Diplomacy & Crisis News

Amid the chaos of last year’s House of Representatives Speaker fight, Congressional aid to Ukraine became a casualty. When Kevin McCarthy, a supporter of the Ukraine war effort, was ousted, that support was not shared by his successors and several of his colleagues. Since then, aid to Ukraine has become more divisive and stuck in limbo.

Likely contributing to this are perceptions of Ukraine’s chances of victory. While Ukraine is still resilient against Russian attacks, its stamina is not infinite; the average age of its soldiers is 40, and it has a much smaller population than Russia. There are some on Capitol Hill who are calling for reductions in armaments sent to Ukraine, while others believe the U.S. has already failed to adequately equip Ukraine to defend itself. This is consistent with the fact that globally, aid to Ukraine has gradually decreased in the last year.

But what that faction in Congress fails to acknowledge or understand is that it is infinitely more dangerous for Ukraine to be defeated and have Russia on the doorstep of the West. If Ukraine’s efforts are exhausted and Russia prevails, the U.S. will have to heavily arm the six countries that make up NATO’s eastern flank—Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania—unless it wants to send troops and fight its allies’ war for them.

The frontline state that has received the most assistance thus far is Poland, due to its large, shared border with Ukraine. Poland has upheld its two percent of GDP commitment to defense spending and has been the United States’ most indispensable NATO partner since the war in Ukraine began. Likewise, the United States has signed five-year defense cooperation agreements with each of the three Baltic countries, which include “integrated air and missile defense... participation in international military operations and exercises, infrastructure development and training,” according to the Pentagon.

However, Finland’s recent accession to NATO doubled the alliance’s border with Russia overnight, providing a buffer against the vulnerability of the three small Baltic countries. But as a result, Moscow has escalated the rhetoric it used for years to dissuade Finland from joining NATO in the first place, graduating from implicit threats of aggression to overt ones. As Vladimir Putin commented as early as 2016: "What do you think we will do in this situation? We moved our forces back [from the border], 1500 kilometers away. Will we keep our forces there?"  

Now, Russia’s permanent diplomat to international organizations, Mikhail Ulyanov, has stated that Finland would be the “first to suffer” in the event of a war between Russia and NATO. “Since they are our neighbors, if, God forbid there is some escalation, they will be the first to suffer,” Ulyanov told RIA Novosti, a state-owned news outlet.

He also described the defense cooperation agreement between Finland and the United States, in which Finland allowed U.S. troops to be stationed and military equipment to be stored at Finnish bases, right on Russia’s doorstep, as “already a serious challenge” to Moscow.

In response to the defense agreement with the U.S., Finland’s ambassador to Russia was also warned that Moscow will "not leave unanswered the buildup of NATO military potential on our border, which threatens the security of the Russian Federation, and would take the necessary measures to counter the aggressive decisions of Finland and its NATO allies."

Given those threats, Finland is likely the most urgent candidate to receive new U.S. equipment. In preparation for the need to defend a massive NATO border with Russia, Helsinki is already scheduled to receive 64 of the F-35A, the most advanced combat aircraft currently available. The F-35A is an invaluable asset to the U.S. and its NATO allies for its ability to collect and share more information than other tactical aircraft due to its virtual invisibility to enemy radar, and for its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Given its long border with Russia, Finland is also a logical candidate for M1A1 Abrams tanks. The M1A1 is superior to any tank fielded by the Russian military.

Thankfully, Ukraine is still holding its own and not backing down in the face of Russian aggression. It is focusing much of its efforts on ousting the Russian army from the country’s easternmost regions, and has gained a foothold on the eastern side of the Dnipro River. Even Russian military leaders have admitted to this being the case. Maintaining this foothold will likely be the deciding factor in Ukraine’s ability to recapture Crimea, which was illegally annexed by Russia in 2014.

However, there are also reports that the Ukrainian army has sustained heavy losses. And though they have made these strides ahead of winter, this year’s winter is predicted to be harsher than the last. Their fortunes could turn, and their progress could be reversed under the wrong mix of circumstances.

This is the wrong moment for members of Congress to reduce arms transfers to Ukraine on the table. Conditions of war are changeable, and Congress cannot afford to assume that if Ukraine is lost, the cost of defending the West will not become far greater.

Sarah White, M.A. is Senior Research Analyst and Editor at the Lexington Institute.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

All images are Creative Commons. 

How did the U.S. get its hands on MiG-29 fighters? Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine back in February 2022, there has been a resurgence in interest surrounding Moscow’s airframe arsenal. From MiG-29s and MiG-31s to Su-35s and Su-57s, the Kremlin has deployed a range of aging airframes to the frontlines of the war. Much of Russia’s Soviet-era equipment being used in battle is less capable than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO-delivered).

However, one airframe developed by the USSR and still flown today that has garnered the respect of many aviation buffs is the MiG-29.

Considered one of the most capable Eastern Bloc fighters of the late Cold War period, the ‘Fulcrum’ is a highly respected jet.

Interestingly, the U.S. ended up with 21 MiG-29s in the mid-1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Following lessons learned in the Vietnam War, U.S. officials understood the need to produce an air superiority platform. Existing American airframes like the F-105 Thunderchief were considered subpar to the Soviet’s more advanced and maneuverable MiG fighters. To rectify this, U.S. engineers got to work to create the “F-X” program, which ultimately culminated in the introduction of the formidable F-15 Eagle.

The Soviets couldn’t let the U.S. gain air superiority without a fight and worked to create its own Eagle counter. By the end of this decade, the Soviet General Staff directed engineers to produce a fighter capable of reaching speeds over Mach-2.0 (times the speed of sound) with heavy armament abilities. Eventually, a workload split resulted in this effort and two programs emerged- the Su-27 and MiG-29.

The Su-27 was designed to carry out deep air-to-air missiles against NATO high-value assets, while the Fulcrum was crafted to replace the preceding MiG-23 fighter. When the Fulcrum embarked on its maiden flight in the late 1970s, its elevated capabilities became quite concerning to U.S. officials.

Essentially, it was becoming clear that the Soviets were catching up to America’s aircraft technology. The Fulcrum features seven external weapon hardpoints and can carry up to two R-27 air-to-air medium-range missiles, six R-73 and R-60 air-to-air short range missiles, four pods of unguided rockets and a vast array of munitions.

As detailed by Airforce Technology, “The R-27 medium-range air-to-air missile is supplied by the Vympel State Engineering Design Bureau, based in Moscow. The R-27 is available in two configurations: the R-27R, which has a semi-active radar homing head and inertial navigation control with a radio link and the R-27T missile, which is fitted with an infrared homing head. The missile can intercept targets with a speed of up to 3,500km/h at altitudes from 0.02-27km, and the maximum vertical separation between the aircraft and the target is 10km.”

In addition to its impressive armament, the MiG-29 was one of the first Soviet airframes to extensively use lightweight aluminum titanium alloys, which reduce overall weight and complexity. These fighters also achieved high-angle-of-attack capability due to their widely flared wing leading edge root extension. Countries around the world noted the impressive traits embodied by the MiG-29 and set out to acquire the fighter. Export models of the Fulcrum were sold to India, Iran, East Germany, Peru, Iraq, Poland, Sudan, Syria and others.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the U.S. had the opportunity to acquire the once-feared MiG-29 fighters. Over two decades, more than one thousand Fulcrums were produced in the USSR.

In fact, the peak annual production rate of single-seat aircraft was reached in the late 1980’s. Following the breakup of the country, huge swaths of military equipment- including airframes- were left outside Russia. The majority of these airframes were left in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Concerned that such numerous nuclear-capable weapons were spread over multiple sovereign states, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program was created in order to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction. By the late 1990s, the U.S. used funds from this program to purchase 21 nuclear-capable MiG-29 Fulcrum airframes from the Republic of Moldova- a former Eastern Bloc component.

Moldova indicated that the Islamic Republic of Iran was interested in acquiring these formidable fighters, which urged the U.S. to act swiftly. Ultimately, the U.S. paid $40 million in addition to providing humanitarian assistance in the Fulcrum transaction.

While preventing Iran from receiving modern MiG-29 variants was a leading factor in America’s decision to buy these fighters, the secondary reason was that U.S. engineers were able to closely examine an adversary’s airframe.

During the Cold War, the MiG-290 Fulcrum was feared as a competent platform. Dissecting such a significant aircraft was undoubtedly the cherry on top for U.S. officials.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

The B-21: A Critical Component of Today’s Air Force— America needs the B-21 Raider stealth bomber now.

The Air Force’s newest bomber, the B-21 “Raider,” is built around the most sophisticated and easily maintained stealth technology ever developed. The kit and capabilities inside the jet will allow the United States to hold virtually any conventional or nuclear target in the world at risk. Unfortunately, the Pentagon’s plan to acquire just 100 B-21s, coupled with the proposed rate of acquisition, is insufficient to deter our peer adversaries, much less assure victory, should war arise.

Let’s start with the current state of the Air Force and why its need is so great.

The Air Force has withered significantly since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. In 1987, the service had 4,468 fighters and 331 bombers, and that fleet was so new that it was easy to keep those weapons systems ready for combat. On any given day, more than 80 percent of the fighters and B-52 bombers were mission-capable.

The defense funding cuts that followed the Soviet Union’s collapse led to a gradual reduction in capacity. Coupled with the withering effects of the Global War on Terror and the service’s mismanagement of the surge in funding since 2017, the Air Force now possesses just 2,038 fighters and 140 bombers. By any standard, today’s fleet is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in Air Force history.

