Agrégateur de flux

Appointment of Gen. Gregory (Kiir's in-law)

By Simon Yel Yel

It was on Tuesday, the 3rd of January, the first work day of 2017 when President Salva Kiir Mayardit inked the polemical appointment of Gen. Gregory Deng at J1. It was exactly the third day of the New Year and the New Year's wishes were still fresh in everyone's mind. With that appointment, President has controversially coloured the wishes of the New Year.

For some in Gogrial state (Pres. Kiir's own state) who thought that 2016 was not fair to them economically and politically because of former governor Gum being in power, and they were wishing the New Year to come with many desirable items on its menu ranging from political to economical, I want to say congratulations!
President Kiir has served you with Gen. Gregory on gubernatorial plate as your best New Year wish on the 2017 political menu.

Maburuk! to those who tie their political fortunes to the political success of Gen. Gregory that, please, enjoy but don't forget that there are many challenges lying ahead there and if you don't work hard to maintain this seat by delivering what is expected of you to the people of Gogrial state, then be mindful what brought Gregory may take him away any time.

To those who are mourning the removal of Gum and thinking that it is the their end and a bad kick start of 2017, I want to tell them that, be strong, “PINY ATOU ALONG DET”… President Gives and President Takes!

Arguably, the appointment of Gen. Gregory as a governor for President's home state has glimmered a lot of debate on social media. The appointment did not only draw mixed reactions from Gogrial state natives but throughout the country with some SPLM politicians, writers and analysts defining it in their own terms.

“I disagree sharply with the President's decision to appoint his brother-in-law as the governor of Gogrial state. This decision is against the SPLM principle of equality and Justice; it is a clear sign of bad governance because this post is electable and any appointment can't be done based on marital/social or any similar blood/favoritisms relations,” blasts Suzanne Jambo, former SPLM secretary for external affairs (now a opponent of the president).

Meanwhile, Agel Riing Machar, a senior member of SPLA-IO (Vice-president Taban's faction) Military Council and a former youth leader, chipped in: “The debate should focus on his capability and track records rather than his relationship with the President. He is an excellence choice for the portfolio. The people of Gogrial state can benefit from his connections and influence at the National level as well as regionally and internationally in areas of business and governance.”

To define this appointment based on South Sudanese standard, there is no way that it would fit in any description rather than “nepotism” given the way we view things with our tribal or communal/sectional lenses where one's relationship with an employer always triumphs one's capability.

However, to define this appointment based on law, it is on “meritocracy.”
In America, when President John F. Kennedy appointed his younger brother, Robert, as an attorney General, some media pundits and analysts described the appointment as based on nepotism rather than on merits.

Robert Francis was argued to be under-qualified for the job because he was only 35 years old with a few years of legal service as legal counsel to two senate committees; however, with the backing of his brother, he passed the senate vetting.

“It is not simply good enough to name a bright young political manager, no matter how bright or how young or how personally loyal, to a major post in government”, the New York Times editorialized after the nomination.

A member of Senate later observed, “it was nepotism, I mean; he was the brother of the President”. Anthony Lewis, a veteran courts reporter said “though it was simply awful idea, Kennedy was a zealot with no understanding of the terrible responsibilities of an attorney General.”

After the assassination of President Kennedy, his successor, President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 was prompted by the appointment of Robert to lobby and sign into law a Nepotism statue prohibiting a President from appointing a family member.

Legally speaking, it is generally agreed among legal scholars that “Nepotism”, for purposes of the law, refers to the hiring and advancement of un- or under-qualified relatives simply by virtue of their relationship with an employer or officer. In other words, it's only restricted if the appointee is not qualified for the position.

So, given how nepotism is viewed legally, and therefore could be argued in court, for the purpose of law, Gregory has both academic merits and experiences that can qualify him not only for gubernatorial portfolio but for any portfolio in Kiir's government or in any other government to come.

The question of nepotism can be licit only if we have anti-nepotism law in our constitution like in the U.S.A and if he were under-qualified for the job. Unfortunately, with the absolute absence of such law as of now in our constitution, we can only objurgate the appointment made by any public officials such as the President, ministers, or governors as based on “nepotism” only if the appointee has no merits or under-qualified to claim that post.

It is also up to our legislators to legislate an anti-nepotism law if they see that the appointment of Gregory could possibly open a Pandora box of nepotism and may be of advantage to some corrupt public officials who might use it as an ambiguity to employ their unqualified relatives.

Therefore, it is upon our legislators whether to legislate it or not or the public should shut up feeble and incoherent arguments of fanciful articles in our constitution being infracted by the appointment of relatives by public officials.

Gregory didn't become President's brother-in-law in 2017 nor did he divulge his political ambitions to lead people (in various capacities) after Kiir assumed presidency.
Gregory got his first political assignment in 2002 by late Dr. John Garang as the first commissioner for Gogrial East County. He is brilliant, thoughtful, politically ambitious, undoubtedly articulate, and wondrously learned with good qualities of a leader; however, the history of defunct Warrap politics of “stabbing the back” and his previous records in commissionership office can be the best guide to foretell his success or failure, politically, socially, and security-wise.

He has his own political ambitions to achieve and he had laid bare his desire many times to be a governor of the defunct Warrap state before and after 2010 elections. In 2010, Gregory was among the three gubernatorial aspirants for Warrap state whose names were sent to SPLM political bureau in Juba for final nomination of one candidate to battle it out with other candidates in 2010 General Elections.

Unluckily, Gregory lost the nomination to Nyandeng Malek, however, he accepted the decision of political bureau and campaigned vigorously for Nyandeng to win the election. Sometimes later after her election, Gregory fell out with Nyandeng and joined the voices calling for her removal.

Debatably, with the election time remaining uncertain and the life span of the presidency that you can't predict, Gregory had run out of long wait for General Election to contest but to lobby Gogrial community and other political deities to support him and convince the President that it is now a high time for Gregory to govern Gogrial state.

Gregory is an entity, a person with his own political ambitions different from Kiir's and has a right to enjoy all the rights and privileges that every citizen in South Sudan is entitled to in our constitution; and it is unfair to divest him of these rights because of his mere relationship with the President.

Therefore, what matters the most is not how Gregory is related to the President but whether or not he has what it takes to be in that position; for example, does he have clear track records; does he understand the values and ideals of the state that he is going to govern; does he understand the urgent need of the people of Gogrial state; does he understand that he is now a politician and his high military ranks can't immune him from being condemned if he does something wrong; does he understand that the military philosophy of “whatever your boss says is true” doesn't work in politics; and does he understand that in politics, critics or dissents are not jailed, intimidated, prosecuted, or exiled, but are given freedom of expression and debate them with open mind and challenge them with your achievements?

