European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Etienne Bassot.

A year ago, we were assessing the European Commission’s delivery on the eve of the 2021 State of the Union address against the backdrop of a progressive return to freedom of movement following Covid‑19 lockdowns and an economic crisis, chaos in Kabul, and megafires and deadly floods in Europe. This year, we prepare our assessment against the backdrop of growing inflation and an energy crisis, a war on our continent and even more extreme weather phenomena, once again not only severely disrupting everyday life but even causing deaths. The phase of profound changes described last year has not faded: on the contrary, it continues to unfold in Europe and the rest of the world – as analysed in our study on ‘Future Shocks 2022’ (see References section) – and the situation is becoming increasingly acute for European policymakers, businesses and citizens alike.

The heart of the European project – peace, democracy, and prosperity – is being challenged, and even attacked: peace, with a war leading to major international consequences – from millions of people fleeing their bombed homes and seeking refuge abroad to new alliance outlines – at the European Union’s border; democracy, with the unjustified invasion of Ukraine and, at home, interference in our elections and our public debate; and prosperity, through the domino effects of spiralling prices, with European citizens increasingly anxious about heating their homes this winter, having endured a climate catastrophe of record high temperatures, megafires, disappearing glaciers and drought during summer 2022.

These profound changes do not render the European project obsolete – quite the opposite, they make it even more relevant. Peace is the root of the European project – peace among European nations from the ashes of the Second World War, as well as world peace, as encapsulated in the very first words of the Schuman Declaration: ‘World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it’. Democracy has been at the forefront of the European agenda these past months with the Conference on the Future of Europe coming to its conclusions in May 2022, with its final report submitted to the presidents of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, celebrated ‘this unique exercise in active citizenship, in Europe building and in future proofing our foundations’, and recalled that Europe means: ‘freedom, democracy, the rule of law, justice, solidarity, equality of opportunity’. During the same closing ceremony, President von der Leyen declared that the Commission would ‘announce the first new proposals responding to (the) report in (her) state of the Union address’, expected just after this publication comes out. Finally, prosperity, which is preconditioned by peace and democracy, is of the essence, with inflation reaching levels unseen since the creation of the euro and a growing awareness of resource scarcity, from energy to water. In this context, ever more Europeans cherish the relevance of the European project, as the latest Parlemeter shows: six in ten people make the defence of European values, such as freedom and democracy, a priority, and the fight against poverty the priority they expect the European Parliament to address. Overall, two thirds of Europeans see EU membership as a good thing.

Advancing the general interest of the Union falls to the Commission, which takes the appropriate initiatives to this end. When she took office in 2019, President von der Leyen set six policy priorities. The Commission’s first priority since then has been climate change, an area where President von der Leyen wants Europe to lead globally. On taking office, she also stated that Europe ‘needs a geopolitical Commission’, which becomes even more necessary with the ‘tectonic’ magnitude of this year’s changes. At home, the ambitions are to help the EU recover from the coronavirus crisis, to turn the EU into a digital continent, followed by aims of promoting the European way of life and a new push for European democracy, notably with the Conference on the Future of Europe.

Our analysis monitors all six of these priorities. It combines a two-page presentation of each priority and a single-page infographic (page 3) illustrating the degree of progress – both overall and under each of the six priorities.

Our assessment is that, of the over 500 initiatives foreshadowed (521), almost two thirds (62 %, 330) have already been submitted and, in the case of legislative proposals, the co-legislators have started work. It is worth noting that almost one in five of the Commission’s initiatives are non-legislative in character, such as strategies, action plans and other communications. Among the 330 initiatives, almost half (48 %) have already been adopted (160) – by the legislator in the case of legislative proposals, or simply by the Commission in the case of non-legislative initiatives – while the great majority of the remainder are either proceeding normally through the legislative process (120, or 71 %) or close to adoption (16, or 9 %). Conversely, a certain number are proceeding very slowly or are currently blocked (34, or 20 %).

These numbers reflect the state of play as the Commission will soon enter the fourth year of its five-year mandate, the last full year before the 2024 European elections, a year when the executive typically continues to come forward with new proposals, whilst the twin branches of the legislature (the European Parliament and the Council of the EU) are simultaneously fully engaged in considering and (very often) amending them. The ranking and proportionate progress have remained stable compared with the previous assessment, which is remarkable given the two major crises (the pandemic and the war in Ukraine and their multifaceted consequences) that the European Union has faced since 2020.

With a focus on each of the six policy priorities, our assessment shows how the European Commission is performing at the different stages of announcing and tabling proposals, followed by the three institutions’ progress in negotiating and finally adopting legislation. The European Green Deal ranks highest in the number of initiatives planned (125), but the executive has tabled only just over half of them (or 55 %), leading to less than a quarter being adopted by the co-legislators so far (23 %). The third priority, ‘An economy that works for people’, comes next (99), but this time with more initiatives tabled (77 %) and a third of them adopted (34 %). The digital priority totals 78 initiatives planned, 60 % of which are already submitted (47), and 18 already adopted (23 %). For ‘A stronger Europe in the world’, an area with relatively few legislative initiatives by definition, and in contrast with the majority of the Commission’s priorities, over four in five (85 %) initiatives have already been tabled (see Section 4) and three out of five adopted. A fair amount of work remains to be done for the other priorities: 40 % of the proposals remain to be submitted for ‘A Europe fit for the digital age’, 28 % for ‘Promoting our European way of life’ and 45 % for ‘A new push for democracy’ (see Sections 2, 5 and 6). This latter priority comes lowest in terms of number of initiatives announced (51).

Following the State of the Union address, the Commission will adopt its work programme, in accordance with the 2010 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Commission. It has announced its 2023 work programme will be published on 18 October 2022.

Commission delivery in 2023 will be all the more important as we approach the 2024 European elections, when citizens will watch carefully how the EU has responded to today’s challenges. Europeans will vote with these profound changes in mind, but also – in a positive note worth noting in the latest Parlemeter – with hope, a dominant feeling in more countries. For more information on how the von der Leyen Commission’s agenda is proceeding, a proposal-by-proposal assessment is available on the European Parliament’s ‘Legislative Train Schedule’ website, developed by EPRS, at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘The von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities: State of play in Autumn 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities: Legislative and non-legislative delivery to 31 August 2022

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Demographic, socio-political and economic pressures have made eating meat an unsustainable practice for the long term. However, meat substitutes have proved unpopular, owing to social norms and a lack of trust; some alternatives also contribute heavily to climate change. Could microbial protein be a sustainable alternative to meat that not only solves these multidimensional pressures but also contributes actively to reversing climate change?

The massive economic development and urbanisation seen in the past 50 years, coupled with a growing worldwide population and the emergence of protein-rich diets, such as the Atkins and Keto diets, have led to an exponential rise in meat consumption. The amount of meat consumed per capita levels has nearly doubled since 1990 and meat production has more than quadrupled since the 1960s. Globally, we consume 350 million tonnes of meat per year, most of which in Europe, Australia and North America.

However, with inflation, the costs of meat and of the cereals used to feed animals is rising, raising the spectre of food insecurity in the EU on account of the increased import price of cereal. Climate change and conflicts worldwide are leading to food insecurity, malnutrition, and protein and micronutrient deficiency. In addition, concerns are growing over animal welfare. Meat production also negatively impacts the environment, with cattle ranching and crop plantation contributing to deforestation, and increasing methane, carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide and water vapour emissions.

Several alternatives to meat have emerged in recent decades, and some are readily available in Europe’s supermarkets. The most common are soybean products. These have been met with consumer reticence, owing to their cost and an arguably unappetising taste. They have a heavy impact on the environment, contributing to roughly 20 % of tropical deforestation.

Another proposed solution is powder-form insect-based products. Such products are slowly entering the EU market and the European Commission recently approved an additional, third, insect species. However, once more, consumer perception has been cautious, possibly on account of cultural differences compared to parts of the world where such products are part of the traditional diet. In addition, the products found in supermarkets today tend to be highly processed.

