Agrégateur de flux

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Protesters have set 30 June as the date for all undocumented migrants to leave the country.

Protesters have set 30 June as the date for all undocumented migrants to leave the country.

La Cour pénale spéciale a ouvert ce mardi à Bangui le procès de François Bozizé dans l’affaire de Bossembélé. En exil en Guinée-Bissau, l’ancien chef de l’État est jugé par contumace aux côtés de trois de ses principaux officiers militaires. Tous sont poursuivis pour des crimes contre l’humanité présumés commis entre 2009 et 2013 à Bangui, Bossembélé et Bouar. Il s’agit du sixième procès organisé par la Cour pénale spéciale depuis le début de ses activités en République centrafricaine en 2018.

Du nouveau pour les visas Schengen vers la France : Capago, le prestataire exclusif de collecte des demandes en Algérie, vient d’annoncer des changements majeurs […]

L’article Visa pour la France : rendez-vous, frais… Capago annonce plusieurs changements est apparu en premier sur .

On Thursday 2 July, the Committee on Foreign Affairs will hold a workshop on 'A new EU approach to the Sahel region'. The event aims to enrich the EP's debate and oversight of the 2025 'renewed' EU approach for the Sahel region, focusing on its central part (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger).
The workshop will provide current insights into the rapidly evolving challenges, such as security threats, political instability, and humanitarian crises, and foreign interference in a geopolitically challenging environment, following a recent wave of military coups d'état, violent jihadism and separatism.Prof. Nina Wilén will present a study on the topic, including policy options for EU cooperation with the region, in support of regional stability, peace, good governance and potentially improved relations. A debate between her and MEPs, representatives of other EU institutions, and other experts will follow suit.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Thursday 2 July, the Committee on Foreign Affairs will hold a workshop on 'A new EU approach to the Sahel region'. The event aims to enrich the EP's debate and oversight of the 2025 'renewed' EU approach for the Sahel region, focusing on its central part (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger).
The workshop will provide current insights into the rapidly evolving challenges, such as security threats, political instability, and humanitarian crises, and foreign interference in a geopolitically challenging environment, following a recent wave of military coups d'état, violent jihadism and separatism.Prof. Nina Wilén will present a study on the topic, including policy options for EU cooperation with the region, in support of regional stability, peace, good governance and potentially improved relations. A debate between her and MEPs, representatives of other EU institutions, and other experts will follow suit.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The Islamic Republic has survived. Now comes the hard part.

Credit: HuyNguyenSG/iStock by Getty Images. Source: IMF

By Kristalina Georgieva
WASHINGTON DC, Jun 17 2026 (IPS)

More than three months into the war in the Middle East, the global economy appears to be holding up. Commodity prices, inflation and expectations for it, and financial conditions have all been impacted—but not yet in ways that signal a global slowdown. And we have seen strong economic momentum in the world’s biggest economies, the United States and China.

But an overall resilient global picture masks significant disparities. Even among advanced economies, some countries and communities have been harder hit. And in Africa, the negative impacts are more conspicuous. Meanwhile, with the prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz and infrastructure in the Middle East damaged by the fighting, uncertainty and risks remain high.

We will provide an updated analysis of this global picture on July 8, in our next World Economic Outlook Update.

Drivers of global resilience so far

At the conflict’s outset, our immediate concern was the impact on energy prices and knock-on effects on inflation. And they have been considerable. Oil prices are 30 percent higher than pre-war levels. Yet that is lower than was seen earlier in the conflict, despite the straits’ prolonged closure.

Some countries, such as China, have been able—for now—to cushion the disruption by tapping deep oil reserves. This has also helped with demand pressures in otherwise hard-hit Asia. Increased production and refinery utilization outside the Gulf, although not sufficient to offset the shock, have also contained the increase in oil prices. In addition, actions to dampen demand or limit the price passthrough have mitigated the impact so far. But, here too, there are limits to how long countries can manage the higher budgetary costs and higher external financing requirements.

In many economies, higher oil prices are nonetheless contributing to a pickup in headline inflation. That is concerning—but not the full story. It is also important to consider whether people and businesses expect a more persistent erosion of their purchasing power. And these medium-term expectations generally remain well anchored. That’s an encouraging sign of confidence in central banks’ commitment to price stability.

Financial markets have also proven resilient. Government bond yields have climbed significantly since the war began, but risk assets have rallied on strong earnings, and we see little evidence of a broader flight to safety. By historical standards, financial conditions remain accommodative.

