Diplomacy & Crisis News

On les appelle des « Américains accidentels », victimes collatérales du Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (Fatca). De par le monde, des millions d'Américains résident hors des États-Unis ou disposent de la double nationalité. En vertu du droit du sol, toute personne née sur le territoire a droit à la citoyenneté. Même si elle a quitté très jeune les États-Unis pour ne pas y revenir et encore moins y gagner de l'argent. Cela concerne notamment un million de frontaliers canadiens dont la mère a accouché de l'autre côté de la frontière. Jusqu'à l'adoption du Fatca, beaucoup de ces Américains accidentels (qui seraient quelques dizaines de milliers en France) voyaient un avantage à leur situation. Leur vie était ailleurs, mais ils pouvaient toujours se réfugier aux États-Unis. Désormais, ils déchantent.

Au début, on n'a vu dans cette procédure qu'un moyen de lutter contre le crime organisé, les narcotrafiquants, les fraudeurs fiscaux. Quoi de plus légitime pour les autorités américaines que d'obtenir des banques étrangères, notamment suisses, les renseignements nécessaires pour poursuivre ces délinquants ? La réalité s'avère bien différente.

Washington exige des établissements bancaires du monde entier qu'ils fournissent la liste des « US Persons » disposant de comptes qui dépassent au total 50 000 dollars, sous peine de se voir infliger une amende de 30 % sur tous leurs flux financiers provenant des États-Unis — un suicide pour une grande banque, dont la plupart des transactions internationales s'effectuent en dollars et transitent donc par le sol américain. Les Suisses ont été les premiers à céder. Dans la foulée, tous les autres pays européens — à commencer par la France, en 2013 — ont accepté de se conformer aux impératifs du Fatca. Et à ses répercussions fiscales. Si les États-Unis ont signé des conventions de non-double imposition, l'Internal Revenue Service (IRS) applique les règles nationales à tous ses citoyens.

Un Américain qui vit en France, y travaille et y paie ses impôts doit faire une déclaration à l'IRS en vertu de la convention fiscale bilatérale de 1994. Si, au regard de la loi américaine, son impôt est plus important, il doit acquitter à l'IRS la différence entre ce qu'il a versé en France et ce qu'il aurait dû payer aux États-Unis. Les sommes en jeu peuvent ne pas être négligeables, les déductions fiscales (les niches) n'étant pas les mêmes. Ainsi, l'IRS ne considère pas la contribution sociale généralisée (CSG) comme un impôt déjà payé. Il prévoit également une taxe sur la plus-value lors de la vente d'une résidence principale en France, au-delà de 250 000 dollars, alors qu'en France il y a exonération.

À l'automne 2014, les banques ont commencé à adresser des courriers à leurs clients américains, mais aussi à ceux présentant un indice d'« américanité », leur demandant de communiquer leur numéro d'identification fiscale américain ou d'apporter la preuve qu'ils avaient renoncé à la nationalité. Pour des milliers de personnes, le choc est rude. Elles basculent dans un univers kafkaïen. Rien n'est fait pour les aider. Quelques banques en profitent pour les pousser dehors. Certains préfèrent alors faire le gros dos, au risque d'être dénoncés à l'IRS et poursuivis, en vertu de l'accord Fatca, par le fisc français devenu l'auxiliaire de son homologue américain. D'autres veulent renoncer à la nationalité. C'est possible, mais fort coûteux : au total, autour de 20 000 dollars, car il faut obligatoirement prendre un avocat... de préférence américain. Enfin, cela ne dispense pas de devoir faire des déclarations rétroactives sur les trois voire les six dernières années, et de payer l'éventuel surplus.

An immediate pause in fighting is needed in Ukraine to prevent more people dying and repair essential services, the United Nations human rights office said today following another night of shelling in the east of the country.

Condemning attacks on civilians and non-governmental organizations in a town in Central African Republic (CAR)’s Ouham-Pendé province, a senior United Nations humanitarian official has called for protecting civilians as well as for unhindered relief access to the affected areas.

The head of the United Nations refugee agency today warned developed countries against politicizing the issue of refugees, stressing that the move risked undermining the principle of international solidarity with those fleeing war and persecution.

