European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Elena Lazarou and Ionel Zamfir.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has shattered assumptions and expectations about protracted peace in the wider European space. It has stimulated serious reflection about the instruments and tools available to safeguard peace in times of contestation between great powers and of weakened multilateral institutions, phenomena that have been observed consistently throughout the past decade.

At the same time, the promotion of global peace and security continues to be a fundamental goal and central pillar of European Union (EU) external action, following the model of its own peace project. Both within and beyond the EU, there is a widespread expectation among citizens that the Union will deliver results in this crucial area. Nevertheless, as the security environment poses what could be the most significant challenge to security in the post-Cold War period, the EU is urgently intensifying its work for peace and security in a number of key policy areas.

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According to the Global Peace Index (GPI) 2022, the state of peace in the world deteriorated slightly in 2021, continuing a long-standing trend. In addition, multilateralism, a core element of EU foreign policy and identity, and a cornerstone of its approach to peace and security, is under increasing pressure from alternative value systems and ideologies; a situation that has been exacerbated by the effects of the pandemic.

Even before the launch of Russia’s war, the coronavirus crisis had accelerated these pre-existing trends, which were already signalling the advent of a more competitive and less secure international geopolitical environment. In response to these trends, the European Commission under President Ursula von de Leyen, with the support of the European Parliament, committed to reinforcing the EU as an external actor, able to act more strategically and autonomously, while fully upholding the fundamental values stipulated in the founding Treaties, including the achievement of peace. To this day, the over-arching values and objectives of the EU guide all facets of its external action, including common foreign and security policy (CFSP); democracy support; development cooperation; economic, financial and technical cooperation; humanitarian aid; trade; and neighbourhood policy.

Read our Animated infographic on Peace and Security

While the promotion of peace remains the objective of EU foreign policy, achieving it is also linked to understanding peace and its components. Thus, measuring peace and the threats that challenge it is becoming an increasingly relevant exercise. In that context, the Normandy Index attempts to measure threats to peace based on variables identified in the EU Global Strategy. The EU Member States, supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS), conducted a comprehensive threat analysis in 2020, as part of the development of the EU Strategic Compass, which was adopted by the Council and endorsed by the European Council in March 2022.

The EU’s contribution to countering threats to peace, security and democracy globally has grown significantly through legislation, financing and the creation of new structures and initiatives. A significant share of EU aid goes to fragile states and to issues related to securing peace. The EU’s ‘new consensus on development’ emphasises the role of development cooperation in preventing violent conflicts, mitigating their consequences and aiding recovery from them. On the ground, the EU has been able to strengthen the nexus between security, development and humanitarian aid through the implementation of comprehensive strategies, for example in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel. Through its common security and defence policy (CSDP), the EU runs 18 missions and operations, making it one of the United Nation’s main partners in peacekeeping. To help partners withstand sometimes violent attacks on their democratic structures by domestic illiberal forces and external authoritarian powers, the EU has been strengthening its tools to support democracy all over the world.

In 2021, the EU continued to advance its work on countering new threats to peace, such as disinformation, cyber-attacks and climate change. New elements strengthening EU security and defence capabilities were implemented with the aim of boosting EU strategic autonomy, including its capacity to work for peace and security. These elements of ‘hard power’, together with the EU’s long-standing experience in the practice of soft power, form the backbone of its action for peace and security.

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The EU also continues to be a staunch promoter of multilateralism at global and regional levels to counter global threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and global health crises, including the economic and humanitarian consequences of the coronavirus pandemic across the world. The EU’s immediate neighbourhood is a consistent focus in its work, with the aim of building resilience and upholding peace and democracy, both now seriously challenged at the EU’s eastern border by Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Looking to the future, peace and security are increasing in complexity. Even in Europe, the war in Ukraine has shown that the assumption of sustained peace can no longer be taken for granted. The effects of the war on Ukraine reverberate around the world in the form of diminishing food and energy security, inflationary pressures, economic crises and global polarisation. New types of threats and destabilising factors such as pandemics, climate change, foreign interference in democracy, cyber-attacks and bio-terrorism, as well as various types of hybrid warfare, call for innovative thinking and new types of resources and solutions. While the EU has made significant progress in furthering its aim of strengthening its presence and efficiency in the area of peace and security, more remains to be done. The 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) is focused on streamlining the EU’s programmes and instruments to allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to unforeseen threats, while also implementing innovative financial instruments.

While the EU’s quest for flexibility, efficiency and innovation in recent years has been underpinned by the strategic goal of empowering the EU in its global role as a promoter of peace and security, no event has made the urgency of this challenge as evident as Russia’s war on Ukraine. While adapting to the new realities of the international order and the rapid technological, environmental and societal changes of our times, the war has also precipitated bold and rapid change in the EU’s capacity to act for peace and security, such as unprecedented sanctions and support for substantial arms deliveries. Adapting to the rapidly transforming world has meant that the EU has to become a more autonomous, strategic and holistic actor for peace and security by bringing together elements of normative, soft and hard power with steadfastness and resilience.

Read the complete study on ‘Peace and Security in 2022: Overview of EU action and outlook for the future‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

On 28-30 June 2022, NATO leaders met in Madrid and adopted a new strategic concept, rewriting their assessment of the threat environment in the light of Russia’s war on Ukraine. NATO also overhauled its defence and deterrence posture, and officially invited Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance.

NATO’s new strategic concept

From 28 to 30 June 2022, the NATO Allies’ heads of state or government met for the 32nd time since 1949, to steer a course through current challenges and determine the Alliance’s future direction. The summit’s most important outcome was the adoption of NATO’s new (eighth) strategic concept – a document that sets out the Alliance’s strategy, and outlines its defence and deterrence posture, its core tasks, and the security challenges it faces. NATO’s last strategic concept dated back to 2010, when the security situation in Europe was fundamentally different. The new strategic concept marks a fundamentally new departure:

• Threat environment: The new concept states that the Euro-Atlantic area is no longer at peace, and faces ‘the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity’. This is starkly different from the 2010 concept’s assessment, which noted that the area was at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO was low. New security challenges such as space, cyber- and hybrid threats, climate change, and emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are all mentioned. NATO commits to enhancing its cyber-defences and investing in its ability to deter, prepare and defend against hybrid threats. The concept notes that cyber- and hybrid threats could justify invocation of Article 5 (the mutual defence clause). Commentators note the ‘laundry list’ will make prioritising difficult and that it lacks detail on how the challenges should be met.
• Russia: NATO notes that Russia presents the ‘most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area’. By contrast, in the 2010 concept, NATO sought to pursue ‘a true strategic partnership with Russia’. One expert argues that this is the strongest language on Russia since 1991 and is reminiscent of ‘Cold-War style language’. In arguably a rebuke to Putin, NATO leaders also reaffirmed NATO’s open-door policy and stated that ‘no third party has a say in this process’.
• China: China’s ‘ambitions and coercive policies’ are said to challenge NATO’s ‘interests, security and values’, in this first ever mention of the country in a strategic concept. The concept warns that China’s hybrid, cyber- and disinformation activities are a threat to NATO and raises concerns about the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China. However, the Allies remain open to constructive engagement with China. It was in this context that the Allies’ Indo-Pacific partners, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, attended their first ever NATO summit.
• Core tasks: NATO reaffirms and reinforces its three core tasks: cooperative security, crisis prevention and management (as opposed to simply crisis management in the 2010 concept) and deterrence and defence (collective defence in the previous concept). Importantly, the new concept mainstreams resilience through all three core tasks. According to one analyst, the core tasks remain ‘broadly the same’. However other experts argue that the importance of deterrence has risen compared with other core tasks, even arguing that it now has primacy.
• EU-NATO cooperation: The new concept states that the EU is a ‘unique and essential partner for NATO’. The two organisations share 21 (23 once Finland and Sweden join NATO) Member States in common. EU-NATO cooperation focuses on issues of common interest such as crisis management. It was cemented in a strategic partnership in the early 2000s and expanded through two joint EU-NATO declarations, in 2016 and 2018, that outline areas for strengthened cooperation. A third EU-NATO declaration is expected in the near future. The new concept underlines that cooperation will be enhanced on issues of common interest, such as military mobility, EDTs, the impact of climate change on security, human security, the ‘women, peace and security’ agenda, and hybrid and cyber‑threats. NATO recognises that stronger EU defence will contribute to transatlantic security. This is coherent with the emphasis placed on enhancing EU-NATO cooperation in the EU’s Strategic Compass. A Euro-Atlantic dinner was held on 29 June on the fringes of the summit. Challenges nevertheless remain, owing to tensions between member states (most notably Turkey and Cyprus) and comparatively weak EU military capabilities and defence spending (the latter are improving rapidly).

NATO strengthens its deterrence and defence posture

NATO’s secretary-general announced a ‘fundamental shift’ to deterrence and defence, encompassing:

• Enhanced forward presence: Allies committed to boost the eight multi-national battlegroups, currently deployed on its eastern flank, to brigade-level if necessary. For instance, the United States announced that it would significantly increase US troop deployments to several eastern European Allies and that the permanent headquarters of the US Army’s V Corps would be in Poland.
• Forces boosted to high-readiness: The Alliance’s rapid reaction force, the NATO Response Force, will be increased to 300 000 troops. For the first time since the Cold War these forces will be dedicated to defending a specific Ally. By way of example, the United Kingdom has earmarked an extra 1 000 personnel for rapid deployment for the defence of Estonia.
• Forward deployed equipment: The Allies committed to deploy stockpiles, facilities and military equipment to the Eastern flank to boost the credibility of NATO’s deterrence. For instance, on 30 June, following the NATO summit, France deployed a missile defence system to Romania.

