Feed aggregator

What exactly is the European Parliament voting on?

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Près de cinq ans après le début de l’intervention au Mali, le président de la République réunit mercredi à La Celle-Saint-Cloud, une vingtaine de pays, dont l’Allemagne, en soutien au G5 Sahel.

L’émirat va acheter 12 Rafale supplémentaires et négocie l’acquisition de près de 400 VBCI. Après la Belgique et les EAU, c’est le troisième succès de l’équipe Macron-Parly

(Actualisé) Le général Lavigne pourrait lui succéder au MinArm

Pour la première fois, quatre officiers féminins vont embarquer à bord d’un sous-marin nucléaire lanceurs d’engins.

A Stratégiai Tanulmányok Központjának (CSS) "Találkozás gyakolati szakemberekkel" sorozatában Ehud Barak korábbi miniszterelnök és Dan Meridor korábbi miniszterelnök-helyettes voltak a vendégeink Izraelből 2017. október 23-án. A zártkörű beszélgetésen szóba került a Közel-Kelet helyzete, a terrorizmus és a jobboldali populizmus előretörése a nyugati világban. A képen ők láthatók a CSS igazgatójával, Monica Tofttal, aki a diskurzust moderálta. A beszélgetésről írtam legutóbbi posztomat a CSS "Elefánt az irányítóközpontban" blogjára. (Szokolyi Szabolcs kollégám-barátom fordításában: "Elefánt a stratégiai tervezés porcelánboltjában.") A poszt az alábbi linken olvasható:

Engaging Practitioners: CSS Hosts Ehud Barak and Dan Meridor from Israel

A Stratégiai Tanulmányok Központjának (CSS) "Találkozás gyakolati szakemberekkel" sorozatában Ehud Barak korábbi miniszterelnök és Dan Meridor korábbi miniszterelnök-helyettes voltak a vendégeink Izraelből 2017. október 23-án. A zártkörű beszélgetésen szóba került a Közel-Kelet helyzete, a terrorizmus és a jobboldali populizmus előretörése a nyugati világban. A képen ők láthatók a CSS igazgatójával, Monica Tofttal, aki a diskurzust moderálta. A beszélgetésről írtam legutóbbi posztomat a CSS "Elefánt az irányítóközpontban" blogjára. (Szokolyi Szabolcs kollégám-barátom fordításában: "Elefánt a stratégiai tervezés porcelánboltjában.") A poszt az alábbi linken olvasható:

Engaging Practitioners: CSS Hosts Ehud Barak and Dan Meridor from Israel

Economic trends and security are set to dominate debates at the 34th session of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Haiti, starting on 18 December.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Economic trends and security are set to dominate debates at the 34th session of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Haiti, starting on 18 December.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Economic trends and security are set to dominate debates at the 34th session of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Haiti, starting on 18 December.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

« Servir », le livre de l’ancien chef d’état-major des armées a trouvé son public alors que l’auteur refuse d’entrer dans les polémiques

Dans la RDN, le député européen revient sur les critiques faites à la Revue stratégique

A couple of weeks ago, my daughter asked me to help her with her homework. She needed help with a project on Antisemitism. The assignment was to take 4 cartoons -- 2 antisemitic cartoons from the Nazi era and 2 current anti-Israel/antisemitic cartoons -- and compare them..

She wanted my help to find them.

The first two cartoons were easy to find online. Der Stürmer cartoons are easy enough to find.

Title: Brood of Serpents 
Caption (not shown): “The Jew’s symbol is a worm, not without reason.
He seeks to creep up on what he wants.”
Title: Don't Let Go.
Text: Do not grow weary, do not loosen the grip,
This poisonous serpent may not slip away.
Better that one strangles it to death
Than that our misery begin anew.
Title: Insatiable 
The lead article is on the Moscow show trials.
The cartoon caption: “Far be it from the Jews to enslave a single people.
Their goal is to devour the entire world.”There is no problem or argument in seeing these cartoons for what they are. They portray Jews as ugly, threatening and outright dangerous.

