European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Luisa Antunes.

One language disappears every two weeks, and up to 90 % of existing languages could be gone by the turn of the century. Globalisation, social and economic pressures and political options can determine whether a language survives. Multilingualism is a cornerstone of the European project, with 24 official and 60 minority languages. In a digital era, ensuring digital language equality can help preserve linguistic diversity.

Have you heard of Livonian? Yurok? Olmec? Almost 7 000 languages are currently spoken in the world, but every two weeks, at least one dies out, with 50‑90 % of all languages predicted to disappear by 2100. But what causes languages to disappear and how can we prevent it?

The Babel myth claims that all humans once spoke the same language. As humanity migrated and civilisations emerged, metaphorical walls were erected and languages diversified. Chomsky has theorised that language emergence must have occurred early in human evolution. A study of phonemes pinpointed the origin of language to 80‑160 000 years ago in southern Africa, thus predating the latest major exodus of Homo sapiens (50‑70 000 years ago) and suggesting a single or main origin.

Today, three main language families exist: Indo-European, Sino-Tibetan and Afro-Asiatic. In Europe, 90 % of citizens (675 million) are native speakers of an Indo-European language of one of three main language groups (Germanic, Romance and Slavic). Minority Indo-European language groups in the EU include Baltic, Celtic and Romani, the latter spoken by 6 million citizens. In addition, 20 million EU citizens speak non Indo-European languages, notably Basque, Estonian, Finnish, Hungarian, Maltese and Sami, the latter of which is considered severely endangered.

It could be argued that linguistic diversity has been threatened by technology since Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press. The standardisation imposed by the written form helped shape the structure of what is at genesis an oral tradition, originally passed on through small communities and then travelling longer distances with trade and theatre. Take Dante‘s consolidation of the Italian language, for instance. It could also be argued that written codification set bounds to the expansion of language, an example of which are today’s digital communities.

Language is a product of history, politics and socioeconomics, and in turn helps structure them. By 1920, half of the world’s languages had been lost as a result of centuries of European colonisation. Throughout Europe, regional and minority languages were prohibited in the 20th century, as centralised governments imposed a dominant language in order to ‘assimilate’, ‘acculturate’ and preserve ‘national identity’. In Spain, Franco declared Castilian the only official language. In France, minority languages such as Basque, Breton and Occitan were suppressed through both ministerial decrees and educational campaigns, creating a sense of ‘vergonha‘ (shame of one’s identity due to institutionalised persecution). Former French President Pompidou asserted ‘there is no place for minority languages in a France destined to make its mark on Europe’. Languages can also be lost due to socioeconomic pressure, as was the case in Italy, with the mass movement of southern workers towards industrialised cities in the north (Turin, Milan and Genoa). In Ireland, British rule in the 19th century led to the erosion of Irish. Romani faces decline as a result of ethnic persecution and the pressure felt by young people to integrate in wider society.

But not all is lost. Over the last quarter of the 20th century, policies began to shift towards language preservation. Yurok, a Native American language at the brink of extinction following the arrival of Western settlers, had a recent revitalisation thanks to the government’s promotion of a language programme. In the EU, several Member States have integrated minority languages in school curricula and enshrined language rights in national constitutions. In Italy, a 1999 law recognises the country’s historical linguistic minorities. Irish was declared an official language in Ireland in 2003 and an official language of the institutions of the EU in 2007.

Potential impacts and developments

Language is deeply embedded in our sense of culture, social connections and personal identity. While globalisation can lead to language homogenisation, it can also contribute to new linguistic diversity. Brazilian poet Oswald de Andrade wrote, on his theory of anthropophagy, that Brazilian culture is more than the sum of its colonisers and that integrating and elaborating these influences allowed the creation of its synergistic, unique identity. In a reverse dynamic, post 1970s Portuguese society has seen the integration of terms originating from Brazilian and African Portuguese, in a sort of ‘reverse triangle trade’. Mozambican writer Mia Couto is famous for creating ‘almost words‘, based on regional dialects infused with animistic realism, which in turn he ascribes as inspiration from the oral tradition of Brazilian author Guimarães Rosa.

Today, English has entered our lives through television, music and the internet. Its influence is felt in business, administration, science and technology. There is no Italian term for ‘privacy’, nor ‘computer’; Germany’s youth have adopted words like ‘legit‘ and ‘cringe‘; and Bulgarians have taken up ‘trendy‘. One might wonder if English influence on EU languages could become as prevalent as to transform them into bona fide English dialects. Conversely, English is also shaped by non-native speakers, in a cultural mixture known as ‘Globish‘. Some might be surprised to find that ‘beamer‘ and ‘handy‘ do not mean what they might expect.

What could become our lingua franca in the future? Language dominance depends on socio-political power. While Esperanto was created artificially with the intention of serving as a lingua franca for international communication, fewer than 200 000 people speak it today. With the emergence of Asian economies, Mandarin or Hindi, which together have more speakers than English, could become next century’s lingua franca. However, this will depend on geopolitical balances, with hyperglobalisation and deglobalisation at its extremes.

Policy-making

Multilingualism is at the centre of the EU project and recognised as one of the EU’s values, anchored in its cultural and linguistic diversity. Linguistic diversity is enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (Article 3) and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Articles 21 and 22). The EU currently has 24 official and working languages. Members of the European Parliament have the right to express themselves in the language(s) of their choice. To that end, the EU invests €1 billion per year in translation and interpretating services, including in sign languages.

The EU recognises the cultural importance of its linguistic diversity. Maltese, the only Semitic European language, is an official EU language. Irish gained full official and working status in January 2022. Catalan, Galician, Basque, (and previously Scottish Gaelic and Welsh) have semi-official status, which means language services are provided by the Member State, when needed and at its own expense. EU-funded research projects collect corpora of mainly oral languages, such as Romani, to promote language preservation. Language learning and mobility are promoted through Erasmus+ and the Creative Europe programmes, aiming for all young people in the EU to have a good knowledge of two foreign languages by 2025. The EU also funds language learning programmes for specific minority languages, such as Romani.

Digital tools can help overcome language barriers and foster language equality. A 2000 STOA study found that online linguistic diversity is threatened not by the dominance of a single language, but rather by the dominance of machine translation in the five most-spoken EU languages (English, French, German, Spanish and Italian), to the detriment of the remaining 19 official and 60 regional and minority languages used in the EU. Based on the results of a 2017 STOA study, Parliament adopted a 2018 resolution on achieving language equality in the digital age. This led to the creation of the EU European Language Equality (ELE) project, which analysed over 80 languages to develop a roadmap towards achieving full digital language equality by 2030. It includes machine translation, speech technologies, text analytics and natural language understanding. In 2019, Parliament launched a call for tender to deliver live speech-to-text captioning (automatic speech recognition and machine translation) of Parliamentary debates in 24 languages. It aims to contribute to accessibility for deaf and hard of hearing persons, who currently have no direct access to Parliamentary debates. Digital tools for sign language to/from text, however, remain an underdeveloped challenge.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if everyone spoke the same language?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if everyone spoke the same language?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Balázs Széchy.

The European Union’s outermost regions (ORs) qualify for special treatment owing to structural difficulties – such as remoteness, difficult topography and economic dependence on a few products – that can severely hamper their development. In addition, the coronavirus pandemic has hit their economies particularly hard. While these regions are quite different from one another, they have levels of unemployment and GDP significantly worse than EU and national averages.

Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for specific measures to support the ORs, including the tailored application of EU law and access to EU programmes. Specific support mechanisms exist under cohesion, agricultural and fisheries policies, and other policy areas, with the Commission outlining measures aimed at assisting ORs in communications published in 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2017. In July 2021, the Commission opened a public consultation to feed into its plan to renew the EU’s strategic approach for the ORs, with Parliament adopting an own-initiative report in September 2021 inviting the Commission to ‘co-construct’ a new strategy for and with the ORs, accompanied by a precise action plan. On 3 May 2022, the Commission adopted a renewed strategy for the ORs, prioritising place-based approaches and tailored support for the ORs across all EU policies, aiming to unlock their potential through appropriate investment and reforms.

