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David Irion

On 9 September 2024, the world’s press gathered in Brussels. On that day, Mario Draghi, former Italian Prime Minister and previous President of the European Central Bank, presented his eagerly awaited report on “The Future of European Competitiveness”. The publication of the so-called Draghi report was timed to coincide with the start of the Commission’s next mandate, which the Commission itself has declared to be the decisive phase in its fundamental reorientation. The Commission intends the Draghi report to have a significant impact on policy-making and priority-setting in the European Union (EU) in the coming years.

The Draghi report provides a comprehensive analysis of the challenges and opportunities facing the EU and develops strategic approaches to promote stability. Draghi notes that growth in the EU is slowing down, mainly due to weak productivity. He also sees recent negative developments in foreign trade, energy supply and external security as a threat to the EU’s previous growth model. But one of the main reasons for him is the poor performance in terms of breakthrough innovation and the initial concentration of innovation activities in medium to low R&D intensive sectors, which is forcing the new European institutions to adopt a new approach to EU R&D policy.

The report recommends creating science as a ‘fifth freedom’ and a ‘Research and Innovation Union’ to reduce the R&D spending gap between the EU and its main competitors. Draghi’s view is undoubtedly that the future of the EU hinges on the success of science and research and its policy.

 

On the way to centre stage

Against this background, the question arises as to how science and research have become such an important policy area in the EU today. This question is addressed in a special issue recently published in the Journal of European Integration History entitled “EUropeanisation in and through Science: Unveiling the Long-Term Dimensions of European Integration” (Irion & Volf 2024). The six contributions to this special issue, written by historians and political scientists, take a multi-angle view of the impact of integration within the political framework of the European Union and its predecessors, covering a wide historical range of almost seventy years – from the formative years of post-war European cooperation to contemporary debates on research infrastructure.

The articles highlight that an indispensable part of the EU’s complicated journey to its present form is the fascinating but often overlooked story of the Europeanisation of science and research which comprises two interrelated strands: the transformation of European science and research in the wake of political, economic and monetary integration, on the one hand, and the transformative impact of scientific research on the evolving European Union, on the other.

 

One policy, many forms, many forums

Each contribution explores this symbiotic relationship, examining in detail how the various actors, institutions, practices and policies have been shaped by the process of European integration and, conversely, how they have influenced the development of the EU. In doing so some authors even look at networks and institutions that have emerged on the margins or even outside the EU framework, but have interacted with its structures in a lively way. One example is the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN), which in the 1950s was one of the first major instances of scientific cooperation in post-war Europe. Another is the Standing Committee for the Social Sciences of the European Science Foundation (ESF), which was set up in the 1970s and is another organisation independent of the EU.

Looking at the EU itself, the Commission’s initiative for the so-called Framework Programmes illustrates how research is being integrated into the fabric of European governance in the 1980s. The special issue also looks at the evolution of key concepts within European research policy. It examines the evolution of ‘scientific excellence’ in European research, tracing its transformation from a critical concept in the early 1990s to a normative standard within the European Research Council (ERC) since 2007. The European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC), launched by the European Commission in 2009 and which represents a turning point in the organisation and management of European research infrastructures, is also investigated.

Taken together, the articles sketch the landscape of European scientific cooperation and examine its various forms and impacts, but there is still much to be explored in this area. We would therefore like to provide a starting point and some food for thought.

 

David Irion is a PhD candidate and research fellow at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich (Germany). His current research focuses on the emergence and development of European research policy since the 1980s.

 

Reference:

Irion, D. & Volf, D. (2023) EUropeanisation in and through Science: Unveiling the Long-Term Dimensions of European Integration – Introduction. Journal of European Integration History, 30(2): 205–216. https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2024-2-205

 

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After nearly three years of heavy fighting in Ukraine, the countryside has become a graveyard of military hardware, notably main battle tanks (MBTs). What is unique about the conflict is how the armored behemoths from essentially different "eras" are now rolling over the same ground, often meeting the same fate.

Platforms that might have been considered obsolete are also used alongside cutting-edge technology—and the newest hardware clearly has the advantage.

That fact was noted as drone operators from the Rarog Battalion of the 24th Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine released a video that allegedly showed four Russian tanks being destroyed by unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the Bakhmut sector earlier this week.

The tanks were T-62s, a model likely older than some of the parents of the current tank crews!

How Did Old Tanks End Up on the Front

Before launching its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago, the Russian military had the world's largest tank force—at least on paper. However, even then, military analysts saw Russia's tank force as a "paper tiger" as many of the vehicles dated back decades and were kept in storage with little to no ongoing maintenance. Questions were raised as to how many of those antiquated vehicles were operational and how effective tanks from the 1960s would fare on the modern battlefield.

The answers came after Russia was unable to deliver a swift victory in Ukraine, and saw hundreds of its modern MBTs destroyed. As the war dragged on, and losses outpaced the production of new tanks, the Kremlin refurbished those old tanks from the Cold War, returning them to service.

It is apparent that Russia was desperate.