In conclusion, Gregory has been looking for this job for so long and now he has it. It is incumbent on him to clearly spell and work out his programs why had he been after this job for so long.

Gregory must take this assignment as a full time job and prove it to all people that he has political agendas in mind to implement and he is capable of holding any other senior government position than gubernatorial post.

In fact, many rich politicians like him often go for politics to top up their richness with power while others go for politics to change the lives of their people. Whether he is going to top up his riches with power or transform the lives of the people of Gogrial state, only time will tell.

Mr. Governor, don't smile too much, they will think otherwise; remember always, all eyes are on you!

Simon Yel Yel is co-editor (with Paanluel Wel) of the book of the President Kiir' speeches and essential writings published in two volumes as “Salva Kiir Mayardit: The Joshua of South Sudan”. He can be reached at maandeng2017@gmail.com

January 10, 2017 (KHARTOUM) - The Joint Ministerial Committee between Sudan and Belarus Tuesday announced that the Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will visit Khartoum on Monday for the first time.

In a press release extended to Sudan Tribune on Tuesday, Sudan's Oil Minister and head of the joint committee Mohamed Awad Zaid said Lukashenko would be accompanied by a senior economic delegation, pointing the visit comes upon an invitation from President Omer al-Bashir.

He added the visit aims to promote bilateral cooperation between the two countries and to discuss a number of issues of common concern.

According to the Ministry of Oil, Lukashenko would meet al-Bashir and address the Sudanese parliament, pointing the two sides will hold ministerial meeting and sign a number of cooperation protocols and Memoranda of Understanding (MoU).

It is noteworthy that the two countries in January 2015 signed a number of MoU in the domains of higher education, scientific research, pharmaceuticals, medical training, industrial cooperation and auto imports.

According to Sudanese officials, Sudan seeks to broaden the partnership to include industrial and agricultural domains in order to benefit from the Belarussian experience especially in the oil industry.

Last Tuesday, the economic development sector at the Sudanese Council of Ministers approved the report of the Joint Ministerial Committee between Sudan and Belarus.

Belarus is one of the Sudan armament providers. A military cooperation protocol covering training, exchange of experiences, and military science fields was inked between the two countries on June 15, 2006.

(ST)

January 9, 2017 (KHARTOUM) - Sudan's Information Minister Ahmed Balal Osman Monday disclosed an American initiative to hold a meeting between his government and the armed groups in France this week.

Sudanese Information Minister Ahmed al-Balal Osman speaks during a press conference in the Sudanese capital Khartoum on June 9, 2013. ( Photo AFP/ASHRAF SHAZLY)

In press statements Osman told reporters that the informal consultations meeting may take place on 15-16 January in Paris.

However, he didn't give further details about who will participate in the meeting or its agenda.

The opposition Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF)-Agar recently announced that the Sudan Call Leadership Council would meet from 15 to 20 January, but it was not clear if they would meet a government delegation.

Since the failure of August meeting in Addis Ababa over the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access, U.S. Special Envoy Donald Booth met several times with the rebel groups and the government. He also held informal consultations meetings for the two sides in a bid to narrow the differences between the two sides.

The government went on with its national dialogue process saying the holdout groups can join the National Document of a conference held last October and participate in the transitional government. On the other hand, the opposition groups - including the Sudan Call forces- speak more and more about the need to conjugate efforts to overthrow the regime.

Speaking to the press in the capital of South Darfur Nyala, the British Ambassador to Sudan Michael Aron Monday said that his government last week in a meeting held in London had discussed the Roadmap Agreement implementation with the SPLM-N Secretary General, adding that Sudanese people would hear good news soon.

In a related development, the Sudanese communist Party Monday issued a statement reiterating its rejection for any process leading to a negotiated agreement with the regime of President Omer al-Bashir.

"The clear position of the National Consensus Forces is to overthrow the regime by building a broader mass front," said the statement, adding "The conservative and traditional forces managed to bar the way for the uprising, circumvented it and emptied its goals and contents. This attitude has ultimately led to the entry of the country in the dark tunnel since the NIF coup in 1989".

The National Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi Sunday called on the United Nations in coordination with the African Union to adopt a resolution requiring Khartoum to implement the African Union Roadmap Agreement which paves the way for an inclusive process for peace and democratic reforms.

(ST)

Après une très bonne année 2015, l'activité du port de pêche s'est stabilisée l'an dernier. Si la pêche côtière plafonne, la pêche fraîche au large et les importations ont permis une légère augmentation du tonnage débarqué (+ 1,39 %) et du chiffre d'affaires (+ 2,42 %). Le port de Keroman fait travailler quelque 3.000 personnes entre la pêche et la construction navale.

• Lire la suite de Port de pêche de Lorient : Toujours en progression

Le Secrétaire général adjoint des Nations Unies aux opérations de maintien de la paix, Hervé Ladsous, a noté mercredi devant le Conseil de sécurité une décrispation de la crise politique en République démocratique du Congo (RDC) après la signature d'un accord entre acteurs politiques le 31 décembre 2016.

By Tesfa-Alem Tekle

January 10, 2017 (ADDIS ABABA) - The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn said on Monday that his country will not free a prominent opposition leader from the restive Oromia region being jailed under the state of emergency decree.

Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn (Allafrica)

The Chairman of the Opposition Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) party, Merara Gudina, was arrested last month upon return from a meeting with European Union (EU) lawmakers in Belgium.

In Brussels, Merara appeared at the EU parliament to testify on the recent political crises and reports of alleged human right violations in the horn of Africa's nation.

Merara appeared at EU Parliament along with Birhanu Nega, leader of Ginbot-7, an exiled opposition movement long branded by Ethiopia as terrorist entity.

Also present at the EU Parliament was Feyisa Lellisa, Ethiopian Olympic Athlete who staged a protest sign at the Rio Olympics when he came second in a marathon race.

Ethiopian officials told Sudan Tribune Tuesday that the opposition leader was arrested for trespassing the state emergency ruling. Ethiopia imposed a six-month state of emergency in October following months of deadly protests in parts of the country.

The country faced an unprecedented wave of protests mainly in Oromia and Amhara regions over territorial as well as wider political and economic rights.

The decree's directive Article-2 prohibits any individual from communicating with banned opposition organisations or other "anti-peace" elements.