In addition to the unprecedented level of funding for the ORs already negotiated in the 2021-2027 funds and programmes, the Commission is creating, with the renewed strategy, dedicated opportunities in many EU policy areas, including the launch of a series of dedicated calls for projects exclusively for the ORs. However, no legislative initiatives or significant new financial resources are included in the 2022 communication. While the EU plays a key role in helping to unlock the ORs’ growth potential, their well-being and development fundamentally rely on choices and actions by the regions themselves and their Member States. Therefore, the Commission’s communication, while presenting a number of initiatives to be developed at EU level, encourages action by these regions and their Member States, for example to take account of their specificities in cross-cutting policies and instruments. This, however, raises questions about the extent to which the new strategy will truly be sufficient to improve the situation in the ORs and boost their development.

This is a revised and updated version of a briefing from May 2021 by Christiaan Van Lierop.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outermost regions of the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Culture and regional development’ on YouTube.

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Written by Alex Wilson.

On 30 September 2022, the Council of the European Union agreed an urgent regulation to address the problem of very high energy prices in the EU. The Council regulation would raise revenues for Member States to compensate energy consumers for rising prices.

Firstly, Member States would receive the excess revenues of electricity generators that rely on cheaper ‘inframarginal’ energy technologies. These companies are obtaining windfall revenues from high electricity prices caused by the exceptional rise in gas prices, rather than from any increases in their own cost of production. Under the marginal pricing model, high gas prices are largely setting electricity prices across the EU.

Secondly, fossil fuel producers in the EU would be subject to a solidarity contribution on their excess profits, at a rate of at least 33 % across the EU. These revenue-raising measures are accompanied by a voluntary target to reduce electricity consumption by ‑10 % and a mandatory target to reduce peak electricity demand by ‑5 %. These efforts would lower the share of gas in the energy mix and diminish its effect in terms of price setting, especially at peak times. Other measures would temporarily allow price regulation for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and below-cost electricity supply.

The briefing goes on to look at Member State actions in addressing high energy prices and what this implies for a rapidly changing EU framework, with the European Commission expected to adopt further new proposals in the coming months. The briefing then considers some expert views on the reform of EU electricity markets and the European Parliament’s position on high energy prices.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Emergency intervention to address high energy prices in the EU‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Natural gas market prices in the EU (Dutch title transfer facility (TTF), since 2012)

Written by Tambiama Mandiega (1st edition).

On 23 February 2022, the European Commission unveiled a proposal for an EU regulation – the data act – laying down harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data. The aim is to remove barriers before consumers and businesses’ access to data in a context in which the volume of data generated by humans and machines is increasing exponentially and becoming a critical factor for innovation by businesses (e.g. algorithm training) and by public authorities (e.g. shaping of smart cities). The proposed act establishes common rules governing the sharing of data generated by the use of connected products or related services (e.g. the internet of things, industrial machines) to ensure fairness in data sharing contracts and to allow public sector bodies to use data held by enterprises where there is an exceptional need (e.g. public emergency). Furthermore, the proposed act introduces new rules to facilitate switching between providers of cloud services and other data processing services, and puts in place safeguards against unlawful international data transfer by cloud service providers. The Council and Parliament are working on defining their respective positions.

Versions

• October 2022: The Data act (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act) Committee responsible:Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2022)0068
23.2.2022Rapporteur:Pilar del Castillo Vera (EPP, Spain)2022/0047(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Miapetra Kumpula-Natri (S&D, Finland)
Alin Mituța (Renew, Romania)
Damian Boeselager (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Elena Lizzi (ID, Italy)
Margarita De La Pisa Carrion (ECR, Spain)
Elena Kountoura (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Suzana Anghel.

EU leaders met on 6 and 7 October 2022 in Prague for the inaugural meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) and an informal meeting of the European Council. At the EPC meeting, hosted by the current Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU, over 40 European heads of state or government expressed unity in the face of the common challenge posed by the brutal return of war on European soil, affirmed their support to Ukraine and committed to strengthening energy cooperation. They clarified that the EPC was intended as a bi-annual informal platform – hence the absence of a declaration – for dialogue among equals at leaders’ level. The EPC aims to boost cooperation on issues of continental concern – and not to be a substitute for EU policies, in particular enlargement. It was agreed that the next EPC meeting would take place in Chişinău, Moldova.

At the informal meeting of the European Council, which aimed to prepare the forthcoming formal meeting on 20-21 October 2022, EU leaders focused on Ukraine and energy. As regards Ukraine, the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, stressed that, with the successive packages of sanctions, including the agreed oil price cap, the EU was depriving Putin’s regime of the ability to wage war in Ukraine and that Team Europe (EU and the Member States) had pledged €19 billion to Ukraine (military aid excepted). With respect to energy, EU leaders discussed ways of jointly addressing the energy price and security of supply challenges, and notably considered joint purchasing of gas at EU level. EU leaders also discussed the protection of critical infrastructure, which is a key element of work conducted on resilience as part of EU-NATO cooperation.

The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, addressed the leaders by video-link at both meetings, stressing the importance of supporting Ukraine in defending itself. In her address to the European Council, the European Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, emphasised that war and high energy prices had led to high inflation rates, reaching 10 % in the euro area. Following a proposal by Charles Michel, Ms Thérèse Blanchet was appointed Secretary-General of the Council.

1. Background

The Indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2022 included an informal meeting of the European Council on 7 October 2022, preceded a day earlier by the inaugural meeting of the European Political Community. The two events, held in Prague Castle, shared common topics – peace and security, energy security and economic issues. They also presented similarities in outcome, as no declarations were adopted, while leaders stressed, both in the EPC framework and at the informal European Council, their unity against Russia and unfailing support to Ukraine.

2. The inaugural meeting of the European Political Community

On 6 October 2022, the Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU hosted the first meeting of the EPC. The meeting followed on from the proposal formulated on Europe Day 2022 by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, to establish a platform allowing EU and non-EU European countries to come together to discuss issues of common interest in a wide range of policy areas, including security, the economy and energy. The inaugural EPC meeting allowed for clarification of pending issues such as participation, format and aim. It also helped to dissipate scepticism by emphasising that the EPC was not intended as an alternative to enlargement and that those European countries wishing and meeting the criteria would continue on their EU integration path.

Participation

The inaugural EPC meeting was attended by over 40 heads of state or government, as well as President Michel and the Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President (HR/VP) of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, was also in attendance. The Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, was absent from the inaugural EPC meeting for domestic political reasons, but joined her colleagues a day later for the informal meeting of the European Council. The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, addressed his colleagues by video-link, while the Prime Minister, Denys Shmyhal, attended the meeting in person.

As stressed by President Macron, ‘we share the same space, often the same history, and we have a mission to write the future together. This is the EPC.’ Thus, the EPC brought together EU Member States, countries aspiring to become members of the EU (the Western Balkan countries, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Turkey), countries which have left the bloc (the United Kingdom) and countries which do not wish to join (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland). The Prime Minister of Belgium, Alexander de Croo, drew attention to the fact that ‘the whole European continent [was in Prague] except two countries, Belarus and Russia’ and pointed to their level of isolation, an analysis shared by the Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki.

An informal partnership of equals

The EPC is about fostering informal cooperation among equal partners. As stressed by the Czech Prime Minister, Petr Fiala, in his opening remarks, there is, for the moment, no intention to formalise meetings or to transform the EPC into an organisation of its own. In a pre-summit op-ed, the Prime Ministers of Albania, Edi Rama, and the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, stressed that the EPC ‘should be driven not by bureaucracy but by flexibility’ and that it ‘should be guided not by fixed agendas but by priorities that concern us all’. President Michel stressed that European leaders ‘listened to each other’, which was the main objective and achievement of the first EPC meeting.

