Diplomacy & Crisis News

SR-91 Explainer: In the 1980s, the moniker “Aurora’ first appeared in a black program spy plane request. Since then, the infamous and perhaps mythical airframe has remained an enigma. Military engineers wanted to construct a hypersonic plane capable of reaching speeds in excess of Mach-5.0. No other plane in existence has been able to fly this fast. Although several reported sightings of the SR-91 Aurora have been documented, this notorious airframe has not been officially disclosed.

The Los Angeles Times and Aviation Week & Space Technology first put the SR-91 on the map in the mid-1980s.

Both outlets reported that the name “Aurora” had been inadvertently included in America’s 1995 planned $455 million budget for “black aircraft production.” According to the magazine, the moniker “Project Aurora” actually references an array of unique airframes and not just the SR-91 alone.

The Sun Sentinel also corroborated these numbers, according to Sandboxx News. These references indicated that the Pentagon had a secretive program that would expected to cost even more than the nearly $1 billion dollar B-2 Spirit endeavor.

As detailed in a 1986 procurement document obtained by Aviation Week, funding for the mysterious project had reached roughly $2.7 billion.

In the 1980’s, the legendary SR-71 Blackbird airframe was nearing the end of its service life. As the fastest plane to ever fly the skies anywhere on planet Earth, the Blackbird was certainly a tough act to follow. This airframe could reach speeds in excess of Mach-3.2, powered by a unique Pratt & Whitney J58 engine.

Designed with a minimized radar cross-section, the Blackbird is considered to be an early attempt of stealth design. Since the aviation space was radily evolving around this time, engineers were already working toward the Blackbird’s successor. Many analysts believed that the U.S. had the technological capacity to produce a Mach-5.0 airframe capable of reaching hypersonic speeds.

Over the next decade, detailed examinations of a variety of U.S. defense budgets claimed that unaccounted for funds had been channeled into secretive programs. Sightings also began to prop up, all allegeding that the Aurora prototype was already taking flight. In 1989, an engineer asserted that he witnessed a triangular-shaped airframe resembling renderings of the Aurora over the North Sea. However, since this infamous airframe can reportedly fly at speeds five times faster than sound, the likelihood that this individual could have actually spotted it flying is very, very low. The Air Force was flying both the B-2 bomber and the F-1117 Nighthawk around this time, which could have been what was seen flying the skies.

In 2000, an additional Aurora clue emerged. Nic Outterside with the Aberdeen Press and Journal cited “confidential sources” when he claimed that RAF/USAF Machrihanish in Kintyre, Argyll to be a base for the Aurora airframes. Since the base has longer runways, Outterside explained that it would make a suitable runway for high-altitude, experimental aircraft.

Another clue concerning the Aurora surfaced in 2006, when the British Ministry of Defense released a report suggesting that the U.S. Air Force has initiated plans to produce a Mach-4.0-6.0 highly supersonic airframe. Ultimately, though, no “conclusive evidence had emerged to confirm the existence of such a project.” Later, other clues involving the potential existence of the Aurora surfaced. Namely, periodic “sky quakes” were reportedly felt over Los Angeles on various occasions.

In 1993, Bill Sweetman from the well-regarded Jane’s Defense Weekly defense magazine reported that seismologists from the U.S. Geological Survey had been recording tremors near the San Gabriel Valley in Southern California. According to the magazine, these tremors were in keeping with a sonic boom from a high-altitude supersonic aircraft. However, the fast planes heard buzzing over the city more likely came from unclassified airframes from Nevada’s Area 51.

“All I can say is that it’s something that’s traveling through the atmosphere at several times the speed of sound in a generally northeasterly direction,” Jim Mori, a seismologist with the United States Geological Survey at Caltech, told the LA Times in 1992. Sweetman then noted that the nature of the reported sonic bombs were not in keeping with other aircraft known to be flown by the U.S. military. “It’s too fast for any aircraft that we know about,” he added.

One month prior to this incident, the Aviation Week and Space Technology outlet also claimed that reported sightings of an atypical aircraft with diamond-shaped lighting had been spotted flying over northern California alongside two F-117 Nighthawks and a KC-135 refueling tanker. According to the witnesses, the plane turned off its unusual exterior lighting and made a distinct sound similar to “air rushing through a big tube.”

Despite the litany of claims surrounding the Aurora’s existence, this airframe is yet to be confirmed by U.S. officials. If the mysterious SR-91 does exist, it could top the Blackbird’s speed record.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

All images are Creative Commons. 

In holding off the Russian invaders for two years, Ukraine has defied expectations. Although Ukraine has fought valiantly, the resistance would not be possible without the extensive Western donations, namely cash, intelligence, and military equipment, that Ukraine has received since the beginning of the conflict.

Most notably, Ukraine is in the process of receiving fourth-generation F-16 fighters (which Zelensky had lobbied for incessantly).

It has already received scores of other equipment, including surface-to-air missiles, tanks, handheld anti-tank systems like the FGM-148, and various drone systems.

Ukraine will undoubtedly continue pleading for the donation of Western military products. And why not? To date, Western nations have proven highly receptive to Ukraine’s arguments, that propping up Ukraine is vital to the security interests of Europe.

So while NATO nations and her tax-paying citizens seem to be growing fatigued with the fiscal requirements of supporting Ukraine, expect some form of aid to keep trickling in – lest NATO appear to be abandoning Ukraine.

So, let’s consider what military equipment would most benefit the Ukrainian cause.

I’m being mildly facetious, but the simple fact is that no weapon would aid the Ukrainians as immediately and convincingly as a nuclear weapon.

History has demonstrated that nations in possession of nuclear weapons don’t get invaded. Had Ukraine possessed nuclear weapons prior to February 2022, the Russian invasion would have been highly unlikely.

If Ukraine were gifted nuclear weapons now, they would perhaps have sufficient leverage to inspire Russia to withdraw and desist.

Now, I’m not advocating that Ukraine should receive nuclear weapons from her Western allies. Quite the opposite. Giving Ukraine a nuke would be completely irresponsible, for if Ukraine were given nuclear weapons it would likely lead, directly, into a nuclear exchange with Russia, which would be cataclysmic for the Eurasian continent and perhaps humanity itself.

Millions would die. Once-densely populated cities would become uninhabitable, excacerbating Europe’s already severe refugee crisis. Wheat shortages would lead to mass starvation.

Nukes to Ukraine would be bad. But as far as getting the Russians out of the Donbas, nuclear weapons are your most efficient weapons system.

Ukraine has been “outgunned and outnumbered” in the battle for the airspace above Ukraine. Remarkably, Ukraine has managed to deny the airspace to Russia – but Russia still maintains an advantage, mostly through the possession of aircraft that are superior to the Ukrainian aircraft.

But Russia’s aircraft is not cutting edge – they happen to be better than the aircraft Ukraine has presently.

America, however, who happens to be the primary bankroller of the Ukrainian effort, is in possession of fifth-generation fighter technology (and has even exported fifth-generation fighter technology), which would give Ukraine an automatic advantage in the skies over Russia.

While America has never exported the F-22 air superiority fighter, they have exported the multirole F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The F-35 would immensely expand the capabilities of the Ukrainian air defense; with industry leading radar systems and advanced missiles, the F-35 would allow the Ukrainians to engage Russian aircraft from further away, likely further than the Russians could answer from.

The distance advantage would allow Ukraine to start chipping away at Russian front lines, and air defense networks, and aircraft – gradually beginning to turn the tide of the conflict.

Now, Ukraine will not be receiving fifth-generation fighters – this article is merely a thought exercise about what weapons would be most helpful to the Ukrainians.

In reality, Ukraine has struggled to procure fourth-generation fighters, like the F-16, from the hands of Western allies. Don’t count on Zelensky charming the Americans out of any F-35s.

Hypersonic missiles are the cutting edge of missile technology.

Most nations do not possess, nor have attempted to build, hypersonic missiles. Even America, which possesses – by far – the world’s largest military budget, does not possess operational hypersonic missiles. Russia, however, has set the curve regarding hypersonic missile development with the Avangard, Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, 2M22 Zircon, and R-37 hypersonic missile systems. (For what it’s worth, China also possesses hypersonic missiles, which places the US at a disadvantage in the Indo-Pacific.)

Ukraine will not be receiving hypersonic missiles – her allies don’t have any hypersonic missiles to give.

The US is getting closer, with a variety of development programs, like the Boeing X-51 Waverider, the AIM-260 JATM, and the Hypersonic Air Launched Offensive Anti-Surface (HALO) anti-ship missile all in development.

So, there’s nothing for any Westerners to give the Ukrainians with respect to hypersonic missiles. But in theory, hypersonic missiles would allow for the effective targeting of Russians targets at (and beyond) the front line.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Summary: The article discusses the development of the SR-72 Darkstar, often referred to as the "Son of Blackbird," as a potential successor to the legendary SR-71 Blackbird spy plane. The SR-71 Blackbird is known for its impressive speed and capabilities, which still hold several records, despite being retired. Lockheed Martin is potentially developing the SR-72 as an American hypersonic unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with a planned flight expected in 2025. The new concept is intended for surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance missions.

Although long retired, the U.S. Air Force’s SR-71 “Blackbird” still holds several records. This spy plane is notably the fastest plane to ever take to the global skies.

While aviation experts and military buffs widely recognize the Blackbird as one of the most sophisticated platforms to fly, less is known about its possible successor: the SR-72 “Son of Blackbird.”

Expected to fly sometime in 2025, the potential American hypersonic unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) concept is being developed by manufacturer Lockheed Martin as a successor to the legendary Blackbird.

The upcoming concept is intended for surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance. Once completed, will the SR-72 live up to the hype that followed its predecessor?

While aviation-related feats are always particularly impressive, two decades in history really can be considered the pinnacle of technological evolution.

During the 1950s and 1960s, new concepts in metallurgy, electronics, and aviation sparked once-unimaginable developments.

The introduction of the Lockheed SR-71 is perhaps the most outstanding aerial achievement produced in America.

Designed in secrecy, the Blackbird could fly near the edge of space and outfly a missile. The airframe’s development was derived in part by U.S. engineers who were tasked with creating a rival for the Soviet Union’s counterparts.

To gather more accurate intelligence over the USSR, a report commissioned by the U.S. Air Force recommended reconnaissance aircraft should fly at 70,000 feet in order to be safe from the Soviet’s advanced defenses.