Technology is another bright spot. Strong technology-related investment—particularly in artificial intelligence and data centers—has been a driving force in the countries where economic momentum is holding up. The United States is benefiting from this global technology cycle, as are economies in Asia that have seen stronger technology exports. Most countries, however, are yet to feel the productivity and growth impact of technology, leading to concerns about further economic divergence.

To sum up, the combination of economic resilience and technological advancements have helped to cushion the impact of the energy supply shock on growth at the global level and there have been bright spots within regions. But there are countries that are harder hit, largely depending on geography, degree of energy dependence, and available policy space.

Hardest hit

For war impacts, proximity matters. Oil exporters around the Gulf that are directly affected by the war face steep downward revisions to growth this year, with five out of eight countries seeing outright contractions.

For Europe, which is heavily dependent on imported oil and gas, higher energy prices are weighing on growth and putting upward pressure on inflation, with the ECB recently raising interest rates.

Emerging market economies in Asia are also bearing the brunt—with the relatively higher oil and gas intensity of the economies in the region. They face retail gasoline prices that have increased 40 percent since the war began, while rising government bond yields and currency depreciation and capital outflow pressures have amplified the costs of the shock.

Yet, it is the countries that combine heavy reliance on energy imports with limited policy space that are especially hard-hit.

The strain is especially visible in Africa, where many of these factors are at play. For countries in the region that rely heavily on imports, rising costs are worsening external balances and increasing budgetary pressures—and financing needs.

Several African countries have been managing fuel shortages—including Ethiopia, Malawi, and Zambia—and most are feeling the pain of sharp fuel price increases. In countries such as Lesotho, Rwanda, and Tanzania, gasoline prices have increased by about half since the onset of the war.

Higher energy prices have also driven up fertilizer and food costs, increasing the risk of food insecurity. If disruptions persist, farmers in many low-income countries may struggle. That in turn may further fuel inflation for months to come.

Needed: policy discipline and agility

As we have said before, much depends on the duration and intensity of the energy supply shock. The sooner it is resolved, the better—especially as supply will take time to recover given the significant infrastructure damage—and Sunday’s ceasefire announcement is welcome. But should the conflict or disruptions intensify, this is a clear risk to global growth.

This continued high uncertainty underscores the need for all policymakers to be agile and disciplined. Maintaining price stability is essential. Already, some central banks have begun to tighten to keep inflation expectations anchored.

With borrowing costs rising, fiscal discipline is equally important. Price caps, subsidies and similar interventions may be popular, but they are costly. Fiscal responses should be targeted, temporary, preserve price signals, and well-sequenced to protect the vulnerable without undermining public finances.

This is even more important given the need to make room for the fiscal costs of ensuring that AI-driven growth translates into shared prosperity. That includes both the fiscal costs to address new vulnerabilities, as well as investing in technology and people to ensure that emerging and developing economies are not left behind.

Supporting affected members

While there is much our members can do to cushion the impact of the war, they shouldn’t have to go it alone. The Fund remains as committed as ever to helping our member countries navigate this period of heightened uncertainty. Just as the effects vary across countries and regions, our support is tailored to meet the differentiated needs of our members.

For now, most member countries are asking for clear, candid policy guidance rather than financial support. And we have duly responded—providing tailored policy advice and capacity development. While the risks have not yet receded, embracing the right policies will help provide some relief.

For those countries that need financial support, we are stepping up. We are working with several countries and will soon present to our Executive Board proposals to adjust existing programs in response to the shock. The Gambia has requested an augmentation and program extension. Burkina Faso has reached staff-level agreement on a funding increase to address higher external financing needs. In Ethiopia, we aim to bring forward financing to this year, while we have initiated discussions on a new program with Malawi. Bangladesh also has requested a new program.

That the global economy is so far weathering the shock is cause for reassurance—but not complacency. The IMF remains on high alert. We are also deeply mindful of the economic damage some of our members are already suffering. We will work with them to manage the shock and limit its negative impacts, especially on the vulnerable. Our commitment to our membership is unwavering.

Kristalina Georgieva has been serving as Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund since October 1, 2019. She began her second term on October 1, 2024.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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The United States is racing ahead where Europe, China, and India struggle.

Mitte-links hat hoch gepokert – und nur halb gewonnen: Der Nationalrat hat am Mittwoch beschlossen, für die Finanzierung der 13. AHV-Rente die Mehrwertsteuer zu erhöhen. Das letzte Wort hat das Volk.

CONTRE-POINT - Si les idées du président de LR sont majoritaires dans l’opinion, son offre ne l’est pas encore.

L'accord de cessez-le-feu conclu par Donald Trump avec l'Iran place le Premier ministre israélien face à un nouveau dilemme politique et sécuritaire, écrit la correspondante de la BBC au Moyen-Orient.

