Agrégateur de flux

On Wednesday, MEPs approved EU aid for 915 former Goodyear employees in Hanau and Fulda, Germany.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On Wednesday, MEPs approved EU aid for 915 former Goodyear employees in Hanau and Fulda, Germany.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This policy brief discusses how developing countries should continue leveraging the G20 and UNFCCC platforms while improving South–South and North–South cooperation, amid a combative geopolitical scenario, to 1) quantify their finance, technology, and capacity needs for transition and adaptation; 2) ensure – and enhance – finance flows; 3) develop or acquire appropriate at-scale technologies blending modern and traditional expertise; and 4) shape bespoke national energy transition pathways that best suit their developmental priorities and resources.

This policy brief discusses how developing countries should continue leveraging the G20 and UNFCCC platforms while improving South–South and North–South cooperation, amid a combative geopolitical scenario, to 1) quantify their finance, technology, and capacity needs for transition and adaptation; 2) ensure – and enhance – finance flows; 3) develop or acquire appropriate at-scale technologies blending modern and traditional expertise; and 4) shape bespoke national energy transition pathways that best suit their developmental priorities and resources.

This policy brief discusses how developing countries should continue leveraging the G20 and UNFCCC platforms while improving South–South and North–South cooperation, amid a combative geopolitical scenario, to 1) quantify their finance, technology, and capacity needs for transition and adaptation; 2) ensure – and enhance – finance flows; 3) develop or acquire appropriate at-scale technologies blending modern and traditional expertise; and 4) shape bespoke national energy transition pathways that best suit their developmental priorities and resources.

In recent years, the international relations of African countries have been increasingly analysed through the lens of multipolarity and the growing economic, political and strategic competition between external powers. This debate started to gain prominence around 2018–19, when The Economist identified a “new scramble for Africa”. It has since intensified in the context  of the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine finally
exposed the sharp divides as Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and its Western partners, on the other, sought to mobilise African governments in pursuit of international support for their respective positions within the UN.
The world’s political superpower – the US – has been in a process of relative disengagement from Africa for more than a decade now. By contrast, China, India, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expanded their presence on the continent in the areas of trade,
investment, diplomatic support and security engagement. At the same time, Russia, a major player during the Cold War, has renewed its engagement, although, arguably, its activities remain more limited both in scope and in scale. The increasing presence in Africa of the BRICS – South Africa became a member in 2010, while Egypt and Ethiopia followed in 2024 –
is another manifestation of today’s shifting power relations and multipolarity. Similarly, the recent entry of the African Union (AU) into the G20 underscores the external recognition of Africa’s importance. Moreover, it demonstrates the continent’s growing ambition to shape international politics and defend its interests vis-à-vis the rest of the world. [... ]A common thread running through all the chapters in this volume is that in Africa, multi-polarity is not simply a tale of the decline of the West and the rise of competitors like China, Russia, the UAE and Turkey. Rather, there is a complex reconfiguration of power relations under way in which African governments, institutions and societies have their say in negotiating the terms of engagement with the rest of the world, despite the undeniable persistence of asymmetries in terms of material power.

In recent years, the international relations of African countries have been increasingly analysed through the lens of multipolarity and the growing economic, political and strategic competition between external powers. This debate started to gain prominence around 2018–19, when The Economist identified a “new scramble for Africa”. It has since intensified in the context  of the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine finally
exposed the sharp divides as Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and its Western partners, on the other, sought to mobilise African governments in pursuit of international support for their respective positions within the UN.
The world’s political superpower – the US – has been in a process of relative disengagement from Africa for more than a decade now. By contrast, China, India, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expanded their presence on the continent in the areas of trade,
investment, diplomatic support and security engagement. At the same time, Russia, a major player during the Cold War, has renewed its engagement, although, arguably, its activities remain more limited both in scope and in scale. The increasing presence in Africa of the BRICS – South Africa became a member in 2010, while Egypt and Ethiopia followed in 2024 –
is another manifestation of today’s shifting power relations and multipolarity. Similarly, the recent entry of the African Union (AU) into the G20 underscores the external recognition of Africa’s importance. Moreover, it demonstrates the continent’s growing ambition to shape international politics and defend its interests vis-à-vis the rest of the world. [... ]A common thread running through all the chapters in this volume is that in Africa, multi-polarity is not simply a tale of the decline of the West and the rise of competitors like China, Russia, the UAE and Turkey. Rather, there is a complex reconfiguration of power relations under way in which African governments, institutions and societies have their say in negotiating the terms of engagement with the rest of the world, despite the undeniable persistence of asymmetries in terms of material power.

