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Next year marks the 10th anniversary of the end of Nepal’s civil war, a conflict that resulted in the deaths of approximately 18,000 Nepalese and the displacement of around 100,000 more. A decade of violence and political turmoil was ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord by the government and Maoist rebels. It was also accompanied by an agreement to draft a new political constitution for the former mountain kingdom. However, vested political interests and bad governance have once again brought a negotiation process that formally began in 2008 to a grinding halt. As a result, concerns are growing that Nepal might soon be in for another round of political upheaval – at a time when it needs it the least.

Sticking Points

The events of 22nd January amply demonstrate the potential for crisis inside this poor, fragile and now devastated state. The most recent attempt to reach a consensus on a new constitution was marred by violence between members of Nepal’s Constituent Assembly. It was the fourth time since 2010 that lawmakers have attempted to finalize the new constitution’s text. The reasons for this breakdown are all too familiar: political and ethno-religious interests continue to trump pragmatism and political expediency. The complacency and self-interest of many Nepalese lawmakers should also be taken into account. Indeed, the last significant piece of progress dates back to 2007, when a simple interim draft to govern national affairs was agreed upon.

Accordingly, the disturbance also reflects that the ‘sticking points’ between Nepal’s rival political factions have changed very little over the past few years. For instance, debates continue to rage over whether Nepal should be a secular or Hindu state as well as the final shape of country’s electoral system. Of equal (if not greater) importance is the final composition of the federal democratic republic that replaced two centuries of monarchical rule. Debates here continue to reflect the gulf between the coalition government of Prime Minister Sushil Koirala and the Maoist/Madhesi opposition. While the Nepali Congress-CPN-UML coalition is pushing for a smaller federation of six to eight states, opposition politicians continue to demand almost double this number.

The Maoist and Madhesi opposition’s support is based around their heartlands in the south of the country. Both groups want a federal system that better reflects Nepal’s diverse and complex ethnic mix. For its part, the Koirala government remains opposed to these demands, arguing that this approach would aggravate ethnic tensions and undermine a much-needed national unity. As a result, the coalition is determined to push through proposals for a federal system based on geographical rather than ethno-religious logic. The opposition, understandably, views this proposal as a recipe for further disaster.

Towards a Jana Andolan III?

Nowhere are these differences of opinion more keenly felt than on the Terai plains. Located along the border with India, the region accounts for 1/5 of Nepal’s landmass and is home to approximately 50% of its population. The Terai is also the home of the Madhesi community, an ethnic group that’s culturally and linguistically distinct from Nepal’s northern tribes. For this reason, Madhesi activists continue to lobby for a different administrative status from the rest of the country, a demand that’s bitterly opposed by the Koirala administration. So far, protestors have preferred to take non-violent forms of action against the government. However, patience is beginning to wear thin among some activists.

That said, activists from all of Nepal’s ethnic groups continue to feed off the uncertainty caused by Kathmandu’s failure to draft a workable constitution and improve the country’s parlous economic conditions. It’s estimated that a quarter of the Nepalese population lives below the poverty line on an annual income of less than 600 Euros. Moreover, a quarter of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) can be attributed to the vast Nepalese diaspora. In response, Nepal has been plagued by general strikes and sporadic outbursts of pro- and anti-government protests since at least 2006. To further complicate matters, there have been no less than seven changes of government over the past seven years. This is just as much a reflection of the negligence and ineptitude of Nepal’s political elite as it is the general unease among the wider population.

As things stand, Nepal is currently ranked 126th out of 174 countries by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Many Nepalese also view the country’s political parties and legislature as hotbeds of cronyism and nepotism. It’s much the same with public appointments, with the opening line of the Nepal section of the Global Corruption Report stating:

‘’With the exception of recruitments dealt with directly by the Nepal Public Service Commission, nepotism in appointments is systematic in Nepal. Government schools are no exception’’.