The average fighter is now twenty-six years old, and the average bomber is forty-nine. That makes maintaining these jets a challenge. Just 60 percent of the service’s combatant aircraft are mission-capable. If tensions between the US and China escalate to war, the Air Force will have less than a third of the combat-capable fighter and bomber assets when it was last prepared to fight a peer adversary.

Unfortunately, the distances and basing challenges associated with a fight with China are markedly more challenging than those we faced with the Soviet Union. The plethora of allied bases in Europe, coupled with the relatively short distances involved, allowed fighters to handle the majority of the combat sorties required to take on the Warsaw Pact. Bombers, staging out of bases in England, were just 1,300 nautical miles from targets surrounding Moscow - a round trip that our B-52s could accomplish without air refueling.

The basing options for a fight with China are much more limited. The somewhat survivable base closest to mainland China is Anderson Air Force Base in Guam. Fighters sortieing out of Anderson to protect Taiwan would fly 1,700 NMs one way. If hostilities go full-bore, Anderson would be inundated by China’s deep magazine of long-range, precision missiles, forcing bombers to be staged out of the U.S. B-2s flying out of Whiteman AFB, Mo. would fly more than 6,700 miles to hit targets near Beijing.

That twenty-eight-hour round trip would limit mission-capable bombers to flying one sortie every thirty-six hours. Executing a viable operational plan against China would require a fleet of more than 210 mission capable bombers, while still holding a nuclear alert posture. The total demand would require a fleet of more than 300 bombers. Unfortunately, the service is woefully short of that number.

The Air Force has 112 operational (non-training) B-2s, B-1s, and B-52s. With a 60 percent mission capable rate, it could launch a maximum of sixty-seven bombers at any given time—without withholding assets for nuclear alert. The service’s current strategy for the B-21 is to procure 100 total jets at a rate of 10 jets a year, and it will be lucky to declare its first squadron as operational by 2027.

Unfortunately, China’s military rise has far exceeded expectations, and one of the service’s most senior leaders believes it could move on Taiwan as early as next year. To deter that move and be prepared for war should deterrence fail, the Air Force must move immediately to accelerate the fielding of the Raider, increase the rate of production to twenty jets a year, and acquire a fleet of at least 225 jets.

America needs the B-21 now more than ever, and we need to move mountains to bring it to bear as quickly as we can.

John “J” Venable is an F-16 fighter weapons school graduate and Senior Research Fellow for Defense Policy at the Heritage Foundation. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Images: Creative Commons.

Summary: The DF-26, also known as the "Guam Express," is an IRBM with a range exceeding 3,100 miles. It can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads and is capable of targeting ground or naval targets. The article highlights concerns about the DF-26's ability to target U.S. military installations in the Indo-Pacific, including Guam, and its potential to be used in a first-strike scenario in a nuclear exchange and attacks against U.S. naval assets like aircraft carriers.

With China’s “rise” to peer-status seeming more and more like an inevitability, US observers are paying particularly close attention to China’s warmaking abilities. America still has the world’s largest military budget, and world’s most capable fighting force. But the Chinese are working to close the gap – commiserate with their increasing territorial assertions throughout the Indo-Pacific region – and indeed, in some respects, have opened up a gap themselves.

China has made great strides to improve their military capabilities. In the air, the Chinese have unveiled a fifth-generation fighter, the Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon, which is understood to be a espionage-enabled clone of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Meanwhile, at sea, the Chinese are engaged in one of world history’s most ambitious shipbuilding sprees. In fact, the Chinese have surpassed the US in terms of ship quantity, and may now boast the world’s largest navy. Most notably, the Chinese recently launched it’s first supercarrier, the Fujian. America still has eleven supercarriers – far more than any other nation on Earth.

But the Chinese are demonstrating a willingness to match American capabilities. Or at least nullify American capabilities – with weapons that the American carriers cannot (at least according to many experts), at present, defend against, like the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which the Chinese have begun to stockpile.

The Dong Feng-26 (DF-26), or “East Wind-26,” is an intermediate-range ballistic missile. Produced by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and deployed with the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, the DF-26 has a range exceeding 3,100 miles and the ability to execute precision strikes with either nuclear or conventional ordnance. The DF-26 can target ground targets or naval targets - like aircraft carriers.

Overall, the capabilities of the DF-26 are particularly concerning to the Americans. The DF-26 has the range required to target US military installations in the Indo-Pacific, including critical installations at Guam (accordingly, the DF-26 has been referred to as the “Guam Express”). The ability to load the DF-26 with a nuclear warhead makes the missile an ideal candidate for first strike scenarios in a nuclear exchange with the US.

And, the fact that the DF-26 can be toggled to target naval targets is especially concerning. In a conflict with China, the US would rely heavily upon their carrier force – which, with the support of a Carrier Strike Group, and its own airwing, would be difficult for Chinese forces to nullify with their own naval or air forces.

Yet, the DF-26 could offer something of a magic bullet for Chinese forces hoping to strike US carriers from the equation. Of course, the DF-26 can target any US vessel – not just aircraft carriers, although the carrier is the crown jewel of the US fleet.

“China has made major additions to its stockpile of an anti-ship ballistic missile sometimes referred to as a “carrier killer,” indicating its role in a potential conflict would almost certainly be beyond just flattops,” Business Insider reported.

As a Congressional report indicated, “China increased the number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles from 300 in 2021 to 500,” demonstrating that China places a high value on the DF-26 in a potential conflict with the US.

“With an increase in DF-26 stockpile over the past year, China is clearly investing in a capability that can defeat defenses and effectively batter a variety of targets,” Business Insider reported. “That could spell trouble  for not only US aircraft carriers that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) would target should the two titans got to war but also other American ships as well.”

Some observers question whether the DF-26 indeed poses a legitimate threat to US ships, suggesting that perhaps the DF-26 has been over-hyped.

It’s true that the missile's effectiveness has not been concretely demonstrated; for example, there has been a test against a non-cooperative naval asset.

But the fact that the Chinese military has allocated its finite resources towards stockpiling 500 of the DF-26s suggests that the Chinese believe in the capabilities of the weapon (or its just an expensive bluff). Writing the DF-26 off as an over-hyped, unproven piece of tech could be Western wishful thinking.

And if the DF-26 is indeed a capable killer of US vessels, the Chinese will have a relatively cheap way to thwart expensive and difficult-to-replace US vessels.

“In a war at sea the PLA, if it had the inventory to do so, would be perfectly happy to trade a missile (or several), costing perhaps in the order of US $20 million each, for a destroyer that would cost billions to replace,” former US Navy submarine commander Tom Shugart wrote on X.

If the DF-26 is in fact legitimate, the US may be forced to rethink its strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: This article discusses Russia's S-500 air defense system and its potential impact on the conflict in Ukraine. Since February 2022, Ukraine has received significant military aid from the US and NATO, including advanced equipment. Russia's inability to achieve its offensive objectives in Ukraine is partly attributed to Ukraine's well-equipped forces.

Since February 2022, Ukraine’s arsenal of military equipment has dramatically ballooned. The U.S. and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have provided billions of dollars’ worth of aid to support Kyiv’s defensive efforts against Moscow. From main battle tanks and munitions to anti-tank weapons and infantry fighting vehicles, Ukraine possesses some of the best military equipment available.

In fact, Russia’s inability to accomplish its offensive objectives can be attributed to Ukraine’s tough defense. The Kremlin is banking that its superior air-defense system will ward off the well-equipped Ukrainian forces in battle.

While the S-500 is widely touted by Russia’s military to be a fifth-generation killer, the system’s true capabilities are still up for debate.

Russia’s S-500 “Prometheus” air defense system can be linked back to 2010, shortly after its S-400 predecessor was introduced to service.

Russian media outlets claimed that the S-400 was successfully tested in the late 1990s and was scheduled for deployment by the Army in 2001.

By 2003, however, the air defense system had still not been officially introduced. Over the next few years, the S-400 would undergo an array of testing procedures that would delay its entry to service until 2007.

Designated by NATO as the SA-21 Growler, the S-400 was designed to replace Russia’s earlier S-300 and S-200 variants. The former Soviet Union developed both preceding models as a series of long-range surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs). Trials of the original S-200 began in the mid-1950s, although the system was given the moniker S-25 Berkut initially. By the mid-1960’s, the first S-200s were in service.

The S-300 (NATO reporting name SA-10 Grumble) was produced in the late 1970’s. Designed to defend against air raids and cruise missiles, the S-300 is still considered to be one of the most effective anti-aircraft missiles deployed today.

While Russia’s earlier air defense systems are already quite capable, the introduction of the S-500 was intended to counter more modern threats.

Specifically, Moscow desired a new variant capable of defeating fifth-generation aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 as well as low orbit satellites, in addition to ballistic and cruise missile threats that preceding SAM variants could already counter.

The S-500’s trajectory followed a similar path as many other Soviet and Russian weapons, marred by countless delays to service.

In fact, the S-500 wasn’t officially tested until May 2018, when Russia conducted “the world’s longest surface-to-air missile test” by striking a target positioned roughly 300 miles away.

Russia’s new S-500 air-defense system consists of four 40N6M long-range surface-to-air missiles or two 77N6 interceptors in tubes mounted on a launch vehicle.

As detailed by the Center for International and Strategic Studies, the 40N6M long-range missiles can travel at a range of up to 400km, while the 77N6 series interceptors can reach approximately 600km. “The system features four radar vehicles per battery, including the 91N6E(M) S-band acquisition radar, 96L6-TsP C-band acquisition radar, 76T6 multi-mode engagement radar, and 77T6 anti-ballistic missile engagement radar.9 This radar complex reportedly allows the S-500 to detect ballistic and airborne targets at up to 2,000 and 800 km, respectively.”