Around this time, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pursued the U-2 “Dragon Lady.” The U-2 would fly in numerous successful missions over Soviet territory over the next few decades. While the USSR was largely unsuccessful in taking down these spy planes via air defenses for some time, they ultimately downed a U-2 piloted by Francis Powers in 1960.

The loss of this U-2 really spearheaded the effort to design an airframe faster and more capable of evading Soviet air defenses.

As explained by the revered aircraft designer Clarence Johnson who led Lockheed Martin’s infamous Skunk Works at the time, “Everything had to be invented. Everything.”

The A-12 was designed first, followed by the Blackbird. The airframe was constructed to fly at speeds over Mach-3.0 (times the speed of sound.) While the Blackbird possessed radar countermeasures to avoid enemy air defenses, the airframe’s greatest defense was its extremely high speed and altitude capabilities.

Essentially, no surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) could work fast enough to catch the speedy airframe.

Today, the SR-71 is still considered to be the highest-flying, fastest aircraft ever built.

When the Blackbird was relegated to retirement in the late 1990s, aviation buffs speculated on Lockheed’s next big project.

Recent hints that the manufacturer’s Skunk Works division may have already provided a new spy airframe to the U.S. Air Force have reinvigorated speculation about the Blackbird’s successor.

During its time in the air, the SR-71 famously outran more than 4,000 missiles fired at it. The SR-72 is being designed to achieve the same feat.

This time, however, the Son of Blackbird will be even faster than its “father” so that it can outpace even the most advanced modern-day air defenses.

To do this, the upcoming airframe will need to reach hypersonic speeds over Mach-5.0- a truly unimaginable ability.

Lockheed’s program manager Brad Leland noted that “Hypersonic aircraft, coupled with hypersonic missiles, could penetrate denied airspace and strike at nearly any location across a continent in less than an hour,” adding that “Speed is the next aviation advancement to counter emerging threats in the next several decades. The technology would be a game-changer in theater, similar to how stealth is changing the battlespace today.”

Up until now, reaching this high speed has only been accomplished with single-use technology demonstrators and rocket-propelled aircraft.

As detailed by The Aviation Geek Club, “The Waverider successfully launched from a B-52 and was powered to Mach 4.8 by a booster rocket. The X-51 then accelerated to Mach 5.1 after igniting its ramjet engine.”

The original Blackbird was powered by the unique Pratt & Whitney J58 turbojet engine, which aviation experts often refer to as a “turboramjet.” The engine used by the Son of Blackbird will have to be quite the powerhouse in order to meet the airframe’s expectations.

As tensions between Washington and Beijing continue to ramp up, the race to achieve next-generation capabilities is on. The USAF and PLAAF are developing their respective sixth-generation fighter and bomber programs. Moscow is also working toward further developing its hypersonics.

The timely production of the next Blackbird will be vitally important for U.S. national security interests.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

With Kazakhstan at its epicenter, Central Asia’s transit potential has become increasingly significant for global connectivity. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the standoff between Russia and the West have underscored the urgent need for new and alternative transit routes to facilitate trade between Asia and Europe. Central Asia’s strategic location offers an opportunity for both Asian and Western countries to diversify their economic engagements and reinforce strategic interests, creating a new nexus for global trade.

Central Asia, historically a crossroads of the ancient Silk Road, is reclaiming its role as a key transit region in global commerce. Kazakhstan, as the region’s largest country, is pivotal in this resurgence. Connecting significant markets of Europe and Asia, it offers a shorter and potentially more cost-effective route for goods transportation than traditional maritime paths, especially in the current geopolitical climate. During the first ten months of 2023, 22.5 million tons of freight made their way through Kazakhstan, marking a 19 percent increase in volume. This growth is particularly notable in container transportation, which grew by 15 percent over the same period. The transit traffic through Kazakhstan is projected to rise to 35 million tons by 2029. Meanwhile, rail cargo transport, a critical component of Kazakhstan’s transit capabilities, rose by 3 percent, totaling 246 million tons.

Central Asia, and particularly Kazakhstan, has become an increasingly vital gateway for China to conduct trade with Europe and the wider world, underscored by the investments made through the Belt and Road Initiative, which was first announced by President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan and marked its tenth anniversary in 2023. Currently, China accounts for 27 percent of Kazakhstan’s transport flow, equivalent to 6.2 million tons. In 2022, over 23 million tons of goods were transported via rail between Kazakhstan and China, a figure that has since increased by an additional 22 percent. This significant uptick in transit volume demonstrates China’s growing reliance on overland routes through Central Asia for its trade with Europe.

The surge in cargo volume is not just about numbers; it represents a strategic shift in China’s trade routes. Traditionally reliant on maritime shipping, China has increasingly turned to overland routes through Central Asia as a faster, more reliable alternative. The development of the China-Europe Railway Express, for instance, has significantly reduced the time for goods transiting between China and Europe, offering a more efficient option compared to sea transport. However, the ongoing war in Ukraine has adversely impacted the prospects of the China-Europe Railway Express, as its main corridors traverse Russia. The conflict has raised concerns among traders about the viability and safety of using these routes. This uncertainty has made routes through Central Asia not only attractive but also vital for China’s continued trade with Europe.

For the West, too, Central Asia offers an important alternative route for trade with Asia, especially in the wake of the Western rupture with Russia over Ukraine. Central Asian countries, while maintaining a neutral stance in the Ukrainian conflict, are acutely aware of the benefits of diversifying away from the Russian-dominated Northern Corridor. As a result, they have embraced the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), frequently labeled the Middle Corridor, seeing it as a way to improve infrastructure and boost regional trade. In the first nine months of 2023, the volume of cargo transportation along the TITR surged by 88 percent, reaching 2 million tons. Kazakhstan, a key player in the Middle Corridor, experienced a significant increase in cargo volumes, more than doubling to 1.5 million tons, in contrast to the Northern Route’s 40 percent decline, affected by the geopolitical instability around Russia. Kazakhstan’s goal is to increase the capacity of TITR up to 10 million tons by 2030.

This growing interest in the Middle Corridor from powers like the United States, the European Union, and China is not incidental; it’s deeply rooted in their long-term strategies. For Washington, supporting TITR counteracts Russia’s influence over Eurasian trade routes, a desirable geopolitical outcome post-Ukraine. It also opens access to the emerging Central Asian markets, offering trade and investment opportunities beyond transportation. For the European Union, the Middle Corridor aligns with its engagement strategy with resource-rich Central Asia, offering an alternative to Russian routes and enhancing energy security and supply chain diversification. Meanwhile, for China, the Middle Corridor offers a smoother commercial pathway to Europe.

Other major projects are also on the horizon. One of the key projects underway is the completion of the Second Track of the Dostyk-Moiynty Railway in Kazakhstan. Scheduled for completion in late 2025, it aims to boost the transit traffic between China and Europe, with an estimated economic effect of $8.8 billion over twenty years, according to Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov. Another notable project is the construction of the Bakhty-Ayagoz Railway Line, which commenced in December 2023. This new 272-kilometer-long railway line, scheduled for completion in 2027, aims to increase the throughput capacity of Kazakhstan’s border crossing points with China from twenty-eight million tons to approximately forty-eight million.

Furthermore, the Darbaza-Maktaaral Railway Line, a new 152-km line connecting Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, commenced in November 2023 and is set to be completed by 2025. This line aims to increase corridor capacity, reduce transit times, and integrate regional trade routes. Lastly, the Aktau Port Container Hub project, planned for completion by 2025, is expected to increase the port’s container handling capacity from 70,000 twenty-foot equivalent units to over 300,000, significantly enhancing the efficiency of cargo transportation.

Investment in Central Asia’s infrastructure is crucial to unlocking its transit potential. This includes the development of railways, highways, and logistics hubs. Western technology and expertise can play a significant role in this development, creating a symbiotic relationship where Western businesses gain new opportunities and the region benefits from economic growth.

This investment also aligns with environmental objectives. Land-based transit like rail is more carbon-efficient than air or maritime freight. Consequently, investing in these transit routes through Kazakhstan reduces the carbon footprint of international trade.

Moreover, enhancing Central Asia’s transit capacity is a diplomatic endeavor. It offers the West a platform to strengthen ties with the region, fostering balanced regional development and stability and serving the long-term interests of both parties.

Ultimately, Kazakhstan’s transit potential is a geopolitical asset for both the East and the West. By supporting its development, China and Western countries can secure a strategic trade corridor that enhances their economic interests and diversifies international trade routes. It is also an investment in a more interconnected and resilient global economy. Recognizing and capitalizing on Kazakhstan’s strategic position is crucial for nearly all of the world’s major powers in this era of global economic realignment.

Stefan Antić is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development in Belgrade, Serbia, and Managing Editor of Horizons, a quarterly English-language magazine.

Image: Shutterstock.

In the wake of a tumultuous decade marked by conflict and division, Libya stands on the brink of a promising new chapter. Earlier this year, responding to an overwhelming call from my fellow countrymen and women, and given the crippling stalemate that has characterized the UN-led mission established in 2011 to bring peace and stability to Libya, I initiated a series of nation-wide consultations as a path towards building an accurate and representative national dialogue. This effort constitutes the first-ever inclusive, non-sectarian, and entirely Libyan-led endeavor in our nation’s modern history since its independence in 1951. It also represents a pivotal moment when Libyans from all walks of life have a genuine chance to assert their sovereign and inalienable right to shape their destiny, uniting to forge a brighter future for our beloved homeland and its children.

Over the past months, these discussions have transcended the country’s internal divides, bringing together diverse voices and evidencing anew that the Libyan people are willing—and indeed able—to engage in meaningful exchange when given the proper opportunity to do so. Participants have included national political figures, local community leaders, city, municipal, and military authorities, tribal representatives, religious heads, minorities, labor unionists, youth activists, students, and academics. Each meeting and conversation, numerous details and photographs of which have been publicized online, propels us closer to a national consensus, driving the dialogue’s momentum forward in a manner that is as inspiring as it is irreversible.

One point of solid consensus that has emerged is the urgent need for this new and genuinely Libyan-led National Dialogue to carry on and to expand in the most appropriate format all across our homeland. For over a decade now, multiple international stakeholders have attempted—and ultimately failed—to reach an agreement among Libyans. But these initiatives were not Libyan-led, and partly for security reasons, they were almost entirely enacted outside Libya.