As Europe Union leaders gather today in Malta to discuss new measures on migration, including increased cooperation with Libya, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and UN rights experts underlined the need to ensure that children are protected and that migrants should not be pushed back to places where their safety is at risk.

A United Nations human rights expert has called on the Security Council and the General Assembly to explore effective diplomatic and political measures to ensure Israeli compliance with Security Council resolution 2334 (2016), which affirms that all Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory constitute a flagrant violation of international law.

Early cancer diagnosis saves lives and cuts treatment costs, the United Nations health agency today said, particularly in developing countries where the majority of cancer cases are diagnosed too late.

The United Nations refugee agency and its partners are coordinating plans to respond to a potential mass displacement of Iraqis from western Mosul, the latest battleground the Iraqi forces are seeking to retake from Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) terrorists.

President Donald Trump, accompanied by  Chief of Staff Reince Priebus, Vice President Mike Pence, White House press secretary Sean Spicer and National Security Adviser Michael Flynn, speaks on the phone with with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Saturday, Jan. 28, 2017. (AP Photo/Andrew Harnik)

Similar to the two prior U.S. Presidential administrations, the current administration is making overtures towards Russia in the hope of improving U.S.-Russian relations. However, any penchant for deal-making must be buttressed by the clear understanding of other great powers’ legitimate security interests. Additionally, the realization by the U.S. national security establishment that other great powers’ national security architectures consider their own interests no less important to them than the U.S. does its own is critical.

Unorthodoxy Doesn’t Impress Everyone

President Trump has recently signaled his new policy orientation towards both China and Russia in two unorthodox moves. With respect to China, the administration has indicated that unless U.S.-China trade relations are better balanced in favor of the U.S., then the “One China” policy might be under review by the U.S.. Similarly, the administration has hinted at possible removal of U.S. sanctions against Russia in return for a new agreement on nuclear weapons.

While there are indeed some calls for the U.S. to review its “One China” policy, most of these have been voiced without consideration of the Chinese standpoint. Fundamentally, China has spent a generation gradually improving the economic benefits for its citizenry, resulting in more people being lifted out of poverty than ever before in human history. With the end of the Cold War, this economic development has been the basis for the continued legitimacy of China’s leadership in the eyes of its people.

Why, then, would it proceed to jeopardize this legitimacy for the the sake of a trade deal more favorable to the U.S.? As China has itself voiced multiple times, domestic considerations will override global perceptions of itself if given a choice between the two. Lastly, governmental legitimacy is surely a (if not the) prime example of this stark choice.

Without Trust, You’re Wasting Your Time

This pattern of attempting to leverage resolution over immediate issues into questions concerning other states’ overriding national security objectives continues with Russia. As stated above, the U.S. has indicated that it may be amenable to removal of Russian sanctions if a deal can be reached on nuclear armaments between the two sides. However, this deal will be next to impossible to reach, much less actually implement because of two key factors.

First, Russia’s nuclear superiority to the U.S. is a key plank in its bid to re-establish itself as a great power. What sane great power would make any deal towards nuclear weapons reductions when faced with conventional forces massing on its borders in the form of NATO? Additionally, any true progress towards any kinds of mutual arms reduction on both sides would require mutual trust. As is quite evident, there is absolutely zero strategic trust between the U.S. and Russia currently. Again, there is a tendency here by the U.S. to overestimate the importance of issues such as trade (increased or decreased) to a particular country when that country’s own core security interests are at stake.

Secondly, and more importantly, U.S. sanctions were initially imposed on Russia because of the Ukraine Crisis, not any nuclear issues. Again, the Ukraine Crisis is but a symptom of much larger issues between the U.S. and Russia going back to the end of the Cold War. There will be zero progress on issues such as Ukraine and Syria unless these underlying issues are addressed holistically.

Lastly, at the recent CSIS event, “Russia in Global Affairs”, the panel chair actually thanked the U.S. for the role of its sanctions in bringing Russia and China closer together. At the same event, yet another panelist made it quite clear that even if U.S.-Russian relations were improved, this would have absolutely no bearing on Sino-Russian relations. Again, this is evidence of the strategic mistrust between the U.S. and Russia.

