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En juin, le Bureau du vérificateur général du Danemark [Rigsrevisionen] a tancé le ministère de la Défense pour avoir sous-estimé les coûts d’exploitation des vingt-sept chasseurs-bombardiers F-35, commandés auprès de Lockheed Martin, en 2017, afin de remplacer les F-16 de la Flyvevåbnet. En outre, il lui a aussi reproché de ne pas avoir correctement informé...

Cet article Le Danemark a finalisé la commande de seize chasseurs-bombardiers F-35A supplémentaires est apparu en premier sur Zone Militaire.

On Wednesday, 2 September 2026, the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights held an exchange of views on the deteriorating human rights situation in Pakistan. The exchange provided an opportunity to assess the human rights situation in the country and the key challenges affecting the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.

Through contributions from invited speakers, the exchange seeked to provide insight into emerging human rights challenges in Pakistan and the broader trends affecting the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms in the country.

It also provided an opportunity to take stock of the ongoing EU-Pakistan dialogue on human rights, including in the framework of the EU-Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan and Pakistan’s participation in the EU’s GSP+ scheme, and to assess how these instruments can contribute to advancing human rights in the country.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

La commensalité – le fait de partager des repas – peut réduire le risque de dépression et de démence.

The Check on the Check: What the Limits of Article 265 TFEU Reveal about Horizontal Accountability within the EU

While all European Union (EU) institutions have, to some extent, the obligation to ensure compliance with the Treaties’ values and norms, it is the European Commission that bears responsibility for overseeing and securing compliance as the “Guardian of the Treaties”, including ensuring that Member States do not regress in the democratic standards they committed to uphold when they joined.

Existing research has documented the EU’s limited political will to impose sanctions for rule of law and democracy violations. The problem is that, however much we debate this “enforcement dilemma,” every proposed fix hits the same wall: political will is missing, and fixing that would take either all EU governments agreeing to change course (unlikely) or amending the Treaties (even less likely).

Yet, if institutions cannot be incentivised to act consistently, could not sanctioning inaction be an alternative? Article 265 TFEU offers this possibility as a second-order mechanism, a “check on the check,” by giving the European Parliament (EP) both the normative claim and the legal standing to sue other institutions, including the Commission, for failing to act when the Treaty requires it.

The Parliament has held this competence since the 1980s, but has rarely used it against another institution. That seemed to change after 2021, when it brought three independent actions for failure to act against the Commission, two of which concerned rule of law enforcement (C-657/21, in which the EP sued for failing to activate the rule of law conditionality mechanism, and C-225/24, after the release of frozen funds to Hungary).

My own research on the EP’s lawsuit regarding the inactivation of the conditionality mechanism (C-657/21) shows that this apparent uptick does not deviate much from Parliament’s historical pattern of restraint and reluctance. Two obstacles stand out. The first is about design: the strict requirements of Article 265 make it difficult for Parliament to use it as a routine oversight tool, even when it wants to. And one of practice, referring to the logic Parliament actually follows when deciding whether to use this tool.

In this piece, I explain why, drawing on my previous research involving elite interviews with EP policy-makers and officials, and what this means in practice for the expectation that Parliament could somehow constrain the Commission’s forbearance.

A Design That Works Against Itself

First, although Article 265 formally compels another institution to fulfil its obligations, in practice, it can produce at most a declaratory judgment from the Court of Justice of the EU: no enforcement mechanism beyond the moral and political pressure to comply with that ruling.

Second, Article 265 is meant to target inaction, but that is exactly the problem in practice: it is extremely hard to prove in court that an institution failed to act. Judicial oversight operates on formal acts (decisions, legal bases) that generate a case file, a party with standing to challenge, and a record to examine. A decision not to investigate is precisely the absence of such a procedural act, which leaves courts without a file to review. Put differently: Article 265 is, by design, a “fire alarm” tool, in the classic distinction between reactive (“fire alarm”) and continuous, active (“police patrol”) oversight proposed by McCubbins & Schwartz. A fire alarm needs a triggering event, but inaction produces no smoke without files, acts, or an event that a third party could report.

