Africa

The Breast Society of Ghana (BSOG), in collaboration with the Breast Clinic of the Tamale Teaching Hospital, held a grand durbar to commemorate Breast Cancer Awareness Month with an advocacy for social support for breast cancer patients.

Savana Signatures has strongly condemned the alleged gang rape of a teenage Junior High School student (name withheld) in the Tolon District of the Northern Region, describing the act as a grave violation of the survivor rsquo;s rights, dignity, and safety.

The Director of Communications at the Pilgrims Affairs Office of Ghana, Alhaji Mohammed Amin Lamptey, has highlighted the significance of the upcoming Annual Hajj and Umrah Conference and Exhibition, scheduled to take place in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, from November 9 to 12, 2025.

Donald Trump says thousands of Christians are being killed in Nigeria - where has he got the numbers from?

Morocco suffer a blow before the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations as their captain Achraf Hakimi injures an ankle injury playing for PSG.

Ahmed Salem Lebsir, battalion chief and director of the Polisario Front Military School, stands beside an installation marking Morocco’s invasion of the territory 50 years ago. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

By Karlos Zurutuza
ROME, Nov 5 2025 (IPS)

Ehmudi Lebsir was 17 when he trudged more than 50 kilometres across the desert to stay alive. Half a century on, the Sahrawi refugee still has not gone home to what was then Spanish province of Western Sahara.

On 6 November 1975, six days after Moroccan troops pushed into the territory, hundreds of thousands of Moroccan civilians streamed south under military escort. Branded the “Green March”, it was, in effect, an invasion and the start of a military occupation of Sahrawi land.

The UN has now set aside a principle it has long held sacrosanct: the right of peoples to self-determination. That was the framework that had guided its approach to the Sahrawis for more than three decades

Dubbed “Africa’s last colony,” Western Sahara is roughly the size of the United Kingdom and remains the continent’s only territory still awaiting decolonisation. Yet on 31 October this year, that goal slipped further from reach.

Marking the 50th anniversary of Morocco’s incursion, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that, by endorsing Rabat’s autonomy plan, lent weight to Morocco’s sovereignty claim over the territory.

The UN has now set aside a principle it has long held sacrosanct: the right of peoples to self-determination. That was the framework that had guided its approach to the Sahrawis for more than three decades.

Lebsir speaks to IPS by videoconference from the Tindouf camps in western Algeria. Nearly 2,000 kilometres southwest of Algiers, this harsh desert where summer temperatures can touch 60C has been the closest thing to home the Sahrawi people have known for 50 years.

“We faced a choice: remain in Algeria as refugees, or build the machinery of a state, with its ministries and a parliament,” recalls Lebsir, now a senior representative of the Polisario Front. Founded in 1973, it is recognised by the United Nations as the “legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people”.

 

A man walks past a mural in the Tindouf camps in Algeria, where the Polisario Front has managed life in exile while building state institutions. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

 

On arriving in Tindouf in 1975, Lebsir was tasked with setting up schools in the camps. He later oversaw cohorts of Sahrawi students in Cuba, spent a decade in the Sahrawi Parliament and served in the SADR’s Ministries of Justice and Culture.

It was in that parliament that the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was proclaimed in February 1976.

“After a century of Spanish presence, we never imagined Madrid would leave and abandon us to our fate,” he says. “There’s no going back: either we have an independent state, or our people will be buried.”

After the Polisario declared independence in 1976, the UN reaffirmed the Sahrawis’ right to self-determination. But the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), created in 1991, has never delivered the vote it was set up to hold.

Tomás Bárbulo was also 17 when Moroccan forces moved in. The son of a Spanish soldier based in Laayoune —Western Sahara’s capital, 1,100 kilometres south of Rabat—, he had returned to Madrid three months before that 6 November.

“The Sahrawis have survived napalm and white phosphorus, persecution, exile, the systematic plunder of their natural resources, and attempts to erase their identity through the influx of hundreds of thousands of settlers,” the journalist and author tells IPS by phone from Madrid.

Bárbulo, whose La Historia Prohibida del Sahara Español (Destino, 2002) is a standard work on the conflict, lays the stalemate chiefly at the door of “Morocco’s unyielding position, often blessed by the Security Council’s major powers.” The UN, he says, “has capitulated to Rabat”.

Ironically, even the UN does not recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. The occupied territory has been on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories since 1963. In legal terms, the decolonisation of Western Sahara remains “unfinished.”

 

Mohamed Dadach in Laayoune, the capital of occupied Western Sahara. Released in 1999 after 24 years in prison, he is known as the “Sahrawi Nelson Mandela.” Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

‘Open-air prison’

The UNHCR estimates that between 170,000 and 200,000 Sahrawis live in Algeria’s desert camps. However, life inside the Moroccan-held territory itself is harder to gauge, since Rabat does not even acknowledge the Sahrawi people exist.

Understanding living conditions there is equally difficult. Senior observers such as Noam Chomsky have labelled the territory as a “vast open-air prison”.

In a report released last July, UN Secretary-General António Guterres noted that Morocco has blocked visits by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) since 2015.

“OHCHR continues to receive allegations of human rights violations, including intimidation, surveillance and discrimination against Sahrawi individuals, particularly those advocating for self-determination,” he wrote.

Despite restrictions, international rights groups continue to document abuses. Amnesty International’s 2024 report says Rabat curtails “dissent and the rights to freedom of association and peaceful assembly in Western Sahara” and “violently represses peaceful protests”.

Human Rights Watch denounced that courts hand down long sentences based “almost entirely” on activists’ confessions, without probing claims they were extracted under police torture.

At 36, Ahmed Ettanji is one of the most prominent Sahrawi activists in the occupied zone, something he has paid for with 18 arrests and repeated torture.

Speaking by phone from Laayoune, he says the visibility afforded by international NGOs is the only thing keeping him out of prison, or worse.

“We are marking fifty years of a harsh military blockade, extrajudicial killings and every kind of abuse,” he says. “There are thousands of disappeared and tens of thousands of arrests. The economic interests of world powers always trump human rights.”

After five decades, entire generations have been born in the Algerian desert, many families knowing each other only through video calls. Yet Ettanji insists not all is bleak.

“Born under occupation, people my age were expected to be the most assimilated, the most pro-Moroccan. That has not happened. The desire for self-determination is very much alive among the young.”

 

Sunset on a beach in occupied Western Sahara. In addition to a coastline rich in fishing resources, Sahrawis watch helplessly as Rabat exploits the rest of their natural wealth with the complicity of powers like the US, France, and Spain. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

‘Autonomous Region of the Sahara’

The autonomy plan that the UN has now effectively endorsed is Rabat’s sole political offer in five decades. First floated in 2007, it was backed by the Trump administration in 2020.

