth and the political inability to limit spending. The crises of 2010–2015 exposed the weaknesses of the monetary union – macroeconomic imbalances, fiscal policy mistakes and the lack of common assistance mechanisms. The pandemic, in turn, has further increased government debt. According to the latest regional economic outlook by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), without growth-promoting reforms in Europe, there is a risk of a significant increase in government debt. By 2040, this could reach an average of 130 per cent of gross domestic product, which is 40 percentage points more than the IMF considers stable. In the event of external shocks, an even higher debt ratio is possible.

In addition to the legacy of structural problems, budgetary problems are increasingly exacerbated by geopolitical factors. On the one hand, there is an urgent need for higher spending on defence, energy transition, industrial subsidies and aid to Ukraine due to Russia’s aggression and economic competition from China. On the other hand, rising interest rates on government debt worldwide are limiting European Union (EU) countries’ ability to borrow. This creates the vicious circle: Limited fiscal leeway deepens geopolitical dependence, and geopolitical dependence forces further spending.

Hidden costs of public debt

In the context of rising debt, reference is typically made to the growing costs of debt servicing. This narrows the scope for fiscal policy and diverts resources from growth-promoting sectors such as research and education.

However, rising debt also has hidden geopolitical costs: It reduces the ability of EU countries to act together, exacerbates disagreements – for example between north and south or between large and small member states – and weakens confidence in central institutions such as the European Commission, which monitors compliance with fiscal rules, and the European Central Bank (ECB), whose monetary policy could increasingly be oriented towards stabilising member states’ debt.

In addition, high public debt makes EU countries more vulnerable to external factors such as changes in interest rates internationally. Public debt can also become an instrument of external influence on EU member states. The increasing involvement of investors from third countries – including China and the Gulf states – in European bond markets raises the risk that financial dependencies will be exploited politically.

Escaping the vicious circle

Unlike the United States and China, the EU has few options for mobilising capital. Limited fiscal space and weak capital markets make it vulnerable to external shocks. The integration of financial markets and the restoration of competitiveness in Europe are progressing slowly, according to the conclusions given in reports by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi. A rapid breakthrough that would lead to a noticeable inflow of capital to Europe cannot be foreseen.

The EU’s highly decentralised fiscal system relies heavily on the economic future of its three largest member states – Germany, France and Italy. Together, these countries account for about two-thirds of the eurozone’s public debt. However, given their limited fiscal leeway, they can no longer reconfigure their economic models and respond to geopolitical challenges. France’s deteriorating public finances are leading to growing populism in economic policy debates. This not only undermines confidence in the country’s economic policy-making capabilities, but could also put the already fragile structure of the EU’s monetary union to the test.

Amid global economic competition, the stability of the euro and the internal market are among the EU’s few “hard” assets that could easily be lost. A new euro crisis – in which Germany no longer plays a stabilising role and the ECB’s measures may no longer prove effective – would not only be an economic but also a geopolitical disaster for the EU. Sustainable public finances must therefore become an essential part of its geopolitical resilience.

 

Alex Iwobi says Nigeria will have to "lock up" Gabon striker, and his former Arsenal team-mate, Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang when the sides meet in African play-offs for the 2026 World Cup.

Um die "Eventin" und ihre Ladung ist ein langwieriger Rechtstreit entbrannt. Der Sanktionsexperte Sascha Lohmann von der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik sieht Anzeichen dafür, dass die Bundesrepublik das Schiff am Ende wieder freigeben werden muss.

Hannibal Kadhafi, le fils de l'ancien guide libyen, Mouammar Kadhafi, est désormais libre et autorisé à quitter le Liban.

Cette libération intervient après dix ans de détention dans ce pays. Le fils de l'ancien dirigeant libyen avait été arrêté en 2015, soupçonné de détenir des informations sur la disparition du religieux chiite libanais, Moussa al-Sadr, apparu en Libye en 1978, alors que Hannibal n'était âgé que de deux ans.