So, what this means in practice is that, when Parliament lacks a clear legal basis (which is common precisely in cases of inaction or when the Commission resorts to soft law, delegated acts, or emergency procedures), we can expect it to be unwilling to claim Treaty violations, because actually taking the Commission to court is costly and difficult.

Ultimately, therefore, the Commission’s murkiest actions, those in which it exercises executive power free of any legislative control, are the form of noncompliance worst suited to any reactive accountability mechanism, judicial or otherwise. They generate the least incentive for accountability and oversight.

This immediately raises the question of whether the Commission has an incentive to shift toward instruments that shield its inaction from judicial review (soft law, delegated acts, the use of emergency powers that bypass normal legislative processes), precisely because the Commission knows these are hard to challenge before the courts. It would be worth examining whether this shift occurs more often in areas where the Parliament has already shown a willingness to litigate.

As of now, then, we have settled on the inherent design limitation of any complaint-based oversight mechanism when confronted with noncompliance by omission. In addition, using Article 265 depends on EU actors’ willingness to incur political and institutional costs, since it requires parliamentary consensus, and that consensus inevitably relies on political majorities vulnerable to electoral change. Structurally, this further turns horizontal accountability in the EU into a conditional process rather than a systematic one.

An Institutional Logic That Doesn’t Help Either

On the practice side, the bigger problem is that the Parliament does not appear to prioritise its accountability role.

The broader institutional dynamics of an expanding Commission—one that is not only growing by encroaching on legislative powers, but also growing closer to Council governments, at the Parliament’s expense—continue to push Parliament to devote more energy to maintaining its limited ability to shape policy outcomes. To address this marginalisation, the EP decided to sue the Commission (Article 265) and resort to the courts as a tactical instrument to pursue specific objectives, not necessarily accountability aims.

But if this legal instrument is used strategically, where does that leave us in terms of expecting Parliament to more consistently constrain the Commission’s in the future?

A Failed Sanction, or a Successful Signal?

To answer this question, we have to understand Parliament’s motives and aims in its lawsuit against the Commission for the delayed enforcement of the conditionality mechanism. My findings suggest two readings here, and they are not mutually exclusive.

The interview evidence showed that EP policymakers value litigation for its ability to externalise institutional conflict and mobilise public scrutiny. The EP was not necessarily looking to win the case; it was seeking a headline to impose reputational costs on the Commission and push back against its marginalisation. So, we could read this to mean that at least some actors in Parliament (including those able to form a majority) believe not only that failing to uphold the rule of law could undermine public confidence in the Commission as the guardian of democracy, but also that Commission officials are sensitive to this concern.

In this reading, litigation could still shape EU oversight, just not by punishing the Commission. Instead, it works as a signal: taking the Commission to court draws public attention, and it is that public attention (not any court ruling) that hurts the Commission’s reputation, something Commission officials appear to take seriously. So litigation ends up doing something the Treaty never designed it to do: instead of sanctioning noncompliance through a court judgment, it sends a reputational signal to the public, and that signal carries its own kind of accountability effect.

The more pessimistic reading, however, and perhaps more persuasive, points to the limited practical feasibility of horizontal accountability and to its inability to deter misbehaviour among EU elites. The EP’s resort to litigation reflects institutional self-preservation, which in turn points to a strategic logic of power and influence. Not exactly what we would expect or, frankly, want, from our sole check on executive power. Moreover, if Parliament not only avoids contesting Treaty violations but is, as a result, also expected to do so, executive actors have little reason to anticipate costs of noncompliance.

This brings me to the future and the potential for checking the check. Somewhat ironically, accountability dynamics appear to reproduce the same problems of political will and institutional design as the EU’s enforcement dilemma it was intended to fix: it requires parliamentary consensus, electorally vulnerable majorities, and a willingness to bear costs, which has been insufficient if the record is anything to go by. Horizontal accountability, therefore, is unlikely to fulfil its purpose if its activation depends on actors prioritising their own strategic interests over the obligation to enforce the Treaties.

