European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

During his first visit to the European Parliament and the European Council, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appealed to the European Union to provide his country with aircraft and other military equipment needed to repel Russia’s further military aggression. Greeted with a standing ovation in the European Parliament, Zelenskyy said that Ukraine was not only defending its own independence, but also the ‘European way of life’. EU leaders vowed to stand by Ukraine with steadfast support, but Member States have so far failed to make a firm commitment to send fighter jets to Kyiv.

In recent weeks, Russia has been pouring tens of thousands of freshly mobilised soldiers into Ukraine in a move likely in anticipation of a big offensive in February, coinciding with the first anniversary of the war. Russia has boasted of initial gains, but progress has been incremental at best. Overall, there is little movement at the front-line on either side, as the armies are locked in battle in snow-covered trenches, which both sides describe as the deadliest fighting of the war.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

More intensive arms supplies and training for the Ukrainian army
Centre for Eastern Studies, February 2023

Ukraine business resilience can inform reconstruction
Chatham House, February 2023

How Ukraine’s invention and resilience confounds Russia
Chatham House, February 2023

Germany too slow in arming Ukraine
Chatham House, February 2023

NATO can learn from Ukraine’s military innovation
Chatham House, February 2023

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, February 2023

Europe: Crossing the East-West divide
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, February 2023

Sailing through the storm: Türkiye’s Black Sea strategy amidst the Russian-Ukrainian war
European Union Institute for Security Studies, February 2023

Leopard 2 tanks and Ukraine’s war: Keeping an eye on the geopolitical ball
Friends of Europe, February 2023

The Russians aren’t complying with the New START Nuclear Arms Control Treaty: Now what?
Heritage Foundation, February 2023

What is America’s strategic interest in Ukraine?
Hoover Institution, February 2023

Russian offensive campaign update
Institute for the Study of War, February 2023

Russian offensive campaign assessment
Institute for the Study of War, February 2023

A tale of two wars and the pitfalls of success
Rand Corporation, February 2023

Waffenlieferungen an die Ukraine
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2023

No time for timidity in Ukraine
Brookings Institution, January 2023

How the war in Ukraine hinders US-Russian nuclear arms control
Brookings Institution, January 2023

The long war in Ukraine
Brookings Institution, Foreign Affairs, January 2023

Refugees must be central to the reconstruction of Ukraine
Brookings Institution, January 2023

Scholz’s tank decision upends Germany’s long affair with Russia
Carnegie Europe, January 2023

Nearly one year in: How does this war end?
Carnegie Europe, January 2023

Ukraine: A wave of dismissals against a background of corruption
Centre for Eastern Studies, January 2023

Western tanks won’t reach Ukraine before spring
Centre for Eastern Studies, January 2023

Germany, Russia and Ukraine: From ‘turning point’ to missing the point
Centre for European Reform, January 2023

Is European defence missing its moment?
Centre for European Reform, January 2023

The West is sending light tanks to Ukraine: Will they make a difference?
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023

The Scholz way
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, January 2023

Send in the Leopards: Why Western allies should deliver tanks to Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023

Digging in for the long haul in Ukraine: The army of the East and the army of the West
Friends of Europe, January 2023

When the Ukraine war ends, the winner will be…Turkey
Friends of Europe, January 2023

How the West can help Ukraine: Three strategies for achieving a Ukrainian victory and rebirth
GLOBSEC, January 2023

Ukrainian refugees in Visegrad countries: Societal attitudes and challenges of accommodating people fleeing thewar
GLOBSEC, January 2023

Interpol is doing Russia’s dirty work
Heritage Foundation, January 2023

How to get a breakthrough in Ukraine
Hoover Institution, January 2023

La Russie en guerre et le monde musulman
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2023

Russia’s war in Ukraine: What are the emerging military lessons?
Institute for International and Strategic Studies, January 2023

Keeping the right balance in supporting Ukraine
International Crisis Group, January 2023

La neutralité, une idée périmée en Europe?
Jacques Delors Institute, January 2023

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson institute for International Economics, January 2023

Avoiding a long war in Ukraine, gun violence, migrant surges
Rand Corporation, January 2023

The opposite of war fatigue: How European support for Ukraine keeps getting stronger Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, January 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Ukraine: Awaiting Russia’s offensive‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The highlight of the February II 2023 plenary session was a debate with the Council and the European Commission marking one year since Russia’s invasion and the start of its war of aggression against Ukraine. Members also debated the European Union response to the humanitarian situation following the earthquake in Türkiye and Syria. Members discussed EU funding allocated to non-governmental organisations incriminated in recent corruption revelations, following up on measures requested by Parliament to strengthen the integrity of European institutions and to establish an independent EU ethics body.

The European Commission and Council also made statements on a Green Deal industrial plan and access to strategic critical raw materials. Parliament discussed the outcome of the recent special European Council meeting, and among other topics concerning non-EU countries, the further repressions against the people of Belarus, in particular the cases of Andrzej Poczobut and Ales Bialiatski.

Finally, in a formal sitting, Members heard an address by Egils Levits, President of the Republic of Latvia.

REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans

Members debated and adopted the provisional agreement reached with the Council on REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans. The amendments to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) should enable EU countries to use their RRF plans to fund additional energy investment and reform measures necessitated by the twin climate and energy crises. Parliament’s negotiators have ensured that the RRF amendments prioritise tackling energy poverty and small businesses, and that spending under the plans will be fully transparent.

CO2 emission standards for cars and vans

Transport is the only sector in which greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have continued to rise. In line with measures to tackle climate change, Members held a debate and approved the interinstitutional agreement reached with the Council on reducing road transport emissions under the ‘Fit for 55’ initiative. To set stricter CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans, Parliament’s negotiators have succeeded in introducing more ambitious zero low emission vehicle (ZLEV) incentives; limits to the maximum contribution of sustainable production (or ‘eco-innovation’) to CO2 reduction efforts; and have ensured measures are based on real-world energy consumption and emissions data.

Union secure connectivity programme 2023-2027

Members debated and approved an interinstitutional agreement on a proposal to ensure a resilient, interconnected and secure satellite system for the EU. Known as IRIS², this secure connectivity programme will run until 2027, setting up dedicated EU infrastructure to end EU dependency on other countries’ systems, which will be designed and deployed under private partnership to improve cyber-resilience and cybersecurity, high-speed broadband and seamless connectivity. The agreement on the proposal reflects Parliament’s priority for improved telecommunications security and a more sustainable space policy.

Electoral rights of mobile Union citizens

Parliament considered and adopted reports on two proposals to eliminate barriers to exercising the electoral rights of European citizens resident in Member States of which they are not nationals, such as a lack of information or difficult registration procedures. The Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) report on electoral rights in European Parliament elections underlines the need for improved access to voting booths, and encourages civil society involvement in ensuring citizens can obtain information, including in their own language. Members also debated and adopted a Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) report on proposals reinforcing mobile citizens’ electoral rights in municipal elections. The LIBE report calls for an end to derogations and restrictions, and urges Member States to facilitate voting for citizens with disabilities. Both files fall under the consultation procedure (where the Council is not bound by Parliament’s opinion), and the Council has to adopt the proposals unanimously.

European Central Bank annual report

Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), attended the plenary for a debate on an Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee own-initiative report on the 2021 ECB annual report. The report raises concerns about the high levels of inflation – at 2.6 % on average in 2021, but subsequently reaching 9.2 % in 2022. The ECON committee welcomes ECB measures to raise interest rates and the Bank’s recognition of the need to progress fiscal integration in the EU. However, it also warns that measures must be gradual, targeted and justified. The ECON committee particularly welcomes the ECB’s plans to incorporate climate risk in monetary policy.

EU accession to the Istanbul Convention

The Council of Europe’s Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (known as the Istanbul Convention) sets standards on prevention, protection, prosecution and services for those at risk of gender-based violence. Parliament has repeatedly called for EU accession to the Istanbul Convention as well as its ratification by those individual EU countries that have yet to do so. However, certain ‘deliberate misinterpretations’ persist. Members debated and adopted a joint report from Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and the LIBE committee on EU accession to the Istanbul Convention. The report calls for constructive dialogue, aimed at dispelling remaining Member State concerns, and stresses that while not exempting individual countries from the need to ratify, EU accession can take place before all have done so.

Question time – Strengthened EU Western Balkan enlargement policy

Members posed questions to Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi regarding the EU’s strengthened Western Balkan enlargement policy. Under Article 49 TEU, the Parliament must consent to any accession to the EU. Its budgetary powers give it direct influence over the amounts allocated to enlargement tools, and Parliament recommends full use of the new EU enlargement methodology to accelerate integration for countries that demonstrate commitment to EU-related reform.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without a vote, six mandates to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from the ECON committee, on reports on: i) requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor; ii) on supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks; iii) on delegation arrangements, liquidity risk management, supervisory reporting, provision of depositary and custody services and loan origination by alternative investment funds; iv) on establishing a European single access point providing centralised access to publicly available information of relevance to financial services, capital markets and sustainability; and v) on amending certain directives and vi) regulations as regards the establishment and functioning of the European single access point. Members also confirmed, without a vote, one Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) decision to enter into negotiations on the report on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductors (‘chips act’), one decision from the LIBE committee on the report regarding digitalisation of the visa procedure, and one decision from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) on the report on the 2023 European Year of Skills.

Read this ‘plenary at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – February II 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jaan Soone with Jonas Matthias Winkel.

Resilience in transport refers to the ability of a transportation system to recover from disruptions, adapt to changing conditions and continue to provide users with reliable and efficient services. This resilience can be affected by various factors such as weather events, accidents, equipment failures, system overload, political crises and other unexpected events.