How this “Autonomous Region of the Sahara” would actually work is left largely undefined, beyond talk of local administrative, judicial and economic powers.

Polisario rejects the scheme, but rejection has not brought the Sahrawis any closer to deciding their own future.

For many Sahrawis, the timing of the Security Council’s move, on the very anniversary of Morocco’s 1975 incursion, felt less like coincidence than calculated cruelty.

People like Garazi Hach Embarek, daughter of a Basque nurse who treated the first displaced families half a century ago and a founding member of the Polisario Front. The 47-year-old has spent years taking the cause into classrooms, universities, town halls and any forum that will listen.

In an interview with IPS in Urretxu, 400 kilometres north of Madrid, Hach Embarek does not hide her dismay. “Active resistance is extremely difficult, and the Moroccan lobby remains highly influential,” laments the Sahrawi activist.

“We live in turbulent times, where anything seems to go, but this is neither just nor legal. Under the guise of peace, the real aim is simply to legitimise injustice,” she adds, before stressing the need “to forge new alliances.”

“Colonialism is far from over, and we’re merely the casualties of continued misgovernance in Africa’s last colony.”

Related Articles

• Ahmed Salem Lebsir, battalion chief and director of the Polisario Front Military School, stands beside an installation marking Morocco’s invasion of the territory 50 years ago. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS
• Sunset on a beach in occupied Western Sahara. In addition to a coastline rich in fishing resources, Sahrawis watch helplessly as Rabat exploits the rest of their natural wealth with the complicity of powers like the US, France, and Spain. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS
• Mohamed Dadach in Laayoune, the capital of occupied Western Sahara. Released in 1999 after 24 years in prison, he is known as the “Sahrawi Nelson Mandela.” Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS
• A man walks past a mural in the Tindouf camps in Algeria, where the Polisario Front has managed life in exile while building state institutions. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

A professor describes Mamdani as "one of us" while some young Ugandans take inspiration from the 34-year-old's victory.

A professor describes Mamdani as "one of us" while some young Ugandans take inspiration from the 34-year-old's victory.

Operation Dudula has been picketing clinics and hospital, turning away those without South African papers.

The publication “Europe’s Overlooked Allies: Why the Western Balkans Matter for EU Defence Readiness” is a result of ELIAMEP’s initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

The following policy brief and factsheet were prepared in collaboration with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Dialogue Southeast Europe and they present the core findings and strategic recommendations of the full report. It is intended to provide the audience with a concise, accessible overview of the key insights and proposed actions.

The original thematic report authored by Dr. Ana Krstinovska (Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP & Senior Researcher, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Dr. Alessandro Marrone (Head of “Defence, Security and Space” Programme, Istituto Affari Internazionali & Non-Resident Research Associate, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) explores the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the context of the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and enhanced defence readiness.It underscores the argument that Western Balkan countries—despite not yet being EU member states—have increasingly proven their value as security contributors and partners. This contribution is both timely and essential as the EU confronts the implications of the war in Ukraine and potential shifts in the transatlantic security relationship. At the EU level, recent initiatives, such as the 2024 European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the 2025 White Paper on European Defence, aim to enhance collective readiness and industrial capability. Yet, the full potential of regional partnerships—particularly with the Western Balkan region—has not been fully realized, undercutting the ability to leverage and further develop their defence capabilities.

You can read the policy brief here.

You can read the factsheet here.

The full report is available here.

• Venezuela’s crisis has long been narrated through an opposition prism: crowds in the streets demanding democracy, negotiations or contested ballots. In 2025, the spotlight has shifted. The decisive question is not how hard Venezuelans push but what the United States is prepared to do, and why.

• A draft defence review proposes a major redeployment. Led by under‑secretary Elbridge Colby, it calls for concentrating military power on the homeland and the Americas. The plan envisages shifting forces away from Europe and the Indo‑Pacific and expanding air and naval operations along the southern U.S. border and throughout the Caribbean. It revives the logic of the Monroe Doctrine: prevent rival powers from embedding in Latin America.

• For the architects of Washington’s new Venezuela campaign, success will be judged less by what happens in Caracas than by how it plays in Washington DC or Florida. By measuring success in domestic terms, the United States may very well leave Venezuelans no closer to the democracy they seek.

• Washington’s handling of the Venezuelan crisis could be a preview of a wider strategic realignment. Colby’s “homeland first, hemisphere next” doctrine would pull military assets from the East and surge them into the Americas.

• Latin America’s response reflects both caution and fatigue. They will hedge: criticise the optics of U.S. gunboat diplomacy while quietly ignoring any weakening of the Maduro regime.

• The regime’s only remaining legitimacy is the loyalty of its security apparatus and the fear it can instill.

• The opposition, meanwhile, still holds the moral mandate. That legitimacy now carries even more weight after María Corina Machado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize.

• Against that backdrop, four trajectories remain on the table for the crisis itself: 1) Ruling‑party managed transition; 2) Negotiated exit; 3) Forced removal; 4) Regime endurance.

• Venezuela’s impasse is fast becoming a proving ground for Washington’s “America first” doctrine and a primary focus on the Western Hemisphere in their foreign policy in decades.

• The backdrop is a country with its people exhausted, and its institutions hollowed out so internally in Venezuela very little should be expected. A purely theatrical strike may consolidate the status quo rather than topple it. If the United States genuinely wants systemic change, it will need more than sinking boats and slogans, it will need a strategy that endures beyond the next news cycle. Whether that is what President Trump actually seeks remains an open question.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Eduardo Massieu Paredes, Executive-in-residence Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

VENEZUELA’S CRISIS HAS LONG BEEN NARRATED THROUGH AN OPPOSITION PRISM: crowds in the streets demanding democracy, negotiations or contested ballots. In 2025, the spotlight has shifted. The decisive question is not how hard Venezuelans push but what the United States is prepared to do, and why. The United States deployed a naval buildup that includes more than 10 ships, including amphibious assault ships, a nuclear‑powered submarine, a special operations ship and an aircraft carrier, unprecedented to the Caribbean. For all that, the Venezuelan portfolio does not solely sit in the Pentagon or the State Department: Stephen Miller, the president’s homeland security adviser, has also taken a leading role in deciding which vessels to target. U.S. forces have so far destroyed sixteen suspected drug‑smuggling boats in international waters. This intervention could underscore a new viewpoint: is this campaign choreographed for a U.S. audience? Furthermore, how far are they willing to go?

A Don-Roe Doctrine?