Microbial protein, that is, protein biomass derived from bacteria, yeast, filamentous fungi and microscopic algae, could be a viable solution. It involves the fermentation of sugar-fed microbes in large, heated industrial bioreactors, which could alleviate dependency on agricultural land use. A recent study conducted by German researchers has estimated that replacing a fifth of meat from cattle with fungi ‘meat’ by 2050 could halve annual deforestation and related CO2 emissions.

The concept of eating microbial protein is not new. Humans have been consuming products made from fungi (beer and bread) and bacteria (yoghurt, cheese) products since the development of the first Neolithic communities. The first industrial attempt at microbial protein production was made in the 1970s with Pruteen, a protein-rich product made from methanol-oxidising bacteria and used to feed pigs. Pruteen was discontinued in 1979 because of its price and unfounded reports of allergic reactions. Quorn® is a mycoprotein-based product produced from fungi, invented in 1985 and still sold today. An Irish-led Horizon 2020 project, currently under way, is seeking to produce microbial protein from fungi fed with pasta, bread and beer residues. A few products already on the market include milk, eggs, dairy, mycelium ‘meat’ and even seafood analogues.

It seems that microbial ‘meat’ could offer a way to reverse climate change, protect animal welfare and respond to the needs of a growing world population. But do we have the technology in place? What would be the energy requirements for producing large amounts of microbial protein? Are we ready to change our consumption habits and do we trust the safety of artificially-produced meat? Is EU legislation up to date and able to adapt to animal meat substitutes?

Potential impacts and developments

By using fewer land resources for crop and animal farming, cutting deforestation and biodiversity loss, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, microbial ‘meat’ could help to reverse climate change. It would also offer a faster and more cost-effective way to ensure food security for a growing world population. In addition, it could be used as animal feed. However, mass production would require large, power-hungry generators. Therefore, it would need to be coupled with ‘green’ energy in order to be environmentally sound. Furthermore, the use of autotrophic or lithotrophic bacteria would reduce the need for sugar feed as a growth source. Bacteria can fix CO2 and methane from the atmosphere and remediate agricultural and water waste, further helping to counter climate change.

What is more, microbial ‘meat’ would be a healthier alternative to red meat. First, it would help regulate our intestinal pH, increasing the proportion of ‘good’ bacteria, which help prevent diet-related non-communicable diseases, such as tumours, cardiovascular diseases, obesity and diabetes. Second, it would be less sensitive to contamination by common foodborne bacteria such as Campylobacter, Escherichia coli, Listeria and Salmonella. Consequently, it would also require less antibiotic treatment, thus helping reduce the burden of antibiotic resistance in the animal industry, also making it a potentially better alternative than cultured meat. Microbial ‘meat’ does not require pesticides and has a higher protein content than animal meat. In addition, it could be genetically-engineered for a fortified vitamin and mineral content, as well as to approximate its taste and texture to that of red meat.

On the other hand, the possibility of using genetically modified bacteria and fungi (GMM) to produce microbial protein has recently attracted political attention because of potential health risks. However, it is debateable whether these products would fall within the remits of the GMO Regulation, since consumers would eat the derived protein, rather than the organism that produced it.

Anticipatory policy-making

Microbial protein is comfortably anchored in EU legislation. It is recognised under the Regulation on Novel Foods, according to the safety principles defined in the General Food Law. Since 2007, EFSA has been compiling a qualified presumption of safety (QPS) list of microorganisms that are safe and can be used in food and feed.

The European Union has a strategy for tackling food security, health and sustainability by 2030 through its new Food 2030 research and innovation policy framework. Microbial proteins are included under the framework’s umbrella of alternative sources of protein that could contribute to a climate-friendly dietary shift by 2030. The EU also supports research into alternative sources of protein. Under Horizon 2020, the European Commission invested €70 million in 15 different projects investigating the potential of plant-, insect-, microalgae– and microbial- based protein sources. Horizon Europe is now offering funding opportunities through its flagship innovation programme, the European Innovation Council. In addition, EFSA launched a funding call in October 2021 for research into microbiomes in food production systems.

The microbial protein market cannot be developed without economic measures to foster sustainable and healthy food production. The EU has introduced a number of policies aimed at facilitating access to finance, improving access to markets, and fostering competitiveness and innovation for small and medium-sized enterprises.

Last but not least, behavioural change will not be possible without understanding consumer habits and barriers to dietary transition, investing in education and raising awareness about healthier and more sustainable choices.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if microbial protein could help revert climate change?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if microbial protein could help revert climate change?’ on YouTube.

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Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask what the European Union (EU) is doing to address climate change.

The atmosphere is warming, the climate is changing and ecosystems are more at risk with each passing year. The 2015 Paris Agreement aims to keep the global temperature rise well below 2°C compared with pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C. Today, the global temperature is estimated at 1.07°C above pre-industrial levels. Without gradual substantial cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions, aligned with fixed targets for 2030 and 2050, we will exceed the 2°C limit before 2050.

The EU is taking a whole series of measures to place its economy and society on a sustainable path that protects citizens and the environment on a long-term basis.

These climate ambitions are reflected in the EU budget. In the long-term budget for 2021‑2027, €356 billion is set aside for protecting natural resources and the climate. Additionally, the EU has pledged 30 % of the cohesion and regional development funds, two of the largest EU subsidy packages, to climate objectives.

European Climate Law

In June 2021, the EU adopted the European Climate law, which sets the European Green Deal goals into law – that the EU will become climate neutral by 2050, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55 % by 2030, compared to emissions in 1990. It also establishes a framework for achieving these objectives.  

Realising the European Climate Law objectives: Fit for 55

In July 2021, the European Commission presented the Fit for 55 package, a set of legislative proposals aimed at reducing emissions by 55 % by 2030. Council and Parliament adopted their respective positions on the proposals in summer 2022, and will now negotiate an agreement on the final texts. You will find updated information on the Legislative Trains website.

Among the many proposed changes, the following can be highlighted:

As regards transport, specific legislative proposals address emission reductions and alternative fuels for aviation, road transport and maritime transport. For instance, CO2 emission standards for new cars would become stricter. From 2035, all new cars and vans sold in the EU would need to be ‘zero-emission’, meaning they would not have an internal combustion engine.

To make the energy sector more sustainable, at least 40 % of energy would be required to come from renewable sources by 2030, an increase on the current target of 32 %.

The scope of the EU’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) would be expanded to include maritime and aviation transport emissions, in addition to the sectors currently covered (electricity and heat generation, energy-intensive industries and aviation within Europe). Overall emissions from sectors covered by the system would have to be reduced by 61 % by 2030, compared to 2005 levels.

As regards buildings, new rules would aim to tackle the issues of energy poverty, as well as poor building insulation, which represents 40 % of the energy consumed.

The EU supports and involves citizens

With the Social Climate Fund, the EU plans to offer financial help for households, micro-enterprises and transport users that are particularly affected by the impact of the proposed changes.

The European Commission has also launched the European Climate Pact, an EU-wide initiative inviting people, communities and organisations to participate in climate action. It aims to involve the public in the transition to a greener Europe by inviting citizens to connect and share knowledge, learn about climate change and develop and implement solutions.

European Parliament position

Since its 2018 resolution on the UN Climate Change Conference in Katowice (COP24), Parliament has consistently highlighted the importance of implementing an ambitious climate policy.

Ahead of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26), the European Parliament called for an end to subsidies for fossil fuels by 2025, and for the G20 to commit to climate neutrality by 2050. Parliament also called for international measures to protect ecosystems that store large amounts of carbon, such as peatland. It also called upon developed nations to honour their promise to provide US$100 billion in climate finance to developing countries to assist in their green transition.

In June 2022, Parliament adopted its position on eight EU proposals that are part of the Fit for 55 package. Parliament encourages industries to further reduce their emissions and invest in low-carbon technologies. It has also called for measures helping those who are most affected by the proposed changes, such as people with high transport costs, to be expanded.

