Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Briefing Paper

Aid allocation is typically country-based, i.e. focusing first on how to distribute Official Development Assistance (ODA) across countries. Donors consider the needs of developing countries as well as their own interests before deciding which country should receive how much assistance. Subsequently, donor and partner governments choose the thematic areas or sectors of cooperation, such as health, education, the environment, or food security.
As an alternative approach, thematic allocation has gained increasing relevance. This form of allocation earmarks funds for specific issues prior to the selection of partner countries. The special initiatives of Germany’s Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the United States (US) presidential initiatives for health and food security are prominent examples.
The process of aid allocation is crucial for the effective use of scarce public funds. Global changes raise the question to what extent funds should continue to be allocated in a primarily country-based manner or whether a thematic approach is more useful. Historically, development cooperation has evolved as a policy to support poor countries. However, these countries now vary greatly in their development (fragile states, graduated countries, etc.). The North-South logic underlying the term “develop¬ing country” is inconsistent with the universal 2030 Agenda. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are organised thematically. Many challenges require cross-border solutions (e.g. climate, health, migration).
Thematic allocation aligns development cooperation with international challenges. Experience thus far shows both benefits and risks. Thematic allocation can mobilise funding for key issues, bundle resources and raise the visibility of aid. It enables cross-border cooperation, offers room for innovations and is more flexible. Yet, a number of initiatives bypass local capacities and the institutions of partner countries more frequently than country-based allocation does. In other cases, uncoordinated parallel structures arise, which do not take sufficient account of ongoing activities.
Thematic allocation is likely to become more important as part of the global effort to achieve the 2030 Agenda. Donors should therefore systematically examine to what extent they want to use thematic allocation in the future. A rigorous assessment can help to better utilise benefits and minimise risks.
The key challenge is to make effective use of the more flexible cooperation framework offered by thematic allo¬cation. To this end, donors should sharpen their thematic profiles and select issues according to their comparative advantages. Donors also require adequate organisational structures to be able to coordinate all relevant actors in a given issue area, both internally (e.g. through whole-of-government approaches) and externally working together with a broad range of partners. Ultimately, donors should further strengthen the role of partner countries in thematic programmes and initiatives to ensure that a shift of perspective from countries to themes does not come at the expense of country ownership.

Aid allocation is typically country-based, i.e. focusing first on how to distribute Official Development Assistance (ODA) across countries. Donors consider the needs of developing countries as well as their own interests before deciding which country should receive how much assistance. Subsequently, donor and partner governments choose the thematic areas or sectors of cooperation, such as health, education, the environment, or food security.
As an alternative approach, thematic allocation has gained increasing relevance. This form of allocation earmarks funds for specific issues prior to the selection of partner countries. The special initiatives of Germany’s Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the United States (US) presidential initiatives for health and food security are prominent examples.
The process of aid allocation is crucial for the effective use of scarce public funds. Global changes raise the question to what extent funds should continue to be allocated in a primarily country-based manner or whether a thematic approach is more useful. Historically, development cooperation has evolved as a policy to support poor countries. However, these countries now vary greatly in their development (fragile states, graduated countries, etc.). The North-South logic underlying the term “develop¬ing country” is inconsistent with the universal 2030 Agenda. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are organised thematically. Many challenges require cross-border solutions (e.g. climate, health, migration).
Thematic allocation aligns development cooperation with international challenges. Experience thus far shows both benefits and risks. Thematic allocation can mobilise funding for key issues, bundle resources and raise the visibility of aid. It enables cross-border cooperation, offers room for innovations and is more flexible. Yet, a number of initiatives bypass local capacities and the institutions of partner countries more frequently than country-based allocation does. In other cases, uncoordinated parallel structures arise, which do not take sufficient account of ongoing activities.
Thematic allocation is likely to become more important as part of the global effort to achieve the 2030 Agenda. Donors should therefore systematically examine to what extent they want to use thematic allocation in the future. A rigorous assessment can help to better utilise benefits and minimise risks.
The key challenge is to make effective use of the more flexible cooperation framework offered by thematic allo¬cation. To this end, donors should sharpen their thematic profiles and select issues according to their comparative advantages. Donors also require adequate organisational structures to be able to coordinate all relevant actors in a given issue area, both internally (e.g. through whole-of-government approaches) and externally working together with a broad range of partners. Ultimately, donors should further strengthen the role of partner countries in thematic programmes and initiatives to ensure that a shift of perspective from countries to themes does not come at the expense of country ownership.

Increasing global access to digital technologies is creating opportunities and challenges for donors and the humanitarian agencies with which they work to support people fleeing from war, massive human rights abuses and other emergencies. Digital tools make it easier for refugees to reach out to each other and humanitarian agencies, and can support greater efficiency in institutional efforts to provide essentials like medicine, food and money.
However, the effective use of digital tools to support refugee processes comes with a set of challenges. The key question for donors is: What are the existing approaches to digitalisation in refugee response, and the lessons learned, that donors can use to inform how they support digitalisation in refugee processes? To address this question, there are three things donors should focus on when developing a digital strategy for supporting refugees:

• Donors must avoid the problem of “technology looking for a problem to solve”; knowing how refugee communities already use digital tools is the best way to avoid this. Generally, refugees themselves will have found innovative ways to meet their information needs, and donors can provide financial and technical assistance to support access to the existing technologies.
• Building digital tools from scratch is an option when there is no existing tool available to meet the needs of refugees or workers in the field. Custom tools are often best deployed at the organisational level for managing information or resources. Donors should look to innovation and technology hubs, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) Innovation Service, to organise partnerships between United Nations (UN) agencies, refugee-focused NGOs and technology firms.
• Donors must be realistic about what to expect from a digital solution. Technology can be useful, but it is not a silver bullet for solving every information management challenge. Ethics and safety issues must be central in the design of any digital intervention. Donors must take responsibility in making sure the partners they work with can meet the data protection and privacy standards outlined by the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) handbook on digital data protection.

