European Union

Freedom of expression is the right of every person to think as he wishes and to be able to express his opinions by any means he deems appropriate in the fields of politics, philosophy, religion, morals. Freedom of expression in a democratic country of the European Union is considered illegal. In a EU that never hesitates to give lessons in human rights and democracy, for example to African or Balkans countries.

According to Barcelona, the YES has won with 90% of the votes. Some 2.26 million people voted and 2.02 million voted in favor of independence. These figures represent a participation of almost 42.3%, Catalonia counting 5.34 million voters.

The referendum is quite illegal under the Spanish Constitution and the interpretation given to it by the Spanish Constitutional Court. ("It is not within the competence of the autonomies to hold consultations ... which have an impact on the fundamental issues resolved by the constitutional process.") But it is legal according to the Catalan law.

Tag: Catalunyafreedom of expression

The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

DRAFT REPORT on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, Commission and the the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning Hong Kong, 20 years after handover
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Alyn Smith

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Nicoline Frolich and Ivar Bleiklie chair panel on higher education policy

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hannah Moscovitz and Martina Vukasovic

This year’s ECPR (European Consortium of Political Research) General Conference took place at the University of Oslo between September 6-9. The conference included hundreds of panels on a wide array of topics and representation from close to 2,000 academics from around the world. The ECPR Standing Group on the Politics of Higher Education, Research and Innovation, for the sixth time in a row (following Prague 2016, Montreal 2015, Glasgow 2014, Bordeaux 2013 and Reykjavik 2011) organised a section with a total of six panels covering various themes related to knowledge policy governance.

 

The section opened with the panel European Integration in the Knowledge Domain –
Taking Stock and Forward Outlook. The panel was based on the research agenda presented in Maassen and Olsen’s (2007) seminal book “University Dynamics and European Integration”. Peter Maassen began by reflecting on the book’s contribution to empirical and theoretical work on higher education research. Mari Elken presented a paper outlining ideas for further developing the research agenda on European higher education and emphasizing the importance of considering the complex ecology involved. Jens Jungblut followed with a discussion of the political contestations involved in the implementation of European policy ideas at the national level. Finally, Meng-Hsuan Chou and Pauline Ravinet presented their research on higher education regionalism, discussing its potential for contemporary political research as well as the importance of comparing regions ‘beyond Europe’ to further develop this field.

 

The following panel – Policy translation, adaptation and complexity in higher education, research and innovation – explored the various conditions which shape knowledge policy design. Hila Zahavi presented her research assessing the manner in which the EU’s foreign policy interests are embedded in various EU funded higher education programs. Teresa Patricio’s paper explored the research and higher education policy implications involved in complex international collaborations through the example of Portuguese university partnerships. Davide Donina then presented his paper on the examination of New Public Management features in Portuguese and Italian higher education systems, through a comparative and multi-level analysis. Hannah Moscovitz’s paper addressed the role of territorial identity-related interests in the design of knowledge policy from a subnational perspective. Finally, Sandra Hasanefendic’s paper examined the different responses to a new research policy implemented in two Portuguese poly-technics, revealing that the heterogeneous responses can be attributed to unique organisational structures.

 

The third panel highlighted empirical and theoretical contributions to research on the Policy, Governance and Organisational Change in Higher Education. Martina Vukasovic opened the panel with a discussion of the term ‘loose coupling’ in higher education research – outlining how it has been used, discussing some lacunas in its empirical application and opening avenues for future use. Sara Diogo then presented her paper on the influence of the OECD on European higher education, highlighting the diffusion of educational trends in Portugal and Finland. Roland Bloch followed with a presentation on the role played by the German Excellence Initiative in the proliferation of doctoral programs and its impact on the overall structure of German higher education. Agnete Vabo’s paper assessed how university mergers affect institutional autonomy and strategic steering, shedding light on the diversification involved. The panel concluded with a presentation by Ivar Bleiklie on the potential for discussing a Scandanavian model for higher education through a consideration of the commonalities and differences between Scandinavian countries’ higher education models.