Further information

• European Green Deal, European Parliamentary Research Service, At a Glance, 2019
• European climate law, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, August 2021
• Social climate fund: Fit for 55 package, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, June 2022
• Fit for 55 package, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, June 2022

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Meenakshi Fernandes and Cecilia Navarra.

Care work provided in homes and institutions is a public good that is under-valued by society. Care workers are more likely to have low earnings and precarious working conditions. About 9 in 10 care workers are women.

Most unpaid care work within households is carried out by women. The ‘unpaid care penalty’ for women in the EU, which is equivalent to the earnings they lost because of this unbalanced distribution of care responsibilities, is estimated to reach €242 billion per year.

EU action in the care sector has the potential for high returns for society. Fostering the ‘equal earner – equal carer model’ could generate benefits of between €24 billion and €48 billion a year. EU action to promote affordable, high-quality care could produce an additional €90 billion to €160 billion in benefits each year.

This updates a June 2022 EPRS briefing with new data and clarifications on the estimation methods used.

Read the complete briefing on ‘What if care work were recognised as a driver of sustainable growth?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read also: European care strategy: Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional and local positions on the European Commission’s initiative

Potential benefits of EU action in the care sector Vicious cycle of low investment in care and gender inequalities Drivers of the unpaid care penalty: Labour market indicators of women as compared with men Who are the 12 million paid care workers in the EU?

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

European Union foreign ministers have agreed to make it more difficult for Russians to obtain visas to travel to the bloc, but stopped short of imposing an EU-wide visa ban, as called for by Ukraine. More than six months after Russia invaded Ukraine, the country is holding out against the aggressor, helped by military and financial help from the United States, EU countries and others. Ukrainian forces have recently launched counter-attacks against the Russian military occupying areas in the south and east of the country. United Nations experts arrived at Ukraine’s large nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhia to assess the risk of radiation from the facility, which is currently controlled by Russian forces but operated by Ukrainian staff. Russia is scaling down natural gas supplies to the EU in retaliation for sanctions against Moscow, fuelling inflation and additional fears of recession.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the implications of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Politics

Guerre en Ukraine: Un changement de monde?
Institut français des relations internationales, September 2022

Six months, twenty three lessons: What the world has learned from Russia’s war in Ukraine
Atlantic Council, August 2022

A strong Ukraine is the best solution to Europe’s Russia problem
Atlantic Council, August 2022

Russia, Ukraine, and the decision to negotiate
Brookings Institution, August 2022

Understanding the Erdoğan-Putin duet
Carnegie Europe, August 2022

Russia’s longstanding problem with Ukraine’s borders
Chatham House, August 2022

La Turquie et la guerre en Ukraine, ou le retour à une politique du grand écart
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, August 2022

Ukrainian politicians fight for the future
Carnegie Europe, August 2022

Vogue diplomacy: First Lady Olena Zelenska is Ukraine’s secret weapon
Atlantic Council, July 2022

Everyone’s talking about the endgame in Ukraine: Here’s how it might look
Brookings Institution, July 2022

Ukraine and Taiwan on the Biden-Xi chessboard
Bruegel, July 2022

It’s bifurcation, not bipolarity: Understanding world order after the Ukraine invasion
Brussels School of Governance, July 2022

Europe’s continued commitment to Ukraine hinges on Germany
Carnegie Europe, July 2022

Autocracy versus democracy after the Ukraine invasion: Mapping a middle way
Carnegie Europe, July 2022

Ukraine could tear Europe apart
Cato Institute, July 2022

The EU and India agree to disagree on Ukraine… and that’s ok

Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, July 2022

The impact of the war on the economic development of Ukraine
DIW, July 2022

Russian spring 2022 recruitment circle: Putin’s camouflaged referendum
Egmont, July 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine viewed from China
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022

La mer Noire, le spectre d’un nouveau rideau de fer?
Fondation Robert Schumann, July 2022

La guerre russo-ukrainienne, catharsis de deux conflits convergents
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, July 2022

Taïwan-Ukraine: Quel parallèle entre les stratégies maritimes de la Chine et de la Russie?
Institut Thomas More, July 2022

Opinions européennes face à la guerre en Ukraine
Institut Jacques Delors, July 2022

Opinions européennes face à la guerre en Ukraine
Institut Jacques Delors, July 2022

The lessons the United States learned, and that Russia did not
Rand Corporation, July 2022

War of the worlds: How cognitive dissonance and repression shape Russian perceptions of the conflict in Ukraine
Rand Corporation, July 2022

Wirtschaftssanktionen gegen Russland: Internationale Perspektiven und globale Auswirkungen
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine and its consequences
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2022

Krieg und Hunger : Versorgungsrisiken, Lösungsansätze, Konfliktkonstellationen
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2022

Pourquoi la guerre en Ukraine risque d’affaiblir l’Europe dans le monde
Terra Nova, July 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine: How to get to negotiations
United States Institute of Peace, June 2022

Why fear of provoking Putin is the most provocative policy of all
Atlantic Council, June 2022

Ukraine and what it means for European Union enlargement
Bruegel, June 2022

A creeping annexation. Russia’s plans to partition Ukraine
Centre for Eastern Studies, June 2022

Will Putin’s war in Ukraine make the EU stronger?
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2022

Will Putin’s war lead to the collapse of fortress Russia
Clingendael, June 2022

Why the West should support Ukraine but not appropriate the war
Clingendael, June 2022

Ukraine could become an EU Member. What would that mean?
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

How the war in Ukraine shapes the multipolar world
Egmont, June 2022

Peace versus justice: The coming European split over the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

The U.S. must support Ukraine in a fiscally responsible manner
Heritage Foundation, June 2022

Asia and the war in Ukraine
International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2022

Military

Russia’s attack on Ukraine: Day 186
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2022

The EU, NATO and European security in a time of war
Centre for European Reform, August 2022

Russia recruiting volunteers to fight in Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, August 2022

Lessons for the West: Russia’s military failures in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

Four (updated) ways the war in Ukraine might end
Atlantic Council, July 2022

First help Ukraine win the war, then help it win the peace
Centre for European Reform, July 2022

The next war: How Russian hybrid aggression could threaten Moldova
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022

Strike traction: How the West can support a Ukrainian counter-offensive
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022

Shadow of the bomb: Russia’s nuclear threats
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022

Immediate impact: How Western heavy weapons are already helping Ukraine halt Russia
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022

Guerre en Ukraine: Le sens du signalement nucléaire russe
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, July 2022

Les armes nucléaires et la guerre en Ukraine : bilan provisoire et conséquences possibles
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, July 2022

Don’t humiliate Russia! Or how to repeat past mistakes at the cost of European security
Friends of Europe, July 2022

Making it the distance to victory: Ukraine’s war and post-war needs
Globsec, July 2022

The defense impact of the Ukraine war on the Visegrád Four
German Marshall Fund, July 2022

Ukraine: Le cadre européen des exportations d’armes en péril?
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, July 2022

Ukrainians resist in the occupied south
Polish Institute of Foreign Relations, July 2022

Ukrainian society in the face of war
Polish Institute of Foreign Relations, July 2022

Might Russia turn to terror bombing civilians in Ukraine?
Rand Corporation, July 2022

Problems and capability gaps in military aid for Ukraine
Polish Institute of Foreign Relations, June 2022

Possible Russian nuclear deployments to Belarus could shift Europe’s nuclear balance
United States Institute of Peace, June 2022

War crimes and genocidal intent in the heart of Europe
European Policy Centre, June 2022

Energy

Russia in a gas war with Europe
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2022

Attacks on Ukraine nuclear plant: What’s at stake?
Chatham House, August 2022

A German gas crisis will cause jitters across Europe
Brookings Institution, July 2022

European Union demand reduction needs to cope with Russian gas cuts
Bruegel, July 2022

Revitalising EU-Ukraine cross-border infrastructure for a secure, clean energy future
Regulatory Assistance Project, July 2022

Sanctions

UK trade and the war in Ukraine
Chatham House, September 2022

The Ukraine war has made Iran and Russia allies in economic isolation: Here’s how
Atlantic Council, August 2022

Using sanctioned Russian assets to rebuild Ukraine will not be easy
Centre for European Reform, August 2022

Unmoved: Why a ban on Russians’ visas won’t help
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2022

Food

Agriculture supply shocks due to Russia’s war cause hardships for numerous states
Bertelsmann Stiftung, July 2022

Global food insecurity due to the war in Ukraine
Clingendael, July 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine six months on‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi.