Some of the tanks sent to the front lines would seem better suited in a museum or in a historical reenactment than in modern combat. That certainly included the T-62, a platform that was first introduced more than six decades ago.

Developed from the T-54/55 series Soviet tanks, the T-62 was actually considered a very good tank in its day—and it did introduce many design features that became standard in future Soviet and Russian mass-produced tanks, including the T-72, T-84, and T-90. It has been touted as being easier to operate and easier to maintain, but those are hardly selling points given how outclassed the T-62 is compared to modern platforms—not to mention drones.

To put it in historical perspective, the medium tank was introduced before the United States military even adopted the AR-15/M16 as its standard rifle!

Numbers Matter More Than Capabilities For Russia

Production of the T-62 ended in 1975, with more than 22,000 units being produced. Instead of selling off its old stocks of tanks as newer and more capable models were introduced during the Cold War, the Soviet Union often kept older platforms in reserve.

Yet, those tanks sat for years, and then decades, in storage. Instead of ever cleaning out the arsenals, the stockpile built up, and that's how Russia ended up with a massive number of tanks.

Of the 22,000 produced, Moscow inherited around 2,000, and most remained in open-air storage depots. While the Kremlin did refurbish some in the past decade for service with the Syrian military, as many as 1,200 were still held in reserve.

Quantity Doesn't Mean Quality

Those "vintage" tanks have been steadily making their way to Ukraine to bolster Russia's forces and replace the losses of more modern and capable vehicles.

"They're not great tanks­—and they're definitely inferior to Ukraine's most numerous T-64s and vulnerable to its mines, drones, artillery and missiles. Analyst Andrew Perpetua described the T-62s as 'vaguely useful.' But only by '1980s standards,'" David Axe wrote for Forbes last summer, adding, "But vaguely useful old tanks are the best Russia can get as long as its losses in Ukraine greatly outpace the manufacture of new tanks."

What is surprising, too, is which units have been supplied with the T-62s. It was reported early last year that the 1st Guards Tank Army (1 GTA), ­purported to be Russia's premier tank force, was even equipped with the T-62s to make up for previous losses. The unit had previously been due to receive the next-generation T-14 Armata MBT but instead received the T-62.

This speaks to the desperate situation Russia finds itself in.

However, given that at least four T-62 tanks were lost in recent days should give Russia pause about whether the T-62 is even worse than "vaguely useless." Getting trained crews killed in the latest offensive seems to be an ineffective strategy.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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As the world concerns itself with the fate of Ukraine, the turmoil in the Mideast, and rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, there’s a conflict that is simmering much closer to home. At the tip of South America, the tropical socialist dystopia of Venezuela has been engaged in two years of hostilities with its much smaller, oil-rich neighbor of Guyana.

More generally, Venezuela has been committed to undermining the power and reach of the United States throughout Latin America wherever—and however—it can. 

Venezuela’s government has embraced a series of alliances to help Caracas intimidate its U.S.-backed neighbors and crush American power in the wider region. For instance, Venezuela’s regime has made common cause not only with a variety of drug cartels in the region but with the Islamic Republic of Iran. That’s especially odd, considering that the Chavismo regime in Caracas styles itself as atheistic and socialist.

Nevertheless, Venezuela and Iran are dangerously close to each other. This relationship has extended far beyond diplomatic friendship and has transmogrified into a full-blown military alliance, replete with arms sales. More to the point, Venezuela has striven to emulate Iranian unconventional warfare tactics of the kind that both Iran and its terrorist proxies, such as the Yemeni Houthis, have employed throughout the Middle East over the last decade. 

Venezuela’s Plot to Disrupt Shipping in the Panama Canal Zone

Specifically, there is real concern on the part of some U.S. strategists that Venezuela is planning to disrupt key shipping on the Panama Canal in much the same way that the Houthis have been disrupting international shipping in both the Red Sea or the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb or the way in which the Iranian Navy plans to shut down the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a direct conflict with the United States.

This further explains the incoming Trump administration’s seemingly random fixation on restoring direct U.S. control over the Panama Canal Zone, even at the risk of violating international agreements made with Panama. 

A key system that the Venezuelans have procured from their Iranian partners has been the Peykaap-III-class missile boat (known in Iran as the Zolfaghar-class), which was designed as a fast patrol craft meant to conduct quick, agile strikes. Interestingly, the Iranian boats that the Peykaap-IIIs are based on are themselves derived from the North Korean IPS-16 fast-attack boats. 

The Specs

Coming in at almost 57 feet in length with a beam of 12 feet and a draft of a little more than two feet, this fast and tiny boat is meant for conducting attacks in the shallowest of waters. Powered by two diesel engines, these boats can cruise at a top speed of almost 60 miles per hour. 

These boats carry two single anti-ship missile launchers, which can pop off either Kowsar or Nasr, Iranian-built, missiles. The Kowsar missiles have a range of around 12 miles while the Nasr goes out until about 21 miles. These two missiles rely on internal guidance and active terminal homing.

