Agrégateur de flux

Months of talks collapsed over how to codify Europe’s diverse döner traditions

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Le ralentissement de l’économie chinoise est une source d’inquiétude bien plus importante pour les entreprises européennes que les retombées de la guerre commerciale lancée par Donald Trump, selon secrétaire général de la Chambre de commerce de l’UE en Chine.

The post Le ralentissement de l’économie chinoise inquiète davantage les entreprises européennes que la guerre commerciale de Donald Trump appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Reaching a healthy diet requires USD 5.16 PPP per day, an amount out of reach for 182 million people in the region. Credit: Max Valencia / FAO

By Máximo Torero
Sep 30 2025 (IPS)

Just a few years ago, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, millions of families in Latin America and the Caribbean did not know whether they would have enough food for the next day. The shutdown of economies, massive job losses, and the sharp rise in prices pushed food insecurity to levels not seen in decades.

And yet, the region surprised the world: between 2020 and 2024, the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity fell from 33.7% to 25.2%, the largest reduction recorded globally. It was a remarkable achievement, made in a global context marked by overlapping crises.

However, behind this progress lies a silent enemy that does not appear in harvest photos or market openings yet erodes the purchasing power of millions of households every day: food inflation. This is not just a temporary rise in prices, but a persistent trend that threatens to reverse hard-won progress and deepen inequalities.

Latin America and the Caribbean have shown that, with sound policies and political will, it is possible to reduce hunger even in an adverse global context. But food inflation reminds us that progress is fragile, and structural vulnerabilities can erode it quickly

During 2022 and 2023, food prices systematically rose faster than general inflation across the region. South America recorded a peak of 20.8% in April 2022, Central America 19.2% in August, and the Caribbean 15.3% in December.

In January 2023, the regional food price index rose to 13.6% year-over-year, compared to an overall inflation rate of 8.5%. This gap hits hardest the poorest households, where a large share of income is spent on food.

The adjustment of labor incomes to this increase has been uneven. In Mexico, wages followed a trend similar to food prices, partially protecting purchasing power. But in most countries, real incomes contracted, reducing families’ ability to access sufficient and nutritious diets. This is not merely a short-term issue: it reflects structural weaknesses that amplify the impact of any external shock—whether economic, climatic, or geopolitical.

Although the post-pandemic expansionary policies, the war in Ukraine, rising fertilizer costs, disrupted trade routes, and extreme climate events created a “perfect storm” for food security, the problem runs deeper.

The region has been experiencing low economic growth, high dependence on commodity exports, and limited productive diversification. Added to this, there is a worrying decline in public and private investment in agriculture over the past two decades, weakening the sector’s productivity and resilience.

The SOFI 2025 warns that a 10% increase in food prices can lead to a 3.5% rise in moderate or severe food insecurity, a 4% increase in the case of women, and a 5% increase in the prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under five. In other words, food inflation is not just an economic issue: it has direct effects on the health, well-being, and future of millions of people.

On top of this is the high cost of a healthy diet. In 2024, more than 2.6 billion people worldwide could not afford it. In Latin America and the Caribbean, this diet costs 9% more than the global average, and in the Caribbean, 23% more.

In absolute terms, reaching a healthy diet requires USD 5.16 PPP per day, an amount out of reach for 182 million people in the region. This means that even in countries with low hunger prevalence, access to nutritious food remains a luxury for a large share of the population.

In light of this scenario, the SOFI 2025 outlines a roadmap to safeguard achievements and build resilience. First, strengthen social protection systems to cushion the impact of prices on the most vulnerable. Cash transfers, targeted subsidies, and school feeding programs can serve as effective shields if well-designed and delivered on time.

Second, transform and diversify agrifood systems to reduce dependence on a narrow set of commodities and strengthen local production of nutritious foods. This requires investments in logistics, storage, and transport infrastructure to reduce costs borne by final consumers.

Third, maintain open, predictable, and rules-based international trade. Trade restrictions exacerbate volatility and make food even more expensive, so they must be avoided, especially in times of crisis.

Fourth, strengthen market information and monitoring systems to anticipate inflationary pressures and enable rapid, evidence-based responses.

And fifth, promote climate resilience and macroeconomic stability through sustainable farming practices, expanded access to agricultural insurance, and effective risk management, alongside responsible fiscal and monetary policies.

Latin America and the Caribbean have shown that, with sound policies and political will, it is possible to reduce hunger even in an adverse global context. But food inflation reminds us that progress is fragile, and structural vulnerabilities can erode it quickly.

The region has the experience, capacity, and productive potential; what is needed now is strategic investment, regional coordination, and renewed commitment so that the right to adequate food ceases to be an unfulfilled goal and becomes a tangible reality for all.