Notably, the Kremlin has alleged that its new S-500 system is the only weapon capable of intercepting the country’s Kinzhal “hypersonic” missiles. This air-launched ballistic missile can reportedly be equipped with both nuclear and conventional warheads. While the Kremlin has frequently claimed that the Kinzhal is indeed a hypersonic weapon, Kyiv claimed to have shot down one of these missiles with its American-designed Patriot system over the summer.

In April 2022, the S-500 Prometheus commenced serial production, according to Russian state-run media outlets. This announcement was circulated by the Russian government-owned news agency TASS and was later corroborated by the CEO of the air-defense system’s manufacturer. However, international sanctions levied against Moscow are negatively impacting work on the air defense system. The U.S. and its NATO allies have waged heavy economic sanctions on Russia for its illegal attempt at annexing Ukraine.

Now that the invasion has been ongoing for nearly two years, Russia has sunk the majority of its resources into sustaining its war effort. Moscow’s lack of essential munitions, main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and other key weaponry demonstrates the imposition of these sanctions.

A consortium of NATO allies have agreed to deliver 60 F-16 Fighting Falcon airframes to Ukraine in the near future. Opponents of this deal have suggested that these jets would be too vulnerable against the S-500 air defense system. Now that Kyiv will soon be flying these fighters, the true extent of the S-500’s capabilities will be documented - as Moscow could send in the S-500 for air defense duty, which most experts argue still has not occurred yet.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Shutterstock or Creative Commons. 

Is the war in Ukraine becoming the transformative event of the 21st century?

Putin's illegal invasion is draining his armed forces by the day, and some experts think he could lose the war.

And we know one thing: social media will be one of the best ways to get a sense of who is winning or losing over the longterm: 

In a video shared to social media back in the late spring of last year, an M982 Excalibur extended-range guided artillery shell could be seen easily slicing through a Russian D-20 152mm towed howitzer on the left bank of the Dnipro River in the Kherson Oblast.

The U.S.-made Excalibur is a GPS and inertial-guided munition that is capable of being employed in close support situations within 75 to 150 meters (250 to 490 feet) of friendly troops.

It was a prime example of "one shot, one kill."

The type of weapon that fired the round isn't known, but it was likely from a UK-supplied M777 155mm howitzer.

The M982 Excalibur can be used in poor weather with bad visibility, while the high-explosive round can also be delayed to penetrate buildings or bunkers. It has been widely employed to target Russian artillery.

Yet, it may have been a bit of "overkill," and some commentators to the post from Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) – which shared the video – suggested the M982 Excalibur ordnance was likely as costly as the platform it took out.

Russia had more than 1,000 of its D-20 152mm howitzers in service when it launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine last year, and an untold number have already been destroyed.

Not clear in the video was whether the platform seen targeted by Kyiv's forces was still operational or if it had been disabled. The gun-howitzer is typically operated by a crew of eight soldiers; yet, none appeared present at the time of the strike.

It has been suggested that the crew spotted the drone that recorded the incident and which likely acted as a spotter for the Ukrainian artillery. It is also possible the gun was disabled and was used as a decoy – in which case, Kyiv wasted one of the expensive Excalibur rounds.

As noted, the Kremlin had more than 1,000 D-20 howitzers in service, but Kyiv's forces also had a significant number in its arsenals, and it has likely bolstered its strength from those captured by Russian forces.

The D-20 has a proven combat record, first seeing service in the Vietnam War, while it was later employed by Syrian forces in the Six-Day War and later in the Yom Kippur War. However, it wasn't until the Soviet-Afghan War that Kremlin forces first fired the D-20 in anger.

It is now being used by both Russian and Ukrainian forces.

In addition, the Ukrainian Army has begun to receive a number of M1981 artillery pieces, a derivative of the Soviet D-20. Both are manually loaded howitzers. The M1981 was designed by the Romanian Arsenalul Armatei (Army Arsenal) and was first manufactured under license at the Romanian Reșita plant. It weighs 5.7 tons, features a longer rifled barrel (34 calibers long), but can use the same ordnance as the Soviet-developed weapon.

#Ukraine: A Russian D-20 152mm towed howitzer was destroyed by the Ukrainian army with a direct M982 Excalibur hit on the left bank of the Dnipro River, #Kherson Oblast. pic.twitter.com/ecIDxIzEli

— ???????? Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) May 27, 2023

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Since 2021, the Biden administration’s key defense concept has been “integrated deterrence.” The administration’s first strategy document, the March 2021 Interim National Security Guidance (INSG), provided a partial rationale for developing this concept when it identified the threats posed by both China and Russia and the challenge of deterring their “aggression.” To deter these adversaries and prevent them from “directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions,” the INSG asserted, the United States would have to “work with like-minded partners” and “pool our collective strength” to “counter threats to our collective security, prosperity, and democratic way of life.”

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin subsequently built on this in speeches from May and July of 2021. During an address to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii on May 3, 2021, Austin affirmed that the “cornerstone of America’s defense is still deterrence,” which “meant fixing a basic truth within the minds of our potential foes: that the costs and risks of aggression are out of line with any conceivable benefit.” But to achieve this in the twenty-first century, the United States must undertake “integrated deterrence.” This would mean not only “us[ing] existing capabilities, and build[ing] new ones, and us[ing] all of them in networked ways” but also doing so “hand in hand with our allies and partners.” A similar definition was then offered during an address in Singapore on July 27, 2021, where the Secretary of Defense described “integrated deterrence” as “using existing capabilities, and building new ones, and deploying them all in new and networked ways – all tailored to a region’s security landscape, and growing in partnership with our friends.”

Yet the exact content of this neologism and how it differed from the multitude of adjectival forms of deterrence that have punctuated U.S. defense strategy in recent decades remained a mystery that was not resolved until the administration’s almost simultaneous release of its National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Security Strategy in October 2022. These documents, in combination with an examination of the administration’s approach to the war in Ukraine, provide a clearer picture of that “integrated deterrence” has less to do with the deterrence of immediate threats than with the dissuasion of adversaries using not primarily military instruments but diplomatic and economic ones and greater burden sharing with allies.

As such, “integrated deterrence” is less than meets the eye. While seeking to integrate military, diplomatic, and economic instruments of national power and encourage greater burden-sharing with allies may be sensible, “integrated deterrence” does not contain a theory of coercion that explains how the United States will seek to manipulate risk, make credible threats to prevent adversary actions or apply force in the pursuit of well-defined goals.

The October 2022 NDS presented a three-pronged approach to counter what it termed the U.S.’ “most consequential strategic competitor” (i.e., China): “integrated deterrence,” “campaigning,” and “building enduring advantages.”

“Integrated deterrence” was defined as “developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.” “Campaigning,” meanwhile, meant “the conduct and sequencing of logically-linked military initiatives aimed at advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time” so that the Department of Defense could “operate forces, synchronize broader Departmental efforts, and align Departmental activities with other instruments of national power, to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors’ military preparations, and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with Allies and partners.” Finally, “building enduring advantages,” entailed “undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology we need more quickly, and making investments in the extraordinary people of the Department, who remain our most valuable resource.”

Satirist James H. Boren once described such “bureaucratese” as “mumbling with professional eloquence.” Such mumbling, he argued, was defined by “mixing tonal patterns with multisyllabic words for the purpose of projecting an image of knowledgeability and competence without regard to either knowledge or competence.”

Deconstructing in plain language what this “mumbling” means in practice reveals that it has little to do with deterrence as it is conventionally understood.

On the one hand, a core and admirable thrust of administration statements on “integrated deterrence” is to show that it seeks to communicate that “deterrence is distinct from the nuclear deterrent,” that the United States will utilize “all aspects of national power, not just the military, to communicate intent” and to “ensure that U.S. signals are coordinated with those of allies and partners.”

However, on the other hand, there is a lack of clear connection between the neologism and concepts central to deterrence, such as the manipulation of risk, establishment of credible threats to prevent adversary actions, or the application of force to achieve well-defined goals. Rather, as Van Jackson argues, “integrated deterrence” via its emphasis on greater burden shifting to allies and advanced conventional capabilities “backstopped” by its nuclear deterrent “is best understood as referring to escalation avoidance in contingency planning for limited war.”

That “integrated deterrence” is not concerned with a theory of coercion is indicated by some administration officials’ statements surrounding the war in Ukraine. Soon after the Russian invasion, anonymous Pentagon officials were quoted by the Washington Post that the U.S.-led response showed that the “model of integrated deterrence comes out smelling pretty good.” The rationale here, according to an anonymous official, was that the U.S. response leveraged its “primacy in the global financial system” and its alliance networks “in ways that can absolutely pummel aggressors.” This line of argument was subsequently deployed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks during a briefing in March 2022 on the administration’s 2023FY defense budget request. Here, Hicks asserted that the U.S.-led response to Ukraine had enhanced deterrence by making the “costs and folly of aggression” by adversaries “very clear.”

This line of argument, however, ignores the basic fact that Russia invaded Ukraine despite U.S.-led efforts to deter it from doing so. The official was perhaps referring to the administration’s effective marshaling of a U.S. and allied diplomatic and economic response to that fact. Significantly, the administration, both in its pre-invasion attempts to deter Vladimir Putin and post-invasion efforts to assist Ukraine, has studiously avoided consideration of the direct application of U.S. military capabilities. There are, of course, good reasons for this (e.g., concerns about risking escalation to a direct Russia-NATO confrontation), but it begs the question as to what role the administration sees American military capabilities playing in “integrated deterrence”?

