European Union

The 13thmeeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the European Union (SA Council) took place on 18 July 2017. The meeting was chaired by Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Nikola Dimitrov. For the EU, the meeting was co-chaired by High Representative / Vice President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini, while Commissioner Johannes Hahn represented the European Commission. Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Mr. Bujar Osmani also participated. 

The SA Council recalled that the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) remains at the core of the relationship between the EU and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia until the country's accession to the EU. The SA Council took note of the country's primary objective to open accession negotiations and acknowledged the new government's strong commitment to this purpose.  

The SA Council discussed the "Plan 3-6-9", containing short, medium and long term plans and short-term measures to be implemented by the Government. Progress in implementing overdue EU-related reforms, starting with the implementation of the Pržino agreement and the Urgent Reform Priorities, would be an important basis for further discussion by the Council of the European Union.  

The SA Council reviewed the key developments over the previous period relating to the fulfilment of the political criteria, as well as the state of play concerning the economic criteria, financial cooperation and the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.  It noted the results of the Stabilisation and Association Committee held on 29 June. 

Concerning the political criteria, the SA Council was informed of key political developments.  It welcomed the intention of the new government to address outstanding reform issues in an inclusive, transparent and coherent manner. It recalled the importance that the government, together with the opposition, implements their commitments under the Pržino agreement and the Urgent Reform Priorities. It discussed the need to establish accountability for the wiretaps and the attacks in the Assembly on 27 April, to ensure judicial independence, freedom of media, freedom of expression, respect of human rights and public administration reform. 

The SA Council called for more long-term confidence-building measures, at political level, and more pro-active policies to further increase trust and build bridges among communities.  

The SA Council recalled that regional co-operation and good neighbourly relations remain essential and welcomed the first steps taken by the new government. It welcomed the country's active participation and constructive approach in regional cooperation initiatives. 

The SA Council also acknowledged the country's efforts to address the challenge of the European migration and refugee crisis and expressed hope that mutually beneficial cooperation continues in the future. 

Regarding economic developments, the SA Council recalled the targeted policy guidance agreed in May 2017 between the EU and Western Balkans and Turkey, on the Economic Reform Programmes, and encouraged the government to focus on their implementation and follow-up. 

The SA Council welcomed the commitment of the government to invest greater efforts into increasing the absorption of EU funds. It noted the importance of sound financial management and the need for full compliance with the sector approach criteria, especially in public finance management, transport and the justice sector. Attention must also be paid to implementing the European Court of Auditors' recommendations. 

The SA Council noted progress in various areas covered by the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and welcomed the high level of trade integration with the EU.  It outlined the importance of continuing to align with the EU acquis, especially in relation to the internal market, and the need to meet other international commitments, for instance on energy and transport connectivity. It also welcomed the recent signature of the Transport Community Treaty.  

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The Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between the EU and Cuba, endorsed by the European Parliament (EP) on 5 July 2017, opens a new phase in EU-Cuba relations. Until now Cuba was the only country in Latin America without a cooperation or political dialogue agreement with the EU. The PDCA creates a framework for political dialogue and closer bilateral cooperation, including in trade. The parts of the agreement (mostly related to cooperation and trade issues) that fall within EU competence can already be applied provisionally, but the agreement will only enter into force in full after it has been ratified in all the EU Member States. Since negotiations on the PDCA began in 2014, Cuba’s relations with the EU and individual Member States have intensified considerably. For the EU, the PDCA is a tool for supporting a process of change and modernisation in Cuba, while for Cuba it represents the ‘normalisation’ of the relationship with an important economic and trade partner and helps it to diversify its external relations. Parliament will focus, in monitoring the implementation of the PDCA, on two areas of particular concern to the EP: human rights and civil liberties on Cuba, and the role of Cuban civil society.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Liisa Jaakonsaari

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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EU Foreign Affairs ministers meet on 17 July 2017 in Brussels to have a debate on the priorities for implementation of the EU global strategy. They are also discussing recent developments in Libya and the Democratic Republic of North Korea.

Download this video here.

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

"1.         The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has continued to accelerate its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, with most recently the launch of a missile of intercontinental range on 4 July 2017. The Council strongly condemns these actions which constitute outright violations of the DPRK's international obligations, as set out in several UN Security Council Resolutions, and which represent a serious threat to international peace and security. 

2.           DPRK's actions undermine the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime, which the EU has steadfastly supported for decades, and underline the necessity of universalisation of the Comprehensive Nuclear test Ban Treaty. 