This article is based on the author’s paper in the Journal of European Public Policy (JEPP) and was prepared in the context of EUCHALLENGES, a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Salzburg, co-funded by the European Commission under grant agreement no. 101127539

 

The Check on the Check: lo que los límites del artículo 265 del TFUE revelan sobre la rendición de cuentas horizontal en la UE

Andreína Victoria Hernández-Ross, IPP & UAM (0009-0008-3211-608X)

 

Si bien todas las instituciones de la Unión Europea (UE) tienen, en cierta medida, la obligación de velar por el cumplimiento de los valores y normas de los Tratados, es la Comisión Europea la que asume la responsabilidad de supervisar y garantizar ese cumplimiento en su papel de “guardiana de los Tratados”, lo que incluye asegurarse de que los Estados miembros no retrocedan en los estándares democráticos que se comprometieron a respetar al adherirse a la Unión.

La literatura existente ha documentado la limitada voluntad política de la UE para sancionar las violaciones del Estado de Derecho y de la democracia. El problema es que, por mucho que debatamos este “enforcement dilemma”, las propuestas académicas y políticas topan inevitablemente con un límite estructural: no podemos superar la falta de voluntad política sin cambiar los incentivos incorporados al propio diseño institucional de la UE. Nuestros remedios exigen o bien consenso gubernamental (poco probable), o bien una reforma de los Tratados (aún menos probable).

Y sin embargo, si las instituciones no pueden ser incentivadas a actuar de forma consistente, ¿no podría sancionarse la inacción misma como alternativa? El artículo 265 del TFUE ofrece esta posibilidad como mecanismo de segundo orden, un “control del control”, al otorgar al Parlamento Europeo (PE) tanto la legitimación normativa como la práctica para demandar ante las cortes a otras instituciones, incluida la Comisión, por no actuar cuando el Tratado así lo exige.

El Parlamento cuenta con esta competencia desde la década de 1980, pero rara vez la ha ejercido contra otra institución. Eso pareció cambiar a partir de 2021, cuando interpuso tres recursos por omisión contra la Comisión, dos de los cuales se centraban en el Estado de Derecho: el asunto C-657/21, en el que el PE demandó a la Comisión por no activar el mecanismo de condicionalidad del Estado de Derecho, y el asunto C-225/24, tras la liberación de fondos congelados a Hungría.

Mi propia investigación sobre el recurso del Parlamento relativo a la inactivación del mecanismo de condicionalidad (C-657/21) muestra, sin embargo, que este aparente repunte no se aleja demasiado del patrón histórico de contención y reticencia del Parlamento. Dos tipos de problemas parecen lastrar los esfuerzos de rendición de cuentas en la UE: uno de diseño institucional, en el que el propio artículo 265 restringe su uso consistente como mecanismo de supervisión, incluso si el Parlamento estuviera dispuesto a emplearlo; y otro de práctica, referido a la lógica que efectivamente sigue el Parlamento a la hora de decidir si recurre o no a esta herramienta.

En este texto explico por qué, apoyándome en mi investigación previa que incluyó entrevistas a responsables políticos y funcionarios del PE, y qué implica esto en la práctica para la expectativa de que el Parlamento pudiera, de algún modo, limitar la inacción deliberada (forbearance) de la Comisión.

Un diseño que juega en su propia contra

En primer lugar, aunque el artículo 265 obliga formalmente a otra institución a cumplir sus obligaciones, en la práctica solo puede producir una sentencia declarativa del Tribunal de Justicia de la UE (TJUE): ningún mecanismo de ejecución más allá de la presión moral y política para acatar ese fallo.