A resilient transport system is one that can quickly respond to these disruptions, recover and return to normal operations. For example, a resilient transport system may have redundancy built into its infrastructure or have contingency plans in place to mitigate the impact of disruptions.

Resilience in transport is important because it ensures that people and goods can continue to move efficiently and safely even in the face of unexpected events. This is particularly important for critical infrastructure such as airports, seaports and highways, where disruptions can have far-reaching impacts on the economy and society.

With the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine, the EU transport sector has had much to contend with in the last three years. This has further highlighted the importance of looking at the sector’s resilience. The Commission published a new contingency plan for transport in the summer of 2022 and an agreement was reached in December 2022 on improving the resilience of critical entities, including transport companies. 

During the COVID-19 crisis, contact restrictions, public transport closures and border closures affected traffic. In the current crisis, truck drivers have been stranded in conflict zones, the airspace in these conflict zones is closed, and Ukraine’s transport infrastructure has been destroyed and blocked. As a result, supply chains are disrupted and food and energy prices are rising across the world.

The EU decided on a number of immediate measures to support Ukraine’s economy and economic recovery and help to stabilise world food markets and improve global food security, including improvements in transportation links. On 12 May 2022, EU Member States decided to establish alternative transport links between the EU and Ukraine for all modes of transport. These ‘solidarity lanes‘ were developed, in particular, to transport agricultural products from Ukraine and bring the required grain to the world market. Normally, Ukraine delivers about 45 million tonnes of grain annually to the world market, but Russian blockades of Ukrainian ports have prevented grain from being shipped and have caused food prices to rise. The lives of millions of people who depend on this grain are at risk.

The solidarity lanes have already enabled more than 15 million tonnes of grain to be exported by sea, rail and road. In addition, the Black Sea Grain (BSG) initiative has unblocked Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea, helping to end tensions in global food prices. Through the BSG initiative, more than 12 million tonnes of food have already been shipped. The solidarity lanes are also being used for non-agricultural products, such as fuel and aid, and the corridors have already enabled Ukraine to generate more than €15 billion in revenue.

To maintain and further develop the corridors, the EU has mobilised new investment. The Commission is fast-tracking funding of €250 million to expand the corridors and, in the medium term, there will be investment in permanent infrastructure to further expand and strengthen the solidarity lanes. Together with partner financial institutions and the European Investment Bank, the EU is providing a total of €1 billion to strengthen and expand the corridors.

To develop a longer-term approach to ensuring transportation in times of crisis, on 23 May 2022 the Commission published a contingency plan for transport to improve the resilience of the transport sector in the EU in times of crisis. The Commission’s goal is to ensure that, even during crises, flows of goods are not interrupted and transport services can be provided without delay.

To improve crisis preparedness and response capabilities, the Commission is proposing a number of measures to respond quickly and effectively to crises. For example, it wants EU transport legislation to be amended quickly to introduce provisions to improve the way major crises are managed. The connectivity and sustainability of the EU transport system should also be improved and further financial resources mobilised to respond to crises.

Strengthening cybersecurity is an essential tool to improve the resilience of the transport sector, according to the plan. The Commission and EU agencies should therefore continue to support the development of cybersecurity protocols to ensure continuity of operations in the event of a disruption.

The Commission also recommends conducting emergency exercises to assess crisis preparedness. The lessons that can be learned from these exercises should help agencies prepare for emergencies.

The plan promotes several key principles that should apply in crisis response. For example, restricting the movement of goods and personnel must only be a last resort; there must be no discrimination based on nationality when measures are introduced; the measures taken must be coordinated; all measures must be disclosed transparently and be traceable; and attention should be paid to passengers with special needs and transport workers, who should be supported in the best possible way.

A number of other initiatives have been put in place to develop resilience in the EU’s policy measures, including those for improving resilience in transport.

In 2020, the Commission proposed to revise and expand the critical infrastructure directive to further strengthen the rules in light of the new challenges facing the EU, such as the rise of the digital economy, the growing impacts of climate change, and terrorist threats. The Commission argued that recent crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have shown the vulnerability of increasingly interdependent societies in the face of high-impact, low-probability risks and how supply chain disruptions can have a negative economic and societal impact across a large number of sectors and across borders.

Following the changes introduced by the Council and Parliament, the legal act was adopted in December 2022. The directive aims to bolster resilience of ‘critical entities’ – organisations in sectors such as energy, transport, health and drinking water. To this end, EU countries will put in place national strategies, carrying out regular risk assessments, and identify the critical entities that provide essential services. According to the rules, these critically important organisations – such as transport operators, airports, ports and intelligent transport operators – will need to identify the relevant risks that may significantly disrupt the provision of essential services, take appropriate counter-measures to ensure their resilience, and notify authorities of disruptive incidents.

Meanwhile, some current rules on enhancing ship and port facility security, enhancing port security and civil aviation security already require entities in the aviation and maritime transport sectors to prevent incidents caused by unlawful acts and to resist and mitigate the consequences of such incidents. Furthermore, the 2014 EU maritime security strategy and its action plan, which are currently being revised, call for increased protection of critical maritime infrastructure, including underwater infrastructure.

Indeed, the EU has been pushing for greater focus on critical transport and energy protection for some years. The European programme for critical infrastructure protection (EPCIP), set up in 2006, aimed to provide a framework for activities to improve the protection of critical infrastructure in Europe, not only from terrorism but also from criminal activities, natural disasters and other causes of accidents. Meanwhile, a directive on critical infrastructure protection for the energy and transport sectors was adopted in 2008, which the new critical entities directive has replaced.

At the level of strategic planning, the 2020 Strategic Foresight Report aimed to introduceresilience as a new compass for EU policymaking. For example, the report lists transport infrastructure as one of the key enablers of economic resilience. In its 2022 Strategic Foresight Report, the Commission outlined how the policy priorities of greening and digitalisation can foster further resilience in the EU. For example, greater use of digitalisation and autonomous vehicles – which itself will depend on societal acceptance, on investment and on a supportive policy framework – would allow the development of mobility as a service, micromobility, pooling and sharing and new services to improve contact with regions, further improving transport efficiency as well as connectivity and accessibility.

Written by Anne Altmayer (1st edition).

On 14 September 2022, the European Commission presented a proposal for a regulation to prohibit products made using forced labour, including child labour, on the internal market of European Union (EU). The proposed legislation fits into the context of EU efforts to promote decent work worldwide.

The proposal covers all products made available within the EU market, meaning both products made in the EU for domestic consumption and for export, and imported goods. The provisions of the proposal would apply to products of any type, including their components, regardless of the sector or industry.

Member States would be responsible for the enforcement of the regulation’s provisions. Their national authorities would be empowered to withdraw products made using forced labour from the EU market, following an investigation. Customs authorities would identify and stop products made using forced labour at EU borders.

In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). Maria‑Manuel Leitão‑Marques has been appointed as rapporteur.

Versions

• February 2023: Proposal for a ban on goods made using forced labour (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market Committee responsible:Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2022) 453 final

Rapporteur:Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal)2022/0269(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Krzysztof Hetman (EPP, Poland)
Svenja Hahn (Renew, Germany)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (GUE/NGL, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Monika Kiss.

Cycling contributes to the EU’s green transition by reducing road congestion and noise pollution, and by improving air quality. It also plays an important role in improving health through cleaner air and more physical exercise, and in enhancing economic growth by creating new, green jobs and encouraging the circular economy. Nevertheless, cycling infrastructure in the EU is inadequate: there is a lack of dedicated cycling lanes (leading to a significant risk of accidents) and there are not enough secured bike parking places. In addition, measures to prevent theft are insufficient and there is a lack of charging stations for e-bikes. This does not allow cycling to expand in urban environments.

Cycling policies are the Member States’ responsibility, with each country setting up its own regulatory framework. Practical measures, such as developing cycling networks or adapting the public transport network to facilitate combined trips, are taken at local or regional level. EU-level intervention consists of promoting cycling, providing financial support – through the European structural and investment funds and the Recovery and Resilience Facility – and sharing best practice. The sustainable and smart mobility strategy, as well as the Commission’s communications on the new EU urban mobility framework and ‘Save Energy‘ all stress the need to increase the modal share of public transport, walking and cycling in urban areas. There is, however, no EU-level strategy.

The European Parliament has repeatedly highlighted and supported cycling as a transport mode, as well as cyclists’ interests. In a 2015 resolution on implementing the 2011 Commission white paper on transport, the Parliament stressed the importance of supporting regional programmes to establish and expand cycling networks in large European regions, and of collecting better data on transport use behaviour regarding cycling. Cycling was also mentioned in a 2020 resolution on the Green Deal, where the Parliament asked for a more comprehensive urban mobility plan to reduce congestion and improve liveability in towns and cities, through support for zero-emissions public transport and cycling and walking infrastructure. In a 2021 resolution on the 2021–2030 EU road safety policy framework, the Parliament emphasised the importance of the cycling infrastructure deployed by Member States in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which should not only remain in place, but also be further expanded and promoted. The Parliament drafted a resolution on the urban mobility framework in 2022, in which it drew attention to road fatalities in urban areas; 70 % of the victims of these accidents are vulnerable road users, such as pedestrians and cyclists.

European Parliament resolution

The European Parliament has just adopted its first resolution dedicated exclusively to cycling in all its aspects. Calling on the Commission to develop a dedicated European cycling strategy, the resolution also urges the Commission to recognise cycling as a fully-fledged transport mode and to put it on equal footing with the other modes. Cycling should be integrated into urban mobility – for instance, with cycle highways between suburban areas and city centres, secured bike parking facilities close to urban transport nodes, and affordable e-bike and bike-sharing schemes. Cycling should also be integrated into interurban transport – for example, by building cycle lanes parallel to railway tracks or inland waterways when upgrading the TEN-T network, or by making more places available for bikes inside trains.