The Blob Isn’t Going Anywhere

In the end, perhaps the most immediate obstacle to the new U.S. administration’s outreach towards both China and Russia is the U.S.’ own national security architecture. Labeled “The Blob” by the previous administration, it is apparently composed of elements of the defense establishment and the intelligence community, as well as various think tanks and media outlets. The fear is that any intrinsic deal-making expertise brought to bear by the new administration will be ultimately countermanded by The Blob, which apparently is impervious to the desires of The White House, irrespective of any actual party affiliation.

Similar to the national interests of both China and Russia, The Blob is responsible for upholding the national security interests of the U.S.. These interests are many, but surely the paramount interest must be to retain hegemony in a liberal, rules-based order, while simultaneously preventing the rise of peer competitors in East Asia (China) and Eurasia (Russia). Unfortunately for the U.S., even some its staunchest allies have recently voiced a reluctance for further “nation-building”, where Western values are imposed on sovereign regional states. It’s far too early to tell how this game will play out, but what is clear is that unless the new administration understands and respects the national security interests of all three states, there will be no progress at all.

The post For China and Russia, U.S. Unorthodoxy Is No Substitute For Trust appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Bones, suspected to belong to members of Iraq’s Yazidi community, are seen in a mass grave on the outskirts of the town of Sinjar. 30 November, 2015. (Reuters)

The Western countries refugee policy of the last three years has given rise to a great deal of debate and political maneuvering in individual countries and altered the political fortunes of certain politicians. Refugee policy, however, should produce a consensus, as most fair minded individuals agree that helping those in serious need is an obvious response. While hyperbole abounds, no one on either side of the debate wishes to contribute to additional crimes against those fleeing conflict, war and genocide.

A realistic approach to refugee policy should take into consideration that a nation state will not be able to bring in every refugee that it would wish to take in, as the number of conflicts and victims continues to grow. Also, governments should not give assistance to one region of the world while not doing so in other regions that are burdened with more difficult situations. Assistance needs to be concentrated on those who are worst off, as there is a limit to the number of funds and places that a country can provide to individuals under their refugee protection regimes.

Taking in as many as possible without planned consideration will likely have the effect of leaving the worse off in a continued state of threat. For that reason, economic migrants and refugees who have already been settled in safe second countries need to be given opportunities to come to a new state only after the most vulnerable have been assisted. Unfortunately, that is not the case under the current refugee policies.

Three considerations on whether or not to prioritize individuals under a refugee program should be made an inherent part of the process. Before any of those considerations are applied, it must be established that the refugee is not an economic migrant, as a lack of employment is not a consideration for refugee status.

Firstly, refugees that are not be able to return to their region due to threats against them and their community must be given priority. In addition, refugees who will never be able to return to a region due to threats of genocide or continued violent discrimination should be taken in and settled in a different manner as their entire culture and community no longer has a homeland. Transplanting an entire society from one region to another involves a greater degree of trauma and endured issues as an entire society could be eliminated without proper assistance. Recent cases highlight problems that are still not understood by many refugee programs in Western countries, and errors in resettlement that can lead to further abuse.

The second consideration that must be applied is that refugees who are victims of genocide must be given first priority. There are differing degrees of safety for refugees and those that have been settled in safe second countries are not under direct threat. Those safe from the initial cause of conflict that make it to refugee camps should be given priority over those already settled in safe second countries, as taking in those who are already removed from conflict still keeps the less fortunate in danger.

The most vulnerable individuals—at risk of torture, genocide and ethnic cleansing—must always be given priority as they are labelled and targeted by those in their region for death or enslavement. It is often the case that assistance in the same region cannot be properly administered as long as they are a discriminated group in that same region. This even takes place in refugee camps themselves, as assistance to unfavored groups in the region is given last in a discriminatory process that continues the oppression of that group post violence.

This leads to a third consideration. Treating individuals or groups from cultures that are a target of being exterminated should take priority, and actions to assist them should be administered as soon as evidence of even an attempt at ethnic cleansing is found. So serious is that type of situation for refugees, that blocking, blurring or stalling assistance to those vulnerable groups should be taken as a legal violation within Western countries themselves as it would likely contribute to further genocide.