However, the Ethiopian Prime Minister on Monday said his country would not release the prominent opposition leader, but rather allow him face the courts of law.

"Individuals in EU Parliament who are harbouring anti-peace elements can't save those who trespass the law of the country", Hailemariam told reporters.

Opposition officials today told Sudan Tribune that Merara is likely to be tried under the country's anti-terrorism law, which right groups allege is being used as a tool to stifle freedom of speech and to arrest opposition members and critical journalists.

They say the state emergency law has severely affected opposition activities.

Right groups have also said that the decree has affected freedom of expression, dissent and independent reporting.

Ethiopian authorities have arrested over 20,000 suspects since the decree was declared last October in a bid to arrest violence.

The state emergency set to end in May is Ethiopia's first in over quarter a century.

The Ethiopian Prime Minister said the state of emergency decree has brought calm and could be lifted, considering the gains it had so far achieved.

"As far as the date of lifting the state emergency is concerned, it should be seen in the perspectives that we have to consolidate the gains that we have made so far" he added, but did not hint on whether his government would extend the decree after its end.

(ST)

January 10, 2017 (JUBA) - A top South Sudanese rebel commander has warned that rivalry between two rebel factions poses a threat to the cause for which the two camps pledged to pursue jointly.

Maj. Gen. Peter Gadet

Violence has, in recent weeks, risen in parts of South Sudan, which is dominated by the rebels under the command and leadership of former First Vice-President, Riek Machar.

Observers say disputes between Machar's predominantly ethnic Nuer and Lam Akol's Shilluk is attributed to the latest wave of power struggles between the rival factions.

The violence includes political assassinations disrupting the common goal for which the two rebels came into existence and threatens to destabilize the entire country.

So far, 2 top rebel commanders, all allied to Akol's National Democratic Movement — have been assassinated in what seems a contest for influence and control of the area.

Peter Gadet, a top rebel commander and one of those who defected from Machar before the signing of the 2015 peace agreement, sees a link between the two rebel factions as a threat to the cause for taking arms struggle against the Juba regime.

“Everyone was caught by surprise by what happened in Upper Nile. Nobody was expecting that. Nobody was expecting that the differences in views would escalate into the killings between colleagues whose objective is one: to remove the dictatorial regime under Salva Kiir in Juba. By turning on each other in the bush, what have they achieved than killing themselves?" Gadet told Sudan Tribune on Tuesday.

He added, "They have now empowered the regime, which I believe is the one engineering this. It is the regime”.

Gadet said rivalry has shifted to who should have leverage and control over the local people.

"This wave of violence shows there is a real threat that it would derail the focus on the main cause for which these movements were formed. “We are now talking about a security situation that is different than the sectarian fighting, when there are groups fighting against the government and against those who cooperated with the government," the top rebel commander stressed.

"We now have two main groups in the same community and they both accept the political process. But each one wants to be the sole representative of the movement and within the area," he added.

Last week, top rebel commanders, Gabriel Tanginye and Yohanis Okiech were killed in an apparent power struggle in South Sudan's Upper Nile state.

(ST)

Les Italiens avaient été les derniers à fermer leur ambassade en Libye à cause de la situation sécuritaire et ils sont les premiers à revenir à Tripoli. L'ambassadeur a présenté ses lettres de créance et prendra ses fonctions à Tripoli, alors que la situation ne s'est pas améliorée, bien au contraire. Ce retour exprime la volonté italienne de rester le premier partenaire de ce pays même en temps de crise.

C’est la fin de la crise politique en Islande. L’île, située au milieu de l’Atlantique Nord, s’est enfin trouvée un Premier ministre. Son prédécesseur avait dû démissionner après les révélations des Panama Papers. Et près de deux mois et demi après les élections législatives anticipées, Bjarni Benediktsson a donc été désigné par une coalition de centre et de centre-droit.

Herat – the affluent and vibrant city in western Afghanistan – is going through a ‘scattering’ of political power and a deterioration in security. While Ismail Khan, the self-styled ‘amir of the west’, is still the preeminent figure, political power is no longer concentrated only in his hands, and the new actors are behaving differently from the old-timers. One consequence of this is that security has worsened, with several districts seeing heavy clashes between Afghan government forces and the armed opposition – mostly the Taleban – and between rival Taleban factions. In Herat city, insecurity has taken on a largely criminal face as manifested in assassinations, kidnappings and thefts. Reviewing the recent situation, AAN guest author Said Reza Kazemi* argues that the diffusion of political power and deteriorating security pose a crucial test to the vibrancy of Herat and this, in turn, is reflected in the day-to-day life of its people and their striving for the future.

Struggling to keep centre stage: the ‘amir’ of the west’

One still cannot write about Herat without mentioning its self-proclaimed amir, Ismail Khan. He has risen from a captain in the government army (from which he defected in 1979 to join an anti-communist uprising) to mujahedin commander to governor of Herat and self-declared ‘amir’ of what historically was called the southwestern region (1992 to 1994 and again, 2002 to 2004) to the Minister of Energy and Water to a vice-presidential candidate in the hugely disputed 2014 presidential elections.

A prominent member of the influential Jamiat-e Islami party and of the political opposition group Shura-ye Herasat wa Sobat-e Afghanistan (Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan or CPSA) (see AAN reporting here), Ismail Khan currently has no government position. He does not appear on the media much, either. However, there are two specific days in the year when he can always be seen talking to the people around him and to the media: 24 Hut (15 March), the anniversary of Herat’s uprising against the Soviet-backed, Afghan communist government in 1357 (1979) (see AAN reporting here) and 29 Hamal (18 April), the anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and victory of the mujahedin in Herat in 1371 (1992). (1) The reason why Ismail Khan gives special attention to marking these two events is that he believes he played the instrumental role in both. At other times, he gathers his mujahedin commanders, local elders, government officials, journalists and others in his mansion in a street named after himself in downtown Herat to talk about the situation of Afghanistan generally and Herat specifically.

This year, on the two anniversaries (Herat uprising and Soviet withdrawal), as well as at least twice in public meetings at his home (see here and here), Ismail Khan made some very strong points. He repeatedly described insecurity as spreading “to the gates of our city” from nearby provinces like Farah and said that he and his mujahedin would not wait for the Afghan government’s permission to defend Herat if the government hesitated to do so. He vowed to take action to prevent Herat from becoming “another Kunduz” – an explicit reference to the fear that a generally safe province such as Herat could also fall, at least temporarily, to the armed opposition, as Kunduz has done twice (AAN on its fall in 2015 and near fall in 2016 here and here).