 

The panel on Research Executive Agencies – Independent Organizations or the Extension of Research Policymakers?, aimed to prompt a discussion on research executive agencies (REAs) and their implications for knowledge policy research. Sarah Glück introduced the panel by highlighting the importance of scrutinising REAs in order to understand the competing logics inherent in science policy systems. Rupert Pichler and Sascha Ruhland’s paper analysed the normative framework governing research funding agencies, focusing on a number of dynamics impacting Austrian government policies in this domain. Que Anh Dang’s presentation explored Nordic higher education regionalism revealing how regional research agencies have contributed to new forms of region-building and market making in the area. Thomas König and Tim Flink’s paper assessed the challenges of the ERC for European research policy which they attribute to both its organisational framework and discursive compromises it undertakes. Finally, Inga Ulnicane presented her work on the concept of ‘grand challenges’, assessing whether it represents a new paradigm in science, technology and innovation policy.

 

The panel Unbundling knowledge production and knowledge dissemination aimed to conceptualise the ‘unbundling’ of knowledge policy; examining the different actors involved, understanding the consequences of such processes and implications for the university’s perceived role in society. Farah Purwaningrum’s paper discussed the understanding of the university’s third mission in Malaysia, specifically asking how the idea of the third mission as perceived by the Malaysian Ministry of Education affects knowledge production in Malaysian universities? Joonha Jeon’s paper assessed how New Public Management has influenced the realization of universities’ ‘third mission’, highlighting university-industry links in South Korea. Finally, Janja Komljenovic presented her paper assessing the unbundling processes evident in university social media marketing strategies. Through the example of LinkedIn, the study shows an important connection between higher education, markets and digital platforms.

 

The topic of the last panel in the section was Quality and Effectiveness of Governance in Higher Education: Unpacking the Quality of Governance and Effects of Governance Changes in Higher Education Policies. The panel comprised five papers. First, Michael Dobbins presented a comparative study on German and Swiss higher education reforms which, in response to similar challenges such as globalization and competition pressures, took two distinct (and somewhat unexpected routes) – decentralization and centralization, respectively. Giliberto Capano presented the study he co-authored with Andrea Pritoni on whether increasing autonomy can account for changes in education performance in Western European higher education systems. Meng-Hsuan Chou presented the paper co-authored with Pauline Ravinet concerning effectiveness of inter-regional policy dialogues, in particular focusing on cooperation between EU and ASEAN in the form of EU-SHARE project. Beverly Barrett presented a paper on higher education in Latin America, Portugal and Spain. The panel concluded with a paper by Jens Jungblut and Peter Maassen focusing on quality of governance in sub-Saharan Africa, which, amongst other, provided also a conceptual contribution concerning two dimensions of quality of governance – autonomy and capacity.

 

Apart from the panels in this section, the members of the Standing Group also took part in other sessions, including:

-          Roundtable on the consequences of internationalization of political science education

-          Featured Panel: The European Research Council @ 10: What has it done to us?

-          Transformation of the Political Studies Profession: What does it mean to be an Active Academic in the Current Era?

 

Standing Group dinner at the Nordic Institute for Studies in Innovation, Research and Education NIFU

As has become tradition, the Standing Group also had its annual meeting focused on planning future activities, including ECPR 2018 which will take place in Hamburg. The meeting was also marked by the Award for Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar to Que Anh Dang for her paper “The Bologna and ASEM Education Secretariats: Authority of Transnational Actor in Regional Higher Education Policy”. Standing Group members attended the keynote lecture by Johan P. Olsen “Democratic Accountability and the Changing European Political Order” and enjoyed the very generous hospitality of the Nordic Institute for Studies in Innovation, Research and Education NIFU, which hosted the traditional Standing Group dinner.

 

ECPR 2017 was another successful year for our Standing Group, gathering researchers from 20 different countries, currently based on three continents (Asia, Europe and North America). See you in the next ECPR General Conference in Hamburg in August 2018!

 

The post ECPR 2017 – continuing our focus on higher education, research and innovation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Federica MOGHERINI, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, attends the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) Informal Ministerial Meeting, on 29 September 2017, in Brussels.

Download this video here.