The idea of an informal intergovernmental gathering, on an equal footing, of heads of state or government on a continental scale was central to the joint press conference held by President Macron, the EPC’s initiator, Petr Fiala, representing the host country, and the President of Moldova, Maia Sandu, representing the country which will host the next EPC meeting in the first half of 2023. She stressed that ‘solidarity and trust’ represent the rock on which the EPC is built.

In a way, the first EPC meeting mirrored the European Council in its early days, when meetings were informal, resembling ‘fireside chats’ and allowing Heads of State or Government to exchange freely on the most salient issues with the aim of identifying common solutions to common challenges. The absence of a chair is yet another element of flexibility and informality in the organisation of the EPC. This contrasts with, for example, EU-Western Balkans summits organised in the margins of informal European Council meetings by the countries holding the rotating Council Presidency – Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia – and chaired by the European Council President.

European Political Community meeting format

As flagged in the EPRS outlook, the meeting saw a mix of plenary sessions and roundtables. The number of roundtables was reduced to two, one on peace and security (co-facilitated by Slovakia and Moldova) and one on energy, climate and economy (co-facilitated by Greece and Switzerland). The format of roundtables, co-facilitated by an EU and a non-EU country, was successfully introduced at the February 2022 EU-African Union summit. The format notably enabled a focus on various crises taking place on the continent, including tensions in the eastern Mediterranean, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and the situation in the Western Balkans.

Bilateral meetings held on the sidelines of the EPC meeting allowed European leaders to discuss pending issues. For instance, the Prime Minister of Sweden, Magdalena Andersson, discussed the status of Sweden’s NATO bid with the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Migration, a topic which was initially planned as part of a stand-alone roundtable, was discussed by leaders at bilateral meetings. This was the case, for example, between President Macron and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Liz Truss, who agreed during their meeting to, inter alia, increase cooperation on migration. The Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, confirmed that he discussed migration with Truss and that work should continue in a trilateral framework with France and the UK but also in a more inclusive European way.

In addition to bilateral meetings, other formats were explored with different levels of success. For example, a quadrilateral meeting was held by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, President Macron and President Michel. A statement was published after the meeting, confirming Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s commitment to the UN Charter and the 1991 Alma Ata Declaration, in which both countries ‘recognise each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty’. The meeting was key ahead of the meeting of the border commissions to be held in Brussels in the course of October 2022. No similar success was found with respect to facilitating the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. The quadrilateral meeting envisaged between the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, and the President of Kosovo, Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu, in the presence of President Macron and the Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, did not occur, being replaced by two separate trilateral meetings attended by the Franco-German duo.

Main results of the inaugural meeting of the European Political Community European unity

The European leaders sent a strong signal of unity, condemning Russia’s war on Ukraine and expressing support for Ukraine. The Prime Minister of Iceland, Katrín Jakobsdơttir, stressed that ‘Europe stands in solidarity against the Russian invasion in Ukraine’, while Prime Minister Petr Fiala stressed that ‘we all know in our hearts that Ukraine will win because the truth is on their side’.

Priorities for future cooperation

European leaders jointly agreed on six work ‘paths’, or priority lines for cooperation. President Macron stressed that work on protecting critical infrastructure is key in light of the recent attack on Nord Stream and that a common European strategy is needed. Fighting cyber-attacks originating, for instance, in Russia or Iran also requires a joint European approach. Regional cooperation and security in the Black, Baltic and North Seas is yet another aspect in need of a common European vision. The development of an ‘integrated energy strategy’, in particular coordination with non-EU European partners, some of which – notably Azerbaijan and Norway – are energy producers, is needed to bring energy prices down. For Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, the leaders sent a clear message to the energy market that they were ‘completely aligned’ and ‘have the joint ambition to come up with measures to bring down the gas prices’. Last but not least, youth is one area where a more integrated vision is needed on a continental scale.

The way forward

As announced by President Macron, EPC meetings will be held bi-annually. A calendar was drawn up with Moldova to host the next EPC meeting in spring 2023, followed by Spain in autumn 2023 and the UK in early 2024. This pattern shows a desire to alternate meetings between EU and non-EU countries. The nomination of Spain indicates that EPC meetings are likely to be organised back-to-back with informal European Council meetings in the country holding the six-monthly EU Council presidency, which could result in a revival of its role in foreign policy. Furthermore, a number of open questions remain, particularly regarding the financing of the EPC, as outlined by Josep Borrell.

3. The informal meeting of the European Council

On 7 October 2022, EU Heads of State or Government met in Prague for an informal European Council meeting at which they discussed Ukraine and energy. No conclusions were adopted, although exceptionally a draft statement had been circulated ahead of the summit. Prior to the summit, President Michel held a preparatory meeting with President Macron, Chancellor Scholz, Petr Fiala and Ursula von der Leyen.

Main results of the informal meeting of the European Council Ukraine

As confirmed by Charles Michel, EU leaders reiterated their financial, humanitarian, political and military support to Ukraine and strengthened sanctions to increase pressure on the Russian regime. They also considered the global implications of food shortages and confirmed their willingness to support partners under strain around the world. Similar to past meetings held since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine, President Zelensky addressed the European Council, stressing both the need to protect critical infrastructure and Ukraine’s high expectations from the recovery conference being organised by the Commission and the G7 Presidency in Berlin on 25 October 2022.

Main message from the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that only by providing Ukraine with ‘advanced weaponry and military intelligence’ can the war be stopped and real peace achieved. She stressed that aspiring countries must stay the course on EU membership.

Energy

As highlighted by President Michel after the meeting, EU leaders considered ways of addressing the energy challenge on three levels. First, measures to reduce energy consumption and demand. Second, the progressive setting-up of platforms for joint purchasing of energy at EU level, notably gas, to ensure security of supply. And third, they focused on the high energy prices and considered the steps laid out by Ursula von der Leyen in her letter of 5 October 2022, notably price caps, to tackle the situation. The European Commission is to present a more detailed proposal in the coming weeks. President von der Leyen confirmed that Russian gas imports had been cut from 41 % of total EU gas imports in February 2022 to 7.5 % currently and stressed that EU Member States’ gas storage facilities were filled to 90 %, an increase of 15 % compared with one year ago.

Main message from the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola stressed that the Parliament ‘has called for an EU bloc-wide gas price cap’, called for the energy union to ‘finally become a reality’ and emphasised that the Parliament is a reliable partner that is able to act fast whenever needed.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Outcome of the European Political Community and European Council meetings in Prague on 6-7 October 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has threatened to undermine the European Union’s economic recovery from the pandemic. Most EU Member States had returned to growth after two years of COVID, with the help of the massive Next Generation EU fund, but the military conflict brought about a steep rise in the prices of food and, especially energy. The resulting surge in inflation has forced the European Central Bank and other central banks to raise interest rates, boding ill for future growth. Rate hikes by the US Federal Reserve and global financial volatility have pushed the euro below parity with the US dollar. On a positive note, EU unemployment remains relatively low.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the economic situation in Europe. Some earlier publications on inflation and growth can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

What’s next for European energy security? Our experts decipher the State of the European Union Address
Atlantic Council, September 2022

Two large shocks in quick succession: How can Europe avoid another decade of growth disappointment?
Brookings Institution, September 2022

5 key takeaways on inflation from the August CPI report
Brookings Institution, September 2022

The ECB’s monetary tightening: A belated start under uncertainty
Bruegel, September 2022

Tackling inflation: Learning from the European Central Bank’s six lapses
Bruegel, September 2022

An assessment of Europe’s options for addressing the crisis in energy markets
Bruegel, September 2022

National policies to shield consumers from rising energy prices
Bruegel, September 2022

How effective has the pandemic emergency purchase programme been in ensuring debt sustainability?
Bruegel, September 2022

A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis
Bruegel, September 2022

Global economic consequences of the war in Ukraine: Sanctions, supply chains and sustainability
Centre for Economic Policy Research, September 2022

Why gas price caps and consumer subsidies are both extremely costly and ultimately futile
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2022

The economic basis of democracy in Europe
Chatham House, September 2022

Where might high inflation lead to? Economic warfare
Chatham House, September 2022

