Feed aggregator

Volker Kauder und Hans-Gert Pöttering haben in New York die dreitägige Konferenz "Multinational Efforts to Promote Freedom of Religion or Belief” eröffnet.

September 17, 2015 (JUBA) - Over 100 people are feared dead after a fuel tanker exploded in Sudan's Western Equatoria state county of Maridi Thursday, authorities said.

The map of Western Equatoria in red

The incident occurred about 20 kilometres from Maridi town. Several other people were reportedly injured during the huge explosion.

The government of Western Equatoria state has declared three days of mourning to remember victims of the blast, amid fears the death toll could rise further.

The executive director of Maridi county, John Ezkia said nearly 1,000 people had gathered to collect fuel leaking from the overturned tanker.

Other sources told Sudan Tribune the death toll could exceed 100, with dozens wounded.

The state caretaker governor, Patrick Zamoya appealed for assistance to aid the victims.

“We have declared three days of mourning and call upon the UN, the international red cross and the national government to send any help as soon as possible,” said Zamoya.

The fuel tanker was moving from the South Sudanese capital, Juba to Yambio town.

The United Nations Mission in the country (UNMISS) conveyed its heartfelt condolences to the government, people of South Sudan and the families of those who lost their lives.

The mission said it dispatched an emergency patrol to the site to assess the situation, adding, "A special flight carrying a medical assessment team arrived there a few hours ago".

(ST)

Le procès de Bosco Ntaganda se poursuit devant la Cour pénale internationale de La Haye. L'ex-chef de guerre est accusé de 18 chefs d’inculpation pour des crimes de guerre et crimes contre l’humanité commis en Ituri, dans l’est de la RDC, de 2002 à 2003. Le témoin de ce jeudi 17 septembre, le deuxième depuis le début procès, dit avoir été menacé et craindre pour sa vie. Juste avant son audition, la cour a décidé de lui accorder des mesures de protection particulières. Un témoignage sensible au point que l’essentiel de sa déposition s’est déroulé à huis clos.

Kurdish fighters answer questions from the general public, and make the case for foreign volunteers to join their group.

The head of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) today lauded the Chilean Government’s successful efforts to reduce disaster risk and minimise the number of casualties from the 8.3-magnitude earthquake and tsunami which occurred last night.

Après l’exclusion mercredi de la majorité présidentielle du G7, ce groupe de sept partis frondeurs qui, dans une lettre, avaient appelé le président Kabila à respecter la Constitution, et la révocation d'un de ses ministres et d'un membre de son cabinet, jeudi, c'est cette fois Charles Mwando Simba qui a démissionné de son poste de premier vice-président de l'Assemblée nationale. Les frondeurs ont annoncé la création d’une plateforme qui défendra la Constitution.

Senior United Nations officials today expressed outrage at the very serious accounts of war crimes and crimes against humanity that were allegedly committed between 2002 and 2011 by all parties to the conflict in Sri Lanka, including Government security forces, affiliated paramilitary groups and the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

S'il ne soutient pas officiellement le putsch, le Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès (CDP), le parti de Blaise Compaoré, ne le condamne pas non plus. « Les putschistes partagent certaines de nos convictions », déclare Bouda Boubacar, président du groupe CDP au sein du Parlement de transition.

Les résultats de l’autopsie des restes présumés de Thomas Sankara devaient être dévoilés ce jeudi 17 septembre. L'enquête sur l'assassinat de l'ancien président burkinabè avait été relancée par le régime de transition. Le général Gilbert Diendéré, leader des militaires auteurs du putsch de ce jeudi, est cité dans cette affaire. Mariam Sankara, sa veuve, craint pour l'avenir de la procédure.  

Valóságos sátortábor alakult ki a Horgos és Röszke közötti határon, a senki földjén.

Web users and academics cast doubt on the official claim, citing lack of free speech and popular representation.

DRAFT REPORT on the Annual report on human rights and democracy in the world 2014 and the European Union’s policy on the matter
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Cristian Dan Preda

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Fadel Barro, coordinateur du mouvement Y'en a marre au Sénégal, dont les militants ont travaillé avec ceux du Balai citoyen lors du mouvement qui a conduit à la chute de Blaise Compaoré, dénonce le coup d’Etat au Burkina Faso. Il interpelle le président sénégalais, Macky Sall, également président en exercice de la Cédéao, pour lui demander de se montrer ferme face au général Gilbert Diendéré.