This policy brief provides a review of how refugees use digital tools, gives examples from organisations deploying digital technologies in the field, and discusses the effectiveness of and the ethical issues surrounding the use of digital technologies to support refugees. By putting the needs of refugees at the centre of their digital strategies and working with implementing organisations, such as UNHCR and Mercy Corps, to develop technology solutions that meet the needs of refugees and field staff safely and ethically, donors can get the most out of digital tools for supporting refugees.

Increasing global access to digital technologies is creating opportunities and challenges for donors and the humanitarian agencies with which they work to support people fleeing from war, massive human rights abuses and other emergencies. Digital tools make it easier for refugees to reach out to each other and humanitarian agencies, and can support greater efficiency in institutional efforts to provide essentials like medicine, food and money.
However, the effective use of digital tools to support refugee processes comes with a set of challenges. The key question for donors is: What are the existing approaches to digitalisation in refugee response, and the lessons learned, that donors can use to inform how they support digitalisation in refugee processes? To address this question, there are three things donors should focus on when developing a digital strategy for supporting refugees:

• Donors must avoid the problem of “technology looking for a problem to solve”; knowing how refugee communities already use digital tools is the best way to avoid this. Generally, refugees themselves will have found innovative ways to meet their information needs, and donors can provide financial and technical assistance to support access to the existing technologies.
• Building digital tools from scratch is an option when there is no existing tool available to meet the needs of refugees or workers in the field. Custom tools are often best deployed at the organisational level for managing information or resources. Donors should look to innovation and technology hubs, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) Innovation Service, to organise partnerships between United Nations (UN) agencies, refugee-focused NGOs and technology firms.
• Donors must be realistic about what to expect from a digital solution. Technology can be useful, but it is not a silver bullet for solving every information management challenge. Ethics and safety issues must be central in the design of any digital intervention. Donors must take responsibility in making sure the partners they work with can meet the data protection and privacy standards outlined by the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) handbook on digital data protection.

This policy brief provides a review of how refugees use digital tools, gives examples from organisations deploying digital technologies in the field, and discusses the effectiveness of and the ethical issues surrounding the use of digital technologies to support refugees. By putting the needs of refugees at the centre of their digital strategies and working with implementing organisations, such as UNHCR and Mercy Corps, to develop technology solutions that meet the needs of refugees and field staff safely and ethically, donors can get the most out of digital tools for supporting refugees.

Embora na maior parte dos países em desenvolvimento o potencial de receitas ao nível subnacional seja modesto, existem bons motivos para os doadores e os parceiros de desenvolvimento prosseguirem e intensificarem os seus esforços neste setor. Por um lado, as receitas obtidas localmente, apesar de insignificantes quando comparadas com as receitas obtidas a nível nacional, podem fazer uma grande diferença para a margem orçamental disponível para os municípios. Por outro lado, para além da disponibilidade de mais recursos financeiros, prevê-se que uma mobilização mais forte de receitas locais venha acompanhada de «dividendos de governação».
Consequentemente, a mobilização de receitas a nível local constitui um importante tópico para desenvolvimento, não apenas de um ponto de vista fiscal, mas também de uma perspetiva de governação mais lata. Por conseguinte, uma mobilização de receitas mais forte não deve ser apenas vista como um fim em si mesmo, mas também como um meio para promover a boa governação.
Defendemos que a fim de se desbloquearem estes eventuais efeitos positivos, os doadores e os parceiros de desenvolvimento precisam de entender melhor os efeitos que os determinantes sociopolíticos e administrativos têm na mobilização das receitas municipais.
Neste documento, sintetizamos as informações obtidas num estudo sobre como as variáveis administrativas e sociopolíticas a nível local afetam os resultados das receitas dos municípios moçambicanos. Por conseguinte, contribuímos para uma literatura em evolução salientando a relevância dos fatores locais na explicação da mobilização das receitas locais.
Os resultados mostram que, em primeiro lugar, as fragilidades administrativas conduzem a uma forte dependência de determinados instrumentos de receitas fáceis de implementar que não são necessariamente aqueles com maior potencial de receitas. Além disso, os resultados salientam a natureza sistémica do processo de cobrança de receitas: a falha ou falta de capacidade relativamente a um único passo afeta profundamente a eficácia e eficiência de todo o sistema de cobrança de receitas.
Em segundo lugar, os governos municipais que estão politicamente alinhados com o partido que governa a nível nacional mostram menos esforços para aumentar os resultados das receitas do que os governos não alinhados. Isso mostra de que modo as variáveis políticas a nível local, sobretudo na interação com outros níveis de go¬verno, podem afetar profundamente os incentivos para os municípios explorarem o seu potencial de receitas.
Em terceiro lugar, no contexto de uma sociedade civil, em geral, frágil, as variações marginais na força organizacional não parecem afetar o comportamento fiscal dos governos locais. No mesmo sentido, consideramos que a sociedade civil a nível local em Moçambique carece das capacidades para moldar e influenciar a mobilização de receitas de uma forma significativa, mesmo quando têm apoio de doadores.
Estes resultados têm implicações profundas para os doadores e parceiros de desenvolvimento. Não se considerar os efeitos sociopolíticos e os fatores administrativos nos resultados das receitas limita fortemente a capacidade de os doadores anteciparem a eficácia prospetiva das políticas e medidas destinadas a aumentar a mobilização local de receitas. Neste sentido, os profissionais precisam de alargar a sua abordagem à mobilização de receitas municipais e considerar mais siste¬maticamente o modo como as variáveis sociopolíticas e administrativas moldam as perspetivas de impactos mais fortes a alcançar.

