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Die griechische Schuldenkrise ist nun endgültig in der Chefetage der Europapolitik angelangt: Bei einem nächtlichen Treffen haben Griechenlands Premier Alexis Tsipras, EU-Kommissionschef Jean-Claude Juncker und Eurogruppen-Chef Jeroen Dijsselbloem die Grundlagen für eine Einigung gelegt.

Bosnie-Herzégovine : Sarajevo attend le pape, une chance pour le dialogue
Quel avenir pour les catholiques de Bosnie-Herzégovine ?
Religion et nationalisme en Bosnie-Herzégovine : les trente ans de la « Gospa » de Medjugorje
Croatie : le cardinal Stepinac, allié des Oustachis, sera-t-il canonisé ?
Croatie : scandale après une messe en l'honneur d'Ante Pavelić
Nationalisme et religion : les « idoles » de la Croatie contemporaine
Les « icones balkaniques » : religion et nationalisme dans les États post-yougoslaves

/ Société, Religions, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Courrier des Balkans

Bosnie-Herzégovine : Sarajevo attend le pape, une chance pour le dialogue
Quel avenir pour les catholiques de Bosnie-Herzégovine ?
Religion et nationalisme en Bosnie-Herzégovine : les trente ans de la « Gospa » de Medjugorje
Croatie : le cardinal Stepinac, allié des Oustachis, sera-t-il canonisé ?
Croatie : scandale après une messe en l'honneur d'Ante Pavelić
Nationalisme et religion : les « idoles » de la Croatie contemporaine
Les « icones balkaniques » : religion et nationalisme dans les États post-yougoslaves

/ Société, Religions, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Courrier des Balkans

Das Image der EU in Deutschland wird immer schlechter. Das belegt eine aktuelle Umfrage des Pew Research Centers. In vielen anderen europäischen Ländern steigt die Zustimmung hingegen.

L'Afghanistan avait mis à mal les matériels de l'armée de terre française. La BSS les achève, selon le général Pierre de Villiers devant les députés de la commission de la Défense. Surtout quand ces équipements ne sont pas d'une première jeunesse: "Il faut avoir à l’esprit l’état réel de nos équipements : lors de mon déplacement à Tessalit, il y a une quinzaine de jours, j’ai embarqué dans un véhicule de l’avant blindé (VAB) livré en… 1983", a ainsi raconté le CEMA le 21 mai.

Extraits de son audition:
"La pression opérationnelle exercée par les OPEX sur les armées est accentuée par deux facteurs principaux. Le premier facteur concerne les élongations. Les opérations se déroulent sur des zones aux dimensions très importantes qui mettent sous tension nos moyens de transport aéroterrestres avec une surconsommation de leur potentiel. La zone d’opération au Sahel, on ne le dit pas assez, représente à elle seule près de huit fois la superficie de la France, ce qui implique des temps de vol importants pour que nos avions et nos hélicoptères arrivent sur leurs objectifs, et nécessite deux fois plus de moyens de communication qu’un autre théâtre. Autre illustration de ces élongations : l’évacuation de nos ressortissants par la marine, le mois dernier au Yémen, s’est déroulée à 5 000 kilomètres de nos frontières.
Le deuxième facteur est la dureté des théâtres et des opérations. Les conditions d’engagement sont extrêmes pour le personnel comme pour les équipements. Au nord du Mali, du fait de la chaleur – quelque 45 degrés –, chaque homme consomme chaque jour plus de douze litres d’eau. Le caractère abrasif des sables du Sahel et du Levant, de la rocaille des massifs du nord du Mali et de la latérite centrafricaine, conjugué aux vents violents, à la chaleur et aux amplitudes de température de ces théâtres, provoquent également une usure accélérée de nos matériels. Pour les vecteurs aériens, notamment les hélicoptères, ces conditions extrêmes provoquent une dégradation majeure des ensembles mécaniques."

Conséquence: quelque 20 % des matériels terrestres de retour de l’opération Barkhane sont irrécupérables.

Le texte de l'audition du général Pierre de Villiers, chef d’état-major des armées, sur le projet de loi actualisant la programmation militaire pour les années 2015 à 2019 est à lire ici.