According to Wikipedia, the Nazis themselves found Streicher's cartoons downright embarrassing:
Since the late 1920s, Streicher's vulgar and inconsiderate style was increasingly a cause of embarrassment for the Nazi party. In 1936 the sale of the Der Stürmer in Berlin was restricted during the Olympic Games. Joseph Goebbels tried to ban the newspaper in 1938. Hermann Göring forbade Der Stürmer in all of his departments, and Baldur von Schirach banned it as a means of education in the Hitler Youth hostels and other education facilities by a "Reichsbefehl" ("Reich command").Though Hitler supported him, Streicher's luck finally ran out after the war when he was tried at Nuremberg. According to the prosecutors, Streicher's paper incited Germans to kill the Jews, thus making him an accessory to murder. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity and hanged.

Fast forward to today.

If the Nazis themselves realized that Streicher was going too far, can we assume that today's antisemites are equally aware of lines that cannot be crossed?

Not if you are Rutgers Professor Michael Chikindas

Michael Chikindas' tweet
Over three weeks later and Rutgers is still trying to figure what to do about this.

Let's face it: we will always have people who get deranged over Der Sturmer.

Those older cartoons demonized Jews, and did it in a way that was so obvious and so over-the-top that a time came that the Nazis themselves had a sense they had gone to far.

Are people more sensitive to antisemitism and anti-Israel propaganda today?

How about the cartoon below from a Berkeley editorial. I gave it to my daughter as a current example of an anti-Israel/antisemitic cartoon.


Raphael Magarik at the Forward justified the cartoon and claimed it wasn't antisemitic at all, but to do so he had to resort to proving his point by avoiding it.

He picked up on the accusation that this was a "blood libel" -- and defended the cartoon because the whole issue was that blood is being spilled. He then goes on to defend the cartoon by claiming that the various implied attacks in the cartoon on Dershowitz and his politics are justified, which is actually besides the point.

Overlooked was the fact that the image was not of Alan Dershowitz, but of Dershowitz with the body of a spider, an image used in Nazi cartoons, with all that image implies.

I pointed out to my daughter the demonization in the cartoon and I think she understood the point.

A few years ago, the Economist printed a cartoon that it then retracted as being antisemitic:



In the cartoon, the US and Iran, symbolized by Obama and Khamenei are being prevented from completing the Iran deal. Iranian hardliners are holding Khamenei back. Congress is holding Obama back. But one of those stars on that emblem of Congress is a Jewish star.

The issue is not the implication that Jews in the US were trying to prevent the Iran deal. As citizens they had the right to oppose it. The implication was that Jews (or Israel) controlled Congress. It may be more subtle than the Dershowitz cartoon, but that implication was an element of demonization of Jews -- and it was a point that was brought home when even the New York Times attempted to make opposition to the Iran deal into a "Jewish" issue.


The creepiest infographic you'll see today, courtesy of the NYT. Categories include "Jewish?" http://t.co/NenSllbqk8 pic.twitter.com/PxDgZY3bTE— Oren Kessler (@OrenKessler) September 10, 2015Even Linda Sarsour gets in on the action:


Israel should give free citizenship to US politicians. They are more loyal to Israel than they are to the American people.— Linda Sarsour (@lsarsour) July 29, 2014

In another cartoon, at the beginning of the year, The New York State Education Department apologized for including a political cartoon on its global studies Regents exam that critics claimed was anti-Israel propaganda.

Here is the exam question:


Considering the correct answer is (3) Negotiations have failed, the cartoon -- which criticizes Israel and only Israel -- is a poor illustration of the point. Using Natan Sharansky's 3 D's for determining antisemitism -- demonization, double standard and delegitimization -- none of those 3 factors seem to exist in the cartoon in a blatant hyperbolic way.