What, then, of “campaigning”? The NDS tortuously defines this as “the conduct and sequencing of logically-linked military initiatives aimed at advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time” so that the Department of Defense can “operate forces, synchronize broader Departmental efforts, and align Departmental activities with other instruments of national power, to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors’ military preparations, and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with Allies and partners.” In plain language, as two analysts from the Hudson Institute note, this appears to be drawn from U.S. Marine Corps doctrine and refers to the “orchestration of military activities alongside economic, diplomatic, and information actions to achieve specific goals.”

Finally, “building enduring advantages,” is arguably the most straightforward, entailing “undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology we need more quickly, and making investments in the extraordinary people of the Department, who remain our most valuable resource.” This amounts to a sensible focus on the material and human elements of capability acquisition and development necessary to counter perceived challenges/threats.

What does this “mumbling” mean for how we might understand the evolving U.S. defense posture?

“Integrated deterrence” suggests three major—and interlinked—dynamics. First, “integrated deterrence” appears not to be directly concerned with deterrence but rather dissuasion. The distinction between the two concepts is important. Deterrence, as Michael Mazzar states, “is the practice of discouraging or restraining someone” from “taking unwanted actions, such as an armed attack” and is designed “to stop or prevent an action” from taking place. Dissuasion, in contrast, is a broader concept that seeks to shape a (potential) adversary’s long-term behavior, “discouraging that country from embracing policies and building forces that could produce political confrontation, military competition, and war.”

Dissuasion, therefore, acts “not by threatening direct military retaliation as an ever-present reality”—as most theories of deterrence hold—but rather “by making clear that it will thwart and frustrate hostile steps through countervailing measures of its own.” Key to successful dissuasion is an element of reassurance: the dissuader must be able to assure the adversary that if it avoids “embracing policies and building forces” that could produce conflict, the dissuader will not proceed with countervailing measures. Dissuasion can thus be viewed as a kind of “pre-deterrence” as it is designed to address less immediate challenges through the leveraging not only of military but diplomatic and economic instruments of national power to convince a potential adversary not to pursue certain military and strategic actions that may make conflict more likely.

This, arguably, is what the United States undertook after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Here, it endeavored not only to supply Ukraine with what it required to defend itself but also sought to ensure that the conflict did not spread beyond Ukraine and/or escalate to a Russia-NATO conflict. The administration, as Janice Gross Stein argues, combated Russia’s “strategy to manipulate uncertainty”—through its repeated threats of nuclear escalation—with “a strategy to reduce uncertainty” based on the establishment of “boundary conditions” (e.g., communicated to Russia that the United States did not seek war between Russia and NATO) to guide the American response. Indeed, as reported by Politico, President Joe Biden, as early as October 2021, had identified three guidelines for the U.S. response should Russia not be deterred from invading Ukraine: “Support Ukraine—nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine, bolster NATO, and avoid a war with Russia.”

Second, the “integrated deterrence” construct suggests that the administration is concerned primarily with escalation management and burden shifting rather than deterrence. Concerning the former, the NDS (and Nuclear Posture Review, NPR, released with it) seeks to subordinate U.S. nuclear strategy to overall defense strategy where U.S. nuclear capabilities become a “backstop” to its advanced conventional capabilities. As such, “integrated deterrence” envisages U.S. nuclear capabilities as providing a “defensive mission meant only to complement offensive but non-nuclear ones.” The objective, as the NPR states, is to “strengthen deterrence and raise the nuclear threshold of our potential adversaries in regional conflict by undermining adversary confidence in strategies for limited war that rely on the threat of nuclear escalation.”

Concerning the latter, “integrated deterrence” (as detailed in policy documents such as the NDS) clearly emphasizes the role of allies and partners in both deterrence missions and force planning. Not only are “allies” mentioned 141 times in the eighty-page NDS, but the document asserts that a central task is to “anchor” American strategy in them. Such “anchoring” will be attained through prioritization of “interoperability,” enabling “coalitions with enhanced capabilities,” and developing “new operating concepts” as well as “combined, collaborative force planning.” As Van Jackson notes, this constitutes a major shift in U.S. strategy as allies “have historically featured in force planning as sources of political legitimacy, or providers of territorial access, but their expected battlefield contributions were typically treated as marginal.” “Integrated deterrence,” however, canvasses the possibility that future deterrence contingencies will not only be “all-domain but all-coalition.”

Taken together, the themes of dissuasion, escalation control, and burden shifting evident in “integrated deterrence,” combined with the contours of the U.S. response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, indicate that under the current administration, the United States is more risk-averse than in the immediate past and constitutes a tacit admission that it is no longer confident of U.S. military superiority (across the spectrum of capabilities) in possible conflict scenarios with great power rivals.

Dr. Michael Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the Centre for Future Defence and National Security, Deakin University, and an Adjunct Professor at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Congress’s latest defense bill represents an enormous failure to take the threat of China seriously—and it’s primarily the fault of certain Wall Street-friendly Republicans who were allowed to hijack the process.

Not long ago, House Republicans could have credibly argued that they were Capitol Hill’s toughest China hawks. Despite that track record, lame-duck Financial Services Committee Chairman Patrick McHenry (R-NC) and a few cronies were allowed to strip out virtually all of the important China-related national security provisions from this year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

This outcome only benefits the special interests who want to keep making money in China. And it comes with severe national security consequences for the American people.

Most concerningly, McHenry removed a bipartisan Senate amendment that would require disclosure for some U.S. investments into military technologies in China. The broadly supported amendment passed with ninety-one votes, and a similar effort in the House has drawn high-level bipartisan cosponsors, indicating a similar level of support. The top China national security experts from both parties went to bat for the provision, as did prominent conservative groups, including the Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action for America.

But while Speaker Mike Johnson could have gone over McHenry’s head to protect this provision, the latter’s fringe pro-China demands prevailed. It was a pyrrhic victory. President Biden’s weak executive order on outbound investments into China will— eventually —partially reduce the amount of U.S. pensions and investments being used to fund our own destruction. And McHenry, who announced his retirement from Congress the same month he killed bipartisan China legislation, will be remembered for helping Wall Street hide its financing of Chinese warships and fighter jets. However, he succeeded in squandering Congress’s best shot to address these dangerous investments in China for at least another year.

Shockingly, McHenry was also allowed to remove sanctions on China for fentanyl trafficking, as well as a measure to enhance scrutiny over China’s purchases of American agricultural land. He wasn’t alone in his malfeasance. Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee Chairman and Democrat Gary Peters inexplicably blocked a House measure that would stop taxpayer dollars from being used for genetic testing equipment from BGI, a company that shares customers’ genomic data with the Chinese military.

The NDAA also reflects broader failures in the Indo-Pacific, such as the missed opportunity to complete the Compacts of Free Association with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia. These critical pacts grant the United States a military monopoly over a large swath of the Pacific, and our armed forces have long relied on these privileges as part of our regional strategy. Heading into the new year with the Compacts expired, and no resolution in sight will only help China’s effort to supplant the United States and shift the military balance across the Pacific in the CCP’s favor.

Some useful provisions for deterring China did make it into the NDAA, however. It authorizes six multi-year procurement authorities for six munitions critical to any fight in the Pacific, a significant change that could speed up production and drive down costs. This is important because the United States faces a munitions supply crisis as it confronts multiple security threats in different military theaters. The bill also adds Taiwan to a list of countries eligible for expedited munitions sales, authorizes the San Antonio-class amphibious ship requested by the Marine Corps, and includes essential planning and funding for the defense of Guam and Hawaii, along with coalition-building in the Indo-Pacific.

House Republicans also succeeded in establishing the sea-launched cruise missile nuclear program (SLCM-N) as a program of record, over the objections of the Biden administration. Despite the administration’s protests and the political appointees in the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), SLCM-N is critical to establishing an effective deterrent against China’s ever-expanding nuclear arsenal.

These overdue incremental achievements are welcome, but make no mistake: the Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Budget is a gift to Xi Jinping. The NDAA is always one of Congress’s most significant opportunities for national security action. To their credit, both the House and Senate came to the table with proposals to address urgent threats from China. But almost none of them survived the closed-door negotiations, and it is shameful that Congress couldn’t even agree that we should scrutinize— much less prohibit —the financing of Chinese weapons that will be aimed at U.S. soldiers.                                                                                                                         

Time is short. This year, China’s military aggression toward Taiwan has increased to unprecedented levels. Almost immediately after President Biden’s concessionary summit with Xi Jinping, aggressive Chinese actions in the South China Sea nearly brought it to the brink of armed conflict with the Philippines—a U.S. treaty ally.

China couldn’t have asked for a better outcome in this year’s NDAA, but the American people should demand one. Congress should fix this —quickly.

Bryan Burack is a Senior Policy Advisor for China and the Indo-Pacific in the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. Wilson Beaver is a Senior Policy Analyst for Defense Budgeting at Heritage’s Center for Defense Policy.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: The article discusses the F-111 Aardvark, a Cold War-era strike aircraft known for its sweep-wing design and two-seat configuration. It served in the Vietnam War and remained in the US Air Force's fleet until the late 1990s, while the Royal Australian Air Force used it until 2010. The article explores whether the US retired the F-111 too early. The F-111 was a Cold War-era strike aircraft, distinct for its sweep-wing format and two-seat configuration. The F-111 debuted during the Vietnam War and served venerably for decades. The US Air Force didn’t retire the F-111 Aardvark until the late 1990s. Yet, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) kept imported F-111s in service until 2010, raising the question: did America retire the F-111 too early? The answer depends on your perspective and your priorities.   

Initially, the F-111 was designed with an A-variant and a B-variant. The A-variant was to be used with the US Air Force; the B-variant was to be used with the US Navy. The B-variant was scrapped before entering production, however, while the A-variant became the F-111 that would serve for multiple decades.