Peykaap-IIIs carry lightweight anti-ship torpedoes, compatible with Chinese (another close Venezuelan ally) C-701/FL-10 models. These boats come with heavy-caliber machine guns for close combat. Thus, the Peykaap-III boats are perfect for hit-and-run tactics, particularly against less maneuverable ships. Venezuela’s acquisition of the Peykaap-III-class missile boats began in 2023 and mean only one thing: at some point, Caracas will seek to do to international shipping in the Panama Canal Zone what both the Houthis and Iranians have done in the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb. 

For the last two years, U.S. intelligence surveillance has spotted Peykaap-IIIs in Venezuelan waters around strategic areas like the Gulf of Paria near Trinidad and Tobago, suggesting an intent to dominate (or at least monitor) key maritime routes near Venezuela. The deployment of these boats so close to Guyana adds a layer of tension to overall regional maritime security. 

The Geopolitical Implications

Venezuela is a revanchist power in Latin America that is intent on rolling back U.S. power and influence in the region. It has aligned with Iran and other rivals of the United States to achieve this goal. The recent acquisition of Peykaap-III-class missile boats from Iran highlights this fact. 

And if the United States does not pay close heed to what Venezuela is up to in its own geostrategic backyard, then it might discover that the Venezuelans are doing to the Panama Canal that which Iranian-backed militias in the Mideast are doing to global shipping in that region. 

The Peykaaps are in Venezuela’s possession for one reason: to increase Venezuela’s power projection capacity and to complicate America’s. Sure, the United States Navy has infinitely more powerful, larger warships to enhance its power projection in the region. But the Peykaap-IIIs are specifically designed to stunt and stymie the larger powers of the world while still allowing the Venezuelans to run roughshod over international shipping and their neighbors.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock. 

The State Department has approved the possible FMS, worth a staggering $3.64 billion, which will provide the Japan Air Self Defense Force with up to 1,200 AMRAAMs to be used by its fighters. The U.S. State Department has approved a possible FMS (Foreign Military Sale) of AIM-120D-3 and AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM (Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles) […]

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Ghana's Kantamanto market has been devastated by fire with traders urging the government to help.

America’s iconic B-52 Stratofortress first took wing during the halcyon days of the Truman administration. A long-range nuclear bomber that was designed to counter what was then the immense and growing nuclear threat that the Soviet Union posed to the United States, it has transitioned over the decades to a multirole platform capable of both conventional and nuclear missions. These behemoths have seen action in basically every post-World War II confrontation the United States has engaged in. 

The current variant, the B-52H, has been in service since 1961—meaning it has seen combat in every war or campaign from the Vietnam War to Desert Storm to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

A new variant is in the offing, one which will totally knock the proverbial socks off the Air Force’s bomber jockeys and strategists alike. That’s the B-52J. Three key elements undergird the B-52J project. The B-52 is getting a new lease on life that will extend its service to our country until the middle of the century, effectively ensuring that the warplane will have served for a century.

That is truly incredible (and a shot across the bow at the fantasists who currently control U.S. defense policy, who seem to think that the newer, more complex, and costlier the plane, the better).

The Upgrades

But the Stratofortress will continue proving its worth with the Air Force’s three major upgrades to the bird’s engines, its avionics and sensors, and enhancements to its overall structure to make it more relevant to the modern (and evolving) battlefield. 

As for the most important upgrade for the B-52J variant, its new engines, these things are really the crux of the entire enhancement. The old engines were the Pratt & Whitney TF33s. These aging engines have been replaced by brand, sparkling new (and powerful) Rolls-Royce F130 engines. 

With these engines come greater fuel efficiency, reduced maintenance requirements, and overall better performance over the older Pratt & Whitneys. Of note, the engines grant the B-52J better takeoff and climb capacity, which are crucial in the kind of contested battlespaces these birds will be operating in over the next several decades.

The B-52J will feature a new Raytheon AN/APG-79B4 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, replacing the older mechanically scanned arrays, thereby increasing the aircraft’s situational awareness and targeting capabilities. Upgrades also include brilliant new communication systems, glittering cockpit displays, and an overall streamlining of onboard functions (one of the crew stations has been removed for the new B-52s).

All the aforementioned upgrades prioritize data networking and cross-integration with friendly combat platforms in any engagement. In other words, network-centric warfare comes to the B-52 with a vengeance.

Structural modifications were made to the airframe of the new B-52J to make it more relevant in modern combat scenarios. For instance, the Air Force removed some of the sensor pods to reduce drag and improve flight performance. The Pentagon then doubled down on its investment in defensive systems for these flying juggernauts, making it possible for them to avoid grisly fates at the hands of the vastly improved anti-aircraft systems of near-peer rivals, like those of China and Russia (should direct conflict with either of those powers ever occur).

Upgrades are Behind Schedule

Sadly, there is no program the Pentagon can take on today that won’t be met with abysmal delays, complications, and ghastly cost overruns. The B-52J is no different. Initial engine testing of the Rolls-Royce F130s was supposed to take place at the end of 2023. But these were delayed. Not only have there been delays with the engines, but there were serious complications with the fancy new software upgrades on the bird.