Global food crisis: Fuelled by conflict
Chatham House, September 2022

Conseil énergie du 9 septembre 2022: Quelles réponses européennes à la crise?
Confrontations Europe, September 2022

How is the EU paying for the economic crisis?
German Marshall Fund, September 2022

Energy unity or breakup? The EU at a crossroads
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

Enabling green innovations for the circular economy: What factors matter?
Economic and Social Affairs Institute, September 2022

Euro Area Autumn 2022: Recession ahead
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, September 2022

As the economy tanks, will the Fed pivot or stay the course?
Mises Institute, September 2022

Uncoordinated monetary policies risk a historic global slowdown
Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2022

Biden could reduce inflation, mitigate a recession, and strengthen democracy with a new EU-US trade agreement
Brookings Institution, August 2022

Macroeconomic stabilization for a post-pandemic world
Brookings Institution, August 2022

Germany is now the fulcrum for Vladimir Putin’s pressure
Brookings Institution, August 2022

The ECB’s monetary policy and its new instrument
Luiss School of Political Economy, August 2022

Inflation and unemployment: Where is the US economy heading over the next six months?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2022

The West must take urgent steps to prevent Ukrainian economic collapse
Atlantic Council, July 2022

Euro-dollar parity: Beyond symbolism
Bruegel, July 2022

Covid-19 in the European Union: Health impacts and effects on economic activity
Bruegel, July 2022

Legal options for a green golden rule in the European Union’s fiscal framework
Bruegel, July 2022

An individual tax on fuel consumption is an effective, flexible and sustainable solution to combat inflation
Bruegel, July 2022

Central banks have been too slow in responding to higher inflation
Bruegel, July 2022

How can the ECB deal with the risk of fragmentation?
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

Real effects of financial market integration: Evidence from an ECB collateral framework change
DIW, July 2022

Achieving the full potential of sustainable finance: The role of national, European and international initiatives
European Policy Centre, July 2022

The war in Ukraine and the European Central Bank
International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 2022

Read this briefing on ‘The EU’s economic woes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

Russia’s war on Ukraine once again featured at the top of agenda during the October I 2022 plenary session, with a debate held with the European Commission and Council on Russia’s escalation of the conflict, and Members calling for a massive increase in defence support for Ukraine, as well as additional support for those regions most affected. Regarding the related energy crisis, Members demanded that the EU response focus on the most vulnerable. A number of political debates were held, inter alia, on ocean governance; rule of law conditionality in Hungary; Romania and Bulgaria’s accession to the Schengen area; and the EU strategy on fertilisers to ensure food security in Europe. Members also debated ending discrimination against Roma people, and called for an end to illegal trade in wildlife by 2025.

Common charger

The long-running issue of the compatibility of chargers for electronic devices (such as smart phones, tablets, cameras, headphones, game consoles and portable speakers) is finally being resolved. As a voluntary approach from industry had neither reduced the numbers of chargers needed by consumers, nor their frustration at not being able to find a compatible one, Members debated and adopted, by a large majority, a provisional agreement on the proposal for a common charger for such devices. The adopted text, agreed with the Council in trilogue, should simplify life for consumers and reduce electronic waste.

European Health Union

Members debated and adopted provisional agreements reached with Council negotiators on two proposals that aim to create a European Health Union. Drawn up in the wake of the COVID‑19 pandemic, the Commission’s plans should ensure the EU is better prepared to deal with future health threats. The proposed regulation on serious cross-border health threats envisages that the EU and each Member State sets up coordinated, regularly reviewed and updated complementary preparedness plans to deal with health crises. Boosting networks should also improve contacts and knowledge-sharing among epidemiological and medical surveillance bodies. Furthermore, the extension of the mandate of the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) broadens its role to monitor health systems across the EU, and ensures data are made available to address all major health threats.

Customs single window

Members voted to adopt a legislative proposal on the establishment of an EU customs single window, which should streamline the paperwork traders and shippers are required to complete – such as documents relating to health, the environment, agriculture, and compliance with standards, as well as customs – by enabling them to use a single electronic gateway.

Coronavirus relief measures for the aviation sector

Although the pandemic has not yet quite disappeared, air traffic has recently increased. Members therefore voted to revise the pandemic relief measures, including the rules on take-off and landing slots for airlines, which were allowed exceptions due to COVID‑19. Airlines will now have to use 75 % of their landing slots to be allowed to retain them the following season.

Statistics on agricultural input and output

Members also voted to adopt a proposal on new rules for data on input and output of agricultural activity, including farmers’ use of agro-chemicals, within the framework of the modernisation of the collection of agricultural statistics.

Transposition of management measures for Indian Ocean tuna fisheries

Parliament adopted measures, following an agreement with the Council, to bring the latest rules of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) into EU law. The western Indian Ocean is a key fishing ground for tuna for the EU fishing fleet, with a catch of some 217 000 tonnes in the area in 2020. As a contracting party to the IOTC, the EU is obliged to ensure its conservation and fisheries management measures are applied to EU fishing vessels.

Horn of Africa

Instability in the eight countries located in the Horn of Africa stems from violent conflict and food insecurity. However, as they are located on major trading routes through the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, they are of strategic interest for the EU. Members debated and adopted a set of recommendations to the Commission, Council and High Representative on EU policy on the Horn of Africa, underlining the need to combat the influence of third parties in the region that do not act under similar values to those of the Union.

Protests in Iran over the death of Mahsa Amini

Among other foreign policy issues tackled during the October I plenary session, Members debated the protests in Iran, following the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini. Iran has seen increasingly brutal repression of protests by the authorities, since the death of Amini on 16 September, following her arrest for allegedly violating the Iranian law requiring women to wear a veil. The protests are reportedly being led by women in solidarity with Amini, but commentators underline that the demonstrations also come in a context of deteriorating economic conditions and the soaring cost of living.

Question time: Tackling depopulation through cohesion policy instruments

During a question time session with Elisa Ferreira, European Commissioner for Cohesion and Reforms, Members discussed the issue of tackling depopulation through cohesion policy instruments. Several Member States and regions are facing population decline, caused by factors including low fertility rates, net emigration and an ageing society.

Question time: Heightening tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Members took the opportunity during Question Time with Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, to discuss recent tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where hostilities have recently broken out on Armenian territory despite the November 2020 ceasefire agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – October I 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Niestadt.

The way children use digital technologies has changed a lot over the past decade. Most children go online using a smartphone, and do so almost twice as much as 10 years ago. They also use the internet at an earlier age than did children 10 years ago. Although the internet provides many opportunities for kids to learn and explore, to be creative or to interact with their friends and family, it also entails many risks such as cyberbullying, age-inappropriate content, disinformation and sexual abuse.

On 11 May 2022, the European Commission published a new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+). The strategy builds on its predecessor with the same name, adopted in 2012. The new strategy contributes to the vision for the EU’s digital transformation by 2030 and reflects the principle, ‘Children and young people should be protected and empowered online’.

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The BIK+ strategy is built around three topics focused on children: safe digital experience, digital empowerment and active participation. It includes concrete actions that the Commission plans to support such as media literacy campaigns and the EU code of conduct on age-appropriate design to ensure privacy, safety and security for children online.

Within the European Parliament, the file has been attributed to the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT). The committee plans to deal with this file together with the proposal for a regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. It does not plan to adopt a report on the updated strategy itself. The Commission plans to carry out an evaluation of the strategy every two years and publish regular reports.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+)‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Balazs Szechy.

The European Week of Regions and Cities (#EURegionsWeek) is the biggest annual Brussels-based event dedicated to cohesion policy. The 20th edition of EURegionsWeek under the motto ‘New Challenges for Europe’s cohesion’ includes online and onsite sessions and a virtual exhibition. The European Parliamentary Research Service is organising two workshops and will be moderating a high-level event as part of the EU RegionsWeek.