It is my deeply held conviction that no process of national dialogue can succeed unless it is Libyan-led, concluded on Libyan soil, and inclusive of all segments of Libyan society. Therefore, the next phase of this ambitious National Dialogue shall not only focus on broadening and intensifying our efforts with great determination but also anchor these discussions firmly in our homeland to bring this chapter of unimaginable suffering and chaos to an end and at last to set our beloved country on its righteous path to stability, prosperity, and a hopeful future.

A second area of significant convergence lies in the resolute belief that, after years of conflict, division, and failed political experimentation, the time has come to rediscover and embrace our shared Libyan national identity once more as the basis of any solution. This singular identity, steeped in a rich tapestry of history—from the days of the ancient Greeks and Romans to the Ottoman era to the struggle against Italian colonization and the Second World War, and the pivotal moments leading to our independence in 1951—is both our unifying force and our greatest strength.

In fact, in 1949, the first National Dialogue in our country’s modern history was launched. Through this momentous process, which drew on our own history, culture, and traditions, Libyans collectively and decidedly chose a democratic constitutional monarchy as their way forward to independence and beyond. This golden era, held under the cohesive power of the Independence Constitution, serves as a tribute to our ability to unite, self-govern, and thrive.

As we again engage in these most vital and urgent conversations of nation-building, a common aspiration arises: namely, to return to the principles and values on which the Independence Constitution was founded. These include patriotic duty, national responsibility, good ethics, transparency, tolerance, and inclusivity, and all remain central components of our cherished Libyan identity. This time-honored framework resonates profoundly with our national ethos and offers a beacon of hope for a well-governed, united Libya.

To our friends in the international community, we extend sincere gratitude for their past support, yet now convey our staunch commitment to charting our own autonomous path. We invite you to join us and contribute to this new comprehensive dialogue. This Libyan-led and inclusive movement is effectively more aligned with the Libyan people’s yearnings, free from the narrow internal and external interests that have spawned dysfunctionality and systemic domestic corruption.

To our neighbors, we extend a brotherly invitation to partake in Libya’s rebirth. A stable, peaceful, and flourishing Libya will not only bolster our own nation but also contribute significantly to the broader region’s safety and overall prosperity. In division, our weaknesses become your risks. But in unity, our thriving becomes your strength.

As we advance and deepen this new Libyan National Dialogue, we are not merely discussing our country’s future—we are actively shaping it. This process vastly surpasses a simple political endeavor; it stands as a renewal of our national spirit, a rekindling of hope, and a compelling testament to the resilience and unity of the Libyan people. Together, we stand at the dawn of a new era, ready to reclaim our destiny and rebuild a nation that honors our proud history, our diverse voices, and our collective aspirations. Long live a united Libya.

His Royal Highness Mohammed Senussi is the Crown Prince of Libya.

Image: Husein Eddeb / Shutterstock.com.

Northrop Grumman Set to Lose a Billion Dollars Building the First B-21 Raiders - The greatest threat to the United States military may not be near-peer adversaries such as Russia and China – rather, it could be the rising cost of the latest military hardware.

A point could be made that we're not facing mutually assured destruction in a war with either power, but that we're at risk of mutually assured bankruptcy.

It was in October 2023 that Northrop Grumman announced it would likely lose up to $1.2 billion to produce the B-21 Raider bomber during its low-rate initial production. Due to inflation, labor problems, and lingering supply chain issues – all of which are complicating the production process for the next-generation long-range strategic bomber – the company at best is expecting not to turn any profit at first.

"We are planning at a zero profitability [on the B-21 for now]," Northrop Grumman chief executive Kathy Warden said in an October call with analysts, according to a report from Defense News. "But we have to perform, and we are working hard to ensure that plan is what we achieve."

The aerospace firm reported a quarterly profit of $937 million, up from two percent a year prior – so it isn't completely dire.

The United States Air Force has announced plans to buy at least 100 B-21s, an advanced stealth bomber, which will replace the aging B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit bombers now in service. The B-21 will provide the service with new abilities to conduct penetrating deep-strike missions, and the aircraft will be able to carry both conventional and nuclear weapons – but it will also be one of the most expensive aircraft ever built, and the service certainly won't want to lose any.

Though the price has been classified, each aircraft could cost upwards of $750 million, and that's only if the costs are spread out to a full 100.

This is a lesson the Air Force learned all too well more than 15 years ago.

It has been reported that the B-2 Spirit named "Spirit of Kansas" that crashed in 2008 at Andersen Air Force Base saw the complete loss of the stealth aircraft as it flipped and caught fire. The total price tag of the accident was $1.4 billion!

It isn't just the latest and greatest aircraft that are becoming so expensive. As previously reported, the United States Navy has been at a standstill in negotiations with Boeing over the final F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets. Previous estimates put the unit cost of the final batch of aircraft at $55.7 million, and lawmakers on Capitol Hill authorized about $1.15 billion for the aircraft. The math added up to the 20 aircraft – but then like everything else, the price went up, way up.

Boeing's estimate for the Super Hornets came in much higher, almost to the point that it was approaching the cost of the Lockheed Martin F-35C, the aircraft carrier variant of the Lightning II. According to a report from Breaking Defense in October, Lots 15 to 17 – the latest of the F-35C – had a reported cost of $102.1 million per aircraft.

Boeing, which was locked into a handful of contracts that forced the company to take a loss when technology development went over budget, saw significant losses last year, Reuters reported in October.

The story is similar to Boeing's F-15EX, as its price tag has also gone up, and it has a higher price tag than the fifth-generation Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. The per-plane cost for the F-15EX Eagle II in Lot 3 is expected to be as high as $97 million and $94 million for Lot 4.

The F-35 Joint Program Office spokesman Russ Goemaere also told Breaking Defense in October that the United States Air Force's variant of the stealth fighter – the conventional takeoff and landing F-35A – currently has an "average" flyaway cost of $82.5 million for the jet's 15th, 16th and 17th production lots, which will be delivered in calendar years 2023, 2024 and 2025 respectively.

Indeed, the average flyaway price for the vertical takeoff and landing F-35B is $109 million, while the carrier-launched F-35C has a flyaway price of $102.1 million for lots 15-17, but neither variant is used by the Air Force.

It was also reported in July that Northrop Grumman had announced that it won't compete to be the prime contractor for the United States Air Force's Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter program – yet, it could still bid on the U.S. Navy's F/A-XX or Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft programs.

As it stands, only Boeing and Lockheed Martin now build fighters for the Air Force. While these companies are still giants in the military aerospace sector, a question should be asked if they can afford to lose money building the aircraft. And if they opt to exit the market, what does that mean for the future of the Air Force and Navy?

And this doesn't even address the costs of the U.S. Navy's aircraft carriers – which are the most expensive military platforms ever built!

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

Images are sourced from both Shutterstock and Creative Commons. 

The Ukrainians have fought ardently to keep the Russian invaders at bay – but the Ukrainian resistance has depended mainly on foreign military aid.

Wisely, the Ukrainians have vigorously lobbied the Western powers for cash and equipment donations. And at the top of the Ukrainian’s wish list was the multi-role F-16, an American fourth-generation fighter that has been exported throughout NATO.

The Ukrainians were elated when allies agreed to ship F-16s to Ukraine. But now, an initial shipment of Copenhagen’s F-16s will be delayed several months, complicating the Ukrainian defense effort.

Yet, the Ukrainians have lasted two years without the F-16 – is the jet vital to Kyiv’s defense?

Ukraine is “outnumbered and outgunned in the skies.” The Russians have relied upon the Su-35 and MiG-31 whereas the Ukrainians have relied upon the Su-27 and MiG-29. The Russian aircraft have higher-powered radar and more advanced missiles (AA-12;Khinzal) than the Ukrainian counterparts.

The result is that the Russians can detect and engage the Ukrainian aircraft, almost like a boxer with a pronounced reach advantage, from a distance within which the Ukrainians cannot detect or fire upon the Russians. So, Russians can engage frontline targets with relative impunity, beyond the range of Ukrainian aircraft.   

Ukraine has supplemented their deficiency with surface-to-air missiles – which have helped to mitigate the effectiveness of Russian aircraft. Western aid has proven especially helpful in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense system; Western nations have donated IRIS-T, NASAMS, and PATRIOT missile defense systems. But the surface-to-air dependency is a stop-gap, offering a purely defensive stance.

The F-16s offer Ukraine a longer-term fix and the opportunity to take the offensive. Indeed, the F-16, which has more advanced radar and missiles than the Ukrainians existing Su-27s and MiG-29s, would allow Ukraine to engage the Russian aircraft from greater distances. The F-16 can launch missiles like the AIM-120, a “fire and forget” system that will track a target without the pilot keeping the target in their line of sight. And the AIM-120 can be fired upon multiple targets simultaneously.

“Kyiv’s allies hope the [F-16] can push Russian aircraft farther from the frontlines, target radar transmitters more effectively and hunt down more cruise missiles,” Reuters reported. “But [the F-16s] will help address a problem that has persisted from the start of the invasion in February 2022: Russia’s more modern combat aircraft have been difficult for Ukraine’s military to counter with its own aging fighters.”

Ukraine has done an admirable job of denying air space to the Russian invaders. Early in the conflict, in a bid to gain air superiority over Ukraine, Russia ran aggressive air attacks. Ukraine thwarted the initial aerial assault – and then bolstered their air defense network with surface-to-air missiles and intelligence gathering, beating the odds and denying Russia air superiority for almost two years. But the Ukrainians are treading water, so to speak, and rather than just tread water, the F-16 would allow Ukraine to push back.

“Besides potentially limiting the number of airstrikes on front-line Ukrainian troops, F-16s could operate closer to the line of contact and attack Russian air-defence systems,” Reuters reported.

Still, F-16s are not going to offer some sort of magic bullet for the Ukrainians.

“Western military officials and experts say adding F-16s to Ukraine’s fleet will not abruptly change the course of the war,” Reuters reported. “Training pilots and support crews takes time, surface-to-air missiles remain a major threat, and the jets are not designed for Ukraine’s damaged and sometimes makeshift runways.”

But the F-16 is most assuredly an improvement over the Ukrainian’s existing fighter fleet. And the F-16 offers Ukraine the opportunity to move away from Soviet built tech, and become more closely aligned with NATO technology.

Acquiring F-16s “locks Ukraine onto a technological path that NATO is currently on,” said Professor Robert Farley. “What Ukraine has now is a dead end; It’s not going anywhere. If you want to have an air force in 10 years, it’s going to have to be F-16s or something similar.”