3.           The Council urges the DPRK to comply without delay, fully and unconditionally, with its obligations under all relevant UN Security Council resolutions and to refrain from any further provocative action that could increase regional and global tensions. 

4.           The EU sanctions' regime towards the DPRK is currently among the most restrictive in operation. The Council will consider further appropriate responses in close consultation with key partners and in line with UN Security Council deliberations, notably through additional autonomous restrictive measures. Recalling UNSCR 2321(2016), the Council expresses concern about the DPRK regime's activities to raise hard currency to fund its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and calls upon States to exercise vigilance. 

5.           The Council supports the leading role and call of the Republic of Korea to the DPRK to engage in a credible and meaningful dialogue, including through confidence building measures in order to defuse tension and to enable steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and the full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The EU is ready to support such a process in consultation with key partners. 

6.           The Council is strongly convinced that a lasting peace and denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula must be achieved through peaceful means. The Council reaffirms the EU policy of Critical Engagement with the DPRK, which combines pressure with sanctions and other measures while keeping communication, and dialogue channels open. The EU policy of Critical Engagement is not an end in itself but a means to promote the DPRK's full compliance with UNSC Resolutions in terms of abandoning its nuclear, WMD and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and progress on all other issues of concern. The Council urges the DPRK to make credible progress on its obligations to denuclearise enabling negotiations leading to a peaceful solution. 

7.           The Council highlights the importance of unity of the international community in addressing this challenge. Closer engagement with all EU's key partners in the region and worldwide is essential in this respect, including through enhanced outreach activities and support for the full implementation of UN sanctions by all countries. 

8.           DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes divert resources from the necessary investments into social and economic development and reform, which would benefit the DPRK population at large. In this context, the Council supports the Republic of Korea's aspiration to restart inter-Korean dialogue on humanitarian affairs. 

9.           The Council deplores the ongoing and grave human rights' abuses by the DPRK regime and is committed to continue working with partners to draw attention to these violations, to assure international accountability and to maintain pressure on DPRK to cease its human rights violations."

The Council adopted conclusions on Pakistan, stating that the EU has a clear interest in a stable, secure, and democratic Pakistan.

Over the past years, the bilateral relations between the EU and Pakistan have been deepened through the implementation of the 5-year engagement plan adopted in 2012. The EU has also intensified institutional dialogues across priority areas including, political cooperation, security, governance, human rights, migration, trade and energy. Further dialogues have been set up in new areas such as counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and disarmament. 

Work is ongoing between the EU and Pakistan on a political framework to replace the 5-year Engagement Plan through a new EU-Pakistan strategic engagement plan. 

On 17 July 2017, the Council adopted a set of temporary autonomous trade measures in favour of Ukraine. These measures should enter into force by the end of September and will apply for a period of three years. 

“With today's decision, we are allowing more Ukrainian products to be exported to the EU. It is our duty to support Ukraine and strengthen our economic and political ties, also in the face of the ongoing conflict on its soil."

Sven Mikser, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Estonia, which currently holds the Council presidency 

The proposal is aimed at improving access for Ukrainian exporters to the EU market, in view of the difficult economic situation and the economic reform efforts undertaken by Ukraine.

It adds to trade provisions already introduced under an EU-Ukraine association agreement that have been provisionally applied since 1 January 2016 and that will formally enter into force on 1 September 2017.

Today's decision is the final step necessary to formally adopt the regulation. The European Parliament adopted the text on 4 July. The text should be published and enter into force shortly after the signature of the text by the co-legislators during the EP's plenary session in September.

Coinciding with the EU-China Summit, US President Donald Trump’s 1 June announcement that America would leave the Paris climate change agreement had one silver lining: it provided a golden opportunity for the European Union and China to claim co-leadership over the climate talks.

For Europe, this represents a 180-degree turn from its humiliating experience at the 2009 Copenhagen conference: Europe was absent from the negotiating table when the United States and the ‘BASIC’ countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) agreed the final outcomes. Moreover, before 2015, it was the US-China joint climate statement that was seen as the turning point leading to the Paris agreement.

This was immensely frustrating for the European negotiators. After all, the EU had a much better track record in terms of climate change. The Union complied with its Kyoto commitments, was a major provider of climate finance for developing countries and had much more ambitious goals for Paris. Yet it faced a glass ceiling. The world’s eyes were set on the US and China because of their share of global emissions (around 43% in 2015) and their rivalry, which meant one would not move without the other.

Today, China and the EU have more in common on climate change than ever before. Their new, shared objective is to isolate the US and prevent further departures from the Paris agreement: Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia may be tempted to become renegades.