The AJC condemned the cartoon as being
“blatantly anti-Israel, disparaging of Israeli soldiers … and is entirely inappropriate to include on a test administered to young minds.”Granted the cartoon is "blatantly anti-Israel" and "disparaging of Israeli soldiers," does that make it "inappropriate"?

The exam was in New York.
What would have happened if this appeared on a test in Iowa?

Antisemitic and anti-Israel cartoons may not be as blatant as this one attack Ariel Sharon and Israel:


But this Ariel Sharon cartoon was "cleared" of being antisemitic by a UK press watchdog. More than that,  the cartoon went on to win the UK's "Political Cartoon of the Year Award for 2003" of the Political Cartoon Society.

But what about the resemblance to the Nazi cartoon above of a Jew eating people? Someone decided the cartoon was criticism, not demonization. Does over-the-top criticism automatically become demonization, antisemitism and anti-Israel propaganda?

Fourteen years later, how do we distinguish antisemitic cartoons from criticism -- valid or not -- of Jews or Israel, especially when those cartoons can sometimes be more nuanced?

Dershowitz opens what may be a Pandora's Box when he quotes approvingly from a letter to the editor from students from a pro-Israel organization at Berkeley printed in the Daily Cal:
To a Jewish student on this campus, seeing this cartoon [of Dershowitz] in the Daily Cal is a reminder that we are not always welcome in the spaces we call home…

Telling Jews that we can or cannot define what is offensive to us, because of our status as privileged minority in the United States, is antisemitic.Considering that this strategy is being used by other groups on campuses across the US, Jewish students should be able to use it too -- especially when the antisemitism on campus is such a threat.

Not to mention antisemitic crime incidents over the years as tracked by the FBI:


But do we really want to have to resort to the "safe spaces" argument?

If we demand the right to define what is offensive to us as Jews, as opposed to seeing it as mere criticism, are we validating the claim that Jews deliberately define criticism of Israel as antisemitism?

Safe spaces are not the answer.
The line between criticism and demonization of Israel may not always be so clear.
We have little choice but to stand our ground.




-----
If you found this post interesting or informative, please it below. Thanks!

PONARS Eurasia has just published my memo on Russian military modernization plans from our September policy conference in Washington. I’m reposting it here. Lots of other very interesting memos are available on the PONARS website.

By the end of 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin will approve Russia’s State Armament Program for 2018-2027. This memo summarizes publicly available information regarding the types of armaments that will be procured for the Russian military in the next eight years and assesses the likelihood that the Russian government will be able to meet these commitments. Based on these plans, Russia seems primed to stay ahead of its competitors in some capabilities (anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare, air defenses), narrow the gap in areas such as drones and precision-guided munitions, and continue to lag well behind in a few areas such as surface ships and automated control systems.

The Scope of the Program

The Russian State Armament Program (SAP) for 2018-2027, which is set to be approved toward the end of this year, will set out Russia’s rearmament priorities for the next ten years. The previous program, which runs through 2020, was the blueprint according to which the Russian military has been modernizing its equipment since 2011. That program had a total budget of 19.3 trillion rubles. SAP-2027 was initially regarded as a kind of lifeline for SAP-2020, whose expensive, long-term programs were to be transferred to the next ten-year plan. The cost of the successor program is expected to total 19 trillion. This suggests that military procurement spending is actually being kept fairly constant because the ruble amount remains about the same and almost all of the purchases are from domestic suppliers, meaning the sales are not impacted by changes in the ruble’s exchange rate.

The size of the program was the subject of an extended tug-of-war between the Defense Ministry and the Finance Ministry. As early as 2014, the military asked for funding in the range of 30-55 trillion rubles over a ten-year period, while the finance ministry set a target of 14 trillion. As the country’s financial situation began to deteriorate in 2015 and the adoption of the SAP was postponed until 2017, both sides lowered their targets. In 2016, the Defense Ministry asked for 22-24 trillion rubles for eight years, while the finance ministry suggested no more than 12 trillion. After an extended and sometimes tense negotiation, a figure of 17 trillion rubles was agreed last winter. This has now been increased to 19 trillion rubles, with the duration extending to the normal ten years. As a result, a number of the most ambitious and expensive projects, including new designs for aircraft carriers, destroyers, strategic bombers, and fighter-interceptor combat aircraft will all be postponed.