Most of the world’s farmers are engaged in small‑scale agriculture. The majority of them are in developing countries but there are many in developed countries as well. Small farms make up the vast majority of the EU’s 10 million farms. What constitutes a small farm depends on the context. However, improving the conditions of small-scale food producers is a global objective.

Recent studies have lowered past estimates of how much of the global food supply is produced by small farms. Notwithstanding the complex nature of such estimates and the possible under-estimation of small operators’ production because of self‑consumption, it is clear that small farms allocate larger shares of their production to food and have a more diversified produce portfolio than larger farms. Moreover, small farms’ role in food production and availability also depends on their involvement in local food systems: when they are well connected in the supply chain, small‑scale producers tend to leave less space for self‑provisioning and their businesses are more viable.

In addition to producing food, small farms play a key role in the EU’s rural world. They are typically associated with protecting landscape features and biodiversity and the notion of providing public goods. They help to maintain lively rural and remote areas, help preserve the identity of regional production, and offer employment in regions with fewer job opportunities. Yet, the pace of disappearance of small farms has been quite rapid in recent decades. Unfavourable demographic change in rural areas is part of the explanation. In addition, it is small farms that suffer most from the challenges facing the agricultural sector, such as market pressures and weather extremes, and they have to invest greater effort to engage in innovation and new technology.

The EU’s farm policy includes specific measures to address small farms’ needs, although most of the EU’s agricultural funds go to farms with larger farmland areas. However, the new policy framework that will start operating as of 2023 provides a valuable opportunity for EU Member States to use the flexibility offered in the development of their strategic plans to tailor measures to small farms and local conditions and help preserve the economic, social, and environmental assets that small farms bring to the EU food system.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Small farms’ role in the EU food system‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU farms and farmland by land size class Percentage distribution of farms by farmland area in hectares (ha) The decreasing share of the EU’s small farms World farms and farmland by land size class

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou with Massimo Spinelli.

From the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020, and up to mid-April 2020, EU Member States were facing an extraordinary situation that led to the declaration of a health emergency. EU governments gradually took urgent measures to contain the spread of the virus, such as re‑introduction of border controls in the Schengen area, implementation of temporary travel restrictions, and introduction of sanitary measures. These had vast impact on both mobility and migration.

Multiple measures also aimed to mitigate the effects of the pandemic on foreign nationals residing on the territory of EU Member States. National responses to contain Covid-19 diverged both in nature and scope. Overall, restrictive measures affected asylum-seekers’ right to look for protection on EU territory; their – and migrants’ – right to access relevant procedures; their residence status and permits; and their enjoyment of other rights, such as access to health services.

Member States had to adapt their asylum procedures swiftly to the pandemic. The measures focused on the extension of residence permits, regularisation of undocumented migrants, the release of migrants and asylum-seekers from detention centres, and suspension of forced returns.

At the same time, new obstacles arose in ensuring an effective and fair asylum procedure for first-instance applications and appeals, relating for example to the quality of remote interviews, applicants’ access to electronic tools and the skills needed to use them, and the quality of processes and data protection. After mid-April 2020, EU Member States gradually lifted restrictions, starting to adapt to the new reality after the pandemic. The European Parliament has addressed the impact of Covid-19 on vulnerable groups, including asylum-seekers and refugees. At the same time, Parliament stressed that internal border controls and travel restrictions at the external borders should not affect the right to seek asylum.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Impact of Covid-19 on asylum procedures in EU Member States‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mar Negreiro.

The digital transformation is making the EU institutions and administration more vulnerable to cyber-threats and incidents, the number of which has surged dramatically in recent years. There were as many during the first half of 2021 as in the whole of 2020, for instance.

Yet an analysis of 20 Union institutions, bodies and agencies showed that their governance, preparedness, cybersecurity capability and maturity vary substantially, weakening the system.

This proposal for a regulation would establish a common framework to ensure that similar cybersecurity rules and measures are applied within all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, to improve their resilience and incident-response capacities and rapidly improve the existing situation.

In the European Parliament, the file has been allocated to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), where the rapporteur is working on her draft report.

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2022) 0122
22.3.2022Rapporteur:Henna Virkkunen (EPP, Finland)2022/0085(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece)
Izaskun Bilbao Barrandica (Renew, Spain)
Mikuláš Peksa (Greens/EFA, Czechia)
Markus Buchheit (ID, Germany)
Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, Czechia)
Marc Botenga (The Left, Belgium)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Gregor Erbach and Martin Höflmayr, with Nela Foukalová.

The aim of the European Green Deal is to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent, by 2050, while maintaining economic growth and prosperity. It is Europe’s growth strategy. The transition to a climate-neutral economy with net zero greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) over the course of just 28 years represents an industrial revolution at unprecedented speed, with significant impacts on gross domestic product (GDP), investment, employment, competitiveness, distribution, public finances and monetary stability.

Outlining the expected impact of transition to a climate-neutral economy on economic indicators on the basis of analysis by academics and think-tanks and the Commission’s impact assessment (IA) of the climate target plan, this briefing focuses in particular on economic output (GDP), public debt, competitiveness, labour markets, energy prices, inflation and distributional effects.

Climate mitigation policies affect economic output. According to the IA, transition towards net zero
is expected to have only limited impacts on aggregate output (GDP), but its composition will shift
from consumption towards investment . Moreover, the impacts on sectoral output, investment and
the labour market are likely to be significant, creating a need for policy measures to ensure a just
transition. There is a risk of negative short -term impacts if consumption and production decrease,
e.g. as a result of carbon pricing. However, increased investment, for example in low-carbon technologies, would potentially boost productivity and economic growth in the long term.

Transition to climate neutrality demands solid economic governance to manage the risk to macroeconomic and financial stability. The Commission’s sustainable growth strategy in the European Semester framework is built around four aspects of competitive sustainability. Parliament has called for the addition of a climate indicator and coordinated efforts to implement the digital and environmental transitions, alongside the current approach to fiscal and budgetary policies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Economic impacts of the green transition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

GDP, energy consumption and GHG emissions (World and EU)

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

The EU solar energy strategy proposed under the REPowerEU plan aims to make solar energy a cornerstone of the EU energy system. Boosting renewable energy is also an important part of the European Green Deal in the context of the green transition towards climate neutrality. Solar energy is affordable, clean and has been the fastest-growing energy source in the last decade. It can be used for electricity and heating, while also helping reduce EU dependency on energy imports by replacing them with domestic production.

EU measures to boost solar energy include making the installation of solar panels on the rooftops of new buildings obligatory within a specific timeframe, streamlining permitting procedures for renewable energy projects, improving the skills base in the solar sector and boosting the EU’s capacity to manufacture photovoltaic panels.

Several challenges still need addressing, however. These include competition for land use with other sectors, technological issues, skills shortages and the need to prevent a new energy dependency on non-EU solar panel producers.

The ambitious plan includes doubling the current level of solar photovoltaic capacity by 2025 and producing almost 600 GW by 2030. Achieving these goals will depend on continued commitment to renewable energy deployment, success in addressing a number of challenges, and the ability to unlock the full potential of solar energy in the EU, for instance, by boosting domestic solar production and the use of new technologies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Solar energy in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Karin Jacobs.

In the framework of the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT) and Better Regulation agenda, and as announced in the 2011 White Paper on Transport, the Commission has presented a legislative proposal to amend existing rules on damage stability requirements for roll on roll off (ro-ro) passenger ships, known as ferries. This is to improve the maritime safety of both vessels and their passengers.