According to experts, these steps are an impressive show of resolve to bolster defences and counter Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. However, one analyst cautions that these commitments will be expensive, and if not backed up adequately, could undermine NATO’s credibility.

Support to Ukraine

NATO Allies have supported Ukraine with military equipment and aid since even before the beginning of the Russian invasion. These deliveries have been coordinated inter alia by the EU and the Ukraine Contact Group, which includes 50 nations. At the summit, the NATO Allies confirmed their commitment ‘for as long as it takes’. NATO members also committed to continue with major bilateral military and financial help, and agreed to a comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine, including non-lethal equipment such as ‘secure communications, fuel, medical supplies and body armour’. NATO further committed to help Ukraine transition to modern equipment, enhance interoperability and bolster its defence and security institutions.

Accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO

Finland and Sweden officially submitted their NATO membership applications on 18 May 2022. It was initially unclear whether their application would be accepted (NATO accession requires unanimity), owing to Turkey’s concerns that the countries were harbouring ‘terrorists’. However, ahead of the summit, Finland, Sweden and Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding in which Turkey obtained commitments on counterterrorism (relating to groups it considers terrorists) and on national arms embargoes. On 29 June 2022, NATO formally invited Finland and Sweden to become full members and on 5 July, NATO ambassadors signed the accession protocols, paving the way for ratification by all members. Finland and Sweden can now participate officially in NATO meetings (they had already been attending unofficially since Russia invaded Ukraine). The ratification process could take up to a year and may yet be blocked by Turkey. Once complete, NATO’s secretary-general will officially invite the candidates to accede to the Washington Treaty. Once their instruments of accession have been deposited, Finland and Sweden will be full members.

European Parliament position

In its June 2022 recommendation on the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Parliament underlined the need to intensify EU-NATO cooperation and the importance of a substantial third EU-NATO joint declaration. MEPs also called for a further boost to NATO’s enhanced forward presence, while acknowledging that NATO is the bedrock of its members’ collective defence. In 2021 the Parliament adopted a resolution on EU-NATO cooperation, in which it emphasised that strong partnership was vital to address today’s security challenges and called for deeper cooperation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the Madrid NATO Summit, June 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Abstract

Today’s EU pharmaceutical market is unsustainable, due to the fragmentation of EU players and public dependence on private interests. A recent Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study proposes a solution involving the creation of a public European medicines infrastructure, a body that would control of the entire drug cycle, from its inception to its delivery.

The forthcoming STOA workshop will discuss how such a structure should be developed. This event is part of a series of STOA activities (including publications and events) addressing the EU health response to the Covid‑19 pandemic, with a view to fostering preparedness to counter future health threats.

Today’s EU public health system is unsustainable

The Covid-19 pandemic exposed gaps in the EU public health system: from non-standardised Member State data reporting and uncoordinated Member State crisis responses, controversial vaccine contracts and slow national vaccine rollouts, to a fragmented network of institutional actors in health.

The EU’s response to Covid-19 improved upon some of these issues. We saw the launch of the EU4Health programme and the pharmaceutical strategy for Europe initiative, the reinforcement of the roles of EU agencies the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and European Medicines Agency (EMA), and the creation of two new EU structures, the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA) and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), the latter of which has a mission to stockpile and distribute vaccines and other medical countermeasures to the 27 EU Member States.

However, some have argued that these solutions are limited and do not address the root of the problem – the unsustainability of the present EU pharmaceutical system. A STOA study analysing 200 literature sources and interviewing 60 experts identifies the main market and policy failures at the heart of the problem, including:

1. a mismatch between public and private research and development (R&D) priorities;

2. a mismatch between public sector ‘open’ science and private copyright regimes;

3. an excessive flow of public subsidies towards the private sector;

4. private monopoly control over access to and the cost of medicines.

A solution is therefore sought that can repurpose the massive public investment in pharmaceutical R&D for an effective and sustainable public EU ecosystem.

With its resolution of 17 September 2020, the European Parliament called on the Commission and Member States to ‘examine the possibility of creating one or more European non-profit pharmaceutical undertakings which operate in the public interest to manufacture medicinal products of health (…), in order to complete and guarantee security of supply and prevent possible shortages of medicines’.

The December 2021 Council conclusions negotiated under the Slovenian Presidency of the EU and signed off by all 27 EU Health Ministers took note of the importance of Parliament’s resolution to ensure the supply of medicinal products affected by market failures.

In July 2022, an open letter to EU institutions signed by researchers, doctors and by Italian ex-ministers of Health Rosy Bindi and Giulia Grillo, called for the creation of a public European infrastructure that can develop vaccines and other therapeutics, for the common good.

Developing a public European medicines infrastructure

According to the authors of the STOA study, a European medicines infrastructure would focus on serving public interest by developing effective, affordable and safe medicines that are free from private intellectual property rights and where public funds are reallocated to public-interest projects. Such a structure would allow the development of new antimicrobials and medicines used to cure rare diseases (‘orphan medicines’), areas traditionally left out of private strategies.

Unlike HERA, which does not have the mandate to directly implement pharmaceutical R&D projects, this new structure would have the authority to control the full drug lifecycle, from research to development, production and distribution. It would centralise EU public health R&D in a manner equivalent to other EU structures. It could take inspiration from the United States’ health federal agencies, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), with their reinforced budgets and scope. It would remain open to collaborations with scientific and public health centres at national and EU levels and with pharmaceutical companies, based on transparent contracts.

A European medicines infrastructure could be developed in one of four models, depending on the level of autonomy – from public/private partnerships to fully public – and R&D capacity – and from a focus on infectious diseases to a wider focus on public health.

The upcoming STOA workshop

On 28 September 2022, the European Parliament will organise a roundtable discussion on the purpose and feasibility of creating a European medicines infrastructure. The event will gather experts from research, industry, civil society governmental and non-governmental organisations to discuss the development models for such a structure.

Ahead of the workshop, participants have shared their views. EU research fragmentation is a main contributor to the issue, advises Karin Sipido of KU Leuven. Rolf Apweiler, from EMBL, highlights the importance of ‘open’ science and accessible data sharing for health crisis response. Rosa Castro, from EPHA, supports EU coordination for areas of low commercial profitability, and includes HERA in such a structure. For Salah Dine Chibout, from Novartis, public and private bodies have complementary roles and should continue to collaborate in clinical trial stages. Global vaccine access and distribution remains unequal, due to private monopoly control, notes Els Torreele,in an appeal for new policies and governance rules.

In conclusion, the industry is a key player in pharmaceutical R&D and innovation. However, overwhelming evidence points to a structural disconnect between public health priorities and private strategies, which lead to market and policy failures that do not benefit the public interest. A European medicines infrastructure could offer a new approach to fixing these issues. The forthcoming workshop will contribute to the ongoing public discussion.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask how the Parliament responds to the issue of forest fires and what actions the European Union can take.

In recent years, several countries around the world have been confronted with particularly intense and widespread forest fires. In 2021, forest fires severely affected California, Turkey and Mexico, in addition to yearly European hotspots, such as the Mediterranean. 

The protection of forests in the European Union (EU) falls primarily under the national competence of the governments of EU countries. There are a number of ways, however, in which the EU contributes to preventing and helping in the case of forest fires, both through EU funding and EU mechanisms.

The European Parliament has repeatedly called on the European Commission and EU countries to do more to protect forests. The Commission has introduced protection mechanisms and a forest strategy for 2030.

European Parliament demands for better protection of forests

Recognising forests’ key role in climate action, the European Parliament has adopted several resolutions concerning the conservation of forests.

• In a resolution of September 2018, Parliament highlighted that sustainable and inclusive forest management and responsible use of forest commodities constitute the most effective and cheapest natural system for carbon capture and storage.
• In a resolution of January 2020, on the European Green Deal, Parliament called on the Commission to ‘present a new, ambitious EU forest strategy to give appropriate recognition to the important, multifunctional and cross-cutting role that European forests, the sector, and sustainable forest management have in the fight against climate change and biodiversity loss’.
• In a resolution of September 2020, on the EU’s role in protecting and restoring the world’s forests, Parliament urged the EU and EU countries to recognise that the protection of native forests provides an outstanding climate mitigation benefit, and to restart the negotiations for an international forest convention.
• In a resolution of June 2021, Parliament welcomed the new EU forest strategy and underlined the importance of strengthening sustainable forest management.

EU plans to protect forests

A 2019 European Commission communication lays out actions to protect and restore forests outside the EU. Primary forests require special attention as they are unique and irreplaceable, have high carbon stocks, unique ecological features, and protect biodiversity. The EU aims to work in partnership with producer countries to reduce pressures on forests and to strengthen international cooperation to halt deforestation and forest degradation.

Regarding forests inside the EU, a 2021 European Commission communication (known as the ‘new EU forest strategy for 2030’) pursues the biodiversity and climate neutrality objectives enshrined in the European Green Deal and the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030. The strategy aims to improve the quantity and quality of EU forests by, for instance:

• providing education and training for people working in forest-based industries and making these industries more attractive to young people;
• promoting sustainable forest management;
• improving the size and biodiversity of forests, including planting three billion new trees by 2030;
• developing a strong research and innovation agenda to improve our knowledge on forests.

EU action to fight forest fires

The European Union actively supports forest fire prevention projects through its Regional Development Fund. Furthermore, the European Union Solidary Fund provides support to help EU countries tackle major natural disasters such as forest fires.

The European Union Civil Protection Mechanism ensures the rapid deployment of resources and personnel to any country in the world that requests assistance during crises such as forest fires. At the core of this mechanism is the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, which monitors forest fire risks and emergencies across Europe. This centre is supported by national and European monitoring services, including the European Forest Fire Information System.