This was not the end of tensions over defense financing, however. Although the total amount has been decided, there is now an internal conflict within the defense ministry over how much procurement financing will go to each branch of the military. The various branches have produced documents defending the importance of what they do. As highlighted by the recently approved naval doctrine, such documents often have little connection to any real assessment of either Russian military needs or the capabilities of the defense industry for producing the requested weapons and platforms. Although the final version of the program will not be adopted until the end of the year, it has become increasingly clear that the Russian Navy is in the process of losing the battle for financing. The highest priority for procurement funding will go to the ground forces and to the modernization of nuclear weapons, while the navy, which had the highest level of funding in SAP-2020, will fall to the bottom of the pecking order.

Nuclear Forces

The development priorities of Russian nuclear forces through 2027 are largely clear. After 2021, the naval component of the nuclear triad will consist of six Delta IV-class and eight Borei-class strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), evenly divided between the Northern and Pacific Fleets. This will allow for 12 submarines to be in service at all times, while two undergo overhauls and modernization. The air component is being upgraded, with modernized versions of both Tupolev Tu-95MS (Bear H) bombers and 11 Tu-160 (Blackjack) bombers receiving new engines and avionics, as well as weapons upgrades. The new long-range cruise missile, labeled Kh-101, is replacing the Kh-55, with a range of up to 4,500 km in the nuclear variant. In addition, the Russian military has announced that it will resume building new Tu-160s, with serial production expected to resume no earlier than 2021. This is a more cost-effective and technologically feasible alternative to bringing a completely new design (known as PAK DA) to the point of serial production in a reasonable time frame.

The future development of the land component of the Russian triad presents the least certainty. There are three projects under way, the Rubezh road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM, and the Sarmat heavy silo-based ICBM. The Rubezh project is closest to fruition, with testing completed in 2015 and deployment expected later in 2017. The RS-26 Rubezh is a further development of the RS-24 Yars, with independently guided warheads designed to break through missile defense shields. The Barguzin is expected to be ready for flight testing in 2019, even though there was a period of several months in 2016 when it appeared that the program was going to be suspended due to budget cuts. The Barguzin is expected to be superior in range and accuracy as compared to the Soviet rail-based system that was decommissioned in 2005. The RS-28 Sarmat is the next-generation silo-based ICBM. It was originally expected to be ready for deployment in 2018, but unspecified snags in its development have pushed ejection testing from the original target date of 2015 to no earlier than June 2017. As a result, the Sarmat is unlikely to be deployed any earlier than 2020, assuming the difficulties have been overcome and the tests proceed as scheduled.

Ground Forces

After being largely starved of funding in SAP-2020, the ground forces are expected to get the largest share of funding in SAP-2027. Some sources indicate that over a quarter of the total program budget will go to equipping the Ground Forces and Airborne Forces. This is in part due to Russia’s experience in Ukraine leading to an increased perception that ground forces may be needed in future conflicts, but mostly the result of new armored vehicle and tank designs being ready for serial production. T-90 and T-14 Armata tanks, Kurganets-25infantry fighting vehicles and Boomerang armored personnel carriers are all expected to enter the force over the next eight years, though numbers of some items such as Armatatanks may be limited due to their high cost of production.

The production of artillery and ground based missiles has been a bright spot for the ground forces. Deployment of medium-range Iskander missiles is proceeding on schedule, with all units set to be in place by 2019. New Uragan and Tornado-S multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) are also being deployed beginning in 2017, with purchases expected to continue throughout the duration of SAP-2027. Procurement of the Koalitsiya self-propelled gun started in 2016. It is eventually expected to fully replace the Soviet-era Msta system. New short range air defense systems will also be procured.