Until recently, environmental concerns have played only a marginal role in trade policy. The rulebook of the World Trade Organization (WTO) rarely touches upon environ­men­tal concerns and mainly features an exception clause for the protection of the environment (GATT, Art. XX). How­ever, the rising number of modern preferential trade agree­ments (PTAs) covers an ever-broader array of policy areas, going far beyond the traditional reduction of tariffs by also including environmental provisions. Numerous PTAs nego­tiated on a bilateral and regional basis have compre­hen­sive “green” components. For example, many PTAs include ob­li­ga­tions not to lower environmental standards, the right to regu­late for the benefit of the environment, and the com­mit­ment to implement multilateral environmental agreements. The inclusion of environmental provisions can spark con­troversies. For some, the inclusion of environmental pro­visions offers untapped potential for actual environ­mental protection, making these agreements more compatible with environment and climate policies. However, trade critics often see these provisions as mere “fig leafs” that are included in modern PTAs in order to make them less controversial in the eyes of the public and legislators. For other critics, they represent an instrument of “green protectionism” in order to keep cheaper products from developing countries out of the market. Given the newness of the widespread inclusion of environmental provisions in PTAs and the heated debate that is raging about the nature and effects of trade policies, better data and research is needed to understand and analyse this development. Firstly, we need to improve our understanding of the specific design of these new rules and the related policy initiatives of PTA signatories. What drives the inclusion of environmental provisions in trade agreements? Which are the most innovative agreements and which the most innovative countries in terms of including environmental provisions in PTAs? Which environmental provisions are diffused more often than others into subsequent PTAs? Secondly, there is a need to understand the interplay between PTAs and other environmental or climate agree­ments. To what extent do PTAs with environmental pro­visions serve the purpose of multilateral environmental agree­ments (MEAs) or the Paris Agreement on climate change? Last but not the least: What are the implications of environmental provisions? Does the inclusion of these provisions in PTAs help the contracting parties to implement domestic environmental laws? The innovative and interactive online tool TREND analytics based on the Trade & Environment Database (TREND), which tracks almost 300 different environmental provisions in the texts of about 630 PTAs, offers new ways of going further and of undertaking research to generate fine-grained information on the interplay between trade and the environment, providing fresh insights into a number of relevant policy discussions. This Briefing Paper summarises recent research results based on TREND, along with providing new insights into these questions and policy discussions at the interface of international trade and the environment.

When Alice in Wonderland wonders which way she should take, the Cheshire Cat responds that it depends on where she wants to go! Researchers and policy-makers considering a country’s long-term development path also have to know where they want to go. Typically, they seek to determine the realistic growth potentials for a country’s economy and how to reach them, and identify the key assets that could make the country competitive and the economic sectors that should be prioritised to drive structural change. Most critically, they have to find out how to reconcile narrow goals regarding com­petitive­ness and productivity with broader goals related to social inclusive­ness and environmental sustainability. The challenge is to design a methodology for evidence-based anticipation of future competitive advantages that merit industrial policy measures. The sectors that could create viable growth must be understood. Identifying a country’s competitive advantage in five to 10 years presents a thorny methodological challenge and a complex set of factors to consider, including: avail­able domestic resources, institutional capabilities, production costs relative to other countries, geographic conditions, the country’s position within the global trade and investment system (including expected changes in relevant regulatory regimes), and also long-term shifts towards new technological domains. More often than not, the analytical, conceptual and institutional preconditions for such an exercise exceed the capabilities of developing countries and constitute a core area of advisory services provided by develop­ment cooperation partners. Against this backdrop, we explore three aspects of possible methodologies: 1.   The strengths and weaknesses of various contempo­rary methodologies, all of which fail to include im­portant determinants of future competitive ad­van­tages. Since they do shed light on various comple­men­tary aspects, however, we suggest combining them to create a more complete picture of emerging opportunities. 2.   The growing role of disruptive structural change. We are already confronted with radical and rapid structural change that impacts virtually all economic sectors and disrupts the prevailing techno-economic trajectory (seemingly the case for both decarboni­sation and digitalisation). What are the method­logical implica­tions for predicting future competitive advantages? We recommend a stronger emphasis on using ‘open’ qualitative forecasting methods. 3.   Evidence-based approaches for measuring compete­tiveness and anticipating its future direction must be embedded into a political economy framework that connects analytical tools to societal objectives and accounts for the different imple­mentation capabilities of various countries. Essentially, we argue that there is no ‘silver bullet’ method­o­logy for predicting emerging patterns of competitiveness. However, a variety of tools can be used to reduce the number of promising options and inform policy-makers about how to exploit emerging opportunities.

