The Pax Americana, which guaranteed the security of Germany and Europe after the Second World War, is coming to an end. Europe can no longer rely on its alliance and partnership with the United States. Even before Donald Trump’s second presidency, Europe was seeking to reduce its dependency on Washington for peace, democracy and prosperity. This cannot be achieved overnight, and will require a significant increase in material resources and strategic thinking over the next five to ten years. The fourteen contributions to this SWP Research Paper show how different the starting conditions for developing transition strategies are, depending on the policy area and challenges. Europe needs to consider all the options: with, without or even against Washington. The analyses of Europe’s agency and the scope for European policy towards Russia, the Middle East and China are very wide-ranging. Trump’s logic of quick deal-making and unilateralism under the banner of “MAGA” often collides fundamentally with the EU’s multilateral foreign and security policy, which is bound by international law, and its commitment to sustainable peace. The keywords for the urgent reorganisation of security in Europe are: Europeanisation of NATO, strengthening Europe’s own military capabilities, new leadership constellations for security policy in Europe, and resilient governance in technology and cybersecurity. Even at this geopolitical turning-point (“Zeitenwende”), the EU should continue to develop its soft power. When it comes to the crucial questions of global governance – from UN and international law to trade, climate and energy policy – Europe must find new partnerships and, if necessary, new institutional solutions without and against the United States.
It’s certainly hard to imagine relevant agreements being reached that could, in the foreseeable future, bring substantive progress in international relations. Alliances of like-minded states could conceivably coalesce around individual issues, but these mechanisms need to become significantly more professional if they are to operate effectively at the margins of international politics (‘pockets of effectiveness’). Europe and other proponents of multilateral cooperation need to urgently ask themselves what the essence of a new multilateralism might be. The ongoing UN80 reform process focuses on efficiency enhancements and institutional reforms. These are certainly necessary, but if reforms are not guided by a clear normative compass, there is a risk that the political substance of international cooperation could be further diluted.
It’s certainly hard to imagine relevant agreements being reached that could, in the foreseeable future, bring substantive progress in international relations. Alliances of like-minded states could conceivably coalesce around individual issues, but these mechanisms need to become significantly more professional if they are to operate effectively at the margins of international politics (‘pockets of effectiveness’). Europe and other proponents of multilateral cooperation need to urgently ask themselves what the essence of a new multilateralism might be. The ongoing UN80 reform process focuses on efficiency enhancements and institutional reforms. These are certainly necessary, but if reforms are not guided by a clear normative compass, there is a risk that the political substance of international cooperation could be further diluted.
It’s certainly hard to imagine relevant agreements being reached that could, in the foreseeable future, bring substantive progress in international relations. Alliances of like-minded states could conceivably coalesce around individual issues, but these mechanisms need to become significantly more professional if they are to operate effectively at the margins of international politics (‘pockets of effectiveness’). Europe and other proponents of multilateral cooperation need to urgently ask themselves what the essence of a new multilateralism might be. The ongoing UN80 reform process focuses on efficiency enhancements and institutional reforms. These are certainly necessary, but if reforms are not guided by a clear normative compass, there is a risk that the political substance of international cooperation could be further diluted.
The parliamentary elections held in Bangladesh on 12 February 2026 marked a turning point in the country’s recent history. In August 2024, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who had served for a total of 20 years, with one interruption, was removed from office. An interim government led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus subsequently took power. Following two years of political uncertainty, it succeeded in organising elections that were procedurally sound. Bangladesh’s political system has thus demonstrated a considerable degree of institutional resilience. At the same time, the election outcome raises new questions regarding the future of democratic pluralism in the country. The decisive election victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) means that one of the country’s two historic political family dynasties will remain at the helm of government. The Muslim fundamentalist camp gained vote share, which could negatively impact the role of women in society as well as complicate Bangladesh’s renewed rapprochement with neighbouring India.
Bei der sogenannten Riester-Reform, über die am morgigen Freitag im Bundestag beraten wird, hat die SPD die Einführung eines staatlich organisierten Standardfonds für die private Altersvorsorge durchgesetzt. Peter Haan, Leiter der Abteilung Staat im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), kommentiert diesen Vorschlag wie folgt:
Viele Elemente des vorgeschlagenen Altersvorsorgedepots haben das Potenzial, die Verbreitung der privaten Altersvorsorge zu stärken. Positiv hervorzuheben ist die Einführung eines staatlichen Standarddepots – allerdings ist die Kostengrenze von einem Prozent immer noch ziemlich hoch. Auch der Wegfall der Beitragsgarantie ist grundsätzlich sinnvoll: Er ermöglicht renditestärkere Anlagestrategien und macht das Produkt langfristig attraktiver.
Allerdings löst diese Reform das wichtigste Problem nicht. Die Verbreitung der privaten Altersvorsorge ist heute sehr ungleich verteilt – und besonders gering bei Haushalten mit niedrigen Einkommen, also genau dort, wo das Risiko von Einschnitten im Lebensstandard im Alter und die Altersarmut am größten ist. Freiwillige Anreize haben daran seit zwei Jahrzehnten nichts geändert. Wer diese Lücke schließen will, kommt an einer Verpflichtung nicht vorbei – ob über die betriebliche oder die private Säule, darüber lässt sich streiten.
Hinzu kommt ein Verfahrensproblem. Die Bundesregierung hat eine Alterssicherungskommission eingesetzt, die bis Mitte 2026 klären soll, wie viel Altersvorsorge insgesamt notwendig ist und wie die drei Säulen zusammenwirken sollen. Ein Gesetz zur dritten Säule jetzt zu beschließen, setzt Fakten, bevor die Gesamtarchitektur steht. Das ist keine gute Grundlage für eine Reform, die Jahrzehnte wirken soll.
Die strukturelle Krise der Welthandelsorganisation prägt die kommende Ministerkonferenz. Die WTO braucht dringend einen Fortschritt, um nicht ihre Handlungsfähigkeit zu verlieren, mahnen zwei IDOS-Wissenschaftler.
Die strukturelle Krise der Welthandelsorganisation prägt die kommende Ministerkonferenz. Die WTO braucht dringend einen Fortschritt, um nicht ihre Handlungsfähigkeit zu verlieren, mahnen zwei IDOS-Wissenschaftler.