Sa libération intervient quelques jours après que les autorités libanaises ont levé son interdiction de voyager et ont fait passer la caution de 11 millions à 900 000 dollars, facilitant ainsi sa remise en liberté.

Selon des sources judiciaires et sécuritaires, la somme a été versée par une délégation libyenne. La justice a également précisé que l'équipe de défense de Kadhafi avait retiré la plainte déposée en octobre 2025 à Genève contre l'État libanais, laquelle dénonçait sa détention prolongée sans procédure.

Avant son arrestation, Hannibal Kadhafi vivait en exil en Syrie avec son épouse libanaise, Aline Skaf, et leurs enfants, jusqu'à son enlèvement en 2015 par des militants libanais exigeant des informations sur le sort d'al-Sadr.

Lefaso.net
Source : Africanews

Nach dem Rückzug der USA aus dem Kampf gegen den Klimawandel kommt bei der COP30 China eine Schlüsselrolle zu. Europa wirkt dagegen wenig ambitioniert.

On 10 November 2025, the OSCE Presence in Albania brought together 30 prosecutors and judicial police officers from Durrës and Elbasan for a training course on “Cybercrime, electronic evidence, human rights and data protection.”

The workshop aimed to strengthen participants’ capacity to investigate and prosecute cybercrime while ensuring that human rights and data protection principles are respected in every stage of the process. It specifically focused on developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to guide prosecutors and judicial police officers in handling digital evidence.

“These SOPs are not abstract technical papers. They are practical tools to ensure the integrity of investigations, the reliability of evidence and the protection of individual rights,” said Mauro Puzzo, Head of the Presence’s Rule of Law and Human Rights Department.

The course was delivered by French expert Franck Cormary, who guided participants through theoretical and practical sessions focused on the legal framework for handling electronic evidence and the development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for computers, servers, mobile devices, Internet of Things (IoT), cloud environments and cryptocurrencies. Participants also engaged in hands-on exercises on forensic examination and a simulation on accessing cold crypto-wallets.

This training builds on the Presence’s 2024 initiative, which offered a series of foundational courses on the Budapest Convention and practical aspects of handling electronic evidence to approximately 100 prosecutors and judicial police officers in Shkodra, Lezha, Korça, Saranda and Gjirokastra. Insights and experiences from that earlier series have shaped the development of this advanced workshop, designed to provide justice professionals with standardized, practical tools they can apply in their daily work.

The event is part of the OSCE Presence’s continued support for Albania’s justice reform and its efforts to promote the rule of law, human rights and institutional integrity in addressing cybercrime and digital challenges.

Rapporteur Jörgen Warborn will brief journalists on 13 November at 13.30 on Parliament’s position on the simplification package for sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements.
Committee on Legal Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Rapporteur Jörgen Warborn will brief journalists on 13 November at 13.30 on Parliament’s position on the simplification package for sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements.
Committee on Legal Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Rapporteur Jörgen Warborn will brief journalists on 13 November at 13.30 on Parliament’s position on the simplification package for sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements.
Committee on Legal Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Rapporteur Jörgen Warborn will brief journalists on 13 November at 13.30 on Parliament’s position on the simplification package for sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements.
Committee on Legal Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Rapporteur Jörgen Warborn will brief journalists on 13 November at 13.30 on Parliament’s position on the simplification package for sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements.
Committee on Legal Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

European Parliament’s spokespersons will hold a last-minute briefing on the 12 - 13 November plenary session tomorrow at 14.30.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

European Parliament’s spokespersons will hold a last-minute briefing on the 12 - 13 November plenary session tomorrow at 14.30.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

European Parliament’s spokespersons will hold a last-minute briefing on the 12 - 13 November plenary session tomorrow at 14.30.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

European Parliament’s spokespersons will hold a last-minute briefing on the 12 - 13 November plenary session tomorrow at 14.30.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP