Feed aggregator

Il aura donc fallu 18 ans après leur adhésion à l'Union européenne pour supprimer leurs frontières communes. Cela facilitera les voyages, notamment en été lorsque les embouteillages bloquent les postes-frontière entre la Bulgarie et la Roumanie. Les transporteurs routiers se sont également félicités pour ce développement longtemps attendu dans le secteur.

In a historic moment for Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum has become the country’s first female president. She inherits a landscape filled with challenges, ranging from emboldened criminal organizations to strained relations with Mexico’s top trading partner, the United States. Sheinbaum’s national security strategy, which contrasts sharply with that of her predecessor, focuses on reviving bilateral cooperation while navigating the complex demands of Donald Trump’s incoming administration.

The tone of the bilateral relationship was set early in Sheinbaum’s first call with President-elect Donald Trump. Trump announced that Sheinbaum agreed to stop the flow of migrants to the United States and to close the U.S. southern border. Sheinbaum clarified that her country’s position is to build bridges between governments, not shut down borders. Despite their differing accounts of the call, Mexico has expressed a willingness to address pressing issues on the bilateral agenda, including migration and drug trafficking.

Yet, the future of U.S.-Mexico relations looks grim. President-elect Donald Trump has proposed a possible renegotiation of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the imposition of a 25 percent blanket tariff on all Mexican imports if Claudia Sheinbaum’s government fails to reduce the flow of fentanyl, organized crime, and migrants to the southern border of the United States. Despite the challenges, Sheinbaum’s proposed security strategy offers a glimmer of hope for the strengthening of bilateral relations. With her apparent understanding of the interconnectedness of migration, security, and trade, she has unveiled a bold national security plan that prioritizes combatting transnational criminal organizations. Unlike former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s (AMLO) controversial “hugs, not bullets” strategy, which focused on addressing the root causes of violence over direct confrontation, Sheinbaum’s approach emphasizes investigation and intelligence gathering, inter-agency coordination, and targeting high-profile criminals in the country’s six most violent states. 

Central to this effort is Omar García Harfuch, Mexico’s new Secretary of Security and Civilian Protection. García Harfuch is a seasoned police officer who previously served as Sheinbaum’s police chief during her tenure as mayor of Mexico City and is credited for reducing the homicide rate in the nation’s capital by half. He is no stranger to the dangers of his work, having survived an assassination attempt by the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel in 2020. At a time when AMLO’s government turned its back on the U.S., García Harfuch collaborated closely with U.S. security agencies at the local level. His appointment by President Sheinbaum was well received by U.S. agencies, who are cautiously optimistic that bilateral security cooperation will be revamped under his leadership.

For U.S.-Mexico relations, the stakes couldn’t be higher. President Sheinbaum understands what lies ahead for the future of Mexico’s relationship with its top trading partner if her government fails to combat organized crime effectively. The incoming Trump administration has made it clear that failure to address the fentanyl crisis—which claimed over 100,000 American lives in 2022—will carry severe economic and political consequences for Mexico.

In recent weeks, Secretary Garcia Harfuch announced that over a ton of fentanyl pills were seized in Mexico, the largest in the country’s history. Sheinbaum’s security cabinet continues to double down on efforts in the battle-scarred state of Sinaloa, a move that signals a willingness to disrupt the operations of the Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generación cartels, the primary suppliers of fentanyl to the United States. President Sheinbaum may not have traveled to Mar-a-Lago to meet with Trump, but her government has taken concrete actions to demonstrate its commitment to meeting U.S. demands.

However, it will be a difficult task to accomplish as bilateral security cooperation declined under AMLO’s presidency. From the outset of his administration (2018–2024), AMLO held a deep distrust of U.S. security agencies, calling for an end to the Merida Initiative, which sought to dismantle criminal organizations, strengthen Mexico’s rule of law, modernize the border, and help violence-ridden communities. Despite its shortcomings, the Merida Initiative was a blueprint for bilateral security cooperation that established an understanding of the shared objectives and challenges both countries faced. 

In 2021, the U.S. and Mexico laid out a strategy to restore faith in security cooperation efforts with the creation of the Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities. While offering a long-term vision for security cooperation, it lacks clear metrics to measure its success. Trump and Sheinbaum will have to determine whether the Bicentennial Framework will continue to guide security objectives going forward or whether a new plan will be needed. 

The two nations must first reestablish mutual trust between their respective security agencies. Events that occurred under AMLO’s government, like the arrest of former Secretary of National Defense Salvador Cienfuegos by DEA agents at Los Angeles International Airport and the detention and subsequent release of Ovidio Guzman, the son of notorious kingpin Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, marked major blows for bilateral security efforts. The tremendous show of force that the Sinaloa Cartel carried out after Ovidio’s arrest in Sinaloa proved evident that certain areas of Mexico are completely overtaken by criminal organizations powerful enough to challenge Mexican security forces.

The fallout from AMLO’s policies remains evident. He consistently argued that no country, particularly the United States, could intervene in Mexico’s internal affairs nor infringe on its sovereignty. What AMLO failed to understand is that the United States will go to great lengths to protect its national security interests, whether through joint actions with Mexico or, if needed, unilaterally. The strange series of events that led to the arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, one of the founders of the Sinaloa Cartel, and Joaquin Guzman Lopez (another of “El Chapo’s” sons) in Texas earlier this year is evidence of the latter. The same will hold true under the incoming administration, which has threatened to designate Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations and touted the possibility of intervening militarily in Mexico.

In his final month in office, and after the governing party’s landslide victory in Mexico’s June elections, AMLO’s constitutional reform to place the National Guard under the Ministry of Defense (Sedena) complicated prospects for U.S.-Mexico security collaboration. Historically, Mexico’s military has been wary of working with U.S. counterparts, a stance that could impede joint efforts under Sheinbaum’s leadership.