Two forces shape the Caribbean stand‑off. First is a policy shift. President Donald Trump returned to office on an agenda that places national security, economic strength and sovereignty ahead of traditional diplomacy. Marco Rubio, the new secretary of state and the first Hispanic to hold the job, has been tasked with turning that creed into policy. The State Department’s first hundred‑day report notes that foreign‑aid programs were cut and visa rules tightened to ensure U.S. dollars serve “America First” priorities. It also touts persuading Panama and other Central American countries to reduce cooperation with China’s Belt and Road infrastructure plans. The message is clear: the Western Hemisphere is once again Washington’s sphere of influence.

The plan envisages shifting forces away from Europe and the Indo‑Pacific and expanding air and naval operations along the southern U.S. border and throughout the Caribbean.

Second, a draft defence review proposes a major redeployment. Led by under‑secretary Elbridge Colby, it calls for concentrating military power on the homeland and the Americas. The plan envisages shifting forces away from Europe and the Indo‑Pacific and expanding air and naval operations along the southern U.S. border and throughout the Caribbean. It revives the logic of the Monroe Doctrine: prevent rival powers from embedding in Latin America. In this view, Venezuela is not simply a faltering dictatorship but a potential beachhead for Iranian or Russian influence; deterrence must be visible and follow in line with this administration’s motto of ‘peace through strength’.

Always Victory at Home 

For the architects of Washington’s new Venezuela campaign, success will be judged less by what happens in Caracas than by how it plays in Washington DC or Florida. The White House homeland‑security adviser, Stephen Miller, chairs a reworked council that picks targets and sometimes sidelines the State Department. He has reportedly described the government in Caracas as a cartel—language calibrated for a domestic audience that wants to see criminals punished. War Secretary Pete Hegseth told marines aboard the USS Iwo Jima that their deployment is not a drill but a real‑world mission to “end the poisoning of Americans,” casting it as a crusade that keeps citizens safe. The presence of these two figures, alongside Secretary of State Marco Rubio, underscores how closely the ‘MAGA’ operation aligns with familiar Republican hawkishness: tough on security, unilateral when necessary, and keenly aware of how it plays in the electoral map.

Mr Rubio’s involvement also reflects personal and political ties. As Florida’s former senator he cultivated deep relationships with Venezuela’s opposition; he once called María Corina Machado, the most recent Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, the “Iron Lady” of her country and published an op‑ed praising her courage. He knows that Venezuelan‑American and Cuban‑American voters are pivotal in his home state, and he is not alone in seeing the Caribbean as fertile ground for political capital. For all three men, pressing a regime they see on the ropes may look like a low‑hanging fruit: a way to showcase toughness, score points with a conservative base and, perhaps, advance their own ambitions.

The question is whether this chase for a domestic victory will actually change anything inside Venezuela. By measuring success in domestic terms, the United States may very well leave Venezuelans no closer to the democracy they seek.

In this view, Caracas is both a proxy and an opportunity: neutralise a hostile regime, demonstrate that Washington will police its neighbourhood and send a message to US’ voters that the administration is protecting the homeland. The question is whether this chase for a domestic victory will actually change anything inside Venezuela. By measuring success in domestic terms, the United States may very well leave Venezuelans no closer to the democracy they seek.

What can Europe learn from the Caribbean 

Washington’s handling of the Venezuelan crisis could be a preview of a wider strategic realignment.

Washington’s handling of the Venezuelan crisis could be a preview of a wider strategic realignment. Colby’s “homeland first, hemisphere next” doctrine would pull military assets from the East and surge them into the Americas. In practical terms, that would mean fewer ships and aircraft watching the South China Sea or the Baltic Sea, and more watching the Caribbean and the southern border. For instance, the U.S. Navy’s most powerful aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, and its strike group departed from Croatia and are heading to the Caribbean for a new deployment. Latin America becomes the arena where America wants to prove it can still dominate without alliances, while Europe and Asia get pushed down the priority list.

This administration also seems to be resuscitating the Reagan-Bush discourse of the “war on drugs”. Four lethal U.S. strikes against drug boats in the Caribbean are being justified as part of a “non‑international armed conflict” with terrorist cartels. In other words, this administration sees little threats in a geopolitical context of democracy vs. autocracy as well as no need to consult international allies or Congress. Domestic optics—especially playing to voters who want a hard line on drugs and immigration—seem to matter more than European approval or Asian deterrence. The Venezuelan case suggests that, for the foreseeable future, U.S. security decisions may be shaped less by global consensus and more by domestic calculations with a Monroe‑style sphere of influence twist. 

Reaction from the Neighbourhood

Latin America’s response reflects both caution and fatigue. Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva described the U.S. naval buildup as a source of tension and warned it could threaten regional peace. He noted that Washington’s drug‑trafficking accusations lacked evidence and that the lethal strike on a boat was likely illegal. The comment signals the delicate position of governments that distrust Mr Maduro but also remember past US interventions contemptuously. In Mexico City, Mr Rubio faced questions about sovereignty even as he promised deeper cooperation with President Claudia Sheinbaum. Mexico and Brazil may oppose an ‘invasion’ but are unlikely to expend political capital defending Caracas. They will hedge: criticise the optics of U.S. gunboat diplomacy while quietly ignoring any weakening of the Maduro regime.

As Venezuela’s largest neighbour and leading diplomatic power in South America, Brazil is deeply concerned that a forced collapse of the Maduro regime would trigger mass migration to its northern frontier, regional militarisation, and paramilitary spillover.

As Venezuela’s largest neighbour and leading diplomatic power in South America, Brazil is deeply concerned that a forced collapse of the Maduro regime would trigger mass migration to its northern frontier, regional militarisation, and paramilitary spillover. This pushes Brazil to continue favoring a negotiated scenario, yet Brazil’s influence has proven limited in the past. The opposition pointed to how it could not secure safe passage for dissidents under its protection in Caracas, and how little diplomatic pressure any international actor can put on Maduro. Brazil will continue to signal to the US against any form of intervention, will quietly promote talks, and essentially seek stability on its border regardless of the fate of Mr. Maduro.

Legitimacy at a Nadir

All this is happening while Mr Maduro’s own standing is at its lowest. International observers and independent tallies agree that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia won the 2024 presidential vote, only for the regime to rewrite the results. Even some of Mr Maduro’s traditional allies in the region—like Brazil and Colombia—acknowledged doubts about the election’s legitimacy and declined to recognise his new mandate. The regime’s only remaining legitimacy is the loyalty of its security apparatus and the fear it can instill.