John A. Tirpak of the Air & Space Forces Magazine, reported last month that on December 13, “the Rolls Royce F130, has cleared its critical design review, meaning it can enter final development, test, and production on time.” Although, Tirpak assesses that the overall program is “still three years behind.” So, rather than starting ground and flight tests around 2028, the B-52J is unlikely to start real testing until around 2033.

Of course, these developments will only complicate America’s already flagging air warfare abilities as we enter into a period of severe great power competition that may result in another world war. The jury is still out as to whether the Air Force will even be able to meet the expected number and deployment timeline for this most important system. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Andrew Harker / Shutterstock.com

It was not shocking that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States sought to defer a decision on Nippon Steel’s $14 billion offer to acquire Pennsylvania’s U.S. Steel until after the November 5 presidential election. What is shocking is President Joe Biden’s decision to block the transaction over concerns about foreign ownership.

In a White House statement, Biden asserted that blocking the takeover promotes U.S. national security and “resilient supply chains” by maintaining a “strong domestically owned and operated steel industry.” This would be considerably more persuasive if a Russian steel company, NLMK, did not already own three sites in Indiana and Pennsylvania at a time when Russian officials assert that Washington is “in a state of indirect war” with Russia.

Indeed, even as the Biden administration has imposed sanctions on thousands of Russian companies and individuals, the White House has avoided imposing sanctions on the Russian steelmaker. As a point of comparison, the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration cut off exports of steel, scrap iron, and various other metals and metal products in an escalating wave of sanctions on Imperial Japan during World War II in the summer and fall of 1941; these policies, together with a U.S. oil embargo, aimed to punish Tokyo for its war in mainland China—not dissimilar to the current effort to impose costs on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. This is not to say that an export ban of that time should be applied today, but it is striking that sanctions were used in an analogous situation but have not been used now.

The administration has not offered a public explanation for its restraint. Or, for that matter, for how its insistence that projects funded by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act use domestically produced steel. The administration’s formal guidance, which the director of the White House Office of Management and Budget issued two months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, did not make a distinction between steel produced domestically by American companies and that produced domestically by foreign-owned firms like NLMK USA, the Russian company’s U.S. subsidiary.

An earlier failed bidder for U.S. Steel, the American company Cleveland-Cliffs, apparently still hopes to buy all or part of the company, something that one analyst suggested could prompt antitrust objections, and to buy NLMK’s American facilities. Cleveland-Cliffs praised Biden’s September action to block the U.S. Steel takeover before the election.

One could make a case that a successful Cleveland-Cliffs acquisition of most or all of U.S. Steel, and NLMK USA, would strengthen the American steel industry. Moreover, this would usefully ease the Russian firm out of the U.S. market, in a manner respectful of the law and of property rights, unlike Russia’s approach to some U.S. and European companies. Considering American concerns about a potential future conflict with China, and that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the endurance of twentieth-century industrial war, there are significant national security reasons to increase domestic steel production capacity. In 2023, America’s total steel production was only about one-tenth of China’s. U.S., Japanese, South Korean, and German steel production combined reached only one-third of China’s.

Yet this is not the case that the Biden administration is making. Instead, U.S. officials appear to be facilitating that outcome without acknowledging it.

Paul J. Saunders is President of the Center for the National Interest and a member of its board of directors. His expertise spans U.S. foreign and security policy, energy security and climate change, U.S.-Russia relations and Russian foreign policy, and U.S. relations with Japan and South Korea. Saunders is a Senior Advisor at the Energy Innovation Reform Project, where he served as president from 2019 to 2024. He has been a member of EIRP’s board of directors since 2013 and served as chairman from 2014 to 2019. At EIRP, Saunders has focused on the collision between great power competition and the energy transition, including such issues as energy security, energy technology competition, and climate policy in a divided world. In this context, he has engaged deeply in energy and climate issues in the Indo-Pacific region, especially U.S. relations with Japan and South Korea. His most recent project at EIRP is an assessment of Russia’s evolving role in the global energy system.

Image: Shutterstock.

Shortly after assuming office, the new Trump administration will undertake a comprehensive review of the missile threats confronting the United States. Geopolitical and technical developments are undermining the longstanding foundations of U.S. missile defense policy. Potential adversaries such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are deploying an expanding portfolio of ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles—supplemented by large fleets of reconnaissance and strike drones. These countries are pooling their resources in the missile domain. Both Iran and North Korea give Moscow missiles and drones to use against Ukraine, while Russia is assisting these partners’ aerospace programs. Meanwhile, technology is transcending delineations between regional and homeland missile systems.

Some beneficial changes have already occurred. The Pentagon is deploying a Next-Generation Interceptor before the end of this decade. The new interceptor will make the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system protecting North America from intercontinental ballistic missiles more effective. The Missile Defense Agency has launched a new Transformation Task Force to evaluate options for realigning missions and responsibilities, integrating cross-domain capabilities, modernizing digital technologies, improving internal agency processes, and enhancing cooperation with operational forces and other partners.