There are more problems with tactical automated control systems for the ground forces. Originally expected to be deployed to 40 brigades by 2020, these remain in field testing in a single division. Reports indicate that the military has mixed feelings about the system and may decide that it needs improvement before it can be widely adopted. In that case, the development of network-centric warfare capabilities may be delayed beyond 2027. In the meantime, the ground forces will continue to receive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare systems that have been used to good effect in Syria.

Naval Forces

The Russian Navy stands to be the big loser in SAP-2027. After being allocated 4.7 trillion rubles in SAP-2020 and finding itself unable to spend all of that money due to a combination of problems with Russia’s shipbuilding industry and the impact of Western and Ukrainian sanctions, the Russian Navy’s allocation is expected to be cut to 2.6 trillion rubles in SAP-2027. Despite grandiose plans being mooted in documents such as the recently approved naval doctrine, Russia is planning to focus its naval construction on submarines and small ships. In surface ships, the focus will be on new corvettes of several different types that will have greater displacement and better armament than existing classes, as well as the start of serial production of the long-delayed Admiral Gorshkov-class of frigates. Until the problems with the Admiral Gorshkov are resolved, the Navy will continue to build the less advanced Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates.

The only new class of surface ships expected to be built in the next eight years are the so-called Super Gorshkov-class, an 8,000-ton frigate that is increasingly seen as a cheaper and more practical alternative to the 14,000-ton Lider-class destroyers. The key takeaway is that the Russian Navy is looking to increase the size of its smaller ships in order to increase their armament and endurance, while reducing costs by indefinitely postponing the procurement of larger ships such as destroyers, amphibious assault ships, and aircraft carriers.

As for submarines, SAP-2027 will undoubtedly include financing for the completion of six Yasen-M nuclear attack submarines and possibly for a seventh, as well as for the modernization of four to six each of the Soviet-era Oscar– and Akula-class nuclear attack submarines. Construction of fifth-generation nuclear attack submarines (tentatively named the Husky-class) will begin in the mid-2020s. In diesel submarines, the focus will be on developing air independent propulsion systems for the forthcoming Kalina-class, while Lada– and improved Kilo-class boats are built in the meantime.

More important than new ships and submarines, the coming eight years will see the Russian Navy concentrate on developing new weapons systems and improving existing ones. The introduction of Kalibr missiles has provided the Russian Navy with a standoff anti-ship and land-attack cruise missile capability that can be used to make even small ships that have to stay near home ports a potential threat to adversaries, included NATO member states. The Russian military recognizes the advantages that these missiles provide and has put them on a wide range of ship and submarine classes. Over the next eight years, Russia will continue to deploy these missiles on most new surface ships and submarines, retrofit some existing vessels to carry the missiles, and work to improve the accuracy and reliability of the missiles themselves. It is also working to develop a new hypersonic missile that could pose an even greater threat to Russia’s adversaries in the medium to long term.

Air Forces

In the last seven years, the Russian Air Force has begun to receive modern aircraft in significant numbers and has continued to pay for the development of new designs such as the recently christened Sukhoi Su-57 fifth generation fighter jet (formerly known as the T-50or PAK FA). The Su-57 is not expected to enter into serial production until upgraded engines are ready, which is unlikely to happen until 2027. Over the next eight years, Russia will continue to purchase small numbers of these planes for testing. It will also continue to purchase Su-35S fighter jets, with a new contract for 50 additional aircraft signed in late 2016. Purchases of Su-30SM fighter jets and Su-34 strike aircraft will also continue, most likely at rates of 12-18 aircraft per year of each type. Mikoyan MiG-35 fighter aircraft may also be procured, but probably not in large numbers. Overall, with many modern fighter aircraft now in place, rates of procurement will slow in order to allow for the purchase of other types of aircraft. The same goes for military helicopters, since the Russian military has received what it needs in new helicopters during the last seven years. Development of a new high-speed helicopter will not start until after 2027.