Such perceptions have undoubtedly created a sense of disillusionment among Nepal’s electorate. This is further compounded by research suggesting that the country’s military, media outlets, religious bodies and business community are also viewed with a fair degree of cynicism. As a result, many Nepalese do not expect the current social, economic and political system to improve living standards, enhance transparency and provide opportunities for greater participation in the country’s politics.

One can only imagine how the recent earthquakes will impact upon Nepal’s already less-than-ideal social and economic conditions. For the time being, however, public dissatisfaction and political dissent is likely to give way to the need to rebuild the country’s infrastructure. This also means that a return to the more extreme political protests that blighted Nepal between 1990 and 2006 is unlikely to happen in the months ahead. Dialogue on a new constitution will be placed on the backburner, and troops will be (re)mobilized to aid recovery efforts rather than breaking up political protests. It also remains to be seen whether the recovery from this latest natural disaster will instill a new sense of identity among Nepal’s disparate ethnic groups.

In the Wings

The earthquake crisis is also likely to have a temporary impact on the strategic calculations of Nepal’s largest neighbors, China and India. Of the two, the latter currently has a greater vested interest in the long-term fate of the country. Kathmandu’s relations with New Delhi were cemented in 1950 with the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. An estimated 600,000 Indians currently live in Nepal, thereby expanding the country’s Hindu community and making a significant contribution to the economy. India also accounts for approximately 40% of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Nepal, as well as two-thirds of its foreign trade. However, a number of high-profile energy projects – such as the Raxaul-Amlekhgunj pipeline – have stalled as a result of the country’s political instability.
By comparison, Nepal’s relations with China remain a ‘work in progress’. In December 2012, Nepal’s foreign minister Mahendra Bahadur Pandey used his trip to China to confirm the Koirala government’s admiration for Beijing’s “peripheral diplomacy” and “development cooperation relations”. He also confirmed Kathmandu’s interest in being part of China’s ambitious Silk Road initiative. While Nepal has little to offer in the way of natural resources or manufactured goods, its involvement in one of Beijing’s flagship projects will enhance connectivity between South Asia and China. It will also provide Beijing with a greater degree of influence over a state that was once thought to be exclusively in New Delhi’s strategic backyard. Indeed, China can now stake its claim with an even greater degree of confidence now that it has replaced India as the largest contributor of FDI into Nepal.

The strategic rivalry between Beijing and New Delhi is also being played out in Nepal’s post-earthquake recovery efforts. Despite geographical proximity, neither side is prepared to coordinate their emergency and rescue activities. But that’s not to say that both countries are completely locked into a game of one-upmanship over Nepal. There are many issues where Beijing and New Delhi share mutual interests and concerns, including a desire to see the establishment of a bona fide federal republic and an end to political unrest. Just don’t expect either side to work together to resolve them.

Post-recovery

As stated earlier, efforts to rebuild the country following two earthquakes that have killed almost 10,000 Nepalese will, for the time being, take precedence over creating a political constitution. However, once rescue and reconstruction efforts have ended, the international community is likely to be confronted by an all-too-familiar Nepalese state. Elites from across the political and ethnic divides will remain locked in a battle over the future shape and trajectory of the country – much to the chagrin of ‘ordinary’ Nepalese citizens. Further social unrest inside this isolated and landlocked Asian country cannot (and should not) be ruled out.

Juncker, left, with Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras at last month's EU summit in Brussels

The Greek daily To Vima has a nice scoop this afternoon about a document they’ve been leaked purporting to be a new proposal from Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, on how to break the standoff between Athens and its creditors.

According to the To Vima report, the plan envisions a deal with Greece that completely cuts out the International Monetary Fund and releases about €5bn in aid to Athens from three different sources: the €1.8bn remaining in the EU’s portion of the current bailout; €1.9bn in profits from Greek bonds purchased by the European Central Bank back in 2010; and another €1.3bn or so in additional Greek bond profits the ECB will get in July.

In exchange, Greece would agree to adopt a relatively short list of economic reforms that are significantly narrower from those being sought by the IMF and a German-led group of hardliners within the eurozone.