Advances in U.S. missile defense capabilities have been evident in the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. The United States can leverage these technologies to build a more comprehensive missile shield. However, budget constraints and competing priorities could degrade capabilities and increase risks.     

In particular, U.S. defenses against hypersonic missiles are lagging. The Chinese and Russian militaries are constructing several types of hypersonic conventional and nuclear delivery systems capable of traveling at many times the speed of sound. The Defense Department’s latest China military power report assesses that “The PRC has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal.” Russia has employed several hypersonic missiles against Ukraine, including its new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile in December.

Chinese and Russian leaders perceive hypersonic weapons as providing their countries with critical strategic and operational capabilities. At the strategic level, long-range hypersonic glide vehicles flying unpredictable trajectories in the upper atmosphere can circumvent existing U.S. national missile defenses. At the regional level, hypersonic cruise and ballistic can quickly destroy high-value targets such as U.S. command centers, military bases, and forward-deployed forces.

The United States needs a well-constructed plan to parry these hypersonic threats. The Defense Department is developing constellations of Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor satellites to provide continuous coverage of hypersonic vehicles in flight. The Pentagon is further assessing a software program to upgrade the Long-Range Discrimination Radar under construction to identify hypersonic targets. 

But seeing and tracking fast maneuvering gliders in the upper atmosphere is only half the problem. The United States also needs to shoot them down. Congress has established a deadline for the United States to field an initial hypersonic interceptor capability by the end of this decade. The Pentagon is accordingly building the first system optimized to attack hypersonic gliders. Though a novel capability, this Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) leverages proven technologies that the Navy has used to shoot down hundreds of missiles and drones in the Middle East. 

Unlike U.S. offensive hypersonic missile programs, which have experienced repeated technical setbacks, defensive efforts have been primarily budgetary rather than technologically constrained. The Pentagon spends less annually on hypersonic interceptors than it does on a pair of new F-35 fighters. Funding limits have compelled the Pentagon to curtail R&D contacts for engaging hypersonic gliders.

Meanwhile, proposals to divert the limited funding to build a “gap-filler” terminal interceptor with constrained capabilities have arisen to provide patchwork protection until the GPI is deployed. Though terminal interceptors shielding a few critical sites could help build a layered defense, funding for any gap filler should supplement rather than divide the budget for the GPI, which will protect a much wider area.

The GPI program also has built-in burden sharing. The Japanese government is allocating $368 million to support its development through a Cooperative Development agreement with the United States and other means. The president and Congress should leverage these matching funds to support a rigorous GPI development, testing, and deployment program.

Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia, as well as U.S. foreign and defense policies. Before joining Hudson in 2005, Dr. Weitz worked for several other academic and professional research institutions and the U.S. Department of Defense, where he received an Award for Excellence from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Image: Andrea Izzotti / Shutterstock.com.

Experts are trying to figure out how a 500kg metal ring ended up crashing into Kenya.

En décembre, alors qu'Israël poursuivait ses bombardements sur les camps de réfugiés dans la bande de Gaza, la question de l'échange de prisonniers restait au cœur des discussions en vue d'un cessez-le-feu. Les détenues palestiniennes sont souvent les premières libérées, avec les mineurs. Leur (...) / Palestine, Prison, Mouvement de libération, Éducation, Femmes - 2025/01

Ukraine is expected to receive a first batch of three Mirage 2000-5F fighters in the first quarter of 2025, with France also providing six-month training courses for both pilots and ground personnel and a full support package. Six months after French President Macron announced that an unspecified number of Dassault Mirage 2000-5 fighters is set […]

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For the people of Vanuatu, climate change is not a distant threat—it’s here now. Rising seas swallow shorelines, storms batter homes, and entire villages face relocation. Desperate to hold the world’s biggest polluters accountable, this small Pacific island nation has asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to define countries’ legal obligations around climate justice. They point out that carbon emissions from major polluting nations have led to a crisis for their people and argue this injustice constitutes a violation of international human rights law. The ICJ will advise on whether or not existing human rights treaties cover climate and, if so, what comes next.

The United States, in its oral argument before the court earlier this month, defended the efficacy of the Paris Agreement, the existing global framework where countries set their own climate targets and cooperate to meet them, and argued that the court should not put climate under the purview of other treaties not designed to address climate. Activists quickly derided this position as “disheartening” and “morally bankrupt.” But practically speaking, the United States is right. The Paris Agreement—though far from perfect—is working: global warming projections have dropped significantly in the last decade, and large nations are cutting emissions. If the ICJ now takes human rights treaties not written with climate in mind and uses them to accuse historical emitters of human rights violations, they would risk alienating countries and muddying the global cooperation needed to continue tackling climate change.

While Vanuatu’s pursuit of climate justice is compelling, the ICJ can only offer symbolism and fresh rhetoric for “America bad” rallying cries that undermine productive climate efforts. To achieve real progress on climate change and true justice for low-lying nations like Vanuatu, diplomacy and cooperation remain the best path forward. 