Ukraine’s current fighter fleet consists of Soviet Cold War fighters – which have long since become obsolete. Supplementing the Mig-29s and Su-27s are even older models like the Su-24s and Su-25s – jets that will struggle to keep pace with advancing Russian technology and will become increasingly hard to service as spare parts become harder to find.

In sum, the Ukrainians, relying on Western assistance, have done an admirable job of denying Russians the airspace over Ukraine. The F-16 would help Ukraine mitigate Russia’s fighter advantage, perhaps allowing Ukraine to “push back.”

But the F-16 will not be a panacea or an overnight key to ousting the Russians from Ukrainian territory.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are from Shutterstock. 

At the Reagan National Defense Forum last month, United States Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo gave seemingly conflicting statements on the purpose of AI regulation, her stance on the U.S. relationship with China, and the continued development of artificial intelligence. Rather than focus on enabling U.S. development of AI, she threatened companies with lost revenue due to regulations while saying the United States should maintain its AI lead. She compared the U.S. relationship with China with that of the Soviet Union while claiming she doesn’t want “tension.” This comes after her department was greatly empowered by Biden’s recent executive order on AI—an important role that requires trust and a level head.

Raimondo’s statements came with a jibe directed at tech companies who lost money to her capricious regulations. “I know there are CEOs of chip companies in this audience who are a little cranky,” she said, “[be]cause they’re losing revenue. Such is life”. Not only is it unbecoming that of all government officials, the Commerce Secretary would be this actively hostile to industry, but that hostility also risks creating an uncertain environment for AI investment in the United States—a grave error for an industry Raimondo correctly cites as one of the most important for our national security.

Secretary Raimondo, who heads the department that has already once banned the export of chips designed to meet her requirements, then complained that it was “not productive” for Nvidia to respect export controls again by creating new chips below the latest thresholds. These thresholds, designed to restrict extremely high-performance chips, are primarily objective metrics of compute power measured in FLOPS, or “floating point operations per second.” The Commerce Department restricts chips with performance above these thresholds, indicating that those under it are deemed acceptable for export by the United States. Despite this, the strategy of the Commerce Department does not seem to be setting this threshold where they want it to be — or they simply don’t have the understanding to develop consistent thresholds and are setting reactionary regulations. Raimondo claimed that if manufacturers design a chip too close to the threshold—even if it’s still below it—“I’m going to control it the very next day.” This statement hinted at a potential export ban on Nvidia’s upcoming H20 chip, designed in good faith to comply with current regulations.

Such a ban would constitute enormous waste, both of design time and manufacturing, but that doesn’t seem to faze Raimondo, who boasts that “Every time I take an action, it denies them revenue.” Deny them the revenue it has, with the impacts of one regulation on the U.S.-based Nvidia estimated at $400 Million. That’s money that, were it not for the government’s intervention, could be reinvested into furthering chip development and increasing the U.S.’s lead in this technology. It’s difficult to ascribe any motivation to this destructive ambiguity from regulators short of active hostility to business from the Commerce Secretary.

Secretary Raimondo is not only inconsistent on export policy but also on foreign relations as a whole. At the same fireside chat, just minutes after recommending “Cold War” tactics on export controls, Raimondo turned to discuss ties with China, saying, “We have no interest in tension”—not quite the message sent by Cold War rhetoric. Raimondo phrased her export bans as “denying an entire country” access to technology, saying, “We’re going to continue to go in that direction.” This denial of technology to China also denies technology to smaller U.S. companies that can’t afford to train their Large Language Models but can use large “open weights” models released by Chinese researchers. While this may not be a major factor in the current day, with top open-weight models like Mistral and Llama 2 coming out of Western nations, any blow to open-source AI stifles innovation and benefits Sam Altman’s OpenAI, which will have less competition in the space of very large models like ChatGPT.

Raimondo cites an agreeable goal for this policy, stating, “We’re a couple years ahead of China, no way are we gonna let them catch up.” It is, indeed, essential for the United States to retain its lead in this vital technology over China, however useful their contributions may be. But not being caught requires continuing development. Raimondo also railed against the “effective acceleration” (“e/acc”) movement, mainly composed of software and AI engineers who believe in advancing AI development. She said, “There’s a view in Silicon Valley, you know, this ‘move fast and break things,’ effective acceleration. We can’t embrace that with AI, it’s too dangerous.” If Raimondo truly believes this technology is too dangerous, it’s all the more critical to maintain our lead over China—and if it’s not, then we shouldn’t slow down the development of a technology that is already improving outcomes in fields like healthcare.

Perhaps if Raimondo believes in maintaining our lead in AI, she should spend less time railing against the U.S. companies and engineers and leave them room to invest more time and money into staying ahead — something best done without vague threats of regulation and lost revenue hanging over the heads of American companies.

Dylan Dean is a software engineer with degrees in Electrical and Computer Engineering and an advocate for the decentralization of emerging technologies.

Image: Lev Radin / Shutterstock.com.

Russia's Last November-class Submarine Took a Road Trip - In October 2022, a 352-foot-long "Whale" was transported through the streets of Kronstadt near Saint Petersburg, Russia. It wasn't a literal whale but was rather the sole surviving Project 627 Kit (Russian for "Whale"). Known by the NATO reporting name "November," it was the Soviet Union's first class of nuclear-powered attack submarines, which had been in service from 1958 to 1990.

The K-3, which had been at the Nerpa shipyard since 2005, was prepared for its final voyage that included being placed on a floating dock, operated by the Russian Ministry of Defense's Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), where it sailed from the Barents Sea coast via the White Sea and the inner waterways to Kronstadt.

According to The Barents Observer, the floating dock, commissioned at the Zeleodolsk shipyard by the Volga River in 2015, was specially designed for sailing Russia’s inner waterways, including the White Sea Chanel that was built by Soviet prisoners in Karelia during the Stalin era.

The K-3 Leninsky Komsomol, built in 1957, was the Soviet Union's first-ever nuclear submarine. It was developed as part of an effort to counter the United States Navy's USS Nautilus (SSN-571), the world's first nuclear-powered sub.

More than 135 Soviet organizations, including 20 design bureaus, 35 research institutes, and 80 works, participated in the design and construction of this completely new type of submarine in 1952–1958.

Interestingly, the lead vessel of the Project 627 was prototyped in wood, with each of five segments scattered between five different locations around Leningrad, including the Astoria Hotel. The K-3 submarine was subsequently built in Molotovsk, and launched in August 1957.  It was commissioned the following year as part of the Soviet Navy's Northern Fleet.

The torpedo-shaped boat displaced more than 4,000 tons submerged and more than 100 meters long. Seventy-four seamen and thirty officers divided in the K-3's nine compartments, made up the boat's crew.

Despite the issues with the boats, the K-3 reached the North Pole underwater in June 1962, the first Soviet boat to achieve the feat – and just four years after the USS Nautilus.

Though the submarine suffered a fire five years later while transiting the Norwegian Sea, resulting in the death of 39 crew members, the boat was repaired and remained in service until 1988 – seeing three decades of service.

The K-3 served as the prototype submarine for a total of 12 similar subs (Project 627A) that were subsequently built, including the K-159 that sank north of Murmansk in 2003
As previously reported, the Project 627 submarines were seen excellent attack vessels. Once in range, one of these boats could strike with 533mm SET-65 or 53-65K torpedoes; yet while they were technically more powerful than their American counterparts, the Soviet subs were extremely noisy. As a result, the Project 627 vessels were easily detected and could therefore not be employed in submarine hunting operations. 

Another major flaw the boats possessed was the overall lack of safety measures. Crew members were often sickened by the ship's lack of radiation shielding. Multiple incidents plagued the various November-class submarines over the years.

After being taken out of service in 1988, the retired submarine was moved to the Nerpa shipyard in 2005, and a few years later, the work on cutting out the reactor compartment began. The nuclear reactor compartment was removed, and as a result, the restored boat is actually a bit shorter.

The boat had to be carefully moved through the streets of Kronstadt and is now scheduled to be preserved as a museum – a testament to the first Soviet nuclear-powered submarine.

There has been speculation that the Soviet-era sub was saved only because of the efforts made to preserve the USS Nautilus, which was decommissioned in 1980 and designated a National Historic Landmark in 1982. The former U.S. Navy submarine has been preserved as a museum ship at the Submarine Force Library and Museum in Groton, Connecticut, where the vessel receives around 250,000 visitors per year.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary: The article traces the history of German submarines from World War II to the modern era, focusing on the highly capable Type 212A submarines. Developed by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG (HDW) for the German and Italian navies, the Type 212A introduced Fuel Cell Air Independent Power (AIP) technology, enabling silent cruising and extended submerged operations. These submarines have become an integral part of the German Navy, expanding its operational range to Northern Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean Sea. The article also previews the future Type 212CD submarines, featuring improved sensors, extended range, and reduced acoustic presence for covert missions.

The Imperial German Navy (Kaiserliche Marine) was among the earliest pioneers of submarine warfare, and the first to operate submarines successfully on a large scale in wartime. During World War II, the Kriegsmarine further expanded its use of submarines – where they were a major component of the Battle of the Atlantic.

Germany's U-boats successfully operated far from its home waters, as far as the southern African coasts and even into the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. By the end of the war, almost 3,000 Allied ships (175 warships; 2,825 merchant ships) had been sunk by U-boat torpedoes.

Today, the modern German Navy (Deutsche Marine) operates a far smaller number of submarines, but these are considered highly capable boats that could quickly confront an adversary's surface fleet or ballistic missile submarines.

Barred from having submarines in the Bundesmarine after World War II until 1960, West Germany lagged in the development of submarines. Beginning with the Type 201 submarines – the first U-boat class built after the Second World War – there has been renewed focus on submarines that has continued into the 21st century.

The current generation of Deutsche Marine submarines is the Type-212A (aka U-212A) has earned a reputation as a reliable and advanced submarine. Developed by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG (HDW) for the German and Italian navies (as the Torado-class for Italy), the Type-212A was the first to make use of Fuel Cell AIP (Air Independent Power).

The submarines can operate at high speed on diesel power yet switch to the AIP system for silent cruising at slow speed. It can also stay submerged for up to three weeks with little exhaust heat­making the Type-212A virtually undetectable.

The German Navy has boasted that it is the quietest submarine in operation today, and a total of six Type 212A U-boats were commissioned between 2004 and 2015.

As the German Navy has expanded its operating area to cover the waters of Northern Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean Sea, the Type-212A has been crucial­allowing Germany to operate in the littoral areas as well as the open sea. The submarines are also equipped with a highly integrated command and weapons control system that interfaces with the sensors, weapons, and navigation systems.