Working even passively against assisting refugees that are in a situation that is tantamount to events that led to the Nuremberg Nuremberg goes against the very fibers of modern democracies and the essential elements of human rights. When considering your own policy position on refugees, their region, language and color should not make a difference, the situation and the above criteria should be critical in deciding who receives assisting and is accepted into the limited spaces available for refugee protection in individual nation states.

The post Refugee Policy Should Always Prioritize the Most Vulnerable appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère (n°4/2016). Norbert Gaillard propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Joshua Kurlantzick, State Capitalism – How the Return of Statism Is Transforming the World (Oxford University Press, 2016, 296 pages).

Joshua Kurlantzick, connu pour ses travaux sur le soft power chinois, étudie l’influence grandissante du capitalisme d’État depuis deux décennies. Définissant celui-ci comme toute économie dans laquelle au moins un tiers des 500 plus grosses entreprises nationales sont contrôlées directement ou indirectement par l’État, l’auteur précise d’emblée que plusieurs capitalismes d’État coexistent dans le monde. Les moins efficaces sont généralement les plus autocratiques (Algérie, Arabie Saoudite, Égypte, Iran, Ouzbékistan, Russie et Venezuela), en raison de leur incapacité chronique à innover et du comportement prédateur des élites politiques.

De nombreuses raisons expliqueraient la résurgence du capitalisme d’État : la multiplication des « autocrates élus » (sur le modèle de Thaksin Shinawatra en Thaïlande) ; l’autopromotion lancée par des États (la Chine et Singapour) qui pouvaient – et peuvent toujours – mettre en exergue leur insolente réussite économique ; la crise du capitalisme de marché de 2007-2008, et les renflouements massifs décidés par les gouvernements occidentaux ; l’essor des fonds souverains dans les pays émergents ; enfin le sentiment de plus en plus répandu que l’interventionnisme est indispensable pour constituer des géants mondiaux et ainsi réaliser des économies d’échelle.

Quoique fasciné par la réussite du « modèle chinois », Kurlantzick n’en considère pas moins que le capitalisme d’État présente plusieurs limites. Il tend à saper les valeurs démocratiques et l’état de droit, comme en Thaïlande, en Argentine et en Afrique du Sud. Ensuite, il est voué à l’essoufflement s’il s’avère incapable d’innover, d’améliorer le système éducatif et d’éliminer progressivement le népotisme. À cet égard, la Malaisie est tout particulièrement critiquée. L’auteur déplore aussi que l’étatisme puisse servir de contre-modèle à l’économie de marché. Deux systèmes semblent suffisamment efficaces et légitimes pour inspirer des pays émergents et en développement : le capitalisme chinois et le capitalisme singapourien. Le premier a une base éminemment politique et souverainiste. Le second a la particularité de s’intégrer pleinement dans la globalisation financière actuelle grâce à son excellent environnement des affaires, ses dépenses élevées en recherche et développement et la profitabilité impressionnante de son fonds souverain Temasek. Mais le danger principal du capitalisme d’État serait que les entreprises publiques soient utilisées comme armes de guerre économique, voire de guerre tout court, afin de voler des propriétés intellectuelles et des technologies. Kurlantzick s’alarme par exemple de l’influence des groupes russes et chinois, et de leurs connexions avec le pouvoir militaire. L’expansionnisme économique de Pékin créerait encore d’autres menaces, en soutenant des dictatures et en violant les normes sociales et environnementales.

La conclusion comprend plusieurs recommandations. Les firmes multinationales occidentales devraient se rapprocher des entreprises privées des pays promouvant un capitalisme d’État afin de contenir les ambitions des entreprises publiques. Américains et Européens auraient également intérêt à renforcer la démocratie dans les États où elle est menacée (Thaïlande, Malaisie, Afrique du Sud, Ukraine, Venezuela, Birmanie, Argentine et Égypte), et à sanctionner sévèrement les comportements délinquants des grandes sociétés d’État étrangères. On ne peut qu’approuver ces conseils, tout en regrettant que les gouvernements occidentaux avancent en la matière en ordre dispersé.

Norbert Gaillard

 Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

In a report issued today, the United Nations human rights arm said that the widespread human rights violations against the Rohingya population by Myanmar&#39s security forces in the country&#39s northern Rakhine state indicate the very likely commission of crimes against humanity.

