Feed aggregator

Military working dogs (MWDs) are of great value in Counter-IED operations, and the pooling and sharing of this capability at the European level has long been a subject of discussion among C-IED experts. Late last month, the European Defence Agency organised the first Ad Hoc Working Group on MWDs at the Austrian Military Working Dogs School facilities of Kaisersteinbruch, in Austria.

Twenty-two participants from Austrian, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden gathered for three days  to discuss national capabilities and their respective level of ambition. The C-IED Centre of Excellence and representatives from academia also took part in the event.

Several training opportunities were also staged on the margins of the meeting. Four MWD teams (each comprising a dog and its handler) from Hungary and the Netherlands attended the event, as well as teams from host nation Austria. Capabilities of Labrador dogs were also demonstrated, while a full day was dedicated to training at the Austrian MWD school. Attendees took the opportunity to train teams with specific innovative explosive conditioning materials in a pure multi-national environment.

The Working Group also had the opportunity to receive lectures on innovative solutions for MWDs preparation as well as on previous operational deployment experiences and lessons learned. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) experts from the Austrian Armed Forces provided support by preparing specific scenarios for military search performance by the teams.

Big interest was showed by all participants and planning for the next Ad Hoc Working group meeting is currently on-going. It is envisaged that MWDs teams will participate in further multi-national C-IED related exercises in 2016. Thus, such a capability will be fully included within the planning process and subsequent execution of C-IED related tasks at the mentioned events.

More information

• Counter-IED project page

http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/20150706_125916_thumb_169_1436190582_1436190581_129_97shar_c1.jpg

EU Ministers responsibles of Sport meet on 6 July in Luxembourg.

Download this video here.

Entrevista - 7/7/2015
La Voz de Galicia
Entrevista de María Cedrón a Miguel Otero Iglesias en La Voz de Galicia sobre el futuro de Grecia tras resultado del referendum del pasado 5 de julio.

DT 11/2015 - 7/7/2015
Javier Arregui
El documento aporta un marco analítico sobre el concepto de poder, influencia y capacidades dentro del contexto de la acción política que llevan a cabo los Estados miembros (EM) en el proceso político de la Unión Europea (UE).

Opinión - 7/7/2015
Federico Steinberg
El escenario que se abre en Grecia tras la victoria del ‘no’ en el referéndum griego es enormemente incierto. Lo único que se puede afirmar es que Grexit es más probable que nunca, aunque aún es evitable.

This study provides an overview of China’s current approach to foreign policy and external relations. It focuses more particularly on the role and actions of China in global governance, its territorial claims and relations with countries in Asia, and its emergence as an important actor in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood. It assesses the implications for the EU and makes recommendations on how the EU should deepen its strategic partnership with China. The study argues that China has not made a unilateral and exclusive turn towards assertiveness in its foreign policy. China’s foreign policy assertiveness represents a policy choice that should be understood in the broader context of its external relations, which is one of uncertainty. Both the impact of China’s emergence in international affairs and the use China intends to make of its power and influence remain uncertain. This uncertainty is explained by the interdependence between a number of international and domestic factors as well as by the absence of a grand strategy. The uncertainty in China’s foreign policy opens avenues for the EU to influence China and further deepen the scope of the EU-China Strategic Partnership.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

This study provides an overview of China’s current approach to foreign policy and external relations. It focuses more particularly on the role and actions of China in global governance, its territorial claims and relations with countries in Asia, and its emergence as an important actor in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood. It assesses the implications for the EU and makes recommendations on how the EU should deepen its strategic partnership with China. The study argues that China has not made a unilateral and exclusive turn towards assertiveness in its foreign policy. China’s foreign policy assertiveness represents a policy choice that should be understood in the broader context of its external relations, which is one of uncertainty. Both the impact of China’s emergence in international affairs and the use China intends to make of its power and influence remain uncertain. This uncertainty is explained by the interdependence between a number of international and domestic factors as well as by the absence of a grand strategy. The uncertainty in China’s foreign policy opens avenues for the EU to influence China and further deepen the scope of the EU-China Strategic Partnership.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

DRAFT REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Barbara Lochbihler

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_c96321.r21.cf3.rackcdn.com/15372_169_full_129_97shar_c1.jpg

Eurojust is a judicial cooperation body created to help provide safety within an area of freedom, security and justice set up in 2002 to improve the fight against serious crime by facilitating the optimal co-ordination of action for investigations and prosecutions.