Much hinges on the direction in which Sheinbaum takes her government. President-elect Trump’s threat of placing a 25 percent tariff on Mexican imports depends in large part on the ability of Sheinbaum’s security strategy to produce immediate results. By prioritizing collaboration and demonstrating a firm resolve against organized crime, her administration has an opportunity to reset the tone of U.S.-Mexico relations. The looming possibility of tariffs, mass deportations of undocumented migrants, and the upcoming USMCA 2026 review process will test the bilateral relationship. For now, both countries remain at a crossroads, with their leaders tasked with navigating one of the most consequential partnerships in the world. 

However, Sheinbaum’s security plan offers a cautiously optimistic path for improving bilateral security cooperation and restoring peace to Mexico. The coming years will reveal whether U.S.-Mexico relations will be a continuation of past struggles or a positive turning point for the two nations. 

Lila Abed is the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute Director. She previously served as a correspondent for NTN24 and as a Public Policy Advisor at Covington & Burling.

Image: Israel Gutierrez / Shutterstock.com. 

As tensions between Washington and Beijing continue to mount, the race to produce the world’s first-ever sixth-generation aircraft is in full throttle. At the tail end of 2024, new images surfaced the internet depicting a Chinese-made stealthy, high-performance next-gen combat aircraft. While detailed information regarding the plane remains very limited, its overall design parallels what experts have already deduced about Beijing’s future aerial aspirations.

In videos published on social media outlets, the mysterious aircraft is seen flying alongside a Chengdu J-20S fighter jet. According to a War Zone report on the matter, the presence of the fifth-generation fighter suggests that this flight likely took place near the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation factory airfield. The aircraft’s tailless configuration has particularly stunned aviation buffs, as this design can significantly reduce the platform’s radar signature. The U.S. has also prioritized this structure as deploying airframes that are more difficult to detect is essential in the current threat climate.

As summed up by The War Zone, the mysterious Chinese aircraft features several advanced traits in addition to its tailless design: “It has a modified delta wing with chine lines extending all the way to the nose area, while its central fuselage section, at least the bottom of it, is loosely reminiscent of the J-20.” Additionally, the airframe appears to be designed with five trailing edge control surfaces per wing, including split flaps close to the wingtips. While no other information surrounding the aircraft has been divulged, Beijing’s progress toward achieving sixth-generation technology is worrisome.

China has been striving to introduce the world’s first-ever sixth-generation bomber for years. Its upcoming H-20 “Xi’an” bomber coincides with the PRC’s growing emphasis on nuclear deterrence and long-range offensive capabilities. In addition to stealth, experts believe that China’s new bomber could possess a range of more than 8,500 kilometers, which would allow Beijing to reach well into Japan, the Philippines and even the U.S. territory of Guam if not stopped. If a full-blown war between Washington and Beijing were to unfold, the H-20 could give the PLAAF the ability to strike U.S. bombers on the tarmac before they could take off. A 2018 Pentagon assessment also detailed how the development of a refuelable bomber would pose even greater risks for the United States. The PLAAF could “expand long-range offensive bomber capability beyond the second island chain” if a refuelable bomber were introduced to service. American analysts also believe that the H-20 will feature an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.

While these specs and abilities are alarming, China is not the only nation working on next-generation aerial material. The U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program is being developed to counter China’s advancing abilities in the skies. The upcoming sixth-gen program is referred to as a “family of systems,” consisting of sixth-generation fighter jets and Collaborative Combat Vehicles (UAVs) that will accompany them. Considering the progress Beijing appears to be making on the sixth-gen front, the timely introduction of NGAD is essential.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Carlin has over 1,000 articles published over the last several years on various defense issues.

The Yemen-based Houthi rebels have found a new backer: the People’s Republic of China. In a recent report published by i24 News, U.S. intelligence sources detail the undercover collaboration between Beijing and the Iranian-backed terror group which has perpetuated the ongoing instability in the Red Sea. While the Houthis have indiscriminately carried out attacks targeting warships and shipping vessels alike in these waters for years, the rebel group's maritime strikes have escalated following the October 7, 2023, massacre in Israel. According to the Israel-based news outlet, the Houthis are now using Chinese-designed weapons in their attacks. In exchange, the terror group will cease attacks on ships flying the Chinese flag. With a shared mutual contempt for the West, Beijing and Tehran’s collaboration in the region makes sense.

An overview of Red Sea barrages

 Iran has suffered significant blows over the last year. From the decimation of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon to the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, Tehran’s clout in the Middle East is rapidly deteriorating. Lacking the resources and weapons needed to continue its asymmetric objectives in the region, the regime has relied on China and Russia for support. The rogue allies are largely isolated from the international community and therefore lean on each other for arms, funds and even training at times.

According to i24 News, American intelligence services have uncovered a complex supply chain which provides the Houthis with the sophisticated components needed for their ballistic and cruise missiles. As detailed in the report, “Houthi leaders are reportedly planning to manufacture hundreds of cruise missiles capable of striking Persian Gulf states, using these same Chinese components. Washington has repeatedly passed on this information to Beijing since September, including detailed lists of Chinese companies involved in this arms mechanism.”

Chinese-Iranian collaboration is only expanding

The Houthis’ increased barrages targeting ships in the Gulf of Oman mark a dangerous escalation. Since roughly one-fifth of the world’s crude oil traded by sea passes through the Strait of Hormuz, these attacks hamper the flow of the global economy. The Houthis deploy lethal UAVs, missiles, rockets and other projectiles in their frequent barrages. From October 2023 to mid-2024 alone, the rebel group attacked more than five dozen vessels in the Red Sea. Clearly, the Iranian-backed Houthis depend on a constant influx of these weapons in order to keep up with this rate of attacks. Beijing’s delivery of the key components required by these aerial weapons to function enables the Houthis directly.