The proposed revision of the existing directive originates from maritime accidents, as with the MS Estonia in 1994 and the MS Express Samina in 2000. It would ensure consistency with the applicable international standards, recently updated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) under its 2020 SOLAS Convention. It also aims to strengthen the fleet entry requirements within the EU for large vessels that have not yet been certified here.

The proposal will amend the existing Directive (2003/25/EC) in this area. The main purpose is to align current technical rules with IMO stability requirements, and to simplify these rules.

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/25/EC as regards the inclusion of improved stability requirements and its alignment with stability requirements defined by the International Maritime Organization Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2022) 0053
18.2.2022Rapporteur:Roberts Zile, ECR, Latvia)2022/0036(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Magdalena Adamowicz, EPP, Poland
Vera Tax, S&D, The Netherlands
Caroline Nagtegaal, Renew, The Netherlands
Jutta Paulus, Greens/EFA, Germany
Elena Kountoura, The Left, GreeceOrdinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

With the Conference on the Future of Europe now at an end, a new phase has started: that of following up on the more than 320 recommendations it produced.

This process is however a complicated one. Legally, ways to implement the Conference’s recommendations may require changes to the European Union (EU) Treaties, which is a complex and challenging process. Politically, debating how to implement reforms and deciding to what extent to modify the EU legal system may require intense negotiations.

The current EU Treaties, which are the fruit of successive reforms occurring over the last 35 years, may be modified only according to a complex set of procedures. The ordinary revision procedure may be used to amend any part of the Treaties, including the modifications of the institutional set up and of the Union’s competences. The simplified revision procedure may only be used to modify limited areas of EU policies – namely Title III of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – or the Council’s decision-making rules.

The recommendations issued by the Conference on the Future of Europe and the recent international crises and political developments might provide an impulse for a deeper reform of the EU, as the European Parliament has suggested in several resolutions. Whether a deeper reform will be attempted depends however on the political will of the national governments, which hold the power to decide on whether to engage in a revision of the Treaties and, ultimately, on the content of the reforms.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How the EU Treaties are modified‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Philip Boucher.

Three members of the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) – Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia) Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, Spain) and Rosa D’Amato (Greens, Italy) – visited the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission in Seville on 18‑20 July 2022, to discuss their work on digital, green and innovation policy.

As the Commission’s science and knowledge service, the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (JRC) provides advice and support to EU policy. It has 2 000 scientists working at six sites in five countries. The Seville site hosts 400 staff and focuses upon socio-economic and techno-economic research.

The members were welcomed to Seville by JRC’s Director for Growth and Innovation Mikel Landabaso. He gave an overview of their activities in digital, environmental and innovation policy, as well as analyses supporting responses to the pandemic and the situation in Ukraine. Beyond its role in EU policy, JRC Seville also works closely with national administrations, regional partners, universities, industry and civil society organisations. Members participated in a discussion about how JRC activities are selected and financed, the modalities of their relationship with other Commission Directorates-General, and how they balance scientific excellence and policy needs.

The first day was dedicated to JRCs projects in the context of the digital transition. Carlos Torrecilla explained that digital transformation is not about digitising the things that we do now, but dramatically changing the way things are done. Their analyses provide support across EU digital policies and programmes and are poised to play a major role in future, for example in hosting part of the forthcoming European Centre on Algorithmic Transparency. Giuditta De Prato presented the JRC’s contribution to Europe’s digital decade, which sets targets for skills, infrastructure, public services and business looking to 2030. Yves Punie and Riina Vuorikari then outlined the Digital Competence Framework for Citizens and Emilia Gómez highlighted JRC initiatives in education and healthcare. The session concluded with demonstrations of a robot and a facial recognition tool, which are used in JRC research projects. The discussion sessions focused upon the importance of wide-ranging metrics of inequality and the JRC approach to working with industry and academia.

During the second day, the delegation learnt about JRC projects related to the green transition. Serge Roudier explained the Sevilla Process, which brings together industry, Member States and environmental groups to co-create environmental norms, resulting in consensus around sets of actions that lead to major reductions in emissions of air pollutants. Antonio Amores and Ana Agúndez then shared their insights on fairness aspects of the green deal, including EUROMOD, a tool that analyses the effect of reforms in a range of taxation and social assistance measures in terms of poverty and inequality. The session continued with Antonio Soria, who demonstrated the need to focus upon efficiency, clean energy and electrification in order to meet the Paris targets. Abdel Bitat then presented his work on sustainability competences in education, and René van Bavel concluded the session with an explanation of the role of behavioural insights in EU policy. Wide-ranging discussions with Members covered from the suitability of various metrics and measures to the impacts of sanctions on Russia.

The third and final day focused upon innovation. Guia Bianchi and Ignacio González Vázquez presented the JRC project on Partnerships for Regional Innovation, a strategic approach to innovation-driven territorial transformation. They have developed a ‘playbook‘ of non-prescriptive PRI tools, and are now running a pilot process in collaboration with the Committee of the Regions. Emanuele Pugliese explained JRC assessments of region’s capacities for competitiveness and innovation and, crucially, their potential for growth in specific sectors. Manuel Palazuelos and Filipe Batista gave an overview of JRC activities related to sustainable and resilient tourism, including the EU Tourism Dashboard, which will be launched later this year. Finally, Fernando Mérida Martín and Fabrizio Guzzo presented JRC work on start-up villages including the forthcoming Forum, and the Commission’s long-term vision for more connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas. The discussion with Members examined the key challenges facing regions, in particular the distribution of benefits from innovation and tourism.

During the delegation, Members also took the opportunity to visit the Cartuja Science and Technology Park (PCT), where they were welcomed by representatives of the Junta de Andalucía – General Secretary for External Affairs, Enrique Millo, and General Secretary for Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Enterprise, Pablo Cortés. The Cartuja area of Seville was developed for the 1992 World Expo and now hosts the park as well as several other facilities, including the JRC. PCT Director General Luis Pérez explained that the park is designed to foster a prospering innovation ecosystem through cooperative projects. Rafael Sánchez, ENDESA’s Director General for Andalucía, Extremadura, Ceuta and Melilla also joined the delegation to present the eCitySevilla project, a comprehensive sustainability plan for Cartuja. Finally, the Mayor of Seville, Antonio Muñoz met with Members and expressed the city’s enthusiasm for the New Bauhaus philosophy, as well as Seville’s ambition to become a climate neutral city. He highlighted key challenges for the city in climate change, the digital transition, and social inclusiveness.

The JRC currently rents its office in Seville, and there are some limitations in terms of operational needs, cost-effectiveness, security and environmental performance. A decision has been taken to build a new facility on adjacent land, which has been provided without cost by Seville’s City Council. Vincenzo Cardarelli, Advisor to the JRC’s Director for Growth and Innovation, presented the winner of a recent design contest. The building will be the first EU building under the banner of the New European Bauhaus and is envisaged as an instrumental connection between the JRC and the community. It is also designed as a ‘post-covid’ building that recognises the new work modalities, notably teleworking, and maximises the benefits of exchanges that take place when colleagues are physically present. The discussion focused upon how design choices for the site and the wider area can foster greater integration with Seville’s public spaces and community. Work has commenced on a final design.

STOA is grateful for the JRC and the Cartuja PCT for hosting the visit, to all of the researchers for sharing their interesting and important work, and looks forward to further opportunities for exchange and engagement in future.

Members of the STOA Delegation (Ivars IJABS (Renew, Latvia) Lina GÁLVEZ MUÑOZ (S&D, Spain) and Rosa D’AMATO (Greens, Italy)) meet the Mayor of Seville Antonio Muñoz at the Cartuja Science and Technology Park.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

A recently published Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study examines the impact of biases on datasets used to support decision-making systems based on artificial intelligence. It explores the ethical implications of the deployment of digital technologies in the context of proposed European Union legislation, such as the AI act, the data act and the data governance act; as well as the recently approved Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act. It ends by setting out a range of policy options to mitigate the pernicious effects of biases in decision-making systems that rely on machine learning.