Ismail Khan’s rhetoric should be read in terms of messages for opponents, supporters and the general public. An experienced local journalist told this author that 70-year-old Ismail Khan is using worsening security as a pretext for arguing for the need for his Shura-ye Mujahedin (Mujahedin Council). It brings together many of his former Jamiat-e Islami allies from western Afghanistan and, through it, Ismail Khan keeps his central position in Afghanistan’s changing political landscape (more on his mujahedin council project in this previous AAN dispatch). There are at least two changes in the country’s political scene that Ismail Khan is reacting to: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami party’s reconciliation with the Afghan government – its pictures and statements have been on billboards as well as on some car windows in parts of the city – and future parliamentary elections (whenever they happen – for more, see previous AAN dispatch on elections here). A high-ranking government official who is close to both Ismail Khan in Herat and his allies in Kabul told this author:

Ismail Khan and his allies are preparing themselves for the coming parliamentary elections. They see Hekmatyar as a potential rival. They want to have a strong presence in the future parliament, and this will allow them to put pressure on the leadership and ministers of the National Unity Government.

Ismail Khan has so far managed to maintain his Mujahedin Council, not because everybody agrees with him and his agenda, but because he has been able to gratify them, particularly economically. He has accumulated abundant wealth and spent part of it on satisfying and keeping his former mujahedin commanders and members on side. For instance, local sources told this author that he reportedly earns a monthly income of around 19 million AFN (approximately USD 292,000) from leasing out three markets in the centre of Herat city alone. Additionally, he has intervened in other economic sectors from hospitality to partnerships with major business people since 2001. (2) One example is the swish, multi-storey Esteqlal Hotel in downtown Herat that is owned by him and where foreign guests, visiting government officials and those close to the ‘amir’ stay.

Ismail Khan’s continued political and economic influence in Herat would certainly help him sustain and even enhance his standing in Afghanistan’s national political sphere, particularly via the Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan, where he heads the defence and security committee. Nevertheless, many in Herat agree that the nature of his influence has changed. “Ismail Khan is no longer the only determining man in town,” said the journalist quoted above, “because others have risen and are vying for power.” This has been possible, broadly speaking, because of Herat’s socioeconomic dynamics, including the entry of more educated younger people into politics and the rise of new economic-political actors. In Herat, we now see a diffusion of political power, what in this dispatch is referred to as ‘scattered politics’.

The shadow of the past governors

After Ismail Khan was moved to Kabul to become the Minister of Energy and Water in 2004 in a bid by then President Hamid Karzai to impose central government authority on the disobedient Herati ‘amir’, Sayyed Muhammad Khairkhwa became the first in an unusually long line of successors. Khairkhwa had worked with Ismail Khan in the resistance before 1992 – something that it was assumed would help reduce the likelihood of Ismail Khan acting as a spoiler against him. (3) Khairkhwa – a Herati transitional solution, at least from Karzai’s perspective – did not last long and was replaced by Sayyed Hussain Anwari the following year. A non-Herati from Parwan province and a Shia Hazara, Anwari met with opposition from the local Herati Sunni elite and population. However, he managed to stay in his position until 2009, during which, some people say, he advanced the interests of the Shia Hazara community, including his support for the development of the populous Mahalla Baba Haji and Jebrail settlements which house thousands of people, mostly Shia Hazaras and Sayyeds, in Herat city. (Anwari died of cancer in July 2016) Like other provinces across Afghanistan, Herat’s security was deteriorating by 2009. One reason was that Ismail Khan, angry about being removed from his home area and not mollified by his promotion to the cabinet, used local allies such as Commander Ghulam Yahya Akbari Siawushani to undermine security in Herat province. (4)

Anwari was replaced by Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani, another non-Herati and a technocrat who had been Minister of Irrigation and Environment (2002-04) and Deputy Defence Minister (2005-08) under Karzai. (He had been a supporter of the former king, but later became close to Karzai.) Nuristani did not endure long, because of, among other reasons, his lack of understanding of and involvement in Herat’s local social and political dynamics.

Nuristani’s 2010 replacement, Daud Shah Saba, was different. A Herati with dual Afghan-Canadian citizenship, a geologist by profession (and later Minister of Mines and Petroleum, 2015-16), Saba’s attempts at reform threatened the interests of the established elite, particularly those around Ismail Khan, such as former mayor and Ismail Khan protégé Muhammad Salim Taraki. Saba was forced to resign in June 2013 (more on his resignation in this AAN dispatch). His successor, Fazlullah Wahidi, a non-Herati from Kunar province, did not last long either, as he was, along with many other local government officials, summarily dismissed by President Ghani in a surprise visit to Herat in December 2014.

The repeated changing of Herat governors, writes Jolyon Leslie, an architect and researcher who has been working in Afghanistan since 1989 (p. 22), shows:

… how narrow a path [Herat’s] governors need to tread – and how little support they might expect from Kabul in the end, for their reform or any other efforts.

This past experience weighs heavily on the incumbent governor, Muhammad Asef Rahimi, another non-Herati, this time from Kabul, who has studied public administration and development in the United States and is a former minister of agriculture. He is Herat’s sixth governor since 2004. Officially, the governor is at the apex of power in his (or her) province. In practice, this is often not true, and is certainly not in present-day Herat. Several local journalists and many ordinary people speak of Rahimi as a symbolic and ceremonial official with little influence. They also describe him with phrases like ‘overly conservative’ or ‘extremely cautious.’ He is mostly seen meeting foreigners and various groups of local government officials and people in his office, speaking at events and opening exhibitions. Like other non-Herati governors, Rahimi is not heavily involved in Herat’s political and economic dynamics. Speaking on Tolo TV on 1 November 2016, Rahimi himself even referred publicly to his lack of power in Herat. (5)

Acting in this rather constrained way has helped him do one main thing: maintain his office, albeit without being able to deliver much. Additionally, as a governor on generally good terms with the two NUG leaders, as well as with Ismail Khan, Rahimi represents a weak administration that is more involved in its own internal politicking than public service delivery. (6)

The new generation: political power diffused

The towering shadow of Ismail Khan has diminished since the early years after 2001, not only because of his years of absence from the province, but also because of Herat’s larger societal dynamics. Herat’s political scene has, therefore, seen several new actors emerging. One is the current mayor, Farhad Niayesh, a Herati with a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from the University of Herat and a master’s degree in water resources management from India. Aged 31 and not belonging to any political faction, he is the youngest mayor Herat has ever seen and is generally viewed by locals as hardworking. Many Heratis know him as a mayor whose civil service appointment test was taken and approved by President Ghani himself. This is seen as an important change in Herat politics because the highest municipal position has traditionally been a prerogative of Ismail Khan. The post is also economically significant: Herat Municipality collects over one billion AFN in revenue on an annual basis.