The Type-212A offers an even greater range, diving depth, and displacement than its predecessor submarines while being equipped with improved communications systems and reconnaissance capabilities. In support of the modernization efforts, the sixth Type-212A submarines in service have also been equipped with land-attack capability. The first of the improved class, U-32 is approximately 183 feet long with a beam of nearly twenty-two feet. It has a draught of nineteen feet.

Notably, that the Type-212A boats are manned by just five officers and twenty-two sailors, and the submarine features two decks­which was able to provide additional sleeping and living space and the end of "warm bunking." The boat's torpedo area is even reported to be spacious enough that it is no longer necessary to divide the interior to reload weapons.

Torpedoes are still the primary weapon, and the Type-212A features six 533-millimeter torpedo tubes. The tubes are positioned in two rows of three, four pointing slightly to the left while two tubes point to the right. Additionally, the submarines can be used to deploy German special operations forces through the torpedo tubes. While the German Navy may only have six of these Type-212A boats in operation these are quite a powerful and quiet boat that has the ability to operate in brown, green and blue water environments.

Germany has already begun to look beyond the Type 212A U-boats, while Norway has begun constructing identical submarines to boost their maritime defense and strengthen military collaboration. Dubbed the 212CD, the vessel will be based on the well-established Type 212A operated by the German Navy and the Italian Navy.

A total of six 212CDs are now being constructed as part of a contract worth 5.5 billion euros ($5.9 billion) signed in 2021. Two of the advanced submarines under construction will be handed over to Berlin, while four will be delivered to the Norwegian Navy beginning in 2029.

The new submarine will be significantly larger than its predecessor, measuring 73 meters (240 feet) compared to the earlier version's 56 meters (184 feet). Moreover, the 212CD will boast a displacement of 2,500 cubic meters (88,286 cubic feet), as compared to the 1,450 tons of the 212A.

The future vessels will be equipped with improved sensors, an extended operational range, and reduced acoustic presence to support covert operations.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org 

Although both the House and Senate leaderships have agreed to a top-line budget of $1.59 trillion (with an additional “side deal” of $79 billion) for fiscal year 2024, there remains the requirement to pass the remaining eight appropriations bills to avoid a partial government shutdown. With time running out before a shutdown, Congress will likely have to pass another Continuing Resolution that would last long enough for the appropriations bills to pass. Critically, however, even if all the appropriations bills were signed into law before January 19, when the first tranche of bills must pass, Congress would not yet have passed legislation to provide additional funding for Ukraine.

The Biden administration’s October supplemental appropriations request for $106 billion, upon which Congress has yet to act, consists of funding to provide additional military and economic support to Ukraine, assistance to Israel and Taiwan, and resources for border protection programs. Funding for Ukraine, which totals $61.4 billion, is by far the largest item in the supplemental request. The defense-related aid package, the most critical element of the Ukraine-related request, amounts to over $44.4 billion for items in the DoD operations and maintenance accounts. These provide for, among other things, personnel support, intelligence analysis, flying hours, replacement of defense materiel sent to Ukraine, reimbursement for services provided to Ukraine, and defense production capacity expansion. The administration is requesting an additional $6 billion in the DoD procurement account, consisting of funds to increase the production of missile systems and critical munitions, for ship depot maintenance, for cybersecurity, and for some classified programs.

Late in December, with Congress failing to act on his supplemental request, President Joe Biden announced yet another drawdown of military equipment for Ukraine. It was the fifty-fourth such drawdown since 2021. The DoD reported that the latest drawdown consisted of air defense capabilities, artillery, antitank weapons, and other equipment totaling $250 million.

While certainly to be welcomed, the sum involved is but a tiny fraction of Ukraine’s urgent requirements and, indeed, what the supplemental calls for. Moreover, reportedly, the drawdown is likely to be the last of its kind, so that absent the passage of the supplemental, even the trickle of military aid to Ukraine will come to a complete halt.

The supplemental’s fate depends not so much on congressional attitudes toward supporting Ukraine, though these have slowly cooled since the Russians invaded the country in February 2022, but rather on whether Congress can reach an agreement on funding and policies for border control. Even if such an agreement could be reached and the supplemental approved, it is not at all certain that the Administration could push through a follow-on supplemental later this year.

Ukraine is no longer the center of media and public attention. Moreover, to the extent foreign policy will be a major issue in the presidential election campaign, it is more likely to focus on the Middle East—especially with Israel still at war—and on China, whose aggression in the South China Sea is unlikely to diminish, rather than on the war in Europe. Moreover, Ukraine’s failure to achieve anything like a decisive result in its much-ballyhooed spring counteroffensive has also dampened congressional enthusiasm, especially among an increasing number of Republicans who question whether it is worth continuing to spend large sums to support Kyiv.

Clearly, should no additional supplemental funding be forthcoming, Ukraine will find itself entirely dependent on European and other allies for equipment, logistics support, and training. Since Washington has provided roughly half of all military funding to support Ukraine, the absence of American support would jeopardize Ukraine’s chances of retaining the territory it currently controls, much less adding to it.

Indeed, in recent days, Russian forces have slowly seized some additional Ukrainian territory, west and south of Marinka near Donetsk City as well as southwest of the city near Novomikhailivka. The Russian objective remains to take control of all of Donetsk and Luhansk to strengthen its claim to the two rebellious provinces. Though Russia has lost most of the forces that initially attacked Ukraine, it has replenished them with a mélange of older and younger draftees. Ultimately, Russian forces vastly outnumber those of Ukraine, and Putin has shown no compunction about employing a meatgrinder strategy if that is what it takes both to block Ukrainian advances and to inch Russian forces forward. While Ukrainian forces have generally kept Russian troops at bay until now, it will be much harder for them to do so if American assistance dries up.

Putin is determined to stay the course and prosecute his war, in President Biden’s words, “for as long as it takes.” Staying the course means, at a minimum, pursuing Russian operations until after the American presidential election, from which Putin surely hopes that Donald Trump, who has no interest in supporting Ukraine, will emerge victorious. Congressional reluctance to fund additional military support for Ukraine would only further encourage Putin to resist any overtures for a negotiated solution to the war.

In the absence of American support for Ukraine, the odds that Russia will achieve its objectives will rise dramatically. It could either ingest all of Ukraine in one fell swoop or bite off a portion of the country, leaving it as little more than a rump state, which Moscow could ultimately swallow much as Hitler swallowed post-Sudetenland Czechoslovakia. Moreover, like Hitler, Putin is unlikely to remain satisfied with absorbing Ukraine into what he considers to be historical Russia. Moldova would probably be next. And then, if Trump makes good on his promise to re-evaluate American participation in NATO should he return to the White House, one or more of the Baltic states would be sure to follow.

There is no predicting the outcome of the November elections. If a month is a long time in politics, ten months is even more so. Still, the specter of an indifferent America led by Donald Trump should worry all legislators who care about the future of a free Europe and what the loss of that freedom would mean for the United States. For that reason, Congress should fund the supplemental as soon as President Biden signs the various appropriations bills that will come before him in the next weeks. And Biden, in turn, should request yet another follow-on supplemental.

The stakes for the United States are simply too high for America to turn a blind eye to a war that could spread well beyond the borders of Ukraine and ultimately threaten both American world leadership and its national security.

Dov S. Zakheim is Vice Chairman of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a member of The National Interest Advisory Board. He is a former Under Secretary of Defense and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Sweden is Developing an Advanced Submarine - Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union had the largest fleet of submarines in the world, as well as the largest in world naval history. Today, the Russian Navy is essentially a shell of its former self, but its submarines are still considered capable and that is a fact that has worried NATO leaders for years. Soon, however, the international alliance will have another member state that will help counter Russia's submarine force – namely Sweden.

It was announced in late June 2022 that Sweden, along with Finland, had been formally invited to join NATO, and that news coincided with the word that a keel laying ceremony was held for HMS Blekinge, the first two of two A26 type submarines now on order for the Royal Swedish Navy.

The Keel Laying Ceremony for HSwMS Blekinge took place at Saab's shipyard in Karlskrona. In attendance were representatives from the Swedish Navy.

The A26 program was formally launched in 2015 after FMV (Swedish Defence Materiel Administration) placed an order for two new generation submarines for the Royal Swedish Navy. Each of the Blekinge -class boats will be 65m in length, and the modern submarines will have a surfaced displacement of 2,000 tonnes (2,200 tons). The boats will be equipped with a Stirling AIP and can dive for more than 18 days.

The standard complement will reportedly consist of 26 sailors, but it can accommodate up to 35 sailors including commandos and other passengers.

HMS Blekinge is expected to be delivered to the Swedish Navy in 2027 while the second submarine, HMS Skåne, is set to be delivered in 2028. Construction began in 2015 at Saab's Kockum Shipyard, in the southwest of the country, and according to a report from international analytics firm GlobalData, the contract allocation for the conventionally powered boats is worth $731 million.

According to a December 2023 report from Naval-Technology, the A26 submarine's modular hull structure is made from special steel, which was developed to offer high-seakeeping performance and operational effectiveness. In addition, the boats' X-rudder configuration with four independently controlled control surfaces is meant to provide high maneuverability, while the subs will require low operating and maintenance costs.

Saab has also expressly stated it is "currently constructing the world's most advanced conventional submarine" – and that includes its stealth technology, notably the Sterling Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system, which can enable the diesel-powered vessels to spend longer periods underwater without having to surface to recharge batteries.

As previously reported, the A26 program also makes use of Saab's Ghost stealth technology – the Genuine HOlistic Stealth – which is even quieter than their upgraded Gotland-class submarine.

"This incredibly low acoustic signature is achieved through a variety of means. The Blekinge-class makes use of rubberized mounts and baffles inside the submarine to reduce noise cause by on-board machinery or crew. Additionally, frames within the sub are filled with 'acoustic damping plates' that absorb ambient sound from within the submarine," noted Caleb Larson for TNI.

Sweden may not be the only operator of the advanced conventionally-powered boats.

A modified export variant of the A26 program – designated the C718 design – has been proposed for the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN). It would feature a larger hull diameter, increased length, and greater displacement.

In addition, the A26 Blekinge submarines have been offered to the Polish Navy as a possible choice for the "Orka" modernization program.