In 2019, to strengthen the mechanism, the EU established a new European reserve of capacities. Known as rescEU, it includes firefighting planes and helicopters. For the 2022 forest fire season, Croatia, France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden put a total of 12 firefighting planes and 1  helicopter at the disposal of other EU countries in case of an emergency. The European Commission will decide jointly with these EU countries on the deployment of the planes and helicopter.

Further information

• New EU forest strategy for 2030, European Parliamentary Research Service, At a Glance Note, February 2022
• Forest fires: Environmental stakes, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, November 2020
• Legislation on protecting the EU’s forests against fire, European Commission
• Forest Fires, European Commission, Fact Sheet, June 2022

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Karin Jacobs.

Ukraine is one of the worlds’ largest producers of grains and oilseed, and – for the export of these products to Africa, the Middle East and Europe – heavily dependent on its maritime transport and ports, currently blocked because of the war. Ukraine and Russia together typically export nearly 12 % of food calories globally. Before the war, Ukraine exported more than 90 % of its agricultural products, around 6 million tons per month, via the Black Sea. Alternative routes by road and rail only provide for a partial solution, while free navigation in open sea is an international right of sovereign states.

Background

The closure of Ukrainian ports has caused serious disruption in European and other supply chains, and owing to lack of maritime logistics and connectivity, an international food crisis is looming. Russia’s war on Ukraine has affected the maritime transport sector heavily, including its ports. With commercial ships hit in the conflict, operators have to redirect freight transport and divert vessels. Most large shipping companies, citing unpredictable operational impacts, have suspended shipments to and from Ukraine and Russia. Important shipping routes in the Black Sea – in particular, Odesa and the Sea of Azov – are blocked and occupied. At the start of the war, around 2 000 seafarers were stranded aboard 94 vessels in Ukrainian ports. These numbers have fallen slightly. According to the Atlantic Council, Russian naval ships have hit at least 10 commercial ships since Russia’s assault. About 80 commercial ships have been blocked in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov for months. Before the war, Ukrainian Black Sea ports accounted for up to 90 % of the country’s grain and oilseed exports, of which one third is destined to Europe, China and Africa. At the European Parliament’s Transport (TRAN) Committee meeting in May 2022, Ukrainian Minister of Infrastructure Oleksandr Kubrakov said that 70 % of total exports from Ukraine are normally carried by sea. With supply chains heavily disrupted, re-routing of goods to road and rail will not suffice, given the volumes implicated. This situation exacerbates congestion at terminals, putting maritime logistics and connectivity, as well as maritime safety and security, at risk. The International Maritime Organization has called for safe maritime corridors, and the International Transport Forum has made a call for action to unblock trade routes and seaports in the Black Sea for international trade to resume. The United Nations is attempting to open a protected shipping lane in the Black Sea, avoiding an international food crisis. Meanwhile, Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gabrielius Landsbergis, proposed establishing a non-military international maritime coalition to break through the blockade of Ukrainian ports.

EU action

In response, the EU has adopted multiple sanctions against Russia. Companies targeted by EU sanctions include Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port and the United Shipbuilding Corporation. The fifth EU sanctions package includes a ban on Russian-flagged vessels entering EU ports. Exemptions apply, for example for medical, food, energy, and humanitarian purposes. The European Council conclusions on the sixth sanctions package envisage a ban – with EU leaders having agreed on a partial ban – on most Russian oil imports (crude oil and petroleum products) arriving in the EU by sea by the end of 2022. This amounts to around two-thirds of imports from Russia, reaching up to 90 % by the end of the year. EU operators will be banned from insuring and financing oil transport services, in particular through maritime routes, to third countries, after a six-month wind-down. This will mainly concern insurance companies from the EU and the United Kingdom. EU ports are facing the need to apply EU sanctions from the fifth and sixth packages against Russian-linked vessels. The situation could affect the forthcoming review of European maritime safety rules, not least regarding port state control, and the TEN-T review for improving connectivity with, inter alia, Ukraine. Russia has been suspended, until further notice from the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on port state control, which includes ports of 22 EU Member States. The European Sea Ports Organisation stressed that Europe’s ports are crucial in keeping supply chains operational and setting up new alternative routes for Ukrainian exports. Ports are pivotal in safeguarding energy supplies and reducing energy-dependence from Russia. The European Parliament has welcomed, in particular, the third pillar of the fifth package of sanctions, calling on the EU to further tighten sanctions against the Russian maritime sector and to refuse entry to EU ports for ships that have docked in Russia on their way to the EU. In this respect, Parliament proposed that the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) could play a role in providing a list of Russian vessels to be banned from EU ports, taking into account those that have re-flagged or re-registered since February 2022. EMSA could provide guidance on the uniform application of sanctions, while maintaining a level playing field for EU ports. EMSA is also conducting flights over the Black Sea to enhance maritime surveillance. Parliament has also asked to refuse calls at EU ports to all ships, irrespective of who owns or operates them, if they also call at Russian ports along their route. It has welcomed the decision of several of the world’s largest shipping companies based in Europe to halt all cargo bookings to and from Russia. Ships wanting to make an EU port call will not be allowed to bunker fuel in Russian ports or from Russian bunkering ships at sea. To avoid further supply chain delays, governments should ensure sufficient staff and resources are available for these measures. A parliamentary question has also expressed concern over the impact of international shipping, logistics, supply chains, and fuel prices, in particular on freight rates in the maritime sector. The EU’s plan for solidarity lanes as alternative logistics corridors, by road, rail and water, to export agricultural goods (e.g. grain, maize) from Ukraine, aims inter alia to unblock 20 million tons of foods in Odesa. The Commission presented its action plan to the TRAN committee in June. Its aim: to redirect 3 million tons of grain a month through new modal routes, such as the Danube, Constanta (Romania), and Polish, Baltic and Adriatic ports. According to the Commission, around 6 million tons have been exported up to now. Most recently, the EU has signed a truck deal with Ukraine and Moldova, to shift cargo from sea to road. This would sustain export flows and allow Ukraine to import necessary goods. At the June 2022 European Council meeting, Ukraine and Moldova, as Black Sea states, were granted EU candidate country status.

Outlook

With the Sea of Azov fully blocked by Russia – and Black Sea ports, including Odesa, not being operational for an indefinite period – Ukraine, the EU and UN are taking action to redirect trade flows and goods away from Ukrainian ports. Increasing the capacity of the Sulina channel connecting the Danube River with the Black Sea could be one option that would permit additional exports. Alternative transit through Danube Maritime Cluster ports could cover a part of global transport needs. Connections need to be made with ports such as Constanta, visited recently by the TRAN committee, and Varna (Bulgaria). Meanwhile, Turkey has forbidden access of all naval ships through its territorial waters, based on the Montreux Convention, and Ukraine has recently asked Turkey to take action over a Russian-flagged cargo ship carrying grain from Berdyansk port in the Sea of Azov. Bunker fuel prices have risen worldwide, over which Parliament has already expressed its concern. According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the war in Ukraine is hindering trade and maritime logistics, in particular in the Black Sea region, leading to more global vessel demand and higher costs of shipping globally (see Figure 1). The war and the pandemic have affected global shipping costs. Disruptions in logistics and port operations, the destruction of infrastructure, and trade restrictions have increased marine insurance costs and fuel prices. Shipping distances have increased, along with transit times and therefore costs.

Rising shipping prices (daily vessel earnings, in US$/day)

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Maritime logistics and connectivity‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The thirty NATO member states agreed on 29 June to invite Finland and Sweden to join the Western military alliance, accepting the Nordic countries’ accession bids, which came after Russia launched its war on Ukraine nearly five months ago. The June NATO Summit in Madrid also endorsed a new Strategic Concept and branded the Russian Federation as ‘the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area’. NATO also agreed to boost significantly its defence capabilities and offer more support for Ukraine.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the NATO Summit and on European defence.

Summit speed read: How the G7 and NATO pushed back on Putin
Atlantic Council, July 2022

The triumphs and question marks from this week’s NATO summit
Atlantic Council, July 2022

Scowcroft strategy scorecard: NATO’s Strategic Concept clear on threats, but will require sustained commitment from Alliance
Atlantic Council, July 2022

Americans’ preparedness to pay a price for supporting Ukraine remains robust
Brookings Institution, July 2022

La Boussole stratégique de l’UE répond-elle aux énigmes existentielles de la défense européenne?
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, July 2022

NATO after Madrid: How much deterrence and defence on the eastern flank?
Centre for Eastern Studies, July 2022

Why Sweden and Finland joining NATO makes perfect sense
Heritage Foundation, July 2022

NATO’s new Strategic Concept: Novelties and priorities
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2022

Russia on NATO Enlargement to Sweden and Finland
Polish Institute of International Affairs, June 2022

It’s the national security, stupid
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2022

Explaining Turkish foreign policy moves in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2022

Our experts decipher NATO’s new Strategic Concept
Atlantic Council, June 2022

Blinken: NATO is ‘more united, more focused’ after historic summit
Atlantic Council, June 2022

NATO priorities: Initial lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war
Atlantic Council, June 2022

What Turkey won with its NATO leverage
Atlantic Council, June 2022

European security after NATO’s Madrid summit
Brookings Institution, June 2022

Strategic responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense
Brookings Institution, June 2022

Strengthening the US and NATO defense postures in Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Brookings Institution, June 2022

America’s real deterrence problem
Brookings Institution, June 2022

NATO and the EU’s strength lies in their unity
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

NATO and the EU need a strategy for Eastern Europe
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

Is Europe serious about defense?
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