Niayesh has been actively working to change the face of Herat city. As part of a new urban master plan, the main road in central Herat is being widened (only Iran’s consulate still stands in the way as they have so far refused to move) and the city’s squares are being rebuilt (see, for example, here). Niayesh has also been working to connect Herat internationally. New railway lines are being constructed to link it to neighbouring Iran and Turkmenistan (see here and here). He also recently signed a ‘sister city’ agreement between Herat and Council Bluffs, a city in the US state of Iowa, in July 2016. This was a joint effort by military veterans from Iowa who had served in Afghanistan and Herati leaders to sustain and enhance bilateral understanding and relationships.

However, the young mayor has also run into hurdles. The widening of the main road, for example, has pitted him against the provincial council. Niayesh has accused the council of seeking USD 50,000 in kickbacks from contracts related to the project, an allegation the council has rejected as baseless. No investigation has so far been conducted into the accusation. The road project and the development of informal settlements in and around Herat city have again also revealed the extent and depth of land grabbing in Herat. This is a threat to the young mayor’s push for development, because it is extremely difficult to settle land and property disputes in a fair manner.

The mayor is also reportedly having a difficult relationship with Governor Rahimi. Local sources told this author the mayor tends to work in an independent manner, partly because he believes he enjoys the support of the president. This is putting him in conflict, not only with the governor who expects more consultation, but also with influential members of the provincial council. The pressure of other actors may force the mayor to proceed more carefully in order not to further threaten the interests of the local elite such as Ismail Khan and those around him.

The second recently emerging actor is the head of the provincial council, Haji Kamran Alizai. In contrast to the self-styled amir, the ‘ceremonial’ governor and the independent mayor – with all of whom he has a tense relationship –, Alizai belongs to what a writer in the Afghan daily newspaper, Hasht-e Sobh, has termed “a different generation of emerging local powerbrokers.” (7) A Pashtun from Kohsan district of Herat province and perceived as close to former President Karzai and recently to First Vice-President Abdul Rashid Dostum, Alizai means different things to different people. For his supporters, he is a determined and assiduous man who does what he says. For his opponents, he is a ranting, domineering bully who takes the law into his own hands.

He does not refrain from showing off the wealth he has accumulated, in his own words, from “oil imports from Iraq, Iran and Turkmenistan.” (8) Alizai is reportedly closer than most Herati figures of influence to the Iranian government through that country’s consulate in Herat. He frequently travels to Iran and has assumed an Iranian Farsi accent.

In an incident in May 2016 in downtown Herat, Alizai’s bodyguards shot and severely wounded a provincial National Directorate of Security (NDS) officer who had wanted to search the vehicles in Alizai’s convoy for illicit drugs. (10) It is because of events like this that some, including Hasht-e Sobh, have alleged that a major part of his wealth comes from large-scale smuggling of narcotics from western Afghanistan to Iran and Turkmenistan. (9) In another blatant case, Alizai along with his armed men stormed the Herat Appellate Attorney’s Office (the part of the Attorney General’s Office that deals with appeals) and freed a man accused of embezzlement. (11) This happened at the same time as, in Kabul, the Anti-Corruption Criminal Justice Centre was being opened by new Attorney General Muhammad Farid Hamidi and just before the Brussels conference on aid to Afghanistan when accountability would be one of the major themes (see previous AAN dispatch on Brussels Conference on Afghanistan here).

Until this point, the Afghan government had been either unwilling or unable (or both) to hold Alizai accountable for allegedly breaking the law, but Attorney General Hamidi did try. The confrontation between him and Alizai became what Herati parliamentarian, Ahmad Farhad Majidi, called “the battle between law and force in Herat.” (12) On 18 August 2016, the Attorney General issued an order suspending Alizai as head of Herat’s provincial council, banning him from leaving the country and asking the local government to arrest him. Nothing was actually done, though. This failure, among other things, increased the tension between Alizai and Governor Rahimi whose spokesman Jailani Farhad initially announced that the local administration would implement the Attorney General’s order. Back to Herat from a short visit to Kabul where he was seeking political support, Alizai was welcomed by a cheering crowd of supporters on 27 August 2016. He held a press conference soon afterwards in which he emphasised he did not apologise for his actions and blasted the local government, particularly Governor Rahimi, as “incompetent.” (13)

One of the people Alizai contacted and won backing from in Kabul was First Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum. Billboards showing pictures of Alizai and Dostum were put up in various parts of the city after Alizai’s return to Herat. Even President Ghani has not intervened to remove Alizai after earlier complaints against Alizai’s alleged violations of laws. “The president told us that the people of Herat have elected Haji Kamran [Alizai] as provincial council head, so he couldn’t do anything about it,” said a civil society activist who had attended a meeting with Ghani when he visited Herat to inaugurate the Salma hydropower dam in June 2016.

As expected, Alizai stayed in his post as head of Herat provincial council for a third consecutive term. He reportedly stayed chairman “through the force of money”. The journalist quoted earlier told AAN that Alizai had offered up to USD 200,000 to each provincial council member who voted for him.

Deteriorating security around and in Herat city

In Herat, the elite is divergent and political power scattered among many actors. Additionally, the administration in Herat province and districts is generally dysfunctional. Many officials, including heads of provincial departments, district administrators and district police chiefs, who were summarily dismissed by President Ghani in December 2014, have still not been replaced by fully mandated authorities. These key provincial and district positions continue to be occupied by acting officials whose authority is only weakly recognised. One result of all this is that security has deteriorated across Herat province. Several districts have seen violent clashes not only between the Afghan government and the armed opposition – mostly the Taleban – but also between rival Taleban factions. Government forces’ patrols and checkpoints on the gates and outskirts of Herat are needed to guard the city against insecurity spreading from nearby districts such as Karokh to the northeast and Gozara to the south. In the words of one well-placed local journalist who covers security:

The Taleban are increasingly operating in most districts of Herat. They have their governor for Herat province and their administrators for Herat districts. The government is a physical structure as seen by its offices of governor and district administrators as well as by its security forces. The Taleban operate differently: they want to affect the minds of the people.