“Today, China and the EU have more in common on climate change than ever before”

Both China and the EU are well-placed to exert global climate leadership. They are on course to exceed their 2020 Paris commitments. Given their import dependence on fossil fuels, a key element of their domestic energy security strategy is to increase the share of renewables within their energy mixes. Moreover, they seek major economic benefits from becoming leaders on low-carbon and resource efficiency technologies.

Finally, they share a commitment to provide climate finance to developing countries. China made a pledge of US$3.1bn in 2015, while Europe and its member states delivered €14.5bn in 2014. The climate change statement issued at the summit confirms China and EU’s joint ambitions on climate change.

For this bilateral cooperation to be ground-breaking, China and the EU must pass the following three tests:

• Put the world on a credible, long-term decarbonisation pathway in line with science. This means coming to the UN negotiating table with evidence-based, mid-century plans for reaching net-zero emissions domestically and globally by 2020.
• Make global carbon pricing a reality. According to a recent report, we need carbon prices to reach a minimum of $40 per tonne of CO2 by 2020. This is not achievable without a successful reform of EU Emissions Trading Scheme, a convincing kick-off of China’s new carbon trading system as well as joint diplomatic action to link together existing carbon markets.
• Step up cooperation on climate finance, at the very least to fill the gap left by US withdrawal from its climate finance commitments.

Alas, there are some dark clouds in this rosy scenario. The G20 saw rising trade tensions around the steel industry. The US, the EU and China are all scrambling to protect their domestic sector in a context of global over-production, instead of looking for more economically, socially and environmentally sustainable solutions.

The EU and China successfully used the G20 to maintain the US isolation on climate change. In a way, this was the easy part.

According to the scientific community, the window of opportunity to keep climate change under control is rapidly closing. Some say we only have three years left. Given this urgency, protecting the steel industry should be the least of their worries. Instead, the EU and China should step up their bilateral cooperation to support a low-carbon transition in heavy-polluting industries, like the steel sector, which produces five per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions.

The EU and China should also explore how trade policies ‒ whether domestic or through the World Trade Organisation ‒ can effectively support the realisation of the Paris agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Bridging the gap between sustainable development commitments and mostly carbon and sustainability-blind trade policies would be a real game-changer.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – European External Action Service

The post Can EU-China cooperation save the Paris agreement? appeared first on Europe’s World.

One year after the British vote on Brexit, the Member States of the European Union seem to be on the verge of waking the ‘Sleeping Beauty’ of European defence: permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). Do they have the same understanding of its intended goals and of the ways forward or means of achieving them, or are they simply motivated by the desire not to end up on the edges of the sort of Eurogroup for defence that is being set up? What are the specific areas of agreement and disagreement between the groups taking shape in the European Council? Have any debates intentionally or unintentionally glossed over been glossed over and, if so, which ones? Lastly, what are the desirable scenarios for the months and years to come? Is there still time to change things or has the die been cast? The purpose of this study is to answer those questions.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Tag: Sharp VigilanceSharp Fence

The Council adopted conclusions on addressing the risks of famine. The conclusions note that humanitarian needs have been unprecedented in 2017. They include numerous chronic food security crises, with four countries facing an alarming risk of famine: Yemen, north-east Nigeria, Somalia and South Sudan, where overall about 20 million people at risk of starvation. 

The conclusions recall that the EU and its member states collectively have provided more than EUR 1.2 billion this year alone for humanitarian assistance in the four countries at risk of famine and call on all traditional and emerging donors for further efforts to be made. The Council notes however that funding is only part of the solution. These crises are man-made, with their roots lying in conflict, and they require political solutions going beyond humanitarian assistance.

The Council adopted a crisis management concept for a new civilian CSDP mission in Iraq. 

The mission will focus on assisting the Iraqi authorities in the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Iraqi security strategy. EU experts will provide advice and assistance in priority work areas responding to the needs of the relevant authorities. 

The national security strategy aims at building state institutions capable of consolidating security, peace and preventing conflicts under the rule of law, and outlines a number of threats to national security, including terrorism, corruption, political instability and ethnic and sectarian polarisation. 

In response to a request from the Iraqi authorities for support in the civilian security sector reform area, and in line with the Council conclusions on Iraq of 19 June, the EU agreed to prepare a civilian CSDP mission in Baghdad.  The adoption of a crisis management concept is the first step to launch a new CSDP mission, after which preparations to deploy begin. 