In addition to the Blekinge-class boats that will eventually enter service by the end of the decade, Sweden currently has three Gotland-class submarines, which were built between 1992 and 1997. Stockholm is currently undertaking mid-life upgrade (MLU) modernization efforts on the submarines of the class to extend the service lives of those vessels. It was the first operational submarine class in the world to use air-independent propulsion in the form of Stirling engines which use liquid oxygen and diesel as the propellant.

The Royal Swedish Navy further continues to operate two of the original four Västergötland -class submarines dating from the 1980s, while two others were sold to Singapore. Two other submarines were also launched as part of the Västergötland-class, but have since re-launched after an extensive modernization in 2003 and 2004 as the   Södermanland- class. HSwMS Södermanland (Söd) and HSwMS Östergötland (Ögd) are expected to remain in service at least until the Blekinge-class are commissioned.

All of the Swedish submarines will likely play an important role in countering Russian aggression in the Baltic Sea, which could increasingly become a NATO-controlled lake.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. 

Main Image is from Saab. All others are Creative Commons. 

Summary: This analysis discusses the continuous evolution of the Leopard 2 main battle tank (MBT) since its introduction in 1979, focusing on the modernized Leopard 2A7 variant. This advanced MBT features significant upgrades, including enhanced armor, improved energy systems, crew comfort enhancements, and a state-of-the-art weapon and battlefield management system. The article also highlights key specifications and features of the Leopard 2A7, such as its weaponry, protection systems, and mobility enhancements. Furthermore, the author distinguishes between the Leopard 2A7 and the 2A7+ models, with the latter being optimized for urban combat and fortified against RPGs and mines.

Since being introduced into service with the West German military in 1979, the Leopard 2 main battle tank (MBT) has earned significant praise as one of the best in the world. As the successor to the Leopard 1, the German-made tank has been adopted by allied and partner nations around the world.

The platform has been steadily upgraded and improved, so much so that the latest variations are now practically tailor-made for specific roles. This includes the Leopard 2A7, a modernized version of the Leopard 2A6 MBT. It is equipped with new armor, an energy system, a crew compartment cooling system, and a new weapon/battlefield engagement/management system.

The 2A7 variant includes hull mine protection, a 17 kw Auxiliary Power Unit, a third-generation Attica thermal imaging unit for both Commander's Independent Sight and Gunners Sight, and a Spectus multi-spectral driver's vision device. The MBT's weapon system was also adapted for firing HE ammunition.

According to Army Recognition, the main armament of the Leopard 2A7 is similar to the Leopard 2A6 and consists of one L/55 120mm Rh 120 smoothbore gun, one MG3A1 7.62x51mm caliber coaxial machine gun, and a 7.62 mm MG3 machine gun mounted on loader hatch located on the left side of the roof turret. Eight 76mm smoke grenade dischargers are mounted on each side of the turret. The weapon system was further adapted for firing DM11 high-explosive (HE) rounds with an adjustable fuse.

The Leopard 2A7 is equipped with a collective NRBC system, power pack preheating, a crew compartment heater, a fire extinguishing system, electric bilge pumps, and an escape hatch in the hull floor, located behind the driver. To increase the comfort of the crew in hot and humid regions, the Leopard 2A7 is equipped with an energy system and crew compartment cooling system installed at the rear of the turret.

The first Leopard 2A7 was handed over to the German Army in Munich in December 2014, with more than a dozen vehicles produced for Tank Battalion 203, while an additional four went to the Armored Corps Training Center and another to the Technical School for Land Systems and School for Technology of the Army.

There has been no shortage of confusion over the differences between the Leopard 2A7 and the 2A7+. However, it is important to note that while similar and based on the initial Leopard 2 design, the 2A7 variant was not optimized for urban combat.

This is where the 2A7+ model comes into play – as it was developed specifically to operate both in low-intensity and high-intensity conflicts. The MBT's tank's protection was increased by modular armor, while the frontal protection was enhanced via a dual kit on the turret and hull front, providing 360-degree protection against RPGs and mine protection to increase the survivability of the tank and its crew in urban operations.

The modular armor's system components were first employed by the Canadian military in Afghanistan. As with the 2A7, the 2A7+ variant can fire programmable High Explosive munitions, while the turret-mounted MG3 has been replaced with a stabilized FLW 200 remotely controlled weapon station.

Mobility, sustainability, and situational awareness have also been improved. The is equipped with an exterior telephone for dismounted personnel to aid in communication with friendly forces.

Last year, after the Czech Republic had donated the last of its Soviet-designed T-72 tanks to Ukraine, Prague announced plans to acquire the latest Leopard 2A7+ MBTs from Berlin.

Last summer, Hungary also received the first of its Leopard 2A7HU models, the configuration equipped with a new fire control system and remote weapon station as well as reinforced roof protection. In 2018, Budapest ordered a total of 44 Leopard 2A7 tanks and an additional 12 Leopard 2A4s from existing Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) stocks to the Hungarian Defense Forces for training purposes.

The deal was part of an effort to replace its Soviet-era arms, and the Leopard 2 tanks in their newest configuration, dubbed 2A7HU, were also slated to replace Russian-made T-72s.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in some of the largest tank engagements since the Second World War.

Throughout the conflict, Russia has suffered tank losses that many analysts consider staggering, given the perceived disparity in equipment, manpower, and training at the outset of the war. 

Many of these losses have not come during large tank engagements. Instead, they result from Russia’s apparent inability to conduct combined arms warfare.

Tanks may appear to be unstoppable machines, but when left unsupported by infantry, air cover, and artillery fire they are very vulnerable. 

This video from the fall of last year shows one such tank, apparently alone on the road, being attacked by kamikaze drones. 

The tank showed in the video is a T-90M. This is one of the newer variants of the T-90, a line of tanks first introduced in 1992 and now serving as Russia’s main battle tank. Originally, the T-90 was designed to replace three tanks then in service with the Soviet armed forces: the T-64, T-72, and T-80.

Each of these tanks was created and manufactured by a different firm, leading to a huge logistical burden as almost none of their parts were interchangeable. 

While the overall design of the T-90 is derived from the T-72, several upgrades have made it a capable, modern tank. The M variant was introduced in 2016 and has major advantages over previous designs. Its turret is welded instead of cast, increasing its armor capabilities.

Four cameras mounted on the exterior of the tank increase the commander’s situational awareness by providing a 360 degree view. An upgraded fire control system combined with enhanced gunner’s sights aid in engaging targets. Upgraded armor, to include explosive reactive armor, and infrared jammers increase the tank’s survivability. In all, the T-90 is an impressive machine. 

These upgrades were apparently not enough for the crew, however, as the tank can be seen covered in sandbags. This form of up-armoring is as nearly as old as tanks themselves. There are many iconic photos of the Sherman tanks of the U.S. Army stacked high with sandbags, logs, spare tracks, and even concrete. The idea is that anti-tank rounds will detonate against the exterior armor instead of the steel of the tank itself, potentially saving the crew from what would otherwise be a deadly blow. In practice, however, most extra armor is only somewhat beneficial against slower rounds. Against modern, armor-piercing munitions, it is little more than ornamentation. 

The current conflict in Ukraine is not the first drone war, but it has resulted in serious innovations in drone warfare. The video above is a good example of how first-person view drones are used in kamikaze attacks on Russian equipment. Drone teams usually operate by using one machine as a spotter, finding likely targets and guiding the attack drone in. Operators in Ukraine have become skilled at targeting the weak points on Russian vehicles. The attack in the video shows the drone striking the rear of the tank, a vulnerable location where the engine sits.

Russia’s loss of tanks is proceeding at an alarming rate. The T-90 is their mainstay tank. Only the T-14 Armata is more advanced, and this war has exposed it as a paper tiger. As the conflict has progressed, Russia has had to field older tanks that are not nearly as capable as the T-90.

Battlefield observers have spotted T-64s, T-72s, and T-80s, the three tanks the T-90 was meant to replace.

Earlier last year, analysts even saw a T-62, a tank that dates back to the 1960s.

#Ukraine: A Russian T-90M tank with "special" sandbag addon armour was hit by a FPV loitering munition of the Ukrainian 11th National Guard Brigade East of Oleshky, #Kherson Oblast- leading to the detonation of ammunition onboard and a turret toss. pic.twitter.com/g86gR4QHrw

— ???????? Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) September 13, 2023

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: This article delves into the persistent threats and belligerent actions coming from North Korea toward the United States, Japan, and South Korea, with a specific focus on its nuclear arsenal and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities. It offers insights into the historical context of North Korea's nuclear program, its withdrawal from the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and its extensive nuclear testing. Moreover, the article sheds light on North Korea's suspected offensive chemical and biological weapons program, which dates back to the 1960s and includes the acquisition of dangerous agents like anthrax, cholera, and bubonic plague. 

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s government has threatened nuclear war and kinetic war with Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. in recent months. Pyongyang has also increased the pace of missile launches in the region, indicating that the nation is willing and capable of provoking its adversaries.

While analysts mostly focus on the threat of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, Pyongyang’s arsenal of chemical and Biological weapons is also a worry. 

North Korea turned to the Soviet Union after World War Two to give its nuclear program a start. It paid dividends when the USSR built the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, finishing construction by the mid-1960s.

North Korea did ratify the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, but it did not abide by the Treaty for very long, withdrawing officially in 2003. Since that time, Pyongyang has carried out several increasingly sophisticated nuclear tests.

In addition to its nuclear stockpiles, the DPRK is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and is believed to oversee an offensive biological and chemical weapons program. 

According to author Robert Collins, a former intelligence analyst with the U.S. Forces Korea Command, Pyongyang started to research biological weapons in the 1960s. Around this time, a germ weapons research organization was developed under the National Defense Science Institute, which led to the DPRK’s acquisition of anthrax, cholera and the bubonic plague. In an interview with The Hill, Collins added that Pyongyang’s hackers endanger South Korean chemical plants: “These hackers have also hacked into South Korea’s Chemical Accident Response Information system for the purpose of understanding where the South’s chemical plants are located and how much damage would result locally if they were subject to explosions.”

Seoul outlined the DPRK’s possession of anthrax, smallpox, and the plague in a 2018 white paper released by South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense. Analysts believe that North Korea in a future war could weaponize its stocks of phosgene, sarin, mustard and V-type chemical agents. At least 12 facilities are believed to be responsible for developing these chemical agents, according to industry experts.  

According to IHS Jane, a 2017 analysis of Pyongyang’s biological weapons capabilities cites the following evidence:

-“On 17 June (2015), the RoK MND issued a report that stated North Korea possesses an assortment of biological agents - including anthrax and smallpox - and the ability to weaponize them within 10 days. The report also stated that the North did not yet possess warheads to employ bioweapons.”

