Afrique

Le Burkina Faso annonce la dissolution d'une centaine d'organisations de défense des droits de l'homme. Amnesty International se dit ''alarmée'' et ''préoccupée par cette ''atteinte flagrante au droit à la liberté d'association''.

Le Burkina Faso annonce la dissolution d'une centaine d'organisations de défense des droits de l'homme. Amnesty International se dit ''alarmée'' et ''préoccupée par cette ''atteinte flagrante au droit à la liberté d'association''.

What do Japanese and Chinese think about each other’s countries? Let’s look at the numbers.  

BRICS appears to be more riddled with internal conflicts than most multilateral groups.

Amid turbulence in the international order, will international society remain capable of countering totalitarian heresies?

At the 61st session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva on March 30, 2026, South Korea reaffirmed its position on human rights in North Korea, joining 50 countries as a co-sponsor of the council’s annual resolution. The move marked Seoul’s first such participation since the inauguration of President Lee Jae-myung, a former human rights lawyer. The resolution, adopted for the 24th consecutive year since 2003, passed again by consensus without a vote.

The measure condemns “in the strongest terms” what it calls “systematic, widespread and gross” violations in North Korea, citing crimes against humanity that include forced labor used to support nuclear and missile programs, the operation of political prison camps, torture, public executions and what it describes as a “pervasive culture of impunity.” It urges Pyongyang to take “immediately all steps” necessary to end such crimes, including the closure of prison camps, the release of detainees and sweeping legal and institutional reforms.

Compared with last year’s text, the 2026 resolution makes only modest adjustments but places clearer emphasis on dialogue. It highlights the “importance of dialogue and engagement to improve the human rights situation in North Korea, including inter-Korean dialogue,” signaling a subtle shift from earlier iterations that focused more heavily on the severity of abuses.

The resolution also offers limited acknowledgment of North Korea’s recent engagement with international mechanisms. It “welcomes” the country’s compliance with certain human rights obligations and its participation in the fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review, including a United Nations review on disability rights in Geneva in August last year and its appearance in the U.P.R. process in November 2024.

As various assessments have noted, however, North Korea’s normalization in the international community is unlikely to be realized without parallel progress on both denuclearization and human rights. From this perspective, human rights should not be treated as a secondary or downstream issue, but rather as a form of leverage operating alongside CVID‑style denuclearization—jointly shaping the conditions under which meaningful engagement, and ultimately normalization, can occur.

Despite the strategic importance of such parallel progress, South Korea’s new Lee administration marks a departure from the previous government’s policy emphasis, weakening its leverage to nudge North Korea onto a path toward normalization. Under the previous Yoon administration, former Vice Foreign Minister Kang In‑sun explicitly linked human rights pressure with denuclearization objectives. At the 2025 high‑level segment of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, she called on North Korea to abandon all nuclear and missile programs in a “complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner,” directly invoking the CVID framework.

By contrast, at the 2026 session of the same forum, Jeong Yeon‑du—serving as a senior official overseeing strategic affairs and North Korea policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—outlined a phased approach centered on “halt, reduction, and dismantlement,” while emphasizing dialogue, coordination, and a return to negotiations. Notably, his remarks did not include any reference to CVID.

Taken together, the shift from an explicit CVID formulation to a phased, open‑ended sequence narrows the gap between pressure and process, but at the cost of blurring the intended end‑state of denuclearization.

On March 26th, 2026—the 16th spring since ROKS Cheonan (PCC-772), a Pohang-class corvette comparable to the US Navy’s Cyclone-class PC-1, sank after North Korean torpedoes struck in 2010—this waterside memorial gathering honors the 46 sailors whose sacrifice still weighs heavy on their families and the Republic of Korea Navy 2nd Fleet Command (Photo credit: RoK Navy).

China’s Gray Shadow Still Looms Over Defectors

On the issue of North Korean defectors, the resolution again addresses China indirectly by reaffirming the principle of non-refoulement, urging all states to ensure that no one is forcibly returned to North Korea. The wording closely mirrors that of resolutions adopted from 2023 through 2025, reflecting a continued effort to preserve consensus by avoiding explicit reference to Beijing — a choice that, critics say, comes at the cost of diminishing attention to the plight of defectors.

While the resolution maintains general language on forced repatriation, it stops short of expanding or sharpening scrutiny on the issue, even as reports of ongoing detentions and returns persist. The relative lack of new emphasis has drawn criticism from experts, who warn it risks signaling reduced urgency at a time when conditions for North Korean escapees in China remain severe. Ahn Chang-ho, chairperson of South Korea’s National Human Rights Commission, said that “some core elements were reduced or deleted,” including protections related to North Korean defectors, expressing concern that attention to the issue had been weakened. 