Cycling is a valuable alternative for travel over short distances in urban and rural areas, and for tourism, but this potential has to be unlocked. Therefore, the resolution asks for more investment by Member States, local authorities and other stakeholders in cycling infrastructure and related facilities, and in cycling-related training and awareness raising. In this way, more people who are interested in cycling could get (back) on a bike. According to the resolution, cycling also has the potential to create 1 million new jobs by 2030 by absorbing and reskilling workers. To achieve this, it is crucial to enhance the production of bikes and e-bikes within the EU.

Cycling can offer an affordable transport alternative for vulnerable social groups who may be exposed to transport poverty. The resolution therefore encourages Member States and local actors to develop support systems to facilitate the purchase of bicycles or participation in bike-sharing systems.

To help prevent accidents, the Commission is invited to work with the Member States to draw up common road-safety guidelines and recommendations for micro-mobility, e.g. on speed limits, helmet requirements and training. The resolution also suggests that the Commission declare 2024 the European Year of Cycling.

The draft resolution was adopted by the TRAN committee on 31 January 2023, and voted in plenary on 16 February. In its plenary statement on the resolution, the Commission noted that cycling has already been taken into account in a number of Commission initiatives, such as REPowerEU and the Fit for 55 package. However, the security of cyclists remains an important issue to resolve. To this end, the Commission plans to set up a dedicated expert group and to come up with recommendations.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik.

As shown by the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus, the power of Aliaksandr Lukashenka depends entirely on Russia. That is why his regime has offered his country’s territory to Russia to support it in its aggression against Ukraine. The question is whether the Belarusian army is capable of supporting Russia in direct battle, without further undermining the stability of Lukashenka’s regime. As bilateral military cooperation progresses, with repetitive military exercises and a growing Russian military presence in Belarus, the answer remains unclear.

Belarusian army power and shared borders

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2022, the Belarusian army has roughly 48 000 troops (of which 6 150 in special operation forces) and a further 12 000 state border troops. The estimated number of reservists who have served within the past 5 years is 290 000. The Belarusian army ranks 60th in the 2023 global firepower index – behind Hungary and Bulgaria and ahead of Slovakia and Belgium. Both Belarus and Russia are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a Moscow-led military alliance; this year, Belarus holds the CSTO presidency. The length of the Belarusian border is as follows: 1 084 km with Ukraine, 1 250 km with the EU, and 1 283 km with Russia.

Lukashenka’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine

In November 2021, Lukashenka, whose regime depends on Russian support, abandoned his policy of non-recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and his previously assumed mediating role in the Ukraine conflict, and stated that Crimea is ‘legally Russian’. After Lukashenka pledged loyalty to Moscow, Russian troops entered Belarus and held joint military exercises lasting longer than planned (10‑20 February 2022). The exercises served as a cover-up for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February. Russian forces based in Belarus attacked Kyiv and Chernihiv, and initially took control of the Chernobyl power plant, and of nearby cities and villages, such as Irpin and Bucha, where they committed war crimes.

Constitutional referendum in Belarus and the issue of a nuclear-free zone
The attack on Ukraine coincided with a constitutional referendum in Belarus, which took place on 27 February. The referendum replaced an article that had the declared aim of making the country’s territory a nuclear-free zone and the state neutral, with a new article explicitly stating that ‘Belarus excludes military aggression against other states from its territory’ – a commitment already broken at the time of voting – but leaving out the aim of a nuclear-free zone. At the time of writing, Belarus remains a non-nuclear state party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Currently, as underlined by experts, Belarus supports Russian armed forces in many ways. First, it provides its territory for Russian missile strikes and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks against Ukraine. It also supplies Russia with military equipment, including tanks and ammunition, military training and health care, logistics and other services (e.g. accommodation, fuel-processing and military equipment repairs). Belarus serves as a safe haven for the Russian army. Moreover, the constant threat of invasion across the Belarusian border keeps part of the Ukrainian army there, rather than on the front line where it is most needed.

Furthermore, there are repeated signs that Russia is pressuring Belarus to send its soldiers to Ukraine. Belarusians, regardless of their political position, are against direct military engagement in Ukraine. Some claim that the decision to send troops could spark a new wave of massive protests and expose the lack of Belarusian army support for the regime, with some units putting down arms or switching sides. Besides further destabilising the situation in the region, such a scenario would further increase Lukashenka’s dependence on Russia. Russia, as suggested in the past, might then try to choose a new ruler for Belarus. Some experts argue that for these reasons, the current arrangements may be optimal for both Putin and Lukashenka. The experts add, however, that constant monitoring of the situation (with regard to the scale of Russian troops and equipment on Belarusian soil) is necessary, as this assumption of an optimal scenario for both sides may change or prove incorrect.

Military cooperation

The new military doctrine of the Union State of Belarus and Russia, a slowly-progressing integration framework covering the two countries, was approved on 4 November 2021, 22 years after the Union State was created. The doctrine pays special attention to actions to be taken during a period of perceived increased military threat. These actions include pursuing agreed security and foreign policy, regular joint exercises, deepened defence industry cooperation, coordination of armament procurement and a bi-national Regional Group of Forces (RGF); in 1999 the Treaty on the Union State referred to it as a ‘regional grouping of troops’ (the media use both names). Other actions include infrastructure development and the establishment of an RGF joint command. The doctrine further addresses hybrid threats, including information warfare and cyber. Soon after its adoption, Russia launched its open invasion of Ukraine.

In October 2022, Lukashenka announced that the RGF would be formed on Belarusian territory, owing to an alleged ‘threat’ to the borders of the Union State. Analysts found it possible that, by pointing to a ‘threat’ to Belarus’ external borders, Lukashenka was trying to argue against direct involvement of the Belarusian armed forces in Ukraine. However, as shown below, it only further stepped up Russia’s military presence in Belarus (with the Russian RGF component officially estimated at 9 000 soldiers), accelerated the two armies’ integration, and deepened the regime’s dependency on the stronger partner – Moscow.

December 2022 was marked by many high-level bilateral meetings. On 3 December, the Russian and Belarusian ministers of defence signed a protocol amending the 1997 agreement on the joint provision of regional security in the military sphere. While the content of the amendment remains confidential, some assume it covers the establishment and operation of joint training centres, which would lead to the unification of the two sides’ training systems and increase interoperability. On 19 December, Putin and Lukashenka held a meeting in Minsk where they agreed that Belarus and Russia would create a ‘common defence space’. Experts expect that such a space will translate into even closer joint defence activities and planning, with a permanent Russian military presence in Belarus. On the same day, Lukashenka announced the start of the combat duty of Iskander-M (the short-range ballistic missile system capable of carrying nuclear weapons) and of the S-400 air defence missile system received from Russia. Putin confirmed that Russia would provide training for Belarusian pilots of jets capable of carrying nuclear weapons (Belarus claims that its jets have been modified to be able to carry out this task, although Belarus does not have nuclear weapons). Other December 2022 announcements include joint military exercises in Belarus, Russian support for Belarusian railway troop development (note that Belarusian railway workers managed to disrupt military transit through the country by sabotaging infrastructure) and increased intelligence cooperation.

Joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises took place on Belarusian soil in early 2023, reportedly focusing on urban warfare, followed by air force drills. A key part of the most recent joint staff training of the RGF Joint Command was ‘decision-making on the use of a regional grouping of troops in the interests of ensuring the military security of the Union State’. Reportedly, the training was ‘aimed at increasing the compatibility of the military authorities of the two states’ and ‘is the next stage of preparation for the joint operational exercise ‘Union Shield – 2023’.

According to a leader of the Belarusian opposition, everything is ready for mobilisation in Belarus, as evidenced by Lukashenka’s decision in October 2022 to verify military reservists’ records. Some view this as hidden mobilisation, while for others it is merely a way to check how many reservists have left the country since 2020. In December 2022, Belarus ran a check of its troops’ combat readiness.

European Parliament position

In its resolutions, the European Parliament has repeatedly condemned the use of Belarusian territory for Russian aggression against Ukraine. Moreover, in a resolution of 24 November 2022, it endorsed the position of the Belarusian democratic opposition and civil society that ‘Belarus should be recognised as an occupied or de facto occupied territory’. On 19 January 2023, Parliament stated that the tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine ‘must have jurisdiction to investigate … also Aliaksandr Lukashenka and the political and military leadership in Belarus, as an enabling state’. On 19 October 2022, in its plenary session, the European Parliament debated Lukashenka regime’s active role in the war against Ukraine.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia-Belarus military cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The symbolic attendance of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, at the special European Council meeting, and his poignant address to EU leaders, meant that the meeting focused more on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine than initially envisaged. EU leaders discussed with the Ukrainian President his 10-point peace plan, a possible new sanctions package, additional military, financial and humanitarian support, and the road towards opening Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations. The other points on the agenda were the EU’s economic competitiveness, and migration. On the first point, EU leaders agreed to targeted and temporary support for strategic sectors for the green transition, and to a redeployment of existing EU funding towards sustainable technologies. They also stressed the importance of a strong trade policy in boosting EU competitiveness. On migration, while condemning attempts to instrumentalise migrants for political purposes, EU leaders agreed on immediate measures to reduce pressure at the EU’s external borders, notably through enhanced cooperation with third countries on returns and readmissions.

Following the deadly earthquake on 6 February, EU leaders expressed their condolences to the people of Turkey and Syria, and declared the EU’s readiness to provide further assistance. They also called urgently for progress to be made on the Belgrade–Pristina Dialogue.