Machine learning (ML) is a form of artificial intelligence (AI) in which computers develop their own decision-making processes for situations that cannot be directly and satisfactorily addressed by available algorithms. The process is adjusted through the exploration of existing data on previous similar situations that include the solutions found at the time. The broader and more balanced the dataset is, the better the chances will be of obtaining a valid result; but there is no a priori way of knowing whether the data available will suffice to collect all aspects of the problem at hand. The outputs of systems based on AI can be biased owing to imbalances in the training data, or if the data source is biased itself with respect to ethnicity, gender or other factors.

Biases are commonly considered to be one of the most detrimental effects of AI use. In general, therefore, serious commitments are being made to reducing their incidence as much as possible. However, the existence of biases pre-dates the creation of AI tools. All human societies are biased – AI only reproduces what we are. Therefore, opposing this technology for this reason would simply hide discrimination and not prevent it. Our task must be to use the means at our disposal – which are many – to mitigate its biases. In fact, it is likely that at some point in the future, recommendations made by an AI mechanism will contain less bias than those made by human beings. Unlike humans, AI can be reviewed and its flaws corrected on a consistent basis. Ultimately, AI could eventually serve to build fairer, less biased societies.

Rather than increasing regulation, it is crucial to ensure that existing rules, such as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), cover all new aspects that may appear as the technology evolves. European legislation such as the proposed AI act (together with the data act proposal and the data governance act) may apply not only to algorithms but also to datasets, thereby enforcing the explainability of decisions obtained through systems based on ML. The idea of setting up AI ethics committees to assess and provide certification for the systems or datasets used in ML is also proposed by organisations such as International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CEN). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) follows similar lines in its recommendations on AI. While setting up standards and certification procedures seems a good way to progress, it may also lead to a false impression of safety, as the ML systems and the datasets they use are dynamic and continue to learn from new data. A dynamic follow-up process would therefore also be required to guarantee that rules are respected following the FAIR principles of data management and stewardship (FAIR: findability, accessibility, interoperability and reusability).

The STOA report begins by providing an overview of biases in the context of artificial intelligence, and more specifically of machine-learning applications. The second part is devoted to the analysis of biases from a legal point of view, which shows that shortcomings in this area call for the implementation of additional regulatory tools to address the issue of bias adequately. Finally, the study, and its accompanying STOA options brief, put forward a range of policy options in response to the challenges identified.

Read the full report and STOA options brief to find out more. The study was presented by its authors to the STOA Panel at its meeting on 7 July 2022.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Martin Höflmayr.

Understanding inflation dynamics requires an understanding of the underlying concept and how it is measured. Inflation is defined as a process of continuously rising prices and falling purchasing power. In other words, a general and broad-based increase in the price of goods and services over an extended period. The main objective of central banks is to keep prices stable, to preserve the integrity and purchasing power of people’s money.

The most common inflation indicator measures the average change in the price of a basket of consumer goods and services over time. The closest approximation of what people intuitively understand by the term inflation is the change in their cost of living. The Harmonised Indicator for Consumer Prices (HICP), against which the European Central Bank (ECB) assesses the achievement of its price stability objective, is based on this concept.

Strong inflation momentum for a broad set of goods and services in the consumer basket led to a record high inflation rate in June 2022, standing at 9.6 % in the EU and 8.6 % in the euro area, driven mainly by energy and food prices, which rose by 42 % and 8.9 % respectively. Inflation is expected to remain significantly above the euro area inflation target of 2 % for some time, due to continued geopolitical uncertainty and persistent supply bottlenecks.

In its monetary policy meeting on 21 July, the ECB raised interest rates for the first time in over a decade by 0.5 percentage points and unveiled a new Transmission Protection Instrument. The latter would help the ECB to counter unwarranted, disorderly market dynamics and to make secondary market purchases of securities under certain conditions, thus preventing financial fragmentation within the currency bloc. At its meeting, the ECB also suspended forward guidance on the size of future rate rises in the interest of more flexibility. In conclusion, the latest ECB decision reflects increased efforts to bring inflation back to the 2 % target through a front-loaded policy rate hike, while putting in place an additional tool to counter unwarranted fragmentation.

This is an update of a Briefing published in April 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Inflation explained: What lies behind and what is ahead?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Inflation generalisation index: combined weight of items in the euro area HICP inflation basket with inflation rates above 2 %, in % Headline and core inflation (including the contribution of energy to their levels) in the euro area, in %

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

A recently published Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study offers a bird’s eye perspective of the key societal and ethical challenges that can be expect as a result of the convergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and communication technologies, and proposes some policy options that can be considered to address them.

Ethical discussion about digital technologies in the past few years has frequently focused on AI. It is important, therefore, to note that the challenges extend well beyond those that are typically or usually discussed in the AI ethics literature. The convergence of digital technologies will lead to new technological applications, but will also contribute to the creation of new sociotechnical systems and systems of systems, which may raise their own challenges. The convergence will therefore most likely result in technological possibilities and features that extend beyond those of individual enabling technologies like AI, the internet of things (IoT) and blockchain. To address these challenges, we need to look for policy options and regulation that extend beyond the realm of AI and the concerns it has raised.

Supported by the arrival of 5G and, soon 6G, digital technologies are moving towards an AI-driven internet of robotic and bionano things. New acronyms reflect this blending of technologies: ‘AIoT’ (AI and IoT merging), ‘IoRT’ (IoT and robotics merging) and ‘IoBNT’ (IoT and bionano tech merging). Blockchain, augmented reality and virtual reality add even more technological options to the mix. Smart bodies, smart homes, smart industries, smart cities and smart governments lie ahead, with the promise of many benefits and opportunities. However, unprecedented amounts of personal data will be collected, and digital technologies will affect the most intimate aspects of our life, like the realms of love and friendship, more than ever. The STOA report offers a wide overview of the key societal and ethical challenges we can expect as a result of this convergence, and of the possible policy options to address them.

Many, if not all, new applications and sociotechnical systems will display one or more of the following features: interactive, long-distance, distributed, autonomous, intelligent, adaptive, reconfigurable, hybrid, fully connected, invisible, fast, precise in location, intimate, immersive, persuasive, and commercially exploitable. These features partly stem from the individual technologies ‘in the mix’. For example, features like interactivity, autonomy, intelligence and autonomy are typical characteristics of AI systems. However, some features also emerge due to new combinations of technologies. Moreover, it is often the combination of the features that creates new challenges for society, policy-making and regulation. Based on these features and inspired by the interviews with a number of experts, the STOA study identifies (and explains in more detail) a series of key opportunities and challenges. Using responsible research and innovation (RRI) as the overarching framework for developing policy options, an analysis then centres around four dimensions: inclusiveness, anticipation, reflexivity and responsiveness. Inspired by these dimensions, the report puts forward a variety of policy options in response to the challenges identified. These range from measures aiming to give digital innovation a clearer space in the Horizon Europe funding scheme and to stimulate industrial development in the sector, to fostering the development of critical infrastructures. The proposed measures also address the societal impact of these technologies in relation to specific issues such as digital literacy, privacy and digital rights for citizens.

Read the full report and STOA options brief to find out more. Some preliminary results of this analysis were presented by its authors to the STOA Panel at its meeting of 20 January 2022. A complete version of the study has now been released, incorporating the ideas provided at the time by the STOA Panel Members through their suggestions and comments.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Velina Lilyanova.

The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the core element of the EU’s largest and most innovative financing instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU), created to help the EU’s economies and societies recover from the global pandemic. The facility is structured around six pillars representing policy areas of European relevance, identified by the RRF Regulation as vital for strengthening the EU’s resilience. The pillars define investment priorities and the scope of application of financing under the RRF. This briefing is dedicated to one of them – the digital transformation pillar – for which, along with the green transition, the RRF Regulation sets a specific spending target. The briefing aims to give an overview of why the digital transition is one of the key policies in focus under the RRF, what the RRF Regulation requires in that respect, and the approach taken by EU Member States.