Lezárulni látszik az a mintegy 4 hónapos fegyveres konfliktus, amely az Egyesült Államokat és Iránt, illetve Izraelt állította szembe egymással. A hétvégi genfi találkozón az amerikai és iráni fél aláírja ugyan a keretegyezményt, de ettől még a háborút kirobbantó kérdések megoldása nem következik be. Eddig úgy tűnik, az USA inkább tekinthető vesztesnek – véli Keresztes […]

Articolul Ködös keret, számtalan kérdőjellel apare prima dată în Kolozsvári Rádió Románia.

Context is a critical component of business and management research, shaping organisational behaviour and influencing outcomes. In management literature, it is widely acknowledged that “context counts” and “context matters”. Yet it is often present only implicitly, as a backdrop – an afterthought or a control variable – limiting the development of context-sensitive theories and marginalising indigenous perspectives on local phenomena. The field is thus regularly criticised for inadequate contextualisation of emerging economies’ studies, resulting in calls for researchers to “practise more context”. All this was truly relevant to me, as I faced this challenge in my PhD study. My PhD project focuses on the strategies of wineries from Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine – three post-Soviet countries aspiring to join the EU.

As a phenomenon to be understood and explained – an explanandum – eurointegration is best studied not in management research but in EU studies, a field that has spent decades building specific knowledge about it. This led me to engage directly with the context, by turning to the field in which it is most explicitly theorised. So, I had no excuse: I immersed myself in studying that context in depth.

However, for the core phenomena of management and business studies – firm strategy, internationalisation, sectoral adaptation, and so on – eurointegration plays the role of context, or explanans, in which such phenomena are embedded. For these firms, eurointegration is not simply a background condition; it structures the strategic environment in which they operate.

Yet eurointegration, even though it plays distinct roles in EU studies and management research (explanandum versus explanans), is what connects the two fields. You would expect them to talk to each other. But in practice, they rarely do and have mostly grown up in isolation. EU studies theorise integration in depth but seldom follows it down to the organisational level where it takes effect. Meanwhile, management research tends to label the entire process ‘eurointegration’ and move on, treating it as context without spelling out the mechanisms that make it matter.

Thus, in my PhD project, I tried to overcome this limitation by bridging the two fields – and the paper I presented at the forum explains how.

My approach rests on a distinction from accounting research – between domain theory and method theory – to which I add a third, missing constituent – context theory. Together, they split any study into clear jobs. Domain theory says what we are explaining – a firm’s strategy. Method theory says how we study it. And context theory, the missing element of the puzzle that I added, says what shapes the phenomenon: here, what eurointegration does to it. The three depend on each other: domain theory sets the question, context theory supplies the conditions that answer it, and method theory ties them together, and none is asked to do everything – which is what usually goes wrong when one field borrows from another. I do not prescribe any particular domain, method, or context theory. That choice is the researcher’s, to be made according to what best fits the study and explains it most powerfully.

That leaves one question: where does the context theory come from? This is where EU studies come in – that is where I found suitable candidates. The easiest route is to borrow: take an EU theory off the shelf and apply it to firms unchanged. But pure borrowing leaves eurointegration vague, the theory never quite fits, and the two sides stay disconnected. I suggest translation instead. By translation I mean reworking an EU theory’s core explanatory logic for the level of firms and sectors while keeping it recognisably tied to the original – the idea, long familiar in organisation studies, that concepts are transformed as they travel between fields. Translation preserves a theory’s core mechanism, its source of variation, and the conditions under which it holds, so it still does real work as context theory.

Done this way, five EU traditions become five context theories that management research can use. EU-induced domestic change becomes a regulatory adaptation context; differentiated integration becomes a heterogeneity context, since a diversified firm faces not one European market but several; conditionality becomes an anticipatory alignment context, explaining why some firms align before any legal obligation, drawn by the prospect of future market access; multi-level governance becomes a multi-principal context; and politicisation becomes a legitimacy and uncertainty context, where contested integration turns the durability of the rules themselves into a strategic risk.

My wineries sit exactly here. In EU-aspiring countries the institutional environment is neither fully domestic nor fully EU-internal: conditionality drives domestic reform, which generates firm-facing pressure long before membership, and firms respond not with automatic compliance but with a range of options – acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, or manipulation. To explain why one Moldovan or Georgian producer aligns early with EU standards while its neighbour waits, generic management theory is not enough, and macro-level EU theory is not enough. We need both, to bridge the macro–micro divide in research.