By Eric Reeves

The Obama administration has, by all measures, done a very poor job of responding to the complex challenges in Sudan and South Sudan, and to the vast humanitarian crises exacerbated by short-sighted policy decisions. Even so, a remarkable opportunity has presented itself, one that allows the administration to create an important legacy for the two Sudans, one that would endure long after the end of President Obama's term in office.

In June 2014 the Department of Justice convicted BNP Paribas (BNPP), the French banking giant, of criminal financial activities benefiting the Khartoum regime in Sudan. This regime has for the past twenty-five years tyrannized and waged war against its own people. As a consequence of its criminal actions, BNPPP was obliged under the terms of the plea agreement to pay a forfeiture and fine that together totaled approximately $9 billion. Predictably, with so much money on the table, various U.S. entities were scrambling for a piece of this vast pie.

But from the pie, DOJ committed explicitly to providing restitution to those who were "directly and proximately harmed" by the actions of BNPP (the language is that of presiding District Court Judge Lorna Schofield). No one fits the most obvious sense of this phrase better than the people of greater Sudan.

In referring to "harm" I mean to refer not only to "harm" suffered by Darfuris, but suffered also by the 370,000 Darfuri refugees in eastern Chad; by the vast numbers of people who are suffering and dying in South Kordofan and Blue Nile—and yet who are relentlessly denied relief aid by the Khartoum regime; by the communities of eastern Sudan, who have also been victims of the ruthless, militarized security state the regime has created—most austerely over the past four years. So, too, the people of Nubia in the far north, many of whom have been displaced by ill-considered dam schemes on the Nile River.

Importantly, there must be a considered response to the needs of the people of South Sudan, who endured many of Khartoum's worst military crimes committed in the years 2002 - 2008, the window of time for Sudan created by the Department of Justice "statement of facts" (South Sudan did not become an independent nation until July 2011). The Nuer communities of Unity State suffered particularly brutal attacks and civilian clearances in the oil regions.

Also conspicuous in this context, if rarely reported, is the terrible harm done to the people of the Abyei region. Militarily denied their right to a self-determination referendum by the Khartoum regime, the indigenous Dinka Ngok are daily moved further and further into Khartoum's expansive death grip. In flagrant violation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, containing an "Abyei Protocol," Khartoum effectively annexed Abyei, with no meaningful protest from any international actor of consequence—none.

Given the extraordinary levels of destruction, murder, displacement, land appropriation, as well as widespread and ongoing suffering and deprivation—and the acute lack of adequate humanitarian resources—it seems morally imperative that the Obama administration's Department of Justice view the BNPP restitution provisions as justifying the urgent provision of relief aid in greater Sudan. Although not clearly guided by legal precedent in this unprecedented criminal forfeiture case involving BNPP, the Department of Justice—including Attorney General Loretta Lynch—certainly has the power and discretion to expedite forfeiture funds that have been designated for "restitution."

So far, no money from the BNPP settlement has gone to the Sudanese communities harmed by BNPP's illegal financial support of Khartoum, although the Department of Justice is considering a proposal to do so. DOJ should strongly support the proposal and move ahead expeditiously; the people of Darfur and other displaced Sudanese communities are dying now:

Mortality rates owing to severe malnutrition among children in western Jebel Marra, Central Darfur, are rising rapidly. Nierteti Hospital is crowded with young patients from the areas of Guldo, Tor, and Golo, an activist told Radio Dabanga. "From 18 July until Thursday more than 15 children at Nierteti hospital died as a result of undernourishment," he said. "Seven of them died last week ... (Radio Dabanga, September 9, 2015)

We know also that the UN's High Commission for Refugees has warned that in 2016 there will be no funding for the 370,000 Darfuri refugees living in eastern Chad; and relief organizations are withdrawing from Darfur for lack of funding, leaving gaping holes in the humanitarian infrastructure created over the past eleven years.

So what impedes the decision to release at least part of the restitution funds destined for Sudan, which suffered from 72% ($6.4 billion) of the criminal activity on BNPP's part—financial activity that supported the Khartoum regime while it waged war on its own people?

• The humanitarian need is overwhelmingly clear;

• The predominant role of the Khartoum regime in benefitting from BNPP's criminal financial activities is beyond question—at the very least, 72 percent of those "directly and proximately harmed" by the action of BNPP. (Cuba, also part of the BNPP case, is unlikely to produce credible and comparable claims of harm, given conditions prevailing in the Caribbean nation during the time window created by DOJ's statement of facts;Iran was the beneficiary of only a very small percentage of illegal financial activity);

• The BNPP forfeiture funds are in the hands of the Treasury Department, which awaits instructions on how to disburse the $3.84 billion designated in the sentencing phase of the criminal trial (May 2015).