Nicknamed “Aardvark” because of the airframe’s distinctively long nose, the F-111 debuted a variety of then-novel technologies. Most notably, the F-111 was the first sweep-wing aircraft ever to enter production. The sweep-wing, which became familiar to the general public thanks to the sweep-wing F-14 Tomcat featured so prominently in Tony Scott’s Top Gun, is a wing that can pivot back and forth, mid-flight, to change the shape of the aircraft.

The result is an aircraft that can operate in a straight-wing configuration (creating maneuverability at low speeds) and a swept-wing configuration (to achieve supersonic speeds). The Aardvark’s wings could sweep between 16 degrees and 72.5 degrees.

Sweep-wing technology never became the standard for military jets. The majority of military aircraft feature fixed wings. Yet, several prominent jets incorporated sweep-wings, including the Su-17, MiG-23, Tu-22M, Su-24, Tu-160, B-1 Lancer, Panavia Tornado, and of course, the F-14.

The F-111 introduced more than just swept-wings; The F-111 had afterburners on turbofan engines, a terrain-following guidance system – and an escape capsule for ejecting the entire two-person crew together. The afterburners and terrain-following guidance have become standard features in military aviation.

While the F-111 debuted several new features, the jet did resemble a contemporary: the A-6 Intruder, best remembered for the film Flight of the Intruder, featured Danny Glover and Willem Dafoe. Like the F-111, the A-6 could operate in all-weather conditions and was designed to penetrate enemy defenses, using terrain-following guidance and drop bombs. But where the A-6 was slow and bulbous, the F-111 was sleek and fast, with swept-wings and supersonic top speeds.

The F-111 entered service in time to join the American effort against the North Vietnamese. However, the F-111’s first deployment did not go well. Debuting in March 1968, F-111s began crashing. The cause of the crashes was a mystery. After a third F-111 crashed in just two months, the new jet was grounded and the problem was diagnosed: a hydraulic control-valve rod for the horizontal stabilizer sometimes caused the F-111 to defy the pilot’s inputs and pitch up dangerously.

When the entire fleet was inspected for the horizontal stabilizer flaw, 42 jets were found to feature the problem. The F-111 fleet would not become operational again for three years.

Once the horizontal stabilizer problem was sorted, the F-111 became an asset to US efforts, effectively delivering ordnance during Operation Linebacker and Operation Linebacker II. The North Vietnamese came to fear the F-111 specifically, referring to the strike aircraft as “Whispering Death.”

The F-111s were still in service when the US commenced Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The F-111 served admirably, completing 3.2 successful strike missions for every unsuccessful strike mission; the F-111s success ratio was better than any other strike aircraft that the US used during the conflict. Yet, just a few years after outperforming newer and more heralded strike aircraft, the F-111 would be retired from service – more than a decade before the Australians would retire the F-111 – begging the question: did the Americans retire the F-111 too early?

The answer comes down to how much you want to spend on defense. The F-111’s performance was still adequate to warrant inclusion in the US’s force structure. But the Cold War era jet required a lot of maintenance time for each hour of flight time – meaning that the jet was rather expensive to maintain. And by the late 90s, the US had versatile airframes (like the F/A-18 Super Hornet and F-15E Strike Eagle) that could slot in and perform the F-111s functions reasonably well.

Maybe the F-111 was better at its sole and specific strike function. But the versatile airframes were more cost-effective – which counted for more in the cost-conscious post-Cold War era.

Keeping the F-111 in service would have given the US a broader depth of strike options – but in the unipolar moment of the 1990s, the cost was hard to justify.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

HIMARS artillery systems are powerful weapons of war and, when sent to Ukraine, were considered a game changer on the battlefield. 

Since being introduced, social media lights up anytime we get footage of these systems being used in action.

We know one thing: Putin might want to shut off his smartphone if he comes across any of these videos. 

Back in April, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense showed that it had a true sense of humor when it posted a short video clip to social media.

In the 34-second-long video, three U.S.-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) launchers could be seen firing multiple rounds toward Russian positions.

"Stop, HIMARS time!," @DefenceU captioned the post to Twitter – a reference to the 1990 song "U Can't Touch This" by rapper MC Hammer, which had the line "Stop, Hammer Time!"

That riff has become a popular meme on social media, and while still considered somewhat of a "novelty song," the track has been seen millions of times since it was first posted to the video-sharing service 14 years ago.

Some commentators on social media also noted, perhaps intentionally, that the HIMARS video featured a background of a clear blue sky.

At the same time, the launchers were positioned on a yellow field that comes into focus as the rocket lit up the early morning sky.

It briefly appears reminiscent of the Ukrainian flag.

Ukraine's Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi also shared the footage to his Telegram channel and wrote "Ukrainian artillery proves its effectiveness. It destroys thousands of units of soldiers and enemy equipment. Along with foreign weapons, Ukrainian soldiers skillfully combine domestic artillery systems that affect hostile objects on the battlefield. The 27th, 43rd and 107, jet and artillery brigades have repeatedly proved their productivity. They provide powerful fire support during various military operations."

Syrskyi added, "I am proud of our artillery! Glory to Ukraine and our heroes!"

The lightweight rocket launchers have been seen as a potential game changer for Kyiv, as they have a range of 50 miles, and have already been used with great success to strike Russian ammunition depots, bridges, and other high-value targets.

The video was shared on social media back in April just days after the United States Department of Defense (DoD) announced at the time that it would provide a $2.6 billion security aid package that included additional ammunition for the HIMARS. 

Stop, HIMARS time!

???? Ukrainian Land Forces pic.twitter.com/Kimu4edhjh

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) April 9, 2023

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Russia’s Ukraine invasion is often referred to as a “drone war,” which is apt considering the prevalent role unmanned aerial vehicles have played.

Since February 2022, Kyiv has relied on a combination of foreign-supplied and domestically produced drones to support its defensive efforts.

Moscow has also manufactured its own UAVs, although Russian forces largely depend on continuous influxes of Iran-designed drones. 

These relatively cheap and easily manufactured aerial weapons have grown to symbolize modern warfare. 

Late last year, open-source intelligence group Ukraine Weapons Tracker published a video showing one of these drones at work.

In the footage, a Ukrainian first-person view loitering munition appears to strike a Russian TOS-1A thermobaric multiple rocket launcher. The short clip culminates in a powerful detonation of the rockets on board. 

Since the onset of the invasion, Ukrainian engineers have been working hard to design more advanced and capable drones that can be manufactured right in Kyiv. Over the summer, the New York Times identified two new drones used by Ukraine in the war — the Bober and the UJ-22 Airborne. 

Although little information is available about these drones, both were used in barrages targeting Russian territory. The box-like Bober UAV was identified in several videos of attacks on Moscow. Named after the Ukrainian word for Beaver, this UAV is likely being deployed amid Kyiv’s counter-offensive efforts. 

According to state sources, Ukraine’s UJ-22 UAV can fly for six hours at a range of 500 miles. 

In the video shared by Ukraine Weapons Tracker on X, a Russian TOS-1A appears to be destroyed by the Ukrainian-launched UAV.

Often referred to as a “vacuum bomb,” this weapon disperses gaseous clouds of chemicals in the air, which creates a vacuum that can ignite a powerful ripping effect on soft materials when reversed.

This horrifying system dates back to the Cold War and was first used by the Russian Army in Chechnya. It is typically fitted onto a T-72 main battle tank, which is capable of holding up to two dozen unguided thermobaric rockets. 

As detailed by The Drive,“Once the target is hit, the first explosive charge allows the fuel container to open and disperse a cloud of fuel, and the second charge ignites the incendiary fuel cloud which results in the fiery explosion and a subsequent oxygen-sucking vacuum. The detonation of the rockets causes such a rapid and drastic change in air pressure that taking shelter within a trench or cave, behind a reinforced barrier, or, in some cases, even inside of an armored vehicle would fail to protect a human.”

The destruction of the TOS-1A in the footage above is a win for Kyiv. In recent months, Russian Forces have been trying to retake the offensive in the war, which proved to be a painful feat.

While Kyiv managed to breach Russia’s main line of defenses back in August, it has struggled to expand that gap into a major breach that would enable its troops to advance forward. 

#Ukraine: A Ukrainian FPV loitering munition struck a Russian TOS-1A thermobaric multiple rocket launcher- leading to the powerful detonation of the rockets on board. pic.twitter.com/ObqLSp0l2O

— ???????? Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) October 13, 2023

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Video on Social Media Presents View From Within Su-25 Cockpit in Ukraine: A video shared on social media last year offered the view from within a Ukrainian Su-25.

Though just 26 seconds long, the clip provided a glimpse of what it is like for Ukrainian pilots to fly low and fast while firing at an enemy position.

Several missiles can be seen launched, while the aircraft's Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) lit up like a Christmas tree, suggesting the aircraft was facing threats from numerous radar systems including airborne, early warning, and even short-range.

The video was posted by the open-source military intelligence monitor OSINT Technical (@Osinttechnical) and has since been seen more than many times.

Though the GPS coordinates were blurred out, at the end of the clip the aircraft appears to pass over a bombed-out urban center – indicating that this particular sortie may have taken place in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine.

Developed during the Cold War for the Soviet Ground Forces, the Sukhoi Su-25 Grach (Russian for "Rook" – NATO reporting name "Frogfoot") is a subsonic, single-seat, twin-engine jet aircraft that was designed to provide close air support.

It has been described as Russia's "flying tank," and is broadly analogous to the United States Air Force's A-10 Thunderbolt II. 