While in most developing countries revenue potential at the subnational level is modest, there are good reasons for donors and development partners to continue and intensify their efforts in this sector. On the one hand, locally collected revenue, although negligible when compared with revenue collected at the national level, can make a big difference for the fiscal space available to municipalities. On other hand, beyond the availability of more financial resources, stronger local revenue mobilisation is expected to come with a “governance dividend”.
As a result, the mobilisation of revenue at the local level is a relevant topic for development, not only from a fiscal point of view, but also from a broader governance perspective. Consequently, stronger revenue mobilisation should not only be seen as an end in itself, but also as a means for promoting good governance.
We argue that to unlock these potential positive effects, donors and development partners need a better understanding of the effects that socio-political and administrative determinants have on municipal revenue mobilisation.
In this paper, we summarise the insights gained in a study on how administrative and socio-political variables at the local level affect the revenue performance of Mozambican municipalities. Thereby, we contribute to an evolving literature highlighting the relevance of local factors in explaining local revenue mobilisation.
Results show that, first, administrative weaknesses lead to strong reliance on certain easy-to-implement revenue instruments that are not necessarily those with the highest revenue potential. Moreover, the results highlight the systemic nature of the process of revenue collection: failure or lack of capacity concerning one single step strongly affects the effectiveness and efficiency of the whole revenue collection system.
Second, municipal governments that are politically aligned with the party governing at the national level show fewer efforts to increase revenue performance than non-aligned governments. This shows how political variables at the local level, especially in the interaction with other levels of government can strongly affect the incentives for municipalities to exploit their revenue potential.
Third, in the context of a generally weak civil society, marginal variations in organisational strength do not seem to affect the fiscal behaviour of local governments. In this line, we find that the civil society at the local level in Mozambique lacks the capabilities to shape and influence revenue mobilisation in any meaningful way, even where they have donors’ support.
These results have strong implications for donors and development partners. Not considering the effects of socio-political and administrative factors on revenue performance strongly limits the capacity of donors to anticipate the prospective effectiveness of policies and measures aimed at increasing local revenue mobilisation. In this line, practitioners need to broaden their approach to municipal revenue mobilisation and more systematically consider how socio-political and administrative variables shape prospects for stronger impacts to be achieved.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted within the framework of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda are universal and apply to all countries, whereby each country is free to establish its own priorities. In order to address the concern that support for the problems of poverty endemic in developing countries could be curtailed in the process, industrial nations including Germany pledged to link national challenges with international objectives, particularly those relating to poor developing countries – in accordance with the Agenda's principle Leaving no one behind.
We analysed the revised version of the “German Sustainable Development Strategy,” (GSDS), adopted on 11 January 2017, which outlines measures designed to implement the 2030 Agenda, with regard to a primary concern of the developing countries, namely goal number 2: ending hunger, achieving food security and improved nutrition, and promoting sustainable agriculture.
Specifically, we analysed the indicators, i.e. the strategy’s measurable substance. However, the indicators cited in the GSDS fail to incorporate the developing countries’ immediate needs. Measures implemented at national level are aimed chiefly at improving ecological sustainability within the context of German agriculture. Here, particular reference is made to two verifiable indicators relating to the propagation of organic farming and the reduction of the nitrogen surplus in the agricultural sector.
These objectives are doubtless desirable for Germany, and may make a meaningful contribution towards the achievement of other SDGs (e.g. water, biodiversity, health). However, they hardly contribute to the essence of SDG 2. On the contrary, no account is taken of the possible consequences of these two indicators for food security efforts in developing countries, and, with this, their coherence in terms of development policy. Said consequences could include agricultural extensification and a tendency towards increased food prices. Other policy areas which (could) exercise a considerable influence on global food security, such as bioenergy and agricultural trade, are also overlooked.
Although important and necessary measures are described for the international context, which Germany must implement in order to achieve SDG 2, verifiable indicators and commitments that these efforts will be continued in future are lacking.
All things considered, the German Sustainable Development Strategy has so far failed to meet the requirements of the 2030 Agenda as regards SDG 2. Which changes are necessary for the further development of the GSDS, planned for 2018?

• In a national context, an indicator ensuring the (examination of and endeavours to achieve) development coherence in the field of national policy measures surround¬ing SDG 2 is required.
• As far as the international context is concerned, a credible safeguarding of the current engagements in the field of development cooperation (DC), or a voluntary commit¬ment to increasing the German contribution even after the end of the special initiative “ONE WORLD – No Hunger”, is essential.
• Indicators concerning the sustainability of German agriculture as a whole, the consumption of agricultural products, specifically animal products, and genetic diversity would be particularly expedient in this regard.

If a 2°C-compatible pathway is to be achieved, an enormous investment gap exists and this will need to be financed both with public and private funds. Green bonds have the potential to assume a crucial role in mobilising financial funds for the low-carbon transition. First, green bonds enhance the transparency on the underlying assets by disclosing the use of proceeds. Second, with long-dated maturities, they can match the long-term nature of issuer investment horizons with investor time horizons. Third, green bonds can augment issuers’ reputation. Fourth, green bonds can attract a larger and more diversified investor group.
This potential is reflected in the development of the green bond market. The annual issuance of labelled green bonds grew from USD 2.6 billion in 2012 to USD 82 billion in 2016 and in 2017 the Climate Bonds Initiative expect an increase to 150 USD billion.
According to the Green Bond Principles (GBPs) – the most widely adopted international standard – green bonds are any type of bond instrument whose revenues are used to partly or completely finance or re-finance new and/or existing “eligible” green projects.
While the green bond market has expanded sizably, one main problem in its further development is the lack of harmonised standards. Although several international and national taxonomies addressing green bond standards have improved practices around transparency, bonds structure and reporting (including the GBPs and the Climate Bonds Standard), there are no universal definitions of what constitutes a “green” bond. The architecture of green bond standards at the international and national level is fragmented. Several voluntary standards and various instruments for certifying green bonds have been established including second opinions, green ratings, and green bond indices.
On the one hand, existing standards should be better harmonised at the international and national level because different standards reduce investor confidence and increase their transactions costs. In addition, the various certification schemes for green bonds, including second opinion-providers, should be aligned accordingly. To foster efficient trading and increase liquidity in the market, harmonisation of green bond indices and green bond listings rules should be increased. On the other hand, some diversity at national levels and across different types of green bonds is needed in view of country-specific circumstances and to take into account the different purposes of green bonds. Where diverse standards are required, however, transparency into their differentiation from accepted norms must be provided.
In order to design harmonised standards, a vigorous dialogue among market participants is crucial. Annual consultation of the International Capital Market Association on the GBPs and the consultations organised by the Climate Bonds Initiative are important steps in the right direction. In the same vein, the current work of various authorities and private sector financial market actors on a “green bond term sheet” including standards for the definition, certification and validation of green bonds represents a crucial initiative.
The G20 could promote harmonisation of green bond standards by providing an important dialogue platform for public and private financial actors. Country authorities of the G20 countries could take on a frontrunner role in supporting and implementing harmonised standards for green bonds. They should better align their different domestic standards amongst each other and align them with international standards.