Treasury has received no such instructions, but President Obama could direct Attorney General Lynch to provide the means for rapid, highly targeted, supplementary humanitarian assistance—by means of the U.S. Agency for International Development—to people in desperate need in Sudan, South Sudan, and refugees camps in other countries to which many hundreds of thousands of Sudanese have been driven.

Internal displacement has also been massive in Sudan: in Darfur alone more than 2.5 million people are internally displaced, and increasingly at risk of attack by Khartoum's militia forces, particularly the Rapid Support Forces.

More than 1 million children under the age of five are severely or acutely malnourished. And at the same time funding shortfalls are biting deeply: less than 40 percent of what is needed for humanitarian purposes in Sudan and South has been provided by the international community. The UN very recently reported (September 6) that:

[T]he UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) has a funding shortfall of $9.9 million which, if not addressed, will force the agency to close down air services at the end of the month. UNHAS passenger and cargo services are critical to facilitating humanitarian work in Sudan especially in remote locations where, due to lack of infrastructure, insecurity and lack of commercial alternatives.

Now is the time, Mr. President, for you to make your mark—at a critical juncture in Sudanese history; a detailed plan already exists, with widespread Sudanese support (http://sudancommunitycompensation.org/).

Your legacy, if actions are prompt, will be defined not merely by the diplomatic errors of the past but by your determination—now that you have the means—to deliver a partial but important form of justice and compensation to those communities of greater Sudan that have been harmed in terrible ways—ways materially assisted by the criminal actions of BNP Paribas in its gross abuses of the American financial system.

Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College, has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for the past sixteen years. He is author of Compromising with Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 - 2012 (September 2012)

OPINION on Towards a European Energy Union
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Francisco Assis

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Kiváló hangulatú musical- és operettgálával lepték meg a hétvégén a városnapi rendezvénysorozat keretében a zentai közönséget a Budapesti Operettszínház művészei, Dancs Annamari, Dolhai Attila, Janza Kata, Laki Péter, Lukács Anita és Szabó P. Szilveszter, akik saját elmondásuk szerint kiválóan érezték magukat Zentán, hiszen egyrészt olyan vendégszeretettel fogadták őket a Tisza-parti településen, amilyenben csak nagyon ritkán van részük, másrészt a város főterén felállított nagyszínpad előtt összegyűlt óriási tömeg kiváló közönségnek bizonyult, hiszen mindvégig együtt élt és együtt lélegzett a produkcióikkal, és az egybegyűltek szemmel láthatóan nagyon élvezték a főként közismert musical- és operettslágerekből álló koncertjüket.

 

A nyugati hadviselés egyik alapvető oszlopa a harcos egyén megóvására, megmentésére tett lépések sora, illetve ennek az erőfeszítésnek a tudatosítása. Mondani sem kell, hogy ennek milyen fontos szerepe van a morál és a kohézió fenntartásában. Az ellenséges vonalak mögé került személy (lelőtt repülőszemélyzet, egységétől elszakadt katona, etc.) koalíciós, összhaderőnemi viszonyok közepette történő kimentésének képességét az európai haderők között építeni és normalizálni hivatott kurzus a napokban Pápán és országszerte több helyszínen zajló CJPRSC 15.

Először a támogató erők érkeznek a helyszínre, mindenekelőtt egy nagyobb túlélőképességű fast air (itt egy AMX), ami kezdetben főként kommunikációs szerepet tölt be - reléként funkcionál, tartja a túlélőben a lelket, s közben a lehetőségek függvényében az azonosítási eljárás első lépéseit is megteszi, valamint szabad szemmel és szenzoraival építi az SA-t. Ezt követően érkezik csak meg a forgószárnyas rész, a felderítést-közelbiztosítást ellátó tűztámogató képességgel bíró eszköz formájában (itt: A109)

Nem árt, ha a helyszínre érkező gépek megfelelő szenzorcsomaggal rendelkeznek. Itt jól látszik az egyik AMX hasán lévő Litening konténer.

Bár vannak ennél korszerűbb metódusok is, a füstjelzés a pozíciómegadás legegyszerűbb ezáltal legmegbízhatóbb formája.

Spanyol légierős AS332-es Super Puma érkezik a helyszínre...