En segundo lugar, aunque el artículo 265 se dirige formalmente contra la inactividad, en la práctica constituye una limitación sustantiva, porque las omisiones resultan extraordinariamente difíciles de probar ante un tribunal. La supervisión judicial opera sobre actos formales (decisiones, bases jurídicas) que generan un expediente, una parte con legitimación para impugnarlos y un registro a examinar. Una decisión de no investigar es, precisamente, la ausencia de ese acto procedimental, lo que deja a los tribunales sin expediente que revisar. Dicho de otro modo: el artículo 265 es, por diseño, una herramienta de “alarma de incendios”, siguiendo la clásica distinción entre supervisión reactiva (“alarma de incendios”) y supervisión continua y activa (“patrulla policial”) propuesta por McCubbins & Schwartz. Una alarma de incendios requiere un hecho desencadenante, pero la inacción no genera humo: no hay expedientes, actos ni un suceso que un tercero pueda denunciar.

Lo que esto significa en la práctica es que, cuando el Parlamento carece de una base jurídica clara —algo habitual precisamente en los casos de inacción, o cuando la Comisión recurre al soft law, a actos delegados o a procedimientos de emergencia—, cabe esperar que se muestre reacio a alegar violaciones del Tratado, porque los costes de impugnar la acción del Ejecutivo son altos en términos de lo que supone llevarla realmente ante los tribunales.

Por tanto, las actuaciones más opacas de la Comisión, aquellas en las que ejerce poder ejecutivo libre de todo control legislativo, son la forma de incumplimiento peor adaptada a cualquier mecanismo de rendición de cuentas reactivo, judicial o de otro tipo. Son precisamente las que generan menos incentivos para la rendición de cuentas y la supervisión.

Esto plantea de inmediato la pregunta de si la Comisión tiene incentivos para preferir instrumentos que blinden su inacción frente al control judicial (soft law, actos delegados, el uso de poderes de emergencia que eluden los procesos legislativos habituales) precisamente porque sabe de la dificultad de ser sancionada. Valdría la pena examinar si esto se produce con mayor frecuencia en los ámbitos en los que el Parlamento ya ha mostrado disposición a litigar.

Por ahora, hemos constatado la limitación de diseño inherente a cualquier mecanismo de supervisión basado en denuncias al enfrentarse a un incumplimiento por omisión. A esto se suma que el recurso al artículo 265 depende de la voluntad de los actores de la UE de asumir costes políticos e institucionales, ya que requiere consenso parlamentario, y ese consenso depende, inevitablemente, de mayorías políticas vulnerables al cambio electoral. Estructuralmente, esto convierte además la rendición de cuentas horizontal en la UE en un proceso condicional, más que sistemático.

Una lógica institucional que tampoco ayuda

En el plano de la práctica, el problema principal es que el Parlamento no parece priorizar su función de control.

La dinámica institucional más amplia de una Comisión en expansión —que no solo crece invadiendo competencias legislativas, sino que también se acerca cada vez más a los gobiernos del Consejo, a costa del Parlamento— sigue empujando a este último a dedicar más energía a preservar su limitada capacidad de incidir en los resultados de las políticas. Para hacer frente a esta marginación, el PE recurrió al litigio por la vía del artículo 265 contra la Comisión como instrumento táctico para perseguir objetivos concretos, no necesariamente de rendición de cuentas.

Pero si este instrumento jurídico se utiliza de forma estratégica, ¿qué nos dice esto respecto a la expectativa de que el Parlamento limite, de manera más consistente en el futuro, la inacción deliberada de la Comisión?

¿Una sanción fallida o una señal exitosa?

Para responder a esta pregunta hay que entender los motivos y objetivos del Parlamento al demandar a la Comisión por el retraso en la aplicación del mecanismo de condicionalidad. Mis hallazgos sugieren dos lecturas posibles, que no son mutuamente excluyentes.

Las entrevistas mostraron que los responsables políticos del PE valoran el litigio por su capacidad de externalizar el conflicto institucional y movilizar el escrutinio público. El PE no buscaba necesariamente ganar el caso, sino un titular que impusiera costes reputacionales a la Comisión y sirviera para contrarrestar su propia marginación. Cabría interpretar esto, entonces, en el sentido de que al menos algunos actores del Parlamento (incluidos los capaces de formar mayoría) creen no solo que no defender el Estado de Derecho podría minar la confianza pública en la Comisión como guardiana de la democracia, sino también que los funcionarios de la Comisión son sensibles a esa preocupación.