Download this video here.

Au lendemain de l’écrasante victoire du “non” lors du référendum organisé par le gouvernement d’Athènes, l’Europe se divise sur la voie à suivre pour trouver une solution à la crise grecque. Alors que le ministre de l’Economie allemand, le social-démocrate Sigmar Gabriel, accuse la Grèce d’avoir "coupé les ponts" avec Bruxelles, les négociations sont censées reprendre mardi dans un climat de méfiance réciproque.

Most Russians have only negative associations when they think of gambling business. The dynamically developing industry has not taken roots in Russia, even though it was bringing very good taxes to regional budgets and state treasury. In 2009, all casinos in Russia were closed. More than 400,000 people - most of them young people - lost their jobs

Le patrouilleur hauturier l’Adroit va poursuivre ses opérations au profit de la flotte française jusqu’à l’été 2016.

Normalement, le patrouilleur hauturier L’Adroit aurait dû être rendu au groupe industriel français DCNS, au terme d’un accord de trois ans passé avec la Marine nationale. Cet accord permettait à la marine française de préparer le projet de bâtiment de surveillance et d’intervention maritime BATSIMAR. L’industriel et le ministère de la Défense ont négocié un nouveau contrat de mise à disposition qui porte jusqu’à l’été 2016.

Après quatre mois d’un déploiement qui l’aura conduit du Canal de Suez au détroit de Gibraltar, en passant par le Cap de Bonne Espérance, le patrouilleur hauturier L’Adroit a accosté le vendredi 3 juillet 2015 au matin à Toulon.
Durant ce déploiement, le patrouilleur a participé à l’opération européenne de lutte contre la piraterie ATALANTE, en conduisant plusieurs opérations de renseignement au large des côtes somaliennes. Le 5 avril 2015, alors que la situation se dégrade sérieusement aux Yémen, le patrouilleur contribue, avec la frégate de type La Fayette, (FLF) Aconit à l’évacuation de ressortissants français depuis le port d’Aden. Ensuite, il participera à la mise en place d’une route d’évacuation entre les ports d’Al-Mokha (Yemen) et de Djibouti en escortant les boutres dans la zone sensible du détroit de Bab-al-Mandeb. À partir du 28 avril 2015, il entame deux semaines de mission de surveillance maritime, de contrôle de pêche illégale et de veille contre l’immigration clandestine le long de la Zone Économique Exclusive (ZEE) française du canal du Mozambique. À cette occasion, l’Adroit participera à plusieurs exercices avec les marines étrangères, notamment en Afrique Centrale et en Afrique de l’Ouest.
Arrivé à Mayotte pour les festivités de Camerone, le patrouilleur quittera Mayotte le samedi 2 mai, pour porter assistance à Serge Girard en panne de dessalinisateur. Serge Girard l’ultrafondeur français, était parti de la Réunion en mars pour deux ans de traversée des espaces maritimes et terrestres. Le 10 mai 2015, victime dans le canal du Mozambique de courants et de vents contraires dans une mer déchaînée et étant dans l’impossibilité de rejoindre la côte africaine, Serge Girard sera secouru par un cargo norvégien.
Au total, ces derniers mois, le patrouilleur Adroit aura parcouru plus de 17 000 nautiques et fait escale dans treize ports différents.

Du 25 mai au 8 juin 2015, au cours d’une nomadisation, le détachement d’hélicoptères Fennec (DETFENNEC) de l’opération Sangaris a passé le cap des 800 vols cumulés depuis son déploiement sur le théâtre centrafricain.

Greece’s recently-departed finance minister Yanis Varoufakis repeatedly argued that Greece could never leave the eurozone because there is nothing in the EU treaties that permits exit from the bloc’s common currency. But that hasn’t stopped EU lawyers from looking.

According to eurozone officials, EU legal scholars have been combing through the treaties to find provisions that would allow for Grexit – not because it is something they’re pushing for, but rather because they’re worried the country could be soon entering a legal limbo that could prevent it from getting the financial aid it desperately needs.

If Greece begins printing its own money – which could happen in a matter of weeks if the European Central Bank decides to cut off emergency loans to Greek financial institutions – it may no longer be eligible for aid from the eurozone’s €500bn rescue fund, since it is using a different currency.