 

Excerpt:

Máximo Torero Cullen is Chief Economist of FAO and Regional Representative ad interim for Latin America and the Caribbean

This is part of a package of measures including an arms embargo on Israel aimed at halting what Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called "the genocide in Gaza"

Az Egyesült Államokban 1925. március 25-én kezdte meg működését egy repülőgépes növényvédelemmel foglalkozó vállalkozás, hogy azután átnyergeljen a belföldi utasszállításra, majd később Delta Airlines néven a légiközlekedés globális szereplőjévé nője ki magát. Jól csengő nevét a Mississippi deltájáról kapta, arról a vidékről, ahol a története elkezdődött.

Kalandos kezdet a gyapotföldek felett

A Delta története a múlt század húszas éveinek elején indult az amerikai délen, ahol a pamutipar fontos gazdasági tényező volt. Ezt az iparágat veszélyeztette a pamut alapanyagát fenyegető gyapottokmányos bogár, amely komplett gyapotföldeket volt képes elpusztítani. Azt, hogy a kártevők elleni küzdelemhez repülőgépet kellene használni, először a hadsereg hadnagya, John Macready próbálta ki 1921-ben, az ohiói Daytonban. A következő, immár célzott kísérleteket az Egyesült Államok mezőgazdasági minisztériumának megbízásából Bert R. Coad kezdeményezte azzal, hogy 1922-ben a hadseregtől kölcsönkért gépekkel és pilótákkal gyapotföldeket permeteztetett Louisiana államban. A bíztató eredmények alapján Coad egy New York állambeli repülőgépgyártóhoz, a Huff, Daland & Companyhoz fordult, hogy építsenek egy kifejezetten légi növényvédelemre szolgáló repülőgépet. A Huff-Daland Duster elnevezésű típus 1924 júliusában emelkedett először levegőbe a hadseregtől a mezőgazdasági minisztériumhoz vezényelt Harold Harrissal a pilótaülésben. A három elkészült példánnyal a gyártó cég, a mezőgazdasági minisztérium valamint a georgiai állami mezőgazdasági főiskola közös szervezésében, még azon a nyáron megtartották az első nyilvános bemutatót. Nem eredménytelenül, mert szeptemberben az Egyesült Államok mezőgazdaságának történetében először szállt fel egy repülőgép kereskedelmi célú légi növényvédelemre. Az eseményre a Mississippi állambeli Heathmanban került sor, ahol egy Huff-Daland Duster 720 hektárt permetezett le. A georgiai mezőgazdasági főiskola novemberben egy újabb találkozót szervezett, amelyen a Huff, Daland & Company képviselőin kívül mezőgazdasági ügynökök és helyi farmerek is részt vettek.

Huff-Daland Duster

[...] Bővebben!

With the world on track to 3°C of warming by the end of this century, the scientific community and a growing number of institutions are exploring climate technologies that could reduce the worst impacts of global warming.

La grande famille TRAORE à Ouagadougou, Niamey, Tenkodogo, Bobo-Dioulasso, la famille de Feu TRAORE Abdoulaye à Dapoya II, Tenkodogo, les familles Bidiga à Tenkodogo, Zabsonré à Bané, Tahirou à Tillabery au Niger, la famille Sorgho à Tenkodogo,

Les familles TAPSOBA, TIEMTORE, CONGO, COMPAORE, à Zam, Tamsin, Ouagadougou et ailleurs.

La Famille OUEDRAOGO à Bendogo.

TRAORE Salifou Ingénieur Agronome, Cadre de la CEDEAO à la retraite, le Général de Brigade TRAORE Abraham à la retraite, TRAORE Youssouf Ingénieur Topographe à la retraite, Mme Nébié Née TRAORE Salimata Angèle Greffier à la retraite, Mme COMPAORE Née TRAORE Maïmounatou, au Médiateur du Faso à la retraite, TRAORE Soumane Abdoulaye précédemment à la CNSS à la retraite, TRAORE Inoussa Pharmacien à Bobo-Dioulasso, TRAORE Seydou Joel Professeur à la retraite, et leurs frères et sœurs,

Mme veuve TRAORE Née TAPSOBA Théophine, précédemment au Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale et de la Mobilité (MATM), à la retraite,

les enfants : Housseim, Aboubacar Fabrice, Abidine Stéphane, Faridatou Marie-Noëlla,

les pétits enfants,

Les familles amies et alliées,

Ont le grand regret de vous annoncer le décès de leur fils, frère, époux, père et grand-père

TRAORE Mamadou Jean François de Salles,
Assistant Major de Police à la retraite,
Décès survenu le Lundi 29 Septembre 2025 à l'âge de 68 ans.

Programme des obsèques

Mercredi 1er Octobre 2025
– 20h 30 mn : Veillée de prières au domicile du défunt à cité an IV B, porte N°25

Jeudi 02 Octobre 2025

– 08h 30 mn : Levée du corps au domicile du défunt.

– 09h 00 mn : Messe à l'église Saint Pierre de Gounghin, suivi de l'inhumation au cimetière de Gounghin

Union de prières

But less red tape, perhaps

The Azov Brigade was once considered far-right—and is now the key to the country’s military success.