The European Week of Regions and Cities is a[FC1]  four-day event during which cities and regions showcase their capacity to create growth and jobs, implement European Union cohesion policy, and prove the importance of the local and regional level for good European governance. During this year’s edition, held from 10 to 13 October 2022, over 1 000 speakers will take part in 386 hours of interactive conferences. The main aim is to discuss common challenges for Europe’s regions and cities and examine possible solutions, by bringing together politicians, decision-makers, experts and practitioners of cohesion policy, as well as stakeholders from business, banking, civil society organisations, academia, the EU institutions and the media. The event provides a platform for capacity-building, learning, and to share experience and good practice for those implementing EU cohesion policy and managing its financial instruments. It facilitates cooperation and networking between regions and cities. The EU Regions Week also feeds into the debate on EU cohesion policy in a wider context, including recent research and views from third countries and international organisations.

For the seventh year running, EPRS is organising a workshop on research as part of the EU RegionsWeek College. This workshop will discuss how the Parliament’s research work is organised and will examine how closer links can be established between researchers in the academic world and EU policy-makers. The workshop is open to all.

A second EPRS workshop will examine the effectiveness of cohesion policy as a tool for solidarity in the context of the war in Ukraine. With large numbers of people having fled Ukraine, the event will focus on the new measures introduced under the cohesion policy framework, such as CARE, CARE+ and FAST-CARE. A panel of policy experts and political practitioners will guide the session, aiming to identify actionable ideas for improving cohesion policy in this area, and involving audience participation through the use of interactive polls. Members of the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions are due to participate in the debate. Issues such as cohesion policy’s capacity to address unforeseen emergencies, or how recent regulatory changes (in addition to flexibility introduced through the CRII packages and REACT-EU) might accelerate a paradigm shift from cohesion policy being a long-term investment mechanism to incorporating a crisis-response feature on a permanent basis, are likely to feature.

The EPRS will also moderate the high-level workshop on ’20 years of EU policies in island regions: where are we?’, organised by the Sardinia Region’s EU liaison office, in partnership with the regional authorities of Corsica, the Balearic islands, Gozo, Crete and the Ionian islands. High-level political representatives from these regions will take the floor, alongside a representative from the European Commission and four Members of the European Parliament, including the Committee on Regional Development’s Chair, Younous Omarjee (GUE/NGL, France).

As in previous years, the European Parliamentary Research Service has published a topical digest linked to the event, providing a selection of briefings and studies published by the European Parliament on many of the major issues under discussion, including the green transition, territorial cohesion, digital transition and youth empowerment.

We look forward to welcoming you online on 11-12 October 2022.

Written by Liselotte Jensen.

The European Union (EU) is legally bound by the Climate Law to reach climate neutrality by 2050 and deliver negative emissions from that year on. To do so, carbon emissions must be significantly reduced and any remaining greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions balanced, and subsequently exceeded, by sequestration or removals, to limit and ultimately reverse the warming of our planet.

In its December 2021 communication on sustainable carbon cycles, the Commission outlined various approaches to capture and store or sequester carbon dioxide emissions, or capture already released carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere to reduce the concentration and thereby its warming effect. Various solutions, both technology- and nature-based, are being brought forward to this end. A key challenge will be to ensure permanence of carbon dioxide removals, whether in underground geological storage or through actively managed natural processes, such as carbon farming and management practices in the land use, land-use change and forestry sectors.

Many products today, such as plastics and chemicals, are produced using virgin fossil-based carbon resources. The Commission therefore also aims to push for product and process innovation to substitute current fossil-based feedstock with sustainably sourced bio-based materials, or through the circular economy, to ensure that carbon integrated in products is recycled and remains stored. More CO2 transport infrastructure is essential to increase the reuse of captured carbon.

At the end of 2022, the Commission plans to put forward a legislative proposal on a European framework for the certification of carbon removals, which could lead to a market for carbon removals, further incentivising measures to increase carbon sequestration and storage. Ensuring high environmental integrity and adequate monitoring and reporting frameworks is crucial, while also taking into account potential trade-offs or co-benefits of potential solutions.

Read this briefing on ‘Sustainable carbon cycles: Promoting removal, storage and recycling‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Carbon flows EU-27 (2018)

Written by Pieter Baert (1st edition).

In most countries in the European Union (EU) and in the rest of the world, debt is treated more favourably from a tax perspective than equity, with interest payments to loans generally being tax deductible. In contrast, costs related to equity financing, such as dividends, are mostly non-tax deductible. This unequal treatment between debt and equity induces a bias towards debt in businesses’ investment decisions and can therefore lead to high levels of indebtedness in the European corporate sector. On 11 May 2022, to support the creation of a harmonised tax environment that places debt and equity financing on an equal footing across the EU, the European Commission presented a proposal for a debt-equity bias reduction allowance (DEBRA). The DEBRA lays down rules on both a tax allowance on increases in equity and on a limitation of the tax deductibility of interest payments.

Versions

• October 2022: Debt-equity bias reduction allowance (1st edition)

Proposal for a debt-equity bias reduction allowance and limiting the deductibility of interest for corporate income tax purposes Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2022)0216
11.5.2022Rapporteur:Luděk Niedermayer (EPP, Czechia)2022/0154(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Evelyn Regner (S&D, Austria)
Gilles Boyer (Renew, France)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)
Michiel Hoogeveen (ECR, Netherlands)Consultation procedure (CNS) – Parliament adopts a non-binding opinion Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Suzana Anghel.

On 6 and 7 October 2022, the EU Heads of State or Government will meet in Prague for an informal meeting of the European Council, preceded by the inaugural meeting of the European Political Community (EPC). Seventeen non-EU European heads of state or government will join the EU-27 leaders for the first meeting of the European Political Community. The 44 leaders are expected to focus, in smaller groups, on peace and security, climate and energy, migration and economic cooperation. They could also grasp the opportunity to define jointly the modes and pace of future political and security cooperation under the new EPC format. At their subsequent informal European Council meeting, EU leaders will discuss Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, energy (notably a possible gas price cap), as well as economic issues. These three interlinked topics have been on their agenda since the outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Reaffirming unity and a common vision will be central to the meeting, which serves as preparation for the regular European Council meetings of October and December 2022, at which decisions are expected to be taken. As with other such meetings held earlier this year, the European Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, will attend the informal European Council meeting.

Inaugural meeting of the European Political Community

On 6 October 2022, EU leaders will meet with 17 non-EU European heads of state or government for the first meeting of the European Political Community in Prague. Six Western Balkans countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia), five Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom will participate. The meeting will be held at the invitation of the European Council President, Charles Michel, and the Czech Prime Minister, Petr Fiala, whose country currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU.

Origin, initial reactions and aim of the European Political Community initiative

On Europe Day 2022, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, proposed to create a European Political Community, a framework that should foster cooperation with like-minded non-EU European partners in areas such as security, energy, transport and infrastructure. Although he stressed right from the outset that the EPC’s aim would be to ‘complement’ and not to substitute the enlargement process, the proposal evoked mixed reactions in the Western Balkans and wariness in Ukraine. Touring the Western Balkans in the following weeks, President Michel championed the proposal, stressing that its aim was ‘not to replace the EU accession process’ but to allow ‘immediate political integration’ and ‘regular political dialogue among leaders’. President Michel then coined the term ‘European geopolitical community’, placing foreign policy cooperation at its core; he suggested that participating states should ‘meet at least twice a year’ at leaders’ and ministers’ level. The European Council discussed the EPC in June 2022, when they agreed that the objective was ‘to foster political dialogue and cooperation to address issues of common interest so as to strengthen the security, stability and prosperity of the European continent’, and confirmed that there was no intention to replace enlargement.

Inaugural meeting agenda, format and possible outcome

The agenda consists of a mix of plenary sessions and roundtable discussions, whilst also enabling bilateral meetings. There will be four parallel roundtable discussions allowing European leaders to focus in smaller groups on the following subjects: 1) peace and security; 2) energy and climate; 3) economy; and 4) migration. The thematic roundtables format was used at the EU-African Union summit of 17 February 2022, where each roundtable was co-chaired by several participating countries. It remains to be seen whether the meeting will bring greater clarity to the concept, focus, structure and frequency of meetings of the new EPC. President Michel outlined that ‘no formal written outcome’ of the meeting is envisaged.