Yet that loyalty is brittle. Years of purges and politicisation have left the armed forces fractured. This fragmentation has done two things at once: it has prevented a coup—no faction is strong enough to depose Mr Maduro—yet it also means that if he falls, no coherent military bloc is likely to topple his successor.

As U.S. warships drew closer in September, he ordered the Bolivarian National Militia—a civilian force attached to the armed forces— instead of the Army to prepare to “defend the homeland.” In other words, the state’s coercive power rests as much on politicised volunteers as on the regular army—a sign of weakness rather than strength.

Years of dictatorship have also depoliticised society. Under the weight of hyperinflation and collapsing services, many Venezuelans have turned away from ideological debate; politics is secondary to hunger and survival. This makes Mr Maduro’s appeals to defend the homeland against imperialism ring hollow for large swathes of the population. A militarised mobilisation might energise loyalists who benefit from the status quo, but it does not convince those who are simply trying to feed their families. The contrast is stark: on one side, an ageing elite clinging to power; on the other, a society more concerned with the price of food than with slogans about sovereignty.

The opposition, meanwhile, still holds the moral mandate. That legitimacy now carries even more weight after María Corina Machado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize.

The opposition, meanwhile, still holds the moral mandate. That legitimacy now carries even more weight after María Corina Machado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize. It is a powerful endorsement at home and abroad, yet the opposition has not been able to translate its moral authority into decisive action. With prominent leaders jailed, exiled or underground, Machado is the only widely recognised voice, operating from the shadows yet carrying a broad popular mandate. Her ally Edmundo González, widely regarded as the true winner of the 2024 election, speaks from abroad; together they embody a legitimacy that the regime lacks, though they cannot convert it into power while the armed forces remain fragmented and society is exhausted by poverty and persecution. That credibility matters in a post‑Maduro scenario: there is a leader to hand the reins to, even if the day‑to‑day structures of the state are in disarray. But the longer the standoff drags on, the more the opposition risks becoming symbolic rather than operational. The stalemate endures partly because everyone is too weak to break it.

Scenarios Beyond the Headlines

In Washington, the priority is a win that plays at home. The administration shows little interest in adjudicating who governs in Caracas; all signals suggest Mr. Trump’s instinct is to avoid classic “regime change” so much so that the President failed to mention Maduro or Machado by name when he talked about his phone call with the Nobel Peace Prize winner. Is this enough to hypothesize that the US administration could land on a middle course, declare victory over “the cartels” for a domestic audience while steering clear of Venezuela’s internal power struggle. Against that backdrop, four trajectories remain on the table for the crisis itself:

1. Ruling‑party managed transition: The president may be replaced by senior figures within the ruling socialist party (for example Vice President Delcy Rodríguez). This would keep the regime’s structures intact but remove its most toxic symbol. International actors might accept this as progress; the democratic opposition would reject this option and would look to access power through a rebellion.
2. Negotiated exit: Mr. Maduro, under intense international pressure and perhaps fearing arrest or death, could bargain for safe passage abroad, trading his exit for guarantees on his life and property. Such a deal would leave a power vacuum and require a caretaker government with some form of support from the military until fresh elections, which would likely be won by Mrs. Machado.
3. Forced removal – An internal coup, mass uprising or foreign‑backed intervention could topple Mr Maduro. A new leadership, most likely stemming from the current opposition or unexpected military leaders would need rapid international support to prevent chaos and respond to the collapse of public services. Without a plan, local militias could fracture into insurgent groups with a very weak government on the ground.
4. Regime endurance – Mr. Maduro could survive the pressure as he did before, thanks to repression, inertia and a paralyzed opposition. The government would become more repressive and insular; hopes for a negotiated transition would fade, and the world would look away.

Will Optics Trump Outcomes? 

If the United States genuinely wants systemic change, it will need more than sinking boats and slogans, it will need a strategy that endures beyond the next news cycle.

Venezuela’s impasse is fast becoming a proving ground for Washington’s “America first” doctrine and a primary focus on the Western Hemisphere in their foreign policy in decades. To some in this administration, reviving Monroe‑era language, sinking a few boats, slap the label of “narco‑terrorism” on an adversary, and declaring a mission accomplished to voters in Florida will be a win. To others, victory is only possible if the US collects Maduro’s bounty, but there we will be entering into unknown territory, territory which could make President Trump uncomfortable. In addition, the backdrop is a country with its people exhausted, and its institutions hollowed out so internally in Venezuela very little should be expected. A purely theatrical strike may consolidate the status quo rather than topple it. If the United States genuinely wants systemic change, it will need more than sinking boats and slogans, it will need a strategy that endures beyond the next news cycle. Whether that is what President Trump actually seeks remains an open question.

 

Morocco controls much of Western Sahara, although part of it is controlled by a pro-independence movement.

A session titled Youth Movements and Democratic Futures in South Asia at International Civil Society Week, held at Bangkok’s Thammasat University. Credit: Zofeen Ebrahim/IPS

By Zofeen Ebrahim
BANGKOK, Nov 5 2025 (IPS)

The message is clear: today’s youth are not “wishy-washy.” They are not just the future—they are the present, full partners in shaping it, and “power-sharing” is the new mantra. The veterans of activism are being reminded not merely to listen but to hear and to leave their egos at the door.

These were among the many resonant takeaways from the five-day International Civil Society Week, held at Bangkok’s Thammasat University.

Yet beneath the optimistic rhetoric, a different mood lingered. Many young participants seemed despondent, feeling short-changed by their elders—empowered in words, but excluded in practice.

At a session titled “Youth Movements and Democratic Futures in South Asia,” young voices from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, and Nepal shared their frustrations and fears for the future.

Student activist Ammad Talpur at the Youth Movements and Democratic Futures in South Asia session at International Civil Society Week, held at Bangkok’s Thammasat University. Credit: Zofeen Ebrahim/IPS

In Pakistan, said student activist Ammad Talpur, nepotism runs deep, inequality is horrific and brutal, and the powerful break laws with impunity. “We long for change, but fear silences us, as those in power will not brook dissent.”

A similar sense of frustration echoes beyond Pakistan.

“Though sometimes its exercise may come at a cost, youth in India are free to say anything and freedom of speech does exist,” Adrian D’ruz, another panelist, told IPS after the session. And journalists, academics, students, and comedians who questioned those in power, he said, reportedly faced legal action, online harassment, or institutional pressure.

To curb dissent, legal provisions are misapplied, resulting in people “leaning towards self-censorship rather than risking consequences,” said D’Cruz, a member of a network of NGOs in India called Wada Na Todo Abhiyan, which promotes governance accountability and inclusion of marginalized communities.