In July 2016, the security committee of Herat provincial council raised its concerns over insurgent groups having taken control of numerous areas in a number of districts, pointing to Shindand, Adraskan, Golran, Koshk-e Kohna and Farsi as particularly threatened. The committee members said that Taleban ruled most of the villages in those districts.

The most restive is Shindand, the most southern and strategic district that hosts one of Afghanistan’s largest airbases (and still some US military presence). As AAN reported in April 2016, the district witnessed violent clashes between two rival Taleban groups, from the Mansur/Haibatullah mainstream and the dissident faction loyal to Mullah Rasul. In response, government forces have, on several occasions, intervened in the Shindand conflict to quell the insurgency. The intra-Taleban clashes in Shindand are ongoing and have caused heavy casualties. There has also been government/Taleban fighting, including an attack on Afghan commando forces in October 2016; the number of casualties remains unknown. (14) To make the situation more manageable in this volatile part of Herat province, the Afghan government plans to divide Shindand into several smaller districts. Whether this will contribute to security and governance is doubtful, however.

Other districts have also been getting increasingly unsafe. Like Shindand, there has been Taleban infighting in the district of Pashtun Zarghun to the immediate southeast of Herat city. Further in the east, in Chesht-e Sharif district, where the strategic Salma hydro-electric dam is located, the local Taleban have repeatedly abducted people who work for the Afghan government and also claimed an attack on foreign tourists (see here and here). (15) In the west, in the districts of Kohsan and Golran that border Iran, increasingly active local Taleban has spurred the Afghan government to carry out “mopping-up operations” there (see here and here). The district of Koshk-e Kohna in the north has also witnessed increased Taleban activity. The nearby southern district of Gozara, the centre of which is only around 15 kilometres away from central Herat city, is home to increased criminal activity by armed kidnappers and thieves.

Herat security officials have vowed to improve security in their province. The late commander of the Herat-based, Afghan National Army’s 207th Zafar Corps, General Mohiuddin Ghori, who died in a helicopter crash on 29 November 2016, had vowed to turn Afghanistan’s western region into “the graveyard of the Taleban” and had effectively taken an increasingly offensive posture against the insurgents. General Ghori had replaced General Taj Mohammad Jahed after Jahed was appointed Interior Minister in May 2016. It is not known yet who will replace General Ghori or how his death will affect Afghan security forces in the western region. There has also been a new police chief, General Muhammad Ayub Ansari, who succeeded General Abdul Majid Rozi following the latter’s retirement as per a presidential decree in July 2016. Rozi had been under increased public pressure due to worsening security.

Inside Herat city, insecurity is largely criminal and armed. (16) According to media reports, Herat is becoming notorious as “a city of assassinations, kidnappings and thefts.” (17) In a recent high-profile incident, on 28 April 2016, Samiuddin Rahin, the provincial attorney, was killed in his car by unknown armed motorcyclists in broad daylight in downtown Herat. It is not clear whether this killing was carried out by insurgents or criminals (or both).

This author has also come across at least two local people whose relatives have been kidnapped and, in one case, killed even after they paid a heavy ransom. In May 2016, the provincial NDS arrested what it called “16 professional kidnappers who had, in eight months, abducted ten people, hidden them in eight hideouts across the city, demanded ransom from their families and killed three of them”. As for thefts, both petty and grand, they have become commonplace. Local people are concerned about thefts of their cars, motorcycles and mobile phones. Member of Herat provincial council Habib ul-Rahman Pedram has said there are “at least ten cases of car thefts in Herat city per day.” (18) In late October 2016, armed men wearing police uniform broke into two jewellery stores and stole two kilogrammes of gold in broad daylight in central Herat. A few police officials were sacked in the wake of this robbery.

It seems there are various motives behind rising crime inside Herat and its environs. Several local elders told this author that many assassinations are, in fact, contract killings, paid for by local figures of influence to settle scores among them. Additionally, there are reports that locals whose fortunes have worsened in the wake of the international military drawdown are resorting to abductions and thefts as a quick way to make lots of money. Many believe the criminals operate in collusion with a corrupt police force.

Testing Herat’s dynamism: the experiences of local Heratis

Although political power in Herat has become more diffuse and security has deteriorated as a result, it does not mean that the current order in Herat – at least in the city – will fall apart. Rhetoric by local figures of influence such as Ismail Khan that Herat might fall to the armed opposition as Kunduz did is at best premature. This is because the insurgents – mainly the Taleban – and the criminals are as yet far from being able to counteract government forces. Equally importantly, Herat – again, the city at least – is economically, socially and culturally vibrant and this sustains and motivates the local population to keep up their every-day lives.

The dynamism of Herat is reflected in the day-to-day life of its people. This author has followed three Heratis** with different backgrounds and socioeconomic conditions for around a year. They give an indication of how non-elite Heratis are reacting to security and political developments and are thinking of and striving for the future.

Qader is a medical doctor in Herat Regional Hospital, the hospital that usually receives those killed and injured in security and criminal incidents in the city and surrounding areas. He also works in a number of crowded private clinics and hospitals in Herat city. Undeterred by the generally disappointing news of Herat and Afghanistan, which he follows on a daily basis, Qader is building a future for himself and his family by recently buying a plot of land in the centre of the city. On this land, he has almost finished constructing a house. The land and the house are currently worth around USD 100,000. However, Qader carries a pistol and closely follows his two children between home and school, as do almost all well-off fathers across the city.

The second Herati, Mama Farid, is a former mujahed and patriarch of a family in downtown Herat. He has discouraged his children from migrating abroad. Instead they continue their higher education in the bustling University of Herat, which has around fourteen thousand students, and work in the private sector, including in a money exchange in the major Khorasan Market in the city centre.

The third Herati, Rauf, a returnee from Iran, is a plasterer who has worked on the construction of the houses of both rich and poor people in and around Herat city. He believes in the future of Herat and, more broadly, of Afghanistan, that it will not return to ‘the bad old days’, because, in his words, “there has been so much change in terms of construction and development that makes it difficult for the past to be repeated.”

The lively city of Herat also hosts, on a weekly basis, events related to topics ranging from security to economics to culture and science. Recent examples include a film festival, an exhibition on tourism and souvenirs, the fifth Herat Security Dialogue, held in the ancient, renovated Herat Citadel and the five-star Arg Hotel, an exhibition of rural market products bringing village-based producers together from across the province, a biennial graphics exhibition in the University of Herat, the tenth exhibition of Afghan and Iranian industrial products, an exhibition of forty thousand books and events on mental health and psychotherapy (19), to give just a short list. (20) Of special note are, compared to Herat’s past as well as to other provinces across Afghanistan, the greater numbers of girls and women who are contributing to almost all spheres of Herat’s public life from education to the economy at large.