The Commission’s spokeswoman responsible for economic issues, former Reuters correspondent Annika Briedthardt, has already distanced the Commission from the document, saying in a tweet that she’s not aware the proposal actually exists:

Can't confirm media reports on @EU_Commission /Juncker proposal on GR. Not aware of such proposal. Working towards comprehensive deal.

— Annika Breidthardt (@A_Breidthardt) May 18, 2015

Other commission officials are similarly playing down its importance. “We have many documents,” said one, only half-jokingly.

Although nobody is admitting the provenance of the document, what it appears to be is one in a series of proposals going back and forth between the Commission and Athens in an effort to find common ground, rather than a full-blown “Juncker Plan” to cut the Gordian Knot.

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Le président burundais Pierre Nkurunziza a annoncé lundi un remaniement ministériel, alors que son pays traverse une crise politique. Trois ministres ont été remplacés, parmi lesquels ceux de la Défense et des Affaires étrangères.

In this interview, Jean-Marie Guéhenno joins Global Dispatches to discuss his new memoir The Fog of Peace. Guéhenno discusses his experiences as the top French foreign policy planning official during the fall of the Berlin Wall; what it was like have Kofi Annan interview you for a job; and the future challenges facing international peacekeeping.

Ce successeur du Reaper associe la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie.

VIENNA, 18 May 2015 – Following the Supreme Rada’s adoption on 9 April of the law “On condemnation of the Communist and Nazi totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and banning of propaganda of their symbols,” OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatović on 15 April wrote to the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, asking for his careful consideration of the law before approving it. The law was signed by the President on 15 May.

“It is discouraging for freedom of expression and media freedom advocates that the law has gone into effect, despite various calls to safeguard these basic rights,” Mijatović said.

The law criminalizes public denial of the activities of these regimes and bans all related symbols, except for restricted educational or scientific purposes. Violation of the law carries a penalty of potential termination of activities of media and prison sentences for five to ten years.

“While I fully respect the often sensitive and painful nature of historical debate and its effect on society, broadly and vaguely defined language that restricts individuals from expressing views on past events and people, could easily lead to suppression of political, provocative and critical speech, especially in the media,” Mijatović wrote.

The Representative also commented on the law “On the legal status and honouring of fighters for Ukrainian independence in the twentieth century.” The law, also signed by the President on 15 May, introduces liability for publicly expressing disrespect for certain groups of fighters for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century and criminalizes public denial of the legitimacy of their fight for Ukraine’s independence.

“The media is a vital element of a healthy democracy and its role should be respected at all times,” Mijatović said. “Contested information and potentially problematic speech should not be banned, on the contrary, it should be addressed through an open debate.

“Disproportionate restrictions on media freedom can never be justified in a democratic state and Ukraine’s significant progress in this area should be preserved, not undermined,” Mijatović said.

Mijatović also noted that representatives from civil society had not been given the opportunity to participate in public discussions about the laws.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. She provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Le conseil de perfectionnement de l’école de formation des sous-officiers de l’armée de l’air (EFSOAA) s’est tenu à Rochefort le mardi 12 mai 2015.

Das dänische Kulturministerium organisiert eine Kampagne gegen raubkopierte Inhalte im Internet. Dafür macht es gemeinsame Sache mit Internetdienstleistern und Hight-Tech Firmen. Das trifft nicht überall in Europa auf Wohlwollen. EurActiv Brüssel berichtet.

Yemen has become the testing ground for Saudi Arabia’s new assertive foreign policy and its bid for regional leadership. A Saudi-led coalition launched an aerial bombing campaign at the end of March to contain and reverse Houthi rebels’ expansion and reinstate exiled President Hadi.

The Saudi Kingdom was able to leverage shared concerns over the threat represented by Iran’s growing influence and backing of the Houthis to gain the support of other Sunni regimes in the region. However, Yemen represents little more than a backwater for many of the external actors involved. This is why Saudi Arabia, the country that has most invested in the crisis, may end up paying the highest political price for it.