Even so, criticism of China persists. Advocates argue that Beijing continues to fall short of its obligations under international law, including the Convention against Torture and the 1951 Refugee Convention, both of which prohibit returning individuals to countries where they face a risk of torture. This concern is underscored by a particularly telling latest case from March 2026 documented by Human Rights Watch: a North Korean woman in China who helped her son survive a border crossing is now facing forced repatriation. If returned, she is at high risk of torture, forced labor, sexual violence, and enforced disappearance—abuses that the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korea identified as potentially amounting to aiding and abetting crimes against humanity when carried out in cooperation with another state. Human Rights Watch stresses that, even as a party to these core treaties, China’s ongoing pattern of forcibly returning North Koreans, exemplified by this recent case, continues to erode the fundamental principle of non-refoulement.

Estimates suggest that roughly 2,000 North Korean defectors are being held in China without access to asylum procedures, often in undisclosed facilities or border detention centers, prior to being repatriated. Those who are returned face a high risk of torture, enforced disappearance, or execution.

 

Jeudi soir, Donald Trump a annoncé un cessez-le-feu de 10 jours entre Israël et le Liban, deux jours à peine après l’ouverture de négociations directes à Washington. Une annonce qui intervient alors qu’Israël continue d’occuper le sud du pays.

Mais c’est un autre fait qui retient l’attention : Benjamin Netanyahou a exigé l’exclusion de la France de ces négociations, allié historique du Liban, alors qu’elles sont elles-mêmes conduites par les États-Unis, principal allié d’Israël.

Cette exigence israélienne pose une question de fond : que reste-t-il de la relation franco-israélienne ? Elle apparaît aujourd’hui profondément déséquilibrée et unilatérale ; Israël exige, la France cède, ou se contente de condamnations verbales qui n’ont jamais infléchi la moindre décision de Tel-Aviv.

Est-ce le signe d’une fin définitive de l’amitié franco-israélienne, ou simplement l’aboutissement d’un affaiblissement diplomatique français ?

Mon analyse dans cette vidéo.

L’article Liban : nouvel affront israélien à la France est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

A constitutional revision solves the wrong problem – and creates new complications.

India has turned the corner in its battle against Naxalism – and effectively governing its own margins is an essential step toward global power status.

The Indian Ocean has no shortage of distressed strategic assets: financially stressed yards, ports, and logistics infrastructure in small states that cannot sustain them independently.

With Viktor Orban’s election loss, Pedro Sanchez is now Beijing’s most useful European leader.

L’IA devient l’un des principaux terrains de rivalité stratégique entre grandes puissances. Les États Unis et la Chine cherchent à s’assurer une maîtrise complète de la chaîne de valeur, des semi conducteurs au développement des modèles de fondation, en passant par le contrôle des infrastructures de calcul. D’autres puissances cherchent également à se distinguer dans ce nouvel espace de compétition géopolitique à la croisée des enjeux de souveraineté, de sécurité et de compétitivité.

Philippe Barbet, professeur émérite d’économie à l’Université Sorbonne Paris Nord et chercheur associé à l’IRIS, répond à nos questions :

• Les États-Unis et la Chine ont-ils définitivement distancé leurs concurrents en matière d’IA et de sa chaîne de valeur ?

• Quel est le rôle de l’UE sur ce marché de l’IA ? Quelle carte a-t-elle à jouer ?

• Certains parlent d’un futur éclatement de la bulle IA. Ce scénario vous semble-t-il plausible ? Cette fébrilité ne représente-t-elle pas une faiblesse pour les États-Unis par exemple dont l’économie est dopée à l’IA ?

Cette vidéo a été réalisée à l’occasion de la 3e édition des Rencontres géoéconomiques et géopolitiques organisées par l’IRIS et NEOMA Business School, en partenariat avec Diplomatie Magazine et Courrier international, le 2 avril 2026.

L’article Géopolitique de l’IA , quels nouveaux rapports de force mondiaux ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

In an era defined by geopolitical fragmentation, the Australia-Japan partnership shows how middle powers can cooperate to mitigate risk and enhance resilience. 

Il y a plus de 10 ans, nous pensons que nous avons un tel préjudice ou notre son. Mais la lumière émise par le téléphone portable est loin d’être une véritable raison qui nous amène à mal dormir.

Committee and political group meetings, Brussels

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Le cessez-le-feu tiendra-t-il et les efforts diplomatiques se poursuivront-ils, ou l'Iran et les États-Unis se dirigent-ils vers une escalade contrôlée, voire vers une guerre plus vaste ?

AMENDMENTS 1 - 290 - Draft report 2025 Commission report on Kosovo
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Riho Terras

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Despite the swearing-in of a new "civilian" government, progress on the project is likely to remain sluggish.

While drone attacks from Iran have temporarily halted oil and gas production in Iraqi Kurdistan, the Sarsang oilfield, which produces [...]

It's the annual gathering of spymasters from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, when the heads of ASEAN's military intelligence [...]

It's rarely a good thing for a company to find itself on the agenda at a meeting of the top [...]