1. General aspects

Originally scheduled as a two-day special meeting, the European Council completed its work in one long day − as was also the case with the December 2022 meeting. Despite lasting only one day, the meeting’s conclusions were longer and more detailed than average (more than 50 per cent longer than the average length of conclusions in 2022). After a period of shorter conclusions under former European Council President Donald Tusk, the trend has been for a steady increase in the length of conclusions since Charles Michel took office.

As a result of the attendance of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the customary order of proceedings was modified at this special European Council meeting. Zelenskyy addressed EU Heads of State or Government at the start of the meeting, in the presence of the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. She took the floor later in the afternoon.

This meeting was most likely the last European Council for the outgoing President of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, as former foreign minister Nikos Christodoulides was elected president on 12 February. Leo Varadkar returned to the European Council, as Irish Taoiseach, after having held this position previously from 2017 to 2020.

Charles Michel did not use the opportunity provided by the meeting to renew the Leaders’ Agenda, the work programme for the European Council indicating future meetings and agenda items. The most recent update of the Leaders; Agenda expired in December 2022.

2. European Council meeting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

EU leaders discussed Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine for the ninth time since the outbreak of the war nearly a year ago. Zelenskyy addressed the European Council in person, which was a first, as for the past year he has always spoken with his EU counterparts by video-link. Zelenskyy’s presence in Brussels transformed the meeting from a routine gathering to a special, symbolic and poignant meeting, arguably an historic moment for both the EU and Ukraine. In his address, Zelenskyy thanked the EU leaders for their staunch support, reminded them of Russia’s hybrid warfare activities targeting the EU and its neighbourhood and warned them of Russia’s intensions to replicate the Ukraine scenario elsewhere. He urged them to go further with their sanctions against Russia and include the drone industry, and called for an international tribunal.

Michel greeted Zelenskyy, saying: ‘welcome to the EU, welcome home’. The two presidents held bilateral talks, while a series of four breakaway sessions were held to allow Zelenskyy to meet EU leaders in smaller groups. The day before the meeting, Zelenskyy had met with the French President, Emmanuel Macron, and the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, in Paris, where he received assurances that support would continue. Macron stressed that ‘Russia cannot and must not win this war’.

EU leaders reiterated their condemnation of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, which breaches the UN Charter. They called once more on Russia to end its aggression, confirmed the EU’s staunch support for Ukraine ‘for as long as it takes’, its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and the country’s right to self-defence. EU leaders reiterated their call on Russia to end its attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and stressed that deported Ukrainians, adults and children, must be allowed to return safely home.

The European Council focused on Zelenskyy’s 10-point peace plan, which it upheld, expressing support for the ‘peace formula’ summit, committing to work to ensure wide participation. EU leaders agreed ‘to maintain and seek to further increase’ pressure on Russia to end the war and withdraw from Ukraine. The European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, confirmed that a 10th sanctions package, which could ‘target Putin’s propagandists’ and introduce ‘an additional export ban worth more than €10 billion’, was in preparation. For now, EU leaders have committed only to reinforce existing and anti-circumvention measures, referring to the agreement on a price cap on petroleum products − a measure intended ‘to further raise the cost’ of the war for Russia.

The military, financial and humanitarian support that the EU and its Member States have already given Ukraine totals €67 billion, including nearly €12 billion in military support. As underlined in the joint statement following the 24th EU-Ukraine summit, EU leaders confirmed that the EU would provide Ukraine with ‘political, economic, military, financial and humanitarian support for as long as it takes’. They reiterated their support for the work done jointly with international partners in bolstering the EU solidarity lanes, trade and exports from Ukraine. They also welcomed the launch of the Donor Coordination Platform and called for efforts to step up work on using ‘Russia’s frozen and immobilised assets to support Ukraine’s reconstruction’. EU leaders confirmed that more demining assistance would be provided and, for the first time, acknowledged the importance of the rehabilitation and reintegration of former military personnel.

On accountability, EU leaders stressed the Union’s commitment to hold all perpetrators to account for their war crimes. They confirmed the EU’s support for the establishment of ‘an appropriate mechanism for the prosecution of the crime of aggression‘, for the creation in The Hague of an international centre for the prosecution of the crime of aggression against Ukraine, and for investigations by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

The EU leaders recognised the progress made by Ukraine in fulfilling the conditionality outlined in the European Commission’s opinion on the country’s membership application. Zelenskyy emphasised Ukraine’s goal of opening accession negotiations by the end of 2023. Von der Leyen, however, noted that there was ‘no rigid timeline’, stressing that the Commission would provide an oral report on Ukraine’s progress in the spring and a written report in the autumn.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola warned EU leaders that ‘we cannot allow war fatigue to set in’, calling for more support for Ukraine. Earlier that day, when hosting Zelenskyy in an extraordinary plenary session of Parliament, Metsola stressed that ‘our response must be proportional to the threat − and the threat is existential’.

Economy

At the special meeting, EU leaders discussed the EU’s long-term competitiveness and role in the global setting, in the light of the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) − which it is feared will take away EU companies and jobs − and of a general rise in global competition. The EU approach builds on deepening the single market, a success story celebrating its 30th anniversary this year, and on securing a level playing field both internally and globally.

On the basis of the Commission’s Green Deal industrial plan for the net-zero age and the associated forthcoming legislative proposals, the Heads of State or Government defined five lines of action. First, on the adaptation of State-aid policy, despite the differences in views, as highlighted by EPRS, and demonstrated by the arrival doorstep interviews, EU leaders agreed to allow ‘targeted, temporary and proportionate’ support for sectors that are strategic for the green transition. In doing so, they insisted on the need for ‘simpler, faster and more predictable’ procedures. The European Council also asked the Commission to report regularly on the impact of the new State aid policy on the single market and on the EU’s global competitiveness, perhaps to ease the concerns of those Member States that are apprehensive about the IRA’s potential impact on the single market.

Second, EU leaders called for more flexible deployment of existing EU funding to help European industries to roll out key green technologies in a timely and targeted manner. In order to avoid imbalances in the single market, the process should occur in both a fair and a more flexible way, and without compromising cohesion policy objectives. Third, EU leaders also called for a simple, predictable and clear regulatory environment, including simplified administrative and permitting procedures and modernised public procurement rules to promote green industries and EU standards more effectively.

With 2023 designated European Year of Skills, the European Council’s fourth point was a call for increased investment in skills. Considering demographic challenges, job transformation, and labour shortages, the development of skills is considered crucial for the green and digital transitions.

The fifth point focused on closing the EU’s public and private investment gaps, which it is feared could undermine growth. In that context, EU leaders called for an acceleration of work on the capital markets union action plan. They also took note of the Commission’s intention to present a proposal on a European sovereignty fund before summer 2023, to support strategic sectors.

As expected, EU leaders underlined the importance of a strong trade agenda, combining openness and engagement with partners with the use of trade defence instruments to counter unfair practices. The European Council also reiterated its call for increased efforts to diversify supply chains, notably of critical raw materials, that will play an important role in the green tech industry.

Von der Leyen stated that the Commission would table − in time for the March European Council meeting − a concrete proposal taking into account the discussions at the special meeting. Michel noted that the EU’s long-term competitiveness, trade and internal market policy would be discussed at both the March and June 2023 European Council meetings.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Metsola pointed to the added value the single market had brought Europe over 30 years and to the need to gain a competitive edge by speeding up investment, sticking to democratic values, and avoiding a protectionist race to the bottom.

Migration

The highly controversial discussions on migration, notably on the question of the financing of fences with EU money, resulted in conclusions framed in language that managed to satisfy the differing positions. Michel reported that the European Council had focused on three areas, namely i) external action, ii) returns and readmissions, and iii) protection of external borders.

The European Council agreed to increase the EU’s external actions to ‘prevent irregular departures and loss of life, to reduce pressure on EU borders and on reception capacities, to fight against smugglers’. This would be achieved through intensified cooperation with countries of origin and transit, and the development of ‘mutually beneficial partnerships’. The EU’s neighbouring countries, the visa policies of which would be strictly monitored, were urged to align with the EU.

To ensure effective returns to countries of origin and transit, all possible forms of leverage would be used, while considering visa restrictions against countries which do not cooperate. EU Member States were invited to recognise each other’s return decisions.

To protect the EU’s external borders, EU leaders stressed the role of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and called on the Commission to act immediately to ‘mobilise substantial EU funds and means to support Member States in reinforcing border protection capabilities and infrastructure, means of surveillance, including aerial surveillance, and equipment’.

While not focusing on the internal dimension of migration, EU leaders called on the co-legislators to complete work on the migration and asylum pact and on the revised Schengen borders code and the return directive. After having been absent from the European Council agenda in 2019 and 2020, and mainly mentioned in the context of Belarus and Ukraine in 2021 and 2022, EU leaders committed to ‘revert to the matter on a regular basis’. Charles Michel indicated that the European Council meeting of 23-24 March 2023 would already review progress on the implementation of decisions taken at this February special European Council meeting. In the meantime the Council would discuss the implementation of the Dublin roadmap and the matter of operations by private entities in search and rescue operations.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Metsola stressed that all the current challenges relating to migration, such as strengthening the EU’s external borders, resolving the issue of secondary movements and enhancing cooperation with third countries, could be dealt with through the European pact on migration and asylum. She insisted, therefore, that ‘it is imperative that negotiations begin between the two co-legislators within the next months, to allow enough time to strike the right balance’.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 9 February 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tambiama Madiega (1st edition).