The Chinese-Iranian collaboration on this front coincides with the allies’ determination to establish a new international order based on their own rules. Beijing, Tehran, Moscow and even Pyongyang are increasingly working together to undermine the U.S. and Western power. The People’s Republic of China has also allegedly interfered in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine by providing drones to Moscow. Now that U.S. intelligence services have uncovered China’s material support for a group perpetuating attacks against Israel, the U.S. and other Western nations, the depth of this collaboration is even more alarming.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Carlin has over 1,000 articles published over the last several years on various defense issues.

Image: CENTCOM.

Military aircraft do not often cross over into mainstream popular culture. Rare instances of transcendence usually result from film. The Top Gun series, which centers upon naval flyers in the F-14 and F/A-18, put the Navy’s jets at the forefront of the American conscious. Otherwise, military aircraft mostly reside in the periphery – something that people are aware of, yet rarely pay much mind to. 

Last weekend’s Rose Bowl offered a rare reprieve, however: a moment in which a military aircraft was organically inserted into a moment of cultural prominence. Football flyovers are hardly rare; they occur regularly enough. But the impact is typically muted. The recent Rose Bowl, however, played between Oregon and Ohio State, was different for two reasons: one, the magnitude of the game; and two, the presence of the mighty, and rare, B-2 Spirit stealth bomber.

A rare sighting

The B-2 stealth bomber is exceedingly rare. Only 21 were ever built. Only 19 are still in service (one was retired in 2022; another was destroyed in a crash on Guam in 2008). By comparison, over 4,600 F-16s have been built, meaning one is exponentially more likely to encounter an F-16, or some other fourth-generation fighter, than the B-2. And of course, encountering a B-2 defeats the purpose. The B-2 is a stealth bomber, after all, designed to move about undetected behind enemy lines, quietly and unseen either to radar or the naked eye. So the B-2 is a counterintuitive choice for a gaudy flyover. Yet the rarity of the airframe—and its distinctive silhouette—help to give the Air Force a transcendent cultural moment.

For most of the people in attendance at the Rose Bowl, the B-2 flyover marked the first and last time they will ever see the stealth bomber. I myself have never seen a B-2, and don’t expect to before the platform is phased out in favor of the upcoming B-21 Raider.

Already outdated

The B-2 Spirit was the world’s first (and still to this day only) operational stealth bomber. The platform was an immediate strategic game-changer, giving the United States the coveted ability to operate a nuclear-capable aircraft behind enemy lines. Immediately, the B-2 allowed the US to deploy a credible, robust nuclear triad, complete with stealth options in air and sea. Even today, a generation later, no nation boasts the ability to deploy nuclear weapons from a stealth bomber.

Yet, times have changed; air defense systems have grown more sophisticated and sensitive. Resultingly, the B-2 is not as stealthy as it once was. Enter the B-21 Raider, the Air Force’s next-generation stealth bomber. Outwardly, the B-21 appears quite similar to the B-2, each with their distinctive flying wing design and dark grey paint job. But the B-21 is expected to feature a lower radar cross section (RCS) than the B-2, and hence should be stealthier. In theory, the B-21 will restore the strategic advantage that the B-2 once enjoyed when she first debuted.

The new stealth bomber isn’t ready yet; she’s still undergoing initial flight testing, with the expectation that she will join the Air Force in the next few years—at which point you may expect to find the B-21 conducting the occasional football flyover instead.

Harrison Kass is a senior defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image: Mariusz Lopusiewicz / Shutterstock.

The battlespace is changing. America’s adversaries are producing increasingly sophisticated systems, i.e. fifth-generation aircraft, advanced air defense systems, and hypersonic missiles, forcing American forces to adapt to enhanced threats. Yet, simultaneously, America’s adversaries are producing low-tech systems, particularly drones, which despite their humble nature, are requiring American forces to adapt.

Case in point: when F-22 pilot Lt. Col. Dustin Johnson was deployed to the Middle East last year, his squadron’s primary concern was not enemy aircraft, but rather enemy drones and cruise missiles.

“The dangers that most concerned Johnson and his Airmen included Iranian-designed drones and cruise missiles that Tehran and its proxies have employed during he most recent stretch of unrest in the Middle East,” Air & Space Forces Magazine reported.

“We were not necessarily worried about shooting down anybody else’s airplanes,” Johnson told Air & Space Forces Magazine. “We were primarily there to defend our ground forces against the threats that were being posed by the UAVs in the AOR, as well as the cruise missiles that we’ve seen become more prevalent, both from the Houthis as well as militia groups in the region.”

The fact that the vaunted, fifth-generation F-22 is being used to guard against relatively inexpensive, low-tech drones suggests that rebel forces in the region have devised a formula for mitigating America’s vast technological and financial advantages.

Emerging low-tech threats

Iran and their proxies have deployed their drones to disruptive effect. Last April, Iran deployed over 80 drones in an attack against Israel. American-supplied Israeli fourth-generation aircraft were used to engage the drones—a pairing that in and of itself represented a win for the Iranians. If an inexpensive platform like a drone can be used to divert the attention of a multi-million-dollar aircraft, that constitutes a profound resource imbalance.

Iran isn’t the only entity operating drones in the region. Iranian proxies, like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, are also operating Iranian drones.

“It was a very fluid situation,” Johnson said. “Knowing exactly where threats were coming from and when is becoming exponentially more difficult to discern because the threat has just proliferated to the point that it can literally be one person from anywhere with a single UAV.”