...hogy kirakja az EF-et, azaz a kiemelő erőt, azt a csapatot, akinek a feladata felkutatni, azonosítani, átkutatni, ellátni, majd a mentést végző (időközben a sebezhetőséget csökkentendő nem helyben maradó) gépre vinni a túlélőt.

Az ellenséges vonalak mögött bizony megesik, hogy felbukkan az ellenség. A gyakorlaton a rosszfiúkat, az OPFOR-t magyar katonák alakították.

Spanyol PJ-k (vagy valami olyasmik) munkában.

Jön egy kis merevszárnyú légi támogatás is.

Egy járóképes, és egy lábán sérült járásképtelen, így hordágyon fekvő túlélőt kísérnek, illetve visznek az ismét leszállt mentőhelikopterekhez, immár az EF német tagjai.

A támogatást (fedezetet) a mentőakció teljes ideje alatt biztosítani kell, így előnyt élveznek a nagy repülési, őrjáratozási idejű típusok, illetve fontos lehet a légi utántöltés és a támogató erők váltása is...

...valamint a forgószárnyasok esetében az előretolt utántöltési és újrafegyverzési pontok (FARP).

A túlélők berakása. A helikopter ilyenkor, mozdulatlanul a legsebezhetőbb, akár a legprimitívebb fenyegetések által is (pl. farokrotorba vágott tomahawk, esetleg fokos)

"Get the hell outta here"

Szorgosan fotózzák a VIP-ek az egyik leszálló istranai egérfogót.

Pápán vagyunk, az biztos..,

 ...ahol a régi mögött szépen készül az új, magasabb torony, melyről a HAW hangárépítés miatt beláthatatlanná vált déli végre is rá lehet majd látni.

A CJPRSC15 pár, a bemutatott akcióban nem szereplő résztvevője:

 

Francia CSAR Puma, komoly ASE-vel.

Lengyel Mi-24W.

Német GFD Learjet 35 (ami az előző posztban látott börgöndi track-gombolyagért felelőssé tehető).

AMI AB212, egy magyar honvédségi befogadó nemzeti támogatást nyújtó traktorral.

MM EH101, magyar tankerrel.

W-3PL Gluszec, izraeli Toplite szenzortoronnyal (lényegében Litening forgórésze függőlegesen beépítve) a kabin fölött.

Végül magyar részről talán Szaddam Huszein örökségének egyik darabja, a 6215-ös vett részt (persze lehet, hogy ez volt a kutató-mentő, illetve annak váltása).

S amiről ezek miatt a gépek miatt ma lemaradtunk:

Az amerikai-magyar "folyami" átkelés helyszíne a Mosoni-Dunán Győr-Bácsánál.

A pakoló magyar műszakiak.

Ez pedig már az M19-esen guruló amerikai konvoj.

 Zord

 

Seven years after the Great Recession, the Fed keeps money dirt cheap.

This post presents my research paper submitted within the framework of the Russian Politics course at KU Leuven (January 2015). Scenario thinking is based on the assumption of a possible political situation in year 2020.

Scenarios presented were created through the SWOT analysis which constitutes one of the most popular heuristic method of analysis, helping to sort the collected information. It allows to examine the internal and external factors affecting studied phenomenon. In my analysis, I have examined the possible scenarios for Russia and Eastern Partnership countries relations, which are part of EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (the ENP). The SWOT analysis has been examined and performed from the Russian perspective.

Both sides, the EU and Russia have a strong commitment and strategic interest in the Eastern region, which strongly influence their mutual contacts. Nevertheless, the future situation of this region is currently one of the most important issue on the foreign affairs agenda on both sides. Therefore, it is important to address the greatest importance of Russian future strategic scenarios towards Eastern Partnership countries- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine, with the relation to EU’s Eastern policy.

The ENP was launched in 2004 with an aim to support partner countries in their political, economic and institutional reforms; to strengthen democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights along with economic modernization and liberalization. The main goal of the ENP is to establish a closer relation with non-EU countries and integrate them more with European market and EU sectoral programmes and policies[1]. Within the framework of the ENP, The Eastern Partnership project (the EaP) was launched in 2009 towards six post-Soviet countries, thus it is not hard to imagine that Russia do not support and agree with EU’s actions in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. These countries, countries of “strategic importance”, are part of Russian increasing assertive foreign policy, with Russian leaders and a Russian public opinion that wanted and strived to stop the Western influence and regain control over its “Near Abroad”[2].

