European Union

The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk received the letters of credentials of the following Ambassadors:

H.E. Mr Abu Sufian Bin Haji Ali, Ambassador, Head of Mission of Brunei Darussalam to the European Union
H.E. Mr Manasvi Srisodapol, Ambassador, Head of Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand to the European Union
H.E. Mr Ata Oveznepesovich Serdarov, Ambassador, Head of Mission of Turkmenistan to the European Union
H.E. Mr Mohamed Issa Hamad Abushahab, Ambassador, Head of Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the European Union
H.E. Mr Richard Zacharie Akplogan, Ambassador, Head of Mission of the Republic of Benin to the European Union
H.E. Mr Sibusisiwe Mngomezulu, Ambassador, Head of Mission of  the Kingdom of Swaziland to the European Union
H.E. Ms Rhoda Jackson, Ambassador, Head of Mission of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the European Union

On 17 July, the Council adopted a decision to conclude, on behalf of the EU, the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol that will ensure the protection of the climate from the powerful greenhouse gases hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). With this decision, the EU is ready for formal ratification, and has signalled its continued determination to lead global efforts to tackle climate change.

The purpose of the Kigali Amendment, agreed on 15 October 2016,  is to achieve a global reduction in the consumption and production of HFCs. Although greenhouse gases do not damage the ozone layer, their release into the atmosphere contributes to climate change and they have a significant impact on global warming.

Taking swift action to cut HFC emissions is essential. The implementation of this Amendment is expected to prevent warming of up to 0.5° Celsius by the end of the century, thus making a positive contribution to reaching the targets of the Paris agreement.

"HFCs are thousands of times more harmful to the climate than carbon dioxide. I very much welcome today's decision to be among the first to ratify the Kigali amendment to cut these greenhouse gases and continue our unwavering commitment to tackling climate change. This is an issue where international cooperation is crucial. Taking the Montreal Protocol as a model, the EU is ready to make sure this amendment is also a success."

Siim Kiisler, Minister of the Environment of the Republic of Estonia

HFCs can be found in equipment and products used in our daily lives such as fridges, air conditioners, foams and aerosol sprays. They were introduced as an alternative to ozone depleting substances, mainly hydrochlorofluorocarbons. 

Implementation at EU level 

The Kigali Amendment sets out a number of steps to be taken by the parties to the Montreal Protocol, in accordance with their economic and social development, to gradually reduce the use of HFCs. The EU member states, like other developed countries, are required to start the first reductions in 2019.  

However, the EU has taken early action and is at the forefront of compliance. The regulation adopted in 2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases enabled the EU to already begin phasing down HFCs in 2015. This regulation will have to be reviewed to comply with the Kigali Amendment beyond 2030. 

Until then, the current EU legislation can still apply. In fact, it not only fulfils the Montreal Protocol obligations, but also provides for a stricter phase-down schedule compared with the measures to be in place under the new amendment. 

Timeline & next steps

On 2 February 2017, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Council decision to authorise the conclusion of the Kigali Amendment. The Council agreed to conclude the Amendment and start the ratification process on 11 May 2017. Subsequently, the European Parliament gave its formal consent during its plenary on 5 July. 

Today's Council decision enters into force immediately after its adoption. The EU has now to formally deposit the declaration of competence together with the instrument of ratification of the Kigali amendment at the United Nations. 

Member states are currently following their respective ratification processes considering that they also need to obtain approval from their national parliaments. 

The Amendment will enter into force on 1 January 2019 upon ratification by at least 20 states or regional economic integration organisations that are parties to the Montreal Protocol. If this threshold is not reached by then, the Amendment will enter into force on the 90th day following the date on which this condition has been finally fulfilled. 

Background - Kigali Amendment & Montreal Protocol 

The EU and its member states are long-standing advocates of climate protection. They are parties to the Vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol to phase out the production and consumption of ozone depleting substances and they had approved its four previous amendments to include in its regulatory scope other non-ozone depleting chemicals which cause climate change.

All 197 parties, including the EU and its member states, have been remarkably committed to the implementation of the Montreal Protocol since its agreement in 1987 and as a result, the recovery of the ozone layer is underway and is forecast to have been completed by the middle of this century. 

In light of this success, the Protocol has been amended a fifth time to reduce HFCs. This Amendment was adopted at the 28th Meeting of the Parties from 10 to 15 October 2016 held in Kigali (Rwanda).

Under its provisions, developed countries will be the first to start the phase-down process in 2019. Measures are more flexible for others. For most developing countries, the first step to reduce the production and consumption of these greenhouse gases begins in 2029 while for the remaining developing parties the first step is only set for 2032.