A Szent Anna-tónál szerdán eltűnt magyarországi kiskorú után kutat a tűzoltóság tíz fős szakértőcsoportja. A fiú több társával úszni ment a tóhoz, de nem tért vissza a partra.
Kategória: Aktuális/Csíkszék

Le 30 mai 2015, à 12h15, heure locale, sous 42°C et après 6 heures de vol, les Rafale engagés dans l'opération Chammal sont rentrés à la base.

June 3, 2015 (KHARTOUM) The Chinese president Xi Jinping has invited his Sudanese counterpart Omer al-Bashir to visit Beijing, announced the Chinese environment minister, Chen Jining.

Sudan's President Omer Hassan al-Bashir reviews the Chinese military honor guard during a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China Wednesday, June 29, 2011. (AP)

Minister Jining who led the Chinese delegation to the inauguration of president Bashir met with the latter on Wednesday evening.

After the meeting the Chinese minister told reporters that the extended an invitation from president Jining to Bashir to visit China.

The minister said they discussed a number of issues of common interest in all fields and ways to develop relations between the two countries. He further expressed his confidence that bilateral ties would continue to progress during the new term of president Bashir.

Bashir's last visit to China was in June 2011, where he reached Beijing after a delay of 24 hours due to last-minute change of his flight itinerary.

The Sudanese president has an outstanding arrest warrant against him by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes and genocide he allegedly masterminded in Sudan's region of Darfur.

In statement to the official news agency SUNA, the spokesperson of the Sudanese presidency Mohamed Hatim Suleiman said president Bashir has accepted the invitation to visit China, adding that the later attaches special attention to the historical relations between the two countries.

Suleiman further said the president praised the strong bilateral relations and expressed his appreciation to China for its participation in the swearing-in ceremony and its support for Sudan in different forums.

(ST)

Júniusban új, egyszeri használatra szóló jogszabály készül a korábban engedély nélkül épült házak törvényesítéséről – nyilatkozta tegnap Zorana Mihajlović építésügyi miniszter.

A kormány ezzel a módosítással kívánja megoldani megközelítőleg másfél millió illegálisan felépített létesítmény problémáját az országban.

– Már a közviták fejezeténél tartunk, és ez azt jelenti, hogy ideális esetben ezután a tervezetet megerősíti a kormány, majd a parlament elé terjeszti. Így még ebben a hónapban elfogadásra kerülhet a törvény. A jogszabály az Európai Bizottság idevágó előírásaival összhangban készült, emellett a parlament a földmérési és telekkönyvezési törvénnyel egyidejűleg fogadja majd el a legalizációs törvényt is – magyarázta a tárcavezető.

Kunduz and Sar-e Pul have both been staging grounds for the Taleban’s first major onslaughts of the ‘spring offensive’ that started in late April – the first under massive public scrutiny, the second a lesser-known example of the same dynamics. In both provinces, the insurgents managed to get close to the provincial centres, at times threatening to take them over. For this dispatch, AAN’s Obaid Ali has looked closer at two specific areas within the provinces – Gortepa in Kunduz and Sheramha in Sar-e Pul, both in close proximity to the respective provincial centres. He describes how the Taleban approached their military operations against the Afghan National Security forces (ANSF), detailing not-yet discussed factors that contributed to their success – such as the insurgents’ skilful use of psychological warfare, the Afghan military’s misjudgements or local powerbrokers’ unwilling opening of avenues for the Taleban’s usurpation of districts.

The Taleban started fighting in the north some time before the announcement of their annual ‘spring offensive’ on 24 April. In Kunduz, our first case study, clashes between government forces and insurgents have been reported from the districts of Imam Saheb, Chahrdara, Dasht-e Archi and Qala-ye Zal, since 22 April. The start of the ‘spring offensive’ only intensified the fighting. AAN has already described the recent clashes in the province in its last Kunduz dispatch (see here and for all Kunduz dispatches our thematic dossier here). The Gortepa offensive, however, is worth a second look as it shows how the Taleban approached and planned a rather brazen offensive, successfully played out in proximity to the province’s centre.