Transport and refueling aircraft, long an area of weakness for the Russian Air Force, will be one area of focus. Serial production of the long-troubled Ilyushin Il-76-MD90A is expected to start in 2019, and the Russian military is expecting to receive 10-12 such aircraft per year thereafter. A light transport aircraft is under development, with prototypes expected to be completed in 2024. The A-100 airborne warning system (AWACS) aircraft, based on the Il-76MD90A, was expected to be delivered starting in 2016 but has been repeatedly delayed. Nevertheless, procurement of this aircraft will be included in SAP-2027. Finally, Russia is experiencing a boom in domestic production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). By 2020, it will have a strike UAV in production, as well as a new generation of reconnaissance UAVs.

For air defense, Russia will continue to deploy S-400 long-range missiles and Pantsir-Sshort-range missiles. However, it seems increasingly unlikely that the next generation S-500air defense system will be ready for serial production any time soon, though official plans still indicate that a prototype will be built by 2020. Original plans called for serial production of the S-500 to start in 2015. The new standard short-range air defense system has just started development and is not expected to be ready for production until 2030.

Impact on Capabilities and Regional Security

SAP-2020 has been widely described as the first successful armament program of Russia’s post-Soviet history. It was designed to help the Russian military catch up from the extended procurement holiday caused by Russia’s economic collapse in the 1990s. During the last seven years, the Russian military has made great strides in modernizing its weapons and equipment. By and large, these new armaments have been based on updated versions of late Soviet designs. The Russian defense industry now faces the far more formidable challenge of bringing new designs into serial production. It has been successful in this regard in some areas, such as nuclear submarines, missile systems, and UAVs. It has been less successful with combat ships and air defense systems. The verdict is still out on combat aircraft and tanks and armored vehicles.

With the most significant gaps largely filled, SAP-2027 is designed to transition the Russian military to a more regular procurement schedule. Funding will remain relatively constant, though it may be adjusted depending on the economic situation. The previous program has shown that this level of funding is more or less achievable for the government budget and for the Russian defense industry to sustain. The biggest challenge will be in bringing new designs successfully to serial production.

In terms of impact on military capabilities, Russia is already strong enough to defend itself in a conventional war against any adversary and to defeat any neighboring state other than China. It also has a more than sufficient nuclear deterrent capability. New procurement will thus be targeted at keeping pace with technological improvements made by its peer competitors (NATO member states and China). In some areas, such as air defenses, anti-ship missiles, and electronic warfare, Russia will continue to maintain capabilities superior to those of its peers. In other areas, such as UAVs, precision-guided munitions, and tanks and armored vehicles, it appears poised to narrow the gap. Finally, in a few areas, such as surface ships, transport aircraft, and automated control systems, it will remain well behind the United States and may start to lag behind China as well.

Article paru dans L'Orient Le Jour (Beyrouth)Le ministre français des Affaires étrangères, Jean-Yves Le Drian (à g.), en compagnie du Premier ministre libanais démissionnaire, Saad Hariri, le 16 novembre 2017, à Riyad. Valérie Leroux/AFP×1 / 2
Proche-Orient : Que peut faire la France?
Frédéric Charillon (Professeur des Universités en science politique, UCA, Sciences Po, ENA – ancien directeur de l’institut de recherche stratégique de l’école militaire)

La France s'efforce, depuis longtemps, de maintenir ou d'adapter son rôle au Moyen-Orient. Aujourd'hui ses grands partenaires (Egypte, Arabie) inquiètent par leurs crispations internes ou leur aventurisme extérieur. Le Liban, auquel elle tient tant, est dans la tourmente.  Face à cette situation, sa diplomatie se heurte à plusieurs obstacles : un contexte international défavorable, la difficulté à trouver des relais régionaux, la contradiction des intérêts français eux-mêmes. Paris peut néanmoins aborder cette séquence difficile avec une nouvelle méthode de dialogue.