Signed by 195 countries in 2015, the Paris Agreement is an international treaty intended to keep global warming to under 2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, and ideally under 1.5°C. Prior to its signing, the world was on pace to warm by nearly 4°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century, a truly devastating scenario. Today, scientists project about 2.7°C of warming—an improvement of over a degree. While far from sufficient, this new trajectory would likely avert several climate tipping points, including the abrupt greening of the Sahara, the collapse of East Antarctica’s ice shelves, and the Amazon rainforest reaching a dieback tipping point that would have released massive amounts of stored carbon and devastated biodiversity. While several tripping point threats remain on a 2.7°C pathway, the Paris Agreement has unquestionably steered the world away from some of the most dire outcomes.

Though the Paris Agreement is often criticized for lacking an enforcement mechanism, many top polluters are still taking major strides within its framework. China’s carbon emissions are set to fall for the first time in 2024, marking the beginning of a downward trajectory. The European Union has slashed emissions by 37 percent since 1990, including a staggering 8 percent reduction from 2022 to 2023. The United States has slashed emissions by 20 percent since 2005, and with help from the recently passed Inflation Reduction Act, projects to reach 40 percent by the end of the decade. Much of this progress is simply economics—clean energy is now often cheaper than fossil fuels—but the Paris Agreement likely spurred some of the investor confidence needed to push the sector to its current heights.

This progress needs to be accelerated to prevent a still-catastrophic 2.7°C warming scenario, but that’s not something the ICJ can achieve. Its ruling in Vanuatu’s case will be merely an advisory opinion clarifying existing international law. The opinion will be non-binding and unenforceable, and increasingly, countries like China and the United States ignore the ICJ’s authority. They may assert that certain human rights laws apply to climate change and demand additional action from major emitters, or they may assert that there is nothing outside the Paris Agreement. Either way, the ICJ will upset someone, which risks driving division when the cooperative approach has proven to work.

Some might point out that the Paris Agreement, even if it slows emissions, can’t deliver justice for Vanuatu and other low-lying nations who did the least to cause climate change but face the most severe consequences—and they would be correct. But in its current state, the ICJ can’t either. The ICJ president, Nawaf Salam, has a troubling record that undermines his court’s credibility on human rights matters. Prior to his current position, Salam (then Lebanon’s ambassador to the UN) defended Assad’s government in Syria on multiple occasions despite its use of chemical weapons and systemic violence against civilians. 

He also consistently shielded Iran’s regime from scrutiny while supporting policies that advanced its regional influence, even in the face of documented human rights violations. Furthermore, his 210 votes to condemn Israel—mostly tied to one-sided resolutions that ignored violations by other parties—compound concerns about his impartiality, especially as he now refuses to recuse himself from cases involving Israel as ICJ president. Considering this past, no one should value Salam’s opinion on any justice or human rights question, even on the off-chance that the broken clock is right twice a day.

Facing an existential threat from climate change, it’s admirable that Vanuatu is exploring every option. Their quest for justice is rooted in scientific reality, and their years of inspiring climate diplomacy have no doubt helped spur some of the aforementioned progress. However, when activists use this case to vilify the Paris Agreement, sow division between countries, and promote hopelessness by downplaying existing climate progress, that only hurts Vanuatu’s cause.

As an American, I can’t say what justice for Vanuatu and other vulnerable nations looks like. Yet, bilateral diplomacy seems a more credible and attainable path. The United States opened an embassy in Vanuatu this year and seems interested in improving relations with Pacific nations to counterbalance China’s influence in the region. This development makes Vanuatu’s future not just a moral imperative but a matter of national interest. The U.S. could consider providing direct foreign aid outside of the UN framework, sharing climate adaptation technologies, and sponsoring visits between the countries to promote mutual understanding. This would be a lasting investment in American leadership and global stability.

To put these investments into a justice framework, the United States could also offer a formal apology for its outsized contribution to global climate change. There is precedent: Reagan apologized in 1988 for the U.S. government’s internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, Clinton apologized in 1993 for the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, and Biden apologized two months ago for the federal government’s role in running Native American boarding schools, which caused generational harm to Indigenous communities. An apology doesn’t change the realities on the ground and would face its share of cynics. Still, I have to imagine the apology—coupled with collaborative climate initiatives that actually help people—would carry more weight than an authoritarian-sympathizing ICJ president’s non-binding opinion and hopefully inspire other countries to take similar action.

Vanuatu’s fight for justice should not have to be so onerous, and climate progress should happen fast enough to keep the world safe. But the answer isn’t for activists to attack what’s working. The Paris Agreement, while imperfect, has brought the world closer to averting disaster than any other global effort. What’s needed now is to build on that foundation, accelerate emission reductions, and find common goals with affected nations like Vanuatu that can lead to support and mutual understanding. Climate advocates must focus on building bridges, not burning them, to uplift Vanuatu’s determination and turn progress into justice.

Ethan Brown is an award-winning climate journalist and a Writer and Commentator for Young Voices. He has a B.A. in Environmental Analysis & Policy from Boston University. Follow him on X @ethanbrown5151.

Image: Menno Van Der Haven / Shutterstock.com.