Informal meeting of European Council members

The Prague informal European Council meeting, which President Michel will chair, follows the tradition established in recent years of organising informal meetings hosted in and by the country holding the rotating Council presidency. The objective is to allow EU leaders to build unity on topics discussed informally and hence prepare well in advance of upcoming regular meeting(s) at which decisions are expected to be taken. The indicative leaders’ agenda released in September 2022 confirms this approach. The topics listed for the informal Prague meeting – Russia’s war on Ukraine, energy and economic affairs – are the same as those listed for the regular European Council meetings of 20-21 October 2022 and 15‑16 December 2022. EU leaders might also address, in light of possible developments, other pressing foreign policy issues. Given the informal nature, no conclusions are expected, although President Michel has issued ‘oral conclusions’ after such meetings in the past.

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

EU leaders have discussed Ukraine at their six meetings held thus far in 2022. They will consider recent developments on the ground, where Ukraine is engaged in a robust counter-offensive aimed at recovering its territory illegally occupied by Russia. EU leaders will most probably condemn the sham annexation referendums organised by Russia in Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, and reaffirm support to Ukraine’s territorial integrity within the country’s internationally recognised borders. Sanctions will most probably be at the core of discussions, testing the EU’s unity in countering Russia. The new package includes a cap on Russian oil export prices, which would translate a G7 agreement from September 2022 to EU level; yet Member States are still divided on this issue. At the UN General Assembly, President Michel had stressed that ‘because we must stop the Kremlin’s war machine, massive economic sanctions were unavoidable’. He also underlined that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are acts of war, pointing to the mobilisation of reservists. EU leaders will most certainly consider several other issues, including accountability for war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine and food (in)security, as well as EU humanitarian, financial, economic and military aid.

Energy

Energy has been a rolling item on the European Council’s agenda since last autumn, when EU leaders first addressed the spike in prices. The renewed price rise could trigger a discussion on energy affordability, bringing to the fore the issue of a price cap on gas transactions. This idea, while being supported by 15 Member States, was absent from the measures agreed at the extraordinary Energy Council of 30 September 2022. Such a cap would be distinct from possible further sanctions on Russia in the form of a gas price cap. Another topic for EU leaders to consider could be the reform of the electricity market, including by decoupling gas and electricity prices. Moreover, the Heads of State or Government are likely to discuss the means of protecting critical infrastructure, following the acts of sabotage on the Nord Stream pipeline, which, as tweeted by President Michel, ‘appear to be an attempt to further destabilise energy supply to EU’. EU leaders could take stock of preparations for the winter undertaken at their request by the European Commission and the Member States. In her State of the Union address, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, underlined that the EU agreed on the joint storage of gas, and that storage facilities across the EU were 84 % full in early September 2022. She has also warned against Russia’s continued manipulation of the European energy market and stressed the importance of phasing out dependency on Russian fossil fuels, a commitment that EU leaders assumed earlier this year.

Economic situation

EU Member States face high inflation rates, estimated at 9.1 % for the euro area and at up to 10.1 % for the EU as a whole in August 2022. This is a sharp increase compared to July 2021, when euro-area inflation stood at 2.2 % and overall EU inflation at 2.5 %. The spike in energy and food prices, exacerbated by Russia’s war on Ukraine, is largely at the root of these high inflation rates. President von der Leyen has stressed that Russia’s war on Ukraine ‘is a war on our energy, a war on our economy, a war on our values and a war on our future’. EU leaders might consider ways to curb inflation, and discuss economic growth as well as reform, including of the energy market. In July 2022, the European Parliament held a debate on the cost of living and the means available to ‘help citizens cope with the rising cost of living’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders in Prague on 6 and 7 October 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Negreiro and Maria Niestadt (2nd edition).

The 2014 Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS Regulation or eIDAS) was the first digital identity legislation to provide the basis for cross-border electronic identification, authentication and website certification throughout the EU. Application of eIDAS has been mixed. However, the pandemic increased the need for such solutions to be put in place to access public and private services.

On 3 June 2021, the Commission put forward a proposal building on the eIDAS framework, with the aim of giving at least 80 % of citizens the possibility to use a digital identity to access key public services by 2030 and to do so across EU borders. The updated European digital identity framework would also allow citizens to identify and authenticate themselves online (via their European digital identity wallet) without having to resort to commercial providers, a practice that raises trust, security and privacy concerns. In parallel, the Commission adopted a recommendation to design a toolbox supporting the framework so as to avoid fragmentation and barriers due to diverging standards.

Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). In the draft report, published on 31 May 2022, the rapporteur Romana Jerković (S&D, Croatia) proposed significant changes to the regulation, particularly regarding the European digital identity wallet. The Council has not yet reached a general approach on the file.

Versions

• October 2022: Updating the European digital identity framework (2nd edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing a framework for a European Digital Identity Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2021)0281
3.6.2021Rapporteur:Romana Jerković (S&D, Croatia)2021/0136(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Riho Terras (EPP, Estonia)
Alin Mituța (Renew, Romania)
Mikuláš Peksa (Greens/EFA, Czechia)
Paolo Borchia (ID, Italy)
Dace Melbārde (NA, Latvia)
Elena Kountoura (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Claudia Vinci.

In 2020, there were over 76 million cattle in the European Union (EU) and beef production reached 6.8 million tonnes – output that makes the EU the world’s third largest producer, after the United States and Brazil. The sector is diverse in terms of herd size, farm structure and geographical distribution of farms between EU regions.

Beef is an important element of most European diets, and it is the third most widely consumed meat in the world. EU beef, together with other EU food products, is known for its quality, and widely exported to third countries. To facilitate trade, the EU negotiates bilateral free trade agreements with those countries.

While offering a wide range of opportunities, the opening of global markets can also have a negative impact on the EU beef industry: beef produced outside the EU is more competitive, which threatens to weaken EU internal production.

In recent years, threats other than the opening of new markets have been putting pressure on EU beef producers. These include the declining consumption of red meat, citizens’ concerns about environmental impact, climate change and animal welfare, and low farm incomes.

The EU’s common agricultural policy offers a wide range of instruments to support farmers and address market changes. These instruments include export refunds, public intervention, and private storage aid. Farmers should also now be able to exert greater leverage over big retailers with the protection provided by the 2019 Unfair Trading Practices Directive.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Union beef sector: Main features, challenges and prospects‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU exports: Beef and veal (million tonnes) EU imports: Beef and veal (million tonnes) EU production of bovine meat in 2018-2020 (thousand tonnes) Farms with specialist cattle-rearing and fattening: Distribution across EU Member States, 2016 Farms with specialist cattle-rearing and -fattening: Standard output, 2016 Organic livestock: bovine animals (by head of cattle, 2020)

Written by Krisztina Binder.

In 1994, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in cooperation with its partner organisations, designated 5 October as World Teachersˈ Day. It commemorates the adoption, in 1966, of a set of guidelines to promote teachersˈ status, and the adoption, in 1997, of a recommendation on the status of higher-education teaching personnel. Since 1994, the teaching profession has been celebrated internationally on 5 October.

World Teachersˈ Day is perhaps one of the global anniversaries that touches everyone most directly. After all, almost everybody remembers a favourite teacher who motivated them to learn and inspired them to explore. This is not a coincidence, as educational research reveals a broad consensus on teacher quality having the greatest impact on student achievement of all in-school factors.

However, across the world, education systems and the teaching profession face problems, many of which are shared. One of these is the global shortage of teachers. For instance, estimations made in 2021 revealed that 15 million more teachers were needed in sub-Saharan Africa; in recent years, many education systems across Europe have also been affected by shortages. Increased class sizes lead to overworked teachers and negatively impact studentsˈ achievements. Moreover, the imbalanced distribution of teachers across subjects, particularly leading to shortages in subjects such as mathematics and technology, and in certain geographical areas, mainly rural and remote locations, also proves problematic. Gender imbalances at different levels of education are also a worldwide phenomenon. While, in sub-Saharan Africa for instance, there are fewer opportunities for women to become a teacher in secondary education, 72 % of the approximately 6 million schoolteachers in the European Union were women, according to 2017 figures.