To receive funds from the RRF, Member States have drawn up individual national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs), laying down a number of reforms and investments. Funds are released based on performance, upon successful implementation of relevant milestones and targets set out in the plans. Each national plan has to earmark at least 20 % of its resources for achieving digital targets. Digitalisation has been under way for a long time and the EU’s response to this process, even before the pandemic, has been indicative of the high priority it gives to this policy area. The digital transition, one of the ‘twin transitions’, is not only considered key to a faster economic recovery, but also to enhanced security and resilience, and to the EU’s achieving strategic autonomy. NGEU provides an opportunity, among other EU policy tools, to contribute to progress in that area.

While the RRF’s time scope is relatively limited, as investments are due to be completed by 2026, it falls within the recently declared EU Digital Decade 2020-2030. The NRRPs are aligned with the overarching priorities to achieve the EU’s digital objectives by 2030. Digital investment is urgently needed across Europe, and a substantial investment gap in digital infrastructure and services has been estimated between the EU and its global competitors. Thus, funding for digital targets in the RRF is expected to complement funding from EU and national budgets and address this challenge.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The digital dimension of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Wolfram Kaiser.

On 2 April 2009, the European Parliament decided that 23 August each year should mark the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of All Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. With the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union had divided Europe into spheres of interest. That agreement, with its secret protocols, preceded the German attack on Poland on 1 September 1939 and the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland, as well as the Soviet occupation and later annexation of the Baltic States, in June 1940.

Background

Questions of historical memory of the Nazi German regime, of fascist collaboration, and of the crimes perpetrated became an increasingly transnational matter in western and southern Europe during the late Cold War period. West Germany experienced its Historikerstreit (or controversy among leading historians) in the 1980s, with debate about the comparability of totalitarian regimes and the singularity of the Holocaust, or Shoah. Trials against surviving perpetrators proliferated in Germany and elsewhere, as in the case of Maurice Papon, for example. Secretary General of the Gironde Prefecture in Bordeaux during the Vichy regime, who was found guilty to have ordered and organised that 1 600 Jews were arrested and transported to the extermination camps during World War II.

At the turn of the century, western European leaders increasingly propagated a common approach to remembering the Holocaust. Representatives from 46 countries met in Stockholm in January 2000 for the International Forum on the Holocaust, to discuss questions of Holocaust education, remembrance and research. On that occasion, they declared 27 January, the anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz extermination camp, Holocaust Remembrance Day, emphasising that its ‘unprecedented character … will always hold universal meaning’.

Politicians drew different lessons from the past, however, as quickly became clear with the controversy in the EU over the formation of a new Austrian government bringing together the People’s Party and Jörg Haider’s far-right Freedom Party in February 2000. Moreover, historical memory in east-central and south-eastern Europe diverged very much from western Europeans’ strong focus on the Holocaust. For many east-central Europeans, Stalinist crimes and what they had experienced as a result of the Soviet-communist occupation during and after World War II had the same, if not higher importance for their individual and collective memory than the Holocaust. As they regarded the cooperation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 as the starting point of their suffering, an estimated 2.2 million people formed the human chain linking Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius on 23 August 1989, marking the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact – an event that contributed to the collapse of communist rule and the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

Leaders from the new and future European Union Member States in east-central and south-eastern Europe increasingly pushed, from the 2000s onwards, for greater recognition and inclusion in remembrance policies of the crimes of the Stalinist and communist regimes. In 2006, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly passed a resolution on the need for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes. On 3 June 2008, prominent politicians including former Czech President Vacláv Havel and future German President Joachim Gauck signed the Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism, calling for ‘Europe-wide condemnation of, and education about, the crimes of communism’, and advocating the institutionalisation of a European Remembrance Day.

European Parliament position

Having already signed the Prague Declaration, around 50 MEPs took the initiative in the European Parliament of launching a written declaration, dated 23 September 2008 and signed by 409 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), which formally proposed the adoption of 23 August as the ‘European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism’. The declaration claimed that ‘the influence and significance of the Soviet order and occupation on and for citizens of the post-Soviet States are little known in Europe’, and that better remembrance could contribute to ‘rooting democracy more firmly and reinforcing peace and stability in our continent’.

The written declaration started a process that led the European Parliament to adopt its resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism on 2 April 2009, which formally marked 23 August as the European Day of Remembrance. The resolution in its final wording addressed a variety of concerns in debates among historians and in the Parliament. First, by referring to all ‘totalitarian and authoritarian regimes’ it broadened its scope beyond Stalinism and Nazism, explicitly referring, for example, to Franco’s Spain. Second, it re-emphasised the ‘uniqueness of the Holocaust’, frequently understood as the systematic industrialised mass-murder of a delineated religious group. Third, it admitted the contested character of interpretations of history, and that ‘parliament cannot legislate on the past’.

The main body of the text centres on the ‘victims of totalitarian and undemocratic regimes … and pays tribute to those who fought against tyranny and oppression’. It expresses the need for ‘keeping the memories of the past alive because there can be no reconciliation without truth and remembrance’. And it connects the memory of the totalitarian regimes and their crimes to the notion of ‘European integration as a model of peace and reconciliation’.

In this form, 553 MEPs voted for the resolution, 44 against and 33 abstained. All EPP MEPs except for 10 MEPs from the Greek New Democracy party, who abstained, as well as all liberal ALDE MEPs present voted for the resolution. 30 MEPs from the S&D group voted against, mostly for fear that the totalitarian paradigm could dilute the place of the Holocaust in European remembrance policies and memory. Most MEPs from the European United Left-Nordic Green Left Group voted against or abstained. Thus, Czech MEP Vladimír Remek, a member of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, claimed that the EP majority was ‘simply trying to lump me together with the Nazis’. And Greek communist MEP Athanasios Pafilis complained about ‘the European Union’s wretched anti-Communist strategy … with the counterfeiting of history, slander and lies’ by equating fascism and communism.

The debate preceding the vote on the resolution showed how important the topic was for east-central and south-eastern Member-States. In fact, all but five MEPs, who spoke in the debate, were from the new Member-States. The debate showed not only that memory of the past was and is perhaps still divided between western and east-central and south-eastern Europe, but also along ideological and other lines. A Day of European Remembrance cannot align such divided memory overnight. Marking the day can however contribute to a better mutual understanding of diverging memories and their greater long-term convergence.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘European Day of Remembrance for Victims of all Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Monika Kiss.

Cancelled and possibly reintroduced coronavirus-related travel restrictions, increasing fuel prices, striking personnel at the airports and the shadow of the war on Ukraine – despite an encouraging increase in terms of travellers, this summer might be challenging for the tourism sector.

Before the Covid‑19 pandemic, the tourism sector has been a major driver for jobs and growth in the European Union, and experienced almost uninterrupted growth for decades. In 2019, the tourism industry employed more than 12.5 million people, accounting for around 10 % of total EU employment.

The impact of the travel restrictions related to the Covid‑19 pandemic (such as cancellation of flights and hotel reservations, mandatory testing, or quarantine measures), changed these figures in an unprecedented way. According to Eurostat statistics, the first lockdown in spring 2020 set tourism almost to zero. A partial recovery followed in summer 2020, driven mainly by domestic demand, with many people deciding to opt for ‘staycations’ in their home countries. At EU-level, the number of accommodation nights for EU tourists had dropped by 61 % from April 2020 to March 2021. Malta (80 %), Spain (78 %) and Greece (74 %) recorded the biggest falls.

The aviation sector suffered the loss of 2 703 million passengers in 2020 due to the pandemic.

Timely and coordinated policy efforts at both EU and national level – for instance, the mutual recognition of vaccinations, or the introduction of the EU Digital Covid Certificate, accepted in all Member States – helped to diminish these impacts and to allow people to travel, even if less than before. Support for employers and employees, such as the SURE Instrument, short-time work schemes, or the REACT-EU package and the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative helped to cushion the impact of job losses and economic downturn.