It is this dynamism that keeps large parts of the population engaged in day-to-day life and away from the insurgents and the criminals. The way that political power has become scattered among many actors and the worsening of security pose a crucial test to this liveliness, but it is premature to say which will overcome which. The current order, in which fragmenting politics and security go on at the same time as the dynamic life of a province and city, will stay, at least as long as Herat has not lost the vibrancy that has made it what it is: a bustling place in the midst of an ongoing battle between law and force.

 

* Said Reza Kazemi is an independent researcher. He has previously worked as a researcher for the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN).

** Names have been changed in order to protect the confidentiality of the local people under study.

 

 

(1) For a concise history of Herat, see this recent work: CPW Gammell, The Pearl of Khorasan: A History of Herat, London: Hurst, 2016.

(2) Antonio Giustozzi wrote in his 2005 paper “Warlords into businessmen: the Afghan transition 2002-2005” that initially “according to available information, Ismail Khan (…) was making so much money out of Islam Qala’s [border crossing] customs that he might not have felt the need to actually get directly involved in business activities. The customs revenue of Herat has been variously estimated at $100-300 million a year.”

Also on Ismail Khan’s interventions in the economy, see Jolyon Leslie, “Political and Economic Dynamics of Herat,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 2015, especially pages 15-16 and 22-25.

(3) Jolyon Leslie, “Political and Economic Dynamics of Herat,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 2015, 22.

(4) Commander Ghulam Yahya Akbari Siawushani, from Siawushan village in Gozara district, was a former Herat mayor under Ismail Khan’s governorship. He was killed along with 24 of his armed men in a military operation by Afghan government and ISAF forces in October 2009. In 2009, he had told a reporter, “I agree with a lot of what the Taleban do, and I have even helped them out financially. I am in contact with one group of Taleban, but I am operating an independent front.” See Thomas Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors and Approaches to ‘Talks,’” Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), Thematic Report 01/2009, July 2009, 11.

(5) AAN media monitoring: Tolo TV, 1 November 2016.

(6) Centre-periphery relations are tense in Afghanistan. The central government has used political appointments to compete with established provincial elite, not for institution-building as claimed, but for its own favourite patrimonialism. See Antonio Giustozzi and Dominique Orsini, “Centre-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan: Badakhshan between Patrimonialism and Institution-Building,” Central Asian Survey, 28:1, 2009, 1-16.

(7) Hasht-e Sobh, 7 Sonbola 1395 / 28 August 2016, 4.

(8) Hasht-e Sobh, 31 Asad 1395 / 21 August 2016, 3.

(9) Hasht-e Sobh, 7 Sonbola 1395 / 28 August 2016, 4.

(10) Hasht-e Sobh, 7 Sonbola 1395 / 28 August 2016, 4.

(11) Hasht-e Sobh, 3 Sonbola 1395 / 24 August 2016, 7.

(12) Hasht-e Sobh, 30 Asad 1395 / 20 August 2016, 7.

(13) Hasht-e Sobh, 7 Sonbola 1395 / 28 August 2016, 4.

(14) Afghan Islamic Press, 20 October 2016.

(15) This author’s interview with a relative of a government employee who has been abducted in Chesht-e Sharif, Herat city, October 2016.

(16) However, there was a high-profile security incident in May 2016 in which three rockets were fired from a secharkh [the three-wheeled Herati rickshaw] on the building of Herat governor’s office, killing a civilian man, injuring seven other people and destroying parts of the building. It is not clear whether this was an act carried out by the insurgency.

(17) Somayya Walizada, “Edama-ye Kabus-e Qatl wa Terur dar Herat [Continuation of the Nightmare of Killing and Assassination in Herat],” Killid Magazine, Issue 720, 14 May 2016, 24; Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Afghanistan’s model city is also its kidnapping capital,” The Week, 6 August 2015.

(18) Hasht-e Sobh, 31 Jawza 1395 / 20 June 2016, 5.

(19) The events on mental health and psychotherapy were attended by scores of people, including this author, in Herat city.

(20) In one spectacular recent event, Herati women held their fourth international film festival in the capital city of Kabul in late October 2016. This film festival is attracting participants from across the world and is becoming globally renowned (all about this film festival here.)

Egyelőre csak találgat mindenki, a vizsgálat befejezését január végére ígérik hivatalosan. Keresik a felelősöket.

Oroszország tudni szeretné, mi történt a TU-154 fedélzetén 2016. 12. 25-én. A vizsgálatok egyelőre még folynak, időnként kiszivárognak információk, viszont a vezető lapok többsége nem kockáztatja hírnevét, nem ül fel alaptalanul, bizonyítékok nélkül semmilyen vádaskodásnak.

Amit az eddigi vizsgálatokból tudni lehet Makszim Szokolov közlekedési miniszter sajtótájékoztatói alapján, az a következő:

• A gép mindösszesen 70 másodpercig volt a levegőben azután, hogy elhagyta Adler repülőterét.
• Robbanás nem volt a fedélzeten, de teljesen még nem zárták ki a terrortámadás változatát sem.
• A szakértők 130 négyzetkilométernyi vízfelszínt és 70 négyzetkilométernyi víz alatti területet vizsgáltak át.
• A gép gyakorlatilag teljesen megsemmisült, 13 nagyobb és csaknem 2000 kisebb géptöredéket hoztak felszínre a szakemberek.

• 19 holttestet szállítottak a moszkvai kutatóközpontba, hogy a hozzátartozóktól vett genetikai minták segítségével azonosítani tudják őket.
• A személyzet érzékelte a veszélyt, a parancsnok utolsó szava, amit a feketedoboz rögzített az utókornak ez volt: „A fékszárnyak…” Ennek okát nem lehet egyelőre tudni.
• Az eddig elemzettekből csak beszédfoszlányokat sikerült lejegyezni, ilyeneket mind:

…Sebesség …300 (nem hallható)

…(Nem hallható)

…Amellett foglalt állást a parancsnok…

…(Nem hallható)

…Huú, az én…

…(Éles jel hallatszik)

…A fékszárnyak… (hangfoszlányok hallhatók csak)

…A magasságmérő!

…Nekünk…(Nem hallható)

…(Riasztás hallatszik Föld közeli veszélyről)

…(Nem hallható.)