NATO 2030: Towards a new strategy
Centre for Eastern Studies, June 2022

NATO must now transform old missions into new strategy
Chatham House, June 2022

NATO knows Asia is vital to protecting global security
Chatham House, June 2022

NATO must prioritize climate change as a security issue
Chatham House, June 2022

NATO countries signal resolve at summit: What does it mean for Russia?
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

How NATO will change if Finland and Sweden become members
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

The G7, NATO, and the future of the West
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

Sweden and Finland steering towards NATO, absent anchorage in Ankara
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, June 2022

NATO: Addressing the alliance’s southern flank, keeping an eye on the geopolitical ball
Friends of Europe, June 2022

Why America won’t turn to isolationism
German Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

Moving towards coherence NATO policy on Artificial Intelligence and innovation
Globsec, June 2022

NATO summit Madrid: Reinforcing deterrence at this crucial time is in the U.S. national interest
Heritage Foundation, June 2022

Will Switzerland move closer to NATO?
Heritage Foundation, June 2022

NATO southern flank matters more than ever, but who will fix it?
Heritage Foundation, June 2022

OTAN: les enjeux du Sommet de Madrid
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, June 2022

L’OTAN: transformation et plasticité
Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire, June 2022

Russia’s war in Ukraine: Large-scale war and NATO
International Centre for Defence and Security, June 2022

The new NATO Strategic Concept and the end of arms control
International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2022

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Change, continuity and implications
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, June 2022

Operationalizing cyberspace as a military domain: Lesson for NATO
Rand Corporation, June 2022

Rethinking nuclear deterrence: A European perspective
Brussels School of Governance May 2022

NATO, the EU and the return of collective defence
Brussels School of Governance May 2022

Spain and NATO: 40 years
Fundacion Real Instituto Elcano, May 2022

Fostering NATO expansion and enlargement
German Marshall Fund May 2022

Read this briefing on ‘NATO and European defence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

Semiconductors (or chips) are the engines of the digital transition. Their production relies on complex and vulnerable global supply chains. Against the backdrop of global chip shortages, of a global ‘subsidy race’ in the world’s main producing regions, and of a renewed EU industrial policy, in February 2022 the Commission presented a proposal for an EU chips act aimed at reinforcing the whole EU chips value chain. The chips act is based on a three-pillar structure: pillar 1 aims to bolster large-scale technological capacity building and innovation in the EU chips ecosystem, improving the transition ‘from lab to fab’; pillar 2 focuses on improving the EU’s security of supply, by attracting investment and enhancing production capacities in the EU; pillar 3 aims to set up a monitoring and crisis response mechanism. In the event of supply crises, the Commission would be allowed to implement three types of emergency measures (request information from companies, request companies to accept and prioritise orders of crisis-relevant products, and carry out common purchasing on behalf of Member States). The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is responsible for the file and plans to consider its rapporteur’s draft report in autumn 2022.

Versions

• July 2022: The EU chips act: Securing Europe’s supply of semiconductors (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the Council on the transparency and targeting of political advertising Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2022) 46
8.2.2022Rapporteur:Dan Nica (S&D, Romania)2022/0032(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Eva Maydell (EPP, Bulgaria)
Bart Groothuis (Renew, the Netherlands)
Henrike Hahn (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Joëlle Mélin (ID, France)
Jessica Stegrud (ECR, Sweden)
Marc Botenga (The Left, Belgium)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report Shares in global semiconductor manufacturing capacity by geographical area (2013-2021) Global market shares in the different segments along the chips value chain Europe’s market shares in chips production for different sectors

Written by Issam Hallak (1st edition).

Both the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the EU and the UK allow a party to adopt measures in order to induce the other party to comply with a ruling delivered by an arbitral tribunal. Both agreements also allow the implementation of measures without having first to resort to the relevant dispute settlement mechanism, and the TCA provides for compensatory measures if a party has been found to have applied remedial measures that are inconsistent with the applicable provisions. The proposed legislation empowers the Commission to act by means of implementing acts for implementation and enforcement of the two agreements.

Versions

• July 2022: Rules for exercising the Union’s rights in implementing and enforcing EU UK agreements (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules for the exercise of the Union’s rights in the implementation and enforcement of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom, of the other part. Committees responsible:Foreign Affairs (AFET); International Trade (INTA); Constitutional Affairs (AFCO)COM(2022) 89
11.3.2022Rapporteurs:Danuta Maria Hübner (EPP, Poland); Seán Kelly (EPP, Ireland); Andreas Schieder (S&D, Austria)2022/0068(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:David McAllister (EPP, Germany); Pedro Silva Pereira (S&D, Portugal); Charles Goerens (Renew, Luxembourg); Nathalie Loiseau (Renew, France); Francois Alfonsi (Greens, France); Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield (Greens, France); Anna Fotyga (ECR, Poland); Helmut Scholz (The Left, Germany); Idoia Villanueva-Ruiz (The Left, Spain)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Vitalba Crivello and Tobias Hoffmann.

Since its launch in November 2020, the New European Bauhaus (NEB) project has brought a new cultural and creative dimension to the European Green Deal. To be successful, this ambitious project will have to go beyond its initial intentions, to embrace not only the world of architecture but also the entire creative sector. This is what emerges from the report on ‘The Green Deal ambition: Technology, creativity and the arts for environmental sustainability’, and from the workshop ‘Combining technology with cultural heritage and creativity: The way forward for the New European Bauhaus project’, organised on 13 June 2022, by the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA).

When launched by President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen two years ago, the NEB promised to be a creative and interdisciplinary movement shaping a new image of European cities and suburbs, with the aim of making them more sustainable, resilient, and inclusive. A project of social, environmental, and economic innovation, the NEB intends create a better future by bridging the worlds of science, technology, and the arts.

A qualitative assessment of the NEB project: the STOA study

In 2021, the STOA Panel commissioned a study on the NEB from environmental journalist and geographer Emanuele Bompan, editor-in-chief of the circular economy magazine ‘Renewable Matter’, and science journalist Elisabetta Tola, CEO of ‘Formicablu’ and founder of ‘Facta.eu’. The study represents a qualitative assessment of the NEB policies adopted so far by the European Commission, and a workshop to present its findings took place at the European Parliament the day after the NEB 2022 Festival.

The research paper combines potential solutions, inspired by recent scientific research papers and reports, with fresh ideas, contributions and perspectives from a selected group of European players, each with expertise in culture, art, architecture, design, and circular economy. The data collected speaks clearly: the European cultural industry is clamouring for full creative sector involvement – from design to new materials, from fashion to digital arts, and from cultural heritage to new technologies.

According to the study’s authors, the eco-systemic transformation of Europe called for by the New European Bauhaus ultimately requires new words and new ideas. It needs innovative communication models, new analysis patterns, and public involvement. All this should be detached from traditional business models. The authors find that those currently adopted, even in the financing schemes launched by the European Commission, are actually standardised and based more on the usual indicators and metrics than on the actual data provided by the territory and are therefore inadequate to deal with the diversity of places and of cultures.

A better definition of the NEB project

The report advocates a more innovative and radical strengthening of the NEB project, noted Emanuele Bompan, who presented the main findings of the study during the first part of the workshop. This could start by building scenarios and sharing models, looking for implementing solutions that continue the co-design process initiated in 2021 by the European Commission, and making the discussion as broad as possible.

‘An important cultural process is needed to support the ecological transition. A process that arises from below, from the territories, and that has the economic support of the European Union’, he explained. ‘This study tells us that, while it is necessary to define and lay down practical projects, there is also a need for extensive cultural work on a new imagination of the inhabited world, of Europe, and of the ecological transition.‘

Two of the experts who contributed to the paper, Gloria Benedikt, scientist and artist, and Piero Pelizzaro, International Relations Director of the City of Bologna, joined the roundtable, pointed out some action to be taken.

Artists should be employed to foster the cultural shift that is a prerequisite for behavioural change. In the future, support should be given to new experimental programmes where the strategy itself is designed by technologists, researchers, artists and decision makers in a truly integrated process.

Gloria Benedikt summarised this goal as: ‘Translating knowledge into understanding is where artists can come in’, ‘to help citizens to internalise the ecological transition and to reinforce green ethics, inspiring them in their deepest self’.

Support should also be given to large and smaller cultural institutions with a strong NEB mission and a clear track record of activity, making deep connections between the creative and cultural industries and science and green and circular economy enterprises.

Piero Pelizzaro, pointed out that ‘the European Union institutions produce a considerable amount of “guidance” with a limited impact, and a more bottom-up approach could perhaps be more successful and make a real difference’. Examples in the spirit of the NEB already exist, such as the collaboration between Leipzig digital performing arts and the Bologna supercomputer centre.

Involve citizens in making the NEB a success

To provide an ‘external point of view’, two experts who did not take part in the study were also invited to the presentation: Ilona Puskas, Lead of citizen engagement activities, European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) Climate-Knowledge Information Centre (KIC), and Michal Gorzynski, Head of Section Impact (EIT) shared their thoughts about the NEB. They discussed the study’s emphasis on the need for action on more decentralised territories and cultural centres. Many of the study’s respondents agreed on the risk related to an excessively centralised approach, notably that it would not create a sufficiently deep sharing of Green Deal values throughout the EU, especially in light of the global crisis and the new ‘Fit for 55’ plan.

Ilona Puskas, highlighted that if ‘the NEB [would want] to reach its goals, we need to be more open minded and welcome experimental approaches when interacting with artists, as the scientific method might not be the right one’. ‘Art represents a source for a result and should not be merely illustrative. Funding should be more accessible, but there are still many blocking elements, such as pre-defined goals, that affect new initiatives’.