Un contexte difficile
Les encouragements donnés par Washington aux postures dures contre l'Iran favorisent la confrontation dans la région. Ni l'état actuel de l'Union européenne, ni la longue prudence des émergents, ne contrebalancent cette tendance. Et Moscou est suffisamment occupé par la Syrie pour se risquer à des arbitrages ailleurs. Dès lors, la France, plus préoccupée que d'autres par la situation libanaise et qui a souhaité y réagir vite, se trouve bien seule pour mener une initiative.
Ayant établi une relation de confiance avec Riyad (essentiellement avant la nomination du nouveau prince héritier), Paris soigne également son dialogue avec Le Caire, et se refuse à donner des leçons à quiconque, comme il l'a été rappelé lors de la visite à Paris du président Sissi. La posture a ses mérites comme ses défauts, mais elle ne permet pas de transcender le problème principal : aucune de ces capitales arabes n'est en mesure d’être un hégémon consensuel dans la tourmente actuelle. L'initiative appartient même désormais aux puissances non arabes, Israël, Iran, Turquie.  Acteurs avec lesquels Paris entretient des relations tendues, et dont l'intransigeance se prolonge (Israël), se renforce (Turquie), ou fait l'objet de rapports de force internes (Iran).
La France doit enfin faire l’inventaire de ses intérêts dans la région. L'affaire syrienne, depuis 2013, reste l'objet d'un débat : en exigeant alors le départ de Bachar al-Assad, Paris a pris le risque d'avoir moralement raison tout en se mettant diplomatiquement hors-jeu. Voir s'effondrer les régimes de l'Arabie ou de l'Egypte serait une nouvelle terrible, mais il est impossible de leur donner carte blanche pour jouer la politique du pire. Soutenir le Liban et le protéger du chaos est un réflexe à Paris : les événements libanais remontent plus haut et plus vite au sommet de l'Etat que beaucoup d'événements internationaux, et la France ne souhaite ni une mainmise étrangère sur le pays, ni un étouffement progressif interne qui ne respecte pas la pluralité libanaise. Mais l'on se souvient du temps passé pour rien à tenter de résoudre la crise institutionnelle en 2007.

L'indispensable changement d'optique
A région bouleversée, méthode nouvelle. La politique des blocs a vécu, l'unité arabe aussi, et les sociétés s'expriment de plus en plus. Comment Paris peut-il se réinventer un rôle ? Les équipes Macron, dans lesquelles on compte plusieurs connaisseurs de la zone, tablent d'abord sur le dialogue avec tous les acteurs, en l’élargissant même à de nouveaux, quels que soient les points de désaccord ; ensuite sur le multilatéralisme ; enfin sur la réaffirmation des principes.
Cette méthode (esquissée par le Président devant les Ambassadeurs français à Paris, où les Nations Unies à New York) peut-elle s’appliquer au Proche Orient ? Le dialogue à tout prix, on l’a vu dans la réception de Sissi à Paris, comme d’ailleurs avec Trump ou Poutine, consiste à chercher les points de convergence en dépit de tensions réelles. Le multilatéralisme, lui, pourrait peut prendre la forme de conférences internationales aux formats ad hoc, sur la Syrie ou pourquoi pas sur le Liban, qui mettront l'accent sur l’avenir des peuples plutôt que sur les compétitions étatiques. La réaffirmation des principes enfin, consiste à édicter la position et les lignes rouges de la France, mais sans en faire un casus belli.
Un enseignement s’impose, sur la période récente : laisser les capitales régionales dériver vers la manière forte pour ménager leur susceptibilité, n'a renforcé ni la stabilité régionale, ni l'influence française. La France teste donc sa nouvelle méthode. Elle maintient le lien historique avec Le Caire ou Riyad, mais mise aussi sur les Emirats, acteur montant. Emmanuel Macron, puis son ministre des Affaires Etrangères (ce dernier fort d’une relation de confiance ancienne avec l’Arabie) rendent visite au Prince héritier saoudien pour parler du Liban, mais invitent dans la foulée Saad Hariri à Paris, comme pour souligner que la souveraineté libanaise n’est pas négociable.
Pour peser davantage, la France doit sortir des dilemmes traditionnels: Doha ou Riyad, Sissi ou pas Sissi, Bachar ou Daech, le Hezbollah ou Hariri, etc. D’autant qu’ainsi formulés, c’est le Proche-Orient qui en est la première victime. Surtout, elle peut tenter de prendre l’initiative, en y associant les institutions internationales, de nouveaux acteurs étatiques, et les nouveaux acteurs sociétaux (jeunes, intellectuels, femmes). La réussite n’est jamais garantie au Proche-Orient, mais il est temps d’essayer ce qui ne l’a pas encore été.