-“During June 2015 North Korea announced that it has created a vaccine, known as Kumdang-2, that could treat Ebola, HIV, ‘a number of cancers,’ and MERS. Kumdang-2 was reportedly manufactured from ginseng grown in fertilizer made from ‘rare-earth elements’ and ‘micro-quantities of gold and platinum.’ Most serious researchers have significant reservations concerning these claims.”

-“In the aftermath of Kim Jong-nam's death in February 2017 due to toxic nerve agent VX, South Korea's MND was quoted by Yonhap News Agency as saying that North Korea's military is probably operating a regiment-level biochemical weapons unit.”

As Pyongyang continues to make nuclear threats, a detailed analysis of the country’s true nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities is important. But its stockpiles of chemical weapons should also be considered a grave threat.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. You can email the author at Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: North Korean State Media. 

Summary: The article discusses North Korea's global reputation as a troublemaker due to its threats and nuclear program. Despite its small size and underdevelopment, North Korea maintains a large military, including 200,000 special operations forces, a significant proportion compared to its total military size. These special forces consist of various units, including airborne, reconnaissance, light infantry, and maritime forces, with the ability to infiltrate and disrupt enemy territories. While their capabilities are acknowledged, experts debate the overall proficiency of North Korean special forces, considering the country's military standards. 

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), known by most of the world as North Korea, has long been a troublemaker on the global stage.

With constant threats against its Southern neighbor, general saber-rattling, and a growing nuclear program, it creates constant pressure on the U.S.-led world order. 

While it is a small, underdeveloped nation by nearly every metric, it nonetheless possesses one of the largest standing armies in the world, counting 1.3 million soldiers in its ranks.

Perhaps more impressive are North Korea's special operations forces, or special forces, which experts estimate at 200,000 soldiers. This may not seem like very many compared to the total size of its force, but consider that it means 15 percent of the country’s soldiers belong to the special forces as opposed to only 3 percent of the U.S. military. 

The Special Forces moniker usually encompasses an array of specialized units and teams. For example, Special Operations Command in the U.S. military encompasses everything from Army Green Berets who specialize in unconventional warfare such as training a partner military how best to deal with an insurgency to Navy SEALs who perform high-stakes missions like hostage rescue.

North Korea’s Special Forces also encompass several different units. Their airborne forces use old Antonov An-2 aircraft to carry out infiltration and assault missions. First introduced in 1947, this venerable craft is capable of both airdropping units as well as landing on remote stretches of highway to allow infiltration. The Reconnaissance Brigades operate similarly to the Spetsnaz of the former Soviet Union, training to infiltrate South Korea and then using direct action to attack and destroy key targets across South Korea in an attempt to cripple its economy and industry and disrupt command and control in the event of war.

Light Infantry Battalions of the DPRK are a more typical version of the Reconnaissance Brigades. These lightly armed and armored troops advance ahead of conventional forces using stealth and speed to strike behind enemy lines to disrupt communication and infiltrate rear areas. Finally, the Maritime arm of the DPRK Special Forces is thought to operate somewhere in between the Light Infantry and Reconnaissance forces, infiltrating along the coast to carry out attacks behind enemy lines. North Korea’s fleet of submarines, including 24 Romeo-class diesel boats as well as at least 45 midget submarines make an ideal platform for covertly inserting these forces. 

Size isn’t the only factor on the battlefield and just because the DPRK is fielding a large number of special operators does not mean they are up to snuff. While the U.S. Department of Defense has acknowledged that “North Korean SOF personnel are among the most highly trained, well equipped, best-fed, and highly motivated forces in the KPA.” Given the state of DPRK forces, this is not a high bar to clear, however, South Korean and American planners certainly are aware of the threat these forces pose.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. You can email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: North Korean state media. 

In November 1896, the popular weekly British magazine “Punch” published one of its regular satirical caricatures. Titled “Turkey Limited,” it announced the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire into a limited company in an attempt to rein in the Sultan’s poor finances. In the caricature, a perplexed Sultan Abdul Hamid II reads the news from a prospectus on some wall and ponders the benefits he will receive from such a development. 

Arcane to modern audiences, the caricature laid bare the poor state of the Ottoman Empire—centered in modern-day Turkey—and its gradual fall from a geopolitical powerhouse after the capture of Constantinople and the defeat of the Byzantine Empire to the “Sick Man of Europe,” as it would be known following the publication of that November 1896 edition of the Punch. 

Today, almost 130 years after British and European audiences laughed at the expense of the poor Sultan, Turkey finds itself in a similar position but now as the sick man of NATO.

Over the past eight years, Turkey has been steadily moving away from the United States and the West. Looking back, the failed coup d’etat against Erdogan in 2016 was the tipping point for the relations between Turkey and the West. 

Whether stemming from a desire to chart a more independent foreign policy course or out of mistrust for Washington, NATO, and Europe, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has managed to offend neighbors and allies with alarming ease while at the same time cozying up with pariah states and terrorist organizations, including Iran, Russia, and Hamas. 

In a relatively short amount of time, Turkey purchased S-400 air defense systems from Moscow, got expelled from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, launched aerial and naval incursions against Greece, threatening war with a fellow NATO member, continued to militarize the illegal state of Northern Cyprus, and harbored terrorist leaders from Hamas. 

Although the Turkish economy has somewhat stabilized, it faces challenging times ahead, making large-scale defense spending and manufacturing much harder for Ankara. 

But as a NATO member, Turkey continues to wield power and influence in the transatlantic alliance. Its recalcitrance to Finland’s and Sweden’s membership bids following the Russian invasion of Ukraine wasted precious time. With Erdogan in power for the foreseeable future and no reasonable alternatives in the opposition, Turkey will likely continue down the path of anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism until something breaks. 

Patience in NATO for a member that is acting as an adversary is running low. Turkey is a powerful country and regional player. Utmost efforts need to be made to ensure that it remains within the West. But its behavior is quickly outweighing its usefulness to the United States and NATO.

Once the sick man of Europe, Turkey is now the sick man of NATO. And as strong organisms often force out weak parts in order to survive, NATO should consider expelling weak links that hold it behind and run against its ideals and policies. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

Another year, and the war in Ukraine continues.

Both sides are in a difficult position, but Kyiv is in a more difficult position than Moscow right now. The Ukrainian counteroffensive failed, and Kyiv must now revitalize interest in its cause among the United States and the rest of its Western partners. 

So, what should the Ukrainian strategy be for 2024? What New Year resolutions should the Ukrainian leadership make?

Now, after the failed Ukrainian counteroffensive and subsequent failed Russian offensive, the two sides are once more in a state of relative stalemate.

To make things clear, the war in Ukraine hasn’t—at least yet—reached a stalemate. The two sides haven’t exhausted their means, and the upcoming spring and summer fighting seasons can decide the fate of the conflict.  

In 2024, Kyiv should try to achieve an operational breakthrough somewhere on the battlefield, preferably in the south, to get within firing distance of Crimea. It’s vital now for Ukraine to show some success on the ground; otherwise, it risks losing some, if not most, of its key Western partners that enable Kyiv’s defense. 

However, Kyiv should also dedicate much effort and resources to training its forces. All the weapons in the world won’t compensate for poorly trained units. Defense is easier than offense. The Ukrainian military is no longer trying to stop the onrushing Russians. In its first counteroffensive in the fall of 2022, the Ukrainian military achieved a resounding success in the east and south because it caught the Russians off guard. A few months later, in the summer of 2023, that wasn’t longer the case.

The Kremlin is on guard now and has mobilized to prevent a catastrophe in Ukraine. Western intelligence estimates put the number of Russian troops in just southern Ukraine to over 300,000. So, against an entrenched adversary, the Ukrainian military must focus on combined arms operations and brigade-level coordination if it wants to achieve real operational progress. 

Ukraine can do a lot to advance its cause. But the U.S. and the West should be more active in their military assistance as well. 

Although the U.S.-led international coalition has committed tens of billions of dollars worth of weapon systems to Ukraine, it has often done so with significant delays. Time and again, the West has been reluctant and slow to provide Kyiv with weapon systems that end up becoming vital to the Ukrainian efforts. 

For example, at around this time last year, there was a heated debate among NATO members about sending main battle tanks to Ukraine. Germany, the country of origin of the populous Leopard 2, wouldn’t budge until the U.S. made a move. The breakout came after the United Kingdom decided to send a squadron of Challenger 2 tanks, prompting the U.S. to commit 31 M1 Abrams, which forced Berlin to greenlight Leopard 2 and Leopard 1 exports to Ukraine.

The result? The Ukrainians didn’t have their complete Western tank fleet ready for the start of the counteroffensive, which played a part in its failure. This is just one instance of the problematic security aid lifeline to Ukraine. 

For the Ukrainian strategy to retain hopes of success in 2024, Kyiv must also get the weapons it needs. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense and national security journalist specializing in special operations. A Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), he holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Pakistan’s senior air force official announced plans to purchase Chinese stealth fighters last week, potentially making Pakistan the first foreign partner to purchase 5th generation fighters from China.

During an induction ceremony for a variety of new military equipment held on January 2, Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu announced the forces’ intentions to purchase Chinese FC-31 Gyrfalcon fighters, according to reporting by Defense News. This reporting was seemingly confirmed by a post on the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Facebook page shortly thereafter.

The FC-31 is China’s second indigenous stealth fighter, which is currently in development for service aboard Chinese aircraft carriers, but has had an eye toward the export market since its inception.

The United States has long maintained a complex and often strained relationship with Pakistan – a country that was seen as a strategic partner at times throughout both the Cold War and the Global War on Terror, but that has also been accused of harboring and supporting terrorist regimes. Today, Pakistan’s primary fighter is the American-sourced F-16 Fighting Falcon, with the country having about 85 operational platforms.

Pakistan’s hostile relationship with neighboring India, which has also been the source of tensions with the United States, has served to deepen military cooperation with China. Pakistan’s relationship with China is often described as “all-weather,” with deep strategic ties extending throughout economic, diplomatic, and military sectors.

The acquisition of FC-31 fighters would make Pakistan the first third-party country ever to purchase stealth aircraft designed outside the United States. Stealth, or low observable, aircraft designs are meant to delay or prevent detection by adversary systems, allowing them to operate inside contested airspace with greater survivability. The US has long maintained a monopoly on stealth aviation, as the only nation on the planet operating stealth aircraft from 1983 until 2017, when China’s first stealth fighter, the Chengdu J-20, entered operational service.