The Council adopted conclusions on the EU priorities at the UN and at the 72nd UN General Assembly. 

The key EU priority will be to uphold, strengthen and reform the UN and the rules based global order. For the 72nd UNGA, the EU will focus on a stronger global governance, on peace and conflict prevention and on an enduring agenda for transformation. Gender equality and women's empowerment as well as women, peace and security will be mainstreamed into all three priority areas. 

The 17th of July marks the date of the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. This day is dedicated to celebrating the developments and achievements of international criminal justice institutions and to remind us that we need to continue working, at both national and international levels, to ensure that the perpetrators of the most serious crimes are brought to justice and held to account.

On this occasion, the European Union and its Member States reaffirm their full support to the International Criminal Court and to the strengthening of an international criminal justice system committed to deter the commission of crimes, to fight impunity and to ensure the protection of the victims' rights.

Justice is one of the core elements towards reconciliation and sustainable peace. Without justice, the most heinous crimes go unpunished, victims are unable to obtain redress and peace remains an elusive goal, since impunity generates more hatred, leading to acts of revenge and more suffering.

The European Union is one of the main donors in support of justice sector reform worldwide, strengthening law enforcement and justice institutions, promoting independent and impartial justice, and supporting access to justice for all. Since 2000, we have committed €37 million in direct support of the International Criminal Court.

The European Union has been also supporting transitional justice initiatives and international justice mechanisms related to specific countries. In the case of Syria, the EU has recently allocated funding amounting to €1,5 million to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in Syria. The EU calls on the international community to support to the Mechanism, including through adequate financial means, to ensure that it would be able to start work as soon as possible and fulfil its mandate, in line with the principles of universality and at the highest level of professionalism.

The European Union will continue to fully support multilateral global governance, based on international law, human rights and strong international institutions. In this regard, we remain committed to advance our fight against impunity, and to promote the universal ratification of the Rome Statute.

Brexit is both a boon and a bane to the teaching and study of British and European politics. In this piece written with Alex Boyle, a politics student at the University of Liverpool, we set out the five ways in which Brexit is central to the study and teaching of both. 

As a student learning the politics of Europe and the UK and as a teacher trying to keep his lecture notes up to date while writing and editing two books on Brexit, Brexit poses for both of us a mix of difficulties and opportunities in our work. With it set to be the defining issue for Britain and one of the most unique challenges to ever face the EU, understanding Brexit is not something any student or teacher of politics can easily hide from.

Granted, by its very nature the study and teaching of politics is about crises and a topic in a perpetual state of flux. As we all know, politics textbooks have a short shelf life. The often slow process of publishing journal articles means many articles reflect the world and knowledge from a few years before publication. Lecture notes can be adapted, sometimes in response to events on the day. Changing reading lists and course structures, however, require time and sometimes higher approval.

Successfully combining Brexit into the study or teaching of British and European politics depends on keeping five things in mind.

Brexit Means Britain

Whether you’re studying or teaching British politics in the UK or on the other side of the world, understanding Brexit means understanding the contemporary UK. As both Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans agree, the issue of Europe is a defining issue for Britain because it reaches into almost every corner of the country’s political life. As Andrew Gamble argued back i03:

The reason why the issue of Europe has been so persistent and so divisive is that there is a lot at stake. For the future of British politics, there is no more important issue, involving as it does a reassessment of British identity, security and political economy, and a judgement about the relative priority to be given to Europe as opposed to other relationships, particularly those with America. Such choices occur rather rarely but when they do they often trigger political realignments which can constitute major turning points in the life of parties and states.

Learning and teaching the origins of a referendum whose result will have such profound implications and the longer history of the UK’s relationship with Europe is, therefore, a solid foundation for understanding not only Brexit but also the development of the modern British political system. As we discuss further below, Brexit opens up an extensive range of topics in UK politics.

The breadth of Brexit as a topic, therefore, offers students of British and European politics a chance to find that elusive ingredient to scoring a high mark: teaching their teacher something new. Synthesising the many different topics and approaches to Brexit allows both students and teachers a chance to escape the silos that too often structure academia. For the teacher, this is a topic where students can do some of the legwork of drawing in new ideas. Many might think of PhD students as the key here. The inevitable flood of PhD students working on Brexit will indeed fill in many of the gaps. But undergraduates, and not least those from elsewhere in the EU and the wider world, can offer much-needed ideas and reports on what Brexit means elsewhere and in other fields.