Of course, the F-22 wasn’t designed to hunt and kill drones, which weren’t especially relevant during its design period in the 1990s. Rather, the F-22 was designed to be the world’s best air superiority fighter, edging out advanced Russian and Chinese fighters. And while drones don’t pose the same level of threat to the F-22 as an Su-57 or a J-20 would, drones do pose their own set of distinct challenges. Specifically, drones are small and slow, which makes them particularly hard to detect.

“It’s air-to-air, but it is a different type of air-to-air than we’ve ever really trained to before,” Johnson said. “[Drones] pose very significant identification problems.”

Despite the challenges of drone identification, American-made aircraft have adapted proficiently; The Iranian drone attack in April was countered successfully enough to deter Iran from deploying drones in their October attack against Israel, opting instead only to use ballistic missiles.

The F-22 “is both a strategic and tactical asset,” Johnson said. “That gives anybody pause to think about how capable their defenses are when that platform is in theater.” 

Harrison Kass is a senior defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

 

 

     

According to unconfirmed Turkish reports, Saudi Arabia has discussed a possible purchase of over 100 advanced Kaan fighters, as the Middle Eastern country seeks to bolster its military capabilities. Turkish media are reporting that Saudi Arabia might be interested in acquiring over 100 TAI (Turkish Aerospace Industries) Kaan fighter jets, the advanced fighter aircraft developed […]

The post Saudi Arabia Reportedly Eyeing Purchase of 100 TAI Kaan Fighters from Turkey appeared first on The Aviationist.

Paved runways and dedicated facilities are a luxury that the United States Air Force knows it can't count on in wartime. The service has explored how the fifth-generation Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II could operate from a remote roadway, but it recently conducted a test where an unmanned aerial system (UAS) didn't even need a road!

The U.S. Air Force's 1st Special Operations Mission Sustainment Team (SOMST) recently carried out tests at the Melrose Air Force Range in New Mexico, where an MQ-9 Reaper drone landed on a dirt strip and was quickly refueled and rearmed before heading back into the sky.

The entire time, the UAS was operated by an MQ-9 pilot and sensor operator based more than 1,100 miles away at Hurlburt Field, Florida, the service explained.

"The 65th Special Operations Squadron hosted Exercise Reaper Castillo Nov. 4 to Dec. 18, 2024 to sharpen mission-essential tasks and develop MQ-9 Agile Combat Employment (ACE) capabilities. The goal: create a lighter, leaner and more agile force," the SOMST team explained.

This test served to validate "the MQ-9's ability to conduct key operations in austere environments, including dirt-strip landings, refueling, rearming and rapid relaunch." That is noteworthy as the MQ-9 has typically required a well-established facility that includes a paved runway, a team of maintainers, and "extensive support functions."

The U.S. Air Force clearly understands that it may need to adapt accordingly and that it can't count on a major base of operations from which to service the Reaper.

"In the future fight, we assess we will no longer be able to rely exclusively on the main operating bases that have persisted," said the 1st SOMST flight commander. "Operating in austere environments anytime, anyplace and anywhere is critical. It enables commanders to have options - something critically needed in special operations forces."

Dirt Landing Zone Tests

The Air Force had previously conducted the first touchdown on a dirt landing zone in 2023, at the Nine Mile Training Center south of Fort Stockton.

The recent tests further highlight how the MQ-9 doesn't require major infrastructure or even a paved road.

"We have to break out of the mindset that we need a huge, paved runway with co-located launch and recovery aircrews," the mission commander added. "If we can free ourselves from the traditional mindset, it makes MQ-9 combat reach nearly limitless."

Extending the Reach of the MQ-9

It was nearly a year ago that Airmen from the 50th Attack Squadron and Air National Guardsmen from the 163rd Attack Wing conducted a successful landing of a Reaper drone at Shaw Air Force Base (AFB) under satellite control.

Satellite-controlled landings are set to become standard practice for the MQ-9 community, replacing legacy processes that require additional ground control stations, aircrews, and maintenance support.

Historically, the MQ-9 had only taken off and landed via line-of-sight antennas, with aircrew members manually flying the aircraft. That satellite control test confirmed how the MQ-9 can literally take off and land from anywhere in the world.

Combined, these exercises highlight how the remotely piloted aircraft can operate from any location in the world, in line with its ACE capabilities.

"War games conducted by the U.S.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2022 found a conflict with China around Taiwan could see Washington and its allies lose as many as 900 combat aircraft – with most of those losses occurring on the ground due to enemy missile attacks. The ACE approach is meant to diminish that risk, and is something the Air Force describes as 'crucial to unlocking the full potential of the MQ-9,'" Flight Global explained.

Designed as a follow-up to the MQ-1 Predator, the Reaper can carry a great deal of ordnance, which allows it to fulfill the "hunter" component of a hunter-killer drone. Reapers can carry double the amount of Hellfire missiles that the Predator can carry, while the MQ-9 can also carry up to 500 pounds of bombs.

The Reaper can also employ up to eight laser-guided missiles. The Air-to-Ground Missile-114 Hellfire possesses highly accurate, low-collateral damage, anti-armor, and anti-personnel engagement capabilities. Even as the U.S. Air Force seeks to develop more autonomous and capable drones, the MQ-9 has continued to be updated and enhanced.

"The MQ-9 is extremely relevant in today's fight and will be in the future as well," said a 65th SOS MQ-9 evaluator pilot and exercise mission commander. "It allows us to go places and do things that we cannot risk sending manned aircraft – such as high-threat environments."

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Mike Mareen / Shutterstock.com

Depuis plusieurs jours, Elon Musk cible le Premier ministre britannique et l'accuse d'avoir couvert un réseau de pédophilie et de prostitution. Entre 1997 et 2013, plus de 1 400 enfants ont été victimes d'un gang dans la région de Rotherham, à l'époque où Keir Starmer était procureur général.