Today, it’s estimated that China has somewhere north of 250 J-20s built, giving it the distinction of operating the world’s second-largest fleet of stealth aircraft. The Shenyang FC-31 Gyrfalcon is the nation’s second stealth effort, developed independently of Chengdu’s J-20 program.

The fighter was meant to be a lower-cost 5th-generation entry with an emphasis placed on the export market, but analysts were quick to point out that the smaller and lighter design may eventually see service aboard China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers as a replacement for the country’s long-troubled fleet of 4th-generation J-15s. In October 2021, those suspicions were confirmed when a modified carrier-capable iteration of the FC-31, dubbed the J-35, took flight for the first time. According to reports, the Chinese air force has also expressed interest in the platform as a lower-cost addition to its J-20 fleet.

To date, there has been no official word as to when this J-35 could see operational service, though some estimates suggest it could be as soon as 2026.

While China’s larger twin-engine J-20 is meant to fill an air-superiority role akin to the F-22 Raptor, the FC-31, and its Naval J-35 variant, are smaller twin-engine aircraft designed to compete with multi-role fighters like the F-35. In keeping with China’s longstanding approach to aviation design, both the J-20 and FC-31 borrow heavily from foreign fighter designs, with the J-20 often described as an amalgam of the long-defunct Soviet MiG 1.44 stealth fighter program infused with Lockheed Martin-derived low-observable design techniques.

While Russian officials have accused Chengdu of stealing elements of the MiG 1.44’s design, evidence to that effect has largely been circumstantial to date. China’s efforts to steal American stealth fighter designs, however, have been thoroughly confirmed, with a Chinese National named Su Bin ultimately charged with the cyber theft of secrets related to the design of many American military aircraft – including the F-22 and F-35 – in 2014.

In Su Bin’s e-mails to his Chinese government contacts, which were later entered as evidence in his trial, he openly gloated about how the stolen documents would “allow us [China] to catch up rapidly with U.S. levels … [and] stand easily on the giant’s shoulders.”

Su was ultimately sentenced to 46 months in Federal Prison for the theft in July 2016.

That is to say that the FC-31’s aesthetic similarities to America’s F-35 aren’t necessarily a coincidence. Because of the lack of transparency within Chinese state media, details about the FC-31’s actual capability set remain nebulous at best.

Current FC-31s in testing are reportedly powered by two Russian-sourced RD-93 afterburning turbofan engines that are each capable of producing about 18,300 pounds of thrust, though China has expressed plans to use domestically-sourced equivalent WS-13s that may increase power output to a combined 39,200 pounds of thrust with afterburners lit.

With an estimated maximum takeoff weight of 56,000 pounds, that could place the FC-31 on similar performance footing as the slightly larger and more powerful single-engine F-35. The American jet is powered by a Pratt & Whitney F135 afterburning turbofan engine that can pump out around 43,000 pounds of thrust under afterburner in a platform with a maximum takeoff weight of some 65,000 pounds. However, it’s important to note that the F135 is not just a more powerful engine, it’s also more advanced when it comes to reducing both radar and infrared (heat) signatures.

Broadly speaking, the FC-31, like its J-20 sibling, is not expected to be able to match America’s F-35 or F-22 in terms of preventing detection, thanks in large part to America’s multi-decade head start on the technologies involved in fielding truly stealth platforms, but that doesn’t mean the FC-31 wouldn’t represent a significant leap in low-observability over fourth-generation airframes like China’s J-15 or Pakistan’s F-16s.

In other words, the FC-31 may not be able to match the F-35 pound for pound, but could likely outperform many of the older 4th generation aircraft it might run across in a 21st century conflict.

That is, of course, if the aircraft ultimately lives up to China’s claims.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

When will Russia finally collapse? - Policymakers and analysts are getting impatient.

Predictions of Russia’s collapse appear to be wrong.

Instead of getting weaker, Vladimir Putin’s realm seems to be getting stronger.

One critic of the collapse argument puts it this way: “[T]wo years on, Russia looks in alarmingly robust condition.”

If that’s true, it obviously makes sense to negotiate with the Kremlin now, before it gets even more powerful and more stable. That may be a bitter pill to swallow, for Ukraine and its supporters of course, but what’s the alternative?

The alternative is obvious. In fact, Russia is not getting structurally stronger and more stable, and almost all theories of system breakdown lead us to expect something deeply destabilizing to happen in Russia. When? There’s the rub. It could be tomorrow; it could be five years from now. Either way, collapse is coming, though perhaps not “two years on.”

The case for Russia’s getting stronger rests on peculiar interpretations of the existing evidence regarding the Putin regime, the war, the economy, and the Russian population.

Putin may be exuding confidence—though why should we expect anything less from him or any leader?—but appearances can be deceiving, especially as Putin’s public persona is as often inclined to cluelessness as to self-confidence. He’s arrested his liberal and right-wing critics and built up the security apparatus, and his propaganda machine remains as active as ever. Are these signs of strength?

Yes, for obvious reasons, and no, because all these measures wouldn’t be necessary if he didn’t feel threatened. By whom? By important political and economic elites, who are unhappy with the war and its effects on the Russian economy and armed forces. The Prigozhin coup attempt is a case in point. Its very occurrence testified to dissatisfaction within the army. More importantly, the attempt could not possibly have been made without the knowledge—and blessing?—of the security services.

So, yes, Putin survived the coup. But its very happening means that his position was and is precarious.

That’s important because Putin’s weakness means his regime’s weakness, since he’s its essential core. All authoritarian, totalitarian, fascist, and dictatorial systems are hyper-centralized by definition. That can be their strength, if the supreme leader is a Platonic philosopher king, but more often than not it’s a fatal weakness. Supreme leaders are resistant to change and reform.

Their centrality encourages buck-passing, attempts at local power-building, and sycophancy. Most important perhaps, they are prone to strategic mistakes, especially as they age and lose their ability to project invincibility, infallibility, and charisma.

Putin’s most significant error was to pressure Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to back out of an Association agreement with the European Union in late 2013, thereby sparking the Revolution of Dignity that led to Yanukovych’s flight and then the launch of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The Jamestown Foundation's Janusz Bugajski makes the case for viewing the war as disastrous for Russia: “Russian leaders are trying to convince Western leaders that Ukraine is losing the war in order to terminate military assistance for Kyiv. In reality, the war is disastrous for Russia. Although the Ukrainian counteroffensive stalled in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia for the winter, after defeating Russian forces in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson, the Russian army is being decimated, and its navy has been pushed back from the western part of the Black Sea. During two years of combat, Russia has lost at least 315,000 killed or severely wounded, from a ground force of some 360,000 that invaded Ukraine. It has also sustained huge losses in equipment, including 2,200 out of some 3,500 tanks and a third of its armored vehicles.” These are not just incidental problems. Together, they bespeak a fundamental, structural decimation of Russia’s armed forces.

The situation with the economy is just as alarming. The opposition Russian economist Vladimir Milov has shown that the state has invested enormously in four sectors (ammunition, railroads, military security, and machine building) directly connected to the war, while reducing or only minimally increasing investments in consumer goods sectors. Putin’s claims that GDP is growing and inflation is low, therefore, conceal the reality that average citizens are being sacrificed on the altar of militarism. As Milov points out, “Russians have become significantly poorer in the last five and especially in the last two years.”

Yale University’s Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his colleagues have convincingly shown that sanctions have worked and that “[R]ussia is no longer remotely an economic power and has suppressed the minimum reporting of transparent national income statistics that is required to retain IMF membership. With industrial might below that of Chile, Putin’s Russia survives merely by seizing assets. The increasingly state-dominated economy is cannibalizing its own companies to maintain Putin’s war machine.”

Finally, we come to the Russian population. Yes, they’re inactive, and yes, that makes them morally complicit in Putin’s crimes. But a significant minority, perhaps as many as one fifth, oppose the war and Putin’s fascist regime. They are largely urban, educated professionals resident in Moscow and St. Petersburg. At present, they’re cowed. But as soon as an opening appears, as it inevitably will, they will make themselves heard—as do all urban, educated professionals the world over.

The empirical case for a strong Russia is thus weak. Meanwhile, the theoretical case for collapse is strong, because Russia is exceedingly vulnerable to the structural forces that generally lead to systemic collapse. It’s important to remember that structures are like tectonic plates. We can predict that earthquakes will inevitably happen where two plates meet, but we cannot say exactly when. And we can say which regions—or states—are in greater or lesser degrees of trouble and increasingly face the prospect of collapse.

What are the structural forces besetting Russia?

The above analysis identified them. The brittle regime is one. The parlous condition of the military is another. The sinking economy is a third. The protest potential of Russia’s educated, urban elites is a fourth. We know from history that such states are prone to break down or, at the least, to experience massive popular protests and regime change. The Soviet Union and its East European satellites in 1989-1991 immediately come to mind.

But so, too, do scores of countries worldwide—such as Argentina, Nicaragua, Egypt, Syria, Zimbabwe, and Libya. Some states, such as the Ayatollahs’ Iran, weather the storms of repeated upheaval and survive. Others, such as the Shah’s Iran, do not. Besides invoking platitudes such as “it all depends on state strength or elite cleverness,” we cannot know what the exact outcome will be.

But we do know that, in most cases, the “contradictions” that structural forces produce come to the fore when “sparks” or “triggers” take place. These can be assassinations, earthquakes, fires, natural disasters—or wars, especially unsuccessful wars that strain already impaired economies, militaries, regimes, and populations. It was World War I that destroyed the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian empires and World War II that almost destroyed the Soviet Union, especially after Joseph Stalin’s massive structural changes weakened the Soviet system and made it prone to collapse.

Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine is probably just such a spark. The regime, army, and economy have gotten weaker, and there is no reason to expect things to get better anytime soon. This means that, the longer the war takes, the likelier the structural forces will grind against one another, the greater the contradictions, and the likelier Russia’s breakdown becomes. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, in Russia and the West, time is not on Putin’s side. He’s not getting any younger, and his regime is not getting any stronger. The West should therefore refrain from negotiating with Putin until his country and regime weaken beyond easy repair.

So, don’t be taken in by his forced bravado. The tune he’s singing is his swan song. As to when Putin Russia will meet its end, it may be sooner than you think. Indeed, consider holding your breath.

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

All images are Shutterstock.