Plenary session and committee meetings in Strasbourg

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The European Council will take place on 19 and 20 October 2017 in the Europa building in Brussels. The press centre remains located in the Justus Lipsius building.

Now open for last-minute accreditation requests (online only)
Procedure

Please note that due to the current security situation in Belgium, specific security measures have been put in place for last minute accreditation requests. Media representatives applying for the first time or who have not been screened recently will be the subject of a comprehensive and detailed verification by our security service. Considering the time and resources needed for these verifications, not all requests may be processed. Media are therefore advised to avoid sending representatives falling into these categories.

If this is your first registration, please make sure you have a recent ID-size photograph in JPEG format (.jpg) and the number of your passport or identity card ready before starting the online process.

You will receive an acknowledgement of receipt by email. Please read it carefully as it includes the list of original documents you will be asked to provide when collecting your badge. Depending on your profile, the requested documents will include: Passport or ID card, press card and/or an original letter in paper copy from your editor-in chief as well as the signed original of your authorisation for security screening (only for media representatives of Belgian nationality or resident in Belgium). The press centre may contact you to request additional information if necessary. No accreditation badge will be issued if you cannot provide all required documents. 

Trainees with media organisations who do not possess a press card are not entitled to request accreditation. 

Journalists holding a 6-month badge (01.07.2017 - 31.12.2017) do not need to register

6-month badges can be collected at the accreditation centre of the LEX building during summits. Please ensure that you have all the required documents when collecting your badge.

Collection of badges

Accreditation badges must be collected in person from the LEX building (145 rue de la Loi, Brussels)  

• Wednesday 18 October, from 09.30 to 13.00 and from 14.00 to 18.00
• Thursday 19 October, from 08.30 to 20.00
• Friday 20 October, from 08.00 to the end of the final press conference (max. 22.00)

Practical information on the press centre and the media programme will follow.

For more details on the meeting of the European Council,  see the meeting page.

Good evening. Let me start by thanking Prime Minister Ratas for hosting the Tallinn Digital Summit. It was indeed a very special event about the future of Europe. And many thanks to all the Estonians for your great hospitality and for inspiring Europe with your "digital" spirit.

We held this summit because Europe must use the opportunities created by huge advances, in everything from robotics to artificial intelligence. We need to actively shape our future and manage the risks posed by the digital revolution to our societies and democracies. That is why the leaders focused on how the EU could successfully navigate the opportunities, as well as the risks. We will now work together with Prime Minister Ratas to  prepare the conclusions for the October European Council, based on our discussions.

Now, let me make a comment on the last night's dinner. As you know, the leaders had an informal debate on the situation of Europe and on our future work in the European Council. I was mandated to translate this good debate  and the visionary speeches we have heard recently, into a concrete work programme. Therefore, I have already started bilateral consultations. In addition to my meeting with Prime Minister Ratas, today I also met the Prime Ministers of Bulgaria, Croatia and the Chancellor of Germany. And during the next two weeks I will consult all Member States.

Based on those consultations,  I will present a very concrete working plan with a number of decisions that need to be taken by the leaders in the next year. Something I could call the “Leaders Agenda 2017/18”. This means further development and enrichment of the programme that I have presented in my Tallinn letter. It will include, inter alia, the launch of the  permanent defence cooperation by the end of 2017, a Euro Summit in December to further deepen the Economic and Monetary Union, with a special focus on the completion of the Banking Union, or a Western Balkans' Summit during the Bulgarian presidency in the EU.

Our guiding principles are clear and I hope will not change. First and foremost, I will do everything in my power to keep the unity of the EU. Secondly, I will  concentrate on finding real solutions to real problems of our citizens, who are concerned about security, migration or unemployment. And finally, we will all make sure that Europe is making progress.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Good morning. Yesterday evening we had a good and constructive debate. I will use this debate to build what I could call the leaders' agenda 2017 and 2018, of course in consultation with all the Member States and I will present this political agenda in two weeks time.

In this process I will respect as always three key principles:

• one, the need to find real solutions to real problems,
• two, the need to make progress step-by-step, issue-by-issue
• three, and above all, the need to keep the unity of the 27 Member States, also in the context of the new ideas.

And there have been plenty. But even though some may think it is a kind of a Eurovisions' contest, and perhaps it is, I am personally convinced that together, we will make good use of it, if we sing unisono.

Prime Minister Theresa May’s speech in Florence was intended to move forward stalled Brexit negotiations. But as I argue in this post that first appeared on the Dahrendorf Blog, Britain has found itself running into numerous problems with Brexit because its strategy for exiting the EU has been a textbook example of failed strategic thinking.

It’s said that in the First World War the Germans viewed the British troops and their generals as lions led by donkeys. One hundred years on, to much of the rest of Europe it is Britain’s national leaders, bereft of any coherent unified strategy for exiting the EU, who are donkeys misleading a great country.

If things continue as they have been, Britain’s approach to Brexit will be studied by generations of strategists as an example of flawed strategic thinking. The rest of Europe and Britain’s key allies such as the United States should lament this. As the Henry Jackson Society pointed out in a recent report, Britain remains a country of immense power and potential. It is not a dwarf and Brexit does not doom it to become one. The British people, like the troops of the First World War, will soldier on. But Brexit does pose the biggest political, administrative, and economic challenge Britain has faced in a long time. If it is handled badly, Britain will suffer unnecessary pain and losses. In facing such a challenge, the British people deserve to be led by leaders with a grasp of what it is they want to achieve and an ability to direct Britain towards it.

Strategy is a balanced combination of ends, ways, and means, which incorporates an assessment of risk and an opponent’s likely behaviour. Successful implementation and adaptation of strategy depends on having leaders who are able and willing to react and lead the struggle. Britain’s approach to Brexit has not lived up to this definition.

Before we open this up further let us be clear that Brexit is not a simple one-off event. It is a series of overlapping multifaceted, multi-levelled processes, negotiations, and debates involving multiple actors in Britain, the remaining EU, Europe, and the rest of the world. Its wide-ranging nature and complexity make it one of the most important and difficult political issues to define and analyse. Finding a way through it, for all involved, was never going to be easy. As I’ll touch on in a future blog post, the EU’s own approach has not been without problems. But Britain has so far gone about it in a particularly poor way.

Ends

Britain has made the fundamental strategic mistake of not knowing what end it seeks from Brexit. “Brexit means Brexit” said Theresa May. But Brexit is a process with no clearly defined destination. It’s like saying “War means war”. War, after all, is a means to an end. Britain’s leadership has been divided, unsure, and left shell-shocked by the Leave vote in a referendum in which most of them had campaigned for Remain. But in voting for Leave what the British people wanted Leave to mean – and therefore what end they want the UK government to deliver – has never been entirely settled. Its why British politics since 23 June 2016 has been defined by a battle to define the narrative of Brexit. It was the need for a mandate to define such a narrative that led Theresa May to trigger an unexpected general election. She hoped it would empower her to pursue the Brexit she outlined in January. Instead, the hung parliament that emerged has only confused things further.

That more than a year on from the vote British politicians are still arguing about the nature of a transition deal points to how far there is still to go before Britain knows what it wants from what Theresa May describes as a “deep and special partnership” with the EU. And it has not been just the governing Conservative party that has struggled. Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and other opposition parties have either fudged the issue or offered unrealistic ends as part of electoral manoeuvring rather than an assessment of what is possible or in the national interest. The inability of British politicians to know what they want and whether they can get it has led to calls for the EU to take the initiative by explaining to the UK what its options are.

Ways

With an unclear end, the UK has been in no position to assess or prepare the ways to get there. Given that no plan survives first contact, the need to constantly plan and adapt is one of the key requirements of any strategy. As Former U.S. President and U.S. Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, “plans are worthless, but planning is everything”. It makes sense, therefore, to task the British civil service with planning for a range of possibilities, including a no-deal scenario. That sounds an ideal way towards a resilient strategy. But the planning only started a year ago, thanks to David Cameron’s refusal to contemplate a Leave vote in the run-up to the referendum. Since then, and as noticed by the EU’s negotiators, Britain’s negotiators have struggled to grasp the detail because there’s so much for them to do. This hasn’t stopped British Ministers from promising to achieve great things. They ignored that they lacked a way – and the time –to settle Brexit in the two-year timeframe provided by Article 50. They forgot that under-promising and over-delivering is a shining virtue; vice versa, a mortal sin.