En esta lectura, el litigio podría incidir de manera significativa en la supervisión en la UE. No funcionaría como una sanción, sino como un mecanismo informativo: modificaría el cálculo del público, el actor capaz de infligir costes reputacionales indirectos que, según parece, resultan centrales para las proyecciones de la Comisión. El litigio no cumpliría, por tanto, su función original (sancionar el incumplimiento mediante una sentencia judicial), sino que se limitaría a enviar una señal de reputación al público, y esa señal conlleva su propio efecto de rendición de cuentas.

La lectura más pesimista, sin embargo, y quizá la más convincente, apunta a la limitada viabilidad práctica de la rendición de cuentas horizontal y a su incapacidad para disuadir la mala conducta entre las élites de la UE. El recurso del PE al litigio refleja una lógica de autopreservación institucional que, a su vez, remite a una lógica estratégica de poder e influencia. No exactamente lo que cabría esperar (ni, francamente, desear) de nuestro único mecanismo de control sobre el poder ejecutivo. Es más: si el Parlamento no solo evita impugnar las violaciones del Tratado, sino que además se espera de él que actúe así, los actores del Ejecutivo tienen pocos motivos para anticipar costes por incumplir.

Esto me lleva al futuro y a la posibilidad de controlar a la Comisión. De manera un tanto irónica, la dinámica de rendición de cuentas parece reproducir los mismos problemas de voluntad política y de diseño institucional que el dilema de enforcement que pretendía resolver: exige consenso parlamentario, mayorías electoralmente vulnerables y disposición a asumir costes, algo que, a juzgar por el historial, ha resultado insuficiente. La rendición de cuentas horizontal, por tanto, difícilmente cumplirá su propósito si su activación depende de que los actores prioricen sus propios intereses estratégicos por encima de la obligación de hacer cumplir los Tratados.

Este artículo se basa en el trabajo de la autora publicado en el Journal of European Public Policy (JEPP) y se elaboró en el marco de EUCHALLENGES, un Centro de Excelencia Jean Monnet de la Universidad de Salzburgo, cofinanciado por la Comisión Europea bajo el convenio de subvención n.º 101127539.

The post (Available: EN/ES)) The Check on the Check: What the Limits of Article 265 TFEU Reveal about Horizontal Accountability within the EU appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Cette rentrée scolaire 2026 est marquée par une nouveauté : une scolarité complète sans téléphone portable, de la maternelle au lycée et la promotion d'un numérique raisonné à l’école. Comment  ces mesures seront-elles concrètement mises en œuvre ? Et comment éviter qu'elles ne soient contournées par les jeunes ? Vont-elles sauver la vie des élèves, comme l'affirme le ministre de l'Éducation nationale ? 

« Mongala oubliée : notre manioc, notre riz, notre arachide pourrissent à cause des routes ». C'est le titre d'une tribune publiée par le politologue Reagan Emomo. Dans ce texte, il attire l'attention sur les difficultés auxquelles est confrontée la province de la Mongala, notamment en raison du mauvais état de la Route nationale numéro 6 et de plusieurs routes de desserte agricole.

Si elle est élue, Marine Le Pen promet d’interdire le voile dans l’espace public. Cette mesure sera proposée dans le cadre d’un référendum.

Comment rendre la guerre aimable ? Avec son slogan de recrutement « Devenez vous-même » lancé en 2010, l'armée française semblait investir le champ déjà bien encombré du développement personnel. Elle mise désormais sur le monde des arts, de l'événementiel et du spectacle. Et contrôle son image (…) / Défense, Cinéma, Armée, Culture, France, Industrie culturelle, Communication

As military power proves less effective, an old IR theory is making a comeback.

China’s pressure campaign against Taiwan doesn’t end when a country switches recognition to Beijing.

The new rules would hit Tajikistan’s tourism companies while benefiting an affiliated state body.