On 17 July, the Council adopted a decision[1] accepting on behalf of the European Union an amendment to the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol to reduce emissions of air pollutants globally. The EU is now ready to formally accept the amendment. 

The amendment strengthens the provisions set out in the original text of the protocol and its annexes with the aim of enhancing in the long term the protection of human health and the environment from transboundary air pollution. 

"Each year, 700 thousand people die in Europe due to air pollution. It affects us all regardless of borders. With the revised Gothenburg Protocol, the emissions of air pollutants will decrease, improving the air we breathe every day. The EU is on track thanks to our new ambitious National Emission Ceilings directive. Today, I am delighted we are reconfirming our international commitments."

Siim Kiisler, Minister of the Environment of the Republic of Estonia

The amendment establishes more rigorous national emission reduction commitments for the four main air pollutants: sulphur (mainly sulphur dioxide), nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds (VOC), other than methane and ammonia. These emission limits are set for each country per pollutant and apply from 2020 onwards. 

A fifth pollutant - fine particulate matter - is covered for the first time. The revised protocol introduces clear emission reduction commitments for it, too. 

The amendment takes a step forward by incorporating black carbon as a particulate matter component. These short-lived particles are major contributors to global warming due to their heat-trapping power, which is immense compared to that of carbon dioxide. 

In addition, the revised protocol updates the emission limit values (emission standards) for different air pollution sources: stationary (e.g. factories and processing plants) and mobile (e.g. vehicles, non-road mobile machines and agricultural and forestry tractors). New standards are introduced on the content of non-methane VOC's in products. 

The amendment also completes the reporting obligation of the parties regarding the emissions of air pollutants as well as the progress made in the fields of technology and research. 

EU emission reduction commitments and implementation 

Under the revised protocol, the EU is set to reduce its emissions for 2020 as follows: sulphur dioxide - 59%, nitrogen oxides - 42%, ammonia - 6%, volatile organic compounds - 28%, and fine particulate matter - 22%. 

Currently, the main instruments used by the EU to implement the Gothenburg Protocol are the National Emission Ceilings (NEC) and the Medium Combustion Plants directives. 

The revised NEC directive, adopted in 2016, has already been aligned with the amended protocol by integrating the new international rules into EU law and by matching the emission reduction commitments for each member state from 2020 to 2029. 

In the revised NEC directive, the EU established more ambitious reductions from 2030 onwards. The EU reduction targets are the following: sulphur dioxide - 79%, nitrogen oxides  - 63%, ammonia - 19%, volatile organic compounds - 40%, and fine particulate matter - 49%.  

Context and next steps at EU level 

The Commission presented a proposal for a Council decision to accept the amendment as part of the 'Clean Air Programme for Europe' on 20 December 2013. 

However, negotiations at EU level have been on hold since then in view of the revision of the NEC directive. Following the directive's adoption on 8 December 2016, the Council agreed on the decision on 25 April 2017 and the European Parliament gave its consent during its plenary on 5 July 2017. 

Today's decision enters into force immediately after its adoption. The EU now needs to officially deposit the instrument of acceptance of the amendment with the United Nations. Member states are also taking the necessary steps to obtain final approval from national parliaments to ratify it. 

The amendment will enter into force on the 90th day after its ratification by two thirds of the parties. 

Background - Gothenburg Protocol & LRTAP Convention 

The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) is the main international framework to tackle air pollution. 51 countries from the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) region are parties to the convention, including all EU member states. 

Over the last 30 years, 8 protocols have broadened the scope of the convention to incorporate stricter emission rules for air pollutants, the eighth being the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol. The EU approved that protocol in June 2003.

In 2012, following lengthy negotiations initiated in 2007, an agreement to amend the Gothenburg Protocol was reached during the 30th session of the LRTAP Convention. With the exception of the revised annex I, which entered into force on 5 June 2013, all other amended provisions required prior acceptance from parties.

[1] Denmark voted against this Council decision. However, it will accept the protocol on behalf of the country to maintain the EU's overall air-quality objectives. See statement

Monday 17 July 2017
10.00 Presentation of letters of credentials of ambassadors
14.00 Meeting with Dragan Čović, member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Good afternoon. I am pleased to welcome President Vučić to Brussels today. And I was happy to congratulate him personally on his election.

Let me start by recalling that the European Union's support to the European perspective of the Western Balkans is unequivocal. This was unanimously confirmed by leaders at the European Council in March. As to the pace of the accession process, it will depend on your advances in the reform agenda.