As new data shows that wheat in Africa, Asia and Europe is increasingly threatened by fresh groups of wheat rust, the United Nations agricultural agency is highlighting the need for early detection and rapid action to keep the fungus under control.

Opening amid backlash against globalization and a marked shift towards marginalization in some parts of the world, a United Nations forum heard an outpouring of optimism and strong belief in collective action by youths and UN Member States for people, planet, peace and shared prosperity.

Briefing the Security Council on the situation in eastern Ukraine, the top United Nations political and humanitarian officials underlined today that continuing fighting in the region, with only short periods of respite, have exasperated human suffering.

More than 200 men and women of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) marched today to demobilization camps, two months after a peace deal that ended the Western Hemisphere’s longest running conflict, United Nations monitors coordinating the process reported.

The military campaign to oust Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) terrorists from Iraq is nearly won, but the humanitarian crisis is expected to continue for months, if not years, the United Nations top official for the country said today.

The main conference room inside South Korea’s National Assembly Building. (Wikimedia Commons)

The four-party system resurrected under the post-impeachment climate complicates the parties’ political calculus of carrying the ‘torch’ of participatory democracy. The political maelstrom is expected to turn more volatile with a possibility of an expedited presidential election cycle. Yet, the journey to permanently end ‘imperial presidency’ continues.

Out of the blame game over President Park Geun-Hye’s bizarre plummet to political perdition, the party in power, Saenuri, gave reluctant birth to the Barun party, pioneered by the anti-Park clique. The newly formed centrist-right party’s quest to establish their party label as the reformist representation of the conservative camp adds a third-way zest to the South Korean party system.

The People’s party entered the National Assembly during the 2016 parliamentary election by riding the increasing tide of conservative ‘dislodgers’ who were at the time dissatisfied with Park’s queenish management of party politics. Since then, the third major party has so far successfully walked a tight-rope, with considerable bargaining power independent of its mother party, the most long-established in the liberal camp, the Minjoo party. Barun’s abrupt parting with the dead-duck leader Park Guen Hye is expected to further boost 2016’s People’s party-led swing voter movement. This time, however, it is fueled by the explosive and anger-based Candlelight Revolution.

After seven weekly vigil-like mass protests, in one of which as many as two million people participated in one day, the National Assembly obeyed the ‘rhyme’ of the people’ participatory democracy. President Park was impeached for her part in a corruption case on December 6, 2016 by a 234–56 margin. The exposure of Park’s synchronization of national governance with her own household management infuriated especially young people with little money, but also their parents, drawing them onto the streets to exercise their civil and constitutional right to protest.

On the one hand, the success of the so-called Candlelight Revolution displayed the strength of participatory democracy in South Korea. Peaceful street demonstrations employing nonviolent, orderly and even artistic ways of communication intrinsically demanded democracy (pluralistic equality) at face value and civil and constitutional justice in eradicating corruption.

On the other hand, it created an impending lapse in high-level policy management and destabilized politics by setting the clock forward for this year’s presidential election cycle. The constitutional court now has up to six months (from December 6, 2016) to come up with the final decision (allegedly, the court will reach its decision by March 13, 2017). Once the ruling is reached, the presidential election must be held with the following two months.

The glory of participatory democracy shines only when pluralistic equality is maintained. Still, the parties are vigilant not to miss the post-impeachment opportunities to herd angry swing voters. The liberal camp, especially the Minjoo party, is eager to carry the torch of the Candlelight Revolution to win the presidential election based on a strategic claim of ‘regime change’. In coping with the legitimacy crisis, the disintegrated conservative camp in contrast seeks ‘constitutional-reforms’ to ‘imperial presidency’, seen as a post-1987 political malfunction, as a catalyst to form a grand coalition, a ‘big tent’, across centrist parties and what is now the façade of the ancien regime, Saenuri.

Former UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s recent return has lifted the curtain on this dramatic framing war between the liberals and conservatives. Although having never officially expressed his interest in running for the presidency, during his return speech at Incheon airport on January 12, 2017, Ban called for ‘political change’ based on an ‘inclusive integration’ of Korean society.