The Case Study of Brexit Britain

Brexit adds to Britain’s place as one of the best and most fascinating national case studies for social sciences. Britain’s politics have often made it a go-to place for many teachers and students on a wealth of topics. For pollsters and psephologists the UK’s multiple electoral systems have turned it into an electoral laboratory. Britain’s ongoing constitutional reforms and the resilience of its Westminster majoritarian model fuel endless debates amongst constitutional and legal scholars and those engaged in comparative politics. For those studying political economy the UK’s pursuit of Thatcherism, neoliberalism more broadly and austerity have left it a key case study. Historians and scholars of war and international relations find a country that has gone from being the world’s superpower to one that still delivers (or at least tries to) a military kick and leads the world in soft-power. How Britain has confronted (or not) its religious, racial and security tensions and histories fascinates those in countries around the world who face similar challenges. The very unity and identity of the United Kingdom makes it a must for any student of nationalism. The list is a long one.

Granted, other states have faced many of the same challenges as the UK, and it always pays to be wary of the biases that can arise from the study of the UK. Students and teachers should always ask how comparable the UK’s experiences are to those in the rest of Europe or the world. For example, was Trump’s election ‘Brexit plus, plus, plus’ as he predicted it would be? Was it a reflection of wider trends in European, Western and international politics? Or was it a reflection of a combination factors peculiar to the UK? Nevertheless, the UK still offers a wealth of easily accessible literature, data and examples backed up by a long history of studies that can be drawn on as a starting point. Brexit itself is fast turning into one of the most researched and data rich topics available.

Europe’s Brexit

It would now be unwise to teach or study Brexit or the EU without also trying to understand the other. Brexit already tells us something important about the nature of the EU. It has changed the politics of the continent to which Britain is forever bound and which shapes Britain more than any other part of the world.

That might all sound trite. Yet too often debates in Britain about Brexit are myopic ones based on an assumption that Brexit is about Britain. Some elsewhere in the remaining EU might like to try and ignore the unsettling fact that one of the largest and leading European states voted democratically to quit Europe’s predominant organisation for politics, economics, society and non-traditional security.

What Brexit means for Europe and what a changed EU means for the UK are fast becoming central issues to studying Brexit, the UK and European politics. For those in the UK studying and teaching British and European politics, studying the EU remains a central plank to understanding not just how the rest of the EU works and is responding to and debating Brexit, but how Britain will continue to live with a continent and political union that it is forever closely connected to. For students from elsewhere in Europe Brexit allows them the chance to examine their national debates about Britain as part of debates about a changing EU.

Theorising Brexit

Brexit is testing many of the theories and models we teach and learn in British politics, European studies and many other courses. We can use Brexit to apply such theories as those of structure versus agency or more nuanced theories of international relations such as constructivism versus neoclassical realism. Economists are wrestling with what Brexit means for their theories of how trade works. It has certainly tested models used by pollsters and psephologists to understand how the British people – and voters further afield – vote.

Too often ‘theory’ is a word that bores or scares many students and even some teachers. It can seem abstract, distant or an irrelevant addition thrown in at the start of an essay or journal article in the hope of ticking a box required for a decent mark or publication. This ignores how theoretical approaches can help make sense of the uncertainty and information overload that surrounds Brexit.

It’s very easy as teachers or students to be drawn into the daily and hourly developments of Brexit. Reading and following so many fast-changing developments can leave us feeling weary and without a sense of the bigger picture into which to fit developments. One thing theory can do is help narrow down the focus for our studies. For example, we could use theories of bureaucratic politics to understand how institutions will shape Brexit or constructivism to analyse the ideas that underpin it. We then have the opportunity to assess these theories, models and other new ideas in real-time as Brexit unfolds.

Generation Brexit 

Another example of a theoretically grounded attempt to analyse Brexit is to see this political and social split within British society as a generational phenomenon, as argued by Jackson-Preece and Dunin-Wąsowicz. This generational divide manifested itself again in the 2017 General Election, which proved that young people are an important political constituency and that older generations, including most politicians, have ignored them since the Brexit vote.

The LSE’s recently launched Generation Brexit social media and research project, which explores Brexit from a sociological perspective, can aid the study or teaching of British and European politics in the shadow of Brexit. This trailblazing project is currently crowdsourcing a millennial cohort vision for the future of UK – EU relations. It invites those aged under 35 from across the UK and Europe to debate, decide and draft a policy proposal that will be sent both the United Kingdom and the European Union Parliaments, and the respective negotiating teams.