However, it is actually employed by both sides – as noted in the recent video.

Powered by two Soyuz/Tumansky R-195 turbojet engines, the Su-25 has a maximum speed of Mach 0.79 or 975 km/h (606 mph), and a range of 1,000 km (620 miles).

It has eleven hardpoints with the capacity to carry up to 4,400 kg (9,700 pounds) of ordnance, including rockets, air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, and a variety of bombs, including the BETAB-500 concrete-penetrating bomb.

It is also armed with a 30 mm Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-30-2 autocannon with 250 rounds, as well as SPPU-22 gun pods for two 23 mm Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-23 autocannons with 260 rounds.

It first entered service in 1978 and was used extensively during the Soviet-Afghan War to strike at Mujahedeen positions.

Nearly two dozen were lost in combat operations, including nine that were destroyed on the ground.

The Su-25 also proved successful against armored vehicles during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), with only one confirmed to have been lost in combat. As a result, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein decorated all of the Iraqi Air Force's Su-25 pilots with the nation's highest military decoration.

During the Gulf War of 1991, the air superiority of the coalition forces was so great that the Iraqi Air Force never stood a chance.

As a result, seven Su-25s were among the more than three dozen Iraqi aircraft that fled to Iran, while two were shot down in the early stages of the conflict.

Low-level Ukrainian Su-25 operations in the east from fin_foin. pic.twitter.com/gvTgCf9kG2

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) March 30, 2023

More than 1,000 of the Su-25s were produced between 1978 and 2017.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, both Russia and Ukraine maintained a number of the ground attack aircraft. Some of the Ukrainian Air Force's Su-25s have been modernized, and a number of previously "retired" jets were made airworthy and returned to service.

Kyiv has also received at least a dozen from the Bulgarian Air Force, and as of 2022, it has thirty-one Su-25s in its air fleet. These continue to be used to conduct attacks against Russian positions as seen in the video.

Russia has maintained even more Su-25s, and the ground attack jet is operated by Russian Aerospace Forces, as well as by the Wagner PMC, the mercenary group that was supporting  Kremlin's war effort in the Donbas region until last year.

The Russian Navy also operates an adapted version of the Su-25UB two-seat trainer, the Su-25UTG, a carrier-capable variant that has been used to carry out deck-landing training aboard Moscow's sole aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov.

Despite its age, the Su-25 will likely continue to be employed by both sides in the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs<

Poland Has Received Additional M1A1 Tanks From the U.S. - NATO ally Poland received 29 U.S.-made M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks (MBTs) from the United States this month. The tanks arrived at the port city of winouj cie in Western Pomerania, along with 79 Oshkosh mine-resistant ambush-protected all-terrain vehicles.

The MBTs are part of a 1.3-billion ($1.4 billion) deal that Warsaw inked with Washington last year to receive 116 M1A1 models of the Abrams, which will complement the Polish military's upcoming 250 M1A2 SEPv3 models that will be received by 2026. Warsaw received the first batch of the M1A1 tanks last June and is expected to receive the rest of that order by the end of this year.

Poland became the first NATO country – other than the United States – to operate the Abrams.

The procurement of the American-made MBTs – considered among the best in the world – is to fill the void left by Poland's transfer of its older T-72, early model Leopard 2, and PT-91 Twardy tanks to Ukraine last year.

Before entering service, the newly arrived Abrams MBTs will undergo an inspection at the Pozna Military Motorization Works. Following the satisfactory checks, the tanks will be turned over to the soldiers from the 1st Warsaw Armored Brigade.

The U.S. tanks, which are equipped with a 120 mm M256 smoothbore gun and a Honeywell AGT1500 turbine drive unit capable of generating 1500 KM of power, were previously employed by the United States Marine Corps. The service had announced in 2020 that it would eliminate its tank force, with the majority of its Abrams transferred to the U.S. Army.

It was announced in November that the Polish military would integrate the SitaWare suite of C4ISR technology from Systematic into its newly acquired M1 Abrams tanks and support vehicles. The technology is intended to equip the 18th Mechanized Division with advanced command-and-control, as well as tactical communication systems, providing a boost to Poland's armored and battlefield engineering operations, adding that the SitaWare Frontline battle management system will be installed across the Polish military's fleet of M1A1 and M1A2 SEP V3 Abrams main battle tanks, alongside various support vehicles.

The software supports a wide range of interoperability standards and features an open architecture design, which is intended to facilitate seamless data exchange and connectivity across command structures.

Other upgrades include the Firepower Enhancement Program (FEP), which provides improved thermal imaging, alterations in the fire control system, a navigation module, and a laser rangefinder, as well as various diagnostic systems. Moreover, the M1A1 Abrams tanks have received an upgraded commander's observation dome – the Abrams Integrated Display And Targeting System (AIDATS) – which provides superior camera capabilities that facilitate target detection and identification from greater distances. Some of the MBTs supplied to Poland also feature additional side modules of reinforced armor.

The U.S. Army has noted that the delivery of the MBTs will further improve the U.S. Army's interoperability with the Polish armed forces and will significantly boost the nations' combined military deterrence strength.

As reported by The Defense Post, Warsaw has been increasingly open about its defense spending to deter any would-be aggressors – notably Russia – in light of the war in Ukraine.

Last year, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki shared that the upcoming military budget would amount to four percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), a significant increase from the previous year's three percent. It will also exceed NATO's spending target of two percent of GDP for its members.

In addition to the deal with the United States for the M1 Abrams MBTs, Poland has also begun purchasing capabilities from other countries, notably 180 K2 Black Panther tanks from South Korea.

The first batch of South Korean K2 Black Panther main battle tanks (MBTs) and K9A1 Thunder self-propelled howitzers arrived at the Polish port city of Gdynia in December 2022. In total, the South Korean-based Hyundai Rotem will supply Poland with 180 K2 MBTs by 2025 – and the delivery will also include a training/logistics package along with ammunition for the tanks. During the second stage of the framework agreement between Warsaw and Seoul, the Polish military is expected to receive a total of 820 K2PL MBTs.

While not as speedy as its animal namesake, the Black Panther MBT can still hunt down its slower-moving prey thanks to its license-built MTU MB 883 Ka501 diesel engine, which produces 1,500 horsepower. It can reach a top speed of 43 mph on the road, and 31 mph cross country. There is also an auxiliary gas turbine power unit, offering 400 horsepower.

The tank also is equipped with a unique suspension system, which can be contorted into a variety of positions. For cross-country performance, the suspension is raised, providing the K2 greater ground clearance, while on roads, the suspension is lowered, hugging the ground for better speed. In addition, the K2 can "lean," "sit" or "kneel" to provide the main gun better maneuverability in hull-down positions.

Polish land forces also operate the German-made Leopard 2A4 and Leopard 2A5 tanks, so its future armored forces will have a truly diverse mix of MBTs. Polish defense officials have said the acquisition of these vehicles is to enable the country's military to counter Russia's T-14 Armata tank.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author at Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Greece Wants the F-35 – But Turkey and Sweden Could Delay That Acquisition - Currently, ten NATO members, along with another half a dozen partner nations, either operate or plan to adopt the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. Two NATO alliance countries would like to join the program. One likely will never operate the fifth-generation stealth fighter, while the other is currently in a related "holding pattern."

Those countries are regional rivals Turkey and Greece.

As has been previously reported, Turkey was famously expelled from the program despite being an early program member after Ankara moved forward with its controversial decision to adopt the Russian-made S-400 "Triumf" air defense system. The United States and NATO argued that the systems were incompatible and that utilizing both would compromise the security of the fighter jet.

It remains unclear whether Turkey regrets its decision, and there has been speculation it only moved forward as a matter of principle and to save face. To date, Ankara's S-400s are not currently operational.

It was just last month that Turkish Defense Minister Ya ar Güler told reporters that the S-400 system would only be utilized when needed.

"This is a defense system. Don't we use a defensive weapon when someone attacks us? No country launches an attack on another by declaring, 'I will attack you in two hours.' In a wartime scenario, you need to move your aircraft, operate hundreds of trains and declare mobilization, and so on. In other words, for a country to launch an airstrike on another without anyone noticing is very difficult," Güler told journalists, per NordicMonitor.com.

Greece has also sought the F-35, yet any proposed sale by the U.S. of fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets to Athens is reportedly being delayed due to the complex geopolitics of Washington's relations with Turkey.

Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis said in an interview with Skai TV on Saturday that it is only a matter of time before Greece joined the F-35 program, but he also acknowledged the complexity of the situation.

Gerapetritis made the comments in advance of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's visit to Athens, and the minister said he would again request the purchase of the Lightning II.

"They (F-35) would significantly upgrade the country's defense. We will discuss this issue (during Blinken’s visit). I believe there will be positive developments," Gerapetritis explained.

Any request from Athens also comes after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's landmark visit to Greece last month, after the two neighboring countries experienced a tumultuous relationship in recent years.

Erdogan said in a news conference with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Athens, that any issue between Turkey and Greece could be resolved and that together the aim was to "turn the Aegean into a sea of peace and cooperation."

Turkey and Greece announced the Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations and Good-Neighborliness, in which they stressed that they are committed to fostering friendly relations, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and understanding and seeking resolution to any dispute between in line with international law.

Greece has for years been seeking to buy twenty of the fifth-generation aircraft, with an option to buy an additional 20 F-35As over time.

However, it has been reported that Washington has essentially tied the acceptance response to Athens with the progress of the request made by Ankara for the acquisition of new F-16 "Viper" aircraft, along with the upgrade of older ones now in Turkey's arsenal.