Gortepa is part of Kunduz’ capital city, an area only 15 kilometres northwest of the city’s centre. Locals call it the “gateway to Kunduz.” It borders the districts of Imam Saheb to the west, Qala-ye Zal to the north and Chahrdara to the south. Ethnically, Gortepa is mixed, with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and a smaller minority of Arabs  (1), the latter living in 40 to 50 villages. Having a strong base here thus helps facilitate insurgents’ movements  within the wider province. At the same time, the proximity to the provincial centre enhances their ability to quickly and effectively target crucial central administration and security facilities.

This is just what they did during their first major operation of 2015, starting only two days after the spring offensive declaration. Before stabbing at Kunduz city, the Taleban first took on the security forces in Gortepa. At the initial stage, they chose the village of Mahsud Zubair as their target. According to Nurullah, an ALP commander stationed in that village, the Taleban, led by commander Mawlawi Shamsuddin from Chahrdara, supported by local sub-commanders, attacked at eight in the morning. Shortly after, according to Nurullah, “most of the state security bases were surrounded.” By seven in the evening, all security forces – Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Nazm-e ‘ama (the Afghan National Civil Order Police) – had fled, and the Taleban issued a statement that they were in control. They had also taken over the Gortepa villages of Khan Shirin, Waziri, Gultepa-ye Awal and Goltepa-ye Dowom, Tapa-ye Burida and Chahrdarachi.

His own ALP men, said commander Nurullah, held their position until nightfall; then they, too, gave up. It was a windy night, he said, and this helped the men to crawl to a nearby forest and flee to Asqalan village, and then cross the river towards Pul-e Archin close to the provincial centre.

Speaking to AAN, three other ALP commanders in Gortepa presented a similar picture. Asked for the reasons for their defeat, they cited “shortage of weapons and ammunition and a lack of support by the local government.” Sayed Sarwar Hussaini, spokesman of the provincial police, confirmed that the ALP had not been equipped well enough to defeat the Taleban. “The light weapons of the ALP are not eligible for fierce fighting,” he said. He also said, though, that before the operation in Gortepa, on 10 April, a larger number of the ANSF from Kunduz had been deployed to Badakhshan to beat back the Taleban in Jurm district. This, however, can only be called a massive misjudgement on part of the security forces, as an imminent surge of the Taleban in this crucial area of Kunduz province was not only to be suspected, but information about it was already readily available, as elders told AAN.

Insurgents, rather skilfully using psychological warfare, had started spreading messages about their strength some time before the attack on Gortepa. They also spread news about a major attack to be launched soon. As a result, as elders from Gortepa confirmed to AAN, some ALP commanders left their bases already in the night before the Taleban offensive.

Locals against ALP

ALP commanders described the reality on the ground differently. Some told AAN they believed the local population sheltered and supported the Taleban. These concerns have been mostly raised by those ALP commanders who came into Gortepa from other districts and hail from different ethnic groups (the deployment of ‘outsiders’ has created ethnic tensions not only in Gortepa (more here). Gul Ahmad, for example, an ALP commander in Shinwari village in the Gortepa area, a former Jamiat commander and an ethnic Tajik who hails from Chahrdara district, accused the – predominantly Pashtun – locals of not supporting the ALP. According to him, 50 per cent of the locals offered shelter to the Taleban. Those who had attacked the ALP bases in Shinwari, he said, “were local Taleban from the same village.” They even imprisoned 23 ALP soldiers for two weeks in their own town. Local elders had to intervene and get the assurance of the prisoners that they would leave the ALP; only then they were released.

Gul Ahmad himself does not want to return to Shinwari village. “It is impossible for an outsider to ensure security there,” he told AAN.

Until today, most of Gortepa is under Taleban control. The local government, on 2 May, asked the residents to evacuate ahead of a clearance operation it allegedly planned on carrying out. Hundreds of families have been displaced to the capital, Kunduz. However, Muhammad Shafiq, a local farmer in Gortepa, told AAN in mid-May that it has “now already been almost two weeks” since he, along with other villagers, left their homes; yet there was no sign of any government action in Gortepa. (More about the displaced here). Addressing local authorities did not help to clarify things. The spokesman of the provincial police told AAN end of May that the government “will launch a clearance operation once it has drawn up a comprehensive plan and deployed soldiers to permanent military bases in Gortepa.” The evacuation thus came too early and has put additional hardship on the local population.