Furthermore, fewer young people are entering the profession and qualified teachers are leaving the field, creating an ageing teacher population. Several factors drive these trends, including, among others, a perceived low value and status of the profession, general dissatisfaction with salaries, precarious employment conditions, the burden of administrative tasks and higher expectations in terms of student outcomes.

The COVID-19 pandemic that disrupted education services and led to school closures has presented teachers with even more challenges. For instance, to be able to maintain contact with students, teachers had to adapt their practices to online and remote education. They were also expected to support their students’ psychological wellbeing in unfavourable circumstances by, for example, promoting social interaction among them. However, in some cases, the teachersˈ own physical and mental health was also impacted, as they experienced stress and suffered from burnout.

Recent coronavirus-related developments again highlight the fundamental role played by teachers in our societies as a driving force for our education systems contributing to social, economic and cultural life. Moreover, the crisis brought about a renewed awareness of teachersˈ situation and the problems facingthe profession. It is in the shared interest of our communities to develop policy responses that raise the status of teachers and reinstate the attractiveness of the education profession. These include measures on initial preparation and professional development, employment prospects, remuneration, and teaching conditions. Other initiatives should also be explored, such as involving the teaching personnel in creating more adaptive education systems and in innovating teaching practices.

Education policy lies primarily with the Member States; the role of the European Union is to encourage cooperation and support national actions. The European Parliament has expressed continued support for teachers to help them face the challenges of their profession. In its 2021 resolution on the European Education Area, the Parliament called for better recognition of the teaching profession, and stressed, among other things, that teachers and educators should be adequately remunerated for their work. In its 2022 resolution on an EU strategy to promote education for children in the world, the Parliament acknowledged and expressed appreciation for the work delivered by teachers in the context of the pandemic. In May 2021, Members adopted the 2021‑2027 edition of the Erasmus+ programme, with almost doubled funding enabling it to reach more teachers and students.

Main sources:

• Ivana Katsarova, Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Teachers: Contributing to the EUˈs future, At a glance, Infographic, European Parliament, EPRS, October 2019
• Ivana Katsarova, Teaching careers in the EU: Why boys do not want to be teachers, Briefing, European Parliament, EPRS, February 2020
• UNESCO, Education International, ILO, UNICEF, World Teachersˈ Day 2021: Teachers at the heart of education recovery, Concept note, 2021
•  UNESCO, ILO, UNICEF, Education International, World Teachersˈ Day 2022: The transformation of education begins with teachers, Concept note, 2022
• European Commission, European Education and Culture Executive Agency, Motiejūnaitė-Schulmeister, A., De Coster, I., Davydovskaia, O., et al., Teachers in Europe : careers, development and well-being, Birch, P.(editor), Publications Office of the European Union, 2021

Written by Gyorgyi Macsai (Members’ Research Service) with Igor Tkalec (GlobalStat, EUI).

The infographic illustrates the economic development in the United States in comparison with the EU economy in the past decade. Besides showing strong economic recovery capacity in both regions, it gives an insight into economic phenomena, such as rising inflation and growing public debt – unfavourable trends that started before 2022, a year marked by war in Europe. It also portrays trade relations between the two blocs, which, despite having suffered during the COVID-19 pandemic, grew to record levels in EU exports of goods and services in 2021. This is a further updated edition of an infographic, the last edition of which was published in June 2021.

Read this at a glance note on ‘United States: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Henrique Morgado Simões (1st edition).

On 5 April 2022, the Commission presented a proposal for a regulation on fluorinated greenhouse gases that would repeal Regulation (EU) No 517/2014. The proposal is amongst the last in the ‘fit for 55’ package, aiming to align EU climate and energy laws with the EU Climate Law’s 2030 target.

The proposal aims to further reduce emissions of fluorinated greenhouse gases (F-gases). It would change the existing quota system, gradually reducing the supply of hydrofluorocarbons (HFC) to the EU market to 2.4 % of 2015 levels by 2048. It would also ban F-gases in specific applications and update the rules in respect to implementing best practices, leak checking, record keeping, training, waste treatment and penalties. The current licensing system and labelling obligations would be strengthened in order to improve enforcement of trade restrictions. Finally, the proposal would align EU legislation with the requirements of the Montreal Protocol to reduce production of HFCs.

In Parliament, the proposal is being discussed in the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI).

Versions

• September 2022: Review of the Regulation on fluorinated greenhouse gases: Fit for 55 package (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on fluorinated greenhouse gases, amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 517/2014 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 150
5.4.2022Rapporteur:Bas Eickhout (Greens/EFA, the Netherlands)2022/0099(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Stelios Kympouropoulos (EPP, Greece)
Günther Sidl (S&D, Austria)
Ondřej Knotek (Renew, Czechia)
Danilo Oscar Lancini (ID, Italy)
Alexandr Vondra (ECR, Czechia)
Nikolaj Villumsen (The Left, Denmark)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Monika Kiss.

After the lifting of COVID-19 related health restrictions, figures in the transport sector are slowly returning to pre-pandemic levels. According to EUROCONTROL 2022‑2024 forecasts, 9.5 million flights are expected in the aviation sector this year, corresponding to 85 % of 2019 levels, despite the impact of the invasion of Ukraine and global economic challenges. Measures concerning take-off and landing slots should reflect this evolution.

Background

The allocation of airport slots is regulated under the Slot Regulation (EEC Regulation 95/93). Airlines granted a slot at an airport may use the entire range of infrastructure necessary for the operation of a flight at a given time (runway, taxiway, stands and for passenger flights, terminal infrastructure). Changing figures in the volume of air traffic meant an update of the legislation was needed.

The Commission’s December 2011 airport package included a legislative proposal to review the Slot Regulation. The proposal aimed at ensuring optimal allocation and use of airport slots in congested airports and fair competition between operators. The Council adopted its general approach in October 2012 and the Parliament adopted its first reading position in December 2012. In its position, the Parliament aimed to introduce a number of additional measures designed to strengthen the independence of slot coordinators across Europe, and make slot allocation more transparent. The Parliament also sought to strengthen the coordinator’s functions and the independence of the coordinator’s supervisory board. The Parliament rejected proposals to raise the ‘slot series usage rate’ to 85 % and to increase the minimum number of weekly slots for priority allocation. The proposal is currently awaiting Council’s first reading position and remains blocked in the Council.

The Parliament’s resolution of 16 February 2017 had urged the Council and Member States to make swift progress on deadlocked files, including this one. Furthermore, in its aviation strategy for Europe from June 2019, the European Commission urged the Council and the Parliament to adopt the revised regulation swiftly, to enable the optimal use of the busiest airports and to provide clear benefits to the EU economy.

The COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath

In 2020, after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the related lockdown measures, air traffic fell steeply. However, airlines are required to use 80 % of their slots to secure their slot portfolios for the following season – should they not reach this threshold, the slots go to the slot pool for reallocation. To temporarily waive the rules on take-off and landing slot utilisation, the European Council suspended airport slot use requirements (the ‘use it-or-lose-it’ rule) from March to 24 October 2020. This measure was extended again until 27 March 2021, to avoid the environmental harm caused by running empty flights (‘ghost flights‘) for the sole purpose of retaining slots for the following season.

Due to some recovery in the demand for air travel, the European Commission proposed in December 2020 to return to the ‘use it-or-lose-it’ rule, to maximise benefits for the greatest number of slot users, consumers and connectivity. After discussions in the Council and Parliament, the agreed threshold was set at 50 % for the summer season, running from 28 March to 30 October 2021. In addition, the Commission was given delegated powers for one year to decide on the extension of the temporary measures and to amend the slot use rate within a 30‑70 % range. The Commission has extended the measures to the winter season, running from 31 October 2021 until 27 March 2022, with the same 50 % threshold. In December 2021, the Commission extended the slot relief rules for the 2022 summer scheduling season, running from 28 March 2022 until 29 October 2022, with a threshold of 64 %. The ‘justified non-use of slots’ exception was also extended.