While Pakistan and India illustrate the pressures youth face under entrenched power, in Nepal the response has taken a more visible, street-level form, riding a wave of unrest that began in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

In Kathmandu, “rising unemployment, corruption, nepotism, and broken promises” fueled the unrest, said Tikashwari Rai, a young Nepali mother of two daughters, worried for their future.

Tikashwari Rai, a Nepali mother of two daughters, at the Youth Movements and Democratic Futures in South Asia session at International Civil Society Week, held at Bangkok’s Thammasat University. Credit: Zofeen Ebrahim/IPS

“We don’t want to work as domestic help in the Middle East; we want opportunities here, in our own country. But because there are none, many young people are forced to leave,” she explained.

Yet, she admitted, the protests came at a heavy cost—lives lost and infrastructure destroyed. “Our youth need guidance and stronger organization to lead social movements effectively,” she added.

Beyond the immediate triggers of street protests, some activists argue that deeper systemic issues fuel youth disenchantment.

Melani Gunathilaka, a climate and political activist from Sri Lanka, at the Youth Movements and Democratic Futures in South Asia session at International Civil Society Week, held at Bangkok’s Thammasat University. Credit: Zofeen Ebrahim/IPS

Melani Gunathilaka, a young climate and political activist from Sri Lanka, who was also on the panel, believed the roots of disenchantment ran deeper. “While these protests are often labeled as anti-government, at their core, they demand systemic change and true accountability from those in power.”

The immediate triggers seem to spread across corruption, authoritarian governments, repression, lack of access to basic needs and more,” she said.

A closer look at the situation in countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Kenya, however, exposed economic hardship, debt burdens, and deepening inequalities. And this trend is also observed globally, she pointed out.

Despite these frustrations, the conference also explored how young and older activists can work together, not just to protest, but to reshape movements constructively.

“Across civil society, there is growing recognition that youth must be meaningfully included in development and nation-building. While progress varies from group to group, the direction of change is unmistakably forward,” said D’cruz.

Talpur further fine-tuned D’Cruz’s sentiment. “It’s not about taking over; it’s about working together through collaboration.” He also found it “unfair for the boomers to create a mess and leave it to the millennials and Gen Z to fix it.”

Interestingly, the sentiment found an echo among the older generation itself. Founder of the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, Debbie Stothard, said it was unfair to leave the mess her generation had created to the young and then expect them to “fix it.”

Speaking at the closing plenary titled “Futures We’re Building: Youth, Climate and Intergenerational Justice, she noted that she had been talking about “intergenerational equity” for 40 years, yet many in her generation of activists still fail to “walk the talk” in how they live and lead. Still, she added, it is not too late: “We can still make space.”

That space, she explained, begins with a change in mindset. “It’s not our job to empower the youth; it’s recognizing that they have power,” she said—a reminder that true equity lies not in giving power away, but in acknowledging it already exists.

This shift in perspective is already reshaping how movements operate. Youth no longer need to “look up to” traditional authority figures for inspiration, said D’cruz. Many within their generation are already leading change.

Mihajlo Matkovic, a member of the Youth Action Team at CIVICUS, from Serbia, also at the closing, demonstrated how real change required innovation and persistence. “Because our generation did not have any great example of what a direct democracy looks like,” he said, adding, “We had to basically reinvent it.”

But success depends on civil society letting go of their ego and letting the youth enter the arena, he pointed out.

Matkovic’s example showed the potential of youth-led innovation—but for such change to succeed, civil society must genuinely make space and resist old hierarchies it claims to challenge, because these patterns have also fueled a climate of mistrust. “It’s hard to trust civil society,” said Rai. “They’re not sincere to the causes of ordinary people.”

Gunathilaka echoed this sentiment, noting that civil society has often been co-opted by the very systems the youth seek to change. “Ignoring the influence of private capital and international financial structures that prioritize the needs of global trade while sidelining the needs of communities has only deepened the mistrust among youth,” she added.

This climate of mistrust, while not explicitly mentioned in the final declaration of the ICSW—which urged governments to protect democracy, human rights, the rights of minorities and excluded groups, and to ensure environmental protection and climate justice—nonetheless underscored a broader challenge: civil society itself must look inward, confront its shortcomings, and reimagine how it engages meaningfully with the next generation.

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Belém - View from the Convention Center where the COP30 summit is to be held. Credit: Sergio Moraes/COP30 Brazil Amazonia

By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR, India, Nov 5 2025 (IPS)

The world is falling dangerously short of meeting the Paris Agreement goals, with global greenhouse gas emissions rising to record levels and current national pledges still far off the mark, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) said in its Emissions Gap Report 2025: Off Target.

The report, marking ten years since the Paris Agreement’s adoption, concludes that even with full implementation of all existing pledges, global temperatures are projected to rise between 2.3°C and 2.5°C this century. Should current policies persist, global warming could potentially reach 2.8°C.

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, in his video message posted after the report launch on November 4, said that the new Emissions Gap Report, issued by the United Nations Environment Programme, is clear and uncompromising. If nationally determined contributions, the national action plans on climate, are fully implemented by 2035, global warming would reach 2.3 degrees Celsius, down from 2.6 degrees in last year’s projections. That is progress, but nowhere near enough.

He said that the current commitments still point to climate breakdown. Scientists tell us that a temporary overshoot above 1.5 degrees is now inevitable, starting at the latest in the early 2030s. And the path to a livable future gets steeper by the day. “But this is no reason to surrender. It is a reason to step up and speed up. 1.5 degrees by the end of the century remains our North Star. And the science is clear: the goal is still within reach. But only if we meaningfully increase our ambition. Our mission is simple, but not easy,” he said.

Only about one-third of countries have submitted new or updated climate pledges (NDCs) by the September 2025 deadline. The report warns that despite some progress in renewable energy deployment, overall global emissions reached 57.7 gigatons of CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂e) in 2024—a 2.3 percent increase from 2023, the steepest annual rise in over a decade.

According to UNEP, deforestation and land-use change accounted for more than half of the increase in 2024’s emissions, with fossil fuels contributing 36 percent. The G20 nations remain responsible for 77 percent of total global emissions, and only the European Union recorded a decline last year. India and China saw the largest absolute increases, while Indonesia registered the fastest relative growth.

Despite the Paris Agreement’s requirement that all parties submit new or revised NDCs by early 2025, only 60 parties, covering 63 percent of global emissions, have done so. Of these, just 13 updated their 2030 targets. Most new NDCs offer little improvement in ambition, with many missing commitments to double energy efficiency or triple renewable energy capacity by 2030. “Costs are falling, investments are rising, innovation is surging, and clean power is now the cheapest source of electricity in most markets and the fastest to deploy. It strengthens energy security, cuts pollution, and creates millions of decent jobs. Leaders must seize this moment and waste no time,” Guterres  said.