Sar-e Pul – a lesser known example of the same dynamics

As in Kunduz, but much less noticed by the media and other observers, the Taleban have been inching closer to the centre of Sar-e Pul province further west, too. (2) The security in this remote province has been deteriorating over the past two years. From here, the Taleban can monitor and support the insurgents in Balkh and Jawzjan provinces.

Sar-e Pul is located in the northwest of Afghanistan and consists of seven districts (Balkhab, Gosfandi, Sayad, Kohistanat, Sancharak, Suzma Qalah and Sar-e Pul centre). In the past years, the Taleban already established footholds in far-flung areas of Sayad and Kohistanat districts. According to an AAN report, already in 2010

most of the insurgents operating in the area are locals, they are supported by infiltrators from Badghis and Faryab. Taxation on behalf of the Taleban occurs also in the area close to provincial capital. The Taleban attacks against the ANP and ANA posts increased in 2010.

By today, according to locals, the Taleban have established a base only ten kilometres from the provincial governor’s office, just beyond the city borders, in the Sheramha area. From there the insurgents orchestrate operations against the ANSF’s bases in Sar-e Pul city. Offensives by local Taleban against ANSF and harassment of the local population have increased in frequency. According to figures from an independent international organisation monitoring the security in Sar-e Pul, Taleban attacks against ANSF almost doubled from 2013 to 2014,  from 96 to 157. Meanwhile, ANSF operations against insurgents have decreased from 10 in 2013 to only 6 in 2014, with 3 operations in 2015, by mid-May. The Ministry of Defence would not comment.

The case of Sheramha

The situation looks particularly bleak in Sheramha, close to the provincial centre. It is a mountainous area with up to 200 villages, dominated by ethnic Arabs, bordering Balkh province to the northwest and Jawzjan to the east. The Taleban have built a strong presence in this area in the past three years. Currently, according to Salahuddin Cherik, a representative of Sheramha in the provincial council, “most villages are ruled by them. But the government has not taken any considerable steps in this regard, for unknown reasons.”

The Taleban in Sheramha have a strong team that has been able to establish the beginnings of local ‘governance.’ The newly appointed shadow provincial governor, Mawlawi Attaullah, along with Mulla Nader, the head of the shadow military committee, has tasked two other influential insurgent figures from the area, Sebghatullah Rohani and Hakim Qaryadar, to set up a military-administrative unit (to recruit fighters and appoint sub-commanders) and judicial units. The latter’s verdicts on local peoples’ cases are usually obeyed by the villagers. (More about the Taleban’s administrative structure in Sar-e Pul here.) Nasema Arzo, the head of the provincial women’s affairs department, told AAN the insurgents now exerted their influence right up to the provincial centre’s border, patrolling these areas during the night. She also said she was worried about the women in the province. Women were not interested anymore in working in government offices due to threats by insurgents. She herself, she said, could not raise her voice in public, either.

“Taleban too strong to be interested in reconciliation”

The security forces seem helpless. According to Haji Payenda, the deputy head of the ALP in Sheramha, last year all 81 ALP members fled to Sar-e Pul city, taking their families with them. Two ALP commanders joined the insurgents with 18 of their men.

Reconciliation attempts with the local insurgents remained futile. Speaking to AAN, Mawlawi Naqib, the provincial director of the High Peace Council, stated that in the past few years 750 Taleban, including their field commanders, had indeed joined the peace process, but many then rejoined the insurgents. Six months ago, for example, a Taleban commander, named as Khan Muhammad, along with his 51 followers, laid down his weapons. However, local strongmen pushed the provincial judicial department to issue an order for his arrest and to accuse him of criminal activities. The Taleban commander swiftly rejoined the insurgents. “Also, this year’s spring offensive has made the insurgents believe that they are getting stronger in the north,” said the director. “They are currently not interested in laying down their weapons anymore.”