The EIT has been involved in the NEB project since its launch, and as Michal Gorzynski noted, ‘What NEB means today will not mean NEB in two years’ – ‘the project should be designed by citizens and for citizens’. According to Gorzynski, citizen involvement, as clients of what the NEB has to offer, is currently lacking. Additionally, he feels the regional level is critical, as NEB means different things in different EU regions, and requires greater focus. ‘Industry, and innovators, should also be brought in, and work hand in hand with artists and scientists’.

Christian Ehler, (EPP, Germany) STOA Chair, closed the workshop, focusing on the role of citizens as key players and clients of the NEB project, and on the need to address the final beneficiaries of the project. ‘For the NEB to work, it has to be attractive for citizens. Most of the time citizens are addressed as consumers, not as citizens. And as consumers, people are addressed in a very modern and versatile way, with their attention attracted by visuals and art support’.

According to Christian Ehler, ‘The NEB should look at the consumer market, and efforts should be made to integrate marketing strategies because citizens are used to them’. Mr Ehler concluded that, sustainability needs to meet aesthetics, which brings us to what was at the core of the old Bauhaus, where form followed function. ‘And function is that we need to save the world and behave in an environmentally sound way. You cannot drive a society out of a dystopia. You need to create a utopia’.

NEB Video

The new European Bauhaus: a better future together

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp.

Nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to humanity. Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons in the context of its war on Ukraine has been a stark reminder that this threat is real. At present, nine states are known to have military nuclear programmes. Over recent years, tensions among nuclear-armed states have increased, leading to ‘outright strategic rivalry and competition’ among several of them. Moreover, experts are concerned that the ‘fabric of international institutions, treaties, and norms that has historically contributed to predictable and more stable relationships among nuclear-armed States is deteriorating’. Experts also point to technological developments that heighten uncertainties and unpredictability in the strategic relationships among nuclear-armed states. In January 2021, the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set the doomsday clock to 100 seconds to midnight and warned that the world is ‘sleepwalking its way through a newly unstable nuclear landscape’.

In 1968, the five states that possessed nuclear weapons at the time signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), intended to lead to the eventual abolition of all nuclear weapons and control their proliferation. However, rather than fulfilling the pledge to disarm that they made when they signed the NPT, nuclear weapon states are investing massive sums in more modern nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Moreover, an additional four states have acquired nuclear weapons since the NPT came into force in 1970, and a fifth, Iran, is getting dangerously close to building its own nuclear bomb. The Tenth NPT Review Conference, scheduled to take place in New York from 1‑26 August 2022, will review progress on the implementation of the treaty. The conference is taking place at a time of fundamental divides between NPT member states over key aspects of the treaty. Moreover, Russia’s invasion of a non-nuclear weapon state and its reckless nuclear rhetoric pose particular challenges for the disarmament and non-proliferation objectives of the NPT. The EU remains fully committed to the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and recently called on all parties to work towards a positive and substantive outcome of the conference.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Tenth NPT review conference: Nuclear weapons threat at an all-time high‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Philip Boucher.

A recently published Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study examines different models of data governance practiced in various contexts in Europe and around the world, and their potential contribution to European digital strategies.

The dominant approach to data governance in Europe embraces data as an asset and promotes its appropriation by and through a range of artificial intelligence (AI) applications. This approach can create imbalances between users and platforms in terms of access to the data, control over its use, and the distribution of costs, benefits and risks. However, alternative models of data governance are possible and, indeed, practiced in various contexts in Europe and around the world.

A new STOA study identifies several different data governance models and examines them from a data justice perspective. The authors propose an assessment framework with four benchmarks for ‘good governance’: preserving and strengthening public infrastructures and public goods, inclusiveness, contestability and accountability, and global responsibility. They assess each model through this lens and explore their potential contribution to EU digital policy before articulating a range of policy options.

The authors highlight the following five key messages of their work:

1. Defining the potential for data as a public good

The authors argue that the EU still has work to do in conceptualising what kind of public good data should be. They find that the legal framework under construction articulates an aim of creating value from data for both public and private purposes, yet the mechanisms for arbitrating between these aims are considered unclear, and the balancing of public and private interests is found to vary across legislative instruments.

• Adopting a constitutional lens for data governance

The study shows how the existing regulatory framework in the EU for data governance runs the risk of becoming fragmented. While the focus on building digital markets is coherent in itself, the different instruments involved may create disjunctures in how technological harms are conceptualised, and can limit the equitable distribution of power both in terms of accessing and using data, and in making claims and seeking redress where necessary. The authors argue that approaching data governance through a constitutional lens – an overarching set of aims regarding rights and the equitable distribution of power – could help provide coherence.

• Developing the role of societal groups in decision-making

The authors argue that AI and data governance should centre collective will and decision-making around societal groups, and that plural thinking and input on digital infrastructures is required to support and build resilient public goods within the EU. They find that the current thinking on AI governance leaves civil society too exposed to exploitation and rights violations, and that paths to civil society power over AI’s development and deployment remain underexplored.

• Articulating clear aims for data governance tools

Current trends in data governance involve the development of different tools such as data trusts, various forms of cooperatives and commons, and stewardship processes. The authors argue that these only become relevant in relation to particular goals, and may be misused where the overarching normative goals are not clearly articulated and enforced.

• Democratising oversight and enforcement

The authors suggest that democratising the process of oversight and enforcement with regard to data and AI could help ensure that they can respond to social concerns. As powerful technologies are increasingly used in public contexts, it is increasingly necessary to ensure that oversight and enforcement structures have public-facing components, can demonstrate democratic accountability, and are more representative of society.

Read the full report and STOA options brief to find out more. The study will be presented by its authors to the STOA Panel at its meeting on 15 September 2022. A video of the presentation can be streamed via the Parliament’s Multimedia Centre.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Philip Boucher.

Recent events have increased concerns about a potential fragmentation of the internet into a multitude of disconnected ‘splinternets’. A new Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study examines this phenomenon and sets out four broad scenarios of policy approaches for the European Union (EU) to respond to the issue.

The noun ‘internet’ is most often used in the singular rather than plural form. However, access restrictions and automated customisation for individuals and groups have resulted in substantial divergences in the specific internet content and services that are available to users. Already a decade ago, the Economist referred to these divergences as the ‘balkanisation’ or ‘splintering’ of the internet along geographical and commercial fault-lines. This process can lead to the emergence of a landscape of distinct and autonomous ‘internets’.

This new STOA study explores the phenomenon in the context of EU digital policy. It draws from several interviews and an online workshop conducted by the authors with a range of key experts and stakeholders including institutional representatives, academics, technical experts (from civil society and the private sector), and associations supporting online civil liberties.

The study highlights that that, while the internet can provide the experience of a seamless, open, united and interconnected online public sphere, it is in fact a collection of fragmented networks. It identified several technological, political and commercial factors that can disrupt the experience of seamlessness, with users ‘enclosed’ into technological walled gardens and the emergence of splinternets that can no longer interact with other networks.

Turning to the EU legislative agenda, the authors suggest that it can be seen simultaneously as a driver for positive opportunities and catalyser for the worsening of the very same threats. The EU has repeatedly committed to promote the development of a single, open, neutral, free, secure and un-fragmented network, while adopting a more strategic approach to the process of making internet standards and protocols. As a result, some elements of the EU approach may negatively affect connectivity, for example in the name of digital sovereignty; while others are supportive of an open and universal internet, such as those promoting digital markets, network neutrality, interoperability and data portability. The authors suggest that these apparent inconsistencies may be explained in part by the issue of internet fragmentation being in the early stages of political problematisation.

The study concludes with the identification and assessment of four broad scenarios for EU policy approaches:

• Maintaining the status quo. This scenario is based on the assumption that the internet and the digital market are structured in a way that prevents fragmentation. Internet governance would remain essentially a multi-stakeholder process, and the EU would rarely intervene directly in matters related to standards.
• Embracing fragmentation. This scenario may be based on the premise that fragmentation is in the nature of the internet itself, that fragmentation can be beneficial to digital sovereignty, or that commercial walled gardens can allow companies to create well-integrated, efficient and user-friendly equipment and services.
• Consistently fighting fragmentation. Under this scenario, fragmentation is considered as something to be avoided as such. The EU would have to revise many of its current policies to avoid any fragmenting effects, while ensuring it breaks certain monopolies that allow corporations to create their own walled gardens, and developing instruments to support connectivity in countries that limit internet access.
• Towards fragmentation that is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. This fourth approach is based on human rights law, and considers internet unity to be derived from certain fundamental rights, such as the freedom to access information, and asserts that any limitation to that right should be, in the words of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘necessary in a democratic society.’

These scenarios, and several associated options, are set out in the accompanying STOA options brief, and examined in greater detail in the study.

The study was presented by its authors to the STOA Panel at its meeting of 9 June 2022. A video of the presentation can be streamed via the Parliament’s Multimedia Centre.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Aleksandra Heflich and Jérôme Saulnier.

According to a recent European Parliamentary Research Service Cost of Non-Europe (CONE) report, ambitious and united European Union (EU) action in climate and energy policy could be very beneficial, bringing gains of up to 5.6 % of gross domestic product (GDP), equal to €1 trillion additional GDP per year in 2050, compared to a continuation of the status quo (see Figure 1). However, failure to arrive at a common approach, in particular by collectively addressing volatile energy prices and systemic risks emerging from EU dependency on external suppliers such as Russia, could result in the EU missing out on some, or the entirety, of these potential benefits.