President-elect Trump has taken an​​ opening shot at rewriting the global economic order with his threats of tariffs against Mexico and Canada, as well as China and other BRICS+ countries. While the announcements have triggered a fierce debate about the pros and cons of tariffs, the incoming president’s willingness to pursue both tariffs and deals creates an opportunity to rewrite international economics to put U.S. and allied national security at the center.

During his first term, President-elect Trump, though often portrayed as a unilateralist, demonstrated a willingness to strike trade deals and work with partners. These included the U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade deal, a digital trade agreement with Japan, and changes to the U.S.-Korea FTA. He built international coalitions to tackle security challenges posed by China, for example, persuading European governments to reduce their use of Chinese-made telecommunications equipment, making them less susceptible to espionage and cyber-attacks from Beijing. His administration also supported programs like the Three Seas Initiative to strengthen economic and security ties in Central and Eastern Europe.

President-elect Trump’s tariff threats give his team the opportunity to sit down at the negotiating table to pursue new types of deals that advance American and allied security interests. But rather than traditional FTAs that focus on opening up markets across all sectors, the incoming team should leverage the threat of tariffs to advance a U.S. economic security agenda that would strengthen supply chains, promote an allied economic block, and ramp up pressure on China.

A deal, for example, could strengthen cooperation in discrete sectors that are important to U.S. economic security. These could include sectors like semiconductors, medicines, critical minerals, and defense manufacturing. Here, the United States and its allies are all ramping up their own investments, but future success will depend on the availability of component parts and materials from other countries. Energy is another important sector where the United States and its allies could work to promote the deployment of future energy technology, like new types of high-tech nuclear reactors and geothermal power, while also guaranteeing each other steady access to hydrocarbon fuels.

Trade deals can also help keep China out. Countries could agree to cooperate on tariffs against Chinese products that are flooding global markets, like cars, by raising higher common tariffs against Beijing. Countries could also agree to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains. For example, a car assembled in Southeast Asia that uses significant Chinese parts should be tariffed at Chinese rates rather than being given favorable deal treatment. These types of shared measures against China could help U.S. exporters because they will face less Chinese competition in third-country markets.

President-elect Trump has always been more willing than other U.S. leaders to see that national security and economic relations are no longer separate spheres but inextricably linked realms. Deals could increase cooperation on export controls and investment screening to limit the flow of advanced technology to China. Reducing our use of risky Chinese hardware and software is another area of cooperation. Beyond Chinese telecommunications gear, the Biden administration recently took steps to restrict the sale of Chinese cars in the United States, citing the risk that China could use internet-connected cars to engage in espionage. The European Union, meanwhile, is discussing a “trusted vendor” program that would address cybersecurity risks posed by non-European tech companies. This provides an opportunity to develop a trans-Atlantic trusted technology ecosystem that is open to U.S., European, and other allied tech companies while restricting risky Chinese products.

For deal-making to work, America’s allies need to understand that they cannot just wish away tariffs and tough negotiations. President-elect Trump and his advisors want a global trading order that is less focused on low-cost production and more focused on economic security, trade balance, and increased domestic manufacturing. They are not going to ignore trade imbalances by allies, including in Europe and Asia, and tariffs will be used to help U.S. producers of at least some key products. Allies shouldn’t derail cooperation on the broader set of economic security measures simply out of pique over the inevitable U.S. tariff increases.

Conversely, Trump officials should see tariffs as a scalpel. Targeted tariffs are an essential part of the economic statecraft toolkit. Broad, indiscriminate tariffs against allies would weaken the American Team against the Chinese while raising consumer prices. American national security imperatives call for economic statecraft to grow and strengthen the American Team while minimizing any infighting.

Allied economic engagement also has the potential to strengthen the West’s position in emerging markets like India, Indonesia, and Brazil. China has made inroads with many of these countries through its Belt and Road investment initiative, channeling hundreds of billions of dollars into infrastructure investment. While much of this investment comes with onerous financial terms and geopolitical conditions—so-called “debt trap diplomacy”—if the West does not provide alternatives, countries will take China’s offer.

During his first term, President-elect Trump worked to address this disparity by creating the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which finances development projects in dozens of developing countries, and reauthorizing the Export-Import Bank (ExIm), which finances U.S. exports and can offer terms to help U.S. exporters match offers made by Chinese competitors. Both the DFC and ExIm, however, are set to expire next year. President-elect Trump and the Republican Congress have an opportunity to use the renewal process to push through needed reforms, like expanding work in middle-income countries and allowing better co-investments and co-financing activities with allied-nation counterparts, and prod DFC and ExIm to be better integrated into overall U.S. economic statecraft and national security measures.

As the world moves towards a much more divided global economy, with a U.S.-led bloc and a Chinese-led bloc, the United States and our allies need to ensure that our bloc is bigger and stronger and limit the spillover of technology, expertise, and capital to Beijing’s. President-elect Trump and his team have a generational opportunity to use deal-making, including targeted tariffs, to write the rules for a new geo-economic order.

Kaush Arha is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and previously served as the senior advisor for global strategic engagement at USAID and the G7 Sherpa for the Blue Dot Network during the Trump administration.

Peter Harrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and previously served as senior director for international economics with a joint appointment to the National Security Council and National Economic Council during the Biden administration.

Image: Anna Moneymaker / Shutterstock.com.