Generation Brexit translates research findings into impactful and policy-relevant arguments that can be utilised to the study and teaching of Brexit. Unlike other Brexit-related engagement campaigns, this initiative targets millennials in the UK and in Europe alike. The pan-European dimension captures the reality of the Brexit negotiations, their contingency on both UK and EU27 politics. It also underscores the necessity of establishing a mutually beneficial relationship for the future, built on shared ideas from the millennial cohort of current voters, many of whom are teachers students of UK and EU politics.

Crystal Ball Gazing

All teachers and students of British and European politics will have faced questions from friends, family and strangers as to why Brexit happened and what might happen next. Speculation on a topic such as this is to be expected, not least when Brexit could turn out to be what historians term a critical juncture for the UK and the rest of Europe.

Academics are often told to be wary of crystal ball gazing. That can be left to think tanks and the media. It does mean, however, that unexpected developments or ones we wish to avoid can catch us out. Until the Brexit vote happened, contemplating Brexit or the withdrawal of any member state from the EU was something of a taboo topic for many in the field of European politics. It means there has been a scramble to understand and analyse such topics as European disintegration.

That leaves us with a lack of relevant and rigorously research literature. A lot of literature, including some of the journal articles, rushed out in response, will be conjecture. Due to the polarising nature of Brexit, for both students and teachers the task of being able to critically think and analyse this literature will be an important challenge for avoiding the inherent bias in many people’s work.

And what of the future? Is Brexit a here today and gone tomorrow topic? If it turns out to be a critical juncture then generations of students and teachers of British and European politics will examine the topic, to say nothing of living with its consequences. But even if Brexit is reversed, the experience will have been a significant one in the politics of the UK and the EU, and one that will have cast a light on so much of British and European politics.

This post first appeared on the LSE’s Brexit blog.

Dr Tim Oliver is an Associate at LSE IDEAS, a Teaching Fellow at UCL and Director of Research at Brexit Analytics.

Alex Booth is a history and politics graduate, University of Liverpool.

The post Brexit is a fascinating case study for students and teachers of UK and EU politics appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Place:        Europa building, Brussels
Chair(s):    Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 

All times are approximate and subject to change

from 08.30
Arrivals (live streaming) 

+/- 09.45 (time to be confirmed)
Doorstep by High Representative Federica Mogherini 

+/- 10.00    
Beginning of meeting
Roundtable
Adoption of the agenda
Approval of A items 

Implementation of the EU Global Strategy
North Korea
Libya
Any other business                  

+-/ 13.30    
Welcome by the High Representative Federica Mogherini of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, and the Director-General of the International Organisation for Migration William Lacy Swing (doorstep)

Working lunch on migration 

+/- 15.30
Press conference (live streaming)

The next AFET meetings are scheduled to take place in Brussels, room JAN2Q2:

- Wednesday, 30 August 2017, 09:00-12:30, and 15:00-18:30
- Thursday, 31 August 2017, 09:00-12:30

Further information
Information for visitors
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Place:
Justus Lipsius building, Brussels

Chairs:
Tarmo Tamm, Minister of Rural Affairs and Siim Kiisler, Minister of Environment

All times are approximate and subject to change

Monday 17 July

+/- 09.45
Doorstep by Minister Tamm

+/- 09.25
Doorstep by Minister Kiisler

+/- 10.00
Beginning of the meeting (Roundtable) 
Adoption of the agenda 
Adoption non-legislative of A items
Adoption of legislative A items (live streaming)

+/- 10.15    
Presidency work programme (live streaming)

+/- 10.35
Fishing opportunities for 2018

+/- 11.50
Any other business: 
- antimicrobial resistance (live streaming)
- African swine fever (live streaming)
- symposium on the future of food (live streaming)
- food origin labelling (live streaming)
- dual quality of foodstuffs

+/- 15.05
Organic farming (live streaming)

+/- 16.35
Future of the common agricultural policy
Implementation of May 2015 Council conclusions on simplifications
Any other business:
- meeting of the extended Visegrad group
- reflection paper on the future of the EU finances 
- conference on GMO-free agriculture
- AU-EU conference on "Making sustainable agriculture a future for youth in Africa"

+/- 19.25
Press conference (live streaming)

Tuesday 18 July

+/- time to be confirmed  
Doorstep by Minister Tamm

+/- 10.00
Beginning of the meeting (Roundtable)
Trade-related agricultural issues
Any other business: 
- trade practices of third countries vis-à-vis EU member states

+/- 11.50
Wine grape varieties and their synonyms on labels

+/- 12.20
Any other business:
- drought in Portugal and Spain and Belgium
- farmland trade in the EU