Despite the overall trend toward older populations, substantial differences in age structures exist among countries. Credit: Shutterstock.

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Sep 1 2026 (IPS)

The age structures of populations vary considerably across countries. Some countries have relatively young populations, with large proportions consisting of children and adolescents. Other countries have much older age structures, with a substantial proportion of people aged 65 years or older.

The world’s current population of approximately 8.3 billion has a median age of about 31 years. This is substantially higher than during much of the 20th century, when the global median age was generally below 25 years. The world’s median age was 22 years in 1950, declined to 20 years in 1970, and then increased to nearly 25 years by 1999.

Population ageing is expected to continue worldwide in the coming decades, The median age of the world’s population, currently about 31 years, is projected to increase to approximately 36 years by 2050.

Despite the overall trend toward older populations, substantial differences in age structures exist among countries.

In 2026, approximately 50 countries and territories have populations with median ages of 21 years or younger, reflecting highly youthful age structures. At the other end of the age spectrum, a similar number of countries and territories have median ages of 42 years or older, indicating comparatively old populations.

These wide differences in median age illustrate the striking demographic diversity among countries and the contrasting social and economic challenges associated with youthful and older populations.

Most countries with highly youthful populations are located in Africa. For example, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Niger, and Somalia have median ages of 16 years or younger.

In contrast, countries with comparatively older populations are concentrated primarily in Europe and East Asia. France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Spain, and Switzerland, for example, have median ages of 42 years or older. The highest median ages – about 50 years – are found in Italy and Japan (Table 1).

Source: United Nations.

In addition, the median age is expected to rise in virtually all countries, in both more developed and less developed regions. By 2050, for example, the median ages of several countries – including China, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Spain – are projected to reach 50 years or more.

The substantial variations in age structures of national populations are also evident in the proportions of people under age 18 and those aged 65 and older.

Once again, countries in which approximately half or more of their population is below age 18, while only a few percent are aged 65 years and older, are concentrated primarily in Africa.

In 2026, for example, 56% of the population in the Central African Republic is under age 18, while the corresponding proportions are approximately 53% in Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger, and Somalia. In each of these countries, only about 3% of the population is age 65 years and older.

In contrast, many developed countries – including Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and the Republic of Korea – have much older population age structures. In some of these countries, such as Italy and Japan, approximately 14% of the population is under age 18, while nearly twice that proportion – between 25% and 30% – is aged 65 years and older (Figure 1).

Source: United Nations.

The ongoing changes in countries’ population age structures will have far-reaching implications, particularly for population growth, labor markets, employment, education, healthcare systems, retirement programs, and long-term care.

Many developing countries have relatively young populations and, because of their age structures and population momentum, generally experience relatively high rates of population growth. In contrast, countries with comparatively older populations tend to have slower rates of population growth, with many developed countries already experiencing population decline.

As many developed countries with ageing and declining populations face growing labor shortages, countries with youthful populations continue to have large numbers of young people entering the labor market, often in excess of available employment opportunities

By midcentury, several African countries with particularly young age structures are expected to experience particularly rapid population growth. For example, the populations of Chad, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger, and Somalia are projected to increase by more than 80%.

Such rapid population growth can pose major challenges to social and economic development, particularly in providing adequate education, employment, housing, healthcare, and other essential services. Governments will need to expand infrastructure and public services rapidly simply to keep pace with the growing number of people.

Countries with young and rapidly growing populations may also face greater difficulties in reducing hunger and inequality, advancing women’s rights, expanding access to healthcare, creating decent employment opportunities, preventing social unrest, and addressing internal conflicts.

These demographic pressures underscore the importance of government policies that strengthen human capital, create productive employment, expand social services, and improve infrastructure. Such measures will be essential for ensuring that rapidly growing populations can achieve sustainable improvements in their living standards.

The slow pace of socio-economic development, high rates of unemployment, and limited educational and employment opportunities for many young people are contributing to social unrest, discontent, and political upheaval.