Factors taken into account in the SWOT analysis for Russia were given the weight from - 3, which are the biggest threat and the weakest side, to 3 being the greatest opportunity and the strongest side of the Russian situation. I have removed 0 from the scale, because as a neutral result of studied phenomena, it has no effect on the assessment of the examined situation. Taking into consideration a page limit, the below table presents only part of the key internal and external factors, which were considered as the most relevant for Russia- Eastern Partnership countries relations.

Strengths

Weaknesses

1)      Large country (1)

2)      Common historical and cultural heritage in the Eastern region (2)

3)      Geographical proximity (3)

4)      Energy dependency of Eastern and EU countries from Russia (3)

1)      Authoritarian government (-1)

2)      High rates of unemployment and poverty in many areas (-2)

3)      Crisis on the Russian financial market (-3)

4)      No influence on the EaP policy on the EU level (-1)

Opportunities

Threats

1)      Annexation of Crimea  (3)

2)      Russian minorities in Eastern countries (2)

3)      Economic instability of the EU and Eurozone (1)

4)      Eurasian Economic Union (3)

5)      Armenia and Ukraine did not initial association agreements with the EU (2)

1)      Dependence on oil and gas (-3)

2)      EU’s sanctions (-3)

3)      International conflict with West (-2)

4)      Organized crime and terrorism towards Russians from Eastern countries (-1)

5)      Georgia and Moldova had successfully negotiated Association agreements with the EU (-2)

 Table 1  SWOT analysis of Russia- Eastern Partnership countries relations

Total result of included factors is positive (20-18=2), which means that there is more strengths and opportunities for Russia to develop its policy towards Eastern Partnership countries. It may also be a reason why Russia still intensively develop different incentives for Eastern countries.

The internal factors can be seen as strengths and weaknesses of the current situation and factors coming from outside the country are defining threats and opportunities. Hence we can create four strategies derived from four SWOT quadrants.

 

  Opportunities Threats Strengths Aggressive strategy Conservative strategy Weaknesses Competitive strategy Defensive strategy

Table 2 Four SWOT strategies. Source: http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analiza_SWOT

 

Because of the positive result of SWOT analysis, it seems that Russia would most probably use aggressive strategy towards Eastern Partnership countries and undermine EU’s policy towards this region. Aggressive strategy is a strategy of strong expansion and development of both factors, strengths and opportunities. It is not without significance that Crimea issue is the strongest factor of Russian external factors within opportunities quadrant. The success in the Ukraine conflict and Russia’s annexation reinforced belief that countries of the “strategic importance” would not be easily given up by Putin. Moreover, Russian previous conflicts with Chechnya, Georgia and now with Ukraine can be counted among Russian successes. Putin tries to soothe the loss of Empire and this strategy seems to work at this moment. Hard power versus EU’s soft power in the long-term is the insufficient protection for Georgia’s and Moldova’s frozen conflicts with Russia. According to Raik, “the Eastern Partnership reflects the general tendency of the EU to play down issues of hard security and geopolitics and pursue economic integration as an instrument for enhancing stability and peace[3].” Russia will do not stop with its efforts to attract Eastern countries with the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia’s project is based on common legislation and supranational institutions, in which it resembles European integration. Russia will offer member countries various benefits, mainly of an economic nature, including easier access to the Russian market, financial support and preferential prices for energy resources[4]. The Eastern countries depend on Russian energy, their governments currently more and more decide on some subservience toward Russia: Azerbaijan’s recent article[5], Moldova’s last parliamentary election, Georgian authorities’ new policy and recent events within the government[6], Armenia’s threat of its energy security and joined the Eurasian Economic Union, Belarus pro-Russian approach. Hence, Russia will not be threaten by EU’s policy and will continue with an invasion in Eastern countries. Frozen conflicts, unsolved problems with Georgia, Moldova and Armenia, will be used to achieve Russian interests and gain necessary support from pro-Russian population. The necessary support would be given also for domestic governments- Russia will propose deeper and more comprehensive Eurasian Union’s economic agreements, than the free trade agreements that the EU has already negotiated. The Eastern Partnership countries will not confront themselves with the Russian army and risk their energy and human security. The Ukraine crisis show them that Western countries were not able to hold back Putin, and it is better to join Kremlin, than reject closer integration.