But because Greece would still be legally part of the eurozone, it wouldn’t be eligible for the aid scheme reserved for non-EU countries, known as a “balance of payments assistance” programme. Hungary, Romania and pre-euro Latvia all received so-called “BPA” programmes during the crisis.

The traditional assumption is that because there is no explicit way to leave the eurozone, the only clause that comes into play is Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, which allows for withdrawal from the entire EU. This would require Greece to request a departure, however, which is unlikely, and while there are an increasing number of leaders willing to let Greece leave the eurozone, none want it to leave the EU.

Officials say lawyers are instead looking at Article 7, which was adopted for a very different reason: In the wake of the Austrian government’s decision to include the far-right Freedom Party of nationalist Jörg Haider in a coalition, EU leaders wanted a way to punish countries that did not live up to European values.

Read more

Histoire des Rangers, ces commandos de l'US Army

Depuis le 15 juin 2015, le centre de traitement des soignants (CTS) de Conakry en Guinée a réduit sa capacité d'accueil à 5 lits d'hospitalisation, et à 1 lit de réanimation.

Les 19 et 23 juin 2015, dans le cadre de l'opération Sangaris, ont eu lieu les dernières cérémonies de transfert d'autorité (TOA) de différents sous-groupements de la force française, marquant ainsi la fin de la période de relèves.

Das Nein Griechenlands beim Referendum hat den Schuldenstreit nach Ansicht der Europäischen Kommission kompliziert. Sollte Athen Verhandlungen über…

Photo credits: Wikimedia Commons

Dovilė Rimkutė

As Majone (1999) has observed, the approval of EU authority – as a predominantly regulatory political system – is based on the perception that supranational regulation corrects market failures by relying on a technical exercise and scientific knowledge managed by independent regulators, e.g. the European Commission and European independent agencies. Experts and scientific knowledge has played a key role in EU politics and its significance is increasing as well as takes on new shapes (Gornitzka and Holst, 2015). However, against this backdrop, an increasing body of literature has observed that scientific experts’ involvement in regulatory processes is rather contested (Gornitzka and Holst, 2015; Schrefler, 2010; Radaelli, 2009; Boswell, 2008). Scholars argue that even though regulatory duties are deemed to be a highly scientific pursuit predominantly focused on the technical-instrumental use of scientific knowledge, expertise can actually have many functions in policy/decision-making. That is, alongside the technical-instrumental (or problem-solving) use of knowledge, European regulators can also employ strategic or symbolic uses of scientific expertise.

To that end, the recent publications of Rimkutė and Haverland (2015) and Rimkutė (2015) contribute to this scholarship focusing on the role and functions of scientific knowledge by empirically examining how expertise is used by European regulators and by providing theoretical explanations regarding the variance in scientific knowledge use by supranational regulators.

 

How do scientists perceive their role in EU policy-making?

The article entitled “How does the European Commission use scientific expertise? Results from a survey of scientific members of the Commission’s expert committees” builds on the recent scholarship introducing a typology of knowledge use (Schrefler, 2010; Radaelli, 2009; Boswell, 2008) and suggests further improvements in its conceptualisation and operationalization, however, in particular it aims at empirical contribution. The article informs the debates on the role of scientific expertise in European Union policy-making, a query that is particularly relevant in the case of the Commission’s exclusive responsibility and duty to initiate proposals. In this article, we sought to go beyond the existing case studies by systematically tapping into the use of scientific knowledge across various policy issues and Directorates General (DG) of the Commission. We contribute to the literature with a large-N study in which we surveyed more than a 100 scientists who had participated in the Commission expert groups. In particular, we focused on how scientists’ advice was used by the Commission, and asked: what attitudes do scientists providing scientific advice to the European Commission hold regarding their contribution to policies shaped and adapted at the EU level? How do scientists perceive their role in EU policy-making?

 

When and under what conditions different uses of scientific expertise prevail

The article “Explaining Differences in Scientific Expertise Use: The Politics of Pesticides” further explores how European regulator – European regulatory agencies – actually contend with their core tasks of providing scientific advice to EU institutions. In this contribution, I go one step further and contribute to the theoretical explanation of when and under what conditions different uses of scientific knowledge prevail. I draw upon the theoretical insights of sociological institutionalism and resource dependence theory. The core argument of the article is that whether the regulatory policy process can yield efficient and credible problem-solving solutions is contingent upon both (1) the external environment in which a certain scientific output production process takes place, i.e. the level of formal and informal pressure and (2) the internal agency’s capacity to produce science-based outputs (Rimkutė, 2015: 116).