Provincial security officials struggle with admitting the scope of the Taleban’s influence in the area. This leads to slightly desperate and contradictory statements by provincial police chief Nur Habib Golbahari such as that “Sheramha is a safe place for the Taleban, but they are not strong enough to disrupt the security.” According to Golbahari, the Taleban “conducted several operations in various areas after the announcement of the spring offensive, but the ANSF defeat them.” With the continuing strong presence of the Taleban in Sheramha their ‘defeat’ rather means, though, that they have been driven back momentarily.

From MP to Taleb

The insecurity may be caused by other factors, too, that open avenues for the Taleban to pursue their usurpation of districts. Sar-e Pul is mostly dominated by three political parties: Jombesh-e Melli Islami Afghanistan, Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Mardom-e Afghanistan and Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan. (3)  According to Masuma Ramazan, a provincial council member, the competition for government posts between Jamiat and Jombesh is a major factor affecting the security situation negatively (this has a long history; for more, look at footnote 4). “The governmental posts are exploited for personal interests by local strongmen, and this always intensifies the feud among local players,” she stated. Commanders switch sides frequently – and sometimes over to the Taleban. In September 2013, for example, a representative of Sar-e Pul province in the upper house of parliament and former district governor of Kohistanat, Qazi Abdulhai, went over to the Taleban after he was removed before the end of his term. In a video posted on the Taleban website, Abdulhai justified the move saying that in his four years in Kabul, he saw “the corrupt face of the government.”

For Sebghatullah Ishaqzai, the provincial head of the Right and Justice Party (Hezb-e Haq wa Adalat), (5) the major reason behind the insecurity is the absence of a local government that meet the locals’ demands. “The appointments of the security officials are not on a meritocratic basis, instead they are based on political affiliation and nepotism,” he said. Therefore, “the local officials are simply not capable of drawing up a comprehensive plan to ensure security” for the province.

To give just a few examples of incidents: In April 2014, the Taleban kidnapped nine civilians, including a provincial council candidate, in the capital Sar-e Pul; their bodies were discovered two days later. In October 2014, the Taleban ambushed Afghan security forces and, according to provincial governor Abduljabar Haqbin, killed 14 and wounded 17. Six others were captured. In February 2015, the Taleban attacked a police check post in the provincial centre and set it on fire. In May 2015, hundreds of people in Sar-e Pul said they were tired of waiting for the government to ensure security and took up weapons to protect their villages themselves. However, often such movements are organised by local strongmen to secure their sphere of influence, arming only one specific group. In Sar-e Pul, it remains unclear whether the May self-protection action was a wider public initiative to beat the insurgents or a powerbrokers’ project.

Apparently, as AAN learned from local elders, many Taleban sub-commanders in Sheramha are simply locals angered by the ineffectiveness of local government and local power brokers’ unscrupulous abuse of authority. Insecurity is hampering development projects as well as service delivery, for example in healthcare. There is no asphalted road to the provincial centre, and the education sector is mainly run by local mullahs who have taken over as teachers. This example of local political dynamics applies also to Gortepa in Kunduz. The harassment of villagers by local commanders’ militias and the failure to establish the rule of law have created chaos on all fronts, rendering it easy for the insurgency to make inroads in the province. Clearly, improving Afghanistan’s security is not only about making security forces stronger and beating back the Taleban. It must be a comprehensive approach that starts with people’s satisfaction with their government.

 

(1) A first wave of Arabs arrived in what today is western and northern Afghanistan as part of their conquest of what then was known as Khorasan and Baktria in the seventh century. (Herat was conquered in 652 = 31 hijrishamsi, Kabul only in 871.) Some of them settled in the area. A second wave, of some 10,000s, came from Russian (later Soviet Central Asia), mainly from the region of Bukhara, after the Russian conquest of the area and again after the 1917 October Revolution. According to the US Library of Congress Country Study for Afghanistan, “by the 1880s they were, with the Uzbek with whom they established close ties, the second most populous ethnic group in present day Kunduz, Takhar and Baghlan provinces. Smaller groups settled in scattered communities as far west as Maimana, Faryab Province.” Today, the Afghan Arabs are mainly pastoralists who raise sheep and grow cotton and wheat. They are fully integrated Afghans, speaking Pashto, Dari or Uzbaki – but not Arabic in many cases. (For Arabic-speaking communities in northern Afghanistan, see Charles Kieffer, here.)