…Parancsnok, zuhanunk…

…A fékszárnyak…

• Szemtanúk elmondása alapján a megtalált holttestek egy részén mentőmellény volt, amiből szintén arra lehet következtetni, hogy a repülőgép személyzete tisztában volt a helyzettel, a kapitány a gépet valószínűleg vízre akarta tenni, az utasokat felkészítették az evakuálásra (hírforrás: RIA NOVOSTI) Az INTERFAX is megerősítette, hogy a TU-154 legénysége felkészült az evakuálásra, csak nem volt ideje rá. A forrás szerint, a személyzet rájött, hogy a gép furcsán viselkedik, és megpróbálta felkészíteni az utasokat a következményekre.

• Az állam részéről gyakorlat, hogy egy ilyen tragédia esetén speciális műszaki vizsgálóbizottságot hoznak létre.

• A gép maximális magassága 250 méter volt, sebessége pedig 360-370 km/h (ezt Szergej Bajnetov altábornagy, a Biztonsági Szolgálat és az Orosz Légierők helyettes vezetője erősítette meg).

• 3 csoportban végzik a vizsgálatokat: egy csoport van Adlerben a reptéren, egy Szelkovóban, Moszkva elővárosában dolgozik a Honvédelmi Minisztérium Kutatóintézetében, egy pedig a Biztonsági Repülők Szolgálatánál, a 800. légi bázison (Cskalovszkij repülőterén).

• A bizottsági vizsgálatok elején több mint 15 verzió merült fel a történtekre, a feketedobozok megtalálásával ezen verziók száma csökkent.

• Mára már az is tény, hogy nincs harmadik adatrögzítő, csak azzal lehet számolni, amit találtak, vagyis kettővel (egy parametrikus és egy hangrögzítéses).

• Bajnetov tisztázta az újságíróknak az Adlerben történt tankolás okát is: Mozdokban nem feleltek meg az időjárási feltételek ehhez. (Általános szabály a Szíriába történő repüléseknél- erősítette meg az altábornagy a tényt, hogy a tankolás: Mozdok, Krimszk vagy Szocsi repterén szokott megtörténni).

• Az összes utas Cskalovszk repterén szállt fel a gépre, Szocsiban csak a határőrök szálltak fel, hogy a szükséges ellenőrzést elvégezzék.

• Mivel a Szíriába tartó járatoknak tilos Törökország fölött menni, a másik útvonalat kell választaniuk (Kaszpi-tenger, majd Irak és Irán felett megy a gép – ezt a Flightradar24 közölte).

• Korábban tapasztalt pilóták beszéltek a gazeta.ru újságnak arról, hogy az utasok helytelen elosztása a kabinban is vezethetett esetleg a tragédiához (az egyik szakértő szerint a cskalovszkiji beszálláskor közel volt minden utas a repülőgép orrához, Adlerben pedig már mindenki úgy ült, ahogy akart, megsértve a súlyelosztás szabályát – ebből kifolyólag pedig a repülőgép képes volt felkapni a törzs orr-részét, kritikus állásszögbe hozva).

• A tragédia utáni intézkedés: az orosz védelmi miniszter-helyettes, Nyikolaj Pankov is megerősítette, hogy az idén újra szervezik a speciális repülési részleget a 800. légibázison Cskalovszkijban, amit még 2010-ben szüntettek meg.

Forrás és fotó: gazeta.ru; dw.com; RRnews.ru

Les sous-marins nucléaires d’attaque de la Marine nationale ont connu une activité exceptionnelle en 2016, cumulant pas moins de 1000 jours à la mer. Un cap historique atteint le 31 décembre par l’Emeraude. « Avec un niveau d’activité en hausse de plus de 10%, c’est la première fois depuis l’armement de ces bateaux qu’un tel taux de présence en mer est atteint. Ces 1000 jours représentent un taux d’effort moyen de près de 85 % pour les équipages, ce qui signifie qu’ils passent 85 % de leur temps à la mer une fois qualifiés opérationnels », souligne la Marine nationale.

• Lire la suite de Activité record pour les SNA français

C’est une mission Jeanne d’Arc exceptionnelle que va réaliser à partir de février le bâtiment de projection et de commandement Mistral, accompagné de la frégate Courbet. Pour la première fois, un BPC embarquera au cours de ce déploiement non seulement des unités de l’armée de Terre, mais aussi des Marines américains et britanniques.

• Lire la suite de Mission Jeanne d’Arc : Des troupes anglo-saxonnes sur le Mistral

Parti le 6 octobre de Brest, le second des quatre nouveaux bâtiments multi-missions de la Marine nationale est arrivé le 16 décembre à sa base de Papeete, à Tahiti. Le Bougainville va permettre de renforcer les moyens de la flotte française en Polynésie, qui étaient très réduits depuis le départ du bâtiment de transport léger Dumont d’Urville fin 2010.

• Lire la suite de Le B2M Bougainville a rallié la Polynésie

Prévue fin décembre, l’admission au service actif de la troisième frégate multi-missions française a été légèrement retardée. Rien de grave, seulement une affaire de procédure administrative dit-on chez les marins. La commission chargée de donner son feu vert à l’ASA du bâtiment aurait en fait été reportée de quelques semaines. Logiquement, le Languedoc devrait être en service d’ici février.

• Lire la suite de FREMM Languedoc : Mise en service attendue prochainement

Piriou va assurer à Concarneau, l’été prochain, l’arrêt technique et la modernisation de la Thalassa, l'un des navires océanographiques de l’Ifremer. Le groupe breton a été retenu à l’issue d’un appel d’offres européen lancé par l’institut en juin dernier. Ce chantier majeur constitue en fait une jouvence du bateau, sorti en 1996 des chantiers de Dieppe.

• Lire la suite de Ifremer : Piriou va assurer la refonte à mi-vie de la Thalassa

Livrée en juin 2015 par le chantier brestois CIB, la Valbelle, l’une des deux nouvelles vedettes du Parc naturel marin d’Iroise, a été officiellement baptisée hier au Conquet, où elle est basée. Sa marraine est Irène Frachon, médecin pneumologue au CHU de Brest, connue pour avoir dénoncé les dangers mortels du Mediator.

 

@ Agence des aires marines protégées

@ Virginie Gervois / Agence des aires marines protégées

@ Virginie Gervois / Agence des aires marines protégées

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• Lire la suite de Le parc marin d’Iroise baptise la vedette Valbelle