There are two main approaches to the future: prediction and planning. Prediction often falters in the face of an increasingly complex and interconnected world, where countless variables elude full comprehension. Planning, while not without flaws, offers a chance to achieve desirable outcomes through proactive policy. As we are now at the midpoint of the 2020s (and the quarter-point of the twenty-first century), it is clear that the legacy of this decade will be shaped by the lessons we learn and the actions we take. Here are five key insights that can be gleaned from the first half of the decade.

1) The Indispensability of Values

Not since the Munich Agreement of 1938 has it been so evident that fundamental values cannot be negotiated. Attempts to appease dictators rather than confront illegal actions have repeatedly failed to bring peace. History shows that such concessions only embolden aggressors. The conflicts in Georgia (2008), Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine (2014) were precursors to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The West’s timid responses encouraged Moscow to grasp for more territorial gains. Compromising on core principles and obligations leads to outcomes far more devastating than a proactive and decisive intervention.

2) The Misguided Faith in Economic Interdependence

For years, many in the West believed that economic ties with Russia would deter it from violating international norms. The concept of Wandel durch Handel (“Change Through Trade”), a legacy of post-Cold-War-era diplomacy, encapsulated this belief. For several generations of politicians, it seemed almost undisputable that mutual commercial interests bear a higher priority for the Kremlin than imperialistic ambitions. Yet, on February 24, 2022, the images of Russian missiles raining down on Ukrainian cities shattered that illusion. Russia viewed the West’s dependence on its hydrocarbons, which emerged through the gas and oil trade, as a weakness to exploit.

In the years preceding World War I, similar faith in economic enlightened self-interest proved futile. In the years preceding the current war, European nations indirectly funded Russia’s military ambitions by purchasing its fossil fuels. It took Europe three years to reduce its dependence on Russian energy—a painful yet necessary step. In October 2024, the EU  Commissioner for Energy declared that the EU could now survive without Russian gas and that importation of it was no longer necessary.

3) The Resurgence Of Authoritarianism

Despite global trade and international agreements, authoritarian regimes remain undeterred. Democracies value peace; autocracies respect power. These opposing worldviews create a persistent clash. The 2023 Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit reported the average global score is the lowest since the index’s inception in 2006. Today, only 8 percent of the world’s population lives in “full democracies,” while nearly 40 percent live under authoritarian rule.

Each year sheds more light on the grim reality: when authoritarian regimes see opportunities to expand their power, they seize them. Frozen conflicts and political pauses are not deterrents; they are opportunities for autocrats to regroup and reassert dominance.

4) The Urgent Need to Defend Democracy

The rise of far-right movements in Europe’s core democracies, evidenced by Germany’s and France’s 2024 elections, shows that democracy is under siege even at “home.” Rapid technological advancements, particularly in artificial intelligence, exacerbate the problem. Disinformation and deepfakes are rapidly proliferating, corroding trust in institutions and making societies vulnerable to conspiracy theories.

Once hailed as friends of democratic engagement and freedom, new digital technologies are now tools for authoritarian regimes to undermine those very values. Russia’s disinformation campaigns on platforms like YouTube, Telegram, X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok illustrate this. The 2024 Romanian presidential election, marred by Russian interference, demonstrates the scale and sophistication of these efforts.

Without a concerted democratic “counter-offensive,” the 2030s could mirror the 1930s—an era defined by democratic collapse.

5) The Key Role of Civil Society

In 2024, violent crackdowns on protests in Tbilisi, Georgia, echoing the brutal suppression of demonstrations in Kyiv, Ukraine, in 2014. The patterns of authoritarian repression are unmistakable. Ten years ago, Ukraine withstood owing to its well-elaborated horizontal connections. Today, Ukraine’s resilience in the face of war also owes much to its strong civil society. Organizations like the East Europe Foundation, International Renaissance Foundation, ISAR Ednannia, and others have cultivated a capable ecosystem of grassroots NGOs that bolster national resilience. Thus, only the EEF’s network now includes over 600 local entities.

Unfortunately, emerging democracies are not the only ones at risk. The resurgence of the populist Far Right in older democratic political systems reminds us of the need for a vigilant and empowered civil society. In an age of relentless propaganda, civil society serves as a critical circuit breaker, preventing democratic backsliding.

A Watershed Moment

The year 2025 might be pivotal for the West and for Europe. Have we learned from past mistakes? Can we avoid the traps that lie ahead? The lessons of history remind us that peace cannot be purchased through concessions—it must be secured.

In an interconnected world, no nation is an island. A single fracture risks the collapse of the entire structure. These five insights are not exhaustive, but they offer a framework for decision-makers navigating this critical juncture. The future is still ours to shape—if we act decisively.

Victor Liakh is the CEO of East Europe Foundation. From 2005 to 2008, he was executive director of the Child Well-Being Fund Ukraine. Previously, he worked at the Ukrainian State Center for Social Services for Youth (1996–2001) and for UNICEF (2000–2001). Follow him on X @LiakhVictor or LinkedIn.

Image: Timon Goertz / Shutterstock.com.