(2) Similar developments have been reported from Baghlan (here) and Faryab provinces (here).

(3) Jombeshis are led by Abdul Rashid Dostum, the first vice president; Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Mardom by Muhammad Muhaqeq, the second deputy for Chief Executive Dr Abdullah Abdullah; and Jamiat by Salahuddin Rabbani, the minister for Foreign Affairs. All three belong to the tanzims, the mujahedin ‘parties’ that were involved in the 1990s factional wars. Earlier, in the 1980s, Jamiat and Wahdat fought the Soviet occupants and the regime supported by them while Jombesh (then a militia known as “Jawzjanis” – or even as “kelim jam,” ie “carpet thieves,” allied with the Soviets. (For more background, see an AAN paper about Jombesh here, dispatches about Jamiat for example here, and an external paper about political parties in general that also contains information about the different wings of Hezb-e Wahdat here.)

(4) According to AAN’s report in 2012,

immediately after the Taleban defeat in 2001, the province was divided into zones of predominance between Jombesh (in Sar-e pul’s north) and Jamiat and Wahdat (in the south), with Jombesh and Jamiat controlling the provincial centre and a Jombesh governor (up to 2004). After severe fighting in 2002, Jombesh managed to wrestle control over the provincial centre from Jamiat. In the districts, sporadic fighting continued until 2004. After Rahmati was appointed governor in 2010, the balance of power shifted again. This strengthened the position of Wahdat faction. After the serial protest mainly organised by Jombesh, Rahmati was replaced.

(5) Background about this party is in this AAN dispatch.

 

Der britische Premierminister David Cameron hat eine Aufkündigung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention durch sein Land ins Spiel gebracht. Ausländische Kriminelle könnten sich auf europäisches Recht berufen, um etwa ihre eigene Abschiebung zu verhindern – das sei inakzeptabel.

June 3, 2015 (ADDIS ABABA) – The South Sudanese armed opposition faction of the ruling (SPLM) party has welcomed the decision to revoke the “unconstitutional” dismissal of their leader, Riek Machar, and his colleagues from the ruling party, saying the move was an “overdue” good gesture in complementing the Addis Ababa peace process.

South Sudan's rebel leader Riek Machar speaks during an interview with Reuters in Addis Ababa on July 9, 2014. (Photo Reuters/Tiksa Negeri)

President Salva Kiir's SPLM faction on Wednesday announced their leadership had revoked dismissal of opposition leader Riek Machar and others and that he was reinstated to his previous position as first deputy chairperson of the ruling party. They also said the frozen assets or bank accounts for members of the former detainees and armed opposition faction were unfrozen in the country and they could access them.

The rebels commended the decision as correct one but added that this was not the end of the story as many other processes and decisions were still pending in order to end the crisis in the country.

“Well, we welcome the good gesture. It does not come out of the blue. Actually it is overdue because it is a provision in the roadmap agreement on SPLM reunification process signed in Arusha several months ago,” Machar's spokesman, James Gatdet Dak, told Sudan Tribune on Wednesday evening when contacted for comment.

“President Kiir who was responsible for this unconstitutional dismissal of senior party leaders was directed by the roadmap agreement to unconditionally revoke his decision,” he added.

Dak pointed out that the revocation of the dismissal decree was meant to smoothen further steps in the tripartite intraparty dialogue in order to further negotiate within the party and reach an agreement on reforms in structural, organizational and future party leadership matters.

He blamed president Kiir's group for aborting internal party transformation processes which sparked the violence and had now developed into a national crisis beyond the party.

Even from the onset of the crisis in December 2013, he recalled that the opposition leader Machar immediately composed a team of SPLM leaders from his side in January 2014 to meet with president Kiir's SPLM team in Addis Ababa so that the crisis would have been arrested at the party level, adding Machar's idea was rejected and the “conflict has now developed into a national crisis.”