 

Risk assessments by the European Food Safety Authority

In empirical analysis, I focus on one type of knowledge use – strategic substantiating – that refers to those practices in which an agency seeks to promote and justify its own or external actors’ predetermined preferences, which are based on certain values, political or economic interests. The strategic substantiating use of scientific knowledge is expected to occur under the conditions of high external pressure and high scientific capacity.  To test this theoretical expectation, the case of the neonicotinoid pesticides risk assessment for bees has been selected. The risk assessment has been produced by the key European risk assessor in food safety regulation – European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The empirical analysis combines a variety of data sources including official documents, press releases, scientific outputs, and 10 semi-structured interviews with the academic and industry experts involved in the process.

Specifically, the case of neonicotinoid pesticides has been selected as EFSA in this particular case possessed a high capacity to produce scientific expertise because it successfully mobilised internal human resources: the largest EFSA’s unit—the Pesticides Unit— was in charge of drafting scientific outputs. In addition, EFSA had much sound external research evidence at its disposal when drafting scientific conclusions: extensive sources of expertise, data, knowledge, and understanding of honeybees and the neonicotinoid pesticides. However, the organisational field in which EFSA had to deliver its scientific opinion consisted of defined opposing positions (laboratory research vs. field research) and the conflicting configurations of inter-organisational structures competing with each other (industry vs. beekeeping associations and NGOs). The biggest chemical manufacturers in Europe, Bayer CropScience, Syngenta AG, have been actively involved in the process and in due course have filed legal actions challenging the Commission’s restrictions and accused the Commission of not relying on the entire scientific evidence available and, in so doing, they challenged the EU pesticide regulation.

The article empirically illustrated that such conditions paved the way for the strategic substantiating use of expertise. It concludes that the interaction between high external pressure and high internal capacity leads to the strategic substantiating use of expertise, in which scientific evidence is used to promote the inclinations of actors upon which the agency depends most.

This study develops starting points for further research as it introduced a general theory explaining the differences in scientific expertise use, which have been tested only partly and in one particular context, i.e. one issue within one EU regulatory agency. However, the theoretical argument of the article could be said to be relevant to all expertise bodies acting on the basis of scientific knowledge, including the Commission, comitology committees, national agencies, international organisations, or other executive, regulatory or information bodies whose expertise feeds into various policy-making stages. To that end, I suggest that testing the theoretical explanations outlined in the article in different contexts would clearly be a requisite for further research.

 

Dovilė Rimkutė has been a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) München, Germany since March 2014. Before joining LMU she held a Marie Curie scholarship for Early Stage Researchers and worked as a Research Associate at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. Her research interests cover a range of European Union policy/decision-making topics, however, risk regulation and evidence-based governance in EU regulatory processes and factors affecting it take a central role. In her PhD research, Dovilė examines regulatory science practices employed by EU (quasi-) risk regulators – European regulatory agencies – by drawing upon the theoretical insights of sociological institutionalism and resource dependence theory. Contact: Dovile.rimke@gmail.com

 

References:

Boswell, C. (2008). The political functions of expert knowledge: Knowledge and legitimation in European Union immigration policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 15(4), 471-488.

Gornitzka, Å. and Holst, C. (2015). The Expert-Executive Nexus in the EU: An Introduction. Politics and Governance, 3 (1): 1-21

Majone, G. (1999). ‘The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems’, West European Politics, 22 (1): 1-13.

Radaelli, C.M. (2009). Measuring policy learning across Europe: regulatory impact assessment in comparative perspective, Journal of European Public Policy, 16 (8): 1145–1164.

Rimkute, D. (2015). Explaining differences in scientific expertise use: The politics of pesticides. Politics and Governance, 3 (1): 114-127.

Rimkute, D. and Haverland, M. (2015). How does the European Commission use scientific expertise? Results from a survey of scientific members of the Commission’s expert committees. Comparative European Politics, 13 (4): 430–449.

Schrefler, L. (2010). The usage of scientific knowledge by independent regulatory agencies. Governance, 23(2): 309-330.

The post How do European institutions use scientific expertise? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Az Európai Bizottság elnöke sokszor elmondta, a nemekkel a görögök az EU-ra mondanak nemet. Juncker most nem akar a kamerák elé állni.