In recent years, the international relations of African countries have been increasingly analysed through the lens of multipolarity and the growing economic, political and strategic competition between external powers. This debate started to gain prominence around 2018–19, when The Economist identified a “new scramble for Africa”. It has since intensified in the context  of the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine finally
exposed the sharp divides as Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and its Western partners, on the other, sought to mobilise African governments in pursuit of international support for their respective positions within the UN.
The world’s political superpower – the US – has been in a process of relative disengagement from Africa for more than a decade now. By contrast, China, India, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expanded their presence on the continent in the areas of trade,
investment, diplomatic support and security engagement. At the same time, Russia, a major player during the Cold War, has renewed its engagement, although, arguably, its activities remain more limited both in scope and in scale. The increasing presence in Africa of the BRICS – South Africa became a member in 2010, while Egypt and Ethiopia followed in 2024 –
is another manifestation of today’s shifting power relations and multipolarity. Similarly, the recent entry of the African Union (AU) into the G20 underscores the external recognition of Africa’s importance. Moreover, it demonstrates the continent’s growing ambition to shape international politics and defend its interests vis-à-vis the rest of the world. [... ]A common thread running through all the chapters in this volume is that in Africa, multi-polarity is not simply a tale of the decline of the West and the rise of competitors like China, Russia, the UAE and Turkey. Rather, there is a complex reconfiguration of power relations under way in which African governments, institutions and societies have their say in negotiating the terms of engagement with the rest of the world, despite the undeniable persistence of asymmetries in terms of material power.

Over the past few years, European political elites have increasingly viewed the EU’s and China’s engagement in Africa through the lens of a political rivalry between democracy and autocracy. As early as 2019, the European Commission described China as a strategic rival aiming to normalize its authoritarian model as an alternative to Western democracy. This perception has only deepened in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, further reinforcing concerns among  policymakers in Brussels and other European capitals. While Chinese leaders avoid publicly framing the relationship as a systemic rivalry, in practice they invest heavily in public diplomacy and international networks, at least partly in order to promote China’s political model and modernization approach. When it comes to democracy and political regimes more generally, multipolarity in Africa’s external relations thus takes the form of systemic political rivalry, at least in the view of Western and Chinese policymakers.

Over the past few years, European political elites have increasingly viewed the EU’s and China’s engagement in Africa through the lens of a political rivalry between democracy and autocracy. As early as 2019, the European Commission described China as a strategic rival aiming to normalize its authoritarian model as an alternative to Western democracy. This perception has only deepened in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, further reinforcing concerns among  policymakers in Brussels and other European capitals. While Chinese leaders avoid publicly framing the relationship as a systemic rivalry, in practice they invest heavily in public diplomacy and international networks, at least partly in order to promote China’s political model and modernization approach. When it comes to democracy and political regimes more generally, multipolarity in Africa’s external relations thus takes the form of systemic political rivalry, at least in the view of Western and Chinese policymakers.

Over the past few years, European political elites have increasingly viewed the EU’s and China’s engagement in Africa through the lens of a political rivalry between democracy and autocracy. As early as 2019, the European Commission described China as a strategic rival aiming to normalize its authoritarian model as an alternative to Western democracy. This perception has only deepened in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, further reinforcing concerns among  policymakers in Brussels and other European capitals. While Chinese leaders avoid publicly framing the relationship as a systemic rivalry, in practice they invest heavily in public diplomacy and international networks, at least partly in order to promote China’s political model and modernization approach. When it comes to democracy and political regimes more generally, multipolarity in Africa’s external relations thus takes the form of systemic political rivalry, at least in the view of Western and Chinese policymakers.

The global rush for critical minerals has intensified amid a changing and complex world order. Multiple powers, including China and the United States, as well as the European Union (EU) and others, are vying for influence in Africa, which holds vast reserves of cobalt, lithium, rare earths, and other minerals essential for the clean energy transition. Demand for these resources is surging; for example, global lithium demand is expected to increase tenfold by 2050, driving billions in new mining investments, with Africa likely to attract a substantial share. African countries collectively hold around 30 per cent of the world’s known mineral reserves – including 70 per cent of global cobalt reserves, a metal crucial for batteries. Historically, African economies were trapped in a “primary commodity” model, exporting
raw materials under conditions shaped mainly by external powers, thereby limiting African agency and development.[...]