In this briefing we confirm that the EU has a key role to play to attenuate and eliminate the related risks and in making the transformation possible and successful. We also confirm that fragmentation driven by low ambition and muddling through, or even worst case scenarios of fragmentation, would result in relatively high negative impacts.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Towards carbon neutrality through ambitious transformation of the EU energy system‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Cost of Non-Europe (CONE) in energy: Net zero in 2050 – ambitious and united EU action vs the baseline – detailed results and stress testing of alternative scenarios Potential adverse environmental impact of fragmentation (land use, land-use change, and forestry are not included)

Written by Andrés García with Tobias Hoffmann.

A workshop organised by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) entitled ‘The use of animals for scientific research in Europe‘ was held on 28 June 2022. The event focused on the EU action plan to end the use of animals in scientific research and testing.

The workshop aimed to open a constructive exchange of views between leading experts in related fields to discuss whether this fast track for animal protection can also become a major obstacle to scientific progress in the EU; and, if so, how to find ways to avoid this effect while ensuring the welfare of animals used in science.

STOA Chair Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany) welcomed the speakers and set up the scene regarding EU legislation. President of the European Research Council (ERC) Maria Leptin, then delivered some introductory remarks emphasising that animal suffering must be minimized ‘in research, agriculture and everywhere’. In her view, animal suffering must be always balanced against human suffering stemming from disease.

In her opening speech Laura Gribaldo from the European Union Reference Laboratory for Alternatives to Animal Testing (EURL-ECVAM, JRC), insisted on the principle of the ‘three Rs’, i.e. Replacement, Reduction and Refinement of animal use in basic, applied and translational research. She noted that this principle is also valid for regulatory purposes and already firmly anchored in EU legislation, full replacement of animal testing being the ultimate goal.

An open discussion followed, starting with statements from a panel of experts in the different areas concerned. Meritxell Huch (Max Planck Institute of Molecular Cell Biology and Genetics, Dresden) commented on the need to implement alternative methods to animal testing whenever possible, although to gain holistic understanding of processes that occur at the level of the entire organism, animal studies are required and unavoidable. Peter Loskill (Institute for Biomedical Engineering, Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen), agreed on that idea, but also empathised that, especially for academic research, physiological models based on human tissue are also needed. In his view, this could be already achieved today and help to reduce animal testing. He pointed out that often knowledge about suitable alternatives was lacking within the research community, and called for programmes to better inform researchers. Bart Haagmans (Erasmus MC, Rotterdam) then took the floor to comment on recent developments around the Covid‑19 pandemic. Here, animal testing had been necessary for the quick development and testing of vaccines and suitable medication. He emphasised that, nevertheless and of course, the 3R principle should always be followed. Karin Forsberg Nilsson from the Department of Immunology, Genetics and Pathology at Uppsala University, highlighted the importance of animal testing in neuroscience, since no suitable alternatives are available for complex tissues such as the brain. She further pointed out that no scientist makes decisions lightly on performing animal testing and that the use of animals has been reduced to a great degree in recent decades. Ana Isabel Moura Santos from the Animal Welfare Body at the NOVA Medical School in Lisbon closed this panel, expressing her view that further development of alternative methods would be the best way to reduce animal testing, rather than regulations or legal decisions.

STOA Chair Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany) then invited the audience (both in the room and online) to put questions to the speakers. Following a broad discussion on whether the scientific community is indeed doing enough to reduce animal testing in research, Mr Ehler invited the panellists and attendees to suggest policy options involving action from the Parliament.

In her concluding remarks, ERC President Maria Leptin welcomed the discussion and the fact that politicians are willing to listen to scientists and facts. She highlighted the consensus on reducing animal testing in research and reminded the audience that products used in alternatives to animal testing often require the use of animal products.

The full recording of the event is available here.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu

Written by ESMH team.

4 days, 6 thematic sessions, 1 festival, 26 renowned speakers, 50 science journalists

These are just some figures from the European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) summer school on ‘Journalism and climate change: how to tell complex stories?’, which took place on 8‑11 June 2022 in Brussels. The event focused on the increasing challenge of climate reporting, offering an open forum for journalists to look at possible solutions and to continue doing quality science-based story-telling.

The ESMH summer school 2022

At last, after a couple of years of Covid‑19 related restrictions, the ESMH was once more able to organise its big annual event – the summer school for young science journalists. This year, the summer school was held in a hybrid format, to adapt to the new working conditions imposed by the pandemic.

The first day of the event provided the participants with an overview of the actions that the European Union (EU) is taking on climate, ranging from the EU Green Deal to selected climate-related projects funded under Horizon 2020. Session 1 highlighted not only the environmental policies of the EU institutions, but also the efforts undertaken to engage with Europeans and to promote public awareness of the climate crisis. Session 2 gave an insight into some concrete EU climate projects involving science journalists and communicators, and society more widely.

The morning of the second day (Session 3) dealt with climate topics in newsrooms. The participants engaged in an interesting debate with five experienced environmental reporters on the complexity of climate story-telling. Takeaways included: science journalists need to adapt to the changing media landscape, evolve along with scientific knowledge, and keep the public engaged with their stories while handling data. The additional big challenge is not to overwhelm the audience.

In the afternoon, Session 4 focused on the challenge of the misinformation trap on climate change and ways to tackle it.

Session 5 on day three of the event was dedicated to collaborative EU journalistic projects on climate change. It stressed the added value of what the EU can do for science journalists in terms of networking, liaising with institutions and expanding the range of information sources available.

Session 6 focused on constructive journalism and on the importance of giving positive messages about climate change to the public, so that people feel they can play an active role in solving environmental issues.

The day closed with some final remarks from Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) Chair Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany), who underlined once again the European Parliament’s engagement on the climate challenge. He also emphasised the importance of EU institutions working with the media, especially on complex topics such as climate change and academic freedom.

During the afternoon and the following day, the summer school participants attended a short presentation of the New European Bauhaus project before joining the Festival of the New European Bauhaus, organised by the European Commission.

Past and future editions of the ESMH summer school

The ESMH summer school is an annual event – the first of this kind in the European Parliament – organised with the aim of offering a learning opportunity to young media makers from EU Member States.One of the main objectives of the ESMH is to organise seminars and events for media representatives on current scientific and technological developments.

The first edition of the ESMH summer school for young journalists – labelled ‘European Youth Science-Media Days (EYSMD)’ – took place from 4 to 7 June 2019 in Strasbourg. The three-day science event for young media makers was organised with the cooperation of the European Youth Press network (EYP) and provided an overview of existing interlinks between artificial intelligence (AI) and journalism.

Unfortunately, the pandemic prevented the ESMH from organising the second edition in May 2020. However, in October 2021, ESMH participated in the EYE2021 youth conference in Strasbourg and hostedthe ‘Telling stories on climate change: has the corona crisis changed the debate’ workshop(with in-person attendance) in cooperation with the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Communication and in the context of the two-day European Generation Media Lab event. The ESMH team is already getting very positive feedback on this year’s event, both from speakers and participants. Good suggestions for new topics and further enhancements will be taken on board when organising the next edition of the summer school, possibly in 2023.

Written Maria Diaz Crego (1st edition).

Political advertising is central to influencing how people vote, and may affect citizens’ perceptions of the legitimacy of their own political system, particularly when published in the run-up to elections. Rules governing political advertising are therefore key to guaranteeing citizens’ fundamental rights and the integrity of democratic processes. So, it is not without reason that regulating political propaganda during electoral periods is one of the common focal points of electoral law. However, traditional rules on campaigning may either be ineffective or difficult to enforce in an online environment where new techniques are used to target potential voters with tailored political messages based on large amounts of personal data revealing their sensibilities and vulnerabilities.

To address the new challenges posed by online electoral campaigns, the European Commission presented a proposal that aims to build a harmonised set of rules on transparency and targeting of political advertising, and would apply to both online and offline political advertisements. The proposal is currently under discussion by the European Parliament and the Council through the ordinary legislative procedure. In the Parliament, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) is responsible for the file. The rapporteur presented his draft report to the committee on 16 June 2022.

Versions

• July 2022: Towards new rules on transparency and targeting of political advertising (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the Council on the transparency and targeting of political advertising Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2021) 731l
25.11.2021Rapporteur:Sandro Gozi (Renew, France)2021/0381(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Pablo Arias Echeverría (EPP, Spain)
Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal)
Alexandra Geese (Greens, Germany)
Virginie Joron (ID, France)
Adam Bielan (ECR, Poland)
Stelios Kouloglou (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Committee vote on the draft report

Written by Kjeld van Wieringen with Marcos Fernández Álvarez.

Critical raw materials are essential to sustain Europe’s economic and environmental ambitions. As geoeconomic aggression and geopolitical tensions rise, the EU is re-thinking its reliance on certain imports. Can the EU secure its supply of critical materials?

For many Europeans, 2020 was a year of reckoning. When Covid-19 emerged in China, global supply chains were immediately affected in a negative way. When governments and businesses raced to buy medical equipment, they faced skyrocketing demand and market shortages. Many states imposed export restrictions, and shortages lasted for months. Now, in 2022, supply chain disruptions are still affecting the EU, and threatening to impede its economic recovery.

Against this backdrop, the EU is re-examining its strategic supply chains. The late 20th century was marked by the globalisation of trade. In a quest for ever greater efficiency, supply chains became highly complex and globally interdependent. Now Covid-19 and rising geopolitical tensions have cast doubt on this model. Efficiency is giving way to resilience.

Critical raw materials (CRMs) – such as lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements (REEs) – are essential commodities for the EU economy. They are also key enablers of Europe’s digital, environmental, and defence ambitions. China currently produces 86 % of the world’s rare earth supply. The EU imports 93 % of its magnesium from China, 98 % of its borate from Turkey, and 85 % of its niobium from Brazil. Russia produces 40 % of the world’s palladium. The latter is a reminder of the strategic implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the need for the EU to prepare for an increasingly uncertain world.