The Yemen intervention epitomises the hawkish posture of the new generation of leaders who acceded to power following Saudi King Abdullah’s death in January 2015, in particular Crown Prince and Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef and Deputy Crown Prince and Defence Minister Mohammed bin Salman. Alongside a more muscular foreign policy, they are also keen to portray Saudi Arabia as a modern technocratic state that ensures order and stability. Therefore, the Saudis have justified their intervention as a response to an appeal for help by the legitimate government of Yemen.

But Saudi Arabia has over-reached. The coalition it has crafted is at best tenuous, presenting a common front against Iran but papering over major areas of disagreement. Turkey and Pakistan backtracked after initially signaling their willingness to participate. Egypt, despite significant financial inducements, has limited its contribution to a small naval presence as opposed to the ground troops coveted by Riyadh. Oman bowed out, Iraq is openly critical and Jordan is dissatisfied with the diversion of resources away from the fight against Daesh (or Islamic State).

There is no viable military strategy in place. While the coalition air force has destroyed the aerial and ballistic capabilities of the Houthis and their allies, the Saudis have been unable to force their retreat. There is no united front on the ground but rather a mix of Islamists, tribesmen, and southern separatists spurred on by financial inducements. Many of them are not even supportive of Hadi’s return. By mobilising local forces (popular committees), the Saudis are further contributing to the dismantling of formal state structures. Riyadh has also resorted to retraining Yemeni forces, while rumblings of a ground intervention continue.

There is no viable political strategy in place either. In fact, former United Nations (UN) chief envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, has stated that the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes have derailed efforts towards a power-sharing deal. Saudi Arabia has insisted that peace talks be held in Riyadh, rather than at a neutral venue. Consequently, the dialogue conference that started on May 17th in Riyadh does not include representatives from the Houthis or supporters of former President Saleh.

The intervention is turning into an image problem for Saudi Arabia. Cognisant of growing international concern, Riyadh paid 100 percent of a UN ‘flash appeal’ emergency fund, amounting to $274 million, and then doubled its contribution to $540 million. But the limited military objectives achieved have come at the expense of an acute humanitarian crisis. According to OCHA, as of May 6th 1,527 had died as a result of the conflict, at least 646 of them civilians. An embargo by the coalition is blocking deliveries of fuel, food, water and medicine, while humanitarian groups estimate the number of displaced people at almost 550,000. According to Human Rights Watch, the Saudi-led coalition has used cluster munitions supplied by the United States. Disorder has flamed sectarianism and opened up space for the expansion of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

The humanitarian crisis has increased pressure on Washington to push Riyadh towards a ceasefire. The United States (US) supported Saudi Arabia’s intervention because it would have been unable to stop it. It also wanted to prove to its Gulf allies that nuclear negotiations with Iran would not come at their expense; an effort which it reiterated at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit at Camp David on March 14th, where it lent support to the Riyadh Conference under GCC auspices and committed to help GCC member states defend themselves against external threats emanating from Yemen. The US contributed intelligence, surveillance and re-supply of equipment and munitions, deployed aircraft carriers to the Arabian Sea and issued warnings to Iran not to get involved, all in an effort to reassure the Saudis. But the conflagration has exposed the US’ declining leverage in the region. The most Washington has been able to achieve has been Saudi acquiescence to a five-day humanitarian ceasefire, which broadly held between May 12th and 17th.

Paradoxically, Iran might end up being the one to gain the most. For Tehran, Yemen represents a low-risk, high-return proposition. Its interests in Yemen are not vital and any eventual political solution will have to incorporate the Houthis. Its support for the Houthis is an opportunistic attempt to expand its political influence rather than a strategic long-term investment (as opposed to its long-standing interests in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq). Foreign Minister Zarif has proposed a four-point plan to address the conflict, including a ceasefire, humanitarian assistance, a resumption of broad national dialogue and the establishment of an inclusive national unity government, which has not received much traction. However, Kerry has asked Iran to use its influence to get the Houthis to negotiate and the US has signalled its openness to potentially agree to Iran participating in negotiations.