One example of how the European Union and Serbia have cooperated to tackle a common challenge is irregular migration. Let me thank you for your support then and today. I hope that the European Union can continue to count on Serbia, just as Serbia can continue counting on the EU to provide the necessary support.

Let me also commend you for your personal commitment to the stability and security of the region, a region which remains the European Union's strategic priority. Within your first 50 days in office, you have met almost all your neighbours and regional partners. I encourage you to keep up this work. Your role is absolutely unique.

After a rather turbulent start to the year, today Serbia engages in dialogue - talking to, not at, each other - and I welcome your continued commitment to the Pristina-Belgrade Dialogue and your readiness to pursue, domestically and with Kosovo counterparts, a further reflection on future relations.

For me, the end-game of the Dialogue and Serbia's reform efforts is full membership of Serbia in the EU. This is what we promised in Thessaloniki and what we are ready to deliver. You have reiterated lately that Serbia has made its geostrategic choice, and that there is no turning back. We expect your choice will guide your actions.

Finally, I encouraged President Vučić to pursue reforms to strengthen the rule of law with the same vigour and consistency as progress on the economy. A strong and robust rule of law is the ultimate signal that you are ready to enter the EU. Thank you. 

Delegations

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Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris agreement on climate change provided the backdrop for the 8th Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM), held this year in Beijing.

The summit saw China stepping closer to a global leadership role on climate action, joining forces with the European Union and 24 ministers from around the world to reaffirm its commitment to the climate accords. China also played host to the second Mission Innovation (MI) forum, held in June 2017: a group of 22 countries and the European Commission, all of whom have agreed to double their clean energy research and development budgets over five years.

It is good news that these two summits will continue to be hosted together, as this improves the prospects of them linking up their processes to cover the entire innovation value chain, from upstream research (MI) to market uptake (CEM), in a consistent and streamlined way. MI is essentially driven by public sector investment and hopes to engage the private sector on ‘upstream’ innovation (such as in labs and demonstration sites). CEM, meanwhile, aims to get innovations ‘into the field’.

After the summit, the EU’s Competitiveness Council had just called on the Commission to develop a full industrial strategy. The strategy is to be presented to heads of government in Spring 2018. This is a good idea.

“Europe has its strengths in industrial innovation”

Over the years working in innovation and energy policy, I have become convinced that what we call ‘mission-driven innovation’ is only possible with clear strategic leadership and tangible goals. And this is what is missing in the EU at the moment.

Europe has its strengths in industrial innovation: it has one of best educated workforces in the world; European organisations have been responsible for around a fifth of all clean-tech-related patents in the last fifteen years (the largest share in the world); the EU’s research and development programmes, like Horizon 2020, are some of the best publicly-funded schemes in the world; Europe has an enviable record of setting global regulatory standards.

But we have to admit that there are weaknesses too. Europe may still be the largest global investor in renewable energy but investment levels are now falling. And the ‘deployment deficit’ continues to be an issue: there is no shortage of ideas but too many innovations get caught in the ‘valley of death’, never reaching deployment or even demonstration at scale.  Industrial carbon capture and storage is a good example here. Partly because of this, Europe now finds itself under increasing competition from other global regions, many of which are now very active members of both the CEM and MI.

To take an example, 50,000 European jobs in renewable energy ‒ mainly in solar power ‒ were lost in 2014 alone. This is partly down to local deployment rates for solar and wind technologies still being too slow. For nearly a decade, Europe has been a net importer of solar components, mainly from China. And 2015 was the first year that a European company was beaten to the top spot on the global table for wind energy deployment by capacity, with Chinese manufacturer Goldwind overtaking Vestas. Volkswagen, BMW and Renault’s market share in the global electric vehicle market may be strong for now, but they are vulnerable to slower vehicle sales in their home markets compared with global rates. Again, this is connected to the limited roll-out of European charging infrastructure.

“If we get the next steps right, we could unleash another wave of home-grown, low-carbon innovation”

So, what should the Commission’s next steps be in creating an Entrepreneurial Union?  The first must be mapping the ‘innovation landscape’ in Europe. Where do the most promising technologies stand in the innovation and investment cycle, and which EU policies currently support them? After that, we need to understand the bottlenecks, in order to prescribe specific remedies.

A recent study I was involved in tried to do this for the Energy Union, examining 11 low-carbon technologies, from hydrogen fuels to smart distribution grids, and found that only two (onshore wind and biomass) were benefitting from strong EU leadership at deployment stage.