The global rush for critical minerals has intensified amid a changing and complex world order. Multiple powers, including China and the United States, as well as the European Union (EU) and others, are vying for influence in Africa, which holds vast reserves of cobalt, lithium, rare earths, and other minerals essential for the clean energy transition. Demand for these resources is surging; for example, global lithium demand is expected to increase tenfold by 2050, driving billions in new mining investments, with Africa likely to attract a substantial share. African countries collectively hold around 30 per cent of the world’s known mineral reserves – including 70 per cent of global cobalt reserves, a metal crucial for batteries. Historically, African economies were trapped in a “primary commodity” model, exporting
raw materials under conditions shaped mainly by external powers, thereby limiting African agency and development.[...]

The global rush for critical minerals has intensified amid a changing and complex world order. Multiple powers, including China and the United States, as well as the European Union (EU) and others, are vying for influence in Africa, which holds vast reserves of cobalt, lithium, rare earths, and other minerals essential for the clean energy transition. Demand for these resources is surging; for example, global lithium demand is expected to increase tenfold by 2050, driving billions in new mining investments, with Africa likely to attract a substantial share. African countries collectively hold around 30 per cent of the world’s known mineral reserves – including 70 per cent of global cobalt reserves, a metal crucial for batteries. Historically, African economies were trapped in a “primary commodity” model, exporting
raw materials under conditions shaped mainly by external powers, thereby limiting African agency and development.[...]

Africa’s digital transformation is deeply intertwined with questions of power, strategic influence, and an evolving world order.1 As multipolarity reshapes international relations, the continent has become a focal point in the intensifying competition among major global powers for digital supremacy. Key actors that embrace techno-optimistic narratives and stand ready to partner with the region include the European Union (EU) and its member states, the United States (US), China, and India, among others.

Africa’s digital transformation is deeply intertwined with questions of power, strategic influence, and an evolving world order.1 As multipolarity reshapes international relations, the continent has become a focal point in the intensifying competition among major global powers for digital supremacy. Key actors that embrace techno-optimistic narratives and stand ready to partner with the region include the European Union (EU) and its member states, the United States (US), China, and India, among others.

Africa’s digital transformation is deeply intertwined with questions of power, strategic influence, and an evolving world order.1 As multipolarity reshapes international relations, the continent has become a focal point in the intensifying competition among major global powers for digital supremacy. Key actors that embrace techno-optimistic narratives and stand ready to partner with the region include the European Union (EU) and its member states, the United States (US), China, and India, among others.

Russia is preparing to gradually withdraw Visa and Mastercard cards from circulation following the expiration of their security certificates in early 2025. Financial institutions must first agree on alternative payment solutions before submitting proposals to the Central Bank for review. Expired Certificates Raise Security Risks The head of the National Payment Card System (NSPK), Dmitry Dubynin, explained that the security certificates for all Visa and Mastercard cards in Russia expired on January 1, 2025. He warned that using such cards under current conditions poses security risks, as expired certificates directly affect the safety of financial operations. “It is advisable to begin gradually withdrawing these cards from circulation,” said Dubynin. “However, before proceeding, the market must develop a common position and determine suitable alternatives to Visa and Mastercard.” Once consensus is reached, the proposals will be submitted to the Central Bank for consideration, he added.

On n'a pas besoin d'être expert pour séduire. Parfois, de gestes simples comme dire des mots sympas et doux ou lancer un regard intense suffisent pour mettre du piment dans une relation ou la démarrer.

With European Parliament elections and leadership changes for both the EU and the AU focusing attention elsewhere, 2024 could in some respects be considered a ‘slow news’ year and continued the longer paralysis felt in the continent-to-continent relationship. Fundamental changes in the Sahel were ongoing. Elsewhere, progress was made in trade relations while the EU continued to place strong emphasis on its Global Gateway initiative to promote investment and increase its visibility. Changes at the European level, notably a new balance of power in the European Parliament and European Commission (also reflecting ongoing electoral shifts in the member states), pointed to a more transactional and assertive approach to the EU’s cooperation with Africa.