As a result, increasing numbers of young men and women seek to emigrate to developed countries in search of employment, greater security, and better prospects for themselves and their families. While many use regular migration channels, others increasingly resort to irregular migration, including unauthorized entry, overstaying visas, or seeking asylum and refugee protection.

In several African countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia, half or more of the population reportedly would like to emigrate to another country, typically in Europe and North America. These migration aspirations reflect not only economic motivations but also broader concerns about employment opportunities, personal security, governance, and prospects for the future.

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation, provides a particularly striking example. Approximately half of its population reportedly would like to leave the country and resettle abroad, preferably in an English-speaking country. Economic hardship, unemployment, limited opportunities, and insecurity have contributed to this strong desire to emigrate. Many Nigerians have already moved abroad through regular migration channels, while others have undertaken irregular journeys or sought asylum and refugee protection.

The persistence of such strong migration aspirations in many less developed countries highlights the close relationship between demographic pressures, socioeconomic conditions, and international migration. Where large youthful populations confront limited employment, educational, and economic opportunities, migration can become an increasingly attractive option for seeking a better future.

Unauthorized migration has consequently become a major political issue in many destination countries. Governments in numerous migrant-receiving countries have introduced or strengthened measures to deter unauthorized migration, including increased border enforcement, arrest and detention of unauthorized migrants, deportation, and the return of people who have entered without authorization or overstayed their visas.

At the same time, the demographic circumstances of migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries differ considerably. Many less developed countries have relatively young populations and high rates of demographic growth, whereas many developed countries have substantially older age structures and are expected to experience population decline over the coming decades. By 2050, for example, the populations of countries such as Italy, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, are projected to decline by approximately 13% (Figure 2).

Source: United Nations.

These contrasting demographic trends are likely to increase the economic and political importance of international migration. As many developed countries with ageing and declining populations face growing labor shortages, countries with youthful populations continue to have large numbers of young people entering the labor market, often in excess of available employment opportunities.

The consequences of population ageing are becoming increasingly significant for a growing number more developed countries and are also emerging as an important concern for some less developed countries as well. These demographic changes are prompting governments to reconsider existing economic and social policies, programs, and benefits in order to adapt to population realities.

Population ageing, combined with increasing longevity, is reducing the number of workers available to support each retiree while increasing the fiscal burden on the working-age populations that finances pensions, healthcare, and other age-related government programs.

Longer lifespans also mean that many older men and women may outlive their personal savings or retirement benefits. As longevity continues to increase, pension systems are paying benefits for substantially longer periods than anticipated when many of these systems were established during the 20thcentury.

Consequently, governments are facing growing pressure to reform retirement systems, healthcare services, and long-term care programs to ensure their financial sustainability while maintaining adequate support for ageing populations.

In addition to placing greater strains on government finances, the rising costs of medical treatment and care for growing numbers of older persons are placing increasing pressures on family budgets, capacities, and expectations.

Financing and providing long-term care for older persons is a major challenge for societies and families. In many countries, public provision for long-term care remains inadequate or largely unavailable to significant proportions of the population. At the same time, the growing number of older men and women is placing increasing stress on traditional safety nets, including families, friends, and local communities.

Powerful and largely irreversible demographic trends are driving population ageing, with growing numbers and proportions of people – especially women, who typically live longer than men – spending more years in old age. These trends will have profound implications for the organization and financing of societies.

The contrasting age structures of populations in developing and developed countries require significant social and economic adjustments. Countries with youthful populations need to expand education, employment, healthcare, and other services to meet the needs of growing numbers of young people. In contrast, countries with substantially older populations must prepare for rising demands on pension systems, healthcare, and long-term care.

In light of these demographic realities, governments need to revamp policies and programs affecting their populations. Unfortunately, many governments appear to be postponing these necessary adjustments. The longer governments delay adapting policies and programs to changing demographic conditions, the more difficult and costly the consequences are likely to become for their populations.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of many publications on population issues.

The race to succeed António Guterres has started—and four very different candidates are in the running.