Essentially, the U.S. seeks to simultaneously announce the sale of the Turkish F-16s and the Greek F-35s to maintain some semblance of balance in the Aegean.

The situation has been further complicated by the continued holdup of Sweden's NATO accession, which has prevented the request for F-16s from being approved, and in turn that has caused a delay in the F-35s being sold to Greece as well.

It was in October that Erdogan submitted a bill to the country's parliament approving Sweden's NATO membership. However, the Parliament is delaying the ratification of the bill – and experts have suggested it is being held up over the F-16.

While the White House has said that the is no quid pro quo and that any F-16 sale to Turkey would be independent of Ankara's approval of Sweden's membership in NATO, it does seem that if Turkey gets the F-16s, Greece could get the F-35s and Sweden could join NATO.

To make all of it happen, Secretary Blinken will likely be logging a lot of miles. 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Even as the Russian Navy's flagship aircraft carrier shows no signs of heading to sea anytime soon, its submarine force has seen the addition of two nuclear submarines, which were commissioned at the Sevmash Shipyard in Severodvinsk. The ceremony for the new boats was attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The first of the submarines was the Project 955A Borey-A Imperator Aleksandr III (Emperor Alexander III) the fourth SSBN of the class, and the third in the Pacific Fleet. The new vessel was built by Sevmash under a May 2012 contract with its keel laid in December 2015, while it was rolled out from the shipyard hall in December 2022. Imperator Aleksandr III underwent a series of sea trials last summer and fall. However, as Naval News reported, the first three Project 955 SSBNs were different, and employed hull sections from the unfinished Project 971 Shchuka-B SSNs.

The second vessel to raise the flag on December 11, 2023, was the K-571 Krasnoyarsk, a Project 885M (08851) Yasen-M nuclear-powered attack submarine. It was the third boat from the project, and the second of its class intended for the Pacific Fleet.

The SSNs of Project 885M are a modification of the prototype K-560 Severodvinsk of Project 885, and will become the first main underwater carriers of Russia's 3M22 Tsircon hypersonic missile. In addition, the Russian SSNs of the 885/885M project can carry missiles of the Kalibr-PL system as well as the supersonic 3M55 Onyx anti-ship missiles. The cruise missile subs were developed in the late 1980s by the St. Petersburg-based Malakhit Design Bureau of Machine-Building. It was initially intended to replace the aging Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarines.

"With such vessels and such weapons, Russia will feel that it is safe," Putin told officials and naval officers at the inauguration ceremony.

Both of the newly commissioned submarines are expected to serve with the Russian Navy's Pacific Fleet.

The Sevmash shipyard is currently constructing three more Borey-A SSBNs, which had been due to be launched by the end of last year for the Russian Navy but failed to meet the deadline.

Putin also announced that eight more submarines will be produced in the coming years – including five Yasen-M and three Borei-A. However, some naval analysts have said it could be a costly move, as each of the Boeri-A class boats cost more than 650 million euros ($711 million).

"The submarines will come at the expense of resources allocated to other branches of the military," Jeff Hawn, a specialist in Russian military matters and an external consultant for the New Lines Institute, an American geopolitical research firm, told France24.com.

However, other experts have suggested that Putin can ill afford to abandon his maritime modernization program, regardless of its cost.

"Vladimir Putin has constantly repeated that the West represents a threat, and he must now prove to his public that he is taking the necessary measures to defend Russia," added Sim Tack, a military analyst for Force Analysis, a conflict monitoring company.

The Russian Navy's submariners will also be engaging in training for a new "cold war," one that literally involves operations under the Arctic Sea ice.

According to a report from The Barents Observer on Wednesday, citing an announcement from the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet, nuclear submarine crews will undergo both theoretical and practical training and special attention will be given to under-ice operations of the strategic subs.

The exercise "confirms the capacity of the strategic nuclear naval forces to resolve problems from any part of the Arctic," read the fleet's statement.

The Russian Navy has long conducted comprehensive under-ice Arctic operations, but it is now renewing its focus on the waters to its north. As The Barents Observer also noted, the Northern Fleet is based in Severomorsk, Kola Peninsula, and is the most powerful unit in Russia’s Navy, with a significant number of nuclear submarines, among them two strategic subs of the Borei class.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

B-1B Lancers Grounded at Ellsworth AFB But Still Flying From Dyess - The Rockwell B1 Lancer has been grounded at Ellsworth Air Force Base (AFB), South Dakota, for at least two weeks as investigators begin probing what caused the crash of one of the long-range strategic bombers last week.

All four of the crew were able to safely eject and survived the crash. Three were treated for minor injuries, while one was admitted to the hospital with non-life-threatening injuries.

Regular flying operations in the B-1 at Ellsworth AFB were halted on January 5, the day after the accident, and are slated to remain grounded until January 19, according to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) flight notice. The base, which features a single runway, may extend that downtime as needed, the Air Force Times reported.

The downed bomber was one of two B-1 Lancers participating in a local training mission in the early evening of January 4. While the lead aircraft landed safely at Ellsworth, the second Lancer crashed on approach around 5:50 p.m. local time, the Air Force said. The National Weather Service reported low visibility and freezing conditions at the time of the accident.

It was the first major crash of a B-1 since 2013.

Satellite images of the wreck, taken from Planet Labs, have made the rounds online and as reported by TheDrive, show the bomber resting off to the side of the runway at Ellsworth. It appears that the aircraft undershot the runway, and impacted the ground just before the runway threshold.

"Prominent black marks suggestive of the impact/touchdown point are visible just before the chevrons that demarcate the threshold area. This scarring does not exist in imagery taken of the base in months past," TheDrive noted. The bomber then veered to the left and off the runway.

The crash is being investigated.

Though Ellsworth AFB has grounded its bombers, the B-1 Lancer will continue to fly from Dyess AFB, Texas.

"The B-1B Lancers assigned to Dyess are currently undergoing normal daily operations and will continue to stand ready to deliver combat capabilities at a moment?s notice," the base announced this week.

The host unit at Dyess is the 7th Bomb Wing of the Global Strike Command, which was activated on October 1, 1993. The wing performs combat training with the Boeing B-1B Lancer bomber and is currently the United States Air Force's premier operational B-1B unit with 36 aircraft.

The B-1 supersonic bomber first entered service in the mid-1980s. It continues to be used to support the U.S. bomber presence in the Asia-Pacific region and to conduct close air support missions in U.S. operations around the world. Since the end of the Cold War, it does not carry nuclear weapons.

The B-1 has a blended wing body configuration, with a variable-sweep wing, four turbofan engines, triangular ride-control fins, and a cruciform tail. The wings can sweep from 15 to 67.5 degrees (full forward to full sweep). Forward-swept wing settings are used for takeoff, landings, and high-altitude economical cruise. Aft-swept wing settings are used in high subsonic and supersonic flight.

A total of 104 were originally built, yet fewer than 60 remain in service today. The bombers are stationed at Dyess AFB, Texas, and Ellsworth AFB.

The sad reality is that the B-1B Lancer is getting older and has many hours of service time used up. As the B-21 Raider emerges, the B-1 will be fazed out. 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

As tensions between Pyongyang and Washington continue to tighten, the U.S. will intensify its deterrent capabilities. And that means many more B-2 Elephant Walks in the future. 

The three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad — land-launched nuclear missiles, strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles — have remained a top priority for the U.S. military for nearly seven decades.

As the crux of America’s deterrence strategy, these three elements lend to the military’s mutual assured destruction doctrine, especially as the Biden Administration worries about arms builds ups from China and North Korea in Asia.

Simply put, if another nation launches a nuclear attack targeting the U.S, the U.S. military would respond with a massive retaliation using its own nukes.

This second-strike capability is assured by the three different legs.

Even if one leg fails to launch, the U.S. has two other means to strike. 

Late last year, the North Korean government threatened that the deployment and presence of U.S. bombers, aircraft carriers, or missile submarines around the Korean peninsula would meet the criteria for nuclear retaliation.

These remarks followed the surfacing of the USS Kentucky at the Port of Busan, marking the first visit by an American nuclear submarine to the peninsula since the 1980s.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un also accused the Biden administration of meeting with its South Korean counterparts to discuss plans to use nuclear weapons against North Korea. 

The escalating rhetoric by Pyongyang highlights the importance of America’s nuclear triad.

The good news is that America and its allies have lots of non-kinetic ways to respond. 

For example, back in 2022, B-2 Spirit stealth bombers carried out a training exercise at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, an important 'elephant walk'.

As described by 509th Operations Group commander Col. Geoffrey Steeves, the Spirit Vigilance drills served as reminder that “the B-2 Spirit bomber is the visible leg of the nuclear triad, adding that “the B-2 is the world’s most strategic aircraft. It is the only aircraft on the planet that combines stealth, payload, and long-range strike. 

“We are charged with delivering the nation’s most powerful weapons for our most important missions.”

He added: “We are displaying a capability here to rapidly generate and deploy [the B-2] under greater scrutiny and time restraints than the normal day-to-day flying mission,” Steeves said. “Here we demonstrate to our near peer adversaries, as well as to ourselves, how well we can perform.”

“When we think of near peers and peer adversaries, we have to think multiple steps ahead,” Collier said. “We have to maintain an advantage, and in everything we do, we are thinking, ‘How do we meet a threat?’ but also ‘how do we lean forward and think about the next threat?’ We’re not training for the past or the now, we’re training for the future. That’s how you maintain an advantage.”

In total, 8 B-2 Spirit stealth bombers were put on the tarmac as a warning, as no nation on Earth has anything like the B-2. Not even China or Russia. 

Stealth airframes are designed to operate undercover, but the B-2 is different.