Potential impacts and developments

CRMs combine economic importance with high supply risk. Lithium is a case in point. It is used, for examples, in batteries, which are crucial to the EU’s digital and green transitions towards e‑mobility and clean energies. EU demand for lithium could grow up to 18 times by 2030, and 60 times by 2050, but the EU mines only a small fraction of the lithium it consumes, and relies on China to process it.

REEs head the list of critical materials: a group of 17 chemical elements widely used in high technology and low-carbon products. Neodymium and praseodymium are used in permanent magnets for power generation and electric motors. Lanthanum is needed in military equipment. The average smartphone uses up to 16 REEs. Although REEs are abundant in nature, they are so dispersed that their exploitation is only profitable in few places: China dominates the world’s supply with a 60 % global market share.

The EU is particularly vulnerable to REEs supply squeezes. This is partly due to market forces: demand for neodymium and dysprosium will largely exceed production by 2030. However, the main risk stems from China’s dominance of the market. In 2010, China imposed a two-month embargo on rare-earth exports to Japan, after Japan captured a Chinese fishing boat in waters claimed by both countries. As China becomes more assertive, such actions could become common. Also in 2010, China imposed export quotas reducing exports by 40 % with the declared objective of clamping down on illegal mining and environmentally damaging practices. The WTO later deemed these quotas illegal. In the short term, the quotas caused the cost of some REEs to skyrocket by 1 000 %. Shortly after, a combination of alternative supply, governance response, and illegal trading brought prices down again.

There are other concerns. Cobalt is crucial for batteries, wind generators, and digital technologies. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) accounts for over 70 % of the global supply and China in turn owns 70 % of Congo’s mining industry. Political instability and poor governance in the DRC pose significant risks of supply disruptions. Worse still, the boom in demand is fuelling the growth of ‘artisanal mining‘: a dangerous, arduous practice that increasingly uses child labour, including by armed groups. Despite efforts by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the EU to promote due diligence, this ‘resource curse‘ could leave the Congolese people even worse off.

Anticipatory policy-making

To support effective decision making, the EU must continue to monitor both the market and geopolitical developments. There is a long history of exaggerated fears about access to CRMs. However, supply shortages are highly damaging for economies, no Western country wants to repeat the 1973 oil crisis.

The EU could promote the recycling or substitution of CRMs. Recycling reduces waste and lessens the environmental impacts of mining. To boost recycling, the EU could tighten its regulations, promote ‘circular by design’ manufacturing, and fund research and development. CRMs can often only be substituted by other CRMs, but product for product substitution is sometimes an option. For example, hydrogen propulsion requires fewer CRMs than electric (lithium) batteries. Currently, the EU lacks an economy-wide substitution strategy. This could be articulated through the new European Raw Materials Alliance, the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the European Research Council.

For all that, the EU will still rely on mining to meet its needs. Certain CRMs can be mined in the EU, and some EU neighbours hold significant CRM deposits. The EU could support mining and processing sites in its territory through EIB investment and subsidies. This would mirror the US, which is supporting the reopening of its REEs mine at Mountain Pass (California). Yet the Mountain Pass case shows these exploitations are rarely competitive against foreign firms, and the EU could pay dearly for reducing its CRM dependency. Paradoxically, CRMs are needed for the green transition, but mining and processing them is notoriously polluting. However, effective restoration can greatly reduce damage to the local environment and tilt the balance in favour of reshoring mining. The EU has much tighter environmental regulations than other states, and importing large amounts of CRMs only externalises the environmental impact.

The EU must itself define the extent of its ‘open strategic autonomy‘ ambitions. Complete self-sufficiency, comparable to the post-war agricultural objectives may sound appealing in the light of Europe’s history of reliance on oil and gas imports. However, this would be highly expensive and not all CRMs are present on EU soil. Rather, the EU could combine partial CRM reshoring with diversification and risk management. Following the 2010 crisis, Japan pursued ambitious partnerships and investments in third countries, and is now much less reliant on China for REEs. The US is still at 80 % dependency, while the EU continues to import an unmatched 98 % of its rare earths from China. As many of the EU’s closest allies, including the UK, share its concerns regarding CRMs, the EU could follow Japan’s example and start diversifying its supply chains.

The EU may also opt to invest in environmentally sustainable and socially responsible rare earth mining projects in Africa and elsewhere, as part of its new Global Gateway strategy. At the same time, the EU could gain international leverage by reinforcing its strengths – rather than focusing on sectors where it is non-competitive. This could also help defuse geopolitical tension; in the words of Montesquieu: ‘The natural effect of trade is to bring about peace’. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought this paradigm into question. When the EU and its partners responded to Russian aggression with unprecedented sanctions, the rouble plunged, foreign-listed stocks of Russian companies plummeted, and the Russian economy was put on a path towards deep recession. In a world where direct military action could lead to nuclear confrontation, economic leverage and deterrence including in the field of CRMs, will still be a crucial instrument of foreign and security policy. Here, the EU’s new economic reciprocity toolbox, including the upcoming anti-coercion instrument, could soon come into play.

Read this at a glance on ‘Securing the EU’s supply of critical raw materials‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Kjeld van Wieringen with Julia Hüntemann.

In 2022, most global renewable power growth will consist of photovoltaic (PV) solar energy. In its 2021 industrial strategy, the European Commission acknowledged the need for a more strategic approach to renewable energies. As Member States seek to diversify away from Russian fossil fuels following the invasion of Ukraine, they should avoid exacerbating dependencies on solar panels manufactured in China.

Europe’s solar dependency on China

By 2008, China emerged as the dominant producer of solar PV panels. By 2012, it accounted for 64 % of worldwide production and, as of 2017, eight of the top 10 solar manufacturers were Chinese, supplying approximately three quarters of global solar PV panels. What enabled this unprecedented surge, at least to some extent, was a 75 % decline in production costs among China’s PV manufacturers. The swift price decrease, prompted by cost reductions in combination with alleged state subsidies, allowed Chinese PV manufacturers to outcompete their European and North American counterparts, driving them into bankruptcy. In addition, China has come to dominate the supply of polysilicon, mostly sourced in Xinjiang, which is a critical building block of silicon-based PV panels, with a global production share of 66 % in 2019.

However, China has not always dominated the solar PV supply chain, and Europe had been the frontrunner in the ‘solar revolution’. In 2007, 30 % of PV manufacturing was still located in Europe. In an attempt to protect the industry, the European Commission, in 2013, proposed a phased anti-dumping tariff on solar PV panels imported from China. In a nine-month investigation launched in September 2012, the Commission found that Chinese companies were selling solar panels to Europe at nearly half their normal market value and were receiving illegal subsidies. Proposing duties up to 64.9 %, the Commission’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation was valued at more than €20 billion and became the largest EU-China trade dispute so far. The measures were aborted following Chinese threats to retaliate with tariffs on French wine and German cars.

Currently, Europe holds less than 0.2 % of global PV panel production capacities. The upcoming anti-coercion instrument will seek to better shield EU policy mechanisms from such external pressure, and could help avoid the undermining of protection measures against unfair foreign industrial practices in the future.

Europe’s solar conundrum

In Europe and elsewhere, solar installation companies have over time come to rely on cheap equipment imported from China, and other Asian countries, including South-Korea Malaysia and Vietnam. Without such cheap equipment, solar PV installations – and therefore the implementation of green transition plans – could not advance at the pace they have. However, the Covid-19 crisis has shown that the EU is vulnerable to disruptions of international value chains. The war in Ukraine is another harsh reminder that energy and geopolitics are inseparable. A decade after the EU failed to protect its solar manufacturing industry from Chinese dumping and subsidies, global dependence on Chinese solar equipment has belatedly become a cause for concern.

A larger European PV manufacturing industry has the potential to provide lucrative employment and advance technological leadership. More importantly, in-house PV manufacturing would make the solar sector a source of energy security, allowing the EU to cut the unwanted dependencies that accompany imported oil and gas, particularly from Russia in the face of the ongoing aggression against Ukraine. With Europe importing 80 % of its solar panels from China, dependencies would merely shift from imported oil or gas to imported solar equipment, leaving much to be desired when it comes to the solar sector as a genuine source of energy security and strategic autonomy.

A letter signed by ministers from Austria, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain called on the European Commission to consider solar PV to be a strategic value chain and provide it with more support under Covid‑19 recovery packages. On the same basis, various stakeholders have urged the EU to reinforce European solar energy capacities. In May 2020, 90 organisations from the European solar sector also urged for solar PV manufacturing and research and development (R&D) to be at the core of the Green Deal. As part of the REPowerEU initiative, the Commission proposed a solar strategy that doubles solar PV capacity by 2025 and installs 600 gigawatts by 2030. Coupled with a proposed solar rooftop initiative – a legal obligation to install solar panels on all new public and commercial buildings after 2025 and residential buildings after 2029 – the demand for solar panels will inevitably shoot up.

With pleas to re-shore PV manufacturing capacities to Europe, the question remains how the Commission will go about providing its domestic manufacturers with a competitive business environment without igniting another round of solar trade disputes. This will require the navigation of domestic and international pressures and finding the right balance between the green transition and reinforcing Europe’s supply chain and energy security. Moreover, with energy prices rising steeply, the affordability of solar energy from European manufacturers is an additional challenge for the EU’s energy policy. The US’s pending decision on solar-energy tariffs that pits its goal of combating climate change against its ambition to wrestle high tech manufacturing supply chains from China vividly illustrates this dilemma. As in the US, how to promote EU- manufactured solar panels while keeping the green transition affordable is a real conundrum.