In the first quarter of 2022, a significant increase was observed in tourism, compared to the same period of the previous year: domestic accommodation arrivals more than doubled, and international accommodation arrivals increased six-fold. Air traffic in May 2022 was up 83.1 % compared to May 2021, according to International Air Transport Association (IATA) data, and is now at 68.7 % of pre-pandemic levels. There is still a way to go: at a meeting of the Committee on Transport and Tourism on 12 July 2022, European Commission representative Filip Cornelis noted that figures  are expected to reach 2019 levels by the end of 2024.

A number of issues continue to threaten this generally encouraging increase in the tourism and aviation sectors, however.

Russia’s war on Ukraine affects the tourism industry in different ways. One of its impacts is the loss of Russian and Ukrainian tourists. According to estimates, the two counties accounted for 75 million tourism departures in 2019, which equals 5 % of the global total. In addition, there is also less ‘traveller confidence’ among EU nationals, mainly concerning trips to the countries neighbouring Ukraine. Furthermore, the restrictions imposed by the EU and by Russia on airlines and on the use of airspace are leading to cancelled flights or longer routes in air transport. In addition, higher fuel costs caused by the war (80 % higher jet fuel prices than a year ago), create additional losses for air companies and might lead to higher prices for customers. Increased food, energy and water prices due to the war and related sanctions will unavoidably affect hotels and restaurants and could also lead to higher costs for customers.

The growing willingness to travel after the lifted Covid‑19 restrictions leads to another problem for the catering and transport sector. Due to the closure of transport facilities, hotels and restaurants during lockdowns, a high share of staff were made redundant. For instance, in the aviation sector, 191 000 European aviation workers lost their jobs. The rapidly increasing demand has resulted in labour shortages, as many of these workers cannot be rehired and there is no immediate possibility to hire a new workforce (for example, to carry out ground handling and security tasks, up to 10 weeks training is mandatory). The resulting higher workload for the remaining airport workers, coupled with precarious working conditions, such as ‘zero hour’ or seasonal work contracts, or the lack of wage adaptations compared to rising costs of living, has led to repeated strikes by ground handling workers, joined by pilots and cabin crew. This leads to flight disruption, cancellations and infringements of consumer rights.

Another threat to increasing tourism figures is the possibility of a new rise in Covid‑19 cases. According to World Health Organization data, during the week of 4‑10 July 2022, the number of weekly cases increased for the fifth consecutive week, after a declining trend since the last peak in March 2022. In Europe, over 2.8 million new cases were reported, which is a 4 % increase compared to the previous week. Cyprus has already reintroduced facemasks and other Member States, such as Spain might follow.

The European Commission, together with EU Member State governments and industry stakeholders, is looking for solutions to remedy this situation. Commissioner for Transport Adina Vălean held several meetings with stakeholders to identify the root causes of travel disruption and seek common solutions. The Commission has compiled best practices on better coordination and exchange of information, which stakeholders are expected  to implement. Passengers have to be informed of travel disruption, expected waiting times and their rights when their travel plans are interrupted.

On 12 July 2022, the European Commission proposed to allow the airline slot regime to respond more flexibly to unexpected developments in the near future. The Commission proposes to return to a higher slot use rate (80 % of the 2019 figures as of 30 October 2022) reflecting the demand, but at the same time, to prolong the possibility to make use of the ‘justified non-use of slots’ (JNUS) tool created during the pandemic. Concerning working conditions in the tourism sector, the adoption of a directive on fair minimum wages, planned for the third quarter of 2022, might lead to improvements. The ongoing revision of the Directive on Air Passenger Rights should lead to better protection of air passenger’s interests when travel is disrupted. In the meantime, the Commission has adopted interpretative guidelines to provide guidance to citizens and airlines on the current state of the law.

Citizens often send messages to the European Parliament expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on the House of European History to remove a poster of ‘the Madonna and Christ of Czestochowa with rainbow halos’ from a temporary exhibition. Citizens first began to write to the European Parliament on this subject in June 2022. The Board of Trustees of the House of European History responded, highlighting the story around the poster, as explained and contextualised in the exhibition. It also pointed out that the exhibition presents the views of both critics and proponents of the poster.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the European Parliament on this matter (in English and Polish).

Main points made in the reply in English

We would point out that your message has been brought to the attention of the Board of Trustees of the House of European History. The Board examined it carefully and unanimously supported the following statement at its recent meeting:

‘Your matter of concern is the poster of the Madonna and Christ of Czestochowa with rainbow halos. The image was created in 2019 in protest against anti-LGBT+ statements of the Polish Church. It sparked controversy and led to a criminal investigation and a trial for offending religious feelings and desecrating a ritual object. The activists, who faced trial, were eventually acquitted by the Polish court. Its verdict concluded that this act had not meant to hurt Polish Catholics: “It cannot be claimed that the rainbow flag of LGBT people offends anyone”.

The story around the poster is well explained and contextualised in the exhibition texts and in the exhibition catalogue. Both the criticisms and the court ruling are presented, in line with the commitment of the House of European History to multi-perspectivity.

The poster was chosen to be part of the exhibition – together with the exhibited poster “Je suis Charlie” – in order to reflect about the freedom of expression and to debate about different standpoints, which is the basis of a healthy society. This choice is the result of extensive research by academically independent historians and curators and broad discussions and peer-reviews with the Academic Committee, composed of renowned historians from all over Europe.’

Background to the exhibition

The poster is one of about 150 selected to be part of the ‘When Walls Talk’ exhibition of posters that illustrate European society over the last century. Further information on the House of European History can be found in the Museum’s Mission and Vision statement.

Main points made in the reply in Polish

‘Przekazaliśmy też Pani / Pana wiadomość Radzie Nadzorczej Domu Historii Europejskiej. Rada dokładnie przeanalizowała poruszoną w niej kwestię i na swoim ostatnim posiedzeniu jednogłośnie przyjęła następujące oświadczenie:

„Państwa wątpliwości budzi plakat Matki Boskiej Częstochowskiej z tęczową aureolą. Powstał on w 2019 roku w proteście przeciwko wypowiedziom anty-LGBT+ polskiego Kościoła. Plakat wywołał kontrowersje i doprowadził do wszczęcia dochodzenia i procesu za naruszenie uczuć religijnych i profanację przedmiotu czci religijnej. Polski sąd ostatecznie uniewinnił oskarżone aktywistki. W uzasadnieniu wyroku stwierdzono, że celem działań oskarżonych nie była obraza polskich katolików, ponieważ »symbol flagi osób nieheteronormatywnych nie może być uznawany sam w sobie za znieważający«.

Historię plakatu dobrze wyjaśniono w tekstach oraz w katalogu wystawy. Grafikę umieszczono też w odpowiednim kontekście. Na wystawie przedstawiono zarówno krytykę plakatu, jak i orzeczenie sądu, zgodnie ze zobowiązaniem Domu Historii Europejskiej do prezentowania wielu punktów widzenia.

Plakat został zaprezentowany – wraz z plakatem „Je suis Charlie” – aby zainspirować refleksję nad wolnością wypowiedzi i debatę na temat różnych perspektyw, co stanowi podstawę zdrowego społeczeństwa. Wybrano go w następstwie dogłębnych badań przeprowadzonych przez niezależnych historyków i kuratorów oraz szeroko zakrojonych dyskusji i ocen z Komitetem Akademickim, w którego skład wchodzą renomowani historycy z całej Europy”.

Kontekst wystawy

Plakat jest jednym z około 150 prezentowanych w ramach wystawy Kiedy ściany mają głos, która opowiada o europejskim społeczeństwie w ciągu ostatnich stu lat. Więcej informacji na temat Domu Historii Europejskiej znajdzie Pani / Pan w oświadczeniu o misji i wizji muzeum.’