The bomber’s role in strategic deterrence relies on America’s adversaries knowing exactly what it can do. Capable of all-altitude attack missions at long ranges, the Spirit can fly to any point in the world within a matter of hours. The stealth bomber can carry a payload of up to 40,000 pounds, including conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. Over the years, several key improvements have been incorporated into the B-2, including a Rockwell Collins TCN-250 tactical air navigation system and a Ku-band active electronically scanned array antenna. 

According to Airforce Technology, the Air Force in 2008 began a program to give the Spirit the capability to attack moving targets using precision-guided weapons. 

In light of the growing North Korean threat, the continued development and enhancement of the B-2 and other elements of America’s nuclear triad is essential to national security. As explained by Col. Steeves, “When we think of near peers and peer adversaries, we have to think multiple steps ahead. We have to maintain an advantage, and in everything we do, we are thinking, ‘how do we meet a threat?’ but also ‘how do we lean forward and think about the next threat?’ We’re not training for the past or the now, we’re training for the future. That’s how you maintain an advantage.”

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org 

In November 2021, A-10 Warthogs from the 104th Fighter Squadron conducted an elephant walk at Warfield Air National Guard Base in Maryland. You can see a good example of an A-10 elephant walk in the video below.

The elephant walk was conducted with 16 Warthogs.

“Seeing our entire fleet on the runway, it’s just an awesome display of combat power,” said USAF Colonel Richard D. Hunt. “Our maintainers are some of the best in the Air Force, and this is concrete proof of our ability to bring the full force of our airpower to bear whenever it is needed.”

According to a press release: “The readiness exercise highlighted the ability and rapid mobility of the MDANG’s airpower, demonstrating their ability to launch combat-ready A-10s that are deployable for no-notice contingency operations.”

“Our ability to generate combat airpower at a moment’s notice helps promote regional stability because we can immediately respond to any threat,” said USAF Brigadier General Paul D. Johnson. “The 175th Wing is always ready to answer our nation's call and defend our country from our adversaries. We know they are watching, so it is good for them to know we can bring the fight at any time. I’m proud of our Airmen’s ability to generate and employ with the highest level of excellence in a contested environment and with complete [operational security].”

The airframe used in the MDANG elephant walk was the A-10 Warthog – commonly regarded as the best close air support airframe ever made. The A-10 was built around a 30mm GAU-8/A Avenger cannon with 1,350 rounds of ammunition.

The Avenger cannon is basically a gatling gun capable of destroying tanks and armored vehicles and enemy fortifications.

The A-10 was designed, with straight wings and high stability, to fly low and slow. Flying low and slow makes the A-10 an easy target, so the airframe was built to be durable – with the engines above the wing, and the cockpit encased in what is essentially a titanium bathtub.

“Generating this many A-10s is a testament to all the teamwork that it takes to keep us operationally ready,” said USAF Air Force Colonel David Wright. “As proud as I am of the job our Airmen did, I can’t say I’m surprised by it. Combat readiness is what we do, and our people always rise to the occasion.”

Task & Purpose was kind enough to break down the cumulative figures on display during the 16-ship A-10 elephant walk.

Here are the numbers: 21,600 rounds of GAU-8/A ammo; 32 General Electric turbofan engines (two per jet); $156.8 million worth of aircraft (about $10 million per jet); 176,000 pounds of fuel (11,000 pounds of fuel per jet when fully loaded); 19,200 pounds of titanium armor (1,200 each); and up to 256,000 pounds of mixed ordinance.

In all, it was an impressive display.

The USAF has been ramping up its show of force displays, which includes elephant walks.

The timing is not a coincidence, but rather coincides with escalations in tension between the US and Russia, and between the US and China – two adversaries that have made territorial claims in light of US resistance.

It seems unlikely that the MDANG’s 16-ship A-10 elephant walk had any sort of deterring effect on either Russia or China. Russia invaded Ukraine just a few months after the A-10 elephant walk.

Harrison Kass is a senior editor with over 1,000 published articles. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

F-15 Strike Eagles in a 2022 Elephant Walk - The United States Air Force has conducted a number of impressive "elephant walks" –the term for taxiing a number of aircraft before takeoff – in recent years. In addition to the close formation on the ground, it can involve a minimum interval takeoff.

It was just a few years ago that a formation of two dozen F-15C/D Eagle fighter jets assigned to the 44th and 67th Fighter Squadrons, a KC-135 Stratotanker assigned to the 909th Air Refueling Squadron, an E-3 Sentry assigned to the 961st Airborne Air Control Squadron, and an HH-60 Pavehawk assigned to the 33rd Rescue Squadron was seen lined up on the runway as a part of routine wing readiness exercise at Kadena Air Base, Japan.

As Defence-Blog reported, "The goal of this exercise was to execute a short notice, agile combat execution-style deployment and generation. The large formation movement was part of a routine exercise scenario that tested the 18th Wing’s ability to generate airpower in support of the defense of Japan and other partner nations, ensuring the stability and security of a free and open Indo-Pacific."

It was a decade earlier, on April 16 at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base (AFB), North Carolina, when nearly seventy F-15 Strike Eagles also took part in what was among the largest such elephant walks involving the fourth-generation aircraft.

The Strike Eagles from the United States Air Force's 4th Fighter Wing – with aircrews assigned to the 4th Fighter Wing's 333rd, 334th, 335th, and 336th Fighter Squadrons – had lined up on the runway during a Turkey Shoot training mission, in which the more than five dozen aircraft successfully destroyed in excess of 1,000 targets on bombing ranges across the state to commemorate the 4th's victory over the Luftwaffe on April 16, 1945.

The first elephant walks occurred during the Second World War when large fleets of allied bombers massed for attacks – and observers on the ground noted that as the aircraft lined up, it resembled the nose-to-tail formations of elephants walking to a watering hole.

Today, the U.S. Air Force employs elephant walks to show the capability of a unit as well as the teamwork that is required to conduct such an operation. It also can help pilots prepare for the launching of fully armed aircraft in a mass event if needed.

The F-15 Eagle was developed to keep pace with the emergence of the MiG-23 and MiG-24 fighters, the United States Air Force sought to replace its fleet of McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom IIs, which had been in service since 1960. The program began in 1967 and after more than two years of intensive testing and evaluation, the Air Force awarded McDonnell Douglas the F-15 Advanced Tactical Fighter contract, after the aviation maker placed first amongst the three competitors in all phases of the competition but also had the lowest contract price.

The single-seat, all-weather, air-superiority fighter was a noted departure from the F-4, a tandem two-seat, long-range jet interceptor, and fighter bomber. While the F-4 could engage a ground-attack role, this was initially deemed unnecessary by the F-15 Special Project Board.

However, the designers at McDonnell Douglas continued to work on a potent multi-role version of the F-15E Strike Eagle, which can fulfill both roles of air-to-air superiority and ground strike. That provided the USAF with an aircraft that could fight its way to enemy territory, engage and destroy enemy aircraft, destroy an assigned ground target, and fight its way back home without the need for additional air support.

In its decades in service, the F-15 has racked up more than 100 victories in the sky and yet suffered not a single loss in aerial combat. It is easy to see why the high-flying Eagle/Strike Eagle can make an adversary take notice when it lines up on a runway in an elephant walk.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

In recent years, the United States Air Force has conducted a number of very high-profile "elephant walks," the term for taxiing a number of aircraft before takeoff. In addition to the close formation on the ground, it can involve a minimum interval takeoff.

The first elephant walks occurred during the Second World War when large fleets of allied bombers massed for attacks – and observers on the ground noted that as the aircraft lined up, it resembled the nose-to-tail formations of elephants walking to a watering hole. Today, the U.S. Air Force employs elephant walks to show the capability of a unit as well as the teamwork that is required to conduct such an operation.

It also can help pilots prepare for the launching of fully armed aircraft in a mass event if needed.

While during World War II, dozens and even hundreds of bombers could be lined up, recent elephant walks are far smaller but no less impressive, especially considering the capabilities of modern aircraft.

Such was the case in January 2020, when the United States Air Force's Active Duty 388th and Reserve 419th Fighter Wings conducted the Combat Power Exercise at Hill Air Force Base (AFB), Utah with 52 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II 35As – the conventional takeoff and landing variant of the U.S. military's Joint Strike Fighter.

The elephant walk of the F-35 Lightning IIs was employed to demonstrate the "ability to employ a large force of F-35As" as well as to test the air wing's readiness for personnel accountability, aircraft generation, ground operations, flight operations, and combat capability, according to a Hill statement from the time.

Though the U.S. Air Force's press photos may have looked to many like little more than a number of aircraft lined up, the exercise had actually been planned for months. As TheDrive.com reported, "The amount of hardware on the runway in terms of billions of dollars is staggering."

As previously reported, the elephant walk was quite costly to pull off, as the F-35 Lightning II costs $44,000 per hour to fly.

If each of the 52 F-35 fighters in the elephant walk flew for just a single hour, it was still a $2 million-plus exercise. If the jets flew for two hours, the cost likely exceeded about $4 million.

Yet, it could be described as priceless.

The ability to launch 52 of the fifth-generation F-35 stealth fighters was as much to send a message to detractors of the program within the United States as it was to reaffirm the capabilities of the U.S. Air Force to near-peer adversaries such as China and Russia.

It highlighted the improved readiness rate of the F-35 fleet at the time, which had been lagging for years when the elephant walk was conducted in 2020.

The service had only just reached a mission-capable rate of 75 percent the prior October, up from just 66 percent a year earlier.

No doubt an adversary would have loved to have the chance to take out the Lightning IIs on the ground – which is about the time that the aircraft can be described as truly vulnerable.

 Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.