Next year the MI summit will take place in Europe, alongside the European Clean Energy Industrial Competitiveness Forum. These two events can help kick-start discussions on what needs to be done more strategically, and how the EU can support leading clean energy actors. MI will be a good chance to showcase the progress that has been made in setting up European investment platforms (involving national, regional and local authorities, entrepreneurs, project managers, innovators, investors, companies, research centres and universities) with the aim of covering the entire innovation value chain, from upstream research to market uptake.

Likewise, Horizon 2020 could become an essential catalyst for mission-oriented industrial innovation. And this, in turn, should inform the design of the forthcoming EU innovation programme under the next Multiannual Financial Framework.

If we can get these next steps right, we could unleash another wave of home-grown, low-carbon innovation. An exciting prospect.

IMAGE CREDIT: digitalista/Bigstock

The post A real industrial strategy for Europe could unleash the low-carbon innovations we need appeared first on Europe’s World.

It is with deep sadness that we have learned of the death of Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate and one of the most prominent human rights defenders in China. We send our most sincere condolences and respect to his wife, Ms Liu Xia, his family and friends.

Liu Xiaobo was one of the authors of Charter 08, calling for peaceful democratic reform and rule of law in China. His personal intervention during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 saved hundreds, if not thousands, of lives.

We consistently expressed our opposition to his conviction and asked for his release. Most recently, we urged the Chinese authorities to respect his wish to receive medical care in Germany. Unfortunately these calls were not heeded.

At this time, we appeal to the Chinese authorities to allow his wife, Ms Liu Xia and his family to bury Liu Xiaobo at a place and in a manner of their choosing, and to allow them to grieve in peace. We call on the authorities to remove all restrictions on the movement and communications of his family members and allow Ms Liu Xia and her brother Mr Liu Hui to leave China, if they wish to do so.

We reiterate the European Union's call for all prisoners of conscience in China to be released.

OPINION on addressing shrinking civil society space in developing countries
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Francisco Assis

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EU Ministers of Agriculture and Fisheries meet on 17 and 18 July 2017 in Brussels to focus on the work programme of the Estonian presidency, fishing opportunities for 2018, trade, the future CAP, organic farming, and simplification.

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BASF Grenzach v ECHA
Research, information, education, statistics
The President of the General Court dismisses BASF Grenzach's application for interim measures regarding triclosan, a preservative for cosmetic products

AMENDMENTS 1 - Draft report on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement establishing the EU-LAC International Foundation
Committee on Foreign Affairs

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The 19th EU-Ukraine Summit takes place on 12-13 July 2017 in Kyiv. The European Union is represented by Donald TUSK, President of the European Council, and Jean-Claude JUNCKER, President of the European Commission. Ukraine is represented by President Petro POROSHENKO. The agenda of the summit focuses on three main issues: the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, including the implementation of the Minsk agreements, the reform process, and the regional and international situation.

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The Venezuelan Government has called an election on 30th July to launch the so called National Constituent Assembly process, aimed at writing a new Constitution for the country. This step is unacceptable both in form and in content, casting serious doubts about its constitutionality and threatening the essential principles of democracy such as universal, free, direct and secret vote.
Further information
Complete text of the statement
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

will take place on Monday 4 September, 15:00-18:30 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
watch the meeting live
Access rights for interest group representatives
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Advocate General Bobek considers that a company alleging that its personality rights have been infringed by the publication of information on the internet can take legal action in the Member State where it has its centre of interests for the entirety of the harm claimed

Commission v Spain
Freedom of establishment
Spain is ordered to pay a lump sum of €3 million because of its delay in liberalising the port cargo-handling services sector

Length of video : 112'
You may manually download this video in WMV (1Gb) format

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

It might not have been immediately obvious, but we are now into the meat of Article 50.  Even with a first cycle of meetings now done, it has taken a press conference from Michel Barnier to make any impression on the British media, and even then only to comparing notes on whistling.

All of which prompts some reflection on how it’s all going and, in particular, why the EU seems to be bossing it so far.

To be a bit less loose in my language, I’m pointing here to the way in which the Union has managed to get its views on all key decisions to date be accepted by the UK. This includes the use of Article 50, the sequencing and structure of negotiations and the content within that structure. By contrast, there is literally nothing that the UK has clearly shaped.

So why is this?

The simple answer is that the EU has followed good negotiating practice from the start, while the UK appears not to have done so.

This breaks down into a number of basic points.

Most importantly, the EU knows what it wants. This boils down to ensuring that the integrity of the treaties is maintained and that membership is a better deal than non-membership.

From that very simple starting point, it has been able to build up everything that follows, by virtue of having these underlying interests in place. Interests are not the same as positions, which are specific and usually rigidly defined, and are really useful because they leave open options, rather than closing them down.