The actions of the main external players involved in Yemen are tangential to the political struggle being waged within the country. For Saudi Arabia, it is about confronting Iran and stepping up to a coveted regional leadership role. For the US, it is about addressing its terrorism concerns and trying to balance its geopolitical game. For Iran, it is an opportunity to expand its political influence. Yemen is not a priority issue for any of these players, but some stand to lose more than others in this conflict.

Ana Echagüe is senior researcher at FRIDE.

Photo credits: Ibrahem_Qasim_CC_BY-S_4.0  

 

L’arrivée du printemps et des beaux jours est également pour l’armée de l’air le départ de la saison des meetings. Pour l’occasion, l’Air actualitésnuméro 681 du mois de mai vous relate l’ultime préparation des ambassadeurs avant ce rendez-vous des aficionados de l’aéronautique.

L'intitulé des mesures d'ordre inviduel de la semaine dernière était trompeur : s'il prend bien une
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Russian real estate tycoon Sergei Polonsky, who was deported from Cambodia to Russia Sunday, was officially charged with fraud and questioned Monday, a spokeswoman for the Russian Interior Ministry said.

Amid fears of growing Chinese influence, a radical nativist movement wants to keep Hong Kong for Hong Kongers.

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The European Economic Area (EEA) was established on 1 January 1994 following an agreement between the member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Union (EU).

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Plenary sessions : Military groups in conflict areas such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo often use the sale of minerals found in their territory to fund their activities. A new EU proposal aims to put an end to this by setting up an EU system of self-certification to encourage importers, smelters and refiners to source their minerals responsibly. MEPs will debate the plans on Tuesday 19 May and vote on them the following day. Follow it live on our website.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Plenary sessions : Military groups in conflict areas such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo often use the sale of minerals found in their territory to fund their activities. A new EU proposal aims to put an end to this by setting up an EU system of self-certification to encourage importers, smelters and refiners to source their minerals responsibly. MEPs will debate the plans on Tuesday 19 May and vote on them the following day. Follow it live on our website.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

A négynyelvű kérvényt a kezdeményező csoport eljuttatta többek között az Európai Bizottság elnökéhez, az Európa Tanács emberjogi biztosához, az Európa Tanács Velencei Bizottságának elnökéhez, az Amnesty International jogvédő szervezethez, a Magyar Emberi Jogok Alapítványhoz. A kísérőlevélben leszögezték, hogy noha Romániát a kisebbségi jogok tekintetében mintaállamnak tartják,  a gyakorlatban számos példa van arra, hogy ez a besorolás nem fedi a valóságot. A petícióban megfogalmazottak is bizonyítékai ennek. A kezdeményezők azt kérték a címzettektől, hogy kísérjék figyelemmel az ügy fejleményeit, és a rendelkezésükre álló eszközökkel tegyenek meg mindent azért, hogy Romániában tartsák be a kisebbségi jogokat szavatoló törvényeket és egyezményeket. A civilek többek között azért követelik a marosvásárhelyi rendőrfőnök leváltását, mert nagy bírságokkal fenyegette a városlakókat, akik ingatlanjukra kihelyezték a kétnyelvű utcanévtáblákat.

Plenáris ülés : A hadseregek és egyéb fegyveres csoportok illegális finanszírozásának vetne véget az a javaslat, amelyről kedden vitázik és szerdán szavaz az EP plenárisa. Az uniós rendelettervezet egy olyan tanúsítványi rendszert hozna létre, amelyben az ón, a tantál, a volfrám és az arany (az úgynevezett konfliktus-ásványok) importőrei kellő gondossággal járhatnának el, hogy megakadályozzák, hogy a pénzek fegyveres csoportokhoz kerüljenek. A vitát és a szavazást honlapunkon is élőben közvetítjük.

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2015 - EP