Close Air Support (CAS) is a seriously underrated task that the United States military has a very finite number of systems capable of performing. Warplanes like the A-10 Warthog and the A-29 Tuscano are about the only two systems that can reliably perform this function. The Air Force, however, would have you believe that fifth-generation warplanes, such as the F-35 Lightning II, are more than up to the task of conducting CAS (from over the horizon, which, of course, negates CAS entirely). Of those two aforementioned CAS platforms, though, only one is truly iconic. That is the A-10 Warthog.

And the Air Force has been trying to kill the A-10 for years. 

It’s a stunning move by the Pentagon, because of all the warplanes in its fleet, the A-10 may be the most combat-effective modern warplane ever built by the Americans. Sure, it lacks the panache of the F-35, and it’s more expensive than the propeller-driven A-29. Yeah, fourth-generation warplanes, like the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18s all have an impressive track record. But there are countless American (and allies) servicemen and women who can reliably attest to the fact that they are only alive today because the A-10 Warthog was hovering overhead, providing air cover for them.

Very often, we conflate systems that are increasingly complex and expensive as being superior to those that are relatively simple and affordable. But this is a mistaken belief. After all, what other modern American warplane has successfully managed to have the kill ratio across multiple wars that the A-10 has and has saved the extraordinary number of U.S. troops in combat that the A-10 has saved by providing CAS? 

The answer is no other plane can or has done what the A-10 has achieved in its service. 

Not Understanding the Potency of the A-10

The Eggheads at the Pentagon and at Air War College argue that we’ve moved beyond the age of CAS because modern air defenses are so potent and complex that the slow-moving, loitering A-10 is a sitting duck today. Interestingly, the Pentagon’s Eggheads don’t share this assessment when it comes to U.S. aircraft carriers.

Because, in the age of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), it isn’t just the A-10 that would theoretically be rendered combat ineffective, but the far more expensive aircraft carrier. It’s almost as though the Pentagon just wants the systems that will cost the most amount of money to taxpayers (F-35s and aircraft carriers).

Alas, I digress.

In fact, there is a key difference between the A-10 and aircraft carriers when it comes to overcoming A2/AD threats. If the CAS mission set was as dead and the A-10 as obsolete as the Pentagon argues, then why is it that the U.S. Special Forces community continues to swear by the A-10? What’s more, why is it that the Special Forces community has invested so heavily in the A-29 in recent years? 

That’s because they require CAS for their missions to succeed and, with the future of the A-10 being uncertain, they are still trying to keep the CAS mission alive with the far less impressive A-29.

The idea that CAS can be conducted from over the horizon is one of those fanciful notions that only someone deeply ensconced in the Pentagon could believe. Sure, relying on an F-35 to provide the kind of cover for U.S. ground forces engaged in close combat with enemy units is better than nothing. But the F-35 lacks the endurance, firepower, and armor that the A-10 has when it comes to conducting CAS.

A far better use of resources would be to deploy A-10s in a mixed formation of warplanes. The F-35s, F-15s, etc., can operate in tandem with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and even long-range missiles to knock out enemy A2/AD systems. 

Once the A2/AD networks have been breached, then the A-10s can be deployed to hover over battlefields and provide the kind of loitering CAS mission sets that they’ve proven ad nauseam they are the best at doing.

Trust me, American servicemen and women (and those of our allies) engaged in ground combat will be eternally grateful for the A-10s being overhead.

If Only the US Had Handed the A-10 Over to the Ukrainians Rather Than Old F-16s

There’s one last bit of thinking when it comes to deploying the A-10. 

Given that the Americans and their NATO allies have (over) committed themselves to the Ukrainian cause against Russia’s invasion, it never made much sense as to why all the older A-10 Warthogs that had been sent to the Air Force’s boneyard were not re-tasked and handed over to the Ukrainians.

Now, of course, it’s too late for the A-10s (or any system) to make a difference.

Had the Americans, though, listened to the likes of Erik Prince, and handed over some of those A-10s along with the blessed Main Battle Tanks, it might have made a difference at the tactical level for the Ukrainians.

Alas, the refusal to hand those systems over and instead to give a handful of old F-16s has done little to help the Ukrainians in their cause. Here again, the A-10 could have proven itself to be the most useful, successful modern warplane the West has ever produced. The institutional bias against the A-10 prevented that. Indeed, the institutional bias against the A-10 is going to get many Americans killed when the next big war erupts and U.S. forces find themselves on foreign battlefields without adequate CAS.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Charles T. Peden / Shutterstock.com

The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement enters into force today.

Weekly schedule of President António Costa, 01–05 January 2025

During the press conference held at the end of the European Council meeting of 19 December 2024, President António Costa presented the main results of the discussions. EU leaders adopted conclusions on Ukraine, the Middle East, and resilience, preparedness, crisis prevention and response capacities, amongst other topics.

On 19 December, the European Council adopted conclusions on Ukraine, the Middle East, EU in the world, resilience, preparedness, crisis prevention and response, migration and other items.

On 19 December, the European Council adopted conclusions on EU in the world, resilience, preparedness, crisis prevention and response, migration and other items.