The majority of the population in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lives in rural areas and is directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture. As land is usually tilled by smallholders manually with a hand hoe, or mattock, the worker’s output and productivity (and with it, their income) is low, and the actual workload high. Similar conditions apply in downstream sectors, ranging from processing and transport to marketing. This frequently results in negative health implications for the workers, many of them women, and makes the agricultural sector less appealing. Particularly in the event that they have achieved good levels of schooling or training, young people prefer to take up employment in the cities and choose to leave rural areas. In addition to the heavy workload, further consequences of manual cultivation include high harvest and post-harvest losses, lack of competitiveness, low agricultural exports and high imports. Agricultural mechanisation can help to improve this situation. Its significance is demonstrated in the declara­tion contained in the African Union’s “Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want” to abolish the mattock by 2025. This is at the very core of a more systematic agricultural modernisation strategy. If implemented sensibly and gradually for particularly appropriate processes and in the case of labour shortages, a frequent criticism associated with this approach, namely that mechanisation causes job losses, does not necessarily apply. Indeed, the job ratio created via mechanisation can be thoroughly positive. However, a number of aspects must be taken into account in order to ensure agricultural mechanisation is successful:

• Not every viable stage of mechanisation makes economic sense for all small enterprises. That said, alternative exploitation models (machinery rings, larger agricultural enterprises, specialist service enterprises, contract cultivation) and appropriate technologies (e.g. two-wheel tractors) may make mechanisation accessible to these as well. Additional cultivation and marketing measures are often required.
• The fast and reliable provision of spare parts, repair services, operating materials and fuel or energy must be guaranteed.
• Specific financial products, including combined loans for customers and suppliers, savings and loan products and leasing models can make mechanisation more accessible.
• Mechanisation processes should be promoted in a market-driven manner; the state’s role should be limited to supportive measures. In the process, subsidies should be “smart”, i.e. not cause market distortion, of limited duration and conducive to the economic sustainability of the stakeholders and systems involved.
• Along the value chains, professional competence should be boosted via training courses, either via the private or public sector.
• The financial and agricultural sectors must collaborate to find solutions for specific mechanisation requirements, and receive support in this joint endeavour.

The success of peacebuilding not only depends on the effective negotiation of peace agreements, but essentially also on how negotiations fare during the practical implementation of peacebuilding policies on the ground. Negotiations are thus a central part of the daily business of United Nations (UN) peacebuilding operations. International actors play an important part in these negotiations, not only as facilitators between conflict parties, but as an own party with the political agenda to promote peace and democracy. Yet the impact of negotiations between international actors and domestic elites on the success of peacebuilding has only received limited attention so far. Given the mixed success of UN peacebuilding operations in promoting peace and democracy in post-conflict contexts, this neglect is a missed opportunity to search for avenues that could make peacebuilding more sustainable. This Briefing Paper therefore engages with the role of negotiations in implementing peacebuilding policies and their impact on peacebuilding success. It particularly scrutinizes the challenges that international actors confront during a negotiation process and which constrain the prospects of reaching proclaimed goals of peace and democracy. Several aspects of negotiation processes either limit international actors in pushing through their demands or provide domestic elites with ample leeway to pursue interests not necessarily aligned with peacebuilders’ goals. These challenges to negotiation processes need to be carefully taken into account when planning a peacebuilding intervention. The findings of this Briefing Paper rest on a fine-grained process tracing of external-domestic interactions in four policy fields at the local level in Kosovo. The following messages need to be kept in mind regarding the role of negotiations in peacebuilding:

•  Peacebuilding is a constant negotiation process. Negotiations do not stop after the conclusion of a peace agreement; peacebuilding goals and practice continue to be negotiated at every step of policymaking. Thus the success of peacebuilding also depends on how negotiations fare during implementation.
• During such negotiation processes particular challenges arise for international actors vis-à-vis domestic actors: the reconciliation of the diverging goals of peacebuilders and domestic elites; mutual dependencies on both sides; the balance between flexibility and long-term strategies; and the selectivity of international engagement.

In light of these challenges, international actors need to:

• Be aware of the need for compromise but make sure that compromises do not undermine overall peacebuilding goals. Issues for negotiation need to be selected strategically with a view to ensuring the best outcome of a peacebuilding policy.
• Be aware of the need for contingency planning while finding a balance between flexibility and strategic long-term thinking. Fast-changing security environments may require strategic readjustment, but arbi­trary ad hoc changes in priorities must be avoided.