Increasing the EU’s capacity to act on solar energy

The Parliament and Commission could mitigate Europe’s solar dependence on China in the following ways:

1. Monitoring the supply chain: The new industrial strategy for Europe, adopted in March 2020, and updated again in 2021, announced the creation of an Industrial Forum, which supports the Commission in its analysis of industrial ecosystems and their capacity in supporting the twin digital and green transitions. Task Force 3 focuses on analysing strategic dependencies, and the Parliamentary committees responsible for industry (ITRE) and international trade (INTA) could invite them to present in-depth results. Their work could help in identifying energy partnerships with countries that share compatible production capabilities and quality standards; the US, Taiwan, Malaysia, India and Japan provide cases worth examining. Parliament legislators could support the announcement by the Commission of a legislative proposal (as part of REPowerEU) that intensifies work on the supply of raw materials critical to the production of solar panels.

2. Steer strategic discussions on the trade-off between strategic autonomy and the Green Deal: Regular exchanges of views could be held between the Parliament and relevant Commissioners to discuss the trade-off between ensuring a more autonomous supply of renewable energy technologies and the Green Deal‘s dependence on cheap solar equipment imported from China and silicon inputs from Xinjiang. The Commission would ideally take a clear stance in this trade-off, to avoid creating unclear signals for investors.

3. Encourage access to international investors and R&D institutes: At European level, PV manufacturing companies have already joined forces with Europe’s leading R&D institutes to develop state-of-the-art solar technologies. Now, the EU needs to ensure that European PV manufacturers also have access to international R&D institutes as well as investors. Here, the International Solar Alliance, spearheaded by India and France, could be extremely important in advancing technology transfer, and finding appropriate funding sources for R&D in addition to multiannual financial framework instruments such as Horizon Europe. It will be hard for PV manufacturing companies in the EU or elsewhere to catch up with China in this generation of solar PV technologies (i.e. crystalline silicon PV, accounting for 90 % of all installed solar panels globally). However, European, Japanese and US companies are still on a relatively equal footing with China for R&D in next generation solar technologies, including perovskite and organic PV. Oxford Photovoltaics, for instance, set a record conversion efficiency by combining perovskite with conventional silicon. Given that these solar technologies are largely still in the ‘lab’ stage, scope remains for European companies to enter the market. To make solar a source of EU energy security, Europe should swiftly commercialise them.

Read this at a glance on ‘The 2022 G7 Summit: Against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The war in Ukraine was again an important point on the agenda of the July 2022 plenary session, with Members debating the conclusions of the European Council meeting that took place on 23‑24 June 2022, as well as a long list of Council and Commission statements, including on facilitating exports of Ukrainian agricultural products, and on relations of the Russian government and diplomatic network with extremist, populist, anti-European and other European political parties. Parliament also debated statements on the Czech Presidency’s programme of activities for the next six months, and a ‘This is Europe’ debate was held with the Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsokakis. Members addressed European Union initiatives to address inflation, implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, and taxing energy companies’ windfall profits. Members rejected a motion to oppose the inclusion of nuclear and gas as environmentally sustainable economic activities in the EU taxonomy. A debate on the activities of the European Investment Bank took place in the presence of its President, Werner Hoyer. Members also considered the consequences of the recent heat waves and drought in the EU. Looking further afield, Members debated the United Kingdom’s unilateral introduction of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill and respect of international law, and the United States Supreme Court decision to overturn abortion rights. Debates took place on the treatment of refugees at the Spanish-Moroccan border, and on the post-Cotonou Agreement. Finally, Members debated and voted on a number of legislative files.

Digital single market

Parliament approved two important legislative proposals – the digital markets act and the digital services act – following a political agreement reached between the co-legislators. The digital markets act is the EU’s answer to tackling the dominance of a few large platforms that act as gatekeepers, controlling access to digital markets, and distorting competition. Through its three main provisions, the legislation should provide a definition of a large platform, will oblige them to ensure their services are interoperable, and will ban them from giving preference to their own products in search results or re-using personal data. The European Commission will enforce the law, with the possibility to levy fines of up to 20 % of a firm’s worldwide turnover. The new digital services act should boost consumer protection through rules promoting a safer and more transparent online environment. Parliament has ensured that the new law makes the platforms hosting online search engines, social media and marketplace platforms responsible for protecting users against harmful and illegal content. Platforms will also be obliged to be more transparent and accountable, with larger platforms subject to stricter rules. The European Commission will share enforcement with national authorities, according to the size of the platform concerned.

ReFuelEU aviation initiative

Returning to the ‘Fit for 55’ package aimed at cutting EU emissions, Members adopted Parliament’s position on the RefuelEU aviation initiative. While the initiative seeks to increase availability of sustainable aviation fuels at EU airports, a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report sought to widen the scope, proposing that more sustainable fuels are made available at more airports and for more aircraft. The decision supports a wider definition of renewable fuel, to include electricity, hydrogen and even used cooking oil, while excluding unsustainable food and feed crop-based fuel, such as palm oil, and encouraging further research into alternatives.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Crisis measures in the fisheries and aquaculture sector

In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Members approved an agreement reached between the co‑legislators on additional crisis support for the EU fishery and aquaculture sectors. Given the urgency to act, Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) had swiftly approved and tabled a report on the proposal to provide support for the seafood sector (which is hard-hit by rising fuel prices and trade disruption), by using amounts left over from the 2014‑2020 budget.

Croatia’s adoption of the euro on 1 January 2023

Members overwhelmingly adopted a Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report on Croatia’s pathway to its adoption of the euro, which is expected to take place on 1 January 2023. Concurring with European Commission and European Central Bank assessments that price stability, fiscal sustainability, exchange rate fluctuations and long-term interest rates in the country prove that Croatia is ready to adopt the euro, Parliament’s opinion will now be forwarded to the Council, which is expected to give the final green light on Croatia adopting the euro later in July.

2021 Reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia

Members approved Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee reports on the Commission’s 2021 assessment of accession prospects for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo. The AFET report on Bosnia and Herzegovina underlined the pressing need for a broader strategic and security approach to the Western Balkans, calling for elections and electoral reform to go ahead in the country as planned. Parliament voted in favour of granting Kosovo’s citizens access to the EU visa-free travel scheme. However, the AFET report on Kosovo‘s intention to apply for EU membership in 2022 stressed that, as for other new applicants, there is no fast-track procedure. While judicial independence and reform is one issue to resolve before Kosovo can advance its European ambitions, another is the normalisation of relations with Serbia. While the committee reconfirmed unequivocal support for the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, Members noted that the AFET report on Serbia‘s progress towards accession in 2021 obviously underlines the country’s ambivalent attitude to EU policies and values and its reluctance to stand against Russia, and called for the country to align with the EU position.

Better regulation

As Parliament is committed to making EU laws and policies simpler and easier for people and businesses, Members voted a Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) report seeking to strengthen EU strategy on better law-making. Parliament insists on the need for transparency and openness, particularly as regards the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and the ‘one in, one out’ approach, whereby each new piece of legislation adopted must be accompanied by the removal of an older or outdated law. The JURI committee report also calls for children’s rights to be mainstreamed throughout EU legislation.

Question time: Increasing EU ambition on biodiversity ahead of COP15

Parliament strongly supports the current initiatives to protect and restore biodiversity in the EU, and advocates EU-wide mandatory pesticide reduction. During plenary ‘question time’, scheduled to allow closer scrutiny of the European Commission’s activities, Members questioned Commissioner Virginijus Sinkevičius on EU biodiversity protection, ahead of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the UN Convention on Biodiversity, scheduled for December 2022.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without vote, three mandates for negotiations with the Council: one from the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) Committee on the proposal for a regulation on general product safety; and two from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee, on the proposal for a regulation on the scope of eligible assets and investments, the portfolio composition and diversification requirements, rules on the borrowing of cash and other funding; and on a proposal for a regulation regarding 11 legal acts in the field of national accounts.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – July II 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Kjeld van Wieringen.

The proposed European chips act, presented by the European Commission in February 2022, aims to mobilise €43 billion in ‘policy-driven investment’ for the EU’s semiconductor sector by 2030. The Commission expects long-term private investment to exceed this. The plan serves to enable immediate EU coordination against supply disruptions, strengthen and scale up production and innovation throughout the EU semiconductor value chain, and further enhance the Union’s technological leadership, practical applications and digital sovereignty in this crucial field.

The global semiconductor value chain is characterised by chokepoints and critical dependencies, including on more advanced chips from Taiwan and South Korea, US intellectual property in chip design automation, Japanese wafers and Chinese chip assembly. Europe has strong capacities in research and equipment manufacturing, in addition to some production capacity of (less advanced) chips with larger transistors, often destined for the automotive sector, as well as (chemical) inputs.

The future effectiveness of the EU chips act could benefit from further emphasis on certain key challenges to strengthen and safeguard Europe’s position in the global chip value chain. Internally, reinforcing European chemical input and back-end manufacturing could be advanced by protecting European chemical suppliers against Chinese subsidies and by reshoring back-end facilities to Europe. Bilaterally, attracting and engaging in foreign semiconductor investment could see the use of relevant forums, partnerships and agreements, as well as relevant fast-track permits. Globally, enhancing foreign dependencies on the EU would require further reinforcement of existing European centres of excellence including in innovative research and equipment manufacturing.

The EU chips act, if provided with the right resources, could help to improve the EU’s position in the global semiconductor value chain significantly by 2030. Meanwhile, Intel’s €33 billion investment and Taiwanese interest in European chip manufacturing are also cause for optimism.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Strengthening EU chip capabilities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.