L’année commence sur une campagne politique intense en Allemagne ! Le 23 février prochain, les électeurs devront choisir leurs députés, au cours d’élections anticipées décidées par le chancelier Olaf Scholz. Mais l’heure est à la défiance, voire à la violence, dans l’ombre du parti d’extrême droite l’AfD, Alternative pour l’Allemagne. Des militants et plusieurs élus victimes de menaces et d’agressions physiques ont même préféré jeter l’éponge. C’est le reportage à Berlin de notre correspondante Delphine Nerbollier.

/ Syrie, Conflit, Guerre civile - Proche-Orient / Syrie, Conflit, Guerre civile - Proche-Orient

Numerology is a potent force in human affairs. So is a deadline—especially when it’s clear fateful consequences will come to pass once the cutoff date arrives. The wry English wit Dr. Samuel Johnson was on to something when he quipped that “when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.”

But what happens if you talk yourself into believing a deadline is impending when it’s not? Maybe the executioner is not on a set timetable. An approaching date may concentrate your mind, as Johnson prophesied. And that can be a healthy thing. Deadlines are forcing events. They spur thought and action, compelling you to set aside indecision and sloth. But, perversely, a deadline might goad you into doing something rash—something with dire strategic and political import—in hopes of eluding the hangman’s noose. And then you’ll be stuck with the consequences of your actions—potentially, consequences of cataclysmic proportions.

Even though the hangman was never coming for you in the first place. Being decisive could be self-defeating.

Such are the dangers of a phantom cutoff date. Now to the news. Here are two numbers that have come to fixate officialdom in Washington, DC over the past few years: six and 2027. Both originated in a single committee meeting in Congress. In 2021, while testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, outgoing U.S. Indo-Pacific Command chief Philip Davidson reported that “Beijing is pushing across the globe to diplomatically isolate, economically constrain, and militarily threaten Taiwan.”

No kidding.

That was abundantly true then, and it had been for some time. Fully twenty years ago, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) magnates transcribed their threat to use arms into Chinese domestic law in the form of an “Anti-Secession Law.” The law set the conditions under which China would use force and made—surprise, surprise—CCP leaders the arbiters of whether those conditions had been met. Nor was this mere bombast on Beijing’s part. In the ensuing years, as Chinese military might has swelled, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has taken to deploying sea and air power around the island. As a matter of routine, PLA forces now practice amphibious landings, bombardment of key infrastructure, destruction of the Taiwan Navy and Air Force, and associated precursors to conquest.

The Anti-Secession Law has taken on an increasingly martial hue as China acquires the means to enforce it.

None of what Admiral Davidson told senators in his prepared testimony was especially novel, let alone radical. His prepared remarks were boilerplate. While fielding questions from the committee, though, he had this to say: “I worry that [the Chinese are] accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order, which they’ve long said that they want to do ... by 2050. I’m worried about them moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then. And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years” (emphasis added).

That last became the tagline for the admiral’s remarks. 6 + 2021 = 2027. There’s your numerology. The threat posed by China had become plain enough by 2021. Threats are composed of intentions and capabilities, and by then, Beijing had loudly and often trumpeted its intentions while at the same time amassing fearsome capabilities. But when the threat might cascade into war, if ever, it remained abstract and ethereal. There was no proof that Johnson’s hanging had been scheduled or ever would be. Or maybe the execution would be postponed if it were on the docket. However imposing, the threat emanating from China fell short of wonderfully concentrating minds.

It was possible to dither. And that’s what human beings do best.

Davidson changed all that. He provided specifics. His six-year timeframe was almost instantly dubbed the “Davidson Window,” shorthand for an interval of maximum peril in the Taiwan Strait. The metaphor concentrated minds. Now, that being said, it remains unclear to me precisely why policymakers and opinionmakers locked onto 2027, the endpoint of the Davidson Window. Obsessing over 2027 implies that Taiwan, America, and regional allies still have a couple of years’ respite to get ready for a trial of arms.

No.

Davidson meant to broadcast a more alarming message than that. He meant to tell Congress that the allies had no leisure to prepare, even back in 2021. China could act against Taiwan at any time during his six-year timeframe—including the day he testified, or today, or tomorrow. This hangman is on no fixed timetable. The allies should make haste lest he show up unannounced—as well he might, according to Davidson. That there can never be too much deception in warfare is baked into Communist Chinese strategic culture.

General Secretary Xi Jinping is not about to telegraph the timing of a drastic move like an assault on Taiwan. This hangman hides his thinking.

Which is why it’s also unclear to me why so many influential folks seem to regard 2027 as a deadline. Such a view is not entirely unreasonable. Chinese vest great importance in anniversaries, and 2027 marks the centennial of the founding of the Red Army, the forerunner to today’s People’s Liberation Army. Pomp might warrant extraordinary measures. It is also true that Xi has instructed PLA commanders to have a military option ready by that year, in part to commemorate the centennial and in part because political and military leaders covet having plentiful options. That’s what a capable armed force provides.

But creating an option is not the same as executing it. Human choice remains.

So beware of 2027 mania. Look both left and right of that date. If it hasn’t been already, the Pentagon needs to be laying contingency plans to intervene in a China-Taiwan war should one erupt today. And it could. Not just Phil Davidson but Carl von Clausewitz says so. The sage of Prussia postulates a case in which a weaker contender “is in conflict with a much more powerful one and expects its position to grow weaker every year.” He goes on to ask rhetorically, “If war is unavoidable, should it not make the most of its opportunities before its position gets still worse?”

He concludes that the lesser contender “should attack.”

Apply that to East Asia. If Xi sees military, economic, demographic, or other trendlines turning against China—if he believes the correlation of military might will be worse in the future than it is now—then the CCP supremo might roll the iron dice. If today is as good as it gets, Clausewitzian logic suggests today is the prime time to act.

Opportunism and risk calculations could prod Xi to be a gambler.