Ban, a 50-year veteran diplomat yet a novice in South Korea’s domestic politics, lacks a firm support base that can mobilize resources and collective action on his behalf. Still, his experience as a networked global leader, preparedness in security issues, and relative socio-economic progressiveness compared to other presidential candidates are centrist strengths. These strengths have so far made him one of the top two presidential candidates.

In differentiating his candidacy from that of Ban, the Minjoo party’s Moon Jae-In, the leading presidential candidate in the liberal camp and the former chief of staff to the Ro Moo-hyun administration, emphasizes that, unlike Ban, his competency as a candidate has already been verified. Indeed, Ban’s candidacy will come under great scrutiny both from the public and the parties. Despite this hurdle, once Ban officially declares that he will roll the dice, it is highly probable that he will be the pivot for the conservatives’ grand coalition (Ban dropped out of the race on February 1, 2017, and it seems like there is no one to challenge Moon’s monopoly at this point in time).

Constitutional reforms to ‘imperial presidency’ as steps towards institutionalized participatory democracy

In the aftermath of the Candlelight Revolution, the Korean people’s demands for constitutionally restructuring the post-1987 five-year-term presidency framework have heightened. Although parties’ and presidential candidates’ stance on this political hot potato differ with respect to how and when, no one disagrees over the urgency of implementing relevant remedies.

South Korea’s ‘winners-take-all’ majoritarian party system, leveraged by an ‘imperial’ president’s power, has been long criticized by many minority party leaders and even by faction leaders within the party in power. Pundits have blamed the predominant political culture in the country, under which the hegemony of the predominant regionalist party has a firm grip on the control of both the executive and the legislature. This prevents opposition parties from functioning effectively, and causes extreme legislative gridlock and filibuster.

Reforming such defects of the majoritarian party system was one of the core campaign agendas of the left-centrist DJP coalition in 1998, which helped liberal presidential candidate Kim Dae-Jung to win the election. Nevertheless, the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s DJP coalition was short-lived, leaving the impression that the coalition peddled the promise just to win the election.

Recently, optimism has been growing among Korean political scientists that South Korea’s party politics is ready to embrace Lijphart’s consociational democracy model. Indeed, analyzing through the lens of Sartori’s theoretical framework, South Korea’s relatively narrow spectrum of political cleavages, thus, more centripetal tendencies could render politics a multi-party-system-based ‘moderate pluralism’.

In theory, the new system might allow the grand coalition government and opposition parties to play the two-party system accountability game (since voters would easily figure out which of the two blocs is responsible for failures/successes), with more political voices represented (since cross-party deliberation is inevitable in forming a pre-election coalition, unlike in the two-party system where the two ‘catch-all’ parties simply do marketing to peddle their programmatic agendas to median voters). Such an experimental institutional design, however, needs to resolve the innate agency dilemma between elites and the people, and also come up with proper institutional devices to decentralize the current presidential power.

With regard to the latter challenge, the National Assembly’s Special Committee on Constitutional Reform is already examining whether the German-style semi-presidential system, the U.S.-style four-year-term presidency, or the U.K.-style cabinet system is best suited to reflect the country’s political reality. Nevertheless, ways to institutionalize the political solutions that narrow down the deliberation gap between elites and the people, as well as across the people, must also be taken into consideration.

The significance of the Candlelight Revolution’s success lies in the fact that the ‘rhythm (Hannah Arendt’s term)’ of participatory democracy, although unofficially, made the National Assembly accountable to the people. It is therefore important now to transform this unnatural rhythm into recurring, refined, and self-disciplined participatory institutional mechanisms in order to both ethically and functionally enhance elites’ accountability to the people. Direct-democracy tools like public referenda and popular initiatives such as are already widely practiced in advanced democracies are no doubt great examples of such mechanisms. Still more innovative political thoughts and experiments are pressing to preclude the agency dilemma, especially concerning the case in which the face value of democracy is lost in translation between undisciplined participatory democracy and polarized party politics.

The post Post-impeachment Consensus Calls for a New Political System in South Korea appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A senior United Nations humanitarian official in Somalia today warned that without a massive and urgent scale up of humanitarian assistance in the coming weeks, famine could soon be a reality in some of the worst drought-affected areas in the African country.

Global food prices rose notably in January, led by sugar and cereals, even as markets remain well supplied, United Nations monthly figures show.