This matters especially in Article 50, because the UK does not have a similar set of interests: wanting ‘the best possible deal’ is not an interest, but a statement of hope, so long as the notion of ‘best’ is not unpacked. In the face of the UK’s uncertainty, the EU is able to adapt and work around what it finds, as the UK finds it. If you spend some time with the negotiating mandate for the Commission, you’ll see that there’s not actually any particular result that it required, only a set of observations about the consequences of anything the UK might desire. Thus, the mandate notes that the four freedoms of the single market belong together, so it’s all in or all out, but the UK can decide which for itself.

Secondly, the EU has largely separated the people from the problem. It has been very largely indifferent to who sits in the negotiating chair, or in Number 10, or how big anyone’s mandate might be, because instead it has been focused on the specifics of resolving the Article 50 to a satisfactory conclusion for all involved. In this it has been helped by its relatively dominant position, and by not having to work its (multiple) domestic audiences, but the difference in tone is very evident, as underlined by this week’s contributions from Barnier and Johnson.

Rather than loosing time and effort to managing personality clashes (and more on that in a bit), the Commission has been able to gather and manage a lot of detailed discussion, generate options and identify preferred outcomes. Consider here how quickly it came to an evaluation of the UK’s proposal on citizens’ right and how this was presented in terms of the proposal, rather than of the people presenting the proposal.

And this is the third point: the EU has done lots and lots of preparation. From the morning after the referendum, work was begun to build teams, gather information, find consensus positions with member states and the European Parliament, so that it was more than ready to go by the time the UK got to submitting notification in March. Think on how the Commission has now issued 9 position papers, while the UK has only one. Sure, the Commission hasn’t produced one on the Irish border question, but the overall impression is of directed and focused problem-solving at work. In all this, it has been helped by having enough resource to pursue this work, without having to set up extensive new structures. While Theresa May spent the autumn touring European capitals finding out what might be possible, the EU was building up a head of steam.

This preparation has then fed into owning the agenda. The ideas contained in the very first response to the referendum have been reinforced and elaborated consistently and firmly since, presenting the Article 50 path, and its sequencing, as the only viable and acceptable path to follow. Even the issuing of multiple position papers is a reflection of how it keeps the UK on the back foot, constantly having to respond to the latest output rather than advancing its own ideas first. In the court of public opinion, the UK ends up looking like it’s playing catch-up or being curlish about what’s suggested.

The EU has made the most of this advantage by constructing positions that deal with process before results. The financial liabilities paper is a central exhibit here, as it tries to suggest a way of agreeing a sum, rather than suggesting a sum directly. It might seem obvious, but if everyone can agree on a fair way to do something, then they are much more likely to agree that the outcome is fair, and seen to be fair by others. In this particular case, this matters, because it contains a simple way of drawing out some of the inevitable sting from British reactions, especially from the ‘whistling’ end of the spectrum, for whom any sum is too large. Consider a bit of negotiating ju-jitsu by the Commission to appeal to British fair play: alternatively, think of it as top trolling, after all the fuss David Cameron made about fairness during his renegotiation.

Finally, the Commission has one more card up its sleeve, namely that it is structurally inflexible. You might call this its Uruguay aspect, after its move back in 1992 at the conclusion of a long round on talks for the then GATT, where the Commission claimed (largely sincerely) that it couldn’t give any more ground to the US on agriculture because the French wouldn’t let it.

For GATT, so for Brexit. The mandate might have been largely consensual in its formation, but different member states have different interests in the outcome, so the mandate is something of a balancing act. Both the process of its agreement and its content have already hardened what the Commission might give ground on in the talks. Expect a trip back to Blair House at some point.

But there’s another question underlying all of this: if this is all so obvious, why haven’t the British done the same?

Partly, they have. There is much work in DExEU and other units to build up capacity, plans and positions, most of which has yet to see the light of day.

And that’s because of the first point that I discussed, namely the question of purpose. Reading neither the Lancaster House speech or the White Paper produces any understanding of what the UK wants.

This is a theme I have returned to on several occasions, but the point bears repetition: the referendum campaigns were a pursuit of winning the vote, not having a discussion about the future direction of the country. Unless there is a general understanding of that, then the purpose of being out of the EU is unclear and most necessarily remain so.

Until then the Commission will be able to continue to advance its agenda and preferences, knowing that the UK will struggle to engage or push back, because it simply doesn’t know what it wants or what it needs.

 

PS – If you want a manual for all this, try this one.

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The 2017 Western Balkans Summit in Trieste, Italy is the upcoming fourth annual summit within the Berlin Process initiative for European integration of Western Balkans states. The summit takes place on 12 July 2017.

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