On 12 July 2022, the European Commission proposed to return to a higher slot use rate (80 % of the 2019 figures) as of 30 October 2022 – reflecting the increasing demand, but simultaneously allowing the possibility to continue to make use of the ‘justified non-use of slots’ (JNUS) tool. In the Parliament, Members are expected to vote on the proposal during the October I session.

Written by Maria Diaz Crego and Micaela Del Monte (1st edition).

Over the years, techniques to limit freedom of expression have been refined, in innovative ways, often taking advantage of a legal void or grey zones between legal norms. One of these techniques is that of ‘SLAPPs’ (strategic lawsuits against public participation), a term coined by George Pring and Penelope Canan in the 1980s to indicate an abusive or meritless lawsuit filed against someone for exercising their political rights or freedom of expression in relation to matters of public interest. The purpose of SLAPPs is not to seek justice but to intimidate, silence and drain the financial and physical resources of the targeted victims. Ultimately, SLAPPs have a ‘chilling effect’ that goes beyond the individual case and undermines the building up of a healthy and pluralistic civic space in which citizens can actively participate. Although originally the SLAPPs phenomenon mainly affected activists, environmentalists and citizens who made themselves heard on matters of social relevance, today it affects all individuals who, in the name of public interest, denounce abuses of various kinds committed by both public and private actors.

On 27 April 2022, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a directive aimed at protecting persons who engage in public participation against manifestly unfounded or abusive civil court proceedings with cross-border implications, which is now being analysed by the co‑legislators. The proposal is accompanied by a recommendation to the Member States setting out guidance to address purely domestic cases of SLAPPs.

Versions

• September 2022: Strategic lawsuits against public participation (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Committee responsible:Legal Affairs (JURI)COM(2022) 177 final
22.4.20222Rapporteur:Tiemo Wölken (S&D, Germany)2022/0117(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Magdalena Adamowicz (EPP, Poland)
Ilana Cicurel (Renew, France)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Jorge Buxadé Villalba (ECR, Spain)
Manon Aubry (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Draft report

Written by Sebastian Clapp and Philippe Perchoc.

As part of its Jean Monnet seminar series, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) organised a two-day seminar entitled ‘European strategic autonomy, sovereignty and responsibility: Opportunities and challenges in the shadow of Russia’s war on Ukraine’ in Bazoches and Paris on 8 and 9 July 2022. The panellists included representatives of the Council, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Globsec, Institut Jacques Delors, the German Marshall Fund and a former Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defence and staff from the secretariats of Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Sub-committee on Security and Defence (SEDE).

The first part of the event took place at OECD Headquarters in Paris. In his opening statement, Secretary-General of the European Parliament, Klaus Welle, underlined that the war in Ukraine has triggered a return of geopolitics to Europe. He posed the questions whether Russian President Vladimir Putin is proposing a new bipolar world order, with Russia and China constituting one pole, and whether there is a new era of clashing value systems. If so, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alone does not have all the tools necessary to counter the new Russian threat. However, the European Union (EU), with its comprehensive approach, could provide a large part of the answer. He noted that, with the return of geopolitics, it is critical for the EU to act geopolitically and to work with partners. Important steps were taken at the Versailles Summit when it comes to European defence and strategic autonomy and with the Strategic Compass. Nevertheless, the EU will need support from the United States to build up European resilience. It will be especially important to align defence procurement and boost joint deterrence and defence, together with the USA.

The first panel examined the implications of the Russian war on Ukraine for EU strategic autonomy. Panellists reflected on the broader and longer-term trends linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with a particular emphasis on food security, energy and defence. The effects of the war on Ukraine on global food security were underlined. Already increasing before the war, global hunger has now become fundamentally worse, not least as Ukraine was the biggest supplier of wheat to the World Food Programme. More and more countries will now be dependent on food aid, and at higher prices. The participants also considered the looming energy crisis. Worryingly, US liquified natural gas (LNG) will not be enough to substitute for Russian gas and will be prohibitively expensive; some speakers argued that the EU is not doing enough to solve the energy crisis. On defence, panellists emphasised that, while the possibility of war has always existed, the EU approach was one of ‘waiting for problems to go away’. This has failed. One panellist emphasised that is essential to pay attention to what is happening outside the West, pointing to the importance of finding a way to ‘co-exist with China’.  

The event continued at the Jean Monnet House in Bazoches on the following day. In her opening message, President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, emphasised the historic importance of the Jean Monnet House to European integration and highlighted that Jean Monnet and his guests discussed the first, albeit unsuccessful, projects for a European Defence Community at the house. She underlined that in a time of great geopolitical threat, strategic autonomy has become more pertinent than ever, , and outlined the key areas the EU27 leaders have identified as most important to the strategic sovereignty of the Union (defence, energy, the economy and food security). The first European integration projects were centred around energy, and today this issue is back on the table. She also noted that, in the face of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the EU reacted collectively and decisively and took unprecedented action in the area of sanctions, energy and military aid and focused most on the area of defence and the key measures agreed to in the Strategic Compass and Versailles Declaration.

In her introductory remarks, Vice-President Eva Kailli (S&D, Greece) emphasised that the EU has shown unity in response to recent crises, but noted that the EU lacks foresight. She underlined that a deeper analysis of what is coming is necessary, to ensure better preparedness. The EU must switch from shortsighted policies to long-term strategies based on foresight. Foresight is essential to building a ‘real preparedness plan’ for key areas, such as energy, defence, and raw materials. Foresight is also key to the EU’s green and digital transitions. Eva Kaili commended the European Parliament’s pioneering role in integrating foresight into policy-making, through the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) and the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA). She also emphasised the EPRS’s adoption of foresight practices and underlined that the EPRS and STOA provide lawmakers with ‘clarity and perspective’, allowing Members to ‘see and plan further’. 

The second panel discussed the progress made in the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy/strategic sovereignty in the past six months, drawing on the Strategic Compass and on the Versailles agenda, and reflected on the challenges facing the EU’s capacity to act and to build resilience. Participants highlighted the European Defence Fund as one of the most important initiatives of recent times, with EU co-financing of defence procurement an extremely promising way forward for EU defence policy (vaccine procurement during COVID‑19 was given as an example of successful joint procurement), that complements NATO. However,  greater ambition and new sources of funding are necessary. The importance of critical technologies and reduction of strategic dependencies was also highlighted during the session. Commission initiatives, such as the roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence and the defence investment gap analysis were highlighted. The defence of the Eastern flank of NATO was also discussed, with a particular emphasis on scenarios looking at how the war on Ukraine will end and what the consequences could be for European defence.

The final session explored the importance of partnerships under the theme ‘From strategic autonomy to strategic responsibility? Partnering in times of great crisis’. Panellists discussed the state-of-play of the EU’s partnerships and cooperation with NATO, the USA, the United Kingdom and ‘like-minded partners’ and its implications for security and defence, energy and the economy. In terms of continued US commitment to NATO, the importance of the next US elections was underlined and the risks of a further shift in US foreign policy priorities towards the Indo-Pacific were discussed. One panellist suggested a transatlantic Erasmus programme to foster transatlantic cooperation in future generations. On Ukraine, the effectiveness of EU support to Ukraine including weapons deliveries to Ukraine was discussed. The European Parliament’s support to the Ukrainian Parliament was also underlined. Panellists discussed the UK’s partnerships with the EU, underlining that to the UK, EU foreign policy remains essential across the UK political spectrum; with the UK also supporting stronger EU-NATO cooperation. The session concluded that the war on Ukraine has underlined the alignment of the EU, the UK and the US on defence matters.

This meeting was the second in an annual series on strategic autonomy held at the Jean Monnet house. This year’s session was an occasion to reflect and discuss in a very different context to the first session in 2021. With these regular meetings, EPRS hopes to contribute to continued European and transatlantic dialogue.