Jómúltkor a Facebook oldalamon hüledeztem azon, ahogy az Iszlám Állam és Hezbollah/Aszad-rezsim (gondolom mögöttük az oroszok és az irániak is jóváhagyták) leboltoltak egymással és több tucat busszal a terroristák átautózhattak Szírián keresztül a másik szegletbe, al-Bukamalba.
A várost a napokban elérte a végzete, a kormányerők elfoglalták, majd az alagutakban megbújó (állítólag) ISIS tagok visszafoglalták a várost, nem is tudom most kinek a kezében van akkor.
De nem e konkrétum miatt írok, hanem azért mert a BBC készített egy fantasztikus riportot Rakka elfoglalásáról.. Aki nem követné az eseményeket, annak elmondom, hogy az Iszlám Állam visszafoglalásáról szóló hírek narratívája az volt, hogy a SDF (szíriai kurd és arab erők), hogy bekerítették a várost, majd súlyos harcok után, de relatíve gyorsan (Moszulhoz képest) visszafoglalták a várost, hetek alatt úgy emlékszem. Még drónos video is volt a városban történt pusztításokról.

Ehhez képest jön a BBC riportja, ami azt mondja - bizonyítékokkal, interjúkkal alátámasztva -  hogy az SDF leegyezett az Iszlám Állammal, nyilván a amerikaiak tudtával, hogy ha feladják a várost, elmehetnek, kiengedik őket.

A sofőrök változatos becslése szerint mintegy 4000 embert, ebből sok száz fegyveres és családjaikat, vitték ki: Another driver says the convoy was six to seven kilometres long. It included almost 50 trucks, 13 buses and more than 100 of the Islamic State group’s own vehicles. IS fighters, their faces covered, sat defiantly on top of some of the vehicles.

Az uticél náluk is főleg al-Bukamal volt, de néhányan a török határ felé vették az útjukat. Sok implikációja van ennek a sztorinak, de én csak arra akarok fókuszálni, hogy egyrészt a SDF nem engedett be semmilyen médiát Rakkába, hírzárlat volt ebben az ügyben, amíg csak lehetett. Nyilván nem voltak büszkék rá, ez oké, meg az is, hogy inkább így foglalták el, mint sok száz saját halott árán. Bár az SDF még mindig a legjobb társaság Szíriában, azért ott is van kontroll.

A másik, hogy az USA elfogadta ezt. Persze megtehette volna, hogy szétbombázza a konvojokat, de nem tette. Állítólag egy embere ott volt a dealnél, de nem szólt bele. Szerintem hihető. Ezt azért fontos tudomásul venni, mert az USA nem önmaga akarja megnyerni a háborút (ezek szerint) és respektálta a SDF- amely a helyi partnere, de nem szövetségese - akaratát. Az USA bombázhatott volna, de azzal az SDF hitelességét nullázza le.

Végül külön örülök, hogy a BBC hozta le sztorit. Ennyi előnye még mindig van a nyugatnak az oroszokkal szemben :)