Many actors in the G20, the EU and Germany are calling for a quantum leap in the economic co-operation between Europe and Africa. However current discussion of EU-Africa trading relations frequently focuses solely on the much-debated Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).
EPA negotiations date back to the 2000 signing of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (the ACP group). The ensuing negotiations took a highly controversial contentious turn, culminating during the 2007 EU-Africa Summit, when African heads of state and government accused the EU of looking to conclude trade agree¬ments between fundamentally asymmetrical markets.
In light of the upcoming EU-Africa summit in November 2017, it is important to continue the dialogue regarding what the EU and Africa wish to achieve with the EPAs. EPAs could contribute to the strengthening co-operation between the EU and Africa by forming part of a broad strategy supported by adequate political, human and financial resources. EPAs however remain a divisive topic, with many actors having divergent expectations. Yet in spite of ongoing controversy regarding EPAs on both sides, there remains a strong common interest in intensifying trade co-operation between Africa and the EU.
Against this background, this paper examines four possible scenarios for the future of the EPAs– with their respective opportunities and risks:

• Scenario A: Continuing the current EPA strategy
• Scenario B: Discontinuing EPA negotiations
• Scenario C: Resuming EPA negotiations on a new basis
• Scenario D: Pursuing an adapted and more flexible EPA agenda

The discussion of these scenarios shows that EPAs offer key benefits to EU-Africa trading relations, for example by strengthening legal security for the parties involved (Scenario A). The discontinuation of negotiations (Scenario B) offers no solution for the future of EU-Africa relations, with a restart of these (Scenario C) also offering little prospect of success. We therefore urge the adoption of a modified and more flexible EPA agenda (Scenario D), which specifically addresses the concerns of the ACP countries, reinforces African regional integration processes, and delivers more supportive measures than a continuation of the current strategy.
It is not helpful to consider the EPAs in isolation from the broader field of trade and development and expect them to deliver substantial results on their own. If the current impasse is to be overcome, all actors – whether critical or moderate – need to take part in explicitly interest-led discussions. Scenario D offers the possibility of the EPAs forming an integral element of the debate regarding trade and investment, whereas to date they have formed more of a separate thread of discussion in EU-Africa relations.

In her “farewell letter” to EU-Council President Tusk, UK Prime Minister (PM) May stated that the UK “wants to make sure that Europe is capable of projecting its values and leading in the world.” What exactly this means for British engagement in European external relations and development cooperation (DC), is still unclear. Furthermore, the Brexit White Paper presented by the British government in February has failed to establish clarity regarding substantial issues. Merely three weeks after handing over the notification of the British withdrawal from the Union to the European Council on 29 March and officially triggering the negotiations under Article 50 TEU, PM May called for a general election in Britain to be held on June 8. This paper discusses possible consequences of Brexit for UK and EU cooperation with developing countries. A central recommendation is to protect development policy as far as possible from the trade-offs of the negotiation gamble and place common goals and values beyond dispute. In more detail, EU development policy faces the following challenges: short-term problems regarding existing legal obligations, looming budget shortfalls and the securing of business continuity as well as the longer-term realignment of EU development policy following the departure of the United Kingdom (UK). There is also the problem of the UK’s succession in international treaties and mixed agreements in which both the EU and the member states are partners, such as trade agreements and memberships of international organisations, global development financing and representation in multilateral forums or negotiations. Against the background of what is known about the positions of both sides, this paper addresses three subject areas: 1. Brexit diminishes the influence and shaping power of both sides, the UK and the EU. Issues of security, migration and, above all, trade dominate the debate on post-Brexit external policies. The form and conditions for further involvement of the UK in EU development policy have yet to be defined. Overall, EU-UK cooperation will become less structured, less predictable and more strongly subjugated to national interest. The weakening of Europe’s stature, its DC capacity and economic power might result in a series of negative effects for international cooperation and multilateral processes. 2.  The development agenda plays a subordinate role in the Brexit negotiations as well as in British politics, and risks being instrumentalised as a bargaining chip. The political forces that gained the upper hand in the UK with the Brexit referendum give rise to fears that a shift in political culture and a reduction in the significance of DC in British politics could come to pass. The general elections on 8 June will most likely further strengthen the government’s Brexit-mandate and positions. 3. The effects of Brexit will also be felt on trade with developing countries, presenting these with uncertainties as well as specific challenges and problems. However, the situation presents the occasion to improve existing trade and partnership agreements. Brexit should be viewed as an opportunity and inspiration for reforms to enhance the coherence of EU trade and development cooperation as well as other policy areas. More effective cooperation at EU level could partially compensate for the loss of the UK.

Irrigation can help to improve and stabilise agricultural productivity, thereby contributing to food security and to resilience against climate change. Irrigation – either full or supplementary – reduces reliance on erratic rainfall/droughts and increases yields; it extends cropping periods and cycles, allows the cultivation of a broader spectrum of crops, and provides stable conditions for applying further yield-increasing means (fertilizers). Irrigation also encourages farmers to invest, on the one hand, and financial institutions to provide credits, on the other. Moreover, there is evidence from Asia that irrigation has the potential to reduce both poverty rates and income inequalities.
Several sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries still have a significant potential for expanding the area under irrigation. While small-scale irrigation can be managed by individual farmers or farmer groups (though with some difficulties and risks), for larger schemes  which tap larger potentials  this is hardly an option: public financial sources are constrained, and public management of irrigation schemes has shown many disadvantages.
This Briefing Paper argues that, instead, public-private-partnership (PPP) projects in irrigation can be beneficial for smallholders, rural communities, investors and the public if certain conditions are met. The challenges to realising inclusive PPPs are the following:
Due to the “public good” character of water, the “common pool resources” character of irrigation schemes, and SSA land tenure systems, governments must play a pro-active role in creating security and stability for investments in relation to land- and water-use rights and in protecting public goods.
Investing in water infrastructure alone is not sufficient in SSA countries. It must be embedded in a comprehensive support package including access to extension services and financial products, input supply, and  above all  access to stable markets.
All successful PPPs we reviewed in SSA have in common that smallholders have established farmer-owned liability companies to run commercial businesses. These companies have entered into contracts with private sector companies for irrigation management, service provision and market access. Farmers are represented on the management boards of their companies. For such arrangements, smallholders need long-term support such as vocational training along with assistance in designing contracts and acquiring management skills.
PPP arrangements require country- and site-specific solutions and must address the risks of the various parties involved if it is to be ensured that PPPs are development-friendly, are economically viable and protect natural resources.