The housing problem in Europe is linked to the trajectory from post-war de-commodification to the recent re-commodification and financialization of housing, which has made it increasingly unaffordable for the economically vulnerable. The European Union has launched numerous and diverse initiatives for affordable housing, which may have a significant impact despite their subsidiary role and the challenges they face.

In Greece, the housing question has followed a different path from that of the major countries of Western and Northern Europe. The post-war trajectory began with protective conditions for small market actors and, indirectly, for the wider public. These conditions gradually weakened, along with the housing systems they had supported (self-building and antiparochi), and were replaced by a major shift toward the market—most notably the entry of commercial banks into mortgage lending. Subsequently, the fiscal crisis, the gradual exit from it, the expansion of tourism, the influx of corporate and foreign capital into real estate, and the growth of short-term rentals created increasingly problematic conditions for those in need of affordable housing, particularly rental housing.

Measures introduced so far to address the housing crisis have been inadequate and ineffective, while the issue has now taken a central place in social and political debate in Greece for the first time.

Read here (in Greek) the policy paper by Thomas Maloutas, Researcher Emeritus, National Centre for Social Research (NCSR); Professor Emeritus of Geography, Harokopio University and Dimitra Siatitsa, PhD in Urban Planning, Postdoctoral Researcher National Technical University of Athens/National Centre for Social Research (NCSR).

Présentée comme une solution innovante pour répondre aux besoins colossaux de financement de l’Ukraine, la proposition de « prêt de réparation » pour Kiev suscite autant d’espoirs que de controverses.

The post Prêt de réparation pour l’Ukraine : un projet européen semé d’embûches appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Jian G was found guilty of acting as an agent for a Chinese intelligence service while working for Maximilian Krah, a member of the far-right Alternative for Germany

This paper by Dr. Isabelle Ioannides, Senior Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP, is published in the context of the project EMBRACing changE – Overcoming Blockages and Advancing Democracy in the European Neighbourhood. EMBRACE is a multi-country research initiative that aims to enhance democracy promotion efforts in the EU’s neighbourhood by identifying key obstacles to democratisation and formulating evidence-based strategies to overcome them. The project draws on locally led research and stakeholder engagement across twelve case studies in five regions: the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa.

Focusing on Work Package 8 of the project, the report “Toolkit for EU decision-makers on the geopolitics of EU Democracy Promotion (EUDP)” outlines a conceptual design for a novel approach aimed at strengthening the EU’s ability to respond to democratic backsliding in its neighbourhood. Building on the EMBRACE project’s analysis of factors conducive to democratic opening, such as political structures, historical legacies, and the role of critical junctures, the paper proposes a shift from static and fragmented democracy promotion tools to a dynamic, adaptive, and context-specific system.

The report develops its blueprint based on findings from scenario-building workshops in North Macedonia, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, as well as interviews with stakeholders in Algeria. These consultations interrogated the EU’s existing conceptual framework for democracy promotion and highlighted the need for locally grounded, evidence-based approaches. Central to the proposed Toolkit is a co-design process with local stakeholders, ensuring that EU policy instruments are informed by country-specific realities and informal power structures.

The paper underscores that the Toolkit’s added value lies in its integration of democracy measurement frameworks, data collection and management tools, foresight and forecasting methods, and alert and rapid response systems. These elements are conceived as part of a feedback loop where measurement informs foresight, foresight guides policy design, and outcomes feed back into continuous learning. In this way, the Toolkit leverages local expertise and EU instruments to achieve smarter and more resilient democratisation outcomes.

The report concludes that the EU’s democracy promotion efforts must evolve into a living, continuously adaptive system capable of moving from reactive responses to proactive strategies. By fostering country-specific customisation, local co-creation, and synergies across EU external action instruments, the proposed Toolkit offers a pathway to more effective and resilient democracy promotion both in the five case study countries and beyond.

Read the report here.

Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) legt im September deutlich zu und liegt nun bei 96,3 Punkten, nach 92 Punkten im August. Der Wert nähert sich somit der neutralen 100-Punkte-Marke, die ein durchschnittliches Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft ...

Willkommen bei Rapporteur! Jeden Tag liefern wir Ihnen die wichtigsten Nachrichten und Hintergründe aus der EU- und Europapolitik. Need-to-knows: Gaza: Europäische Staats- und Regierungschefs unterstützen Donald Trumps Friedensplan, Hamas hat noch nicht reagiert Parlament: EVP schweigt dazu, ob die Abgeordnete Dolors Montserrat ein zweites Gehalt bezieht Ukraine: EU-Kreditvorschlag und Beitrittsvorstoß legen Grenzen Brüssels offen Marokko: Laut geleakten Dokumenten […]

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La Republika Srpska va élire un nouveau président le 23 novembre. Après plusieurs semaines de déni, Milorad Dodik vient de reconnaître qu'il n'était plus le président de l'entité. Sans renoncer à peser de tout son poids face à une opposition qui s'organise.

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