The European Commission published a proposal for a directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (the ‘AI liability directive’) in September 2022. The Commission proposes to complement and modernise the EU liability framework to introduce new rules specific to damages caused by AI systems. The new rules intend to ensure that persons harmed by AI systems enjoy the same level of protection as persons harmed by other technologies in the EU. The AI liability directive would create a rebuttable ‘presumption of causality’, to ease the burden of proof for victims to establish damage caused by an AI system. It would furthermore give national courts the power to order disclosure of evidence about high-risk AI systems suspected of having caused damage. Stakeholders and academics are questioning, inter alia, the adequacy and effectiveness of the proposed liability regime, its coherence with the artificial intelligence act currently under negotiation, its potential detrimental impact on innovation, and the interplay between EU and national rules.

Versions

• February 2023: Artificial intelligence liability directive (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (AI liability directive) Committee responsible:Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI)COM(2022) 496 final
28.09.022
Rapporteur:Axel Voss (EPP, Germany)2022/0303(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Lauro Panella.

Although European integration is a key driver of growth, peace, environmental protection and social prosperity, persistent challenges remain and potential crises can be anticipated. Looking forward, a number of possible pathways are open to Europe. The European Parliament favours the path of ambitious, collective EU action, where significant potential gains can be realised, not only for today, but also for various possible future scenarios.

This study seeks to support the European Parliament in defining the political agenda and stimulating debate on a sustainable path forward. It investigates the potential benefits that could be achieved in 50 policy areas, taking into account the state of EU legislation and its untapped potential, and applies quantitative analysis tailored to each policy area. If the EU does not pursue the path of ambitious, collective action, the benefits identified might not materialise fully, leading to a ‘cost of non-Europe’.

The study finds that further EU integration could generate over €2.8 trillion per year by 2032 and help to achieve the EU’s objectives in the areas of social rights, fundamental rights and the environment. Gains from further EU integration would not replace or undermine those from actions taken at national, regional or local level, but rather complement and reinforce them.

A brief summary of quantitative and qualitative impacts follows for each policy area. Quantitative impacts represent annual GDP growth. Qualitative impacts include social and environmental impacts, impacts on fundamental rights and other impacts. Rather than providing an exhaustive summary per policy action and its economic impact, this section highlights key findings from a broader perspective and provides a full range of impacts.

Read the complete study on ‘Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Following the path of strategic, collective action could offer the EU potential added value of €2.8 trillion by 2032

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Written by Stefano De Luca (1st edition).

As products have become more complex in the digital age, on 28 September 2022, the European Commission published a proposal for a new directive on liability of defective products. This would revise the existing Product Liability Directive, adopted nearly 40 years ago in 1985. The proposal aims to bring the European Union’s product liability regime up to speed with the digital age, circular economy business models and global value chains.

Addressing the need to ease the burden of proof for consumers seeking compensation for damages suffered because of defective products, the proposal also introduces new provisions to address liability for products such as software (including artificial intelligence systems) and digital services that affect how the product works (e.g. navigation services in autonomous vehicles). As the circular economy is about extending product lifecycles, the proposal clarifies the liability rules for companies that substantially modify products before resale. The proposed rules also ensure that consumers are compensated for defective products manufactured outside the EU. The proposal alleviates the burden of proof for victims under certain circumstances and obliges manufacturers to disclose information where plausible claims for compensation are made.

The next step is for the European Parliament and the Council to consider the proposal. In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) with Pascal Arimont (EPP, Belgium) appointed as rapporteur.

Versions

• February 2023: New Product Liability Directive (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European parliament and of the Council on liability for defective products Committee responsible:Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI)COM(2022) 495
28.09.022
Rapporteur:Pascal Arimont (EPP, Belgium)2022/0302(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

Corruption, and particularly grand corruption relating to government officials, has a harmful effect on democracy, the rule of law, human rights, security, the eradication of poverty, and sustainable development, all objectives of the EU’s external action. Corruption in third countries can also affect the functioning of EU democracy with flows of money buying political influence in the EU.

In her 2022 State of the Union address, the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, proposed to include corruption in the EU’s human rights sanctions regime. The Commission cannot initiate the relevant legislation on its own, however. EU sanctions are laid down in common foreign and security policy-related decisions, adopted unanimously by the Council on the basis of a proposal by the High Representative. If such a Council decision includes economic or financial sanctions, these need to be implemented by means of a Council regulation, following a joint proposal of the High Representative and the Commission.

While the drafting of the new legislation has not yet officially begun, the Council is holding debates on the appropriateness of using CFSP sanctions to target corruption. The approach to adopt in order to impose sanctions to target corruption globally could involve creating a horizontal sanctions framework (by expanding the scope of the existing human rights sanctions mechanism adopted in 2020 or by setting up a new dedicated regime), or introducing case-by-case country-specific sanctions regimes.

Although Parliament does not play a formal role in the legislative process leading to the adoption of sanctions, since 2012 – when the international debate on the possibility of establishing such a sanctions regime first arose – it has expressed strong support for an EU sanctions regime applicable to corruption globally, and has asked to be involved in this process.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Towards an EU global sanctions regime for corruption‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela Del Monte and David de Groot (1st edition).

On 25 November 2021, the European Commission submitted a proposal to modify Directive 93/109/EC on the right of mobile European Union (EU) citizens – those residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals – to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament. The proposal was presented with three others: to modify the rules on EU citizens’ rights in municipal elections; to set rules on political advertising; and to revise the rules on EU political party and foundation funding. Directive 93/109/EC gives EU citizens the same rights to vote and to be elected in European Parliament elections as the citizens of the Member State in which they reside; Member States have varying rules on the exercise of these rights. The Commission proposal seeks to address some of the concerns raised about the implementation of the directive.

In Parliament, the file was referred to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. The committee adopted its report on 1 December 2022 and a vote in plenary is scheduled for the February II 2023 plenary session.

Versions

• February 2023: Revision of Council Directive 93/109/EC: Electoral rights of mobile EU citizens in elections to the European Parliament (1st edition)

Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (recast) Committee responsible:Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO)COM(2021) 0732
25.11.2021
Rapporteur:Damian Boeselager (Greens/Germany)2021/0372(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Loránt Vincze (EPP, Romania), Pedro Silva Pereira (S&D, Portugal), Sandro Gozi (Renew, France), Leila Chaibi (GUE, France) Next steps expected: Awaiting Parliament’s vote

Written by Antonio Albaladejo Román.

For millennia, farmers have resorted to organic and mineral fertilisers to increase the quality and productivity of their crops. Some studies even date the use of fertilisers in Europe to almost 8 000 years ago. Today, fertilisers remain a key agricultural sector input, with a direct influence on the availability and affordability of food products in the EU. Despite their importance for agriculture, the production and over-use of fertilisers also entails environmental and health risks.

The agri-food sector relies mostly on three mineral substances for fertiliser production: nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus. Nitrogen fertilisers are the most-consumed mineral fertilisers in the EU (10 million tonnes in 2020) and their production process is heavily dependent on natural gas (hydrogen from natural gas and nitrogen from the air are combined to produce ammonia, an intermediate compound later turned into nitrogen-based fertiliser). This reliance on significant energy inputs is a determinant element in the global food crisis that resulted from the COVID‑19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Following the initial COVID‑19 outbreak, fertiliser producers were hit by travel restrictions and labour shortages, as well as the global logistic bottlenecks that accompanied the post-pandemic economic recovery. The high energy prices recorded in 2021 contributed to the first spike in fertiliser prices in the second half of the year. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 later exacerbated this inflationary tendency.

Before the war, Russia represented 16 % of global exports of fertilisers and nearly half of the EU’s imports of natural gas. Seeking to undermine global food security, the regime restricted Russian fertiliser and energy exports, constraining supplies and increasing prices. Although to safeguard global food supplies, the EU avoided targeting Russia’s agricultural production, it sanctioned Belarusian potash exports to curb this importance source of revenue for Minsk. Due to the excessively high prices for natural gas, 70 % of EU industrial production had to shut down in the summer of 2022. As a result, European farmers were hit by soaring fertiliser prices (149 % annual increase in September 2022), on top of higher costs for other critical inputs such as energy, seeds, and feedstuffs. Consequently, there was a dramatic increase in food inflation in the euro area – 13.8 % in December 2022, up from 3.2 % in 2021.

Tackling the rising fertiliser prices was a key priority when the European Commission proposed measures to avert a food security crisis in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion. A temporary crisis framework allowed for State aid measures, to offset rising fertiliser prices. Moreover, in November 2022 the European Commission put forward a communication on ensuring available and affordable fertilisers, outlining a series of domestic and international actions to guarantee the global supply of this critical agricultural input. In the short term, the European Commission encouraged Member States to prioritise fertiliser producers’ access to natural gas in case of shortages. In the medium and longer term, the communication highlighted the common agricultural policy strategic plans’ potential to ensure sustainable fertiliser use through import diversification, increased optimisation, and a greater emphasis on organic and sustainable fertilisers.

The European Parliament has devoted significant attention to the inflationary pressures on the prices of fertiliser. In its 24 March 2022 resolution, Parliament identified fertilisers’ critical role in the agricultural sector and their importance for EU and global food security, calling on the European Commission to ensure a stable and affordable supply. The Parliament’s focus on available and affordable fertilisers has continued into 2023. At the February II 2023 plenary session in Strasbourg, Members are set to question the European Commission on what additional measures will be adopted to ensure fertiliser availability, the EU’s future self-sufficiency in this critical agricultural input, and farmers’ access to information and resources to improve soil fertility and fertiliser management. A vote on a European Parliament resolution on the European Commission’s November communication is expected to follow the debate.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

In 2023, the EU celebrates the 30th anniversary of the single market. Recent shocks have shown not only how vulnerable to crises the single market is, but also the extent to which the EU economy relies on a well-functioning single market. It is now considered to be a key driver of EU resilience.