And he could gamble at any time. But neither should we regard the 2027 centennial year as a graven-in-stone deadline. Deterrence has worked and could work. What the allies do could change Xi’s mind. Clausewitz observes that there are three ways to prevail in contests of arms, and only one requires a combatant to throw down its antagonist on the battlefield and impose terms. He maintains that “inability to carry on the struggle”—the swiftest and surest route to martial triumph—“can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost.”

The latter two mechanisms operate in peacetime as well as wartime. An antagonist can be disheartened by the military situation or by cost/benefit calculations. It could desist from aggression by being rational.

Bottom line, it would be a mistake to succumb to either complacency or fatalism in the Western Pacific. It remains possible to convince Beijing its position in the Taiwan Strait is untenable. If Xi believes the People’s Liberation Army stands little chance of prevailing in 2027, he should refrain from ordering Chinese forces into action because of some arbitrary date. Or if the allies can persuade Xi that the cost and hazards of conquering Taiwan are more than the island is worth to China—or beyond China’s means entirely—he should likewise relent.

The year 2027 is just a year. We should remain watchful as it approaches, lest the prophets of automatic warfare prove correct, but we should neither relax our guard in the meantime nor resign ourselves to a certain clash of arms. Let’s not give up on efforts to defeat Chinese aggression without fighting.

We have a say in whether Johnson’s hanging happens—and how we react to it.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Faculty Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.

Image: Igor Grochev / Shutterstock.com

On Friday, President Joe Biden presented the highest military award for valor to seven U.S. Army soldiers at a ceremony at the White House. It marked the final time that Biden would award the Medal of Honor to a U.S. serviceperson.

Sadly, six of the awards were issued posthumously, for actions taken by the recipients during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The individuals included Pvt. Bruno R. Orig; Pfc. Wataru Nakamura; Cpl. Fred B. McGee; Pfc. Charles R. Johnson; Gen. Richard E. Cavazos; and Capt. Hugh R. Nelson Jr.

The seventh, Vietnam War veteran then-Private First Class Kenneth J. David, was present at the ceremony.

"I'm deeply privileged to honor seven American heroes," Biden said. "That's not hyperbole. These are genuine, to their core, heroes. Heroes of different ranks, different positions, and even different generations. But heroes who all went above and beyond the call of duty. Heroes who all deserve our nation's highest and oldest military recognition, the Medal of Honor."

History of the Medal of Honor

The origin of the highest military decoration dates back to the American Civil War when Iowa Senator James W. Crimes introduced a bill to "promote the efficiency of the Navy" by authorizing the production and distribution of "medals of honor." Within months, a similar bill was introduced for an award for privates of the U.S. Army. The wording and nature of the bills changed, including that this award would be for soldiers of all services and all ranks.

On July 12, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln signed into law the authorization of the Medal of Honor. At the time, it was the only U.S. military decoration. As a result, a total of 1,527 medals were issued during the American Civil War.

The very first recipient of the Medal of Honor was Private Jacob Parrott of Company K, 33D Ohio Infantry, who was one of twenty-two men—later known as "Andrew's Raiders"—who penetrated nearly 200 miles south into enemy territory and captured a railroad train at Big Shanty, Georgia, in an attempt to destroy the bridges and track between Chattanooga and Atlanta. Captured during the raid and severely tortured, Parrott was later part of a prisoner exchange. Parrott continued to serve in the Union Army for the remainder of the war, earning a commission and rising to the rank of First Lieutenant.

The Highest Honor

With the introduction of other medals and awards in the latter half of the nineteenth century, by the Spanish-American War, the Medal of Honor became the supreme honor. In the more than a century and a half since it was first issued, it has been awarded to soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who went above and beyond the call of duty.

"They're the finest military in the history of the world," Biden said of the seven recipients, but the words were true of all of those who have received the decoration. "Today we award these individuals a Medal of Honor. We can't stop here. Together as a nation, it's up to us to give this medal meaning, to keep fighting, to keep fighting for one another, for each other, to keep defending everything these heroes fought for and many of them died for: the ideals of America, the freedom we cherish, the democracy that has made our progress possible."

Notable Medal of Honor Facts:

-Enlisted recipients of the Medal of Honor are entitled to a supplemental uniform allowance.

-Children of recipients are eligible for admission to the United States military academies without regard to the quota requirements.

-It is a federal felony to falsely claim to be a Medal of Honor winner. Under the Stolen Valor Act, it is also against the law to sell or buy a Medal of Honor.

-The Medal of Honor has been presented nine times where the circumstances are "unknown" or "classified."

-The term "Congressional Medal of Honor" is incorrect. The Medal of Honor is presented by the president on behalf of Congress, and the confusion may come from the Congressional Medal of Honor Society, which was formed by an act of Congress in 1958.

-A total of nineteen recipients have been awarded more than one Medal of Honor, and current regulations specify that an appropriate award device be centered on the ribbon. This is an oak leaf cluster for U.S. Army and Air Force medals and a gold award star for the Navy version.

-William "Willie" Johnston remains the youngest recipient, who at the age of thirteen served as a drummer boy in Company D of the 3rd Vermont Infantry during the American Civil War. His division was routed during the Seven Days Battles in the summer of 1862, and Johnston was the only drummer to return with his instrument—a fact that was noteworthy as many soldiers threw away their guns and equipment during their retreat.