So this is my claim, and my call: to treat eurointegration as the complex context in which our phenomena are embedded – something that must be specified and theorised properly, and that is best understood through EU studies. The way to do our own work well is to translate rather than merely borrow, and to fold that translation into frameworks of our own. Built that way, eurointegration context becomes a bridge the two fields can cross toward each other – a vote for interdisciplinarity, not as a fashionable label, but as the most relevant way to study organisations whose strategic world is shaped by eurointegration and to co-create and share knowledge across two fields.

The post Eurointegration as context and a bridge between fields appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

By CIVICUS
Jun 17 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses a proposed United Nations (UN) tax treaty with Jenny Ricks, General Secretary of Fight Inequality Alliance, a global movement that organises to counter the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a small elite.

Jenny Ricks

The UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation is a proposed international treaty currently under negotiation. It aims to make global tax governance more inclusive, transparent and equitable, shifting it away from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and giving the global majority a genuine say in rules that have long been set by wealthy states.

Why do we need a global tax treaty, and what would an ambitious one look like?

Every year, trillions of dollars are drained from public services through tax avoidance, tax havens and sweetheart deals negotiated by and for the wealthiest corporations and people on the planet. This is a system designed by a powerful few, and it’s working exactly as intended. Countries across the global majority are losing money they urgently need for climate adaptation, hospitals and schools while billionaires park fortunes in jurisdictions that ask no questions.

An ambitious treaty must set minimum effective tax rates on corporate profits and extreme wealth, make automatic information sharing a baseline rather than an aspiration, and put in place binding commitments rather than voluntary frameworks that elites can walk away from when the political heat rises. The goal has to be redistribution at scale. Anything less is rearranging deck chairs on a sinking ship.

How does the UN Convention compare to the OECD’s approach, and where might it fall short?

The OECD process was built by rich countries, for rich countries. The global majority had only observer status in negotiations that fundamentally shaped their economic futures. That’s the original sin of the existing framework and no amount of technical refinement changes the underlying power imbalance baked into it.

The UN Convention changes the venue and potentially changes the power balance. When every country has a voice and a vote, the interests of the majority of the world’s people have at least a fighting chance of being reflected in the outcome.

The shortcomings are real, though. Ambition gets negotiated down. Large economies drag their feet, threaten opt-outs or simply refuse to ratify. The convention’s potential is significant, but potential and outcome are very different things, and we have seen promising processes hollowed out before. Without a fundamental rethinking of the international system, including the UN itself, to put power firmly in the hands of the global majority, enforcement will remain elusive.

Who’s pushing the treaty forward, and who’s standing in the way?

States with the most to gain have shown the most political courage, while those that have profited most from the existing architecture are throwing sand in the gears. This pattern is not coincidental. Governments protecting the interests of their wealthiest people and most powerful corporations are the obstacle. The barriers are political, rooted in elite self-interest, and naming that clearly matters.

The negotiations are ongoing and fast-moving. For the latest developments, the Tax Justice Network database is the best place to look.

How is civil society influencing the treaty process?

The movement to tax the super-rich has to be built from the national to the global level. Movements shape what’s considered possible before politicians decide what’s acceptable. When we mobilise people in Kenya, Malaysia and Peru, in the streets and in people’s assemblies, we change the political cost calculation for decision-makers domestically and internationally. We demonstrate that there’s a constituency demanding this change, that it’s a matter of survival for millions of families, not an abstraction debated in Geneva conference rooms.

Fight Inequality Alliance and our allies have worked to surface frontline voices and lived experience in spaces that tend to run on position papers and spreadsheets. We have supported national alliances to bring their governments to the table with clear demands. We have made visible who benefits from the status quo, and that visibility increases accountability. Civil society doesn’t win these fights alone, but without sustained pressure from organised movements, the political space to win them simply doesn’t open.

What do civil society and states need to do to ensure equitable global taxation?

States that have pushed hardest for an ambitious convention must hold firm. Dilution always comes in the final stages, when powerful interests feel threatened. They should ratify promptly, implement genuinely and resist pressure from wealthier governments to hollow out enforcement mechanisms.

For civil society, the task is sustained pressure and political education. People need to understand the connection between tax justice and the hospital that closed, the school that’s crumbling, the debt that their governments cannot escape. That connection is real and it’s political, and once people see it, they don’t unsee it. That’s how movements grow and how the terms of debate shift. We need more of that, faster and bigger, and we need organisations with resources and reach to invest in building those connections alongside us, rather than commenting on the process from a distance.

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SEE ALSO
Global governance: power politics tests global rules CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
UN at 80: a struggle for renewal in a time of crises CIVICUS Lens 19.Sep.2025
Trillions at stake in quest for tax justice CIVICUS Lens 31.Mar.2025

 

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Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP