European Union

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The 14th EU-India Summit takes place in New Delhi on 6 October 2017, and marks the 55th anniversary since the establishment of EU-India diplomatic relations.

Download this video here.

A text I published elsewhere over two years ago.
Read it again against the backdrop of this week’s news, found it still valid.

 

It is not every day that a researcher has the opportunity to be the eye-witness of a nation in the making. Sunday evening 7 June 2015, at the intersection between Avinguda de Sarria and Avinguda Josep Taradellas in the centre of Barcelona, was such a moment. Bumping into a joyful crowd that was waiting for the victory parade of their Champions League heroes in an open-deck bus, we had over two hours to improvise an in-depth session of participant observation. From the reports in the following day’s newspapers, it appears that our ‘field work sample population’ was perfectly representative of the entire city, which for the occasion metamorphosed into a very, very long ‘Fanmeile’.

As is usual nowadays on such fan zones, the patiently waiting crowd was entertained with music from loudspeakers placed at regular intervals along the itinerary of the bus. Next to the DJ, a nice lady was handing out Barça flags to those (a minority) who were not already equipped with garment or objects in the club’s colours, while an equally nice security man was scratching his head somewhat anxiously given the impressive number of persons sitting and standing in the middle of the street.

The crowd had several distinctive features: it was fully trans-generational, encompassing every single age group of the city; it had a striking gender parity within each of these age groups; and it was very visibly ethnically inclusive, with a rather significant percentage of individuals from various migrant origins.

Every now and then the DJ played ‘El Cant del Barça’, the official anthem of FC Barcelona, the lyrics of which are not really on a higher level of poetic sophistication than what can be heard in other stadia, but which seems to be mandatory learning content in primary education, judging from the degree of familiarity shown by the schoolchildren.

The latter were easy to observe since the youngest among them had been placed on the garbage container in order to give them a good view on the bus (as shown by my little photo gallery). They were, of course, excited, and while not all of them were necessarily understanding what exactly was being celebrated, they were certainly all intuitively getting the point that this was an exceptional moment, a kind of cheerful, but solemn ritual allowing individual persons to publicly show their belonging and obedience to a larger social group.

In other words: this was socialisation at work. Right before our eyes, kids from various backgrounds were being turned into little Catalans. For life, probably. The composition of the public, the sheer size of the crowd, and the Catalan flags hanging from every second balcony clearly gave evidence to the fact that the clichéd Barça motto ‘Més que un club’ is not an usurpation. As a matter of fact, this is not a club at all. It’s a national team.

This impression is confirmed when you walk into the Barça museum, where you have to go past a poster that enumerates ‘Catalan Identity. Universality. Social Commitment. Democracy’ as the pillars of the Barça identity.  It sounds like a political platform.

The evening reminded me of two very good book chapters on FC Barcelona. The first one figures in Simon Kuper’s wonderful Football against the Enemy, written in the mid-1990s, at a moment when ‘every day shop signs in Spanish went down and were replaced by Catalan signs’. For Simon Kuper, Catalan nationalism was all about symbolic recognition, not concrete political independance: ‘The Catalans do not want a state of their own, but they want something vaguer than that, symbols to prove they are a separate people’, and Barça is ‘the symbol that this nation needs in lieu of a state’. Certainly not a wrong perception twenty years ago, but it would be difficult to write the same thing today, as it would no longer sound reasonable to qualify Barça as an ‘under-performing’ club.

Ten years later, Franklin Foer also dedicated a chapter to Barça nationalism in How Soccer Explains the World. For him Catalan nationalism is already much more tangible, but it appears to him as an open and inclusive nationalism, like the liberating idea introduced by the French Revolution before it was perverted (mainly by the German romantics) into what then become no doubt the most powerful ideology of the 19th and 20th century.

Foer’s enthusiastic vision of Catalan nationalism is not naive, but it is shortsighted: proto-nationalism that is based on an existing and practiced language and on strong cultural self-awareness, and that may at the same time credibly claim to have undergone a long period of oppression, almost naturally appears as a sympathetic cause. It’s when independence has been reached and a newly existing state is charged with protecting borders, redistributing resources, and defending so-called national interests when things have a tendency to turn nasty.

Producing new Catalans with the help of cultural symbols is not too complicated. Especially if you can use the powerful emotions that football is capable of providing. But maintaining openness, inclusiveness and ethnic diversity in a future independent state will be the real test. A slightly more demanding one than a Champions League final.

The post Nation-building. Participant observation, June 2015. appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It is a true pleasure to be here at our first summit together in New Delhi. Thank you for your warm welcome and friendship.

India and the European Union are two of the world's largest democracies. This carries with it the great responsibility to uphold freedom, democracy, human rights and a credible rules-based global order. Not least in times of uncertainty and change. The best way to face these challenges is to cooperate more and better. By strengthening our strategic partnership.

So, I am happy that today we have agreed to further develop the political dimension of our relationship; that we have agreed to develop our dynamic trade and investment relations; and that we have agreed to step up cooperation on global and regional issues.

Let me briefly touch on some of these topics.

We adopted a joint declaration on counterterrorism in which we agree to counter violent extremism and radicalisation, particularly on-line, and to deal effectively with the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, terrorist financing and arms supply.

We decided to step up cooperation on maritime security in the Indian Ocean and beyond, which I hope will lead to enhanced military cooperation. We welcome the resumption of tactical exercises in the Gulf of Aden between the EU's Naval Force Operation ATALANTA and the Indian Navy and look forward to more such opportunities including India's participation in escorting World Food Programme vessels.

We also discussed the global migration and refugee crisis and agreed to coordinate closely. Through our EU-India Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility. And within the United Nations. Your engagement, Prime Minister, is appreciated and needed. The European Union continues to assume its responsibilities by receiving people in need of protection and by assisting host countries close to the conflict zones. The international community has a responsibility to crack down on human smugglers that exploit vulnerable people and violate sovereign borders.

We addressed the situation in Myanmar and the Rohingya refugee crisis. We want to see a de-escalation of tensions and a full adherence to international human rights obligations in Myanmar, as well as full humanitarian access so the aid can reach those in need. The Rohingya people must be able to return voluntarily, in safety and dignity. We call for the implementation of the recommendations of the international Rakhine Advisory Commission to tackle the root causes of this crisis. As a neighbour, India stands first in line to respond.

Turning to North Korea, the European Union, India and the whole international community have a responsibility to act with resolve for a peaceful denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK must abandon its nuclear weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities. The 11 September resolution unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council is increasing the pressure on the North Korean regime. It sends a strong signal, showing the unity of the international community. The European Union is implementing the resolution and is working on adopting EU additional sanctions to increase the pressure on North Korea.

As regards Ukraine, the European Union remains strong and united in its support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty. That is why we insist on the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements and encourage all our partners to join us in this.

Let me conclude on our trade talks and the gap between each side's expectations. I will not enter into the details as this is for Commission President Juncker but let me just make a political observation. Free and fair trade agreements are not only economically important for our companies and citizens to prosper. Above all, they strengthen and defend the rules-based international order and our way of life. The democracies of the world can be the ones to set ambitious global standards, but only if we cooperate.

Rabindranath Tagore said 'one cannot cross the sea merely by standing and staring at the water'. I am confident we can 'swim' better for this ambitious and strategic cause.

Prime Minister, thank you again for the hospitality and for the discussions today.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

At the 14th EU-India summit in New Delhi, India, on 6 October 2017, the leaders adopted a joint statement, reaffirming their commitment to strengthen the EU-India strategic partnership. 

Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, and Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, represented the EU. The Republic of India was represented by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi.

Joint statement of the EU-India summit, New Delhi, 6 October 2017

EU-India leaders also adopted joint declarations on  specific issues:

EU-India joint declaration on counter-terrorism, 6 October 2017
EU-India joint declaration on climate and energy, 6 October 2017
EU-India joint declaration on a partnership for smart and sustainable urbanisation, 6 October 2017

A number of other documents were also agreed during the summit:

• Implementing Arrangement between the Science & Engineering Research Board (SERB) and the European Research Council (ERC)
• New €500 million EIB loan agreement for Bangalore Metro Phase-II Project
• Joint Declaration between the Interim Secretariat of the International Solar Alliance (ISA), and the European Investment Bank (EIB) aimed at mobilising investments for broad-based deployment of affordable solar energy applications across the 121 prospective member countries of the ISA

On 11 October, the Subcommittee will consider the amendments to the draft report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy by Michael GAHLER, EPP. The draft report advocates a thorough revision of the CSDP to better equip Europe in an increasingly unstable and volatile internal and external security environment.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

There’s nothing very useful to be to added to the general cacophony around Theresa May’s speech to her party conference yesterday: the jokes have all been made, the judgments handed in.

But one aspect that’s been relatively overlooked is the impact on Brexit: as discussion continues to swirl about, could it improve things to have her out of office?

The case in support of this looks pretty solid. Her authority, her policy and her communication are all severely lacking.

Firstly, her position within the party is severely compromised, and has been since the general election this spring. The trashing of her reputation was as swift and brutal as any that has been seen in recent times. The Tories are an unsympathetic lot when it comes to power and May failed the most basic of tests.

The speech appears to have done nothing more than convert some of the contempt into pity, which is not really an improvement, but instead another stage in the party’s rejection. It opens up the line of argument that she is tired and needs a break, ‘for her own good’: the attempt to get the party to buckle down on Brexit can now be met with a ‘there, there’.

Secondly, May’s policy line on Brexit remains utterly unclear. To all intents and purposes, we are still at the ‘Brexit means Brexit’ phase: empty rhetoric and incomplete and contradictory positions. The speech contained nothing to change that, a strange omission even if one considers the Florence speech to have been the main place for this: the conference as a whole was full of Brexit-talk, but without the push from the leader that might have mattered.

And this runs into the communication gap. This isn’t a matter of having a cough, but of having a communication strategy that reaches those it needs to reach, with appropriate messages.  To take the obvious example, the stronger response to Boris Johnson’s sniping would have been to re-appropriate the narrative on Brexit and Article 50 and demonstrate leadership on the matter, rather than skulking in the sidelines.

So, case closed. Right?

Not really. For as much as May is now damaged goods, there are good reasons to think that she remains the preferable person to be in Number 10.

First and foremost is the time question. As I think I’ve mentioned before, time is very much of the essence now in Article 50: we are now only just over a year away from the time when a deal needs to be finalised with the EU. Having already lost two months to a general election, losing another one or two months to a leadership contest – plus maybe another two to a further general election – looks deeply irresponsible. While there are still some who would happily leave the EU on a ‘no-deal’ basis, they are ever fewer in number, so the desire – which has built up markedly in recent weeks – to get to an agreement points towards making done with the current personnel.

Secondly, there is no one in the Conservative party who looks to have a more settled position on how to handle negotiations. There is a choice between the various shades of softening, and the various shades of hardening, but neither direction is built on a rigorous model and vision. Jacob Rees-Mogg and Boris Johnson might have been the darlings of the conference, but neither had any more to offer than platitudes on the greatness of Britain and how it would all work out in the end.

Even if a new leader did take over, the Conservatives would still have no single-party majority in the Commons, plus a potentially more hostile Opposition, galvanized by the scent of blood in the water: any hardening would also make internal party rebellion more likely.

Finally, and in contrast to the negative reasons for keeping May, there is also a positive in her premiership: the very ambiguity on policy that has hurt her so far. Article 50 is a negotiation and one in the which the UK was always going to have to make some compromises. While it might not have been the optimal way to go about it, May’s rhetoric has at least allowed for adaptions of position over time: consider sequencing, finances, transitions and all the other points she has given way on.

The original May plan was to be bold, but vague, then win a huge majority against Labour, then negotiate whatever deal, and then say “that’s what Brexit meant, and there’s nothing you can do to gainsay it, since you gave me a huge mandate.”

That plan now lies in the dirt, but May probably remains the best person to pursue something similar. Her very weakness means that she can now shoulder the blame as she compromises further.

In short, May has been the author of her own, slow-burning disaster. But that doesn’t mean she is yet to meet her end.

The post Must May go, or might May stay? A Brexit balancesheet appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 11 October, SEDE will hold a public hearing on the militarisation in the Black Sea. The hearing is timely, as the regional security situation on the eastern flank has become very challenging for the EU and NATO. It will focus on the security situation following the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, the hearing will analyse the military strategic consequences of the conflicts and the possibilities to foster stability and cooperation.
Location : Paul-Henri Spaak 5B001
Further information
Draft programme
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 11 October, SEDE will hold a public hearing on the militarisation in the Black Sea. The hearing is timely, as the regional security situation on the eastern flank has become very challenging for the EU and NATO. It will focus on the security situation following the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, the hearing will analyse the military strategic consequences of the conflicts and the possibilities to foster stability and cooperation.
Further information
Draft programme
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Entry into office of a new Member at the General Court of the European Union
Entry into office of a new Member at the General Court of the European Union

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President Tusk consults all EU leaders on his proposal for an EU leaders' agenda to move Europe forward. The EU leaders' agenda will be discussed at the European Council  on 19 and 20 October 2017.

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Monday 2 October 2017
15.30 Phone call with Prime Minister of Spain Mariano Rajoy

Wednesday 4 October 2017
(Luxembourg)
08.30 Meeting with Prime Minister of Luxembourg Xavier Bettel
(Brussels)
15.00 Meeting with Prime Minister of Belgium Charles Michel (Lambermont)
20.00 Meeting with Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte

Friday 6 October 2017
New Delhi
EU-India Summit
(local time)
10.15 Courtesy visit of Minister for External Affairs Sushma Swaraj
10.55 Wreath laying ceremony at Mahatma Gandhi's memorial
11.25 Arrival and welcome by Prime Minister Narendra Modi
11.30 Restricted meeting
12.15 Plenary meeting
13.00 Working lunch
14.00 Exchange of bilateral agreements and press statements

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Length of video : 58'
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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 4 October, the Council (EU ambassadors) agreed on a negotiating position on a decision repealing the standardised reporting directive (directive 91/692/EEC) and amending 6 related legal acts. This decision is essential for ensuring legal clarity, enhancing transparency and reducing the administrative burden in the field of environmental reporting.

The standardised reporting directive is the main piece of legislation currently in place which aims at streamlining the reporting obligations of all EU environmental legislation. However, it does not set out all reporting requirements, and over the years most of its provisions have become obsolete.

Specifically, the directive refers to a total of 28 environmental acts. Other legislative acts make use of the directive as well. Of them, one regulation, 9 directives and 23 decisions remain in force despite lacking any legal effect.

"This is an important step towards making environmental reporting clearer and more efficient. Reducing the administrative burden is one of our overarching goals and outdated legislation has no place in the EU legal system. We must ensure that all our legislation is "fit for purpose" and to that end, will move swiftly together with the European Parliament to reach an agreement on this file."

Siim Kiisler, Minister of the Environment of the Republic of Estonia

This decision is part of the standardised reporting directive “repeal package” presented by the Commission in 2016. It includes two other initiatives which will also contribute to the clean-up of unnecessary legislation. 

Overall, the Council supports the proposed decision and agrees on the main elements put forward by the Commission. In terms of content, the proposal aims at adapting the comitology provisions of a number of acts to the Treaty of Lisbon and the current interinstitutional agreement.

The positions of the two co-legislators are very close, and the Council looks forward to negotiations with the European Parliament with a view to reaching a quick and smooth first reading agreement.

Next steps

Negotiations will start in the near future given that the European Parliament already agreed its position on the file during the plenary of 13 September 2017, following the vote of the ENVI Committee on 11 July 2017. A trilogue is likely to be scheduled for November.

Upon the deal's closure and its acceptance by both institutions, the decision will enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, as specified on its provisions. Nevertheless, in order to ensure full consistency and avoid legal gaps, the actual publication of this decision will be put on hold so that it enters into force at the same time as the legislative acts of the Waste package, which are currently being discussed by both legislators.

Background

In its 2014 communication on the regulatory fitness and performance programme (REFIT), the Commission pledged to work on concrete proposals to remove obsolete legislation related to environmental reporting. 

Over the next two years, the Commission adopted a communication on better regulation in May 2015 and launched a REFIT fitness check for environmental monitoring and reporting in its work programme for 2016, which is ongoing.

As a result of those commitments, the Commission proposed a standardised reporting directive “repeal package” on 15 December 2016, consisting of three initiatives, the third of which is this decision. The first takes the form of a Commission communication identifying a series of superfluous implementing acts and the second proposes the repeal of two implementing decisions.

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Meetings of Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with international organisations.

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Publication resulting from the UACES 2017 PhD and ECR Conference

The impact of an EU membership perspective on the national parliament of potential candidate countries is an important yet underexplored subject, writes Blerim Vela. Outlining some of the elements of his research, he suggests that the executive-legislature relationship and strength of the media and civil society are connecting factors in parliamentary development.

Federica Mogherini in Kosovo, EEAS, CC-BY-NC-2.0

The Western Balkans countries first expressed their wish to be part of the European Union in the early 2000s. To accomplish this goal, national executives were strengthened and additional resources were allocated to deal with complex EU accession negotiations.

However, such a realignment of powers and resources at national level did not include national parliaments. They have tried to emulate the parliaments of EU Member States by establishing EU integration committees to oversee the work of their governments during the EU accession process. In many cases, parliaments have been reduced to rubber-stamping institutions for government decisions.

Most of the existing related academic literature focuses on the institutional adaptation of EU Member State parliaments. It considers the various scrutiny arrangements (e.g. European affairs committees) and assesses their effectiveness.

However, it has largely neglected the involvement of other standing committees on EU affairs, differential empowerment of parliamentary actors/bodies, inter-parliamentary cooperation and the role of parliamentary staffers during the EU accession process and subsequently. Moreover, scholars disagree on how to measure or operationalise the impact of the EU integration process on national parliaments.

One unexplored aspect is the impact of the EU integration process on the parliaments of EU potential candidate countries (PCCs). My research seeks to explain changes to the way parliaments of EU PCCs – namely, Kosovo and Macedonia – conduct their business during their country’s bid to become an EU member. I intend to trace the impact of EU accession as a process, rather than an outcome, in two main parliamentary functions: law-making and oversight.

Given the relatively new nature of democracy in the Western Balkans and the lack of historical experience with parliamentarism (in comparison to older EU Member States), I expect to find that the EU accession process is a crucial opportunity to shape institutional structures and procedures in parliaments, including their relationship with the government.

Having said that, it is prudent to also expect that parliaments in EU PCCs, faced with a loss of legislative influence during the EU accession process, react through institutional adaptation and increasing parliamentary oversight.

The impact of the EU accession process on the functioning of parliaments in my research is operationalised through review of formal and informal instruments. On the formal spectrum, this includes the EU’s conditionality and monitoring, based on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the European Commission’s annual progress reports; and the political dialogue with the EU institutions, such as the Joint Parliamentary Committees and European Parliaments reports. On the informal spectrum, this includes the EU’s technical assistance to parliaments – mainly through twinning projects with EU member states parliaments.

The institutional change of national parliaments that can be looked at on three levels. The first is through reviewing changes to parliaments’ rules of procedure based on amendments related to the EU accession process.

The second is through detailing institutional adaptations in parliaments that led to new processes (e.g. new oversight mechanisms or changes to law-making procedures), the establishment of new parliamentary bodies specifically tasked with overseeing the government work and performance on EU accession issues (such as committees and councils) and the creation of new professional support units in parliaments’ secretariats.

The third, following the above, is by observing any change in the nature and volume of parliamentary activities. This can be based on the number of amendments to draft laws, parliamentary questions and successful motions related to EU accession issues.

I aim to test whether the number of veto players constrains parliament’s institutional adaptation. Parliaments are highly formalistic institutions, often requiring procedural and structural changes to be instituted through amending its rules of procedure. In the cases of Kosovo and Macedonia, this requires a two-thirds majority of all MPs.

As such, attaining this majority is subject to the number of veto players involved and the type of political system (consensual or conflictual). Lower numbers of veto players and consensual politics enable the adoption of such amendments. Likewise, the actual implementation of new procedures in parliament is subject to meeting certain thresholds in terms of number of MPs supporting such initiatives and the ability to put items on the agenda.

Additionally, I will test whether free and vibrant media and civil society organisations have an enabling effect on institutional adaptation and level of parliamentary activity during the EU accession process. This proposition assumes that these media and civil society organisations can create motivating factors for both opposition and government MPs to introduce reforms.

Lastly, I predict that executive dominance over the legislature constrains institutional adaptation and the level of oversight. In cases of coherent governing majorities and party discipline in voting, one can expect that opposition parties will have a limited impact in introducing oversight initiatives. However, if the governing coalition is composed of many political parties and party discipline is weaker, the chances are higher that oversight initiatives will come about.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Blerim Vela | @Blerim_Vela
University of Sussex

Blerim Vela is PhD Candidate in Politics at the University of Sussex. His research focuses on the impact of Europeanisation on the functioning of potential EU candidate countries’ national parliaments. He previously worked for the UNDP and OSCE in a number of countries.

The post Measuring the Impact of EU Accession on Potential Candidate Country Parliaments appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Publication resulting from the UACES 2017 PhD and ECR Conference

The usage of the term ‘crisis’ when discussing the EU’s current challenges has become widespread in media reporting, writes Max Steuer. Drawing from his analysis of quality newspapers in several Visegrad countries, where calls for the EU to address problems have often been accompanied by opposition to EU-wide solutions, he calls for more careful referencing to crisis in wider public discourse.

European Parliament in Strasbourg, European Parliament, CC-BY-NC-ND-2.0

The EU is in crisis – hardly anyone could get a different impression when reading or listening to the news. From economics, through to foreign policy, up to the more recent issue of migrants/refugees, the EU is overwhelmingly judged to have failed to effectively respond to the challenges of our times.

But what does crisis, this heavily-loaded term, stand for? When does a series of developments qualify as a crisis? Are there any criteria that are distinctive to it? These questions are largely neglected in political discourse and, more surprisingly, in academic research as well.

The synthesis of some attentive analyses increasingly points to the strong evaluative dimension entailed in the crisis. The way this concept functions is far beyond its etymological origin. However, empirical research is needed to show how crisis is about labelling, framing certain events as detrimental to progress or upholding existing values, and the attribution of responsibility for causing the crisis to concrete actors.

The media is an important forum where the rhetoric about ‘crises’ can manifest in this way. Various actors, not only journalists themselves, present their opinions there. One would expect though, that quality newspapers as opposed to tabloids will publish more in-depth analyses, approaching crisis critically and not as ready-made. This applies in the Central European context as well, where there have been discussions about the Visegrad countries possibly preferring an ‘own way’ in the EU when it comes to policies towards refugees and migrants.

Yet, a closer look at six Central European newspapers – namely, Népszabadság (before it had been shut down through the influence of the Orbán government) and Magyar Nemzet in Hungary, Sme and Pravda in Slovakia and Lidové noviny and Mladá Fronta in Czechia – invites a deal of skepticism about such a claim. Even quality newspapers (and not necessarily only in the countries under scrutiny) tend to take up the rhetoric of the various crises, the three major ones being the economy, Ukraine and ‘migrants/refugees’. The popularity of this rhetoric manifests itself in three ways.

First, the sheer magnitude of articles which discuss the EU, its institutions or policies or its relationship with the Member States, in the context of crises, is remarkable. From late 2008 to days after the Brexit referendum at the end of June 2016, 1347 articles were published which have been identified and fulfil the above criterion. While there are others not portraying the EU in this way, the crisis talk seems to be enormously popular.

Second, there is no unified frame in which the EU in crises is being portrayed. Yet, when it comes to attribution of responsibility, ‘European elites’, ‘Brussels bureaucracy’ and the like is undeniably a major target of blame for the causes of the ‘crises’. This is not only embodied in the rhetoric of several key current or former politicians, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán (for instance, his claim that ‘the European political elite sits in an ideological bubble’) or former Czech President Václav Klaus, who, in his own words, ‘would not defend the EU’.

Third, there is a general preference for a ‘joint EU approach’ when it comes to dealing with the crises, but with hardly any detail of what this approach should be. Moreover, this call for joint action contrasts with opposition to EU-wide solutions, in case of the Visegrad countries particularly in the area of asylum and integration policies. In fact, such opposition seems to decrease the chance for a joint solution – whatever that may mean.

The danger entailed in the rhetoric about crises is the gradual diminishing of the EU’s positives in political discourse. More specifically, the EU institutions and their representatives come to be perceived as the originator of the ‘permanent crisis’ of the EU. A natural implication is that without the EU, or (from a Visegrad Member State’s perspective) without a particular state being an EU member, the harmful effects of the crises would disappear.

Without setting clear criteria that distinguish ‘crisis’ from everything else, the term remains an imprecise, unscientific label that does not offer any value on its own and can be exploited for populist goals to gain support for a certain (mostly anti-EU) set of ideas. To be sure, this does not mean that all criticism of the EU as it stands (and even of EU institutions and their representatives) is invalid or detrimental to the quality of political debate. However, when ‘crisis’ is used to make a negative emotional link to the ‘European elites’ and ‘Brussels’, it becomes a tool for (predominantly anti-EU) political campaigns.

Since June 2016 developments have increasingly pointed towards the option of an EU core being formed by those Member States which wish to join it and adhere to its rules. The ‘core’ argument has been reflected in domestic political debates, for example, in Slovakia. It might yet be another consequence of the crises discourse – if there is crisis, a solution is needed which can also be constructed as a solution and presented to citizens.

It is at this point when ‘de-crisising’ comes in as a recommendation for adjusting the rhetoric of all actors involved. This strategy entails discussing the EU’s challenges, but using ‘crisis’ only when there is a clear explanation of the benchmark for it. Secondly, it implies that there is a need to talk more about the EU’s benefits, and to do so in innovative ways. In order to achieve this, quality newspapers may admittedly offer only a limited forum, and new media, including social networks, should be the focus instead.

This article draws on a chapter by the author to be submitted for the forthcoming edited volume – Bátora, J and Fossum, JE (eds): The EU and its Crises: From Resilient Ambiguity to Ambiguous Resilience

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Max Steuer 
Comenius University in Bratislava

Max Steuer is PhD Candidate in Politics at the Comenius University in Bratislava. His researh interests include political institutions in Central Europe and political rights. He is the Head of the Academic Department of the International Association for Political Science Students (IAPSS).

The post Why the EU Needs ‘De-crisising’ appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Publication resulting from the UACES 2017 PhD and ECR Conference

The journey of connecting your research interests and questions as a PhD student with an effective means of exploring them can sometimes be challenging, writes Rachael Dickson Hillyard. Reflecting on her research critically analysing EU narratives on good governance and rights-based policies, she argues that it is important to recognise the different ways of studying the EU and to embrace more reflexive approaches.

Opening of Unity Dome, Estonian 2017 EU Presidency, CC-BY-2.0

Typically, for me anyhow, I submitted an abstract to the call for papers for the UACES Student Forum conference and, by the time I came to writing the contribution, I kind of changed my mind about what I wanted to talk about. Apologies. When it came to writing this article, I thought the topic actually has a lot to say to EU studies in general and those who research it, try to understand it and, for their sins, attempt to explain it to others.

The European Union is without doubt a complex, diverse, and vast entity. It can be frustrating, dense and is always changing. During undergraduate politics studies, it certainly piqued my attention and I became curious to know more about how it operates, how it uses its powers and how it affects the lives of those who come into contact with it.