As competition for water resources grows, a holistic management approach is required. Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) provides a coordinated, participative management framework to maximise economic and social welfare equitably, without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems. IWRM requires coordination at the national level for effective decision-making. Often IWRM is based on River Basin Management (RBM), which takes the river basin as the working unit for water management.
Implementing RBM is not an easy task and levels of success differ between countries. This policy brief analyses the challenges that Mongolia faces as it continues down the IWRM/RBM path. Mongolia is an interesting case because of its rapid legal adoption of IWRM, its transition towards political decentralisation in its post-socialist era, and the tensions caused by a push for economic growth through mining activities. In particular, we analyse how to move from de jure to de facto RBM implementation. We structure our analysis and recommendations based on the political, legal, and financial dimensions that characterise water management decentralisation under the principles of IWRM.
First, we find that regarding the legal dimension, Mongolia has made considerable progress in advancing the legal framework for IWRM/RBM and defining institutional responsibilities, both horizontally across sectors, as well as vertically across government levels.
However, vertical coordination between the national and the river basin levels still needs improvement. The Ministry of Environment (MEGDT) and the National Water Committee (NWC) can further harmonise vertical coordination through different levels of government. Regulations for the implementation of water pollution fees need to be developed.
Second, regarding the financial dimension, there is still ambiguity in some respects:

• In practice, River Basin Authorities (RBAs) remain underfunded and their financial resources are barely enough to cover their fixed costs.
• River Basin Councils (RBCs), as important as they appear to be in legal terms – allowing stakeholder participation in watershed management and decision-making – remain “paper tigers”, as they are not financially supported. Thus, stakeholder participation is marginal and in practice often only includes the participation of province (Aimag) and district (Soum) representatives, if any.
• Financing strategies related to the River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) are needed.

Third, on the political dimension, the development of the legal framework is an expression of the political will to implement RBM. This political will, however, remains half-hearted when it comes to enforcing environmental law, sparking participation, prioritising funding for respective water organisations and providing those organisations with the equipment required to fulfil their tasks.
Aware of the current payment crisis, this paper argues for securing proper environmental conditions that sustain economic and social development in the long run.

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) is a central part of the EU’s engagement on migration. It has generated both high aspirations and serious concerns regarding its aims, activities, and relation¬ship to broader trends in migration and development policy.
The EUTF’s stated goal is to “address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration”, an aim that is widely seen as unrealistic. However, key actors have other ambitions for the fund. These include demonstrating action on migration in response to political pressure, incentivising African cooperation on migration management, and using the fund’s flexibility to develop innovative programming. It is arguably through such innovation that the EUTF could add most value.
The EUTF is perceived by many African partners as part of a European-imposed migration agenda that prioritises EU interests over African ones. While experiences vary between countries and projects, African ownership within the EUTF is undoubtedly weaker than within traditional European cooperation instruments. The EUTF risks alienating African partners and overlooking local priorities, knowledge and capacities.
The selection of EUTF projects and partners has been criticised as ad hoc and untransparent. Member states’ implementing agencies play the largest role in implementation, and some clearly see the fund as a source of finance for their regular programming. This raises concerns over whether EUTF projects add value to existing programming and are the best fit for either the trust fund’s goals or local context.
The most controversial aspect of the EUTF is its potential to divert development aid in service of the EU’s migration agenda, including in ways that contradict EU development and human rights commitments. This appears to be part of a broader trend towards the securitisation of EU development assistance. The EUTF also undermines EU development commitments by skewing aid allocations towards countries based on their migration profile, and by abandoning aid effectiveness principles such as alignment.
There are several measures that could improve the EUTF and make the most of the opportunities that it offers. These include: more transparent and consultative project development; stronger engagement with local actors and needs; greater emphasis on seeking out “best fit” implementers; and drawing on existing lessons, evidence and approaches. However, if the EUTF is ultimately an indication of the future direction of EU development cooperation, this does not bode well for the EU’s prioritisation of development principles, its long-term interests, or its relationship with Africa.
Several processes lie ahead that will influence the future of EU-Africa relations. These must be used to examine how Europe and Africa can work together more constructively to address migration in ways that meet both their interests.