He added that tripling renewables and doubling energy efficiency by 2030, building modern grids and large-scale storage, and ending all new coal, oil and gas expansion in a just and equitable manner. “The clean energy revolution must reach everyone, everywhere. But developing countries face crippling capital costs and a fraction of global investment,” he added.

UNEP’s analysis indicates that the new NDCs narrow the emissions gap for 2035 only marginally. The world would still emit 12 GtCO2e more than what is consistent with a 2°C pathway and 23 GtCO2e above the level required for 1.5°C. The gap widens further by 2050 unless countries drastically change course.

Overshoot of 1.5°C Now Inevitable

The report warns that global temperatures are set to exceed the 1.5°C limit within the next decade, with 2024 already marking the hottest year on record at 1.55°C above pre-industrial levels. The remaining carbon budget for a 1.5°C future without overshoot is just 130 GtCO₂, which is enough for barely three more years of current emissions.

Inger Andersen, Executive Director of UNEP, said the findings show governments have “missed the target for a third time.” She called the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement a major setback that would add roughly 0.1°C to projected warming.

“The task now is to make this overshoot as brief and shallow as possible,” Andersen said. “Every fraction of a degree matters. Each 0.1°C increase brings more droughts, floods, and losses, especially for the poorest.”

What Needs to Happen

To have a 66 percent chance of returning global warming to 1.5°C by 2100, the world must cut 2030 emissions by 26 percent and 2035 emissions by 46 percent compared with 2019 levels. This would require reducing global greenhouse gas output to about 32 GtCO₂e by 2035.

The “rapid mitigation from 2025” scenario explored in the report shows that immediate and deep reductions starting next year could still limit peak warming to around 1.7–1.9°C before gradually returning to 1.5°C by the end of the century. But UNEP warns that each year of delay makes the path “steeper, costlier, and more disruptive.”

The report emphasizes two imperatives: implementing aggressive near-term mitigation to minimize temperature overshoot and scaling up carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies to reach net-zero and eventually net-negative emissions.

Unequal Progress and Missed Opportunities

Seven G20 members are on track to meet their current NDC targets, but most are far from achieving their net-zero pledges. Many developing countries still lack financing and technical support to implement their climate commitments. The report urges developed nations to provide “unparalleled increases in climate finance” and to reform international financial systems to make green investments accessible.

Despite setbacks, UNEP highlights that 70 percent of global emissions are now covered by net-zero pledges, a sharp increase from zero in 2015. Falling costs of wind and solar energy, along with advancements in battery storage, have made clean energy transition more viable than ever.

“Climate action is not charity,” Andersen said. “It is self-interest. It delivers jobs, energy security, and economic resilience.”

Science and Legal Mandates

The report also references the July 2025 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which ruled that states have legal obligations to protect the climate system under human rights law. It reaffirmed that limiting warming to 1.5°C remains the primary goal of the Paris Agreement, despite temporary exceedance.

UNEP scientists caution that even brief overshoots of 1.5°C could trigger irreversible tipping points, including the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet and thawing of permafrost releasing methane. Each 0.1°C rise beyond current levels increases risks of extreme weather, biodiversity loss, and health impacts, particularly in vulnerable regions.

Path Ahead to COP30

The findings come ahead of COP30 in Belém, Brazil, where nations are expected to present enhanced NDCs. UNEP urges governments to treat the conference as a turning point.

“The Paris Agreement has driven progress, but ambition and delivery have lagged,” the report states. “Each missed opportunity now adds to future costs, instability, and suffering.”

Guterres said that COP30 in Belém must be the turning point, where the world delivers a bold and credible response plan to close the ambition and implementation gaps, to mobilize USD 1.3 trillion a year by 2035 in climate finance for developing countries, and to advance climate justice for all. “The path to 1.5 degrees is narrow but open. Let us accelerate to keep that path alive for people, for the planet, and for our common future,” he said.

The 2025 report was prepared by 39 scientists from 21 institutions in 16 countries, coordinated by UNEP’s Copenhagen Climate Centre. It states that while 1.5°C is still technically achievable, the window is “narrow and closing fast.”

“Global warming will exceed 1.5°C, very likely within the next decade,” it says. “The challenge now is to ensure that this overshoot is brief and reversible. Every year, every policy, every ton of CO2 counts.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Excerpt:

United Nations Environment Programme’s Emissions Gap Report 2025: Off Target concludes that even with full implementation of all existing pledges, global temperatures are projected to rise between 2.3°C and 2.5°C this century. Should current policies persist, global warming could potentially reach 2.8°C.

A portrait of President Samia Hassan hangs on a pole as thick smoke from burning tires fills the air during protests over her disputed candidacy in Dar es Salaam. Credit: Zuberi Mussa/IPS

By Kizito Makoye
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania, Nov 5 2025 (IPS)

At dawn in Manzese, a dusty township on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam, silence hangs where the sounds of commerce once roared. The township, usually crowded with street cooks, vegetable vendors, mechanics, and motorcycle taxis snaking through the morning rush, stood eerily empty. Shutters are pulled down, wooden stalls abandoned, and the air is heavy with the smell of burnt rubber. For five days, the township’s bustling economic life has been paralyzed—leaving residents unable to buy food or access basic services.

“I still can’t believe what I saw,” says Abel Nteena, a 36-year-old tricycle rider, his voice trembling as he recalls the horror that unfolded on October 31. “Masked men in black with red armbands came out of nowhere. They started shooting at us as we queued for fuel. They spoke Swahili, but their accent was strange—and their skin was unusually dark. They shouted at everyone to run and opened fire.”

Nteena says three of his colleagues were hit by bullets and are now fighting for their lives in a local hospital. “One was shot in the chest, another in the leg. I don’t even know if they will make it,” he says.

A City Under Siege

The attack was one of several that rocked Dar es Salaam following the disputed presidential elections, which many observers described as deeply flawed. The unrest has claimed hundreds of lives nationwide, with the government imposing a 12-hour curfew to quell the violence. But in doing so, it has paralyzed the country’s economic heart.

For the millions who rely on informal trade to survive, the curfew has been a nightmare. Shops and markets close by mid-afternoon, public transport halts, and banks and mobile money agents are often shuttered long before sunset.

“I was just buying milk when I heard gunshots,” recalls Neema Nkulu, a 31-year-old mother of three from the Bunju neighborhood. “People screamed and fell to the ground. I saw a man bleeding near the shop. I dropped everything and ran.” She says. “A sniper’s bullet hit the shop’s glass right where I had been standing. I thank God I’m alive.”