In September 2022, the Commission put forward a single market emergency instrument (SMEI) package. It includes one main proposal for a regulation establishing a SMEI, and two accompanying proposals amending harmonised product legislation to ensure that strategic goods can be marketed quickly to address shortages in the event of market crises. The main proposal establishes measures for contingency planning, such as an early warning system. A ‘vigilance mode’ could be activated after a threat has been identified. If a wide-ranging crisis hits the single market, an ’emergency mode’ could be triggered.

The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) is responsible for the file. It plans to consider its rapporteur’s draft report on 27-28 March 2023.

Versions

• February 2023: Single market emergency instrument: Protecting the single market in future crises (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Single Market emergency instrument and repealing Council Regulation No (EC) 2679/98 Committee responsible:Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2022) 459
19.09.022
Rapporteur:Andreas Schwab (EPP, Germany)2022/0278(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:René Repasi (S&D, Germany)
Dita Charanzová (Renew, Czechia)
Anna Cavazzini (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Not yet appointed (ID)
Not yet appointed (ECR)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

During its third plenary session of February, Parliament continues to focus on the energy and climate crises, alongside other urgent priorities. The Council and European Commission are expected to make statements on the EU response to the effects of the recent earthquake in Turkey and Syria, and also on the establishment of an independent EU ethics body. Following President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s address to a special sitting of Parliament on 9 February, the Council and Commission are also expected to give statements as we approach one year since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As part of the regular debates on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Members are due to debate the Russian regime’s inhuman treatment of Alexey Navalny and other political prisoners. On Tuesday morning, the President of the Republic of Latvia, Egils Levits, will address Members in a formal sitting.

Reaching the end of the legislative procedure on the file, Members are expected to consider the provisional agreement reached with the Council on REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans on Monday evening. If approved, the amendments to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) should enable EU countries to use their RRF plans to fund additional energy investment and reform measures necessitated by the twin climate and energy crises. Parliament’s negotiators have ensured that the RRF amendments prioritise tackling energy poverty and small businesses, and that spending under the plans will be fully transparent.

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In line with measures to tackle climate change, on Tuesday morning Members are set to debate an agreement reached with the Council on reducing road transport emissions under the ‘Fit for 55’ initiative. Transport is the only sector where greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have continued to rise. To set stricter CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans, Parliament’s negotiators have succeeded in introducing more ambitious zero low emission vehicle (ZLEV) incentives; limits to the maximum contribution of sustainable production (or ‘eco-innovation’) to CO2 reduction efforts; and have ensured measures are based on real-world energy consumption and emissions data.

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Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), is expected to attend the plenary on Wednesday afternoon, for a debate on an Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee own-initiative report on the 2021 ECB annual report. The report raises concerns about the high levels of inflation – at 2.6 % on average in 2021, but subsequently reaching 9.2 % in 2022. The ECON committee welcomes ECB measures to raise interest rates and its recognition of the need to progress fiscal integration in the EU. However, it also warns that measures must be gradual, targeted and justified. The ECON committee particularly welcomes the ECB’s plans to incorporate climate risk in monetary policy. One area in which inflation has hit hard is agriculture, where farmers have been facing steeply rising prices for fertilisers. An oral question to the Commission on the availability of affordable fertilisers is scheduled for Thursday morning

The digital communications that power much of modern life depend on satellites as well as cabling (e.g. location services, phone calls in rural areas). But the EU depends on other countries for satellite-based service infrastructure. On Monday evening, Members are expected to debate an agreement on a proposal to ensure resilient, interconnected and secure satellite infrastructure in the EU. Known as IRIS², this secure connectivity programme should run until 2027, setting up dedicated EU infrastructure, designed and deployed under private partnership. The programme should focus on improving five areas: multi-orbital infrastructure; cyber-resilience and cybersecurity; links with the EU space programme; deployment of innovative technology; and high-speed broadband and seamless connectivity (including current communication ‘dead zones’). The agreement on the proposal reflects Parliament’s priority for improved telecommunications security and a more sustainable space policy. If Members adopt the text, the EU agency for the space programme (EUSPA) will provide governance.

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The Council of Europe’s Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (known as the Istanbul Convention) sets standards on prevention, protection, prosecution and services for those at risk of gender-based violence (GBV). Parliament has repeatedly called for EU accession to the Istanbul Convention as well as its ratification by those individual EU countries that have yet to do so. However, certain ‘deliberate misinterpretations’ persist. Members are due to debate a joint report from Parliament’s Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on EU accession to the Istanbul Convention on Tuesday afternoon. The report calls for constructive dialogue, aimed at dispelling remaining Member State concerns, and stresses that while not exempting individual countries from the need to ratify, EU accession can take place before all have done so.

The European Parliament supports EU enlargement and the European perspective for all Western Balkan countries, and Members are expected to hear from the Commission during the Question Time session on Tuesday afternoon about the strengthened EU Western Balkans enlargement policy. Parliament closely monitors candidates’ overall progress and their implementation of the EU acquis, and has direct influence over the amounts allocated to tools such as the IPA III. While the reform agenda and accession tempo vary for the region’s six countries, Parliament has stressed the need to build on the positive results already achieved to nurture constructive political dialogue.

Nearly 13.7 million EU citizens live in an EU country of which they are not a national. Sometimes termed ‘mobile’ citizens, they have been able to vote in European elections for 30 years, a right safeguarded by the Treaties. In a joint debate scheduled for Monday evening, Parliament is due to debate and vote on a Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) report on proposals to eliminate barriers to exercising the electoral rights of European citizens in European Parliament elections, such as a lack of information or difficult registration procedures. Seeking to square the proposal with other similar files, the AFCO report underlines the need for improved access to voting booths, and encourages civil society involvement in ensuring citizens can obtain information, including in their own language. At the same time, Members are due to debate a Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) report on proposals reinforcing mobile citizens’ electoral rights in municipal elections. The LIBE committee would like to see derogations and restrictions removed, information provided in the language of the voter’s choice, and harmonised data indicators. The committee also urges Member States to facilitate voting for citizens with disabilities. Both files fall under the consultation procedure (where Council is not bound by Parliament’s opinion), and the Council has to adopt the proposals unanimously.

Further reading

• Agenda for the European Parliament Plenary Session
• Agreement on REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans
• CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans
• European Central Bank annual report – 2021
• Ensuring fertilisers are available and affordable in the EU
• EU secure connectivity programme 2023-2027
• EU accession to the Istanbul Convention
• Question Time: EU Western Balkans enlargement policy
• Electoral rights of mobile EU citizens in European Parliament elections
• Electoral rights of mobile EU citizens in municipal elections

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The European Union-United States Trade and Technology Council (TTC) was launched during a June 2021 summit. The aim was to revitalise transatlantic cooperation, boost bilateral trade and investment, and strengthen the parties’ technological and industrial leadership, while preserving shared values. The TTC has held three high-level political meetings so far. These ministerial meetings steer cooperation within the TTC and guide its 10 working groups on technology standards, secure supply chains, tech regulation, global trade challenges, climate and green technologies, investment screening and export controls. The first two meetings focused on launching the TTC and setting its agenda, while the third – in December 2022 – was described as a ‘shift to deliverables’.

The war in Ukraine has strengthened the transatlantic alliance and created numerous new challenges, to which the TTC has responded, in particular with a swift and coordinated roll-out of export controls. The latest TTC meeting agenda was also influenced by the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Adopted in August 2022, this act earmarked nearly US$370 billion to boost the US fight against climate change and its domestic industry. While some in the EU have approved this increased commitment on the part of the US to climate-related spending, others have voiced concerns about the risks of the IRA triggering a relocation of EU businesses to the US in pursuit of the generous subsidies, grants and tax credits the newly adopted act has promised.

So far, the TTC’s work has focused mostly on information sharing, joint mapping, defining best practice, identifying risks and exploring options for closer cooperation. The third meeting made progress on artificial intelligence standards, global connectivity, transparency of semiconductor supply chains, meaningful dialogue on forced labour and due diligence, sustainable trade, post‑quantum encryption and China’s non-market practices. Observers are divided on whether the TTC should tackle major bilateral trade irritants or work mainly on the forward-looking policies. All agree, however, that the next meeting, set to take place in May or June 2023 in Sweden, must deliver substantial and tangible results if the TTC is to remain relevant and not lose momentum.

Read this briefing on ‘EU-US Trade and Technology Council: Modest progress in a challenging context‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Incentives for private buyers of electric vehicles (in € thousands). EU, US and UK climate-related spending by 2025 (% of GDP)

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Following joint declarations by the EU and NATO in 2016 and 2018, a third joint declaration was signed on 10 January 2023. While some laud the declaration as a manifesto for increased cooperation, others perceive its 14 clauses to be mere symbolism. Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine, and Finland and Sweden’s push to join NATO, have recently highlighted the importance of strong cooperation between the EU and NATO.

Background: EU-NATO cooperation

EU-NATO cooperation focuses on issues of common interest. Relations between the two organisations were institutionalised in the early 2000s through the Berlin Plus agreement. A first EU-NATO declaration, signed at NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, focused on cooperation in seven strategic areas (hybrid threats, operational cooperation (including maritime issues), cyber security, defence capabilities, industry and research, coordinated exercises and capacity building). As a follow-up, 74 measures were endorsed with a view to advancing EU-NATO cooperation: 42 in December 2016 and a further 32 in December 2017. A second EU-NATO joint declaration, signed in 2018, built on the objectives of the 2016 declaration. In addition, the parties committed to making swift progress in areas such as military mobility and counter-terrorism and promoting the women, peace and security agenda.

Progress on commitments in the areas of cooperation are assessed in annual progress reports, most recently in June 2022. Both the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept – a document that outlines the Alliance’s strategy, defence and deterrence posture and core tasks – and the 2022 EU Strategic Compass – a concrete plan of action for the EU’s security and defence until 2030 – underline the partnership’s importance. They also note that cooperation must be enhanced further on issues of common interest such as military mobility, emerging disruptive technologies, and hybrid and cyber threats.