When it came to designing my PhD research, I became somewhat frustrated by the ‘ready-made’ frameworks for researching, and thus understanding, the EU. In the early days, I received comments that EU studies was at best ‘a bit passé’ and, at worst, ‘over’. I couldn’t accept this to be true, particularly as the migrant crisis was surging, and the international media were looking to the EU for answers and solutions. And in the midst of other discussions on the future of the Eurozone, possible (now inevitable) Brexit, among many others.

I was grateful to find UACES and meet a bunch of like-minded people who not only continue to understand diverse and different aspects of EU law, politics, sociology, history, etc but fiercely defend and promote the discipline. At the 2013 UACES Student Forum conference, I listened eagerly to Nathaniel Copsey argue the need for a loyal opposition in the EU, to critique the institution from within.

I returned to my research plan having read Richard Whitman’s call for more dissenting voices in EU studies, and enthused to contribute to its reinvigoration. Essentially, I began searching for ways to research that would address the underperformance of critical reflexivity identified by Lucie Chamlian and Dirk Nabers. The drive to produce relevant research is a pressure for any PhD student, but it seemed even more pertinent in EU studies.

To help action this desire, my supervisor kept probing me to rework and narrow my research questions so as to specify what exactly it was I wanted to find out. Through this process I came to realise that my interest was not so much in what the EU was doing to tackle the migrant crisis or why the EU has developed an identity as an international human rights actor. Instead, I was interested in the how questions. How was the EU going about managing the crisis? How did this affect the practice of rights? How was solidarity defined in relation to this? And, most importantly, how could we better understand the EU’s actions?

Tazzioli’s view that EU studies is too EU-centric, and our understanding of it relies too heavily on the narratives and truths it creates for itself, resonated with my avenues of inquiry. My interest, therefore, became in questioning the knowledge these narratives establish and the assumed truths that underpin understandings of how the EU operates. Foucault saw this type of critique akin to curiosity; it is:

[…] a passion for seizing what is happening now and what is disappearing; a lack of respect for the traditional hierarchies of what is important and fundamental (Foucault, p 325).

In using his ideas to frame my research, I did not adopt a theory or methodology but instead used his ideas as a tool.

This tool has allowed me to do a number of things. Firstly, to offer a critique of the EU’s narrative of good governance and rights-based policies by questioning the relationship between knowledge, power and government. Secondly, using governmentality, to expose the tactics and technologies the EU has pursued. These seemingly mundane and often administrative practices expose subtle power relationships between the EU as a rights-actor and the migrants who are subjected to them. Thirdly, to be creative in cultivating lenses for analysis which offer nuanced and deeper contextualisation of the values underpinning EU policy.

There have been some challenges along the way. Both the ideas of Foucault and the literature on the EU can be difficult subject matter, so synthesis has involved in-depth, lateral thinking, often to the limits of my capabilities. In addition, studies based on Foucault also have their critics. His work might not provide an approach for everyone. He himself did not profess to provide all the answers, but rather shifted how we approach inquiry from restrictive theories to adaptable and flexible tool kits. However, there are a plethora of other critical scholars and lens worth considering. Critical studies based on the work of Jacques Derrida, Gilles Delueze, Wendy Brown and Judith Butler, among others, have provided different perspectives on law, politics and society.

To draw these thoughts together: my experience of devising and using a critical approach to understanding a particular aspect of EU governance shows there is more than one way to look at the EU. It emancipates the debate from dogmatic approaches about who is right and challenges to narratives propagated by the EU. The lessons of self-reflexivity and questions of how will, I understand, become more pertinent as we, the field of EU studies, navigate Brexit and a post-Leave research field.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Rachael Dickson Hillyard | @rdicko
Queen’s University Belfast

Rachael Dickson Hillyard is PhD Candidate in Law at Queen’s University Belfast. Her research focuses on the European Union’s response to the migrant crisis from legal and political perspectives. She was previously a Committee Member of the UACES Student Forum.

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