Russia still continues to define the post-Soviet area as its sphere of influence. The main objectives of this policy is to maintain the status of the Kremlin’s power confronted with the growing power of China and a stable position of the US as a world leader. The confrontation with the EU on the disputed East area is inevitable, but on the other hand, Russia cannot afford EU’s sanctions and to back out from the economic and modernization cooperation with the EU. Through well-defined economic incentives Putin will go toward Eastern countries and undermine the EU’s policy using state-controlled media not only to deliver messages, but rather to spread rumours and create confusion.

Conservative strategy- the studied subject is not able to develop intensively in the existing external environment, because the strengths factors do not correspond with the opportunities of the external environment, thus it is necessary to wait for the improvement in external conditions. This strategy was true before Putin’s first presidential elections. Currently, Russia does not want to wait for the improvement of external affairs, but to create them.

Competitive strategy in case of Russia is not a perfect solution. This strategy comes up when there is an advantage of weaknesses over strengths, but the studied subject acts in a friendly environment, which allows him to maintain his position. Competitive strategy should in that case focus on the elimination of internal weaknesses and use opportunities from the external environment. But Putin does not see any weaknesses in Russia. Russian identity and civilization are the greatest value in the society, and Russia is exceptional because it is not coming from the West. Vladimir Putin wrote in 2012 in a government newspaper, that Russia is not just an ordinary country but a unique “state civilization”, bound together by the ethnic Russians who form its “cultural nucleus”[7]. He will not cooperate with the external West environment which do not understand and tolerate Russian identity. In Putin’s view, it is the West’s intention to interfere with Russia’s historic mission and to thwart the rightful “integration of the Eurasian space”[8].

Defensive strategy: weaknesses are strongly linked to external threats, there is a high risk of state’s collapse. This strategy is focused on the internally and externally survival. Russia is not a state which would collapse, so this strategy can be rejected. Although, if economic and demographic problems will prevail, Russia as a result of the increasing difficulty of administering such a large territory and a lack of adequate resources for investment, slowly begins to give up its colonial heritage in the east of the Urals and the Caucasus.

In 2020 we cannot excluded that the Eastern Partnership Policy may change its current shape and Armenia, Belarus and Azerbaijan would withdraw from the cooperation with the EaP. The EU is not able to forbidden Eastern countries to resign from this policy. Moscow, without strong pressure from the West, strengthens the cooperation with China in Central Asia. Also puts bigger effort on the cooperation in the BRIC group. In fulfilling this scenario, I assume that Moscow will seek to restore its sphere of the influence in the Eastern Europe (Caucasus, Belarus, Moldova), and even head to recover some impact on countries in the Central Europe. Even because of economic problems, Putin will not change his course in the Eastern region and the EU’s widespread condemnation would not change his mind. Instead of military actions, which constitute the last possible option of Russian influence, the economic incentives will gradually undermined the strategic planning in Eastern countries.

[1] Delreux, T. and Keukeleire, S. (2014). “The Foreign Policy of the European Union.” Palgrave Macmillan, p. 251.

[2] Delreux, T. and Keukeleire, S. (2014). “The Foreign Policy of the European Union.” Palgrave Macmillan, p. 260.

[3] Raik, Kristi (2013). “Eastern Partnership as Differentiated Integration: The challenges of EaP Association Agreements.” The Post-Vilnius Challenges of the Eastern Partnership in The Eastern Partnership Review No. 15.

[4] Sadowski, Rafał (2013). “Partnership in Times of Crisis. Challenges for the Eastern European countries’ integration with Europe.” Point of view No. 36. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies. pp. 44-45.

[5] On 3 December the Azerbaijani media published an article, by Ramiz Mekhtiyev, the head of the presidential administration and de facto the second most important person in the state. Among other statements, Mekhtiyev blamed the USA and the EU for trying to create a fifth column in Azerbaijan and stoking a desire to cause a ‘colour revolution’, and also specifically named individuals and organisations supported by the West. The article promotes the idea of a multipolar world consistent with the Russian vision, and emphasises the right of sovereign Azerbaijan to conduct a foreign policy which focuses on the development of bilateral relations. Source: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-12-10/azerbaijan-closer-to-russia-further-west

[6] Some Georgian politicians stress that Prime Minister Irakly Garibashvili is dismissing some ministers due to politically motivated reasons and is trying to undermine supporters for better relations with the West.

[7] Aron, Leon (2014). “Why Putin Says Russia Is Exceptional.” The Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-putin-says-russia-is-exceptional-1401473667.

[8] Ibidem.

The post Scenario thinking: Russia-Eastern Partnership countries appeared first on Ideas on Europe.