However, challenges in cooperation remain, first and foremost owing to tensions between Turkey and Cyprus, but also arising from the comparatively weak European defence capabilities and budgets (though these are improving), which has led to fighting over ‘burden-sharing‘. While some argue that the European Allies are ‘freeloading shamelessly on the US’, others urge caution, arguing that ‘freeloading’ depends entirely on the indicators used. Another recent challenge has been Turkey’s opposition to Sweden’s NATO accession, citing inter alia Sweden’s ‘refusal’ to extradite people allegedly tied to Kurdish militant groups. Experts however argue that Turkey will likely eventually ratify Sweden’s accession.

Recently, Russia’s war on Ukraine, and Sweden and Finland‘s push to join NATO, have given the EU and NATO fresh impetus to build on their cooperation (once the two countries do join NATO, the organisations will have 23 members in common). Since the war began, the two organisations have sought to ensure that their responses to the invasion complement each other. For instance, NATO Allies have coordinated weapons deliveries with the EU. It is in this context that the third EU-NATO declaration was negotiated.

Third EU-NATO declaration

The intention to sign a third EU-NATO joint declaration was announced by the Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, in her 2021 State of the Union address, which stated that it would be presented before the end of 2021. The declaration was finally signed on 10 January 2023. While no reason was given for the delay, experts note that several issues may have contributed: Turkey-Cyprus tensions, difficult negotiations on the wording regarding the EU’s defence role, and similarly on the wording dealing with China. According to one analyst, the two sides spent 2022 privately criticising each other for blocking parts of the declaration.

At the press conference following the signing of the declaration, NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, noted that NATO and the EU ‘are determined to take the partnership … to the next level’. The declaration has 14 clauses, with rather little substance in terms of concrete deliverables and calls to action. Most clauses are observations or assessments of progress or statements of principles. The most important points are:

• common threats: the declaration underlines that both organisations are faced with threats, including ‘the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades’: the Russian aggression against Ukraine, but also inter alia challenges stemming from authoritarian actors, persistent conflict, fragility and instability in the European common neighbourhood, and terrorist groups. These challenges ‘more than ever’ highlight the importance of the transatlantic bond, a sentiment reflected in the EU’s 2022 Strategic Compass and NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept;
• areas of cooperation: the declaration underlines that ‘unprecedented progress’ has been achieved in all areas of cooperation, though experts note that progress has been relatively slow. It describes ‘tangible results’ in countering cyber and hybrid threats, but also as regards operational cooperation, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, exercises, counter-terrorism and capacity-building of partners. It vows to deepen cooperation on existing issues and expand cooperation to tackle growing ‘geostrategic competition, resilience issues, protection of critical infrastructures, emerging and disruptive technologies, space, the security implications of climate change and foreign information manipulation and interference’. In a first sign of progress since the signing of the declaration, on 11 January 2023 NATO and the EU agreed to launch a taskforce on resilience and critical infrastructure protection;
• European defence: while NATO ‘remains the foundation of collective defence for its Allies’, the declaration acknowledges that a ‘stronger and more capable European defence’ is a positive contribution to transatlantic and global security and is interoperable with NATO. NATO had already stated as much in its 2022 Strategic Concept. This has however not always been the case, as the United States – widely considered the most important player in the Alliance – has traditionally been sceptical of European defence ambitions. The Biden administration has however repeatedly expressed support for European defence efforts. Some experts however deem the wording in the declaration as US scepticism of EU defence efforts;
• China: the declaration is the first to mention China, noting that ‘China’s growing assertiveness and policies present challenges that we need to address’. This formulation is neither a condemnation nor a specific call for action, but rather a cautious statement. Experts note, however, that it is markedly different from the Strategic Compass, which describes China as ‘a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival’, and more similar to the US national security strategy, showcasing the US influence on the wording. To address these challenges, NATO and the EU are increasing their engagement with Indo-Pacific partners.

While some, such as the Lithuanian President, Gitanas Nauseda, have welcomed the declaration as ‘a highly important manifesto consolidating [NATO and the EU’s] strategic partnership’, which sends a strong message of transatlantic unity, others see its significance as mainly ‘symbolic’. Some experts have long argued that there should be a division of labour between the two organisations and that it is feasible. One opinion voiced is that, as NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence, the EU should focus on resilience against non-military threats. Others argue that a division of labour ‘may seem rational … [but] it would not work’. However, this issue is not taken up at all in the declaration. In the US, some have called the declaration a ‘defeat for the American people’, arguing that the US should not continue to guarantee EU security and that the US taxpayer should stop subsidising EU defence. Others see the end of European strategic autonomy efforts in the declaration, arguing that faced with the worst security crisis since 1945, the EU and NATO ‘have agreed it’s probably safer to just rely on Uncle Sam’s F-35s… and nuclear capabilities’.

European Parliament position

Parliament’s resolution on the 2022 annual report on the implementation of the CSDP and its resolution on the 2022 annual report on the implementation of the CFSP, both adopted on 18 January 2023, stress the importance of enhancing the strategic partnership with NATO and welcome the third joint EU-NATO declaration. The former highlights the need for further steps to deepen the partnership based on what the Strategic Concept and Strategic Compass envisage, particularly in the areas of military mobility, dual-use infrastructure, resilience and joint exercises. In its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation, Parliament recognised, among other things, NATO’s role as the cornerstone of collective security for those Member States that are also NATO members and highlighted the importance of EU-NATO cooperation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘The third joint EU-NATO declaration‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nera Kuljanic.

By 2050, an estimated two thirds of the world population will live in urban areas. Could vertical farming help feed this growing urban population sustainably by reducing the demand for agricultural land and shortening the travel distance between food production and consumption?

Vertical farming is the practice of producing food in vertically stacked layers or vertically inclined surfaces, sometimes integrated into buildings, without soil or sunlight. The food produced consists primarily of leafy green vegetables, fruits and herbs, such as lettuce, spinach, kale, tomatoes, peppers, strawberries and basil, but not cereals or legumes such as wheat, rice, corn or soy. The plants are grown in hydro- or aeroponic systems, meaning that they are suspended in water or air/mist and receive all their nutrients via this medium. Aquaponic systems combine hydroponics and aquaculture. Methods of controlled-environment agriculture (CEA) are used to manage humidity, temperature, gases, light (amount and wavelength), nutrients, acidity level, carbon dioxide, water and pathogens.

The promises of vertical farming are plenty: year-round, predictable production, independent of weather, season or climate (and therefore climate change) and consequently without large seasonal price fluctuations. A short chain between producer and consumer would drastically reduce food miles and result in fresher, more nutrient-rich produce. Vertical farming could attain higher yields while requiring considerably less water and pesticides or herbicides. It is even possible to alter the nutrient content and flavour of the plants by controlling the growth medium. The bottlenecks slowing down the full-scale application of vertical farms are their high energy demand and related environmental sustainability issues, efficiency of the light use by the plant, and the high start-up and scale-up costs. Will growing food vertically be a distinctive feature of the urban architecture of the future?

Potential impacts and developments

Vertical farming is connected to urban farming initiatives. The idea that food could be grown in stacked layers is being tried and tested all over the world, from New Jersey (US), to Belgium, and from Dubai to Japan, and researchers are also looking into the efficiency of vertical farming. Future developments may bring about kitchen cupboard-sized vertical farms for home gardening enthusiasts or vertical farming aisles in local supermarkets. On a larger scale, by re-using and repurposing empty warehouses, factories and plants, vertical farming could play a role in the reconversion of industrial areas, though this may first involve restoring contaminated land.

While it is in theory possible to grow practically any crop vertically, the most cost-effective are fast-growing crops with little or no inedible parts like roots and stems and with high market value. The technologies underlying such soilless farming in strictly controlled environmental conditions include lighting, watering and waste management systems, harnessing renewable energy, sensors of all kinds, and other smart devices to autonomously control and fine-tune environmental parameters. Machine learning and automation are used to optimise growth conditions and manage the installations. For example, the partly EU-funded company Infarm has connected its widespread point-of-sale farms to a central platform that learns from the growth data of each farm, adjusting conditions and optimising growth. The redesign of buildings and innovation in construction materials and techniques also plays a role in shaping vertical farms.

Vertical farms are energy-hungry. Some of the energy-related costs can be offset by savings from not using agri-chemicals, from considerably smaller transport, storage and distribution costs, and from less spoilage and waste. But the current energy crisis could have dire consequences for the sector. Sustainable generation of electricity, improvements in battery storage and in the efficiency of LED lights will be essential for the sustainability and economic viability of vertical farming. The use of energy also has implications for the carbon footprint of the vertical farms: whether they are fossil fuel- or renewable-powered makes a significant difference. Shorter distribution chains mean fewer transport emissions, but that does not necessarily imply fewer emissions overall for vertical farming. Therefore, research is ambiguous about whether overall carbon emissions are lower for vertical farming than for traditional farming methods.

The number of vertical farming initiatives in Europe is relatively small. While some focus on selling fresh produce, others offer agriculture-as-a-service or sell model vertical farms. On the global market, estimated at €4 billion, Europe comes behind North America and the Asia-Pacific. The sector is young, capital-intensive, and starting a business comes with a risk. Scaling up vertical farms is not straightforward: what works for some companies or on a small scale, might not be the right model for others.