Means

With no clear end and inadequate and confused ways, it should come as no surprise that Britain has been unable to prepare, configure, or effectively deploy the means it has available. The means are plentiful: staff, money (not least Britain’s budgetary contributions), legal positions, diplomatic support from allies, trade deals, military and security capabilities, the status of UK and EU citizens, Britain’s trade relationships with the rest of the EU, the power of the City of London, and so forth. One reason Britain has struggled is because its diplomatic means in Europe are not what they once were. Before the referendum, a great deal of EU business was conducted via Brussels. Large parts of Britain’s diplomatic resources throughout the rest of the EU were redirected towards areas of the world outside Europe, especially emerging powers. That now must be rebalanced.

Britain also needs replacements for EU regulators, additional civil servants to undertake new work, new facilities at ports, new IT systems to address changes in how trade is handled, and much more. None of this is impossible and work has begun, but it’s still in the early phases. The rest of the EU knows this. Those who compare Brexit negotiations to a poker game overlook how both sides know exactly what the others hand is. Threatening to walk away from the EU when you won’t have the means in place to deliver a ‘hard Brexit’ in a way that doesn’t inflict real and lasting damage is a bluff the other side sees straight through.

Assessment of Risk

Britain’s assessment of the risks involved in Brexit has been lacking. In triggering Article 50 when she did, Theresa May made time an ally of the EU and increased the risk of Britain not having a settlement in time for an exit it wanted. The British government forgot what the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu argued in the 5th century BC: ‘The victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory’. Having jumped headlong into Article 50 negotiations, Britain has come to realise over the past year that it needs to look for a way to victory.

Assessment of the EU

Assessment and understanding of the EU, the UK’s opponent in Brexit, has been limited. May’s speech in Florence was billed as a ‘re-engagement with Europe’. That will have perked up the ears of the rest of the EU, because, as the outgoing French ambassador in London recently noted, the UK has spent the past year talking to itself about Brexit. Leaders and decision makers elsewhere in the EU have routinely denounced talk such as ‘having your cake and eating it’, and done so to the point of ridicule. Yet with donkey-like stubbornness, some British ministers have continued to repeat and, even worse, believe their own rhetoric. Mrs May and the rest of the UK’s leadership need to recognize that the EU is changing and that Britain’s place in Europe will be shaped by this dynamic, and not only by its own hopes and plans for Brexit. Brexit is but one of several challenges and opportunities confronting the EU, among them the pressures facing the eurozone, Schengen, Russian relations, the future of NATO and ties with the U.S. How the EU responds to these pressures will determine its place in the world and frame its future relationship with Britain.

Does this mean Britain is doomed to lurch from one Brexit crisis to the next, resulting in catastrophic humiliation for Britain? Not necessarily. Britain might have over-reached in the first phase of Brexit negotiations, but it’s still too early to evaluate the full significance of Brexit and whether the old phrase holds that you can lose a battle but win the war. That, of course, depends on where Britain and the EU end up in the 2020s in terms of their relations and relative power in the world and in Europe. The rest of the EU has its own weaknesses. Strategies for saving the euro have sometimes been nothing more than glorified exercises in muddling through, with EU decision-makers often making donkeys of themselves. The only strategy that can realistically work is one based on mutual self-interest, where losses are minimised for both sides. However, it remains unclear whether Britain, or the EU, can find ways towards this.

This post first appeared on the Dahrendorf Blog.

The post Britain’s Brexit Strategy: Lions Misled by Donkeys appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In view of the continuing instability and gravity of the situation in Libya, the Council has extended the duration of the sanctions against Libya, targeting three persons for a period of six months.

On 1 April 2016, the Council imposed restrictive measures against Libya on three persons: Agila Saleh, president of the Libyan Council of Deputies in the House of Representatives; Khalifa Ghweil, prime minister and defence minister of the internationally unrecognised General National Congress; and Nuri Abu Sahmain, president of the internationally unrecognised General National Congress. These persons are viewed as obstructing the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) of 17 December 2015 and the formation of a Government of National Accord in Libya.