He however said the particular decision to revoke dismissal would be complementary to the Addis Ababa peace process led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), particularly on the executive power-sharing for government during a transitional period.

“Let us wait and see how this reinstatement to previous party leadership positions will reflect on the government's position in regard to leadership structure and executive power-sharing in a transitional government of national unity,” he further added.

He challenged that the government was opposed to IGAD proposed executive power-sharing which would see the rebel leader, Riek Machar, become either a prime minister or first vice president with shared executive powers.

The rebel leader's spokesman however said the intraparty dialogue did not confirm president Kiir to continue as the party chairman, stressing that there were pending processes on mechanisms within the dialogue that would address party leadership in the course of reunification.

He said this would be like restarting from square one from where we left in December 2013 when president Kiir violently interrupted the processes of party transformation, reforms and leadership contest.

On government leadership, he also said president Kiir has become illegitimate president either through expiry of his term limit or by his deeds which caused the war and administered massacre of thousands of civilians in the capital, Juba.

“These are some of the issues the warring parties shall be tackling in the two complementary processes in Arusha or in Addis Ababa,” he said.

He however commended partial implementation of the Arusha roadmap agreement in order to help expedite the Addis Ababa process, but ruled out possibility that the rebel leader would return to Juba as first deputy chairman of the SPLM per party agreement without a comprehensive peace agreement in Addis Ababa.

(ST)

Der bisherige lettische Verteidigungsminister Raimonds Vejonis wird der erste Grüne Präsident der Europäischen Union. Der 48-Jährige will das Militär aufrüsten und eine ökologische Wende seines Landes einleiten.

Les locaux du Comité contre la torture à Grozny ont été saccagés ce mercredi. Plusieurs personnes masquées ont escaladé le balcon pour pénétrer dans le bureau par la fenêtre, car la porte d’entrée est blindée depuis la dernière agression en décembre 2014. Le Comité contre la torture est l’une des dernières ONG présentes à Grozny.

Le Secrétaire général de l'ONU, Ban Ki-moon, et le Conseil de sécurité ont exprimé leur préoccupation jeudi concernant le risque que la violence s'aggrave davantage au Burundi et ont réitéré leur appel au calme et à la retenue.

La Mission des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) a salué jeudi le lancement d'une opération par l'armée congolaise contre les rebelles des Forces de résistance patriotique d'Ituri (FRPI), dans l'est du pays.

La Mission de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine a ouvert une enquête sur des allégations d'abus sexuels commis contre un mineur par un de ses Casques bleus, a indiqué jeudi le porte-parole du Secrétaire général Ban Ki-moon.

Critical aid operations supporting millions of people affected by the conflict in Iraq are at risk of shutting down unless funds are made available immediately, the United Nations official overseeing relief operations in the country warned today as she joined an international appeal for nearly $500 million to cover the immediate needs of 5.6 million Iraqis for the next six months.

The prices of major food commodities continued their downward trajectory through May as cereal prices dropped amid an increasingly favourable forecast for this year’s harvests, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) confirmed today.

June 3, 2015 (RUMBEK) – The road connecting Wulu county in South Sudan's Lakes state to the capital, Rumbek has finally been re-opened after three days of closure.

The incident occurred after trainees attending a course in the area rioted when food was not delivered to them, affecting traffic between Wulu and Rumbek Central county.

Lakes state local government and law enforcement minister, Jok Ayom Majak fully intervened and ensured that food was delivered to the trainees and the road re-opened.

Majak said the road closure badly hampered traffic flow between these two counties.

“The trainees closed off the Rumbek-Wulu road which links Rumbek Central to Juba on Saturday and continued till Tuesday,” the minister told Sudan Tribune by phone.

“As I speak to now, people are moving very freely. Trucks are moving freely,” he added.

Lakes state has been blighted by cattle raiding since South Sudan gained independence from the north in July 2011, and continues to be locked in a cycle of inter-clan clashes and revenge killings.

(ST)