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La coopération sanitaire internationale n’a jamais dissocié, dans sa pratique et son financement, l’impératif humanitaire des considérations géopolitiques qui le sous-tendent. La tension entre solidarité internationale et intérêt national est constitutive de l’histoire de la coopération sanitaire mondiale. Ce qui change avec la stratégie américaine de l’America First Global Health Strategy (AfGHS), publiée en septembre 2025, c’est la rhétorique souverainiste qui s’est radicalement accentuée. Une des plus grandes puissances assume sans détour que son aide sanitaire est un instrument stratégique.

Washington entend signer des accords bilatéraux pluriannuels assortis d’objectifs précis en matière de santé, de délais stricts et de conséquences en cas de non-respect. Cette logique intervient dans un contexte de refonte de la stratégie sanitaire états-unienne, à la suite du retrait des États-Unis de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) en janvier 2025, et du démantèlement de l’Agence des États-Unis pour le développement international (USAID) au premier semestre 2025.

Les États-Unis ont ainsi mis en place des Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), un format bilatéral d’accords avec les pays bénéficiaires qui s’articulent autour de plans quinquennaux (2026-2030). Au 6 mai 2026, 32 accords bilatéraux ont été potentiellement signés, dont 22 accords documentés en Afrique subsaharienne jusqu’à présent, mais le processus de négociation est encore en cours. Les accords bilatéraux conclus dans le cadre de l’America First Global Health Strategy représentent un volume d’au moins 20 milliards de dollars sur la période 2026–2030, dont environ 63 % financés par les États-Unis et 37 % par les pays partenaires.

Ces accords de co-financement, avec un engagement états-unien généralement dégressif, impliquent pour les États concernés de réévaluer la part de leur budget national consacré à la santé. Ces accords semblent par ailleurs recouper un certain nombre d’intérêts stratégiques états-uniens dans les pays concernés.

Analyse en carte et infographie de cette refonte de la stratégie sanitaire états-unienne à l’œuvre.

L’article America First Global Health Strategy : une santé mondiale dépendante des financements états-uniens ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Vladimir Poutine a déclaré ce week-end que la guerre en Ukraine touchait « à sa fin ». Son calcul initial reposait sur un retrait massif du soutien à l’Ukraine avec l’arrivée de Donald Trump, ce qui n’a pas eu lieu. Les États-Unis ont maintenu leur soutien en renseignement, tandis que l’Europe a financé massivement l’Ukraine via un prêt de 90 milliards d’euros.

Dans le même temps, Kiev a considérablement renforcé sa capacité de production militaire, notamment dans le domaine des drones, freinant l’avancée russe et stabilisant plusieurs fronts.

En mobilisant l’essentiel de ses ressources en Ukraine, Vladimir Poutine n’a pas été capable de soutenir ses alliés ailleurs : chute du régime de Bachar el-Assad en Syrie, revers de l’Africa Corps au Mali face au JNIM et au FLA, recul de l’influence russe en Asie centrale… La Russie apparaît aujourd’hui affaiblie sur plusieurs terrains stratégiques.

Malgré la hausse des revenus énergétiques liée aux tensions internationales dans le Golfe, le coût humain, économique et politique de la guerre devient de plus en plus lourd pour le Kremlin. La société russe s’épuise, la répression s’intensifie et la popularité de Vladimir Poutine montre des signes d’érosion.

Bien que la Russie ait étendu son territoire sur la Crimée et une partie du Donbass, le bilan global est négatif : affaiblissement géopolitique, isolement international et épuisement des forces. Vladimir Poutine n’a pas saisi l’opportunité de négocier avec Donald Trump, qui proposait de lever les sanctions en échange d’un statu quo territorial.

Mon analyse dans cette vidéo.

L’article Ukraine – Poutine : gains territoriaux, guerre perdue est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers. 

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers. 

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers. 

The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?

The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?

The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?