The Council last adopted conclusions on Libya on 17 July 2017. The Council reiterated its firm support to the Libyan Political Agreement and to the Presidency Council and Government of National Accord led by Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj established under it as the sole legitimate government authorities in the country. 

The Council reaffirmed its commitment to existing restrictive measures. It reiterated its readiness to repeal them if the conditions for their application are no longer met and to introduce new measures against individuals who threaten the peace, security or stability of the country by, for instance, impeding or undermining the successful completion of Libya's political transition. 

The EU called on all armed groups to refrain from violence, to commit to demobilisation and to recognise the authorities entrusted through the Libyan Political Agreement as the only authorities invested with the right to control Libya's defence and security forces. Violence threatens Libya's stability: the EU believes there is no solution to the Libyan crisis through the use of force.

The Council also warmly welcomed the appointment of Ghassan Salamé as the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, who will play a central mediation role helping to promote an inclusive political settlement based on the Libyan Political Agreement.

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The EU Digital Summit takes place on 29 September 2017 in Tallinn. It is focused on the essential topics of building a digital future for Europe: trust, security, e-government, industry, society and the economy.

Download this video here.

AMENDMENTS - Amendments 1 - 286
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The EU's Political and Security Committee has appointed Kauko Aaltomaa, a high-ranking official in the Finnish Ministry of Interior, as new Head of the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS). He will take up his duties on 1 October 2017.

EUPOL COPPS is a part of wider EU efforts in support of Palestinian state building in the context of working towards a comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on a two-state solution. EUPOL COPPS has been assisting the Palestinian Authority in building the institutions of a future state of Palestine in the areas of policing and criminal justice since January 2006. Through its contribution to security and justice sector reform, the mission supports efforts to increase the security of the Palestinian population and to reinforce the rule of law. EUPOL COPPS's current mandate runs until 30 June 2018. The headquarters of the mission are located in Ramallah.

Kauko Aaltomaa succeeds Rodolphe Mauget (of French nationality) who had held the post since 17 February 2015.

The Council has transposed into legal acts the provisions of United Nations Security Council resolution 2374 (2017), which allows sanctions to be imposed on those actively stymieing progress in implementing the agreement on peace and reconciliation in Mali, signed in 2015.

The targeted individuals and entities will be designated, where appropriate, by the United Nations Security Council or Sanctions Committee as being responsible for or complicit in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of Mali.

In particular, that may cover engaging in hostilities in violation of the agreement on peace and reconciliation in Mali or in attacks against the Malian institutions and security and defence forces as well as against international presences, including United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) peacekeepers, the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) joint force, European Union missions and French forces.

It also includes obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, engaging in human rights abuses, and the use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in the context of the conflict in Mali.

Sanctions against designated parties will include restrictions on admission of targeted individuals (ban on entry to the European Union) and the freezing of assets in the EU belonging to the targeted individuals or entities, in addition to prohibiting persons or entities established within the EU from making funds available to them.

The provisions can be found in full in the legal acts which will be published in the Official Journal on 29 September 2017. The legal acts were adopted by written procedure.

AMENDMENTS 1 - 232 - Draft report Recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

I feel cautiously optimistic about the constructive and more realistic tone of the Prime Minister's speech in Florence and of our discussion today. This shows that the philosophy of "having a cake and eating it" is finally coming to an end, or at least I hope so. And that's good news. But of course no-one will ever tell me that Brexit is a good thing because, as I have always said, in fact Brexit is only about damage control, and I didn't change my opinion.

As you know, we will discuss our future relations with the United Kingdom once there is so-called "sufficient progress". The two sides are working hard at it. But if you asked me and if today Member States asked me, I would say there is no "sufficient progress" yet. But we will work on it.

will take place on Wednesday 11 October, 9:00-12:30 and 14:30-18:30 and Thursday 12 October, 9:00-12:30 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
watch the meeting live
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Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Review by the Court of Auditors of the management system of cases brought before the Court of Justice and General Court of the European Union