With financial services disrupted, Neema and many others cannot access money stored in mobile wallets. “I have cash in my phone, but the agents are closed, and I can’t withdraw it,” she says. “My children have gone without proper food for two days.”

Daily Struggles Amid Curfew

In Dar es Salaam, where nearly six million people depend on daily earnings, the curfew has created cascading hardships. Food prices have soared as trucks bringing supplies from upcountry regions remain stranded due to insecurity and fuel shortages. The cost of maize flour, a staple food, has doubled in a week. Fuel scarcity has sent public transport fares skyrocketing—with commuters paying twice the normal price to reach work.

“I used to sell fried fish every evening,” says Rashid Pilo, 39, who runs a roadside stall in Bunju. “My customers are mostly office workers who buy food on their way home. But now, because of the curfew, everyone rushes home early. I have lost almost everything. One night’s curfew means no income and no food for my family.”

At Mwananyamala and Mabwepande hospitals, morgues are reportedly overwhelmed by bodies of those killed in the violence. Health workers, speaking anonymously for fear of reprisals, say they have run out of space and body bags. The government has released no official casualty figures, but human rights groups estimate that hundreds have died since election day.

“The bodies keep coming,” says one morgue attendant, visibly shaken. “Some have bullet wounds; others were beaten. Families are scared to claim them.”

Fear and Silence

Across the city, the presence of heavily armed soldiers on the streets has instilled deep fear among residents. Armored vehicles patrol major intersections, and random house searches have become routine. Most city dwellers have chosen to remain indoors, venturing out only when necessary.

“I went to three ATMs, but none were working,” says Richard Masawe, a 46-year-old computer specialist at InfoTech  company. “The internet was down, and even mobile banking was offline. I couldn’t buy anything or send money to my family. It felt like we were cut off from the world.”

The government says the internet shutdown was a “temporary security measure,” but rights groups argue it was an attempt to silence dissent and block the flow of information about the violence.

Transport in Dar es Salaam has also been crippled. Long queues of vehicles snake around petrol stations, while most buses remain grounded.

“We have fuel for only half a day,” says Walid  Masato a Yas station manager. “Deliveries have stopped coming. The roads are unsafe.”

An Economy on the Brink

According to economist Jerome Mchau, the post-election crisis has exposed Tanzania’s economic fragility. “The informal sector, which employs more than 80 percent of Tanzanians, is the hardest hit,” he explains. “When people can’t move, can’t trade, and can’t access cash, the entire economic system grinds to a halt.”

Mchau estimates that the economy could lose up to USD 150 million per week if the unrest continues. “Inflationary pressure is already visible,” he adds. “Food and fuel prices are climbing fast, and consumer confidence is collapsing.”

The curfew has also paralyzed logistics networks. Trucks carrying essential goods from the central regions of Dodoma, Morogoro, and Mbeya have been unable to reach the coast, creating artificial shortages in urban centers. “We are seeing panic buying,” Mchau notes. “People are stockpiling rice, pasta, and flour because they don’t know what tomorrow will bring.”

Shattered Trust, Deep Divisions

Beyond the economic toll, the violence has eroded trust between citizens and the government. Many Tanzanians feel betrayed by a system they once considered a model of stability.

“Tanzania was long regarded as a beacon of peace and democracy in Africa,” says Michael Bante, a political commentator based in Dar es Salaam. “But what we’re seeing now is unprecedented—people losing faith in state institutions, opposition voices being silenced, and communities turning against each other.”

Bante says the government faces a monumental challenge in restoring public confidence. “President Samia’s administration must act decisively to unite the nation,” he says. “This means not only investigating human rights abuses but also engaging in genuine dialogue with opposition leaders and civil society.”

The opposition has accused the ruling party of manipulating the vote and using excessive force to suppress protests. The government, in turn, blames “foreign-funded elements” for inciting violence. The truth, analysts say, likely lies somewhere in between—in the deep mistrust that has been festering for years.

A Nation in Mourning

In many parts of Dar es Salaam, grief and uncertainty define daily life. At the Manzese Market, women gather quietly in small groups, whispering about missing relatives. The charred remains of kiosks and motorcycles litter the streets. A faint smell of smoke still hangs in the air.

“Life will never be the same,” says Nkulu, the young mother who narrowly escaped sniper fire. “We used to feel safe here. Now, every sound of a motorbike makes me jump. I can’t even send my children to school.”

Schools across the city remain closed indefinitely. Hospitals report rising cases of trauma and anxiety. Religious leaders have called for calm and reconciliation.

Searching for Stability

President Samia Suluhu Hassan, who has publicly condemned the violence, faces her toughest political test yet. In a televised address, she called for unity and promised to investigate the attacks. Yet, critics argue that the government’s heavy-handed security response risks inflaming tensions further.

“Tanzania is at a crossroads,” says Bante. “The leadership must choose between repression and reform. The world is watching.”

International partners, including the African Union and the United Nations, have called for restraint and dialogue. However, diplomatic sources say mediation efforts have stalled as both sides harden their positions.

For ordinary Tanzanians like Rashid, the fish vendor, politics has become a matter of survival. “I don’t care who wins or loses,” he says, frying a handful of tilapia over a small charcoal stove. “I just want peace so that I can work and feed my family.”

A Fragile Hope

As dusk settles over Dar es Salaam, the city remains cloaked in tension. The once-bustling bus stands and food stalls are deserted, the only movement coming from military patrols sweeping through dimly lit streets.

Yet, amid the fear and uncertainty, some still cling to hope. “We’ve seen hard times before,” says Masawe, the computer specialist. “If we can rebuild trust, maybe we can rebuild our country too.”

For now, that hope feels distant. Tanzania’s post-election crisis has left deep scars in a nation once hailed for its calm. Whether President Samia’s government can heal those wounds remains to be seen.
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A Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal (NKFI Hivatal) kezelésében 2025. március 14-én meghirdetett Nemzeti Kutatási Kiválósági Program EXCELLENCE pályázati alprogramjának célja, hogy az Európai Kutatási Tanács (ERC) által meghirdetésre kerülő támogatási programokban való sikeres részvételhez nyújtson felkészülési lehetőséget olyan kutatók számára, akik a nemzetközi tudományos világ élmezőnyébe tartozásukat a közelmúltban elért jelentős nemzetközi pályázati eredménnyel bizonyították.