La Côte d’Ivoire célébrera prochainement la restitution par la France d’une pièce d’importance : un tambour à fentes, long de 3,30 mètres et pesant 430 kg. Connue sous le nom de Djidji Ayôkwé, cette pièce était officiellement réclamée depuis 2019 par les autorités ivoiriennes. Après une phase de restauration et de longs mois d’atermoiements, l’objet a regagné la Côte d’Ivoire le 13 mars dernier, 110 ans après avoir été pillé par les colons français. Sa restitution témoigne de l’importance que revêt le retour de pièces à forte teneur symboliques pour les populations africaines. Elle pointe aussi la lenteur de ces processus : rendre ce tambour aura pris… quatre ans et demi !

Pour accélérer et généraliser ces restitutions, le Parlement français vient d’adopter une loi-cadre, un texte majeur – longtemps repoussé – qui vient concrétiser la promesse formulée par Emmanuel Macron en novembre 2017 à Ouagadougou de rendre possible ces restitutions. Mais, avec la création d’une commission nationale de restitutions, en sus de comités scientifiques bilatéraux, et en l’absence de trajectoire financière pour développer la recherche de provenance, la France entretient le flou quant à sa réelle ambition en matière de restitutions de biens culturels à l’Afrique.

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L’article Restitution des biens culturels pillés durant la colonisation : la France de retour au premier plan ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

30 Milliarden Euro fehlen der Bundesregierung, um die akute Krise zu meistern. Zugleich sitzt das Land auf riesigen Goldreserven. Warum nicht einige davon nutzen? , Die Bundesregierung steckt mal wieder in einem finanziellen Dilemma: Auf der einen Seite klafft eine Haushaltslücke, die noch deutlich größer ausfallen dürfte als die 20 oder 30 Milliarden Euro, über die bisher diskutiert wird. Es könnte aber noch mehr Geld im Bundeshaushalt fehlen. Auf der anderen ...

DÉCRYPTAGE - L’exécutif souhaite une adoption définitive de la loi visant à légaliser l’euthanasie et le suicide assisté avant l’été. Mais le chemin paraît étroit.

Haiti leidet seit Jahrzehnten unter zahlreichen humanitären, politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sicherheitspolitischen Krisen, die einander überlagern und verheerende Folgen für die lokale Bevölkerung haben. Bisherige Stabilisierungsversuche waren kaum erfolgreich. Die 5.500 Mann starke sogenannte »Einheit zur Bekämpfung von Banden« (Gang Suppression Force, GSF) hat am 1. April 2026 die Nachfolge der von Kenia geführten Multinationalen Sicherheitsunterstützungsmission (MSS) angetreten. Es ist die zwölfte Friedens- und Stabilisierungsmission, die Haiti seit 1990 erlebt. Die GSF wird als VN-mandatierte Mission geführt und operiert vor allem mit zunächst 800 Militärkräften aus dem Tschad. Damit unternehmen die Vereinten Nationen einen gewagten Versuch, die Bekämpfung der organisierten Kriminalität zum zentralen Ansatzpunkt ihrer Missionen nach Kapitel VII der VN-Charta zu machen – und das in einer extrem komplexen politischen, sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Lage in Haiti.

CONTRE-POINT - Le moment décisif ne sera pas le vote en deuxième lecture mais la commission mixte paritaire (CMP) que le gouvernement convoquera après, pressé qu’il est d’aboutir.

DÉCRYPTAGE - Succédant à une ministre très médiatique Rue de Valois, l’ex-journaliste se distingue par sa discrétion. Si la méthode a jusqu’alors payé, il lui faut désormais descendre dans l’arène publique, alors que les travaux du « Grand Louvre » vont démarrer.

Sylvie Godard et Francis Godard, la mère et le beau-père de Christophe Gleizes, étaient invités sur le plateau de France 24 samedi 9 mai pour parler des derniers développements concernant la détention du journaliste en Algérie. Ils évoquent le changement de stratégie pour obtenir sa libération avec sa renonciation au pourvoi en cassation, ouvrant ainsi la voie à une possible grâce du président algérien Abdelmadjid Tebboune, ainsi que le dégel diplomatique entre la France et l’Algérie.