Vertical farmers will require a high level of specialisation, with farms most likely managed by teams of experts with different backgrounds. These will include mechanical, electrical, agricultural and biological engineers, growth managers, architects, data scientists, software developers and cyber-experts. Moreover, with using autonomous robots to handle harvesting, planting and logistics, vertical farming will requires less traditional agricultural manual labour, bringing fear of job losses. The artificiality of vertical farming may scare consumers that have romanticised images of traditional farming, often kept alive by advertising. However, the hyper-local nature of vertical farming may also reconnect consumers with the food production process and help make some fruits and vegetables more readily available.

Since almost 50 % of the calories we consume come from cereals such as rice and wheat that are not grown vertically, vertical farmers will not feed the world. However, vertical farming proposes solutions to the challenges of modern agriculture while contributing to urban sustainability. With all the advantages and challenges of vertical farming, and indoor farming alternatives such as greenhouses, cost-effectiveness is questionable. However, with further technological development and the confidence and knowledge arising from experience in the industry, the performance of vertical farming is likely to improve while costs fall. Finally, the approach may work particularly well for some crops in some environments, such as urban food deserts and metropolises where land is scarce and expensive, or for farming in extreme environmental conditions, for instance in space.

Anticipatory policy-making

Urban agriculture, including vertical farming, has the potential to contribute to viable food production, sustainable management of natural resources, climate action, and balanced territorial development. In March 2020, the European Commission adopted a new circular economy action plan with food, water and nutrients representing one of the key value chains, and, in May 2020, the farm to fork strategy at the heart of the European Green Deal. Vertical farming could contribute to these objectives by reducing the use of agri-chemicals and water in agriculture, and by countering soil degradation, deforestation and water eutrophication (increased nutrient load).

Vertical farming is included in US federal agricultural policy as of 2018. While the EU has been funding initiatives with a vertical farming-related theme under research programmes, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), it is not covered by EU agricultural and climate policies. This could partially be attributed to the nature of vertical faming as a policy theme, as it is found at the intersection of rural and urban planning, and research and development (R&D) and agricultural policies. To make vertical farming a successful contributor to the food supply, it will have to be recognised in public policy. R&D efforts could focus on reducing operational costs and the high energy demand, as well as addressing challenges related to economic profitability and consumer acceptance. Financial incentives from governments should also make vertical faming feasible for small producers, not just big tech.

Under the EU rules currently in force, vertical farming is not considered as organic farming. A special certification system may be needed, as well as establishing standards for vertical farming facilities and practices. Similarly, vertical farming managers and workers will need certified, and recognised training and education opportunities.

Fruit and vegetables grown in vertical food factories might come with premium price tags catering to affluent citizens, leaving those worse off without access to the food grown in their neighbourhoods. Lastly, similar to many other emerging applications, a close watch will have to be kept over the cybersecurity issues related to smart farming.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we grew plants vertically?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if we grew plants vertically?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Martin Höflmayr, Karoline Kowald, Sidonia Mazur, Marin Mileusnic and Marianna Pari.

The economic outlook for 2023 is marked by a large degree of uncertainty, the prospect of a shallow and likely short-lived recession at the start of the year, inflation at elevated levels, and a remarkably robust labour market. However, forward-looking economic data such as production and sentiment indicators give reason for hope that a recession can be fended off despite the gloomy prospects. While at the beginning of last year, the economic momentum for a recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic was strong, supported by decisive fiscal and monetary policies, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 put a premature brake on the economic recovery. Alongside the humanitarian tragedy of the war, Europe was hit by a substantial shock in import prices that severely dented the economic outlook and aggravated price increases. In particular, soaring energy prices pushed EU inflation to unprecedented levels not reached since the advent of the economic and monetary union. In 2022, average annual inflation reached a record of 9.2 %. With fading pressures from energy prices, and monetary policy measures taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) achieving their desired results, overall inflation is expected to fall significantly in 2023. However, it will then remain above the 2 % target, as projections assume that wages will pick up and fiscal measures, which are currently curbing energy prices, will be withdrawn later, pushing inflation up, with a carry-over effect until 2025. The latter effect prompted the ECB to revise its latest inflation projections upwards (Chapter 2). That illustrates the growing divide between fiscal and monetary policy objectives, as monetary authorities are fighting inflation while fiscal policy tries to cushion the impact of high energy prices on households and firms.

While economic growth and inflation trajectories are going in opposite directions – unlike the oil price shocks of the 1970s, which led to a period of stagflation – labour markets have proven particularly resilient. Unemployment rates are at record low levels as demand for labour remains high. In an environment of slowing growth, high inflation, elevated post-pandemic debt levels and eroding real incomes, the economic outlook is heavily influenced by the development of the geopolitical situation and its reverberations in commodity markets; forecasts are thus surrounded by a significant degree of uncertainty. In such an environment, policy responses need careful calibration, as policy coordination in the EU remains limited.

To ensure budgetary discipline and financial planning in an orderly manner, the EU’s finances are established around a medium-term structure, lasting for seven years. The current multiannual financial framework (MFF) – the sixth since the 1980s – was decided at the end of 2020 (Chapter 3). The pandemic has had a major impact on its design. It resulted in the adoption of an unprecedented budgetary package that combines the €1 210.9 billion MFF for the years 2021 to 2027 with the €806.9 billion Next Generation EU (NGEU) temporary recovery instrument. In that new financial architecture, the EU budget and NGEU play a major role in the EU’s strategy to relaunch the economy. Beyond supporting the recovery from the pandemic, the 2023 EU budget (Chapter 4), set at €186.6 billion in commitments, is providing additional funding for several programmes and policies designed to help face the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including the energy crisis, while backing the green and digital transition and biodiversity.

However, in the face of multiple challenges, notably the war on Ukraine and its repercussions, the European Commission will examine, in the second quarter of 2023, whether EU finances are sufficient to cope with the evolving context. The European Parliament has repeatedly voiced its concern that the EU’s long-term budget (Chapter 5) may already have reached its limits, and calls for an ambitious revision to increase the EU budget and make it more flexible. Parliament supports the EU budget being subject to respect of the rule of law, an essential precondition for sound financial management and effective use of EU funding. Moreover, Parliament is a proponent of strengthening parliamentary scrutiny and transparency over EU expenditure, including through NGEU and other EU financing tools, in particular off-budget instruments. Some of these issues will be examined in connection with the forthcoming modification of the EU’s financial rules.

NGEU (Chapter 6) is a major but temporary innovation in EU finances. Overall, it reinforces significantly the resources channelled through EU budgetary instruments up until 2026, supporting ambitious packages of investment and reform measures designed to make the EU economy more sustainable, innovative and inclusive. In 2023, NGEU is projected to finance additional grants worth €113.9 billion in commitments and €130.7 billion in payments, while its main expenditure tool, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), enters a crucial stage in its lifecycle following its first year of full deployment. The national recovery and resilience plans financed by the RRF focus their action on six priority areas of European relevance that have been identified as vital for strengthening the EU’s resilience, including the green transition (at least 37 % of each national plan) and the digital transformation (at least 20 %).

In addition, the RRF is expected to become the main funding tool of the REPowerEU plan, which seeks to end the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the green transition. That development is meant to further reinforce the recovery plan’s already strong energy dimension. The European Parliament has repeatedly underlined the importance of NGEU and RRF implementation and monitoring, given the size and strategic nature of their expenditure. Lessons learnt from the RRF are feeding into the debate on the revision of the EU’s economic governance framework.

The economic focus of this year’s edition of the Economic and Budgetary Outlook is the EU economic governance framework and its forthcoming revision (Chapter 7). The chapter consists of two parts. The first examines the current design of the EU fiscal framework and its effectiveness, in particular by tracking public finance indicators and national compliance with the EU fiscal rules. The forward-looking part takes stock of the main orientations for a revised fiscal framework the European Commission has put forward. That section touches on the question of how greater investment levels across the EU could be sustained – whether through well-designed fiscal rules, an EU fiscal capacity, or by combining the two.

Policymakers and academics commonly agree that the EU economic governance framework is complex, rigid and prone to boosting domestic fiscal policies’ pro-cyclicality. Moreover, the rules have not contributed to the debt sustainability of Member States with particularly high debt-to-gross domestic product ratios, all the more so since the start of the pandemic crisis. In particular, the activation of the general escape clause by temporarily suspending the application of common fiscal rules has signalled the need for a revision of the EU fiscal framework to strengthen growth and investment prospects. The European Commission is expected to table legislative proposals in 2023with the aim of reforming the economic governance framework. Main elements of the forthcoming reforms include improved debt sustainability, stricter fiscal surveillance by the Commission within the European Semester exercise, the development of national fiscal plans (while evoking analogies with the national recovery and resilience plans under the RRF), and increased national ownership through empowered independent national fiscal institutions.

Read the complete study on ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Niestat (1st edition).

The European Commission published on 7 November 2022 a proposal for a regulation on data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services. The proposal contributes to the Commission’s priorities to make the EU fit for the digital age, and to build a future-ready economy that works for people and builds on the recent Digital Services Act, the proposal regulates online platforms, which connect hosts and guests for short-term accommodation rentals.

The regulation should facilitate the registration of hosts and their short-term rental properties and reduce inconsistencies in how online platforms share data. Platforms would have to check whether hosts register their units, and share data about rented nights and guests with public authorities. The regulation should also help to avoid large volumes of differing data requests imposing a heavy burden on online platforms, impairing their ability to offer services across the single market. It should also increase consumer confidence in these services.

The European Parliament and the Council need to set their positions on the file. In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). In the Council, the working party on competitiveness and growth (tourism) is working on the proposal.

Versions

• February 2023: Data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2022) 571
7.11.2022
Rapporteur:Kim Van Sparrentak (Greens/EFA/The Netherlands)2022/0358(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Kateřina Konečná (The Left/Czechia)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report Guest nights spent at short-term accommodation, 2019 (booked via Airbnb, Booking, Expedia Group and Tripadvisor)