In the arid and dry region of Isiolo in Kenya, a new irrigation scheme is helping communities to learn and adopt new ways and to find an alternative to livestock keeping in order to diversify sources of income to attain self-reliance and resilience to recurring droughts. Credit: EU/ECHO/Martin Karimi
 
The 30th "Conference of the Parties" (COP30) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will take place from 6-21 November 2025 in Belém, Brazil. It will bring together world leaders, scientists, non-governmental organizations, and civil society to discuss priority actions to tackle climate change. COP30 will focus on the efforts needed to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C, the presentation of new national action plans (NDCs) and the progress on the finance pledges made at COP29.

By Martha Bekele and Nkiruka Chidia Maduekwe
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia / ABUJA, Nigeria , Nov 5 2025 (IPS)

Three decades after the first Climate COP, the multilateral climate process – which was intended to serve as an instrument of justice and a guardian of the planet’s atmosphere – has fallen far short of its goals.

Over the past 30 years, climate change has arrived and intensified, while the COP process has become a tiresome bureaucratic exercise that continually fails to hold the most responsible to account. It has also become an industry unto itself – and an exclusive one at that.

Without urgent and radical reform to its structure, financial architecture, and participatory mechanisms, the COP will continue to perpetuate the very injustices it was created to address. For the poorer and more vulnerable countries of the world – those that are least responsible for the climate crisis, yet most acutely affected – this situation is untenable.

The next 30 years will not be any different from the first 30, because the climate crisis will continue to worsen. In order to survive, we need a fundamental shift on three fronts: the financial architecture, knowledge sovereignty and accountability. And the changes need to start now.

First, we need a new structure for climate finance

Time and again, we have argued that the climate financial injustice epitomizes the need for a reformed approach to climate finance across the board. There is need for a new system that reduces the cost of capital, provides direct access to climate finance, minimizes transaction costs and bureaucratic barriers, and increases the share of grant-based support.

We must also operationalize the Loss and Damage Fund with equitable governance and resource allocation and to ensure the climate financing plans include clear sub-targets for adaptation, loss and damage, and finance for energy transition – all aligned with energy sovereignty and green industrialization. Climate finance must be seen not merely as a quantum to be delivered, but as a means of achieving justice.

Related to finance, and what is not much talked about, is the exorbitant cost attached to attending the COP itself. Everything related to this process comes at a price. For example, many negotiators, especially from Africa’s least developed nations, rely on external funding just to attend COP.

Civil-society actors are expected to pay exorbitant costs to observe a process and protest injustice. In Belém, hotel rates are reportedly touching $900 per night, the cost of a modest climate-adaptation project in a rural community. An African Participation Fund, supporting both negotiators and non-state actors, could ensure that representation and resistance are not privileges of means.

Second, we need knowledge sovereignty

The data and science shaping global climate targets are still largely produced in the North, leaving Africa to depend almost entirely on foreign research institutions for its climate models and risk assessments. Without their own data repositories and regional research capacity, African delegates are forced to negotiate with borrowed evidence. This cannot stand.

We must build Africa’s knowledge sovereignty by investing in Indigenous knowledge systems, local research institutions and South-South cooperation to generate solutions that are adapted to local needs. It is essential to build African climate-data infrastructure and regional research capacity, enabling negotiators to advocate with their own evidence.

Challenging the dominance of external technical assistance by fostering homegrown expertise and enhancing climate diplomacy capacity is vital. Capacity building for African research institutions and integrating local expertise into COP processes are necessary steps toward equitable participation.

Third, we need accountability

We must develop robust monitoring and reporting frameworks, such as the African Climate Finance Taxonomy and the Africa Climate Finance Strategy, to safeguard against greenwashing and ensure transparency. These tools should provide clear definitions of climate-aligned investments, ensuring that financial flows are directed toward projects meeting both climate and local development priorities.

The taxonomy serves as a countermeasure to the ambiguity of the multilateral process – verifying that mobilized funds are high quality, non-debt-creating, and genuinely transformative. Enforceable commitments, with clear timelines and consequences for non-compliance, are essential for restoring trust and ensuring accountability from developed countries.

As the world looks to COP30 and beyond, the call for urgent, empathetic and authoritative action must be answered with tangible change on these three fronts – climate finance, knowledge sovereignty and accountability. Incremental change will no longer suffice. We need transformation and accountability – and justice for Africa.

Martha Bekele is the co-founder and Director at DevTransform; Dr. Nkiruka Chidia Maduekwe is an Associate Professor of Law at the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies and a former lead climate negotiator for Nigeria.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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A BBC investigation finds evidence that young African women are being tricked into building Russian drones.

A BBC investigation finds evidence that young African women are being tricked into building Russian drones.

UN Photo/ICJ-CIJ/Frank van Beek
 
The 30th "Conference of the Parties" (COP30) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will take place from 6-21 November 2025 in Belém, Brazil. It will bring together world leaders, scientists, non-governmental organizations, and civil society to discuss priority actions to tackle climate change. COP30 will focus on the efforts needed to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C, the presentation of new national action plans (NDCs) and the progress on the finance pledges made at COP29.

By Joan Russow
VICTORIA, British Columbia, Canada, Nov 5 2025 (IPS)

At COP15, the developing countries were calling for the temperature to not rise above 1.5 degrees and they ignored the Copenhagen Accord which agreed to 2.0 degrees

Then at COP21, while the developing countries were still calling for the temperature to not arise above 1.5, they were ignored again. And then, the developing countries praised for their resilience for adapting to the climate change, which has been caused by developed states. In 2024, the United Nation General Assembly sought a legal opinion from the International Court of Justice on Climate change

The response was the following:

“Not only what states are required to do under international law to avert further climate change through both now and in the future, but they also have to assess the legal consequences under these obligations both through what they do and fail to do have caused significant harm to climate systems in other parts of the environment and harm to future generations as well as for those countries by virtue of geographical circumstances are vulnerable to adverse effects of climate change.”

However, a legal opinion from the court is not binding. The court can, however, provide interpretations of international law via customs or treaties such as the UN Framework on Climate Change UNFCCC.

All states are parties to UNFCCC. The objective of the Convention in Article 2 is: “stabilization of greenhouse gases at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.

‘Such a level should be achieved within a time frame to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to ensure food production is not threatened and to enable economic development is done in sustainable way.’“

Under Article 4, the principles include the following:

“The parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent, and minimize any adverse effects on developing countries. Lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures.”

Given that the developing countries are the most affected, but least responsible for climate change, perhaps developing countries could launch a case to seek an interpretation by the ICJ of both the article 2 and the precautionary principle

Dr Joan Russow is founder of the Global Compliance Research Project, formed in 1995 to document state non-compliance with international law.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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