Preventing crises and conflict recurrence in post-conflict societies remains a major concern for international politics. What exactly characterises post-conflict societies, and what are their chances to avoid renewed conflict? What does this mean for peacebuilding efforts, and what types of international support do they receive? Based on a rich compilation of partly newly coded data by the project Supporting Sustainable Peace at the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), this briefing paper analyses international support to 28 countries that emerged out of a civil war after 1990. Moreover, it analyses their predisposition for renewed violence based on established risk factors for recurrence. Recurring violence haunts many countries that have experienced a civil war. Even after a violent conflict has ended, the challenge to build stable peace seems often insurmountable. In fact, peace frequently falters shortly after it has been achieved. Unfavourable background conditions, often created or intensified by the previous conflict, reinforce the challenge and contribute to the conflict trap countries appear to face. Although much international support has been provided to those struggling to overcome their violent past, the amount of official development assistance (ODA) varies strongly between recipients, as well as among different areas of engagement. Based on the data gathered, three main messages become particularly clear. First, half of the cases experience civil war recurrence; the other half remain relatively stable. When civil war recurred, it was usually severe and took place within the first five post-conflict years. The risk of recurrence is enhanced by the fact that almost all post-conflict societies struggle with unfavourable background conditions known to amplify the likelihood for renewed political violence, such as conflict in the neighbourhood. Chances for peace do exist, yet policy-makers need to be aware of – and prepared for – the high risk of renewed conflict. Second, it is striking that those post-conflict societies that receive considerably more international support experience fewer recurrences of civil war. This is even true with respect to each one of the four issue areas that make up international peacebuilding support: socio-economic foundations; security; politics and governance; and societal conflict transformation (SCT). Notably, it is not that external actors only choose to engage in the easy cases where they face the most favourable conditions. Although these findings warrant further analysis, they are a strong indication that international support to the four issue areas does indeed reduce a country’s likelihood of experiencing renewed violence. Third, much potential exists to strengthen support to SCT in post-conflict societies. Many practitioners and academics stress that supporting conflict transformation at the societal level and dealing with the past experience of violence is of utmost importance to create sustainable peace. Our new dataset demonstrates that SCT has received the least support by international actors; in one-third of the cases, international donors did not engage in this area at all.

The entry into force of the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on 4 November 2016 is a milestone towards safeguarding an opportunity for our species to live in peace and dignity on this planet. It is the first universal, legally binding instrument requiring both developed and developing countries to tackle climate change as a joint responsibility. While developed countries reconfirmed their obligation to provide support to developing countries under the Paris Agreement, there is also a growing recognition of the importance and potential of new partnerships among and with developing countries through South-South and trilateral cooperation. The European Union (EU), having shown considerable leadership in forging the Paris Agreement, also expressed its intent to work trilaterally with China and African countries to support the treaty’s implementation. The new EU strategy on China proposes to turn what is often perceived as EU-China competition in Africa into “greater cooperation” and to pursue “joint approaches” to “speed up the implementation of the Paris Agreement wherever possible, including the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions” (European Commission, 2016). Cooperation on addressing climate change has been part of China’s Africa policy since 2006, and China has been increasingly supporting African countries through South-South cooperation as well as trilateral cooperation with the involvement of United Nations entities. In 2015, China committed to significantly scaling-up its efforts in the area by pledging 20 billion Chinese yuan (CNY) (USD 3.1 billion) to its recently established South-South Cooperation Climate Fund, which will focus on supporting African countries. Trilateral cooperation between the EU, China and African countries should be guided by Africa’s priorities. There are 53 African countries that have communicated their national plans on addressing climate change under the Paris Agreement through the submission of so-called (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions ((I)NDCs). Based on an analysis of (I)NDCs and a review of existing partnerships and recent pan-African developments, this briefing paper proposes for EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation to initially focus on renewable energy. The African Union’s newly launched Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) provides a possible entry point at the regional and national levels. The EU and China should build on their existing pledges of support for AREI and jointly explore with African partners the development of pilot projects towards AREI’s goal of installing at least 10 gigawatts (GW) of new and additional renewable energy generation capacity by 2020 and establishing the Africa Renewable Energy Institute. The single largest pledge in support of AREI by an EU member state has been made by Germany, which is well positioned to spearhead the proposed trilateral cooperation by building on its technical expertise and its G20 Presidency objective to support Africa’s development, including in the area of renewable energy.

Increased and more effective public and private investments in the agricultural sector are needed to achieve the goals of ending hunger and reaching food security by 2030. Results-based approaches, which are innovative financing modalities that link payments to pre-defined results, are potentially powerful tools for overcoming the food security challenge.
Results-based approaches promise several advantages over traditional aid modalities, to include a greater focus on results, better accountability systems and improved incentives. They can also be an important tool for accelerating innovation and leveraging additional resources from private investors for agricultural and food security interventions.
While widely applied in the health and education sectors, only few experiences with results-based approaches in agriculture exist, and the suitability of the sector for the instrument is debated. Our briefing paper contributes to this debate by: laying out the challenges to implementing results-based approaches in the agricultural sector; introducing the Five Rural Worlds model (5RW) (OECD, 2006) as a framework for analysis of targeting and interdependencies; and summarising first experiences from pilot programmes.
We briefly review three pilot interventions representing different types of results-based approaches: results-based aid (a contract between governments) in Rwanda, results-based finance (a contract between a funder/host-country government and a service provider) in Zambia, and development impact bonds (DIBs) (a contract between a funder, a service provider, and a private investor) in Peru.
The analysis of the three pilot programmes shows that results-based approaches have the potential to foster innovation in agriculture and to play an important role in improving food security in developing countries.
Results-based aid programmes can provide additional incentives for partner country governments to focus on agricultural innovation and on reducing hunger and malnutrition in the long run. Results-based finance programmes, by offering economic incentives to service providers or private companies, can help to overcome market failures and foster the adoption of new technologies. DIBs are a novel way to engage private actors in addressing development challenges.
However, our analysis also shows that implementing results-based approaches in agriculture is challenging because of the complexity of measuring and achieving results in the sector. First, desired outcomes such as increased yields or incomes are highly variable and influenced by external conditions (e.g. weather and world market prices). Second, agriculture is a productive sector. Market forces and private actors play a much more important role in agriculture than in health or education. Improving agricultural productivity and food security relies on the decisions of millions of farmers and enterprises. Hence, designing results-based incentives and deciding whom to target is much more complex than in sectors dominated by the government.
Using the 5RW model, which distinguishes between five types of rural actors, ranging from chronically poor households to large commercial agricultural enterprises, we find that results-based approaches should take into account interrelations between the RWs.