-March 25 is "National Medal of Honor Day," which serves to "foster public appreciation and recognition of Medal of Honor Recipients." The date was chosen because it was on March 25, 1863, that the very first Medals of Honor were presented to six members of Andrews' Raiders during the American Civil War.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

 

Le président autrichien Alexander van der Bellen a demandé ce lundi 6 janvier au chef du parti d'extrême droite FPÖ, Herbert Kickl, de trouver une majorité pour gouverner. C'est une première dans l'histoire du pays alpin, après l'échec des négociations des autres forces politiques.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Le 1er janvier 2025, l’Ukraine a coupé les robinets des gazoducs permettant d’acheminer le gaz russe vers l’Europe. Kiev a décidé de ne pas renouveler un accord quinquennal avec le géant russe Gazprom et, désormais, plus un seul mètre cube de gaz ne transite à travers le pays. L’Ukraine veut ainsi saper l’effort de guerre russe, puisque le manque à gagner devrait s’élever à 6,3 milliards d’euros par an. Mais cela va aussi engendrer des problèmes d’approvisionnement pour les Européens. L’Union européenne, qui avait infligé des sanctions contre le pétrole et le charbon russes, ne s’était pas attaquée au gaz, car elle en est encore trop dépendante. Pourquoi l’Europe ne s’est-elle pas encore affranchie du gaz russe ? Pourquoi cet arrêt de livraisons met tout le continent sous pression ? Quelles alternatives s’offrent à lui ?

L'État vient toujours au secours d'une grosse banque menacée de faillite : « too big to fail ». Mais ce précepte — « trop grand pour sombrer » — ne vaut pas dans le cas des pays en développement, qui ont collectivement contracté 29 000 milliards de dollars de dette en 2023. Leurs créanciers travaillent (...) / Spéculation, Droit, Dette, Banque, Tiers-monde - 2025/01

Ukraine is set to receive as many as ninety American-made F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole combat aircraft—while around two dozen of the fighters are now in service. Yet, even as more aircraft could arrive in the coming weeks, the Ukrainian Air Force may lack the pilots to fly the warbirds into action.

Last week, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense announced a bold plan to address the issue. Namely that it would cut the training time.

"The basic training program needs to be optimized. This will enable us to train more pilots to defend our country," Deputy Defence Minister Serhiy Melnkyk said in a briefing last week. "Ukrainian combat aviation must eventually gain air superiority, as this paves the way for the success of our actions on the front line."

Aviation experts have warned that training on the F-16 can't be rushed, and even experienced pilots trained on Soviet legacy aircraft could face a steep learning curve on the American fighter. Then there is the language barrier.

"One major concern from the very start has been the language barrier among Ukrainian candidates, many who have struggled to reach an adequate level of English proficiency to allow them to fully absorb the details of the complex systems of this fourth-generation fighter aircraft," the Kyiv Post reported. It added that "inexperienced pilots may struggle to adequately perform in high-pressure situations that could increase the risk of accidents and mission failure."

Just weeks after the F-16 entered service with the Ukrainian military in early August, Ukraine also lost its first Fighting Falcon reportedly due to pilot error.

Understanding the Training Needed to Fly the F-16

Colonel Alex Mahon, United States Air Force (ret.), a fighter pilot with decades of instructor pilot (IP) experience, offered insight into the basics of F-16 training.

"The core training is done in the 'Conversion Phase,' learning how the basic systems work: engine, hydraulics, electronics, etc.; takeoff; landing; acrobatics; taking the airframe to its inner and outer limits of flyability; instrument flying; getting the 'feel' of the aircraft so you can hear it when it talks to you," Mahon explained in an email to The National Interest.

"Notwithstanding the very little I know about today's MiG/Su fighter aircraft, I am confident that a fighter pilot who can stick-and-rudder a Russian fighter can handle an F-16. It's akin to a guy who drives a 1992 Ford F-150. The 2024 Lincoln he rents at the airport may have more buttons and hidden comm features, but he'll figure it out and get where he needs to go," Mahon added.

Mahon further described that the United States Air Force focuses on the "procedures" (the "what") and the "techniques" (the "how"). These are important distinctions.

"Everyone flying a particular aircraft will follow the book procedures, e.g., flying down initial at 1,500 feet AGL/300 kts.; pull the power back, roll into a 60-degree bank turn, and pull 2 Gs for 180 degrees to downwind; lower the gear when abeam the intended touchdown point; descending turn to 'final' when the runway threshold is 45 degrees behind your shoulder; roll out on final 1 mile from the threshold; 2½ degree glideslope; slow to calculated airspeed/AOA bracketed; touchdown 1,000 feet from the threshold; aerobrake until 90 kts.; etc.," said Mahon.

"'Technique' is how any particular pilot controls the aircraft to meet those procedural parameters," the instructor continued. "The Ukrainian pilots were taught USAF F-16 'procedures.' Their individualized 'techniques,' learned/honed over time/experience in Russian fighters, should translate well and will inform them how to meet the procedural requirements."

Continuity is extremely important, Mahon further emphasized.

"I need to be able to fly at least three days per week to keep my head and hands in the game. An average training sortie takes almost five hours to complete—start pre-flight briefing two hours before takeoff time; fly about 1.5 hours/700 miles; land and regroup/take a pee/get a Coke—30 minutes; debrief the entire flight performance in great depth = 1 hour)," he noted while suggesting that even if the training can be abridged, it really can't be rushed.

"These missions are quite arduous—the average trainee can't handle more than one a day," warned Mahon. "The flying schedule would be built around the 'average' student—if I was a quick learner, flying four times a week could speed things up. Conversely, if performance was marginal, extra sorties/more time to reach the target competence level might be required."

Thank you to Col. Mahon for his insight.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Image: EvrenKalinbacak / Shutterstock.com

Az NKFIH és a TÜBITAK közös angol nyelvű információs napot szervez a "A magyar-török alkalmazott kutatás-fejlesztési együttműködési programban való magyar részvétel támogatása” című felhívás (2024-1.2.11-TÉT-IPARI-TR) pályázata iránt érdeklődők részére.