Au Cameroun, l'ampleur des exportations clandestines d'or vers Dubaï met en lumière les failles d'un secteur où les opérateurs étrangers, notamment chinois, occupent une place importante. Sur fond de concurrence commerciale et de tensions sociales, le partenariat avec Pékin suscite désormais davantage de critiques. Le chiffre résume à lui seul l'ampleur du problème. Entre 2021 et 2025, 44 tonnes d'or enregistrées à Dubaï provenaient du Cameroun, alors que les douanes camerounaises n'ont officiellement déclaré que 148 kg d'exportations sur la même période. La valeur de cet écart avoisine 2 000 milliards de francs CFA, soit 3,4 milliards de dollars, selon les données rendues publiques en mai par la Société nationale des mines (Sonamines)Le phénomène n'est pas nouveau. Pour la seule année 2023, le rapport de l'Initiative pour la transparence dans les industries extractives (ITIE) recensait 22,3 kg exportés officiellement, quand les bases commerciales internationales enregistraient plus de 15 tonnes d'or d'origine camerounaise à l'importation, principalement aux Émirats arabes unis.

Des centaines de sites hors contrôle
Face à ces écarts, Yaoundé a lancé une vaste opération d'assainissement. En mai, le ministère des Mines recensait environ 200 opérateurs illégaux dans les régions aurifères de l'Est et de l'Adamaoua. Plus de 95 % étaient des sociétés étrangères. Depuis, les autorités ont fermé plus de 200 activités semi-mécanisées et retiré 39 des 57 autorisations qui avaient été délivrées, notamment pour non-respect de l'obligation de réserver au moins 51 % du capital de ces exploitations à des Camerounais. Le gouvernement reconnaît lui-même que fraude, sous-déclarations et manque de traçabilité privent le Trésor public d'importantes recettes. La présence d'opérateurs chinois ne permet toutefois pas de leur attribuer l'ensemble des 44 tonnes disparues des statistiques camerounaises. Les circuits de contrebande impliquent des intermédiaires, des exportateurs et les failles des systèmes de contrôle. Néanmoins, leur poids dans l'exploitation semi-mécanisée place désormais certains acteurs chinois au cœur des interrogations sur la gouvernance du secteur.

Du sous-sol aux marchés
Cette défiance dépasse les mines. Dans le commerce, des détaillants camerounais dénoncent depuis longtemps la concurrence d'opérateurs chinois capables d'importer directement leurs marchandises puis de les vendre aussi bien en gros qu'au détail, réduisant fortement les marges des commerçants locaux. En mai, une autre affaire a accru le malaise : une vidéo montrant un employé camerounais roué de coups dans un complexe commercial chinois de Yaoundé a provoqué l'intervention du gouvernement et plusieurs arrestations. Des témoignages ont ensuite fait état d'horaires abusifs et de traitements dégradants dans certaines entreprises.

La Chine reste pourtant un partenaire économique incontournable du Cameroun.

La question n'est donc pas celle d'une rupture avec Pékin, mais de la capacité de Yaoundé à encadrer une présence devenue suffisamment importante pour peser sur le commerce, l'emploi et l'exploitation des ressources naturelles. Le scandale de l'or vient rappeler qu'un partenariat présenté comme « gagnant-gagnant » ne peut le rester que si l'État camerounais parvient à conserver le contrôle de ce qui sort de son propre sous-sol.

Une enquête ouverte après un cambriolage a conduit les éléments du commissariat de l'arrondissement de Kétou jusqu'à un ghetto du quartier Obafèmi. Le suspect recherché y a été interpellé au terme d'une vive résistance.

Recherché pour cambriolage, un suspect a été localisé dans un ghetto du quartier Obafemi à Kétou dans le département du Plateau.

Le suspect s'est opposé à son interpellation, a indiqué la Police républicaine dans une publication en date du 1er septembre 2026.

La perquisition effectuée sur les lieux a permis aux policiers de découvrir 21,5 kg de chanvre indien, ainsi que trois motocyclettes d'origine douteuse.

Le suspect a été placé en garde à vue. Les enquêteurs poursuivent les investigations, selon la même source.
M. M.

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